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IHS Janes
Intelligence Review
The magazine of IHS Janes Military and Security Assessments Intelligence Centre

Drawing down
Afghanistans future post-2014

Inner city
Hizbullahs urban training facilities

OFC_JIR1312.indd 1 14/11/2013 14:24:10

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IHS Janes

CONTENTS Volume 25 | Issue 12 | December 2013

Intelligence Review

8 14 54

Terrorism & Insurgency

8 Turning point With President 14 Battle ready With the number of Hizbullahs training facilities
Hamid Karzai to step down and for urban operations increasing, IHS Janes examines the use of
international forces soon to leave, these centres and their effect on the groups tactical capabilities.
Afghanistan is preparing for a
transition. IHS Janes details three 20 Soft target Attacks against schools and civilians in northeast

possible scenarios for the country. Nigeria indicate that Boko Haram is prepared to escalate its
campaign in reaction to the countrys state of emergency.
[PA: 1515066]

International Security
24 Tomorrows world Discussions are ongoing about what form
Country Risk Watch UN Security Council reform should take. IHS Janes examines the
4 All talk No deal agreed after Iran nuclear negotiations various proposals and their potential implications.
7 Holding re Myanmar armed groups support ceasere
28 Strait talking Taiwan is uneasy about Chinas growing military
power, despite increasing political ties between the two.
China Watch
54 Suspicious smiles Russia and Chinas economic,
political, and security relations appear to be blooming.
State Stability
Resource Watch 34 Conformity versus criminality IHS Janes examines the risks of
demobilised insurgents joining Colombias criminal organisations.
56 Marking territory Borderisation has caused conict
between Moscow and Tbilisi, affecting a section of oil 40 Neighbourhood watch Russia has voiced concern about threats
pipeline that passes briey through a disputed region. from Afghanistan spreading into Central Asian countries. IHS

Janes assesses Moscows efforts to bolster security in the region.

58 Emotional vote Bernd Borchardt, head of the EU Rule
of Law Mission in Kosovo, discusses the recent elections. Serious & Organised Crime
44 Faceless crime Technology is increasingly becoming available
to help internet users maintain anonymity. IHS Janes investigates
illegal activities facilitated by this and the problems in tackling it.
Combined effort
Regional security co-operation in Asia

[PA: 17585376]
Proliferation and Procurement
Delicate path 48 Proliferation game Increased proliferation of cruise and air
The future of Russo-Georgian relations TDemodefence missile systems provides smaller states with advanced
military capabilities, which is in turn affecting strategic thinking. December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 3

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COUNTRY RISK WATCH For further in-depth coverage go to

Iran nuclear talks likely to lead to

December 2013, Volume 25, Number 12 only temporary repeal of sanctions
Editor: Matthew Clements MEDA AL ROWAS AND FIRAS ABI ALI by preventing inspectors from accessing
Deputy Editor: Robert Munks
First led online: 11 November sites such as Parchin. Rowhani also needs to
Section Editors ensure that Iran is allowed to enrich uranium,
Terrorism & Insurgency: Matthew Henman
Proliferation & Procurement: Karl Dewey and Emily Chorley
NEGOTIATIONS ON IRANS nuclear programme although the exact extent of enrichment
ended without a deal being concluded on 10 levels is likely to be negotiable, as would be
Regional Editors November. Protracted negotiations between temporary suspensions.
Africa: Natznet Tesfay Americas: Laurence Allan
Asia: Omar Hamid, Pacic: Neil Ashdown Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, The US policy appears to be to give Iran as-
Europe-CIS: Matthew Clements United Kingdom, and United States, plus Ger- surances about the absence of US intent to at-
Middle East: David Hartwell
many) over the exact extent of inspections, tack, in exchange for Iran making its nuclear
Deputy Chief Sub-Editor: Sarah Brown
and sanctions relief and repeal, are likely programme more open to inspections. The US
Senior Sub-Editor: Erena Laird
Sub-Editors: Nisa Ali, Alice Burton, Peter Cogram, Damian before a nal deal is agreed. This is despite the probably accepts that the Iranians will gain
OLoughlin, Harriet Sinclair International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the knowledge required to build a nuclear
Design signing an agreement on broader inspections weapon. As such, Washington will want to
Head of Design: Roberto Filistad
Chief Designer: David Playford
with Iran on 11 November. ensure that a reliable inspections regime is in
The US believes that the sanctions pro- place, allowing the US to detect any Iranian
Director EMEA, Production Services: David Ward gramme is pushing Iran to the negotiating
Production Controller: Martyn Buchanan table. It is therefore unlikely to compromise
Security Publisher: Zbyszko Tabernacki
the robustness of its sanctions regime before The US is unlikely
Iran makes major concessions, including
Director, EMEA Editing and Design: Sara Morgan
Group Publishing Director: Sean Howe ratication of additional protocols to the to compromise its
sanctions regime
Senior Vice President IHS &
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
Managing Director IHS Janes: Michael Dell
which would allow no-notice inspections of
before Iran makes
Email: suspected nuclear sites. The issue of sudden
Tel: (UK/RoW) +44 (0)1858 438 756 inspections is likely to be a sticking point for
(USA toll-free) +1-800 824 0768
Advertising: The Editor and Publisher reserve the right to refuse
Iran, which would demand that military sites major concessions
advertising for whatever reason. IHS Janes gives no warranties, allegedly not related to the nuclear pro-
conditions, guarantees or representations, express or implied, as to the
content of any advertisements, including but not limited to compliance gramme be exempt.
with description and quality or tness for purpose of the product or
service. IHS Janes will not be liable for any damages, including without For Iran, suspending enrichment would be attempt to use that knowledge to build a
limitation, direct, indirect or consequential damages arising from any
use of products or services or any actions or omissions taken in direct the least problematic measure as it could be deliverable nuclear weapon.
reliance on information contained in advertisements.
easily classied as a foreign policy victory to Despite positive political rhetoric, IHS
Editorial Policy: Contributors opinions do not necessarily reect
those of the publisher or editor and while every precaution has been its domestic audience. The justication for Janes assesses that a speedy reconciliation is
taken to ensure that the information contained in this journal is accurate
and timely, no liability is accepted by them for errors or omissions, this would probably be on the basis of retain- unlikely, and there is little chance of outright
however caused. Articles and information contained in this publication
are the Copyright 2013 IHS (unless otherwise stated) and cannot be
ing sufficient stockpiles for civil purposes and sanctions reversal over the coming year.
reproduced in any form without the written permission of the publisher.
The publisher cannot accept responsibility for loss or damage to
centrifuges, as opposed to any compromise Mistrust on both sides is likely to ensure that
uncommissioned photographs, manuscripts or magnetic media. The affecting sovereignty and its right to enrich early concessions are easily reversible. Israel,
editor welcomes correspondence, contributions, photographs and
illustrations, as well as letters. uranium and develop a nuclear programme. as the country whose national security is
Voluntary Submissions: IHS Janes will assume that, by making
submissions, contributors conrm that all material kindly submitted
This is also an easily reversible measure for most immediately affected by Irans nuclear
may be edited or amended at Janes discretion and is provided free Iran (a primary concern for Israel), and there programme, and a close ally of the US, will
of copyright and/or that there is no restriction on its use in Janes
Intelligence Review or any other Janes publication, either in hard copy is little chance that Tehran would agree to dis- lobby hard to prevent the West from granting
or electronic or other formats. Credits or acknowledgements may not be
given in certain circumstances. mantling any part of its nuclear programme, Iran substantive sanctions relief without rst
Editorial Ofce: JIR, Sentinel House, 163 Brighton Road, as sought by Israel. obtaining veriable controls to limit Irans
Coulsdon, Surrey CR5 2YH. Tel. (+44) 020 8700 3700 Fax. (+44) 020
7287 7765 e-mail: Although US president Barack Obama and capacity to progress towards nuclear weapon
Periodicals postage paid at Jamaica NY 11431. US Postmaster: Send Iranian president Hassan Rowhani, with development.
address changes to Janes Intelligence Review, Air Business Ltd., c/o
Worldnet Shipping Inc., 156-15, 146th Avenue, 2nd Floor, Jamaica, explicit backing from Supreme Leader Ayatol- A best-case scenario for Iran would be small
NY 11434, USA.

