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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, 0.C. 20304-1920 [NETASSESSMENT October 18, 2016 MEMORANDUM FOR SSO DIA, SEt SUBJECT: Preliminary Inquiry Report C PPPA ATTN: Mike Copeland 1. Authority: This preliminary inquiry was conducted Sept 17-Oct 18 [AW DoDM $200.01-V3 by CDR Anthony L. Russell from the Office of Net Assessment, 2. Matters Investigated: This inquiry was initiated in response to a possible security incident after receiving a report from a military member not attached to this office that a civilian employee of this office had been observed handling classified materials in the open while on a civilian flight. 3. Personnel Involved: The following personnel were directly involved in this incident and interviewed or submitted statements: a, Mr, Adam Lovinger. GS-15, DOD Analyst, ONA. b. Mr. Jim Baker, Director, OSD Office of Net Assessment c. LCDR J. Austin Maxwell, U Pacific Fleet N391 4, Facts: On the afternoon of Wednesday, Sept. 14, Mr. Adam Lovinger departed his place of work within the Office of Net Assessment in the Pentagon with a stack of papers he intended to read over the course of an extended period of OCONUS travel. Within this stack of papers was a working paper’ titled. “Allies in Decline: Alliance Management and U.S. Strategy in an Era of Global Power Shifts”, by Dr. Hal Brands, a historian and advisor to the Secretary of Defense. This working paper was marked in the Header as “DRAFT” and in the Footer as, “Class Pending” with top source material at the Top Secret level with several caveats. Mr. Lovinger does not recall how or when he received the document in question, but he is certain he did not receive it electronically but only in hard copy. Mr. Lovinger works in a SCIF, cleared for open storage and has routine and necessary access to TS/SCI level information at his workspace. It is his belief that the document in question was placed within a stack of what he believed were unclassified academic research papers that he intended to read during his extended * Per DoDM 5200.01.V3, “Working papers are documents (e.g, nates, drafts, prototypes), created during development and preparation of a finished product.” TDY travel. He claims to have checked to ensure that this stack was unclassified by thumbing through the headers of the documents. I reviewed an electronic copy of the document in question, which was received from Mr. Baker directly from the Author. The document is only marked in the footer, with no markings on the header, Mr. Lovinger discovered the markings while reading the document in the open during his flight to Hawaii on Sept. 15. He claims he was several pages into the document when he noticed the classification markings, at which point he got out of his seat and proceeded to a location on the plane with more privacy in order to review the document more closely. Based on this brief review of the material and his knowledge of the author as an academic temporarily assigned to OSD he concluded that the document contained no classified material. He returned to his seat and placed the document in his carry-on bag. LCDR Maxwell was seated next to Mr. Lovinger on their flight from JFK to Hawaii. They had not previously met nor introduced themselves to each other. LCDR Maxwell observed Mr. Lovinger remove a large stack of documents that he began to review. The documents were well within his peripheral vision and being familiar with classified documents an apparent classification marking caught his eye. The classification he observed is consistent with the document described above and he also recalls that it appeared to be a draft and had something to do with ally capabilities. A short time later LCDR Maxwell observed Mr. Lovinger flip back to look at the front page of the document briefly, fold the document in half, place it in his pants pocket, then ask if LCDR Maxwell (seated in the aisle seat) could let him out. Mr. Lovinger was gone for about 10- 15 minutes before returning with the document still folded in his pocket. Mr. Lovinger then placed all of the documents back in his briefcase. The two had a brief casual conversation later in the flight, establishing that they were both in the Department of Defense but the question of the apparently classified documents was never broached. According to LCDR Maxwell's statement, “It was obvious to me [Mr. Lovinger] recognized his mistake and attempted to secure the document.” Upon returning to work on Sept. 16 LCDR Maxwell drafted a Memorandum for the Record (Encl 1) of the incident and notified his supervisor where they then brought the matter to the attention of CAPT Dale Rielage. On the aftemoon of Friday, Sept. 16, Mr. Jim Baker was informed by CAPT Rielage from PACFLT that a member of his staff had observed Mr. Adam Lovinger reviewing a classified document while they were sitting next to each other on a civilian flight the preceding day. At the next available opportunity Mr. Baker confronted Mr. Lovinger regarding this allegation of his possession of a classified document. Mr. Lovinger states that because he had already concluded in his own mind that the document contained no classified material, he did not immediately grasp what document Mr. Baker was referring to. He also was not aware that LCDR Maxwell had seen the document and its classification markings. To his knowledge no one