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COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

RECUEIL DES ARRETS,


AVIS CONSULTATIFS E T ORDONNANCES

RPARATION D E S DOMMAGES
SUBIS AU S E R V I C E
D E S NATIONS UNIES
AVIS CONSULTATIF DU 11 AVRIL 1949

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

REPORTS O F JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS

REPARATION F O R INJURIES
SUFFERED IN THE SERVICE
OF T H E U N I T E D N A T I O N S
ADVISORY OPINION OF APRIL llth, 1949

I
LEYDE LEYDEN
SOCIT D'DITIONS A. W. SIJTHOFF'S
A. W. SIJTHOFF PUBLISHING COMPANY
Le prsent avis doit tre cit comme suit:
a Rkfiaration des dommages subis a u service des Nations Unies,
Avis consultatif: C . I . J . Recueil 1949. fi. 174. ))

This Opinion should be cited as follows :


"Reparation for i n j ~ r i e ssugered in the service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion: I.C. J . R e p o ~ t s1949,p. 174."

1 NO de vente :
mes,umkr 17 1
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

1949.
April I th.
General List
YEAR 1949. No. 4.

April llth, 1949.

REPARATION FOR INJURIES


SUFFERED IN THE SERVICE
OF THE UNITED NAl-IONS

l~tjrivies sttgered by agents of United Nations i n course of per-


formance of dttties.-Damage to United Nations.-Dafnage fo agents.
-Capacity of United Nations to bring claims for re#avation due
i n respect of both.-International personality of United Nattons.-
Capacity as necessary implication arising from CAnrtev and actiaities
of United Nations.-Functional protection of agents.-Clnim against
a Mevnber of the United 1Vations.-Claim against n non-~izew~bcv.-
Reconciliation of claim by ?zutional State and claim by United Natzons.
-Clailn by United Nations ngainst agent's national Statr.

ADVISORY OPINION.

Present : President BASDEVANT


; Vice-President GUERRERO;
Judges ALVAREZ,FABELA, HACKWORTH, WINIARSKI,
ZORICIC,DE VISSCHER,
Sir Arnold MCNAIR,KLAESTAD,
BADAWIPASHA,KRYLOV,READ, HSU MO, AZEVEDO.
OPIN. O F I I I V 49 (REP.IKATIOS FOR ISJCKIICS SCPFERED) I7j

THE COURT,
composed a s above,
gives t h e folloming ad1-iory opinion :

On Decenlber 3rd, 1948, the General Xssc.mbl'- of t h , Uilitccl


Nations adopted t h e following Kcsolution :
"LVhereas the series of tragic el*ents ahicli 1iax.e lately befallen
agents of the United Nations engaged in the performance of tlieir
duties raises, with greater urgency than ever, the question of
the arrangements to be made by the l-nited Sations with a view
to ensuring to its agents the fiillest Ineasiire o f protection in the
future and ensiiring that reparation be made for the injuries
suffered ; and
\Vhereas it is highly desirable tliat the Secretar\.-Gc~itralslioiiltl
be able t o act withoiit question as eificacioiisly as possible \vit11
a view to obtaining any reparation dile ; tlieretore
The General Assenlbly
Decides to siibmit the following legal questions to tlie Inter-
national Court of Justice for an acivisor>- opinion :
'1. I n the event of an agent of the United Xatioiis in the
performance of his duties suffering injury in circiimstances
iilvolving the responsibility of a State, has the United Sations,
as an Or-ganization, the capacity to bring an interiiatio~ia:
claim against the responsible de jure or de facto governilient
with a view t o obtaining the reparation due in respect o f tlie
clamage caused (a) to the United Xations, ( h ) to tlie \ictini
or to perons entitled tlirough him ?
II. I n the event of an affirmative reply on point 1 ( b ) , how
is action by the United Nations to be reconcilecl \vit11 siicli
rights as niay be possessed hy the State of wliicli the xictini
is a national ?'
Instructs the Secretary-General, after the Court lias gi\-en its
opinion, t o prepare proposais in the liglit of tliat opinion, and to
submit thein to the General Assembly at its nest regiilar session."