Janes Intelligence Review is published monthly by IHS Global Limited.

lah Ali Khamenei, are serious about reaching breakthroughs accompanied by the easing of
Find out more about Janes Intelligence Review and Janes Military and a deal on Irans nuclear programme, both will the sanctions regime in a manner that would
Security Assessments Centre by visiting be constrained by more intransigent domestic temporarily alleviate Irans foreign currency
Printed in the UK by Warners Midlands plc. ISSN 2048-349X
actors. Rowhanis team must demonstrate shortages and improve its access to global
to the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps markets. However, the actual removal of
(IRGC) that he is protecting Irans right to a sanctions will probably be retained by the US
civil nuclear programme and the sovereignty and the European Union as a nal card that is
of its military sites, which Tehran claims only played after the IAEA is given full access
are unrelated to the nuclear programme, to suspicious sites as it sees t.
This publication was produced using FSC certied paper

4 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

004-007_JIR1312_News.indd 4 14/11/2013 14:44:13

For further in-depth coverage go to COUNTRY RISK WATCH

Suicide attack by Russian Islamist militant on

bus highlights threat beyond North Caucasus
First led online: 22 October (updated)

A BUS IN the southern Russian city of

Volgograd was struck by a suspected suicide
bomber on 21 October, killing six people and
injuring 28. According to local law enforce-
ment officials, the bomber was a female
named Naida Asiyalova, reportedly the wife
of Dmitry Sokolov, an Islamist convert serv-
ing with militants in the North Caucasus
republic of Dagestan.
According to video footage of the explosion
shown on Russian news channels, the attack
occurred at around 1405 local time. Media
reports published after the event, which cited
Russian law enforcement officials, suggested
the bomber had initially visited two shopping
centres in Volgograd, but instead targeted the
densely packed bus in an effort to cause the
maximum number of casualties.
The attack illustrates the ability of mili-
tants from the North Caucasus to undertake A bus damaged by a suspected suicide attack
that killed six people in Volgograd, Russia, on
relatively basic, individual suicide attacks
21 October. PA: 1518082
beyond their usual area of operations, which
is centred on the republics of Chechnya, Dag-
estan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. Olympic Games in February 2014, to be held place around the Olympics make a successful
This capability was further illustrated on 25 in Sochi, Krasnodar region, which abuts the attack against one of the main venues unlike-
October when the security forces uncovered North Caucasus. Dokka Umarov, the leader of ly. There is a heightened risk of attack against
a workshop constructing explosive suicide the militant Caucasus Emirate, called in July softer targets such as transport infrastructure
vests in the Dagestani town of Khasavyurt. for attacks on the Games. in Sochi and the surrounding area, most likely
This has particular relevance for the Winter The stringent security measures put in an individual suicide or car bomb attack.

Peace talks unlikely after TTP installs hardline leader

ASAD ALI the Mehsuds, according to a report in Paki- Nawaz (PML-N) has been pushing for since
First led online: 11 November stani newspaper The News on 8 November. coming to power in May.
Fazlullah headed a two-year insurgency in Fazlullahs appointment further dimin-
THE MILITANT TEHRIK-E-TALIBAN Pakistan Swat, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, in ishes the chances of any talks given his own
(TTP) announced Maulana Qazi Fazlullah 2007-09, before a military operation ousted opposition to negotiating with the govern-
as its new leader on 7 November. The ap- his militants. ment. More importantly, the army is now
pointment was triggered by the death of Since then, Fazlullah has remained active probably no longer willing to support the
former TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud in an in orchestrating militant attacks in Pakistan. civilian government in its efforts to get the
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strike on 1 He claimed responsibility for the attack that militants to the negotiating table, largely due
November in North Waziristan. Fazlullah is killed an army general in September 2013, to Fazlullahs role in the Swat insurgency.
the rst person from outside the Mehsud clan after which he subsequently threatened to The risk of TTP revenge attacks will be
to head the TTP and is known as a religious launch a similar attack targeting Chief of severe over the next few months. The TTP is
hardliner among its leadership.
Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani. likely to focus on Western targets, and gov-
Fazlullahs candidacy was supported by Mehsuds death reduced the likelihood of ernment and military assets, in improvised
Mullah Omar, head of the Afghan Taliban, peace talks with the Pakistani government, explosive device (IED) attacks, particularly in
to avert a rift in the TTP leadership between which the ruling Pakistan Muslim League- Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Karachi. December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 5

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COUNTRY RISK WATCH For further in-depth coverage go to

Widespread looting Dissident Irish republicans step

likely as Venezuela
imposes price cuts up attacks against state ofcials
DIEGO MOYA-OCAMPOS EOIN RYAN would probably reduce the republican groups
First led online: 12 November First led online: 30 October (updated) operational capability. However, the letter
bomb campaign marks an expansion of tactics
VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT NICOLS SECURITY SERVICES IN Northern Ireland and the dissident republicans target list. It
Maduros decision to force electronic ap- intercepted a viable parcel bomb addressed also represents a relatively low-risk and high-
pliance retailers to sell goods at reduced to Theresa Villiers, UK secretary of state for prole activity for dissident groups, whereas
prices generated long queues outside shop Northern Ireland, at Stormont Castle on direct attacks on security forces have a greater
premises, while outbreaks of looting have 29 October. The device was discovered at chance of being disrupted under tight secu-
been reported in at least eight cities. ministerial buildings, having passed through rity surveillance. That said, two pipe bombs
Maduro announced a package of eco- security checks at postal sorting offices. thrown at police vehicles in Newtownabbey
nomic measures related to imports, price, This was the fourth such improvised (Belfast) and Charlotte Street (Londonderry)
and foreign exchange controls in early No- explosive device (IED) discovered since in October indicate that attacks on the PSNI
vember, which are likely to lead to further 25 October, when two viable letter bombs and UK military personnel remain the dissi-
government intervention in the economy. intended for the Chief Constable of the Police dent groups main focus. This was emphasised
Maduro is opting to blame the private Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), Matt after dissident republicans were blamed for
sector for conducting an economic war Baggott, and the PSNI Commander in Lon- an attempted attack on 9 November in which
against his government rather than adopt- donderry, John Burrows, were found at Mal- an IED was planted under the car of a former
ing corrective policy measures to deal with lusk and Lisburn sorting offices respectively. PSNI officer in east Belfast. A routine security
growing ination, the economic decit, A similar IED targeted the Public Prosecution check discovered the device, which bomb
and the intensifying shortages of food and Service on the Limavady Road in Londonderry disposal experts said was similar to one that
basic goods. on 28 October. killed PSNI officer Ronan Kerr in April 2011.
It is unlikely that the government Dissident republican organisations are There has been a spike in attacks by the
will take steps to improve the countrys most likely to have been responsible for the New IRA and the Belfast Brigades of glaigh
gloomy economic situation given that it parcel bombs, although there have been no na hireann (ONH) in recent months and it is
does not appear to be tackling the under- claims of responsibility. As these groups are likely that this trend will continue. There is a
lying causes of the problem. The busi- concerned about penetration by UK intelli- strong possibility that additional devices will
ness environment is likely to deteriorate gence, claims of responsibility have not always be sent through the mail system. Further-
further, with more price controls and been issued for operational reasons (for more, dissident groups are intent on increas-
economic intervention measures adding example not providing the security service ing disruptive attacks ahead of the 2016
to the already high tax and regulatory with intelligence about key actors). If major centenary anniversary of the declaration of
burdens for companies. arrests were to follow these latest incidents, it Irish independence.
The increased risk of looting linked to
the governments anti-business rhetoric
constitutes unprecedented hostility to-
wards the private sector in Venezuela. The
governments ambiguous response to the
looting it condemned it but justied the
peoples response by blaming the private
sector is likely to encourage similar
events in the one-year outlook. This could
backre on Maduro should anxieties and
discontent continue to run high.
Should further incidents of looting
eventually take place, these could well
spread to other urban centres across the
country. IHS Janes assesses that wide-
spread civil unrest and looting similar to
the 27 February 1989 nationwide Cara-
cazo riots would signal that Maduro has
lost popular support, and would have the
TDemo Police at the scene near Cullyhanna village,
potential to destabilise his government Northern Ireland, where a dissident republican-
and lead to direct or indirect military style rocket launcher was found in August.
PA: 1515083

6 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

004-007_JIR1312_News.indd 6 14/11/2013 14:44:22

For further in-depth coverage go to COUNTRY RISK WATCH

Myanmar ethnic groups agreement to support

ceasere reduces likelihood of militant attacks
First led online: 5 November

ALL BUT ONE of Myanmars 18 armed ethnic

groups signed a draft agreement to sup-
port a nationwide ceasere agreement on 2
Following a four-day conference in Laiza,
Kachin State, some of the most important
ethnic groups in Myanmar including the
Karen National Union (KNU) and the New
Mon State Party (NMSP) agreed on a
nationwide ceasere ahead of negotiations
with the government. The only group that
did not sign, the Restoration Council of Shan
State, said that it agreed in principle to the
ceasere but wanted more time to consult
with groups in Shan State before committing
to it. The conference in Laiza was followed by
a two-day conference between ethnic groups
representatives and the government in the
Kachin capital Myitkyina.
IHS Janes assesses that the near-unanimity Residents wave ags as they welcome the
among the ethnic groups to support a cease- arrival of representatives of ethnic rebels in
Myitkyina, Myanmar, on 3 November. PA: 1518139
re will increase the likelihood of an agree-
ment with the government by the end of
the year. Until a year ago, it seemed unlikely areas. Although armed ethnic groups rarely engaged in heavy clashes with government
that the government would be able to forge a target foreign companies, they control much troops involving mortar and artillery re. A
ceasere with all the ethnic groups. of the illegal trade in the border areas and can lasting peace deal before the 2015 general
A nationwide ceasere would go some way disrupt infrastructure projects. election is uncertain, with both sides still far
to resolve ethnic conicts in Myanmar and The larger armed groups such as the Kachin apart on issues such as the establishment of a
improve the security situation in the border Independence Army (KIA) have in the past federal state and a federal army within it.