else had observed the document throughout its time in his possession. In the course of the conversation with Mr. Baker, Mr. Lovinger realized that the incident brought to Mr. Baker’s attention involved the working paper described above. At this point, Mr. Lovinger confirmed that he had a document in his possession that had classified markings, but that he did not believe it was properly marked. At the conclusion of the scheduled meetings that day Mr. Baker accompanied Mr. Lovinger to his lodging to review the document. It was Mr. Baker's immediate opinion that the document likely contained classified material, He instructed Mr. Lovinger to place the document in an envelope and to keep it in his possession then immediately contacted the base watch who placed him in touch with the PACFLT Command Duty Officer, with whom he made arrangements to transfer the document for destruction, these arrangements including assuring that the recipient was cleared for the highest level of classification on the document. Mr. Baker and Mr. Lovinger proceeded to PACFLT and tumed the document over to a representative from the Intelligence Watch for destruction. Mr. Baker directed Mr. Lovinger to provide a detailed report to the office’s Security Manager, Ms. Demaris Lawhorn, which he did via e-mail (Encl 2). Mr. Baker also provided an e-mail notification to Ms. Lawhomn (Ene! 3). At the time of the incident Mr. Lovinger was on official intemational travel. I sent him a preliminary e-mail requesting amplifying information to which he responded (Encl 4). Ialso conducted an in-person interview on Oct. 3, the first opportunity available since this incident occurred. I also conducted interviews with Mr. Baker and LCDR Maxwell 5. Conclusion: Based on this preliminary inquiry it is believed that classified information was improperly, but unknowingly, taken out of an authorized secure space and insecurely transported and reviewed in a public location. 1 have subsequently reviewed the working paper. It is marked as described, with no security markings on the header, but the “Classification Pending” with a statement that top source material at the TS level with several caveats prominent in the footer of every page. Per DODM 5200.01 (Encl 5), working papers and materials containing classified {information shall be marked with the highest classification of any information contained therein and safeguarded as required for the assigned classification. In this case the working paper in question clearly indicated the inclusion of material from TS/SCI sources, and thus should have been treated accordingly. In the interest of determining potential compromise or harm by this incident I conducted a detailed review of the document in question. The first actual reference to classified material is not made until page 11 of the document, but this isin the form of a citation with title information only and no apparent classified information. The first appearance of information reasonably considered to be classified is not until page 14 of the document, and there are several citations or references to information derived from classified sources throughout the remainder of the document. Overall, based on my review of the actual content of the document to the extent it contains any actual classified information itis extremely limited and very general in nature. The classification of the top source materials is likely related to sources and purpose, rather than content, and the sourcing information of the original classification is not available or alluded to in this document, Based upon the facts and findings above, it is my opinion that: A security infraction was committed by Mr. Adam Lovinger in that he failed to ‘comply with requirements for the protection of classified information and did improperly transport and review classified information in an open environment. © This infraction was inadvertent, yet avoidable if Mr. Lovinger had been more diligent observing and segregating materials of various classifications at his secure workspace. Mr. Lovinger’s exercise of personal judgment as to the classification of the working paper was not in accordance with DoD policy and impeded a more timely execution of the proper mitigation steps, which should have included: maintaining more active control of the document, notifying a security official at the ‘earliest opportunity, and arranging for its proper return to a secure space or its destruction. These actions all eventually occurred, but not without prompting. ‘+ Itis reasonable to conclude that there was no compromise given the content of the document in question and its close control either on Mr. Lovinger’s person or in his assigned lodging on a military base for a relatively short period of time. For these reasons, no violation is believed to have occurred. In summary, I believe human error and misjudgment were the causative factors in this incident, and not systemic or organizational shortcomings or failu A 4 COk, vce, ‘Anthony L. Russell Encl: (1) LCDR Maxwell Sept. 16 Memo “Observation of Apparent Classified Material Outside of a SCIF.” 2) Mr. Lovinger Sept. 16 e-mail “Security matter” (3) Mr. Baker Sept. 16 e-mail “Security incident: Adam Lovinger” (4) CDR Russell Sept. 20 e-mail “Security matter” with Mr. Lovinger’s reply (5) DoD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information, DDM $200.01, Enclosure 2, Para 13