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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, CR. NO. 17-20274

v. HON. BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN

JUMANA NAGARWALA (D-1),


FAKHRUDDIN ATTAR (D-2),
FARIDA ATTAR (D-3),
TAHERA SHAFIQ (D-4),
FARIDA ARIF (D-5),
FATEMA DAHODWALA (D-6),

Defendants.
________________________________________/

DEFENDANT JUMANA NAGARWALAS


MOTION FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE

Dr. Jumana Nagarwala, M.D., through her attorney, Shannon M. Smith,

respectfully moves for pretrial release. There are conditions that can be put in place

to reasonably assure that Dr. Nagarwala will appear for all proceedings and assure

the safety of the community. Dr. Nagarwala respectfully requests that this Court

revoke the detention order of April 17, 2017 and release Dr. Nagarwala subject to

the least restrictive conditions, or combination of conditions, that will reasonably

assure the appearance of Dr. Nagarwala before this Court and assure the safety of

the community.
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Respectfully submitted,

Dated: July 7, 2017 /s/ Shannon M. Smith


SHANNON M. SMITH (P68683)
Attorney for Defendant Jumana Nagarwala
The Law Offices of Shannon M. Smith, P.C.
1668 South Telegraph Road
Suite 140
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan 48302
(248) 636-2595
attorneyshannon@gmail.com


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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, CR. NO. 17-20274

v. HON. BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN

JUMANA NAGARWALA (D-1),


FAKHRUDDIN ATTAR (D-2),
FARIDA ATTAR (D-3),
TAHERA SHAFIQ (D-4),
FARIDA ARIF (D-5),
FATEMA DAHODWALA (D-6),

Defendants.
________________________________________/

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT JUMANA NAGARWALAS


MOTION FOR PRETRIAL RELEASE

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Due to a change in circumstances from the initial Detention Order in this

case, Dr. Jumana Nagarwala, M.D. respectfully seeks pretrial release. Moreover,

because there are conditions that will reasonably assure her appearance and ensure

the safety of other persons and the community, such relief is warranted. 18 U.S.C.

3142(b).

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INTRODUCTION

Dr. Nagarwala is a Dawoodi Bohra Muslim woman and a United States

citizen, as she was born in the Washington D.C. area. She has absolutely no

criminal history and has lived in the United State her entire life. In fact, Dr.

Nagarwala has never lived abroad. Dr. Nagarwala attended college at the

University of Maryland, graduating first in her class and continued on to medical

school at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, where again, she

graduated top in her class. After medical school, Dr. Nagarwala moved to

Michigan and has resided in Michigan since 1997. She was employed as an

emergency room physician at Henry Ford Hospital in Detroit, however, due to the

instant case, she has lost her job.

Dr. Nagarwala is married to her husband of over 20 years, Moiz Nagarwala,

and prior to her detention, lived in Northville with her two youngest children.

Moiz Nagarwala works as an engineer for a local company. Dr. Nagarwalas two

eldest children have academic scholarships to attend boarding in Nairobi, Kenya.

Dr. Nagarwalas mother in law resides with her family in their Northville home,

and both of Dr. Nagarwalas parents live between the Nagarwala home in

Michigan and their home in Maryland, traveling back and forth every few weeks.

Aside from Dr. Nagarwalas two daughters in boarding school, all of Dr.

Nagarwalas close family lives in the United States and mostly in Michigan.

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Dr. Nagarwala is currently indicted based on allegations of female genital

mutilation (FGM) or related to FGM. She is charged in eight counts of a nine

count Indictment with the following: Count One, Conspiracy to Commit Female

Genital Mutilation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371; Counts Two through Five,

Female Genital Mutilation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 116 and 18 U.S.C. 2;

Count Six, Conspiracy to Transport Minor with Intent to Engage in Criminal

Sexual Activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2423 (a), (e); Count Seven,

Conspiracy to Obstruct an Official Proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

1512(c)(2), (k); and Count Eight, False Statement to Federal Officer, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. 1001.