Senegalese peace talks unlikely to stop insurgents

MARTIN ROBERTS and the development of Casamance. have not explained their non-participation,
First led online: 12 November However, the question of independence but both sections of the highly factionalised
the stated aim of the Casamance Movement MFDC have concentrated for some years on
THE SENEGALESE GOVERNMENT and insur- of Democratic Forces (Mouvement des Forces smuggling, banditry, and illegal trade, to the
gents from the southern province of Casa- Dmocratiques de Casamance: MFDC) or exclusion of the groups original political
mance have agreed on an agenda for peace even of greater autonomy, does not appear to aims of independence or greater autonomy.
talks to end a three-decade-old conict. be on the agenda. Badiats men even took 12 demining experts
The deal was conrmed on 10 November by The rst negotiations brokered by hostage in May 2013, releasing nine men
the Community of SantEgidio, a Rome-based SantEgidio took place in October 2012, and after 70 days; the three women were freed
charity that specialises in peace mediation, were followed in December by the release after three weeks.
and the group said a timeframe for negotia- of eight hostages held by the wing of the The failure to include all groups or address
tions had also been agreed. SantEgidio re- MFDC run by Salif Sadio. It is not clear why the key issue suggests that persistent raids,
leased no details, but other sources quoted by
it has taken so long to resume talks, but once highway robbery, and attacks on security
Radio France International said the subjects again the negotiations have failed to include targets will continue in Casamance, which
for discussion would be a ceasere, disarma- two other active wings of the MFDC run by will further prevent the start of gold mining
ment, reintegration of former combatants, Csar Atoute Badiat and Lama Sambou. They exploration. December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 7

004-007_JIR1312_News.indd 7 14/11/2013 14:44:28


Afghanistan prepares for presidential transition
With President Hamid Karzai due to step down and international forces soon to leave,
Afghanistan is preparing for a transition. Alex Strick van Linschoten details three
scenarios exploring how tribal politics and the Taliban will affect the countrys future.

X KEY POINTS currently no legal framework to cover foreign next year might develop, it is rst necessary
troops remaining after 2014. A meeting of to assess the countrys stability. This can
Amid the drawdown of international tribal elders and political leaders was called by be established by examining ve stability
military forces, the presidential Karzai for 19 November, when the nal tenor factors: political, social, economic, military/
election in April 2014 is likely to of the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) was security, and external.
produce a weak president initially due to be agreed. The agreement will set out
beholden to the outgoing incumbent,
the legal framework under which US troops Political stability
Hamid Karzai.
could remain in Afghanistan after 2015, but is The presidential election is an important
Ethnic and sectarian tensions are not also likely to include provisions for new mili- political transition at the heart of the entire
currently serious risks, and security tary hardware donations to the Afghan army, process, but a great deal of uncertainty re-
is unlikely to be an existential threat
as well as security guarantees against foreign mains for both Afghans and the international
to the Afghan state in the short-to-
interference. US representatives have stated community.
medium term.
that the Afghan government must make a At a minimum, it seems Karzai will leave
The ability of the Taliban and armed decision soon, and have issued repeated warn- office following the April 2014 election,
opposition to carry out visually striking ings about the possibility that all US troops having said that he will stand down. He is
but ultimately low-impact attacks
will be withdrawn from Afghanistan. constitutionally debarred from running for a
on Afghan cities and government
personnel will not necessarily signify a Political engagement between the US and third term. However, the president has acted
failure of the transition process. the Afghan Taliban is currently at a stand- unpredictably in the past and has failed to
still; Washington has chosen to pursue BSA designate a clear successor. Consequently,
negotiations as its top priority, and the Taliban intense political jockeying has arisen.

fghanistan is preparing to face the fu- is dealing with internal fragmentation and Serious contenders to replace Karzai include
ture without a substantial in-country unclear mandates from its senior leadership. the main opposition candidate from the 2009
presence of foreign military forces. Taliban delegates in Doha are nding it hard to election, Abdullah Abdullah; the prominent
The political and security transition has been move forward under these conditions. former mujahideen-era commander and
several years in the making, but the election Furthermore, a spate of meetings aiming religious cleric Ustad Sayyaf; and the former
on 5 April 2014 will mark a denitive new de- to encourage closer co-operation (not least on minister of foreign affairs Zalmai Rassoul, who
parture when President Hamid Karzai who political reconciliation) between Pakistani and is believed to be Karzais personal preference.
has been in power since December 2001 will, Afghan government delegations in mid-2013 Uncertainty also remains about Karzais role
in theory at least, make way for a new leader. led to little practical progress. Even widely after the election, following suggestions by his
At least 330 United States military bases publicised planned releases of Taliban prison- press officer that he will live just outside the
have been closed down, and by the end of ers by the Pakistani government, which could presidential palace (the Arg) or in a palace of
2014 most international combat forces under have spurred peace talks, have not happened. his own.
the aegis of NATOs International Security
TDemo Even if the election manages to produce a
Assistance Force (ISAF) will have left the Risk in December 2013 consensus candidate that everyone can agree
country. The exact speed of the military In order to provide a scenario-based analysis on, the new president will be weak and with-
drawdown has not been nalised as there is of how the transition in Afghanistan over the out much power of his own. Karzais tenure

8 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

008-013_JIR1312_F8_Afghanscenarios.indd 8 14/11/2013 11:43:36


demonstrated that this was not necessarily a than in previous decades, due to high rates of report was not publicly released and this
major hindrance, but the environment since urbanisation which is growing by an estimat- was, to a large degree, on account of increased
the 2001 invasion was unique in Afghan his- ed 6% per year according to the United Nations corruption at customs collection points,
tory. Ultimately, whoever next leads the coun- Development Programme (UNDP), the high- according to Sopko.
try will probably remain beholden to Karzai, est rate in South Asia. The country also has a There is some internal pressure for govern-
at least initially, confusing political procedure large youth population; in 2007, more than ance reform from Afghan politicians, civil
and the lines of power. 50% of the population were under 18 years society members, and younger generation
Moreover, the negotiation process with old, according to UNICEF. The governments activists, but this will be ineffectual as long as
the Taliban has stalled. Taliban delegates are task will not be made easier by the substan- the old guard of mujahideen-era leaders con-
refusing to meet the Afghan government, and tial but largely unquantiable drawdown in tinues to exert inuence over the government
initial talks hosted by the Qatari government money and international support, presenting a and power structures.
in Doha collapsed in June following contro- potentially longer-term problem. It is possible that the next government will
versy over the ying of the Taliban ag when It is highly likely that corruption histori- seek to devolve power and will exert less inu-
their office was officially opened. This, and the cally a major problem afflicting Afghanistan ence on a provincial and district level (as was
resultant public discussion about the nature will endure into 2015 as the last of the the case when Zahir Shah reigned until 1973),
of the future Afghan state, seem to have reo- major international nancial streams starts and this would assuage tensions from the
pened debate about the constitution, an idea to wane. Moreover, as sources of nance dry bottom up. Broadly speaking, even the armed
even committed technocrats such as Ashraf up, accountability mechanisms are also being opposition is not seeking to raze the central
Ghani, a presidential candidate and architect minimised; senior US and UK diplomats told Afghan government and start afresh, and any
of the Afghan government post-2001, are IHS Janes that there is less appetite in govern- genuine reform process would help solidify
willing to publicly entertain. ment for the public shaming of officials than lower-level government structures.
Elsewhere, the provincial councils created in the past, and the reform of the judiciary Meanwhile, rumours of so-called ghost
as part of the post-2001 governance system are and efficacy of ombudsmen are likely to slow brigades in the Afghan National Army (ANA)
less important to the functioning of the entire to a halt because international leverage will have previously fuelled concerns about a coup.
state, but provincial council elections due to evaporate after 2015. However, Karzai has proven highly skilled in
be held at the same time as the presidential The US Special Inspector General for manipulating the power structures to make
poll on 5 April will be strongly contested. Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John F a coup unlikely. Military morale is uneven,
Members of these councils are able to wield Sopko, stated in early October that only 21% of and even though the ANA is spread out across
a considerable amount of power through Afghanistan would be accessible to US civilian the country, the appetite for a coup among
patronage and by administering aid and recon- oversight personnel by the time transition is the senior leadership is difficult to identify
struction funding. From conversations on the nished, while the non-governmental organi- because of the lack of a clear candidate to take
ground, IHS Janes assesses that there is less sation (NGO) Transparency Internationals the lead. Moreover, turnover in the ministries
public appetite for amending local systems of current Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of defence and interior is high, with large
governance, even among the armed opposi- ranks Afghanistan at 174 out of 176 countries numbers of presidential appointees. This also
tion. This suggests that the foundation of the monitored. Revenue collection targets for
Afghan state may be less vulnerable than is 2012 mandated by the International Mon-
often depicted in mainstream international etary Fund (IMF) were 30% less than
media. The new government will have to planned although the exact gure
satisfy greater expectations among the public was not available because the IMF