I n a letter of December 4th, 1948, filed in the Registry on


December 7 t h , t h e Secretary-General of the United ,Vations for-
warded t o t h e Court a certified true copy of the liesoliitioii of
t h e General Assembly. On December ~ o t h i11 , accor(1ance n i t h
paragraph I of Article 66 of the Statute, the Kegistrar gave notice
of the Request t o al1 States entitled t o appear before t h e Court.
On Ilecember r ~ t h ,b y ineans of a special and direct commiini-
cation a s provided in paragraph 2 of Article 66, he informed these
States t h n t , in a n Ortler made on the sanie date, the Court had
5
stated that it was prepared to receive written statements on the
questions before February q t h , 1949, and to hear oral statements
on March 7th, 1949.
Written statements were received from the following States :
India, China, United States of Amenca, United Kingdom of
Great Bntain and Northern Ireland, and France. These state-
ments were communicated to al1 States entitled to appear before the
Court and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 111
the meantime, the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
having regard to Article 65 of the Statute (paragraph 2 of which
provides that every- question submitted for an opinion shall be
accompanied by al1 documents likely to throw light upon it), had
sent to the Registrar the documents whkh are enumerated in the
list annexed to this Opinion.
Furthermore, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and
the Governments of the French Republic, of the United Kingdom
and of the Kingdom of Belgium informed the Court that they
had designated representatives to present oral statements.

In the course of public sittings held on March 7th, 8th and gth,
1949, the Court heard the oral statements presented
on bel-ialf of the Secretary-General of the United Nations by
Mr. Ivan Kerno, Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the
Legal Department as his Representative, and by Mr. A. H. Feller,
Principal Director of that Department, as Counsel ;
on behalf of the Government of the Kingdom of Kelgiurn, by
M. Georges Kaeckenbeeck, D.C.L., Minister Plenipotentiary of
His Majesty the King of the Belgians, Head of the Divisioii for
Peace Conferences and International Organization at the JIinistry
for Foreign Affairs, Member of the Permanent Court of Xrbitration ;
on behalf of the Government of the French Iiepublic, by
M. Charles Chaumont, Professor of Public International Law a t
the Faculty of Law, Nancy ; Legai Adviser to the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs ;
on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland by Mr. G. G. Fitzmaurice, Second
Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office.

The first question asked of the Court is as folbws :


"In the event of an agent of the Cnited Sations in tlie per-
formance of his duties suffering injury in circumstances involving
the responsibility of a State, has the United Xations, as an
Organization, the capacit!. to bring an international clnini :igain.;t
O
the responsible de jure or de incfo government with a view to
obtaining the reparation due in respect of the damage caused
( a ) to the United Nations, (b) to the victim or to perons entitled
throiigh him ?"
I t will be useful to make the follolving preliminary observations :

(a) The Organization of the United Kations \vil1 be referred to


usually, but not invariably, as "the Organization".

( b ) Questions 1 (a) and 1 (b) refer to "an international claim


against the responsible de iure or de facto government". The Court
understands that these questions are directed to claims against a
State, and will, therefore, in this opinion, use the expression "State"
or "clefendant State".
(c) The Court uilderstands the word "agent" in the most liberal
sense, that is to say, any person who, whether a paid officia1 or not,
and whether permariently employed or not, has been charged by
an organ of the Organization with carrying out, or helping to carry
out, one of its functions-in short, any person through ~vhomit acts.
( d ) As this question assumes an injury suffered in such circum-
stances as to involve a State's responsibility, it must be supposed,
for the purpose of this Opinion, that the damage results from a
failure by the State to perform obligations of which the purpose
is to protect the agents of the Organization iil the performance of
their duties.
(e) The position of a defendant State which is not a member of
the Organization is dealt with later, and for the present the Court
will assume that the defendant State is a Member of the Organization.

The questions asked of the Court relate to the "capacity to bring


an international claim" ; accordingly, ive must begin by defining
what is meant by that ccipacitj', and coiisider the characteristics
of the Organization, so as to determine whether, in general, these
characteristics do, or do not, iiicIiide for the Organization a right to
present an international claim.