Originally, Dr. Nagarwala was charged via a three-count Criminal

Complaint (Complaint). Complaint, Doc. 1. As indicated in Special Agent Kevin

J. Swansons Affidavit in Support of the Complaint, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) received

information that Dr. Nagarwala was performing FGM in the Eastern District of

Michigan. Swanson April 12, 2017 Aff., at 10. The Complaint states that Dr.

Nagarwala is employed as an emergency room physician at a hospital in Detroit

and that Dr. Nagarwala is a member of the Community. Id. at 11. The

Complaint identifies the Community as a particular religious and cultural

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community known to practice FGM on young girls as part of a religious and

cultural practice. Id. at 8.

The Complaint charges that Dr. Nagarwala was in telephone communication

with two families from Minnesota, both of whom had seven-year-old daughters,

and that arrangements were made to have both mothers bring their daughters to

Michigan on February 3, 2017. Id. at 12.

On April 10, 2017, Minnesota Victim 1 (MN-V-1) and Minnesota Victim

2 (MN-V-2) were both interviewed by a child forensic interviewer employed by

the FBI. Id. at 15, 17. As per the Complaint, both girls told the interviewer that

they traveled to Michigan and went to a doctors office. Id. Both girls identified

Dr. Nagarwala as the doctor seen in Michigan. Id. Allegedly, MN-V-1 told the

forensic interviewer Dr. Nagarwala pinched her on the place [where] she goes

pee, and MN-V-2 reported that she got a shot on her upper right thigh, that it

hurt, and that it made her scream. Id. The parents of MN-V-2 confirmed to local

Minnesota Child Protective Services that they took their daughter to Detroit to see

Dr. Nagarwala for a cleansing of extra skin. Id. at 20.

On April 11, 2017, a medical doctor in Minnesota performed a medical

examination on both MN-V-1 and MN-V-2. Id. at 16, 19. The Complaint

indicates that Special Agent Swanson spoke with the doctor and was made aware

that the doctors preliminary findings included MN-V-1s genitals were not normal

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in appearance, that MN-V-1s labia minora had been altered or removed, and that

her clitoral hood was also abnormal in appearance. Id. at 16. With respect to

MN-V-2, Special Agent Swanson states in his affidavit that the doctors

preliminary findings indicate that MN-V-2s clitoral hood has a small incision and

that there is small tear to the labia minora. Id. at 19. It should be noted that in

subsequent hearings after Dr. Nagarwalas Detention Hearing, it was determined

that surveillance video revealed each child was only in the clinic for approximately

seventeen minutes and was able to walk out of the clinic on their own after the

procedure. Dr. Nagarwala has continuously stated that she was not engaged in

FGM procedures and has remained firm that the procedure she did do did not

involve the clitoris or labia.

On April 10, 2017, Dr. Nagarwala voluntarily agreed to be interviewed by

an HSI special agent and Michigan child protective services personnel. Id. at 23.

As alleged in the criminal complaint, Dr. Nagarwala told the special agent that she

knew FGM was illegal in the United States, that she had no knowledge of FGM

being performed by anyone in her community, that she had never performed FGM

on any minor children, and that she was not involved in any FGM procedures. Id.

During this same interview, Dr. Nagarwala made the special agent and the child

protective services worker aware that she had a trip planned to Nairobi, Kenya and

that she was scheduled to depart on April 12, 2017. On April 12, 2017, Dr.

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Nagarwala was arrested at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport. After a detention

hearing on April 17, 2017, the magistrate judge ordered Dr. Nagarwala to be

detained until trial. Detention Order, Doc. 9, Page ID # 20-22.1

Since Dr. Nagarwalas Detention Hearing on April 17, 2017, several things

have transpired. On April 21, 2017, Dr. Fahkruddin Attar and Dr. Farida Attar

were arrested and detained. On April 26, 2017, the three were indicted by grand

jury. On April 26, 2017, the Attars were detained pending trial. The investigation

by the Government continued, as other community members received target letters

indicating they may be indicted. On June 7, 2017, the Attars were released by this

Court with several conditions in place to be monitored by Pretrial Services.