TDemo Afghan National Police prepare to join a patrol with

German army soldiers outside Kunduz in September
2011. By the end of 2014, most international troops will
have left the country. PA: 1515442 December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 9

008-013_JIR1312_F8_Afghanscenarios.indd 9 14/11/2013 11:43:38


Afghan president Hamid Karzai in Kabul on 15 and southeast that may take orders from the
October 2013. Karzai is due to step down at senior Taliban leadership. Internally Displaced
the next presidential election in April 2014, but
is still likely to hold considerable power over
Persons (IDPs) are on the rise, and this will
his successor. PA: 1515443 continue throughout the transition period;
more than 34,000 people were displaced in
May 2013 alone. These people are not for the
most part at risk of starvation, although the
cold winter weather between December and
March will affect thousands across the country
and, as in previous years, many will die in IDP
camps or settlements.

Economic stability
The withdrawal of international military
forces from Afghanistan and a drawdown
in assistance will be a serious shock for the
Afghan system. Articially sustained for over
a decade, the Afghan economy has run at a
decit since 2001. Taxation and customs rev-
enue collection only started to be a priority for
the government after 20092010, most likely
makes the likelihood of a coup low in the There is a large amount of non-violent because the impending transition focused the
short-to-medium term. Nevertheless, army crime and corruption, particularly in sectors government on revenue collection as a means
and police units in the provinces are likely to linked to government circles, in part because of making the Afghan state sustainable.
be politicised during the election, although the large foreign subsidies and NGO project The closure of international military bases
not on ethnic grounds. disbursements mean that this is the easiest across the country already means that many
way to gain pecuniary advantage. Judicial Afghans are now unemployed. Bases that
Social stability corruption is extremely high, which is unsur- have laid off local workers prior to closure
Afghan society is divided and fractious in prising in a country where provincial judges have suffered increased numbers of attacks,
many ways, but this rarely boils over into com- earn salaries of a few hundred US dollars per although high rates of unemployment have
munal conict. Ethnic and sectarian tensions month. This is a fraction of the salary earned been a historic norm in Afghanistan and there
are not currently serious risks, and attacks of by an interpreter for the US military, for ex- will be fewer targets for discontent once most
a purely ethnic or sectarian nature have been ample. Most Taliban ghters enter prison with international troops have departed.
highly sporadic, despite there being ample the expectation that it is possible to secure re- Infrastructure decay has already started to
precedent in the civil war that followed the lease through these means, according to Talibs take place in areas where international troops
departure of Soviet troops in 1989 and the fall consulted by IHS Janes in Kandahar and Kabul. and organisations have left. Buildings and ve-
of the Afghan government in 1992. Crime nevertheless looks set to increase as the hicles, in particular, are not being maintained,
Moreover, those at the head of groups cur- transition progresses. Militia forces such as the and many have simply been abandoned; an
rently ghting in the conict (whether state Afghan Local Police (ALP), installed around uneven electricity supply will continue for as
institutions, militia leaders, or the armed the country by international military forces, long as international payments underpin its
opposition) have not turned to sectarian or are already the source of some such crime, and provision, but the infrastructure is not likely
ethnic slogans to stir tensions. This is not to the Afghan National Police (ANP) has a poor to be maintained without previous levels of
say that the fractured nature of the Afghan reputation among the local populace. oversight by international bodies. Indeed,
population and past experiences prevent Separately, there will be signicant health some large cities such as Kandahar may return
recurrences of conict, but it is unlikely in risks following the international drawdown. to the 2010 electricity averages of two hours
the short term. Outside powers interfering in A smaller NGO presence will have fewer re- every other day. In such a climate, large pro-
Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia seeking to sources with which to tackle serious country- jects such as the rehabilitation of the Kajaki
indirectly confront Iran over its perceived nu- wide health issues such as maternal mortality dam hydropower plant are unlikely to be
clear ambitions, to India manoeuvring against or diseases including polio, and insecurity nished. The Kajaki dam is potentially able to
Pakistan could nevertheless trigger divides in outside urban centres will mean that access to provide power for much of southern Afghani-
the medium term. remote areas will become harder. stan, but the failure to install a third turbine
In order for those tensions to erupt into Even organisations such as the Interna- and repeated Taliban attacks on the facility
violence, it is likely that an atmosphere of tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and its access road have left it half nished.
insecurity and impunity would have to exist currently nd themselves unable to secure Taken as a whole, uncertainty about transi-
to levels similar to those currently seen in the
guarantees of safe passage throughout the tion has led to a depreciation of the Afghan
Pakistani city of Karachi, for example. Yet country, to a large extent because of the currency from around AFN48: USD1 in Janu-
levels of crime particularly theft and violent fragmentation of the armed opposition and ary 2005 to the current rate of almost AFN57.
crime are relatively low in Afghanistan. the multiplicity of armed groups in the south Property prices in both urban and rural areas

