CIA DISCUSSED POSSIBILITY OF BHUTTOS DOWNFALL IN 1975

In a memorandum titled 'Prospects for Pakistan' and published on May 30, 1975, the CIA discussed the
likely scenario which could lead to a resurgence of political instability in Pakistan. A major talking point
was the sudden assassination or the removal of then prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

Likely developments after Bhutto's demise or removal from power were predicted as a prolonged struggle
for power in Islamabad, an upsurge in unrest in the frontier areas and a likely take over of the government
by the armed forces.

The CIA analysis gave reasons for Bhutto's possible removal and stated that "Bhutto's penchant for using
repressive tactics against his opponents could backfire".

"Strong opposition could flare up over a number of issues, and the armed forces could grow tired of helping
Bhutto fight his political battles," added the CIA memo.

The memorandum elaborated further on the political landscape and said no other politician in Pakistan
enjoys such widespread support, but it also criticised Bhutto for not preparing a likely successor.

"In such a situation, the armed forces might well decide to resume control over the government. They would
not necessarily find it easy, however, to restore stability."

The memorandum, however, predicted rightly that the political climate in Pakistan will remain stable for
the next two years till 1977. The military coup against Bhutto's government and his subsequent arrest by
the army took place on July 5, 1977, a little over two years after the memo was drafted.

"Internally, Pakistan probably will remain stable during the next two years."

Regarding external threats faced by Pakistan during the time period mentioned, the CIA said that no major
threat to Pakistan's security or integrity was foreseen.

It shedLIGHT on likely Indian and Afghan courses of action, if internal pressure in those countries
increased, and said the countries could adopt more aggressive policies towards Pakistan.

Ayub came to regard Bhutto as a 'special protg': CIA files

In a special report titled Pakistan's Foreign Policy Under Ayub and Bhutto, the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) highlighted then foreign minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's growing role in Pakistan's policy making
while he was serving in former president Ayub Khan's cabinet.

In the "secret" report, dated April 16, 1965, the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence noted that Bhutto's
diplomatic successes as foreign minister had led Ayub to regard him as a "special protg".

President Ayub had given Bhutto wide discretion when he began to take interest in foreign affairs while
being commerce minister.

The report cited a $30 million oil exploration assistance agreement with the USSR as Bhutto's "most
dramatic success" in his capacity.

Bhutto was made the foreign minister at "the height of reaction" to a US decision to give military aid to
India following the attack by China on India's Himalayan border.
"Since that time, Ayub has come to depend heavily on Bhutto for conceiving and carrying out new foreign
policy initiatives," reads the report, which is redacted in some places.

Pakistan's tilt towards China

With Pakistan's foreign policy dominated by "fears" regarding India, the Ayub government made efforts to
strengthen its relationship with communist China.

In a series of gestures directed towards Peiping (the former name of Beijing), Pakistan in 1963 and 1964
had hoped to deter India from deploying its army against Pakistan in entirety and inhibit "the new US
support for India", said the report.

"Every new Pakistan visit to Peiping or statement on China arouses fresh rage in India, but Pakistan seems
to have gone about as far as it is now willing to go in establishing areas of cooperation with China," the
report reads.

Although President Ayub's visit to China in March 1965 "did little more than dramatize previous positions",
the report said, the "heated response from India must have been gratifying" for Pakistan.

Irked by growing Indo-US ties, Pakistan in May 1964 even warned that it might lose interest in free world
concerns and interests in Asia "and concentrate on the narrower field of the preservation of its own vital
national interests".

The report said Pakistan even considered quitting SEATO when it found out that the US would give military
aid worth $100m to India in 1965, but later seemed to have "become more resigned to continued US military
assistance to India as a fact of life beyond its power to change".

As part of its foreign policy reorientation, Pakistan started reestablishing its ties with the Afro-Asian world,
particularly Indonesia, which once had warm ties with India. Economic cooperation between the two
countries was also expanding under the direction of Bhutto, "Pakistan's chief idea man".

"Indonesia's support for Pakistan on Kashmir has won it Pakistani neutrality in the Malaysian confrontation,
despite Pakistan's Commonwealth ties to Malaysia," the report said.