On June 21, 2017, a Superseding Indictment was issued by the grand jury,

adding on Defendants Tahera Shafiq, Farida Arif and Fatema Dahodwala and

making very vague allegations regarding four alleged Michigan victims. Despite

the fact that this case has been pending since April of 2017, Undersigned Counsel

has received very little discovery. Undersigned Counsel filed a Motion that was

previously heard on May 31, 2017 to Compel Discovery. To date, absolutely no

medical information or medical records have been provided to the defense

regarding the allegations from even the initial Indictment. This case will

undoubtedly require several motions regarding discovery and the lack thereof.


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On April 26, 2017, Dr. Nagarwala was charged via Indictment with Conspiracy to Obstruct an

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On information and belief, the Government will be seeking further

Superseding Indictments for other Defendants, based on further target letters

received by members of the community. This case is one of first impression as

FGM has never been prosecuted before in the United States. As such, and based

on the addition of several defendants and the expectation of several more, this case

will be complex and require time to litigate all of the complicated issues, many of

which are of first impression. As such, Dr. Nagarwala files this instant Motion

seeking pretrial release and requests pretrial release conditions similar to the Attars

(and other defendants in this case).

LAW AND ANLYSIS

1. Standard for Pretrial Detention

Title 18, United States Code, Section 3141(a) gives "judicial officers"

authority to make determinations regarding bail in all stages of a criminal case, up

to and including the trial stage. Under 18 U.S.C. 3142 (The Bail Reform Act or

the Act), a judicial officer shall order that, pending trial, the Defendant be (1)

released on his own recognizance or upon execution of an unsecured bond, (2)

released on a condition or combination or conditions, (3) temporarily detained to

permit revocation of conditional release, deportation, or exclusions, or (4)

detained. 18 U.S.C. 3142(a). Under the Act, the judicial officer may detain a

person pending trial only if, after a detention hearing held pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

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1342(f), the judicial officer determines that no conditions or combination of

conditions [set forth under 18 U.S.C. 3142(b) or (c)] will reasonably assure the

appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the

community[.] 18 U.S.C. 3142(e). The Supreme Court, in United States v.

Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) cautioned that [i]n our society liberty is the norm,

and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception. Id. at

755. For this reason, the defendant may be detained only if the judicial officer

finds by (1) clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant is a danger to the

community, or (2) a preponderance of the evidence, that the Defendant poses a risk

of flight. See, 18 U.S.C. 3142(f); United States v. Quartermaine, 913 F.2d 910,

916 (11th Cir. 1990). The default position of the law is that the defendant should

be released pending trial. United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 945 (6th Cir. 2010).

The default is modified, however, when a judicial officer finds that there is

probable cause to believe that a defendant committed one of the crimes listed in

18 U.S.C. 3142(e)(3), in which case, there is a presumption in favor of detention:

Subject to rebuttal by the person, it shall be presumed that no condition or

combination or conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as

required and the safety of the community[.] 18 U.S.C. 3142(e)(3).

As noted by the Sixth Circuit in Stone, 3142(e)(3)s presumption in favor

of detention imposes only a burden of production on the defendant, and the

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government retains the burden of persuasion. Stone, 608 F.3d at 945, citing

United Stated v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v.

Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 1985). A defendant satisfies his burden of

production when he com[es] forward with evidence that he does not pose a danger

to the community or a risk of flight. Id., citing Mercedes, 254 F.3d at 436.

Although a defendants burden of production is not heavy, he must introduce at

least some evidence. Id., citing United States v. Stricklin, 932 F.2d 1353, 1355

(10th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cr.

1991) ([A] defendant must introduce some evidence contrary to the presumed fact

in order to rebut the presumption.)

