CENTCOM Update

Center for a New American Security

GEN David H. Petraeus
11 June 2009

Agenda
• CENTCOM Strategic Approach • Three Major Challenge Areas • Understanding the Surge • Counterinsurgency Guidelines • Anaconda Strategy versus Al Qaeda in Iraq • Security Trends in Iraq • Afghanistan Security Trends • Situation in Pakistan • Full Spectrum Operations • Battle of Sadr City • Questions
2

CENTCOM Strategic Approach

Build Multi-lateral Partnerships

Defeat Extremist Networks Enable Partners Enable Partners Counter Weapons Smuggling

Prevent Proliferation

Defeat Extremist Networks Enable Partners

Deter Aggression Build Multi-lateral Partnerships Enable Partners

Build Multi-lateral Partnerships

Protect Trade Routes

Defeat Extremist Networks

Counter Piracy

3

Three Major Challenge Areas
Iraq:
• Substantial progress since surge... • Still fragile and reversible... • Less fragile since provincial elections.

Afghanistan:
• Situation has deteriorated over last two years… • Must reverse downward trends… • Requires well-resourced, comprehensive counterinsurgency approach.

Pakistan:
• Significant challenges from extremists… • Major operations in NWFP and FATA… • Recognition of need to “clear—hold—build” in order to sustain gains.

4

Understanding the Surge In Iraq

Signal of commitment Increase in US forces Growth in Iraqi Security Forces Employment of counterinsurgency concepts

Surge =

5

Counterinsurgency Guidelines
 Secure and serve the people  Live among the people  Employ a comprehensive approach  Generate unity of effort  Pursue the enemy relentlessly  Hold cleared areas  Separate “irreconcilables” from “reconcilables”  Promote reconciliation  Conduct conditions-based transitions  Be first with the truth  Live our values  Exercise initiative  Learn and adapt
6

Anaconda Strategy versus Al Qaeda in Iraq
Syria Border Ports of Entry Engagement Improvements Work with Source Countries Kinetics Counter-Terrorist Force Ops Conventional Force Ops Iraqi Conventional & Special Force Ops Sons of Iraq Political Reconciliation (Laws/policies) Politics Tribal Awakenings Interagency Strategic Communications Internet Non-kinetics Religious Engagement Education Jobs Programs Services Ideology Popular Support Counterinsurgency in Detention Facilities Detainee Releases Detainee Ops Information Operations

AQI Needs AQ Senior Leader Weapons Guidance Foreign Fighters
Ansar al Sunna

Money Al Qaeda in Iraq Command and Control

Safe Havens

Other Groups

Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Counter Ethno-Sectarian Pressures Intel, Surveillance Intelligence & Recon Platforms Intel Fusion

7

Security Incidents in Iraq
2000
Attacks Against Iraqi Infrastructure and Government Organizations Bombs (IEDs and Mines), Both Found and Exploded Baghdad Security Plan, Sniper, Ambush, Grenade, and Other Small Arms Attacks 15 February 2007 Mortar, Rocket, and Surface to Air Attacks Iraqi elections, 30 January 2005 Parliamentary elections, 15 December 2005 Constitutional referendum, 15 October 2005 Samarra mosque bombing, 22 February 2006 Diyala Operations

1800

Surge of Offensives

18 OCT –Ramadan 14 NOV 04 5 OCT –16OCT-14NOV04 4 NOV 05 5OCT-4NOV05 24 SEP –24SEP-23OCT06 23 OCT 06 13 SEP –13SEP-13OCT07 13 OCT 07 1 SEP-29SEP08 1 SEP – 28 SEP 08
Basrah and Sadr City Operations, 25 March 2008

Ramadan

1600

1400
Battle of Najaf

Second Fallujah

1200

1000

Militia Uprising and First Fallujah

Mother of Two Springs II 15 Oct 2008

800

600

400

200

0
06-Aug-04 19-Aug-05 03-Aug-07 15-Aug-08 20-Feb-04 25-Jun-04 03-Feb-06 09-Jun-06 16-Feb-07 22-Jun-07 29-Feb-08 17-Sep-04 10-Dec-04 30-Sep-05 23-Dec-05 01-Sep-06 14-Sep-07 07-Dec-07 26-Sep-08 11-Nov-05 24-Nov-06 07-Nov-08 19-Dec-08 14-May-04 27-May-05 11-May-07 23-May-08 04-Mar-05 17-Mar-06 30-Mar-07 13-Mar-09 05-Jun-09 08-Jul-05 21-Jul-06 29-Oct-04 13-Oct-06 02-Apr-04 15-Apr-05 28-Apr-06 26-Oct-07 11-Apr-08 04-Jul-08 09-Jan-04 21-Jan-05 05-Jan-07 18-Jan-08 30-Jan-09 24-Apr-09

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Source: SIGACTS (CF reports) as of 06-Jun-09.

