Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 14

Filed 08/30/10 Page 1 of 17

FILED
2010 Aug-30 AM 09:25 U.S. DISTRICT COURT N.D. OF ALABAMA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA WESTERN DIVISION

WILLIAM JOHNSON, ANNIE PEARL LEFTWICH, BOBBI MORGAN, DONALD MEANS, ERNEST EDMONDS, FAIRY GORDON, IRIS SERMON, JOHNNY BUTLER, MERJEAN LITTLE, MOSES JONES, VASSIE BROWN, WILLIE MAE REEVES, BEVERLY GORDON, JOHNNY B. MORROW, FANNIE ISHMAN, LESLIE CHEATEM, MARGIE JAMES, BOBBY SINGLETON, A. J. MCCAMBELL, JOHNNY FORD, LOUIS MAXWELL, MARY RUTH WOODS, LISA M. WARE, CLARA P. GRIMMETT, CHARLES CHAMBLISS, JOHNNIE B. HARRISON, G. DYANN ROBINSON, SHIRLEY W. CURRY, SARAH STRINGER, MILES D. ROBINSON, and WILLIE LEE PATTERSON, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. BOB RILEY, in his individual capacity and in his official capacity as Governor of Alabama, and JOHN M. TYSON, JR., individually and in his official capacity as special prosecutor and task force commander of the Governor’s Task Force on Illegal Gaming, Defendants.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Civil Action No. 7:10-cv-02067-SLB 3-judge court

PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 14

Filed 08/30/10 Page 2 of 17

Plaintiffs William Johnson et al., through undersigned counsel, respond as follows to defendants’ motion to dismiss, Doc. 13. As we will show, defendants’ motion demonstrates that Governor Riley’s Executive Order 44 and Task Force raids are changes affecting voting and that plaintiffs are not asking this Court to resolve, as defendants argue, a “question of what constitutes illegal gambling under Alabama law.” Doc. 13 at 3. I. EXECUTIVE ORDER 44 AND THE TASK FORCE IT AUTHORIZES HAVE EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE ELECTORATE WHO MAY APPROVE LOCAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 743 AND 744. Defendants’ state correctly that “the Department of Justice has not precleared the substance of these amendments under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act.” Doc. 13 at 7. Rather, when the U.S. Attorney General precleared Amendments 743 and 744, he was preclearing the “schedul[ing]” of referendum elections solely by the voters in Greene County and Macon County to approve their adoption.1 The composition of the electorate empowered to adopt local amendments to the Alabama Constitution had been the subject of Amendment 555, which in 1994 for

“This refers to Act Nos. 2003-75, 2003-124, 2003-189, 2003-377, and 2003-433, which schedule the November 4, 2003, special constitutional amendment elections in Conecuh, Macon, Marshall, Tallapoosa, and Greene Counties, and Act No. 2003-287, which schedules the November 18, 2003, special constitutional amendment election in Chambers County, Alabama, submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973c.” Doc. 12-2 at 1.

1

Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 14

Filed 08/30/10 Page 3 of 17

the first time in Alabama history authorized counties to exercise a degree of “home rule” without first seeking the approval of a statewide electorate. When the U.S. Attorney General precleared Amendment 555, he was concerned only that this revolutionary constitutional provision be faithfully implemented, so that matters affecting only one county be voted on by that county’s electorate, not by a statewide electorate.2 This voting rights concern would be present whether a local constitutional amendment authorized or prohibited bingo or the sale of alcohol or dogs off leash or anything else.