In the matter before the Court, the statutory presumption codified in 18

U.S.C. 3142 applies, given that Dr. Nagarwala is charged with transportation

with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, and conspiracy, contrary to 18

U.S.C. 2243(a), (e). See 18 U.S.C. 3142(e)(3)(E). Nevertheless, given that the

presumption only shifts to the defendant the burden of production to come forward

with evidence suggesting that he or she is not a societal danger or flight risk, the

presumption does not alter the governments burden of persuasion to prove by

clear and convincing evidence that no set of conditions will assure the safety of the

community or to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that no combination

of conditions will guarantee the defendants appearance at trial. Therefore,

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[r]egardless of whether the presumption applies, the Governments ultimate

burden is to prove that no conditions of release can assure that the defendant will

appear and to assure the safety of the community. Stone, 608 F.3d at 946.

In making the determination as to whether there are conditions of release

that will reasonably assure the appearance of the [Defendant] as required and the

safety of any other person and the community, the judicial officer is compelled to

consider the following factors:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether
the offense is a crime of violence, a violation of section 1591, a Federal
crime of terrorism, or involves a minor victim or a controlled substance,
firearm, explosive, or destructive device;

(2) the weight of the evidence against the person;

(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including

(A) the persons character, physical and mental conditions, family


ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the
community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or
alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at
court proceedings; and

(B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person
was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial,
sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under
Federal, State, or local law; and

(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person of the community
that would be posed by the persons release.2


2 18 U.S.C. 3142(g).

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Id. at 946. Notably, consideration of these factors shall not be construed to modify

or limit the presumption of innocence. Id.

2. The facts surrounding the offenses do not warrant detention, including


the offense that triggers the presumption of detention in this case
because the alleged conduct at issue does not fall within the statutory
language or statutory intent.

In determining whether the Government has met its burden of persuasion, the

Court must consider the nature and circumstances of the offense charged,

including whether the offense is a crime of violence, a Federal crime of

terrorism, or involves a minor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive,

or destructive device[.] Stone, 608 F.3d at 946, quoting 18 U.S.C. 3142(g).

The alleged offenses at issue in this case stem from conduct related to a centuries-

old religious practice. The presumption for detention of Dr. Nagarwala is triggered

by the offense of conspiracy to transport a minor with the intent to engage in

criminal sexual activity, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a), (e).

While the presumption of detention is a factor to be considered, the court

must also consider all the special features of the case that take it outside of the

congressional paradigm that favors detention. Id. at 945-46. This case is not

representative of the sort of conduct that falls within the parameters of the statute,

given that a review of congressional findings for the statute indicate concerns

about prostitution, sex trafficking, and child pornography, none of which occurred

in this case. Dr. Nagarwala has not denied performing a religious rite of passage

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that is sacred to the Dawoodi Bohra, and the centuries-old religious practice most

certainly does not fall within the ambit of the statute. The Governments

overreaching in equating a traditional religious practice with sexual activity

should be noted when evaluating the nature and circumstances of the offenses

charged.

3. Dr. Nagarwala does not pose a risk of flight.

Pretrial detention is appropriate only in specific limited circumstances,

including a case that involves a serious risk that [the defendant] will flee[.] 18

U.S.C. 3142(f)(2)(A). It is the Governments burden to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant is a flight risk[.] United States

v. Walton, No. 13-20512, 2013 WL 5539604, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 8, 2013).

Notably, the legal standard is one of reasonable assurances, not absolute

guarantees. United States v. Walls, No. CR 2-06-192, 2008 WL 213886, at *1

(S.D. Ohio Jan. 23, 2008) (quoting United States v Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 888 fn. 4

(8th Cir. 1985)). In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or

without trial is the carefully limited exception. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.

At the detention hearing, the Government argued that Dr. Nagarwala posed a

risk of flight given that she has significant resources, a motive to flee, international

connections, and was arrested at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport where she was

boarding an international flight to Nairobi, Kenya. Transcript of April 17, 2017

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Detention Hearing at pp. 11, 15. The Governments argument, however, amounts

to a de facto presumption that all citizens charged with a crime who have financial

means and/or family abroad should be detained. That is not the law. Rather, the

law requires that the Government affirmatively prove, by a preponderance of the

evidence specific to a given defendant, that there is a serious risk that [the

defendant] will flee. 18 U.S.C. 3142(f)(2)(A).