8

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

500

0

Sources: SIGACTS III Coalition and Iraqi reports as of 06-Jun-09.

Violent Civilian Deaths
Iraqi and Coalition Data Coalition Data

Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09

9

100

120

140

20

40

60

80

0

Source: SIGACTS (CF reports) as of 06-Jun-09.

High Profile Attacks (Explosions)
Total Car Bombs Suicide Car Bombs Suicide Vests

May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09

10

Al Qaeda in Iraq and Sunni Insurgents
Winter 2006-2007 Winter 2008-2009

Baghdad

Baghdad

11

Security Incidents in Afghanistan
450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0
Attacks Against Afghanistan Infrastructure and Government Organizations Bombs (IED and Mines), Both Found and Exploded Ambush, grenade, RPG, and Other Small Arms Attacks Mortar, Rocket, and Surface to Air Attacks Victory Day Attack 27 April 08 Sar-e Poza Prison Break 13 June 2008

Ramadan
18 OCT – 14 NOV 04 5 OCT – 4 NOV 05 24 SEP – 23 OCT 06 13 SEP – 13 OCT 07 1 SEP – 28 SEP 08

Transfer of Authority to ISAF 31 July 2006 Parliamentary Elections 18 September 05

Serena Hotel Attack 14 January 2008

Presidential Elections October 04

Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Sources: Afghanistan SIGACTS. Info Cutoff: 3 Jun. Retrieved through WEBTAS on 8-JUN-09

12

Afghanistan Security Incidents: 2008

13

Current Disposition and Planned Additional US Forces Afghanistan US Forces in
X(-)

RC N
(MAZARI SHARIF)

XX

RC E
(BAGRAM)

X(-)

II

XXXX
HQ ISAF/USFOR-A X

RC W
(HERAT)
III X

TF Tigre X TF DUKE TF SPARTAN

RC C
(KABUL)

X
TF HELMAND X X
2 1

III TF ORUZGAN X

TF WHITE EAGLE X TF CURRAHEE

II
TF ZABOL

CSTC-A
X X

X
3

48th
TF KANDAHAR
4

4/82

XX RC S
(KANDAHAR)
1

Legend
X X

COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADE (Kandahar, Qalat, Tarin Kowt) MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE (Bastion, Garmsir, Eastern Farah) STRYKER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM (Spin Boldak, Qalat, Shah Wali Kot, Maywand) AIRBORNE BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM + ADVISORS

2 3 4

In Theater at Start of 2009 Additional Forces

14

Situation in Pakistan

400km

FC Kalam Swat XX XX FC Khwazakhela X Khar Lower Mingora Dir Buner FC FC XXX FC HQ FC X Peshawar FC X FC Thal X Bannu Hangu Kohat

AFGHANISTAN

Kabul
FC

Islamabad

XX FC Miram Shah XX Wana FC

Kohat Regular Army Frontier Corps Wing(s) Ongoing or Recent Operations

Dera Ismail Khan Jandola 0 100 200 km

FC

15

FM 3-0: Full Spectrum Operations
SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Increasing Violence
Stable Peace Unstable Peace Insurgency General War

OPERATIONAL THEMES

FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS
Offense Defense

Offense Defense

Offense
Defense

Offense
Defense

16

The Battle of Sadr City: March-April 2008
Strategic National
EP-3/EPX U2 JSTARS GLOBAL HAWK Green Dart UAV SOF ISR

Operational

2 PREDATORS
AEROSTAT 24/7 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AEROSTAT

Tactical

AIR WEAPONS TEAM

AIR WEAPONS TEAM

AIR WEAPONS TEAM

SHADOW

SHADOW

SHADOW COUNTERFIRE RADAR

RAVEN RAVEN RAVEN

SOF ISF RAID
Other Assets: Other Government Agencies, SIGINT Elements, Deployable Ground Station, Sniper Teams, SOF ISR, Phased Array Radar Pods on CAS
X