10 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

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have decreased signicantly over the past opposition for at least a few years, unless BSA is important for Afghanistans relation-
three years, and the real estate market is swift- political instability causes a fracturing of the ship with the international community be-
ly contracting. The withdrawal of interna- army and/or police. cause a failure to sign would see a precipitous
tional businesses and their money will lead to The government has a tentative hold on the end to US (and probably other international
a rapid slowdown in GDP growth, as shown in major cities and provincial centres, and is able partners) military involvement by the end of
IHS Global Insights forecast of 2.9% real GDP to prevent Taliban activity for the most part. 2014. This would be coupled with a reduc-
growth in 2013 (down from 11.9% in 2012), This is aided by their continued use of militias, tion in the amount of funding provided from
with 4.7% forecast for 2014. This growth, currently numbering around 25,000 and set to 2015 onwards, because of concerns about
moreover, was in part the result of gains in the rise to 30,000 under ISAFs funding approval. corruption in the absence of any independ-
services industry. This is unlikely to persist This effective control is even true in places ent and/or international monitoring. Karzai
beyond 2015, especially as the reason for such as Kandahar, long a bastion of Taliban seems to believe that the US will not leave
much of the service industrys existence (the inuence, and military transition has now Afghanistan for regional and strategic reasons,
presence of foreign troops and organisations) occurred across the country, with Afghans and accordingly is negotiating the BSA with
will cease to exist. taking the lead for security. Foreign troops, the expectation that he can delay and push for
In the banking sector, condence is already in particular special forces, will nevertheless terms almost indenitely.
low following the 2010 Kabul Bank scandal, remain active. As of 1 October, there were still This would call into question much interna-
in which more than USD900 million went more than 86,000 troops in-country (of which tional engagement, not only military support
missing or was lost in loans to associates of the 60,000 were US forces), according to ISAF but also backing from nancial and devel-
senior tiers of the Afghan government. As a re- statistics. More than 70% of those are located opment-focused multilateral institutions.
sult of the scandal, a special tribunal and a trial in the south and south-east of the country. Opacity in the BSA negotiations means that
led to two senior management officials being A serious issue for Afghan security forces either a successful or an unsuccessful conclu-
sentenced to prison terms of ve years. The is their failures in logistics an area that was sion is possible. However, there is a higher risk
growth in the value of deposits has declined never prioritised by international military of Afghanistan losing the support of foreign
to 12.5% over the past three years from an forces, which had their own systems that nancial institutions post-2015 over corrup-
average of 80% in 200509. Commercial loans took up the slack of the Afghan decit. From tion, combined with the conditionality of aid
have also declined by 20% since 2010, and medical evacuation capabilities to the supply being transferred into Afghan government
micronance loans have similarly decreased. of spare parts for weapons and vehicles, the coffers, which adds a great deal of uncertainty
More positively, a new railway link between Afghan army will be severely limited going into the environment.
Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan into 2015. A result of this realisation, which If the BSA is signed, a strong clause is likely
is scheduled for completion by 2015 and will is likely to already have been appreciated by to be included guaranteeing Afghan sovereign-
boost regional trade for Afghanistan in the senior military planners, is that the spread of ty against external aggression. Such a clause is
face of a difficult trading environment with the Afghan army will probably be retracted most likely to be implicitly directed towards
Pakistan. However, the rail infrastructure to supply hubs and urban centres; large Pakistan. Although Kabul is unlikely to go
needed for several natural resource extrac- swathes of the provinces will simply cease to to war with Islamabad, the transition period
tion projects does not currently exist. Afghan be actively patrolled or garrisoned. Moreover, has already led to an increased engagement
government expectations of a swift start to the professionalism of security forces in the with all of Afghanistans neighbours, whether
several mining projects such as the Chinese absence of international monitors has always directly or by proxy means. Tensions may be
involvement in the Aynak copper mine in Log- been a concern, albeit less so for the ANA than allayed by the election of a presidential candi-
ar province are unlikely to be fullled in the for the ANP. Anecdotal evidence available date favourable to Pakistan, but other regional
short-to-medium term. Already able to draw to IHS Janes suggests that a large proportion powers will also continue to seek to exert
on other copper supplies, China is concerned of crime in a province such as Helmand, for inuence. Indeed, politically directed funding
about safety and corruption, and is likely to example, is committed by police officers, and from external sources is likely to increase dur-
wait to see the post-transition landscape. the withdrawal of oversight and monitoring is ing the 20145 period and onwards.
likely to increase this tendency. India, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia (and
Military and security stability Highlighting the physical perils facing to a lesser extent the countries of Central
Security is unlikely to be an existential threat Afghan security forces in the future, approxi- Asia) are likely to escalate their involvement
to the Afghan state in the short-to-medium mately 400 Afghan army and police person- in this way. In the short term, this is unlikely
term. Afghan security forces have taken the nel are being killed in action every month, to overly destabilise Afghan politics, but if it
lead in responsibility for military planning according to testimony given to the US Senate continues unchecked its effects could lead to a
over the past two years, and have proven able Foreign Relations Committee on 11 July by a return to more widespread violence.
to handle the serious threat that the Taliban senior Department of Defense official. How-
previously posed, limiting the armed opposi- ever, these gures have always been high, and Risk factors Risk in December 2013
tion to assassinations and visually striking it seems unlikely that they will threaten the Political risk Critical

urban operations with a limited number of security forces ability to operate. Social risk High

ghters that usually end within 48 hours.

TDemo Economic risk Critical

A continuation of the current stalemate is External stability Military & security risk Critical

highly likely. Afghan security forces will be A key milestone still absent from the transi- External risk Signicant

able to counter or make deals with the armed tion is the signing of the BSA with the US. The Total country risk High December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 11

008-013_JIR1312_F8_Afghanscenarios.indd 11 14/11/2013 11:43:53


The following three scenarios assess Afghanistans political transition in 2014 amid the international military drawdown and the upcoming presidential
election, as well as the extent to which the armed political opposition will be contained or accommodated.

Scenario 1: Peaceful transition and violence contained

Probability Low areas fully transitioned to ANA control have it might be willing to negotiate with the new
seen less proactive engagement of this kind state organs. This is less likely, because the

his best-case scenario is what would and more of a tendency to make deals with system of government and the involvement
happen in Afghanistan if the transi- opposition forces instead. The ANA and ANP of power brokers with a history of involve-
tion went to plan. The ANA and ANP also suffer from acute logistics issues, making ment in the violent politics of the past three
are already taking the lead across the country such operations difficult to sustain. decades will not change.
in military matters, and the total registered The insurgency would not pose the exis- In the absence of a deal, the Taliban would
number of irregular militia forces (includ- tential threat to the state that it appeared to be increasingly fragmented and publicly
ing the ALP) has reached close to 50,000. in 200708. Popular support for the armed divided. The failure to meaningfully inte-
Nevertheless, the loyalty of irregular forces opposition would sink to new lows and the grate within state structures would lead to a
to the Afghan state and to the rule of law narrative of jihad against occupation would fall in support and its recruitment base. The
remains questionable. lose its potency for young Afghans after the impetus for large-scale attacks would increas-
In this scenario, these forces would departure of most foreign troops in 2014. ingly come from Pakistani-affiliated groups or
combine together and manage to contain This has already happened to some those who could never reintegrate with the
violence from affecting urban centres for extent, although the effects of a drop in state, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader
the most part. The security implementation support for the Taliban would not neces- of Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin.
would not be awless, but most large-scale sarily mean a boost in the Afghan states However, despite the possibility of some
attacks would be prevented or swiftly con- popular legitimacy. In the short-to-medium elements of this scenario coming to pass, the
tained. The ANA would not start to disinte- term, the administrative weaknesses of the overall relative probability remains low.
grate in the short term, particularly while it government would be likely to continue,
continues to receive external funding. including corruption and generalised inef- Risk factors Scenario one
In rural areas, this scenario posits that ciency at all levels. Political risk High

government forces would continue to keep This scenario could also potentially include Social risk Signicant

up the pressure against the Taliban and its a successful deal with the Taliban following Economic risk High

allies. For this, they would use a combination the presidential election. If the Taliban lead- Military & security risk High

of night raids and more conventional sweep ership judged that the new government were External risk Signicant

operations. This is less likely, in part because substantively different from its predecessor, Total country risk High

Scenario 2: Messy transition and insurgent integration

Probability High the departure of foreigners and their cash structures, and a widening divide between
ow might temper the extent to which cor- the military and political wings of the Taliban

his scenario is the default pathway for ruption is lucrative and/or endemic. would continue, but with no short-term
Afghanistan, in which there are no External interference would continue, but disintegration of the Taliban. In part, this is
major surprises; it offers a logical con- either the levels of this intervention would because the benets not available to the Tali-
clusion to the transition process, and as such remain stable, or excessive activity by one ban over the past 12 years will become avail-
is mostly predicated on a continuation of the country would be balanced out by another. able after 2015. This could take the form of
countrys current situation and dynamics. There remains the possibility for an exter- integration into the post-Karzai governmen-
In this scenario, the handover of political nally fuelled scenario similar to the early tal structure, or more simply be measured
control to a new president in the April 2014 1990s civil war, but this would be extremely in territory seized as Afghan security forces
election would lead to signicant political unlikely in the short term; any such dynam- cease to control the same geographical spread
turmoil, but the levels of violence would be ics would take at least one year to manifest. as at present.
managed by the Afghan National Security There would be no major changes to the There might be an increased role for Paki-
Forces and associated militia forces. Corrup-
armed opposition, either in structure or stani or foreign groups, but this would not
tion and economic difficulties would contin- tactics. Trends that have been ongoing for present a signicant threat to the state. In
ue, but these would not contain the seeds for the past two years such as fragmenta- places where international forces withdraw,
heightened levels of instability. Moreover, tion, a loosening of command-and-control such as has already occurred in parts of the

12 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

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east, the Afghan troops replacing them have be unable to interact with the state in any fraught with instability, but is unlikely to
often made deals with the armed opposition, meaningful way, and would have signicant- be enough to call the viability of the Afghan
similar to the situation in the late 1980s and ly less leverage. In general, this period would state into question in the short term.
early 1990s. involve intervention from internal and exter-
Political instability would peak around nal actors, but there would be action taken Risk factors Scenario two
the time of the presidential and provincial among Afghan political groups and stake- Political risk Critical

council elections on 5 April 2014. The diverse holders to preserve the broad status quo. Social risk High

candidate list would mean strongly contested These measures could include the system Economic risk Critical

results. In 2009, the post-election wrangling of political rule, the constitution, and the Military & security risk High

took two-and-a-half months. During the mechanisms of patronage coupled with the External risk Signicant

2014 elections, international actors would conict economy. This scenario is therefore Total country risk High

