MAMERTO SEVILLA, JR. V.

COMELEC AND RENATO SO

G.R No. 203833 March 19, 2013

FACTS:Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Sucat,
Muntinlupa City during the October 25,2010 Barangay and SangguniangKabataan Elections, in
which Sevilla was proclaimed as the winner. So filed an election protest with the MeTC on the
ground that Sevilla committed electoral fraud, anomalies and irregularities in all the protested
precints. The MeTC dismissed the election protest.
So filed a motion for reconsideration from the dismissal order instead of a notice of appeal; he
also failed to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period. But the MeTC denied the
motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was prohibited pleading. In response, So filed a
petition for certiorari with the COMELEC, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
MeTC Judge.
The COMELEC Second Division granted Sos petition and held that certiorari can be granted
despite the availability of appeals when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise
of judicial authority. It also ruled that the assailed order was fraught with infirmities and
irregularities in the appreciation of the ballot.
The COMELEC en banc, by a vote of 3-3, affirmed the COMELEC Second Divisions ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it gave due course to the petition
despite its loss of jurisdiction after the dismissal order became final and executory due to Sos
wrong choice of remedy.

HELD:
The court resolve to dismiss the petition for having been prematurely filed and remand the case
to the COMELEC for its appropriate action. It ruled that COMELEC en bancs resolution lacks
legal effect as it is not a majority decision required by the Constitution and by the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.
In the present case, it appears from the records that the Comelecen banc did not issue an Order
for a rehearing of the case in view of filing in the interim of the present petition for certiorari by
Sevilla. In both the cases of Juliano and Marcoleta, cited above, we remanded the cases to the
Comelecen banc for the conduct of the required rehearing pursuant to the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. Based on these considerations, we thus find that a remind of this case is necessary for
the Comelecen banc to comply with the rehearing requirement of Section 6, Rule 18 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.

VELOSO V COA

Facts:On December 7, 2000, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040
entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of Exemplary Public Service Award to
Elective Local Officials of Manila Who Have Been Elected for Three (3) Consecutive Terms in
the Same Position.
 Pursuant to the ordinance, the City made partial payments in favor of the following
former councilors:

Councilor/Recipients Check Date Amount

Abraham C. Cabochan353010 06/07/05 P1,658,989.09
Julio E. Logarta, Jr. 353156 06/14/05 P1,658,989.08
Luciano M. Veloso 353778 06/30/05 P1,658,989.08
Jocelyn Dawis-353155 06/14/05 P1,658,989.08
Asuncion
Marlon M. Lacson 353157 06/14/05 P1,658,989.08
Heirs of Hilarion C.353093 06/09/05 P1,628,311.59
Silva
TOTAL P9,923,257.00

On August 8, 2005, Atty. Gabriel J. Espina (Atty. Espina), Supervising Auditor of the
City of Manila, issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2005-100(05)07(05) [6] with
the following observations:

1. The initial payment of monetary reward as part of Exemplary Public

Service Award (EPSA) amounting to P9,923,257.00 to former councilors of the
City Government of Manila who have been elected for three (3) consecutive terms
to the same position as authorized by City Ordinance No. 8040 is without legal
basis.

2. The amount granted as monetary reward is excessive and

tantamount to double compensation in contravention to Article 170 (c) of the IRR
of RA 7160 which provides that no elective or appointive local official shall
receive additional, double or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized
by law.

3. The appropriations for retirement gratuity to implement EPSA ordinance was

classified as Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses instead of Personal
Services contrary to Section 7, Volume III of the Manual on the New Government
Accounting System (NGAS) for local government units and COA Circular No.
2004-008 dated September 20, 2004 which provide the updated description of
accounts under the NGAS.

Issue: WON the COA has the authority to disallow the disbursement of local government funds.

Ruling: Section 458 of RA 7160 defines the power, duties, functions and compensation
of the SangguniangPanlungsod, to wit:

SEC. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a)

The SangguniangPanlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of
the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper
 exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of
this Code, and shall:

xxxx

(viii) Determine the positions and salaries, wages,

allowances and other emoluments and benefits of officials and
employees paid wholly or mainly from city funds and provide for
expenditures necessary for the proper conduct of programs,
projects, services, and activities of the city government.

In the exercise of the above power, the City Council of Manila enacted on December 7,
2000 Ordinance No. 8040, but the same was deemed approved on August 23, 2002. The
ordinance authorized the conferment of the EPSA to the former three-term councilors and, as
part of the award, the qualified city officials were to be given retirement and gratuity pay
remuneration. We believe that the award is a gratuity which is a free gift, a present, or benefit of
pecuniary value bestowed without claim or demand, or without consideration.
However, as correctly held by the COA, the above power is not without limitations.
These limitations are embodied in Section 81 of RA 7160, to wit:

SEC. 81. Compensation of Local Officials and Employees. The

compensation of local officials and personnel shall be determined by the
sanggunian concerned: Provided, That the increase in compensation of elective
local officials shall take effect only after the terms of office of those approving
such increase shall have expired: Provided, further, That the increase in
compensation of the appointive officials and employees shall take effect as
provided in the ordinance authorizing such increase; Provided however, That said
increases shall not exceed the limitations on budgetary allocations for personal
services provided under Title Five, Book II of this Code: Provided finally, That
such compensation may be based upon the pertinent provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Sixty-seven fifty-eight (R.A. No. 6758), otherwise known as the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Moreover, the IRR of RA 7160 reproduced the Constitutional provision that no elective
or appointive local official or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the
Congress, any present, emoluments, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.
Section 325 of the law limit the total appropriations for personal servicesof a local government
unit to not more than 45% of its total annual income from regular sources realized in the
next preceding fiscal year.