GMLRS

ISF

3/4 ID

17

4th of July Reenlistment Ceremony

18

Questions

Yemen, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea

Monthly Acts of Piracy off Somali Coast
40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
Jan-04 Jul-04 Jan-05 Jul-05 Jan-06 Jul-06 Jan-07 Jul-07 Jan-08 Jul-08 Apr-04 Oct-04 Apr-05 Oct-05 Apr-06 Oct-06 Apr-07 Oct-07 Apr-08 Oct-08 Jan-09 Apr-09
Successful Hijackings/Acts of Piracy Unsuccessful Attemps / Other Attacks

Source: US Navy Central, through 14 May 09

20

Joint Campaign Plan Design
Reconciliation

LOCALIZED SECURITY

SUSTAINABLE SECURITY
Lead

NATIONAL Development

Partner
Overwatch

Lead

Conditions-based transitions

Partner
Overwatch

Conditions-based transitions

Overwatch
LONG TERM

Lines of Operation

(NLT JUL 08)

(NLT JUL 09)

NEAR TERM

INTERMEDIATE TERM

POLITICAL INFORMATIONAL MEANS

DIPLOMATIC

ECONOMIC

SECURITY

SECURITY

POLITICAL

ECONOMIC

Supporting Activities
Engagement for Reconciliation Capacity Building Rule of Law Development Good Governance Promotion Strategic Communications

DIPLOMATIC

21

Ethno-Sectarian Violence in Baghdad
DEC 06 APR 07 SEP 07

Density plots depict incidents of ethno-sectarian deaths.
2500

MAY 09

Ethno-Sectarian Deaths

All of Iraq Baghdad Security Districts

2000

1500

1000

500

Density Least

Most

0

75% Shi’a

75% Sunni 51% Sunni / 25% Shi’a Mixed - Muslim

Shi’a, Christian

May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09

51% Shi’a / 25% Sunni Sunni, Shi’a, Christian

Sources: CIOC Trends (CF and Iraqi reports) as of 06-Jun-09; weekly beginning 01-May-06

22

Jaysh al Mahdi and Shi’a Extremists
Winter 2007-2008 Fall 2008

Baghdad

Baghdad

Basra

Basra

23

ISF Combat Battalion Operational Readiness Assessment
Infantry, Armor, Special Operations, National Police, and Emergency Response Unit Battalions

Over 81% or 149 of 183 Iraqi Army Combat Battalions are “in the lead” for operations
Baseline
89 Total BNs

1 Year
132 Total BNs

2 Years
142 Total BNs

3 Years
185 Total BNs

Current
184 Total BNs

200

April 2006—43% in the lead or 52 of 121 Battalions

150

100

50

0

Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09
ORA 1 ORA 2 ORA 3 ORA 4

ORA = Operational Readiness Assessment
Source: Iraqi Assistance Group. As of 20 APR 09.

24

Lessons Learned: The Strategic COIN Command
Multi-National Force-Iraq is a strategic-level HQ optimized with an arsenal of COIN tools/subordinate commands:
•An operational command (MNC-I) •A command to generate, train, and equip indigenous security forces (MNSTC-I) •A reconstruction command (Gulf Region Division, Army Corps of Engineers) •A detention command conducting “COIN inside the wire” and helping with the Iraqi corrections system (TF-134) •A Force Strategic Engagement Cell (FSEC) to facilitate reconciliation with hostile factions and take them off the battlefield, supported by a Strategic Debriefing Element (SDE) to “map” the enemy •A robust Pol-Mil and Econ staff to reinforce Embassy partners and help execute the Joint Campaign Plan (CJ9) •An element to fight the war of information (IO Task Force) and an element to “be first with the truth” (Strat Comms/Media Ops Center) •Fusion cells (joint MNF-I/USEMB elements) for Energy, Medical, and other critical areas •An intel structure to support all of the above (CIOC, DIA Forward Element, etc.)
Coordination

Fully partnered and in coordination with:
•US Embassy and all its interagency elements •A counterterrorism command (TF-714) •An embedded JIATF that includes a threat financing cell •The United Nations Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) •An element dedicated to commercial development (“Brinkley Group” – TF Business Stabilization Ops)
UNAMI