Competence to bring an international claim is, for those possessirig


it, the capacity to resort to the customary methods recognized by
international law for the establishment, the preseritation and the
settlement of claims. Among these inethods inay be nit,iitioned
protest, request for an enquiry, negotiation, and reqiiest for sub-
mission to an arbitral tribunal or to the Court in so far as this may
be authorized by the Statute.
This capacity certainly belongs to the State ; a Statcl cari briiig an
international claim against another State. Such a claim takes the
form of a claim between two political entitit.5, cqiial i i l la\\., similar
OPIN. O F II I V 49 (REPSRATION FOR I N J U R I E S SGFFERED) 178
in form, and both the direct subjects of international law. I t is
dealt with by means of negotiation, and cannot, in the present state
of the law as to international jurisdiction, be submitted to a tribunal,
except with the consent of the States concerned.

When the Organization brings a claim against one of its Members,


this claim will be presented in the same manner, and regulated
by the same procedure. I t may, when necessary, be supported
by the political means a t the disposa1 of the Organization. I n
these ways the Orgznization would find a method for securing
the observance of its rights by the Member against which it has
a claim.
But, in the international sphere, has the Organization such
a nature as involves the capacity to bring an international clnim ?
I n order to answer this question, the Court must first enquire
whether the Charter has given the Organization such a position
that it possesses, in regard to its Members, rights which it is entitled
to ask them to respect. I n other words, does the Organization
possess international personality ? This is no doubt a doctrinal
expression, which has so,netimes given rise to controversy. But
it will be used here to mean that if the Organization is recognized
as having that personality, it is an entity capable of availing itself
of obligations incumbent upon its Members.
To answer this question, which is not settled by the actual
terms of the Charter, we must consider what characteristics it
was intended thereby t o give to the Organization.
The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily
identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their
nature depends upon the needs of the community. Throughout
its history, r;ie development of international law has been influenced
by the requirements of international life, and the progressive
increase in the collective activities of States has already given rise
to instances of action upon the international plane by certain
entities which are not States. This development culminated
in the establishment in June 1945 of an international organization
whose purposes and principles are specified in the Charter of the
United Nations. But to achieve these ends the attribution of
international personality is indispensable.
The Charter has not been content to make the Organization
created by it merely a centre "for harmonizing the actions of nations
in the attainment of these common ends" (Article 1, para. 3).
It has equipped that centre with organs, and has given it special
tasks. It has defined the position of the Members in relation to
the Organization by requiring them to give it every assistance in
any action undertaken by it (Article 2, para. 5), and to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council ; by authorizing the
General Assembly to make recornmendations to the Members ;
S
damage caused by the injury of an agent of the Organization in
the course of the performance of his duties. Whereas a State
possesses the totality of international nghts and duties recognized
by international law, the rights and duties of an entity such as
the Organization must depend upon its purposes and functions
as specified or implied in its constituent documents and developed
in practice. The functions of the Organization are of such a
character that they could not be effectively discharged if they
involved the concurrent action, on the international plane, of
fifty-eight or more Foreign Offices, and the Court concludes that
the Members h a ~ eendowed the Organization with capacity to
bring international claims when necessitated by the discharge of
its functions.
What is the position as regards the claims mentioned in the
request for an opinion ? Question 1 is divided into two points.
which must be considered in turn.

Question 1 (a) is as follows :


"In the event of an agent of the United Nations in the per-
formance of his duties suffering injury in circumstances involving
the responsibility of a State, has the United' Nations, as an
Organization, the capacity to bring an international claim against
the responsible de jure or de facto government with a view to
obtaining the reparation due in respect of the damage caused
(a) to the United Nations .... ?"
The question is concerned solely with the reparation of damage
caused to the Organization when one of its agents suffers injury at
the same tirne. I t cannot be doubted that the Organization has the
capacity to bnng an international claim against one of its Mem-
bers which has caused injury to it by a breach of its international
obligations towards it. The damage specified in Question 1 (a)
means exclusively damage caused to the interests of the Organiza-
tion itself, to its administrative machine, to its property and
assets, and to the interests of which it is the guardian. I t is clear
that the Organization has the capacity to bring a claim for tliis
damage. As the claim is based on the breach of an international
obligation on the part of the Member held responsible by the Organ-
ization, the Member cannot contend that this obligation is governed
by municipal law, and the Organization is justified in giving its
claim the character of an international claim.
When the Organization has sustained damage resulting from a
breach by a Member of its international obligations, it is impossible
t o see how it can obtain reparation unless it possesses capacity to
bring an international claim. I t cannot be supposed that in such
an event al1 the Members of the Organization, Save the defendant
IO
OPIN. OF I I IV 49 (REPARATION FOR INJURIES SUFFERED) 181
State, must combine to bring a claim against the defendant for the
damage suffered by the Organization.