With regard to Dr. Nagarwalas April 12, 2017 arrest at the airport, at Dr.

Nagarwalas detention hearing, defense counsel proffered that two of Dr.

Nagarwalas children attend a boarding school in Nairobi and that Dr. Nagarwala

had planned to visit her children for a grand opening of the schools new campus.

Transcript of April 17, 2017 Detention Hearing at p. 19. Dr. Nagarwala was

scheduled to return on April 24, 2017 according to Exhibit A, which was admitted

at the Detention Hearing. Further, following her trip to Nairobi, Dr. Nagarwala

was scheduled to speak at a conference in Florida about surviving the midnight

shift as a doctor, which was confirmed by Exhibit B at the hearing. Id. at 20.

From Fort Lauderdale, Dr. Nagarwala planned to travel to India for a family

wedding and the flight information and wedding invitation showing the wedding

was on May 5th and May 6th were provided to the Court as Exhibits C and D. Id.

The itinerary also confirms Dr. Nagarwalas plans to return to the United States on

May 15th. After that trip, Dr. Nagarwala had a round trip planned to Houston,

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which was admitted as Exhibit E, so that she could celebrate her daughters

engagement with family. Id. It was clear that Dr. Nagarwala had every intention

and planned to return to Michigan and all of these plans had been planned months

in advance of her learning about the investigation on April 10, 2017 when

Homeland Security came to her home. Moreover, the Government conceded that

Dr. Nagarwalas trip had been planned before the events of April 10, 2017. Id. at

12.

Undoubtedly, defense counsel demonstrated that Dr. Nagarwala intended to

return to the United States after her previously planned trip to Nairobi. Moreover,

when an HSI Special Agent interviewed her at her home on April 10, 2017, Dr.

Nagarwala made the Government aware of her trip to Nairobi by explicitly telling

them. Dr. Nagarwalas willingness to inform the Government of her international

travel plans is the opposite of what one would expect from a defendant who

intends to flee, distinguishing Dr. Nagarwala from defendants who present a

serious risk of flight. Further, when informed that Dr. Nagarwala had plans to

leave the United States, neither the special agent nor the child protective services

worker told Dr. Nagarwala or suggested to Dr. Nagarwala that she should postpone

or cancel her previously planned trip.

[O]pportunities for flighthardly establish an inclinationto flee.

Truong v. United States, 439 U.S. 1326, 1329-30 (1978) (Brennan, J. sitting as

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Circuit Justice). Dr. Nagarwalas actions demonstrate that there are conditions that

will reasonably assure her appearance. 18 U.S.C. 3142(b). At the time of her

arrest, Dr. Nagarwalas passport was already seized, and her immediate family are

also willing to voluntarily surrender their passports to assure the Court there is no

risk of flight. Further, the passports for Dr. Nagarwalas two minor children who

remain in the home were surrendered in the child protective proceedings pending

in Wayne County.

4. Dr. Nagarwala is not a danger to the community.

Clear and convincing evidence means proof that the particular defendant

actually poses a danger, not that the defendant in theory poses a danger. United

States v. Patriarca, 948 F.2d 789 (1st Cir. 1991). Moreover, conditions for release

need not guarantee safety, but need only to reasonably assure it. 18 U.S.C.

3142(e).

In the present case, the Government argued that Dr. Nagarwala, if released,

would pose a danger to the community because the defendant knew before her

arrest that this was an illegal procedure, but she proceeded to do it anyway and the

only difference now is that she has been caught and that she faces time in prison.

Transcript of April 17, 2017 Detention Hearing at p. 15. The Government also

argued that the danger to the victims in the community and to the community

overall includes also the danger that the defendant would continue to attempt to

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obstruct justice, that she or others will place pressure on victims in the community

to recant their statements or to lie to the police or that she will pressure other

witnesses in community to lie. Id. at pp. 15-16.

Detention, however, is permitted only if the judicial officer finds that no

condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assurethe safety of any

other person and the community[.] 18 U.S.C. 3142(e).