Choosing development over defence

The Indo-Pak hostility that stemmed from the 1947 Partition amplified after the Sino-Indian Border Conflict
of 1962, when India started an "ambitious" campaign to expand and modernise its military with US and
Soviet aid.

India recruited 300,000 more men to its army in order to prepare to confront China and Pakistan
simultaneously.
Despite being proportionally disadvantaged, however, Pakistan did not respond in the same manner, said
the CIA report.

Instead of increasing its armed forces, the Ayub government maintained its focus on development, as the
president thought the "required diversion of resources would be too costly".

This preference for development allowed Pakistan to post "an impressive record of economic development,
and most of its five-year plan (1961-1966) goals are likely to be achieved", the report noted at the time.

"Pakistan's leaders view this record, when contrasted with India's economic difficulties in recent years --
most notably its continuing food crisis -- as anIMPORTANT source of strength.

RSS instigated assassination bid on first Indian army chief: CIA files

NEW DELHI: In what could be sensational revelations for many Indians and a huge embarrassment for the
Modi government, the recently released CIA files have claimed that the rightwing Hindu Rashtriya
Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) had instigated northern army officers to plot an assassination bid on the
countrys first army commander Gen K.M. Cariappa, who was from the southern region of Coorg.

Gen K.M. Cariappa

The revelations were first published in the Hindi daily Jansatta on Friday, but this correspondent
corroborated the story with the United StatesCentral Intelligence Agency files that were recently released
under President Barrack Obamas orders.

Rift in the officer corps of the Indian army, was the headline of the redacted file dated June 12, 1950.

An attempt to assassinate General Cariappa, Commander in Chief of the Indian Army, was made during
the Generals recent inspection tour of East Punjab. Six persons have been sentenced to death in connection
with the plot; several high army officers are believed involved, the CIA noted.

General Cariappa as a South Indian is resented by Sikh officers of the Indian Army. The RSS is capitalising
on the North-South rift among army officers, whom informant considers treacherous and unreliable, to
spread dissension. Officers from Travancore, Maharashtra and Madras are invariably loyal to General
Cariappa.

Another file made public, but whose date has been deleted, carries a photocopy of the Bombay-based Blitz
weekly, an erstwhile popular tabloid once considered close to Moscow.

It quotes a CIA researcher as struggling to unravel the standoff between Pakistan and India over Kashmir.

He goes on to ponder if India should opt for temporary military rule as Gen Cariappa had suggested. The
general was field marshal in 1965 when he apparently made the remarks. Military officers of both countries
went to school together and fought side by side in World War II, the report said. They would be able to
resolve the issues dogging them.

According to the Blitz story quoting the CIA researcher, Gen Cariappa had pondered that aSHORT stint
of military rule in India would help deal with the communist threat and also tackle regional troubles. The
latter issue may have been inspired by his experience in Punjab where he was nearly killed in a plot, which
was staged by fellow officers, according to the CIA.
Gen Cariappa belonged to the Coorgi region of proud soldiers, which is now part of the southern state of
Karnataka. He is idolised by the Coorgis as a great national hero.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi credits his political moorings to his training as a member of the RSS. He
was campaigning in the poll-bound Punjab on Friday. Former army officers have been fielded by several
parties in Indian elections.

A former Sikh army chief is one of the candidates for the ruling coalition of Bharatiya Janata Party and
Akali Dal in the assembly polls due on Feb 4.

The RSS is the ideological fountainhead of the BJP and it denies periodic charges of having a role in the
assassination of Mahatma Gandhi.

The spy files: CIA discussed possibility of Indian attack on Kahuta in 1980s

CIA published roughly 930,000 documents that make up the CIA Records SearchTOOL (Crest) on Jan
17, 2017

Files in Crest were part of public record before this date, but could only be inspected by visiting the
National Archives in Maryland in person during business hours

CIA initiated the project following a Freedom of Information Act injunction launched in 2014 by
Muckrock, a non-profit news organisation

CIA had planned to publish the documents at the end of 2017, but finished the work ahead of schedule

Trove includes several hundred thousand pages of intelligence analysis and science research and
development

WASHINGTON: Among many other fascinating revelations made by the Central Intelligence Agencys
(CIA) declassified documents recently, it has been disclosed that a CIA official warned US lawmakers that
India could attack Pakistans nuclear facilities in Kahuta to prevent it from making nuclear weapons in
1981.