Scenario 3: Violent transition with external meddling

Probability Moderate remove most of the inuence of these inter- campaign, without the buffer against opera-
national actors, and could well set the stage tions designed purely to target civilians that

n this scenario, the election would be a for politically inspired conict on or around parts of the Afghan Taliban had sought to
catalyst for political discontent to con- the time of the April 2014 elections. enforce. This could involve an increase in
tinue throughout the period of transition Moreover, the Taliban might make some targeting international staff in Kabul. When
and into 2015. The outcome would be con- symbolic victories in early 2015. These would combined with the political instability,
tested and a nal result would either not be be most likely to occur in the south or east, weak leadership, and the absence of foreign
announced, or would be violently disputed. in areas of little strategic value, but still not forces preventing the various Afghan armed
The extent to which many Afghan political without propaganda signicance. This could forces from ghting each other, this violent
actors particularly the older generations be a district centre, or in the east, and poten- environment would create the groundwork
have stated their belief in rearmament sug- tially the fall of provincial capitals for brief for future conict, ongoing instability, and
gests that this is a possibility, even though periods. Backed up by extensive propaganda the likelihood that Afghanistan would once
such a development would be strongly output by the Taliban, this would contrib- again become a problem affecting the wider
discouraged by international actors. Interna- ute to the ongoing sense of mistrust in the international community in the future.
tional mediation could be rejected or unable Afghan state and its ability to stay the course
to force a decision on the part of Afghan in the longer term. Risk factors Scenario three
political players after the election. This post-transition scenario posits an Political risk Critical

A precondition for this scenario would increased role of outside groups mainly Social risk High

be a no vote at the jirga scheduled to take Pakistani that would shoulder more of the Economic risk Critical

place at the end of November in Kabul. Under larger spectacular operations and carry out Military & security risk Critical

these terms, international troops would exit sectarian attacks. Such groups would con- External risk Critical

Afghanistan almost completely. This would tinue the suicide bombing and assassination Total country risk Critical


The presidential election is likely to be departure of most international troops by This article was first published online at
messy whoever wins. The extent to which the end of 2015, but the signicant drop on 11 November 2013.
this political instability leads to uncertainty in media coverage and presence across
or violence depends on whether Afghan the country will make event monitoring
political elites feel that 2015 represents a substantially more challenging.
chance to reshape the political future of the Regardless of whether the handover XON THE WEB
country to their advantage. It also depends process moves more or less accord-
Disquiet on the Western front
on the perception of external countries in ing to plan, there will invariably be some
Security transition in Afghanistan
this regard. manifestation of the armed opposition
The new Afghan leader will most likely able and willing to carry out attacks on the Afghanistans new spy chief injured in
be weak and their primary task after 2015 Afghan government and foreign targets Taliban bomb attack
will simply be to shore up the system and inside Afghanistan. Author
prevent internal and external attempts to The ability of this opposition to carry out Alex Strick van Linschoten is a writer/
further weaken the basic structures of visually striking but ultimately low-impact researcher. He is co-author of An Enemy
the state.
attacks on Afghan cities and government We Created and co-editor of Poetry of
the Taliban and My Life With the Taliban.
In security terms, Afghanistan will not personnel will not necessarily signify a seri-
precipitously disintegrate following the ous failure of the transition process. December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 13

008-013_JIR1312_F8_Afghanscenarios.indd 13 14/11/2013 15:30:21


Hizbullah expands its urban training facilities
As Hizbullahs ghting force undergoes expansion, the number of its training facilities
for urban operations is also increasing. Nicholas Blanford examines the groups use of
these centres and the effect they are likely to have on its tactical capabilities.

X KEY POINTS been undergoing an unprecedented expansion Following the IDF withdrawal from south
in its ghting force. Lebanon in May 2000, one of the main activi-
Hizbullah has built at least three In response, Hizbullah has been expand- ties undertaken by Hizbullah was the covert
Military Operations in Urban Terrain ing its training facilities, and in particular its construction of a sophisticated underground
(MOUT) facilities in Lebanon to Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) defence network of bunkers, tunnels, and
expand the capabilities of its ghting sites. This development is conrmed by both rocket-ring platforms. Confronted by a
force, in preparation for future conict
photography and satellite imagery analysed powerful Israeli conventional force, Hizbullah
with Israel and its current intervention
in Syrias civil war.
by IHS Janes, which has identied three main opted to adapt its low-signature offensive op-
MOUT sites. This expansion of training facili- erations of the 1990s to a defensive role. The
The incorporation of urban warfare ties without consideration for their identica- bunkers and tunnel networks offered the IDF
skills into Hizbullahs training
tion suggests that the need for concealment and Israeli Air Force (IAF) few visible targets
programme underlines the broadening
is outweighed by the need to provide training and allowed Hizbullah to mount surprise am-
tactical capabilities of the group since
its last conict with Israel in 2006. for its growing force, a priority probably bushes against advancing troops and armour.
driven by its experiences in Syria. Neverthe- Most of these military preparations were
Unusually, the MOUT facilities, as well less, although the short-term priority is in conducted in the rural areas of the southern
as other newly constructed training
Syria, the urban training programme and border district. Nevertheless, some defensive
camps in Lebanon, have been built
in the open and are visible to satellite experience gained there will provide Hizbul- underground facilities were built in villages
and aerial reconnaissance, suggesting lah with a highly capable core of ghters to be and towns in south Lebanon, especially those
that Hizbullah has sacriced its utilised against Israel in the event of a future adjacent to the border with Israel.
customary secrecy for the necessity conict, or within Lebanon itself during any The strategy worked effectively, as the
of accelerated training of its cadres. resurgence of inter-factional violence. Israelis discovered in the July to August 2006
conict. The low-signature underground

s the Lebanese militant group The evolution of urban operations and camouaged facilities, combined with
Hizbullah has evolved over the past From its formation in 1982 until the turn of advanced anti-armour systems such as the
20 years, there has been a growing the century, Hizbullahs conict against the AT-14 Kornet and a sophisticated bre-optic
emphasis on urban warfare to complement Israel Defence Force (IDF) was fought mainly communications system, helped Hizbullah
its traditional focus on rural guerrilla ghting. in the hills and valleys of rural south Lebanon, halt the IDF ground offensive by the time a
The threat of striking against Israeli settle- which favoured the organisations then typi- ceasere came into effect on 14 August 2006.
ments across the Lebanese border represents cal hit-and-run guerrilla-style warfare. Notably, for the rst time in the 24-year
a key element in Hizbullahs arsenal; at the However, after Israeli helicopters destroyed Hizbullah-Israel conict, much of the ght-
same time, its ghters have also become
a Hizbullah training camp at Ain Dardara ing occurred in an urban environment. IDF
increasingly embroiled in urban combat while in the northern Bekaa Valley in June 1994, armour struggled in the narrow streets of Bint
supporting government forces in Syria. This killing more than 40 recruits, static training Jbeil, the largest Shia-populated town in the
comes at a time when the militant group has facilities were largely abandoned. southern Lebanon border district. Hizbullah

14 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

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Israeli-style MOUT compound

Arab village-style MOUT compound

Israeli-style MOUT compound

Astrium imagery depicts a Hizbullah MOUT complex near Taraya, Lebanon. Image dated 16 May 2013. Photographs illustrate the rooess nature of the MOUT
installations and their different layouts. Photography by Nicholas Blanford. CNES 2013, Distribution Astrium Services / Spot Image S.A./ IHS: 1486993

militants red rocket-propelled grenades drive was launched, the scale of which was Hizbullah propaganda video broadcast on the
from windows at close range against IDF unprecedented in the groups history. partys Al-Manar television channel showed
tanks and detonated improvised explosive de- Alongside basic training conducted in ghters manoeuvring along the street and
vices (IEDs) hidden in the rubble of destroyed the Bekaa Valley, urban warfare skills were entering the buildings, which were decorated
buildings. After a few unsuccessful attempts included for the rst time, with training in Israels national ag. A video shot of the
to seize Bint Jbeil and other nearby villages, being conducted in Iran and Lebanon. There MOUT site compared with a satellite image of
the IDF resorted to artillery shelling and air is a sophisticated training camp for urban the Beit Mubarak facility conrmed they were
strikes to essentially raze the town to the warfare in Iran. There are some here [in Leba- the same.
ground and subdue the Hizbullah defenders. non] too, but on a smaller scale, Hajj Abbas, a A second identical MOUT site was con-
Hizbullahs rst serious urban combat was veteran Hizbullah combatant, told IHS Janes structed at a new training camp northeast of
therefore essentially of a defensive nature and in July 2013. the Bekaa Valley village of Khreibe. The date
based on the ghters intimate knowledge of The rst known MOUT site to be con- of construction is unclear, but satellite image-
the terrain and careful pre-war preparations. structed in Lebanon appeared around 2008 ry comparisons show that it was some time
Urban warfare techniques were not part of at the Beit Mubarak training camp in the hills before May 2011. Like its earlier counterpart,
Hizbullahs regular training programme be- south of Janta in the eastern Bekaa Valley. It the site consists of two parallel rows of three
fore 2006. However, after the war, offensive consists of two parallel rows of three small cinder block buildings, although this site has
urban warfare was introduced into Hizbullahs single-room rooess cinder block buildings longer structures at the end of each row. The
training programme to prepare the cadres for approximately 4 m by 4 m, forming a street. MOUT site is part of a training ground that in-
the next conict with Israel. At one end of the street is a longer structure, cludes ring ranges, small shipping container-
17 m by 4 m, perpendicular to the two rows of sized buildings, and metal-roofed utility
Urban training complexes buildings. The camp includes ring ranges, a buildings. In the rst half of 2012, ve larger
Hizbullahs military preparations for the next suspected driver training track, and bunkers buildings measuring 13 m by 5 m were built
war with Israel began as soon as the 2006 con-
sunk into the sides of the valley. The MOUT 70 m south of the MOUT site. A 3 September
ict ended. Large quantities of new and more site was provisionally identied by IHS Janes 2013 satellite image obtained by IHS Janes
advanced rockets and missiles were smug- imagery analysis in 2009. The purpose of the shows the ve buildings connected to the
gled into Lebanon and a broad recruitment site was conrmed in March 2013 when a MOUT facility by an asphalt road. It is unclear December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 15