COMMNF-I

US Embassy

CT Command (TF-714) COS

MNC-I

MNSTC-I

GRD

JCC-IA

TF-134

SJA

SCJS

JASG

CHAP

CJ3

CJ5

CJ9

FSEC

CJ1/4/8

CJ2

CJ6

JIATF
Threat Financing

Strat Comms/ MOC

IOTF

TFBSO

CIOC/DFE/SDE

Traditional staff augmented for strategic C2 of a COIN campaign as it evolved in Iraq—Afghanistan HQs will require similar optimization
25

ISAF/USFOR-A Organized for a COIN Campaign
ISAF
Coordination Proposed Sections

USFOR-A
CDR USFOR-A US Embassy

UNAMA Senior Civilian Rep COM ISAF

CSTC-A Opnl HQs
Strat Comms

AEngDist

JCC-IA

CT Command (TF-714)

Detention CJ9 CJ2 CJ3 CJ5 CJ1/4/8

FSEC

J3/5/7

J1

Strat Comms/ MOC IO TF

J4

J2

J6

JIATF CN JIATF TFBSO
Threat Financing

CIOC DIA Fwd Elem Strat Debrief

Augmentation of ISAF/USFOR-A HQs would provide Commander, ISAF/USFOR-A and US Ambassador, Kabul with the additional staff tools necessary to ensure a comprehensive COIN approach.
26

10

15

20

0
Attacks Against Afghanistan Infrastructure and Government Organizations Bombs (IED and Mines), Both Found and Exploded Ambush, grenade, RPG, and Other Small Arms Attacks Mortar, Rocket, and Surface to Air Attacks

5

Sources: Afghanistan SIGACTS. Info Cutoff: 3 Jun. Retrieved through WEBTAS on 8-JUN-09
Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09

RC-Central Security Incidents

27

120

150

180

30

60

90

0
Attacks Against Afghanistan Infrastructure and Government Organizations Bombs (IED and Mines), Both Found and Exploded Ambush, grenade, RPG, and Other Small Arms Attacks Mortar, Rocket, and Surface to Air Attacks

Sources: Afghanistan SIGACTS. Info Cutoff: 3 Jun. Retrieved through WEBTAS on 8-JUN-09
Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09

RC-East Security Incidents

28

120

160

200

240

40

80

0
Attacks Against Afghanistan Infrastructure and Government Organizations Bombs (IED and Mines), Both Found and Exploded Ambush, grenade, RPG, and Other Small Arms Attacks Mortar, Rocket, and Surface to Air Attacks

Sources: Afghanistan SIGACTS. Info Cutoff: 3 Jun. Retrieved through WEBTAS on 8-JUN-09
Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09

RC-South Security Incidents

29

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

0
Attacks Against Afghanistan Infrastructure and Government Organizations Bombs (IED and Mines), Both Found and Exploded Ambush, grenade, RPG, and Other Small Arms Attacks Mortar, Rocket, and Surface to Air Attacks

5

Sources: Afghanistan SIGACTS. Info Cutoff: 3 Jun. Retrieved through WEBTAS on 8-JUN-09
Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09

RC-West Security Incidents

30

10

15

20

0
Attacks Against Afghanistan Infrastructure and Government Organizations Bombs (IED and Mines), Both Found and Exploded Ambush, grenade, RPG, and Other Small Arms Attacks Mortar, Rocket, and Surface to Air Attacks

5

Sources: Afghanistan SIGACTS. Info Cutoff: 3 Jun. Retrieved through WEBTAS on 8-JUN-09
Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09

RC-North Security Incidents

31

Civilian, ANSF and ISAF Casualties
Yearly Totals Civilian ANSF ISAF
200 175 150 125 100 75 50 25 0
Civilian KIA ANSF KIA ISAF/US KIA

2004 125 24 11

2005 101 114 29

2006 429 335 78

2007 534 757 103

2008 718 695 249

2009 225 340 93

Oct-04

Oct-05

Oct-06

Oct-07

Jan-04

Jan-05

Jan-06

Jan-07

Jan-08

Oct-08

Jul-04

Jul-05

Jul-06

Jul-07

Jul-08

Apr-04

Apr-05

Apr-06

Apr-07

Apr-08

Jan-09

Sources: Afghanistan SIGACTS. Info Cutoff: 20 May. Retrieved through WEBTAS on 25-May-09

Apr-09

32

10

15

20

25

0
Vehicle IED Yearly Totals Person Borne Suicide Vehicle

5

Total Person Borne IED Suicide Vehicle Vehicle IED
9 11 24 25 42 4 13 79 74 95 3 10 44 64 74

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Sources: Afghanistan SIGACTS. Info Cutoff: 20 May. Retrieved through WEBTAS on 25-May-09
14 22 31