The Court is not called upon to determine the precise extent of


the reparation which the Organization would be entitled to recover.
I t may, however, be said that the measure of the reparation should
depend upon the amount of the damage which the Organization
has suffered as the result of the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant State and should be calculated in accordance with the
rules of international law. Amongst other things, this damage
would include the reimbursement of any reasonable compensation
which the Organization had to pay to its agent or to persons entitled
through him. Again, the death or disablement of one of its agents
engaged upon a distant mission might involve very considerable
expenditure in replacing him. These are mere illustrations, and
the Court cannot pretend to forecast al1 the kinds of damage which
the Organization itself might sustain.

Question 1 (b) is as follows :


...."has the United Nations, as an Organization,,the capacity to
bring an international claim .... in respect of the damage caiised
.... (b) to the victim or to persons entitled through him ? "
I n dealing with the question of law which arises out of Question
1 (b), it is unnecessary to repeat the consideations which led to an
affirmative answer being given to Question 1 (a). It can now be
assumed that the Organization has the capacity to bring a claim on
the international plane, to negotiate, to conclude a special agreement
and t o prosecute a claim before an international tribunal. The only
legal question which remains to be considered is whether, in the
course of bringing an international claim of this kind, the Organiza-
tion can recover "the reparation due in respect of the damage caused
.... to the victim ....".
The traditional rule that diplomatic protection is exercised by
the national State does not involve the giving of a negative answer
to Question 1 (b).
In the first place, this rule applies to claims brought by a State.
But here we have the different and new case of a claim that would
be brought by the Orgaiiization.
In the second place, even in inter-State relations, there are impor-
tant exceptions to the rule, for there are cases in which protection
may be exercised by a State on behalf of perons not having its
nationalit y.
In the third place, the rule rests on two bases. The first is that
the defendant State has broken an obligation towards the national
State in respect of its nationals. The second is that only the pnrty
to whom an international obligation is due can bring a claim in
respect of its breach. This is precisely what happens when the
Organization, in bringing a claim for damage suffered by its agent,
does so by i~lvokingthe breach of an obligation towards itself.
Thus, the rule of the nationality of claims affords no reason against
recognizing that the Organization has the right to bring a claim for
the damage referred to in Question 1 (b). On the contrary, the
principle underlying this rule leads to the recognition of this capacity
as belonging to the Organization, when the Organization invokes, a s
the ground of its claim, a breach of an obligation towards itself.

Nor does the analogy of the traditional riile of diplomatic protec-


tion of nationals abroad justify in itself an affirmative reply. I t
is not possible, by a strained use of the concept of allegiance,
to assimilate the legal bond nrhich exists, under -Article IOO of
the Charter, between the Organization on the one hand, and the
Secretary-General and the staff on the other, to the bond of
nationality existing between a State and its ~lationals.