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whether the ve buildings are an extension of buildings that appears to represent the centre and there were no obvious utility links such
the MOUT facility. of a typical Arab village, unlike the other as electricity poles and lighting that would
The third identied MOUT facility is the MOUT sites, which closely resembled the lay- suggest a genuine construction project. The
most recently constructed and is located in out of Israeli settlements. Most of the build- lack of roofs, doors, and glass windows in the
the hills behind the village of Taraya on the ings are four-roomed, rooess, and single-sto- houses further attest to the facility being a
western ank of the Bekaa Valley. It is sub- rey. There is at least one two-storey and one MOUT site.
stantially larger in scale than the two earlier three-storey building. The Arab village also The Taraya MOUT facility is not the only
sites and appears to consist of three main includes a mosque with two silver domes. A visible training ground in the area. Another
components. The rst, on the northeast edge water tower is located behind the mosque. sprawling camp believed to have been estab-
of the facility, is similar to the two smaller The differences between the two types of vil- lished in early 2012 is located 2 kilometres
MOUT facilities at Beit Mubarak and Khreibe, lage are also highlighted by the neat layout of (km) south of the Taraya facility near the
although the parallel rows consist of nine the Israeli streets, reecting the high levels village of Shmistar.
buildings each instead of three. The second of urban planning seen in Israel, compared Other training camps or military positions
component is another street at the southern with the more chaotic nature of the Arab are discernible across the parts of Lebanon un-
end of the site, although this one includes a streets, which reect the less planned nature der Hizbullah control. They run in scale from
row of nine rooess multi-room cinder block of most urban areas in locations such as Syria small hilltop outposts consisting of two or
buildings approximately 10 m by 4 m lying and Lebanon. three camouaged huts hidden beneath trees,
in a northwest to southeast orientation. The Local residents in the Bekaa Valley told IHS to a 19 km facility set among mountains in
nine buildings are anked on either side by Janes that they have been aware of the con- south Lebanon with numerous small ship-
parallel rows of six or seven of the smaller 4 m struction activity in a Hizbullah-controlled ping container buildings, a suspected assault
by 4 m structures. At the southeast end of the security pocket on the edge of Taraya over the course, several ring ranges, and a possible
site is a two-storey cement-walled building past 18 months, but the sites specic purpose fenced-off IED test site.
with water tanks on the roof, which appears is generally unknown to them. IHS Janes has The unusual aspect of this post-2006 prolif-
to be one of only two habitable structures at obtained photographic images of the site eration of training facilities and military bases
the site. from high ground, which, along with satel- is their visibility from the air. Although they
The third and most signicant component lite images, conrms the facility as a MOUT are generally constructed away from publicly
of the Taraya MOUT facility is the cluster of site. No personnel or vehicles were visible, accessible areas that grant ground views of the

Hizbullah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah deliv-

ers a speech from a secret location during a
rally at the south Lebanon-Israel border village
of Aita, Lebanon, on 16 August 2013. As a re-
sult of its expanding ghting force, Hizbullah is
increasing the number of its training facilities
for urban operations. PA: 1515069


16 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

014-019_JIR1312_F1_TI_Hizbullah.indd 16 14/11/2013 14:42:52


sites, they are clearly exposed to aerial surveil-

lance. Hizbullah is skilled at camouaging its
military activities and has engaged in decep-
tive practices in the past, such as camouag-
ing its bunker network in southern Lebanon
and deploying decoy positions to mislead IAF
surveillance or human intelligence assets on
the ground. However, the plethora of facili-
ties scattered across south Lebanon and the
Bekaa Valley would suggest that they are not
all decoys.
The more simple explanation is that Hizbul-
lah does not mind if the sites are spotted as
they have little military value beyond train-
ing. Since the end of the 2006 war, Hizbullah
and Israel have avoided overt hostilities along

PA: 1515068
the Blue Line the United Nations name for
Lebanons southern border. This has allowed
A screen grab from Hizbullahs Al-Manar television channel shows ghters training at the Beit Mubarak
Hizbullah some leeway in conducting its MOUT facility, about to enter a building decorated in the Israeli ag. The layout of the MOUT facilities at
training programme more openly. Beit Mubarak and Khreibe closely resembles that of a typical Israeli settlement.
Hizbullah does not hide the fact that it is
training its cadres and appears unconcerned
if the facilities are monitored by Israeli aerial Training for Israel the possibility of Israel occupying Lebanon.
assets. The camps would almost certainly be Since the end of the 2006 war with Israel, Even more, today, Israel is concerned that
destroyed in the event of renewed conict, Hizbullah ghters have hinted that they are Hizbullah might liberate Galilee I tell the
but they are relatively inexpensive to con- being trained to mount operations inside Resistance ghters to be prepared for the day
struct and could be rebuilt quite easily. Israel in the event of another conict. For in- when war is imposed on Lebanon, he said.
Furthermore, the expansion of Hizbul- stance, in February 2011, Hizbullah secretary- These comments came during one of
lahs ghting force since 2006 from around general Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah alluded to Nasrallahs periodic deterrence speeches
300400 full-time ghters to around 5,000 the possibility that his ghters could enter in which he attempted to strike a balance
has necessitated an increase in the number of Israel in the next war. The major accomplish- against the capabilities and possible plans
basic training facilities. ment of the Resistance is that it complicated of the IDF in the next war. He stated that if

Israels urban combat training

Israel has signicantly increased the num- that had developed specic tactics for an base in the Negev desert in southern Israel.
ber of MOUT facilities it operates in recent urban environment. The 41,000 m facility was built in 2006 and
years as part of the lessons learned from The IDF claims that Hizbullahs prepara- funded mainly by US military aid. Known as
the month-long conict with Hizbullah in tions for another conict with Israel are the Baladia, Arabic for village, the facility
2006. The IDF at that time was ill-prepared conned mainly to urban areas in south includes over 600 structures, with shops,
to meet the military challenge posed by Lebanon, rather than the rural hills and eight-storey buildings, a market place, a
Hizbullah, which had evolved consider- valleys as before 2006. Given expectations cemetery, a large mosque, a hospital, and
ably over the previous six years in terms that much of any future war with Hizbullah tunnels to simulate those found in the Pal-
of training, tactics, weapons systems, and would be waged in an urban environment, estinian Territories and south Lebanon.
deployment. Hizbullahs use of bunker and the IDF has increased its MOUT facili- In addition, the Eliakim training centre is
tunnel networks and camouaged rocket ties to better prepare troops for another designed specically for the south Leba-
ring posed considerable difculties for encounter with Hizbullah and overcome the non theatre. Set among the hills of south-
IDF ground forces, as well as for the Israeli deciencies of the past. In 2010, the IDF ern Mount Carmel in northern Israel, which
Air Force. announced that it intended to increase resemble the terrain of south Lebanon,
Much of the combat was set in an urban the number of its MOUT sites by 50% troops learn how to manoeuvre through
environment in the towns and villages by the end of 2011, bringing the total to an environment laced with IEDs, rocket-
of south Lebanon. Although the IDF had around 22. The IDFs Ground Forces Com- launching sites, and tunnel and bunker
previous experience ghting in urban areas mand also decided that urban warfare systems. A mock southern Lebanese
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it was the training should amount to one-quarter of a village, complete with bunkers and tunnels
rst time since the 1982 invasion of south soldiers training.
TDemo beneath the houses, has been constructed
Lebanon that it had fought in built-up areas The largest facility is the Urban Warfare at the centre and is of comparable size to
of the country, and against an opponent Training Center at the Tzeelim training the Hizbullah MOUT facility at Taraya. December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 17