According to a CIA memo dated April 17, 1981, an agency officialBRIEFED US senators on the
possibility of such an attack although the CIA officially denied the claim.

The memo, sent to the chairman, US National Intelligence Council Special Assistant for Nuclear
Proliferation, noted that a few senior American officials also confirmed to ABC news that there had been
serious discussions within the US government on a possibility of Indian attack on Kahuta.

Another CIA memo to the chairman of the NIC also sent on April 17, 1981 illustrated that the agency
took the possibility of an attack seriously as it agreed to compile an intelligence assessment report on Indias
reactions to nuclear developments in Pakistan.

A memo issued on April 1, 1982, disclosed that after reviewing the situation, CIA officials concluded that
two key areas deserved continuing closescrutiny.

These were: (a) Indian perceptions of Pakistani acquisitions of missile materials and (b) nuclear weapons
development and fissile material availability in India for weapons production.
Other memos from the 1980s showed that the United States was so alarmed by the developing tensions with
regard to Indian and Pakistani nuclear programmes that it considered appointing a nuclear emissary to
the two countries.

AnotherTOP secret memorandum, dated September 6, 1985, showed that the proposal was discussed in
depth. The details were omitted from the released version.

A year before the CIAs Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis drafted the memo, then US
president Ronald Reagan warned Gen Ziaul Haq that India could take military action to pre-empt your
nuclear programme, according to state department documents declassified in 2015.

The memo noted that while Pakistanis will welcome an emissary, they will want assurances that the US
can deliver India on any specific measures.

Explaining why the Pakistanis could respond positively to the proposal, the CIA said Pakistan has little to
lose. Yet, a specific Pakistani reaction to the emissary will hinge on the Indian response.

The CIA, however, acknowledged that Pakistan would not give up its quest for a nuclear weapon because
India had already tested one.

The memo also analysed how India might have responded to the proposal to appoint a US nuclear emissary
and concluded that then Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi will avoid anything approaching agreement
to serious US involvement in the problem.

The CIA analysts said that they were not sanguine that even a meeting with Mr Gandhi will produce
positive results. The CIA noted that Mr Gandhi doubted the US desire to deal even-handedly with India
and Pakistan.

The memo stated that Mr Gandhi was looking at alternative approaches to the India-Pakistan nuclear
issue, including possibly arms control rather than non-proliferation.

The CIA believed that Mr Gandhi would be more willing to consider US efforts aimed at non-proliferation
if Washington acknowledged the right of non-aligned nations to increased participation in arms control
regimes.

Zia, Bhutto and Pakistans nuclear capabilities earn mention in CIA documents
The Central Intelligence Agencys (CIA) digital release earlier this month of
nearly 13 million pages of declassified documents from the 1940s to 1990s has
sparked international interest.

While headlines in American publications reporting the release are dominated

by mention of UFOs and the Stargate Project, the Indian media has discovered in the
declassified files how the CIA considered spiritual leader Sathya Sai Baba could start
world religion.

Funnily enough, one detailed country profile of 1971 India titled National
Intelligence Survey goes on at length about the countrys national character in the
following words: In order to offset the fear that they really may be inferior, however,
Indians are often so defensive touchy and sensitive that they appear to be
offensive, that is assertive, vain, and arrogant.

In the following paragraphs, the CIA report also notes, Indians have ability and
ingenuity but not a sense of immediacy It is not that Indian leaders are unconcerned
or unwilling to do the right thing, but their approach appears to be so relaxed that it
often frustrates even infuriates non-Indians.

If one types in the word Pakistan, the searchable database yields 1,233 results
ranging from declassified files on intelligence reports, newspaper clippings, country
profiles on geography and the armed forces and telegrams.

A dive into the trove reveals deliberations by CIA officers on Pak-US relations
against the backdrop of several historical events: Indo-Pak friction, Pakistans nuclear
programme development, Ziaul Haqs decision on Zulfikar Ali Bhuttos execution
and more.

One interesting, undated CIA intel report examines Pak-US ties against the backdrop
of India and USSR relations. It says, Pakistan is likely to continue basically pro-
Western, despite annoyance at the US part in the UN handling of Kashmir and at the
US position on North Africa in the UN.