The Court is here faced with a new situation. The questions


to which it gives rise can only be solved bp realizing that the situa-
tion is donlinated by the provisions of the Charter considered in
the light of the principles of international law.
The question lies within the limits already established; that is
to Say it presupposes that the injury for which the reparation is
demanded arises from a brearh of an obligation designed to help an
agent of the Organization in the performance of his duties. l t is
not a case in which the wrongful act or omission would merely
constitute a breach of the general obligations of a State concerning
the position of aliens; claims made under this head \vould be within
the cornpetence of the national State and not, as a gcneral rule,
within that of the Organiza t ion.
'
The Charter does not expressly confer upon the Organization
the capacity to include, in its claim for reparation, damage caiised
to the victim or to perons entitled through him. 'I'he Court must
therefore begin by enqiiiring whether the provisions of the Charter
concerning the functions of the Organization, and the part played
by its agents in the performance of those functions, imply for
the Organization power to afford its agents the limited protection
that would consist in the bringing of a claim on their behalf for
reparation for damage suffered in such circumstances. Under
international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those
powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are
conferred iipon it by necessary implication. as being essential to
the performance of its duties. This principle of law was applied
by the Permanent Court of International Justice to the International
Labour Organization in its -4dvisory Opinion No. 13 of July 23rd,
12
1926 (Series B.,No. 13, p. 18),and must be applied to the United
Nations.
Having regard to its purposes and functioris already referred
to, the Organization may find it necessary, and has in fact found
it necessary, to entrust its agents with important missions t o
be performed in disturbed parts of the world. Many missions,
from their very nature, involve the agents in unusual dangers
to which ordinary persons are not exposed. For the same reason,
the injuries suffered by its agents in these circumstances will
sometimes have occurred in such a manner that their national
State would not be justified in bringing a claim for reparation
on the ground of diplomatic protection, or, at any rate, would
not feel disposed to do so. Both to ensure the efficient and
independent performance of these missions and t o afford effective
support t o its agents, the Organization must provide them with
adequate protection.
This need of protection for the agents of the Organization,
as a condition of the performance of its functions, has already
been realized, and the Preamble to the Resolution of December 3rd,
1948 (supra, p. 175), shows that this was the unanimous view of
the General Assembly.
For this purpose, the Members of the Organization have entered
into certain undertakings, some of which are in the Charter and
others in complementary agreements. The content of these
undertakings need not be described here ; but the Court must
stress the importance of the duty to render to the Organization
"every assistance" which is accepted by the Rlembers in Article 2,
paragraph 5, of the Charter. It must be noted that the effective
working of the Organization-the accomplishment of its task,
and the independence and effectiveness of the work of its agents-
require that these undertakings should be strictly observed.
For that purpose, it is necessary that, when a n infringement
occurs, the Organization should be able to cal1 upon the responsible
State to remedy its default, and, in particular, to obtain from
the State reparation for the damage that the default may have
caused to its agent.
I n order that the agent may perform his duties satisfactorily,
he must feel that this protection is assured to him by the Organi-
zation, and that he may count on it. To ensure the independence
of the agent, and, consequently, the independent action of the
Organization itself, it is essential that in performing his duties
he need not have to rely on any other protection than that of
the Orginization (save of course for the more direct and immediate
protection due from the State in whose territory he may be).
In particular, lie should not have to rely on the protection of his
own State. If he had to rcly on thnt State, his independence
might w-eil be compi-omised, contrary to the principle applied
by Article ~ o ofo the Charter. And lastly, it is essential that-
whether the agent belongs to a powerful or to a weak State; to
one more affected or less affected, by the complications of inter-
national life; to one in syrnpathy or#not in sympathy with the
mission of the agent-he should know that in the performance
of his duties he is under the protection of the Organization. This
assurance is even more necessary when the agent is stateless.
Upon examination of the character of the functions entrusted
to the Organization and of the nature of the missions of its agents,
it becomes clear that the capacity of the Organization to exercise
a measure of functional protection of its agents arises by necessary
intendment out of the Charter.
The obligations entered into by States to enable the agents of
the Organization to perform their duties are undertaken not in
t h e interest of the agents, but in that of the Organization. Il'hen
it clairns redress for a breach of these obligations, the Organization
is invoking its own right, the right that trie obligations due to it
should be respected. On this ground, it asks for reparation of
the injury suffered, for "it is a principle of international lav that
the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make
reparation in an adequate form"; as was stated bv the Permanent
Court in its Judgment No. 8 of July 26th, 1927 (Series A., No. g,
p. 21). In claiming reparation based oii the injury suffered by
its agent, the Organization does not represent the agent, but is
asserting its own right, the right to secure respect for undertakings
entered into towards the Organization.
Having regard to the foregoing considerations, and to the un-
deniable right of the Organization to demand tliat its Members
shall fulfil the obligations entered into by them in the interest of
the good working of the Organization, the Court is of the opinion
that, in the case of a breach of these obligations, the Organization
has the capacity to claim ad.equate reparation, and that in assessing
this reparation it is authorized to include the darnage suffered by
the victini or by persons entitled through him.