2

As the Assistant Attorney General’s letter stated:

The provisions of Act No. 94-611 are viewed as enabling. Thus, the scheduling of future local constitutional amendment referenda will be subject to Section 5 preclearance. See 28 C.F.R. 51.15, 51.17. In addition, it appears that one other matter may still be unresolved with regard to the Attorney General’s January 31, 1994, section 5 objection to the prior procedure for calling referenda on local constitutional amendments (i.e the objection to Amendment 425 to the Alabama Constitution insofar as it provided that such a referendum could not be held unless it was first approved by the Local Constitutional Amendment Commission). We understand that a number of local amendments proposed by the legislature were vetoed by the Commission, and that the changes reflected in those amendments have not been subsequently adopted. We ask that the state provide a listing of these amendments (with copies of them), and that the state advise us in writing as to its view as to their current status under Section 5 and Alabama law. Doc. 12-1 at 1-2.
3

Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 14

Filed 08/30/10 Page 4 of 17

Governor Riley believes that the electronic bingo machines operating under the authority of Amendments 743 and 744 and the Sheriffs’ regulations promulgated pursuant to those amendments violate an anti-lottery provision in the original 1901 Alabama Constitution and Alabama Supreme Court decisions interpreting it. Doc. 13 at 5-6.3 He objected to “‘an obvious lack of uniformity’ in the enforcement of Alabama’s gambling laws against these machines ‘from county to county.’” Doc. 13 at 10 (quoting Doc. 13-1 at 3) (bold emphasis added). He issued Executive Order 44 and created the Task Force “for the purpose of promoting and supporting uniform statewide enforcement of Alabama’s anti-gambling laws.” Doc. 13 at 10 (quoting Doc. 13-1 at 3) (bold emphases added). Thus, it is Governor Riley’s view that electronic bingo can only be

Indeed, Governor Riley’s motion restates his position that all electronic bingo machines are categorically unlawful. Doc. 13 at 12. This is the position he took most recently in the Alabama Supreme Court. Ex parte State ex rel. Riley v. Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc., 2010 WL 2034825 (Ala., May 21, 2010) at *24 (“The Governor has taken the position that the term ‘bingo’ in the local amendments is a reference to the game traditionally known as bingo, i.e., a game that is not played by or within the electronic or computerized circuitry of a machine, but one that is played on physical cards (typically made of cardboard or paper) and that requires meaningful interaction between those who are playing and someone responsible for calling out the randomly drawn designations corresponding to designations on the players’ cards.”). In an earlier case Governor Riley had not taken this hard stance. Barber v. Cornerstone Community Outreach, Inc., 2009 WL 3805712 (Ala., Nov. 13, 2009) at *11 (“For purposes of the present case, the Riley defendants do not contend that a ‘bingo game’ must be played only on paper cards, and we, therefore, do not address that issue.”).
4

3

Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 14

Filed 08/30/10 Page 5 of 17

approved by a statewide electorate and that electorates composed solely of voters in Greene County and Macon County do not have the power to approve electronic bingo. That is Governor Riley’s explicit purpose for his actions, and that is the ultimate effect of his actions. As defendants must concede, Doc. 13 at 18, one of the four typologies of “factual contexts” that constitute changes affecting voting, and thus fall within the coverage of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, are “changes in the composition of the electorate that may vote for candidates for a given office.” Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 502-03 (1992). In the instant case, defendant Riley, relying on the authority he claims to have been given him by a statewide electorate, is implementing a change in the composition of the electorate that may approve a constitutional amendment authorizing electronic bingo in Greene County and Macon County. For purposes of enforcing the Voting Rights Act, there is no material difference between voting for a candidate for office and voting to adopt a local constitutional amendment. To enforce § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, this Court is not required to inquire into, much less to resolve, disputes about the validity of electronic bingo under state law. The U.S. Supreme Court has “established that an election practice may be ‘in force or effect’ for § 5 purposes despite its illegality under state law if, as a
5

Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 14

Filed 08/30/10 Page 6 of 17

practical matter, it was ‘actually in effect.’” Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 128 S.Ct. 1970, 1984 (2008) (citations omitted). Defendant Riley does not and cannot dispute the fact, as alleged in the complaint, that Amendments 743 and 744 and the Sheriffs’ regulations promulgated as required by those amendments have actually been in force and effect since 2003.4 They have never been invalidated in a judicial proceeding, unlike the statute at issue in Riley v. Kennedy. Governor Riley failed to procure a statewide constitutional amendment in 2006 that would have overruled Local Amendments 743 and 744. See Doc. 4 at 13 and Doc. 12-3. Instead, Governor Riley claimed executive authority to “create” his Executive Macon County Greyhound Park, Inc. v. Knowles, --- So.3d ----, 2009 WL 4016073 (Ala., Nov. 20, 2009) at *1 (bold emphasis added) (“In force at all times relevant to this action were the ‘Second Amended and Restated Bingo Regulations for the Licensing and Operation of Bingo Games in Macon County’ (“the sheriff's regulations”), promulgated by the Macon County sheriff pursuant to Amendment No. 744.”); accord, Hope for Families & Community Service, Inc. v. Warren, --F.Supp.2d ----, 2010 WL 2629408 (M.D.Ala., June 30, 2010) at *46. See also Macon County Investments, Inc. v. Warren, 2007 WL 3441995 (M.D.Ala., Jan. 5, 2009) at *1, aff’d 306 Fed.Appx. 478, 2009 WL 19346 (11th Cir. 2009) (“In reciting the facts, the court construes the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovants. Amendment 744 to the Alabama Constitution made the operation of bingo gaming by nonprofit organizations legal in Macon County, Alabama. Ala. Const. Amend. No. 744. Amendment 744 also authorized the sheriff of Macon County to ‘promulgate rules and regulations for the licensing and operation of bingo games within the county.’” Id.). The regulations of the Greene County Sheriff are attached to this brief as Exhibit A, and the regulations of the Macon County Sheriff are Exhibit B.
4

6

Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 14

Filed 08/30/10 Page 7 of 17

Order and Task Force in 2008, Doc. 13 at 9, and he proceeded to “seiz[e],” Doc. 13 at 12, the electronic bingo machines that had been operating under the regulations and enforcement powers of the Sheriffs of Greene and Macon Counties for over six years. Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, this Court is not concerned about whether or not defendants Riley and Tyson have “misinterpreted the ‘bingo’ amendments found in the Alabama Constitution.” Doc. 13 at 16. Its sole concern is whether by implementing their “interpretation” of the Alabama Constitution defendants have changed a policy or practice that has been in force and effect for over six years. Even if the Alabama Supreme Court, not Governor Riley, had declared the operation of electronic bingo machines under Amendments 743 and 744 invalid – which it has not done, the change in standards, practices, or procedures effected by the ruling would have been subject to § 5 preclearance. “We have also stated that the preclearance requirement encompasses ‘voting changes mandated by order of a state court.’” Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S.Ct. at 1982 (citing Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 262, (2003); Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 265-266, and n. 16 (1982)). To the extent the Alabama Supreme Court rulings uphold Governor Riley’s discretionary exercise of his executive powers to issue and to implement Executive Order 44, see Doc. 4-1, those rulings too must receive § 5 preclearance before they
7

Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 14

Filed 08/30/10 Page 8 of 17

may be enforced. Defendants assert that “Plaintiffs’ reading of § 5 would affirmatively preclude the Governor from fulfilling his constitutional obligation to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed.’ ALA. CONST. Art V, § 120.” Doc. 13 at 22. But the undisputed facts show that defendant Riley has not attempted to enforce the provisions of Amendments 743 and 744 and the Sheriffs’ regulations promulgated under them. Instead, he has attempted to veto or to nullify those local amendments and regulations, effectively denying the right to vote of the county electorates who approved them. Under the Voting Rights Act, this Court must look to the practical effects of the discretionary action of executive or administrative officials to determine whether they affect the right to vote. Given the Voting Rights Act’s aim of preventing “the subtle, as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens their right to vote because of their race,” the Supreme Court has broadly construed what constitutes a “change” under Section 5. Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 501-03, 112 S.Ct. 820, 117 L.Ed.2d 51 (1992) (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 89 S.Ct. 817, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969) and listing post-Allen cases). Changes may be “informal as well as formal changes.” Foreman v. Dallas County, 521 U.S. 979, 980, 117 S.Ct. 2357, 138 L.Ed.2d 972 (1997) (quoting NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 178, 105 S.Ct. 1128, 84 L.Ed.2d 124 (1985)). They may alter an election law in only “a minor way.” Presley, 502 U.S. at 501, 112 S.Ct. 820 (quoting Allen, 393 U.S. at 566, 89 S.Ct. 817). And they may even include “an administrative effort to comply with a statute that had already received clearance,” or legislation passed “in an attempt to comply with provisions of the Act.”
8

Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 14

Filed 08/30/10 Page 9 of 17

Foreman, 521 U.S. at 980, 117 S.Ct. 2357 (quoting NAACP, 470 U.S. at 178, 105 S.Ct. 1128); Allen, 393 U.S. at 565 n. 3, 89 S.Ct. 817. “Nor does it matter for the preclearance requirement whether the change works in favor of, works against, or is neutral in its impact upon the ability of minorities to vote. It is change that invokes the preclearance process; evaluation of that change concerns the merits of whether the change should in fact be precleared.” Young, 520 U.S. at 285, 117 S.Ct. 1228 (citations omitted). Connors v. Bennett, 202 F.Supp.2d 1308, 1317 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (3-judge court) (per Hull, J.). See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964) (“One must be ever aware that the Constitution forbids ‘sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of discrimination.’”) (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 342 (1960)). Governor Riley is not enforcing Amendments 743 and 744 or the Sheriffs’ regulations. Instead, defendant Riley has decided to use the raw power of his executive office to overrule the voters of Greene County and Macon County, to nullify their constitutional choice of electronic bingo operations in their counties, and to impose the “uniform statewide” policy he prefers. This is a change affecting voting in the most fundamental way. II. UNDER THE HOLDING AND RATIONALE OF PRESLEY, DEFENDANT RILEY HAS DE FACTO REPLACED AN ELECTED OFFICIAL WITH AN APPOINTED OFFICIAL. This is an alternative reason for finding that defendants’ actions are changes that affect voting within the meaning of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Defendants’
9

Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 14

Filed 08/30/10 Page 10 of 17

motion to dismiss misreads Presley v. Etowah County Comm’n as holding that absolutely no transfer of power from an elected to an appointed official can ever constitute a change affecting voting. Doc. 13 at 20. But a careful reading of the Presley opinion shows that defendant Riley’s appointment of the Mobile County District Attorney to enforce Amendments 743 and 744 constitutes “a de facto replacement of an elective office with an appointive one, within the rule of Bunton v. Patterson[, 393 U.S. 544 (1969)].” Presley, 502 U.S. at 508.5 First, said the Presley Court, the Etowah County Common Fund Resolution, which transferred powers among members of the county commission, has no connection to voting procedures: It does not affect the manner of holding elections, it alters or imposes no candidacy qualifications or requirements, and it leaves undisturbed the composition of the electorate. It also has no bearing on the substance of voting power, for it does not increase or diminish the number of officials for whom the electorate may vote. Rather, the Common Fund Resolution concerns the internal operations of an elected body. 502 U.S. at 569-70 (bold emphases added). By contrast, as we showed in the preceding section of this brief, Executive Order 44 does effectively change the composition of the electorate empowered to choose which official will enforce the provisions of these two local constitutional amendments. As a practical matter,

Bunton v. Patterson was one of four cases consolidated and decided as Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 89 S.Ct. 817, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969).
10

5

Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 14

Filed 08/30/10 Page 11 of 17

Amendments 743 and 744 create new constitutional offices to regulate and to enforce their provisions, and they designate the elected Sheriffs of Greene and Macon Counties to fill those offices. Defendant Riley’s executive order has created the office of Task Force Commander, has given that officer authority over the officer designated by the constitutional amendments, and has filled that office with a district attorney elected in Mobile County. This diminishes the number of officials for whom the electorates of Greene and Macon Counties may vote by de facto replacing the elected office they created by constitutional amendment with an appointed office. This goes way beyond merely changing the internal operations of an elected body such as the Etowah County Commission. The Presley plaintiffs failed to provide the Court with what the majority considered to be “a workable standard for distinguishing between changes in rules governing voting and changes in the routine organization and functioning of government.” 502 U.S. at 504 (bold emphasis added). The Court refused to adopt a rule that every time a state legislature acts to diminish or increase the power of local officials, preclearance would be required. Governmental action decreasing the power of local officials could carry with it a potential for discrimination against those who represent racial minorities at the local level. At the same time, increasing the power of local officials will entail a relative decrease in the power of state officials, and that too could carry with it a potential for discrimination against state officials who represent racial minorities at the state level. The all but
11

Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 14

Filed 08/30/10 Page 12 of 17

limitless minor changes in the allocation of power among officials and the constant adjustments required for the efficient governance of every covered State illustrate the necessity for us to formulate workable rules to confine the coverage of § 5 to its legitimate sphere: voting. Changes which affect only the distribution of power among officials are not subject to § 5 because such changes have no direct relation to, or impact on, voting. The Etowah County Commission’s Common Fund Resolution was not subject to the preclearance requirement. 502 U.S. at 505-06 (bold emphases added). No one could argue that Governor Riley’s appointment of a Task Force Commander was a “minor” change “in the routine organization and functioning of government” or that it merely redistributed power among officials who are members of the same local government body. To the contrary, the Alabama Supreme Court has said that Alabama governors invoke law enforcement powers like those in defendant Riley’s Executive Order 44 only in “rare cases.” Tyson v. Jones, __ So.2d __, No. 1090878 (Ala., July 30, 2010) slip op. at 39, Doc. 4-1. And the Task Force Commander is not a member of a local government body. Second, applying the same reasoning employed in its discussion of Etowah County, the Presley Court held that the creation of a unit system of road maintenance in Russell County and the transfer of power to supervise road crews from individual county commissioners to an appointed county engineer was not a change affecting voting.
12

Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 14

Filed 08/30/10 Page 13 of 17

[I]t might be argued that the delegation of authority to an appointed official is similar to the replacement of an elected official with an appointed one, the change we held subject to § 5 in Bunton v. Patterson. This approach, however, would ignore the rationale for our holding: “[A]fter the change, [the citizen] is prohibited from electing an officer formerly subject to the approval of the voters.” Allen, 393 U.S., at 569-570, 89 S.Ct., at 833-834. In short, the change in Bunton v. Patterson involved a rule governing voting not because it effected a change in the relative authority of various governmental officials, but because it changed an elective office to an appointive one. The change in Russell County does not prohibit voters “from electing an officer formerly subject to the[ir] approval.” Allen, supra, 393 U.S., at 570, 89 S.Ct., at 834. Both before and after the change the citizens of Russell County were able to vote for the members of the Russell County Commission. To be sure, after the 1979 resolution each commissioner exercised less direct authority over road operations, that authority having been delegated to an official answerable to the commission. But as we concluded with respect to Etowah County, the fact that an enactment alters an elected official’s powers does not in itself render the enactment a rule governing voting. 502 U.S. at 506-07 (bold emphases added). The Court then set out the express exception that plaintiffs in the instant action rely on: We need not consider here whether an otherwise uncovered enactment of a jurisdiction subject to the Voting Rights Act might under some circumstances rise to the level of a de facto replacement of an elective office with an appointive one, within the rule of Bunton v. Patterson. For present purposes it suffices to note that the Russell County Commission retains substantial authority, including the power to appoint the county engineer and to set his or her budget. The change at issue in Russell County is not a covered change. 502 U.S. at 508. In Bunton v. Patterson the Court addressed a Mississippi statute that changed the office of school superintendent in eleven counties from an elected
13

Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 14

Filed 08/30/10 Page 14 of 17

to an appointed position. It held: In [Bunton] an important county officer in certain counties was made appointive instead of elective. The power of a citizen’s vote is affected by this amendment; after the change, he is prohibited from electing an officer formerly subject to the approval of the voters. Such a change could be made either with or without a discriminatory purpose or effect; however, the purpose of § 5 was to submit such changes to scrutiny. Allen, 393 U.S. at 569-70. Thus, contrary to defendants’ contention, Presley did not lay down “a brightline rule.” Doc. 13 at 19. Instead, it instructed lower courts to consider “the rationale for our holding,” 502 U.S. at 506, and to assess the facts of each case in the light of that rationale. This Court should perform the same analysis of the facts here as did the district court in Connors v. Bennett to determine whether, as a practical matter, Governor Riley’s appointment of a Task Force Commander to take control of enforcing the constitution and laws of Alabama regarding electronic bingo in Greene and Macon Counties amounted to a de facto replacement of elected officials with an appointed official. Those facts show that the elected Sheriffs do not “retain[] substantial authority, including the power to appoint the [Task Force Commander] and to set his or her budget,” as did the Russell County Commissioners in Presley. 502 U.S. at 508. And, on motion of defendant Riley, the Alabama Supreme Court has ordered the Sheriffs to stand aside for the Task
14

Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 14

Filed 08/30/10 Page 15 of 17

Force Commander and to cease proceeding with the law enforcement actions they had already begun. See Docs. 1-1, 1-2, 1-3, and 4-1. These circumstances constitute a de facto replacement of officials constitutionally designated by and elected by the voters of Greene County and Macon County with an official appointed by the Governor over whom those voters have absolutely no control. They are changes that affect voting within the meaning of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. III. THIS THREE-JUDGE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO RULE ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS THE REMAINING FEDERAL CLAIMS. This three-judge court has jurisdiction to address only the limited question whether the standards, practices, and procedures challenged in the complaint are changes that affect voting within the meaning of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Presley, 502 U.S. at 495. It should reserve defendants’ arguments about the sufficiency of the claims pleaded under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973; the Ku Klux Klan Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States for consideration in the event this action is remanded to the single-judge court. CONCLUSION
15

Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 14

Filed 08/30/10 Page 16 of 17

This Court should schedule a hearing at the earliest possible date to consider both the defendants’ motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs’ motion for an expedited hearing and issuance of a preliminary injunction. This three-judge court should also consider advancing the trial on the merits and consolidating it with the hearing on motion for preliminary injunction, pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. Following such hearing, the motion to dismiss should be denied, and the motion for preliminary injunction restoring the status quo ante in Greene County and Macon County should be granted. Respectfully submitted this 30th day of August, 2010, s/Edward Still Bar No. ASB-4786-I 47W 2112 11th Avenue South Suite 541 Birmingham, AL 35205 205-320-2882 fax 205-449-9752 E-mail: still@votelaw.com James U. Blacksher Bar No. ASB-2381-S82J P.O. Box 636 Birmingham AL 35201 205-591-7238 Fax: 866-845-4395 E-mail: jblacksher@ns.sympatico.ca Fred D. Gray Bar No. ASB-1727-R63F Gray, Langford, Sapp, McGowan, Gray & Nathanson P. O. Box 830239 Tuskegee , AL 36083-0239 334-727-4830 Fax: 334-727-5877 E-mail: fgray@glsmgn.com CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
16

Attorneys for plaintiffs

Case 7:10-cv-02067-SLB Document 14

Filed 08/30/10 Page 17 of 17

I hereby certify that on August 30, 2010, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following counsel of record: Henry T. Reagan (REA021) OFFICE OF GOVERNOR BOB RILEY 600 Dexter Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130 Martha Tierney (TIE001) OFFICE OF GOVERNOR BOB RILEY 600 Dexter Avenue Montgomery, Alabama 36130

Notice of this filing has also been sent by email and first class postage to: Hon. Troy King Attorney General 500 Dexter Ave. Montgomery AL 36130 Respectfully submitted, s/Edward Still Bar No. ASB-4786-I 47W 2112 11th Avenue South Suite 541 Birmingham, AL 35205 205-320-2882 fax 205-449-9752 E-mail: still@votelaw.com

17

Master your semester with Scribd & The New York Times

Special offer for students: Only $4.99/month.

Master your semester with Scribd & The New York Times

Cancel anytime.