A side note typed on the same document with a distinctly different font notes that,
Pakistans pro-Western orientation stems from her fear of India, and USSR rather
than any basic sympathy with capitalism or Christian civilisation. It is more negative
than positive.

Another handwritten scribble on the document notes: Pakistan is not likely to align
itself firmly with the West except in exchange for substantial benefits.

Other side notes on the document typed in apparent response to what the CIA deemed
as Pakistans response to communist control of Iran said Can we be sure?
Communist control of Iran will greatly step up Pakistans vulnerabilities.

Another interesting document that pops up in the Pakistan search is the debriefing of
US spy pilot Francis Gary Powers, where Powers is asked about his U-2 plane taking
off from a Peshawar airbase before it was caught.

The excerpts cited above are from declassified documents released by the CIA on its
website the Reading Room. Declassified documents were previously only available to
the public at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, accessible on
fourCOMPUTERS during business hours.
While a Moscow-based security adviser has questioned the authenticity of the
documents some of which are heavily redacted and branded them as fake or
misinformation, the CIA rebuts the allegations.

None of this is cherry-picked, CIA spokesperson Heather Fritz Horniak told CNN.
Its the full history. Its good and bad.

The fragile US-Pakistan relationship during the Soviet war in Afghanistan: reportAccording
to an Intelligence assessment report declassified by the CIA, Pakistans support for the
Afghan insurgents against the soviet occupation is based on a number of key factors,
that include:
A belief that if Soviets gain control over Afghanistan, they would use it to exert
influence in Balochistan as a means of influencing Pakistani politics.

The idea that continued support of the Afghan insurgents is that it provides
Pakistan with a basis to secure further military and financial assistance from
the United States, China, Saudi Arabia and Western Europe.

The fear of collusion between Moscow and New Delhi in the dismemberment of
the Pakistani state.

Screen grab from declassified report

Soviet pressure on Pakistan

According to the assessment, the soviets could respond by increasing support for
opposition groups in Pakistan in addition to stepping up military pressure along the
border.

The report goes on to discuss possible reasons why some Pakistani officials were
advocating a more lenient approach towards Kabul and Moscow. The reasons stated
in the document for this particular stance allege that continued opposition to the
Soviets endangers Pakistans security, claiming that Pakistan could not successfully
defend against a major Soviet incursion.

The report goes on to point that India remains Pakistans principal securitythreat and
sustained tensions along the Afghanistan border leave Islamabad vulnerable to
coordinated pressure from Moscow and New Delhi.
According to the report, some Pakistani Officials may also believe in a more flexible
approach towards Moscow due to the continued tensions between Pakistani citizens
and Afghan refugees that put local resources under increased burden. Furthermore,
should the US and the European Community opt for a reduction in tensions with the
Soviets, it could lead to a reduction in foreign support.

The importance of US military assistance

The declassified report claims that Pakistan views US military assistance as the
necessary underpinning to their Afghanistan Policy and that the acquisition of
modern weapons can prove vital to releasing pressure from the Soviets and India.

The sale of advanced weapons is the yardstick by which Islamabad measures US

support for Pakistans political and Security Interests. The assessment states that
any hesitation in military support provided by the US could ensure Pakistans doubts
about the reliability of US commitment in the region and could harm US interests.

If the US does not ensure continued military assistance and support to Islamabad, it
could strengthen the arguments for taking a moreaccommodating approach towards
Moscow and Kabul and result in a diminishing effect on the security of the
insurgents base and propaganda platform in Pakistan.

The report, however, does go on to point out that US willingness to provide modern
weapons to Pakistan could lead to increased regional tensions between India and
Pakistan until Pakistans defenses were strengthened with the delivery of most of
the US weapons in the mid-1980s. Continued US military support could also lead to
the Soviets increasing opposition to the Zia regime in Pakistan, according to the
report.

The Soviet threat

The intelligence assessment states that Pakistan believes the Soviets moved into
Afghanistan as part of a long-term strategy to gain access to the Persian Gulf and
the Indian Ocean. InLIGHT of this, the report believes, Pakistan worries that Soviet
success would lead to a major attack on Pakistan with the aim of seizing Baluchistan
and simultaneously cutting the strategic Karakoram highway to China and linking
with Indian forces in central Pakistan.
The assessment also claims that discussion between Pakistani and US officials
indicate that Pakistan fears USSR and Indian plans to dismember Pakistan into
ethnically based vassal states in Pashtunistan, Baluchistan, Sind, and the Punjab.