The question remains whether the Organization has "the capacity


to bring an international claim against the responsible de jure or
de facto government with a view to obtaining the reparation due
in respect of the damage caused (a) to the United Nations, ( b )
to the victim or to persons entitled through him" when the defen-
dant State is not a member of the Organization.
I n considering this aspect of Question 1 (a) and ( b ) , it is neces-
sary t o keep in mind the reasons which liave led the Court to
give an affirmative answer to it when the defendant State is a
Member of the Organization. I t has now been established that
the Organization has capacity to bring ciaims on the international
plane, arid that it possesses a right of functio~ialprotection in
respect of its agents. Here again the Court is authorized to assume
that the damage suffered involves the responsibility of a State,
and it is not called upon to express an opinion upon the various
ways in which that responsibility might be engaged. Accordingly
the question is whether the Organization has capacity to bring a
claim against the defendant State to recover reparation in respect
of that damage or whether, on the contrary, the defendant State,
not being a member, is justified in raising the objection that the
Organization lacks the capacity to bring an international claim.
On this point, the Court's opinion is that fifty States, rcpresenting
the vast majority of the members of the international community,
had the power, in conformity with international law, t o bring into
being an entity possessing objective international personality, and
not merely personality recognized by them alone, together with
capacity to bring international claims.
Accordingly, the Court arrives a t the conclusion that ail affir-
mative answer should be given to Question 1 (a) and (b) whether
or not the defendant State is a Member of the United Xations.

Question II is as follo~vs:
"In the event of an affirmative reply on point 1 (O), Iiow is
action by the Cnited Xations to be reconciled u i t h siicli rights as
may be possessed by the State of which tlie victim is a national ? "

The affirmative reply given by the Court on point 1 (b) obliges


it now to examine Question II. When the victim has a ilationality,
cases can clearly occur in which the injury suffered by him may
engage the interest both of his national State and of the Organ-
ization. I n such an event, competition between the State's right
of diplomatic protection and the Organization's right of functional
protection might arise, and this is the only case with which the
Court is invited to deal.

In such a case, there is no rule of l a n n:hich assigns priority


to the one or to the other, or which compels either the State or
the Organization to refrain from bri~gingan international claim.
The Court sees no reason why the parties concerned should not
find solutions inspired by goodwill and common sense, and as
between the Organization and its Members it draws attention to
their duty t o render "every assistance" provided by -4rticle 2,
paragraph 5, of the Charter.
hlthoiigh the bases of the two claims are different, that doe
not mean that the defendant State can be compelled to pay the
reparation due in respect of the damage twice over. International
tribunals are already familiar with the problem of a claim in which
two or more national States are interested. and thev know how to
protect the defendant State in such a case.
The risk of competition between the Organization and the
national State can be reduced or eliminated either by a general
convention or by agreements entered into in each particular case.
There is no doubt that in due course a practice will be developed,
and it is worthy of note that already certain States whose nationals
have been iniured in the ~erformanceof missions undertaken for
the Organization have shown a reasonable and CO-operativedisposi-
tion to find a practical solution.

The question of reconciling action by the Organizatiori with the


rights of a national State may arise in another wdy ; that is to say,
when the agent bears the nationality of the defendant State.

The ordinary practice whereby a State does not exercise protcc-


tion on behalf of one of its nationals against a State which regards
him as its own national, does not constitute a precedent which is
relevant here. The action of the Organization is in fact based not
upon the nationality of the victim but upon his status as agent of
the Organization. Therefore it does not inatter whether or not
the State to which the claim is addressed regards him as its own
national, because the question of nationality is not pertinent to
the admissibility of the claim.
In law, therefore, it does not seem that the fact of the possession
of the nationality of the defendant State by the agent constitutes
any obstacle to a claim brought by the Organization for a breach of
obligations towards it occurring in relation to the performance of
his mission by that agent.
The Court is of opinion

O n Question I (a) :
(i) unaiiimously,
That, in the event of an agent of the United Nations in the
performance of his duties suffering injury in circumstances
involving the responsibility of a Member State, the United Nations
as an Organization has the capacity to bring an international claim
against the responsible de jzwe or de facto government with a view to
obtaining the reparation due in respect of the damage Cause to the
United Nations.