The statutorily mandated progression from one choice to the next is critical:
a judicial officer cannot determine that a detention hearing and the possible
imposition of pretrial detention is appropriate merely by determining that
release on personal recognizance will not reasonably assure the
defendants appearance at trial or will endanger the community. The
judicial officer must also consider whether one of the codified conditions or
any combination of the conditions will reasonably assure the defendants
appearance and the safety of the community. The wide range of restrictions
available ensures, as Congress intended, that very few defendants will be
subject to pretrial detention.

United States v. Orta, 760 F.2d 887, 890-91 (8th Cir. 1985) (reversing detention

order despite applicability of statutory presumption based on drug charge).

Detention is not justified simply because a person presents an alleged safety

risk. A risk to the community requires further analysis: the determination of what

condition or combination of conditions would reasonably assure the safety of the

community.

Moreover, there is not a per se rule that an obstruction of justice charge

warrants detention. United States v. Demmler, 523 F.Supp.2d 677, 683 (S.D. Ohio

2007). In Demmler, the Court stated, [T]he Court will not assume that just

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because Demmler has been charged with witness tampering and obstruction of

justice, he is likely to commit these same offenses again during the course of these

proceedings. Indulging in such an assumption would be tantamount to creating a

per se rule of detention in cases involving witness tampering and obstruction,

which this Court has already declined to do. Id. The court noted:

[T]he threshold for detaining a defendant pre-trial, even one who has
engaged in threatening behavior, is not easily satisfied. In United States v.
Brannon, No. 00-2037, 2000 WL 235237, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 3234 (10th
Cir. March 2, 2000) (unpublished), for example, the Tenth Circuit affirmed
an order releasing the defendant pre-trial, even though the defendant was
charged with using the mail to threaten a federal judge, had a history of
mental and emotional disorders and of making veiled or oblique threats,
and his family testified in favor of detaining him. In United States v. Traitz,
807 F.2d 322 (3d Cir. 1986), the defendants were charged with racketeering,
embezzlement, and extortion. Government tapes recorded the defendants
physically abusing their victims and threatening them. The Third Circuit
affirmed the district courts release order, concluding that the district court
did not err in holding that conditions of release could be fashioned to prevent
the defendants from posing a danger.

Id.
The Courts inquiry, therefore, must focus on whether by conditions of

release the community can reasonably be assured of its safety. Indeed, if the statute

were interpreted as requiring a guarantee against any harm, pretrial preventative

detention would become the norm rather than the exception because such

guarantees could be made in almost no cases.

The facts of the case undeniably include parents who brought their daughters

to Dr. Nagarwala for a religious procedure. It is fair to say that everyone in the

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Dawoodi Bohra community is aware of this case and terrified to be indicted or

charged. This case is far different than random attacks of children on the street and

involves a defendant who has absolutely no criminal history. With pretrial

conditions such as house arrest and a tether, the Court could be sure that Dr.

Nagarwala does not leave her home except for Court and legal appointments. Like

the Attars who were also released on bond, Dr. Nagarwala could be prohibited

from having contact with other community members. Dr. Nagarwala would not

have contact with any of the witnesses involved in this instant case except her

immediate family members.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, there are conditions that can be put in place to

reasonably assure that Dr. Nagarwala will appear for all court proceedings and

ensure the safety of the community. Dr. Nagarwala respectfully requests that this

Court allow Dr. Nagarwala to be released subject to conditions, or a combination

of conditions, that will reasonably assure the appearance of Dr. Nagarwala before

this Court and assure the safety of the community.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: July 7, 2017 /s/ Shannon M. Smith


SHANNON M. SMITH (P68683)
Attorney for Defendant Jumana Nagarwala

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on July 7, 2017, I filed the foregoing document with the Clerk

of the Court through the ECF system, which sill send electronic notification to all

counsel of record.

/s/ Shannon M. Smith


SHANNON M. SMITH (P68683)
Attorney for Defendant Jumana Nagarwala

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