Pakistan's support of insurgents

The document shows that Pakistans support for the insurgents was crucial to US
interests in denying Soviets control of Afghanistan since Pakistan is a supply base
and a sanctuary for the insurgents, and Islamabad has allowed them to establish
training camps and receive foreign arms in the border regions. The assessment cites
cross-border infiltration of both insurgents and weapons as a major factor leading to
the success of the insurgency.

According to the intelligence assessment, the Soviets believe Pakistans Afghanistan

policies are personally linked to President Zia. It further goes on to state that the
Soviets had long standing relations with Baluch and Pashtun separatist groups and
could use them to gain leverage over Pakistans policies.

The US intelligence community however did not believe these groups to be strong
enough to threaten the Zia regime in Pakistan and that any efforts by the Soviets to
challenge the Zia regime would move Pakistan and the US closer to each other.

Reliability of the US as an ally

The report repeatedly points out Pakistans doubts about the reliability of the US as
an ally and that the longer the Soviets occupy Afghanistan, the more likely it may
become that the US withdraws its support for insurgents which would leave Pakistan
without any superpower support.

According to the report, these concerns on the part of Pakistan are rooted in the
legacy of the US as an armsSUPPLIER , specifically in hindsight of US arms
embargoes in the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971 and that many Pakistani
officials suspect US support for Pakistan is only a temporary expedient to oppose the
Soviets and any relief in tensions between the two would result in the isolation of
Pakistan.

The documents also point towards the lack for a solid commitment from China to
defend Pakistan, despite Chinas strong support.

Despite of the threats posed by continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan, threats of

direct action, and even suggestions that Kabul would recognize the Durand Line,
the intelligence assessment maintains that Pakistan has not compromised its stance
due to genuine consideration of policy alternatives and also to elicit more foreign
support, especially in military aid.

Pointing out implications for US policy, the intelligence assessment concludes that
any shift in Pakistans policy towards reconciliation with the Soviets or the Afghan
government would be a severe blow to the US in South Asia as it would legitimize a
Soviet backed government in Kabul.

The assessment also touches upon the opportunity cost of increased backing and
military aid to Pakistan as any such build up would further sour US relations with
India, in addition to increasing tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad.

Yahya is not an ogre

In a 1971 DIA Intelligence Appraisal report on the Indo-Pak situation, one

unidentified US ambassador writes to his/her government to apprise them of the
situation between India and PakistanSHORTLY before the fall of Dhaka.

The telegram, marked secret and stamped with the 'Department of State Telegram',
provides an interesting insight into the notes taken by a US ambassador at the time on
meetings with then Indian High Commissioner J K Atal as well as former President
Yahya Khan.

He [Atal] had begun his mission, he said, by a lengthy conversation with Azres.
Yahya, whom he discovered not repeat not to be quote an ogre unquote as reflected in
the Indian press and as characterised by various GOI officials at high levels. Rather,
he said, he found him to be, though bound by the complexes of a military mind,
extremely amenable to suggestion and most desirous of ameliorating the tensions
extant in the subcontinent.

As an example of Yahyas cooperativeness, Atal reported, he had concluded his

conversation with Yahya with a discussion of Yahyas forthcoming Eid message,
which in final published form contained certain statements actually dictated by Atal at
the time for inclusion therein.

Another telegram in the sameCHAIN includes the US ambassadors notes on Atals

meeting with Mrs Gandhi . Atal particularly emphasised the fact that India was not
seeking a break up of Pakistan and said that he was going to make clear this point
with sultan Khan when he saw him this afternoon.

I told him that I was surprised that the name Mujibur Rahman had not entered into
the message in as much as both his PM and foreign minister had repeatedly made
sheikh Mujibur Rahmans release a precondition to any dialogue towards political
settlement.

Atal disaffirmed this as a reflecting current thinking and said, in confidence, that as
far as he was concerned he thought Mujibur was a quote stupid fool unquote. He
added that, in his opinion, Mujibur and Bhutto were primarily responsible for the
present debacle.