(ii) unanimously,
That, in the event of an agent of the United Nations in the
performance of his duties suffering injury in circumstances involving
the responsibilit of ii Statc which is not a member, the United
Nations as an Organization has the capacity to bring an inter-
national claim against the responsible de jure or de facto government
with a view to obtaining the reparation duc in respect of the damage
caused to the United Nations.

O n Question I (b) :
(i) by eleven votes agairist four,
That, in the event of an agent of the United Xations i i i the
performance of his duties suffering injury in circumstances iiivol\.ing
the responsibility of a Member Statc, the United Satioiis as an
Organization ha.; the capacity to bring an international claim
against the responsible de jure or ti'e facto government nith a view
t o obtaining the reparation due in respect of the darnage caused
to the victim or t o persons entitled through him.

(ii) by eleven votes against four,


That, in the event of an agent of the United Nations in the
performance of his duties suffering iiijury in circumstances involving
the responsibility of a State which is not a member, the United
Nations as an Organization has the capacity to bring an inter-
national claim against the responsible de jure or de /acte government
with a view to obtaining the reparation duc in respect of the
damage caused to the victim or to persons entitled through him.
OPIK. OF II I V 49 (REPAR- TI OS FOR I S J C K I E S S C F F I ~ R I ~ D188
)

On Question I I :
By ten votes against fi~ve,
IVhen the United Nations as a n Organization is bringing a claim
for reparation of damage caused to its agent, it can only do so
by basing its claim upon n breach of obligations due to itself ;
respect for this rule wrill usually prevent a conflict between the
action of the United Sations and such rights as the agent's
national State may possess, and thus bring about a reconciliation
between their clairns ; moreovcr, this reconciliation must depend
upon considerations applicable to each particular case, and upon
agreements t o be made between the Organization and individual
States, either generally or in each case.

Done in English and French, thc English test being nuthoritntive,


a t the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eleventh day of .-\pril, one
thousaiid nine huridred and forty-nine, in t ~ v ocopie<, onc of n-hich
will bc placed in the girchivez of the Court and the othrr trans-
mitted to the Secretary-General of the Cnited S:ition<.

(Signed) BASDEVASS,

President .

(Signed) E. HAJIBKO,

Registrar.
OPIN. O F II I V 49 (REPARATION FOR I N J U R I E S SUFFERED) 189

Judge WINIARSKI states with regret that he is unable to concur


in the reply given by the Court to Question 1 (b). In general,
he shares the views expressed in Judge Hackworth's dissenting
opinion.
Judges ALVAREZ and AZEVEDO, whilst concurring in the Opinion
of the Court, have availed themselves of the right conferred on
them by Article 57 of the Statute and appended to the Opinion
statements of their individual opinion.
Judges HACKWORTH, BADAWIPASHAand K R Y L O V , declaring
that they are unable to concur in the Opinion of the Court, have
availed themselves of the right conferred on them by Article 57
of the Statute and appended to the Opinion statements of their
dissenting opinion.
ANNEX.

LIST OF DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO T H E COURT.


DOCUMENTSSUBMITTED BY THE SECRETARY-GEKERAL
OF THE
UXITEDNATIONSI N THE COURSE O F T H E IVRITTEN PROCEEDINGS.

I. Document of the General Assembly (A/674, October 7 t h , 1948).


z. Record of Plenary Meeting of General Assembly (AiPV 169, Decem-
ber 3rd, 1948).
3. Documents of Sixth Committee of the GeneraI .4ssembIy.
AIC.61275. AIC.61282.
,, 275IRev. I. ,., 283.
,, 276. , , 284.
,, 277. ,, 285.
,, 278. ,, 286.
,> 279. ,, 287.
,, 279/c0JT. 1. ,, 291-
,, 280. ,, 292.
,, 281. ,, 293.
,, 281JRev. I. ,, 294.
,, 281IRev. 2.
4. Report of Sixth Committee of the General Assembly (A1749,
December 2nd' 1948), Corr. 1, French text, and Corr. 2, English
text.
5. Records of Sixth Committee of the General Assembly.
AIC.6ISR 118.
,, 119.
,, 120.
,, 121.
,, 124.
,, 124, Corr. 1, Engl. text.