High Profile Attacks (Explosions)

33

Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09

Pakistan

34

Security Incidents in Pakistan
90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0
PakMil Operations in Bajaur

Attacks Against Infrastructure and Government Organizations IEDs, Mines, Suicide Attacks Small Arms Engagements, RPG, Grenades Indirect Fire Attacks, Mortars, Rocket

Swat Peace Agreement PakMil Operations in Dir, Buner, and Swat

Source: WebTAS Pakistan SIGACTS as of 03 June 09

Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09
35

Situation in Pakistan
XX XX 19 HQ FC x3 37 HQ X X 28 88 X AFGHANISTAN X Kalam54 Swat 107 X X X 1AK 26 313 FC x7 FC x4 FC x2 Khwazakhela Khar Lower Mingora Dir Buner Kabul FC x2 FC x5 400km Peshawar XX FC x9 XXX 7 HQ X FC x6 11 HQ X 73 X 22 FC x1 102 FC x11 Hangu Kohat FC x1 Thal X X X 327 23 27 X Miram Bannu 6 Kohat Shah X X 116 Dera Ismail 117 Wana XX Jandola Khan 9 HQ FC x8 200 0 100 km

Islamabad

FC

Regular Army Frontier Corps Wing(s) Ongoing or Recent Operations

36

Counterinsurgency Campaign Design
Starting Conditions Insurgent Attitude of Populace
Information Operations
Combat Operations

End State Insurgent Neutral or Passive

Neutral or Passive

Civil Security Operations

Essential Services

Support
Government

Governance

Support
Government
Economic Development

Whole of Government Approach: An effective counterinsurgency campaign requires a comprehensive and fully integrated use of non-military and military institutions to defeat the insurgency and address its root causes. 37

The Engine of Change
GEN David H. Petraeus

Engine of Change

Knowledge Management
Doctrine
(Theory)

Leader Development
(Understanding)

Collective Training
(Application)

Lessons Learned
(Feedback)

Combat/ Contingency Operations

A Learning Organization
(Leaders and Troopers who “get it”)
39 39

Changes in Doctrine

Doctrine
(Theory)

Pre-9/11: Combat Operations

Updated Doctrine

Today: Full Spectrum Operations

2006
Army Leadership “Modern Pentathlete”

2006
Human Intelligence Collector Operations

2006
Counterinsurgency Operations (with Marine Corps)

2007
Training the Force

2008
Full Spectrum Operations

40 40

Changes in Leader Development

Leader Development
(Understanding)

Pre-9/11: Combat Operations Lecture-based “What to think”

Leader Development Initiatives

Now: Full Spectrum Operations Seminar-based “How to think”
600 500 400

Arabic Pashto

300 200 100 0 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013

Counterinsurgency focused curricula

Regional language and culture training

Contemporary reading lists

Greater civil schooling opportunities 41 41

ACS Slots for Operational Career Field

To name a few…

Changes in Collective Training
Collective Training (Application)

Pre-9/11: Short, violent force-on force engagements

Training Center Modifications

Today: Continuous, complex counterinsurgency operations

Looks like Iraq or Afghanistan

Hundreds of nativespeaking, role players

Improvised Explosive Civil affairs essential… Devices, car bombs, etc. and all do it

42 42

Changes in Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned
(Feedback)

Pre-9/11:
Predominantly hard-copy publications
Since 2001

Today:
Electronic products, virtual communities, and websites

• Website averaging 19K “sessions” & 20K
documents downloaded per month • 65 Collection & Analysis Teams deployed since 9/11 • 641 publications (online and print) • 1,180 requests for information answered in April (broke January’s record of 1,015)
Full Spectrum products

Combat and Counterinsurgency Operations Sustainment Operations Information Operations Advisor Responsibilities

43 43

Changes in Knowledge Management
Knowledge Management

Pre-9/11:
“Band of Bloggers”

Knowledge Management Tools

Today:
Funded virtual communities

Battle Command Knowledge System

Language software and tools

Simulations with the “Human Dimension”

Command Post of the Future 44 44

Changes in Equipping the Force
New Equipment and Technology (Tools)
Rapidly Fielding New Equipment

Pre-9/11

Today:
Latest equipment & technology, designed for this environment

New Tools for Intelligence Fusion

Improved Weapons Systems

IED Defeat Technology

Vehicles With Better Protection 45 45

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