While it may be true that the above appropriation did not exceed the budgetary limitation set by
RA 7160, we find that the COA is correct in sustaining ND No. 06-010-100-05.
Section 2 of Ordinance No. 8040 provides for the payment of retirement and gratuity pay
remuneration equivalent to the actual time served in the position for three (3) consecutive
termsas part of the EPSA. The recomputation of the award disclosed that it is equivalent to the
total compensation received by each awardee for nine years that includes basic salary, additional
compensation, Personnel Economic Relief Allowance, representation and transportation
allowance, rice allowance, financial assistance, clothing allowance, 13 th month pay and cash
gift.This is not disputed by petitioners. There is nothing wrong with the local government
granting additional benefits to the officials and employees. The laws even encourage the granting
of incentive benefits aimed at improving the services of these employees. Considering, however,
that the payment of these benefits constitute disbursement of public funds, it must not contravene
the law on disbursement of public funds.

As clearly explained by the Court in Yap v. Commission on Audit, the disbursement of public
funds, salaries and benefits of government officers and employees should be granted to
compensate them for valuable public services rendered, and the salaries or benefits paid to such
officers or employees must be commensurate with services rendered. In the same vein, additional
allowances and benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to the fulfillment of the
official duties and functions of the government officers and employees. Without this limitation,
government officers and employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or without
justification necessary other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed by the
government. Public funds are the property of the people and must be used prudently at all times
with a view to prevent dissipation and waste.[41]

AGRA V. COA
FACTS:
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989) took effect, Section 12 of which provides:
Sec. 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation.All allowances, except for
representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry allowances; subsistence
allowance of marine officers and crew on boardgovernment vessels and hospital personnel;
hazard pay; allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other
additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM,
shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such other
additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by incumbents only as of
July 1, 1989 notintegrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
Existing additional compensation of any national government official or employee paid from
local funds of a local government unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said official
or employee and shall be paid by the National Government.
Thus, pursuant to its authority under Section 23 of R.A. No. 6758, the DBM x x x issued on
October 2, 1989, DBM-CCC No. 10. Section 5.5 of DBM-CCC No. 10 enumerated the
various allowances/fringe benefits authorized to GOCCs/GFIs which are not to be integrated
into the basic salary and allowed to be continued only for incumbents of positions as of June
30, 1989 who are authorized and actually receiving said allowances/benefits as of said date.
Among these was the rice subsidy/allowance.
A group of NEA employees who were hired after October 31, 19893 claimed that they did
not receive meal, rice, and childrens allowances. Thus, on July 23, 1999, they filed a special
civil action for mandamus against NEA and its Board of Administrators before the Regional
Trial Court.
The RTC rendered its decision on December 15, 1999 in favor of the NEA employees. The
branch clerk of court issued a certification stating that such judgment has become final and
executory.
NEA filed an appeal to the CA, however the CA ordered the extinguishment of the funds of
NEA. Thus, NEA filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the RTC held
inabeyance the execution of its December 15, 1999 Decision.
The SC reversed and set aside theCourt of Appeals decision and reinstated the RTC decision
stating, among other things:
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26of P.D. No. 1445, it is the
COA which has primaryjurisdiction to examine, audit and settle all debts andclaims of any
sort due from or owing the Government orany of its subdivisions, agencies and
instrumentalities,including government-owned or controlled corporationsand their
subsidiaries. With respect to money claimsarising from the implementation of R.A. No. 6758,
theirallowance or disallowance is for COA to decide, subjectonly to the remedy of appeal by
petition for certiorari tothis Court.
Thereafter, in 2001, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) in response to
the request of the then NEA Administrator stated that since there was no appeal made in the
December 15, 1999 decision by the RTC, such had become the law of the case which must
now be applied. Pursuant to such opinion, the NEA issued a Resolution No. 29 approving the
entitlement of rice allowances to NEA employees hired after October 31, 1989.
However, the resident auditor of COA did not allow the payment of the rice allowance for
those who are not incumbent as of June 30, 1989. Motion for Reconsideration was filed
before the COA but the same was denied and hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the claim of NEA employees.
Held:
NO. The RTC has no jurisdiction to decide on the allowance or disallowance of money
claims arising from implementation of RA 6758.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, when an administrative body clothed with original
and exclusive jurisdiction, courts are utterly without power and authority to exercise
concurrently such jurisdiction. Accordingly, all the proceedings of the court in violation of
that doctrine and all orders and decisions reached thereby are null and void. It will be noted
that money claims are cognizable by the COA and its decision is appealable only to the
Supreme Court. The lower courts have nothing to do with such genus of transactions. The SC
observed however that the RTC acted prudently in halting implementation of the writ of
execution to allow the parties to preempt the action of the COA.