014-019_JIR1312_F1_TI_Hizbullah.indd 17 14/11/2013 14:43:06


central Beirut was bombed, Tel Aviv would

be struck by Hizbullahs missiles; if the Israeli
navy imposed a blockade of Lebanese ports,
Hizbullah would threaten Israel-bound ves- Israeli-style MOUT compound
sels with its anti-ship missiles; and if Israel
invaded Lebanon, Hizbullah would in turn
invade Israel.
However, specics of the urban training are
unknown Hizbullah cadres are not permit-
ted to discuss military matters at all, and their
rare private comments on the subject tend
to lack details. The purpose of any operations
conducted inside Israel in the next war is Rooess single-room target buildings
likely not to be to liberate territory, but to
conduct sabotage and hit-and-run attacks to
generally sow panic and confusion on Israels
homefront, as well as scoring propaganda
points with an Arab audience.
One of the possible goals is to seize part or
all of one or more Israeli settlements that abut
the Lebanese border. There are approximately
18 potentially vulnerable Israeli settlements
Astrium imagery details the MOUT training complex and support facilities at the Khreibe training complex.
lying beside the border. Many of these are Image dated 3 September 2013. CNES 2013, Distribution Astrium Services / Spot Image S.A./ IHS: 1486995
only connected to the rest of Israel by a single
road, which could be cut off by an attacking
force. Some, such as Manara and Misgav Am, The propaganda video aired in March northern border, which, although inside
lie adjacent to the border fence and on top of 2013 showing Hizbullah ghters practicing Syria, were populated by Lebanese Shias. It is
an escarpment, potentially facilitating Hizbul- storming homes decorated in the Israeli ag probably no coincidence that construction on
lahs seizure of the settlements and subse- at the Beit Mubarak MOUT site was a delib- the Taraya MOUT site began in early 2012 as
quent defence against IDF rescuers. The IDF erately conveyed indicator that this tactic is Hizbullahs role in Syria was becoming more
maintains approximately 30 outposts along among the organisations battle plans for the pronounced, and the Arab village at the site
Lebanons 110 km southern frontier, but few next war. appears to have been constructed with Syria
of them lie inside the border settlements. A in mind.
swift assault by Hizbullah units amid diver- Training for Syria In May 2013, Nasrallah admitted for the
sionary re could allow the attackers time Nevertheless, it is Hizbullahs ongoing rst time that his cadres were ghting in
to seize a border settlement and cut the ap- involvement in the Syrian civil war, and not Syria. His conrmation came at the onset of
proach roads before the IDF has had a chance planning for a future conict with Israel, that a 17-day assault against the rebel-held town
to react. Furthermore, the IDF announced has given urgency to the recent expansion of Qusayr, 8 km north of the border with
in September 2013 that it was planning to in its MOUT training programme. Several Lebanon. The operation was spearheaded
withdraw troops deployed as guards in nine thousand Hizbullah ghters are estimated by Hizbullah with the backing of Syrian air
communities on Israels northern border to be in Syria ghting on behalf of Syrian power and artillery. We have been trained
after it was assessed by the IDF that existing president Bashar al-Assad, according to very well but this was a new kind of combat
security measures were sufficient. international and regional diplomatic and for us, Hajj Abbas, who served a seven-day
The idea of Hizbullah seizing Israeli border intelligence sources who spoke to IHS Janes. tour in Qusayr, told IHS Janes.
settlements may have been developed before Syria is a key ally of Iran and Hizbullah, and The rebels had prepared extensive de-
2006. In 2002, IHS Janes was told by sources they collectively form a political and military fences in the months preceding the assault,
close to Hizbullah in south Lebanon that one alliance dubbed the axis of resistance against digging tunnels, booby-trapping buildings,
of the plans in the event of a major war with Israel and Western policies in the Middle East. and planting IEDs. Hizbullah split the town
Israel was to capture a border settlement and The survival of the Assad regime is therefore into 16 sectors and assigned code numbers to
hold the residents hostage. Such a feat, if of critical importance for Hizbullahs future different buildings and objectives, according
successful, would place tremendous pressure viability and for Irans ability to extend its to published reports and IHS Janes interviews
on an Israeli government, especially during a inuence into the Arab-Israeli arena. with Hizbullah ghters. Between 1,200 and
time of war. Hizbullah ghters are believed to have been 1,700 Hizbullah ghters were deployed into
The tactic was not exploited in the 2006 serving in Syria from early 2012, according to Qusayr, according to sources in the party and
conict because Hizbullah fought in a reactive
sources close to the party who spoke to IHS published reports. Each combat unit consisted
and defensive manner, in the hope of ending Janes. The ghters were initially conned of between three and ve ghters.
the ghting as quickly as possible and before mainly to the southern Damascus suburbs Once the assault began on 19 May, Hizbul-
too much damage was inicted on its forces. and a cluster of villages opposite Lebanons lah sent in engineering teams to remove

18 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

014-019_JIR1312_F1_TI_Hizbullah.indd 18 14/11/2013 14:43:10


Hizbullahs capability of bringing down entire

buildings and demolishing earth barricade
Weapons range defences with its missiles.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were
also dispatched over Qusayr to scout rebel
positions, although it is unclear whether the
UAVs belonged to Hizbullah or the Syrian
army. The Hizbullah drones [UAVs] were a
big threat to us because they would pin-point
our posts then Hizbullah would hit us with
Weapons range mortar re, one Syrian rebel ghter told IHS
Janes. The rebels also spoke of Hizbullahs
ability to advance under re and outank
their opponents. They had a smart tactic of
Weapons range
attacking us from the front while other units
attempted to ank us. But they would always
leave a small gap through which we could
retreat, one rebel ghter said.
Nonetheless, the assault on Qusayr took
longer than Hizbullah had anticipated and
MOUT training complex and
support facilities
casualties were relatively high. Between
70 and 110 Hizbullah ghters are estimated
to have been killed in Qusayr, according to
Astrium imagery depicts a new training complex established between 2010 and 2011 near Khreibe,
Lebanon. Image dated 3 September 2013. CNES 2013, Distribution Astrium Services / Spot Image S.A./ IHS: 1486994 sources close to the group, testimony to the
difficulties of ghting in an urban environ-
booby traps and IEDs, allowing the combat SVD 7.62 mm sniper ries and even employed ment, despite MOUT training and careful
units to advance. The engineers saved us a Improvised Rocket-Assisted Munitions pre-operational planning.
lot of headaches and saved us time. They (IRAMs) consisting of a warhead of unknown Towards the end of the battle, the surviving
would clear a building then radio to us that size boosted by a 107 mm rocket. The short- rebel forces had been squeezed into a small
building number three or building number range system proved highly effective against sector in northern Qusayr. We squashed
four had been cleared and we could move in, rebel defences. One video captured by a them into the northern part of the town and
Abbas said. Hizbullah ghter and shown to IHS Janes por- then pinned them down with sniper re,
The ghters avoided open doorways and trayed a building in the centre of Qusayr being Abbas said. The battle ended with a heavy
windows and instead blasted holes through struck by an IRAM and collapsing in rubble. artillery bombardment and a nal ground
connecting walls for access. They made Rebel ghters interviewed by IHS Janes in the push by Hizbullah as the rebels ed north
extensive use of snipers armed with Dragunov aftermath of the battle repeatedly referred to from the town.


The battle for Qusayr was the rst time preparations for a confrontation in the This article was first published online at
Hizbullah has mounted a major offensive strategic area and expect the campaign to on 29 October 2013.
operation in an urban environment, offering be waged before the winter rains begin in
an opportunity to put its new MOUT skills earnest in December.
into practice. Since then, Hizbullah cadres The MOUT training in Iran and Lebanon
have fought in Deraa in southern Syria, the has helped expand Hizbullahs battleeld
Eastern Ghouta region outside Damascus, capabilities in terms of the long-standing Hizbullahs role in fall of rebel-held
and Homs, Syrias third city. confrontation with Israel as well as in as- Al-Qusayr raises risk of Sunni-Shia
There is a growing conviction among sisting the Syrian army in its efforts against ghting in Lebanon
Hizbullah ghters who spoke to IHS Janes rebel forces. Although the training has Collision course Israel and Hizbullah
that the group could soon be called on allowed Hizbullah to handle the relative maintain readiness for war
to spearhead a fresh offensive, this time novelties of urban combat, the real benet
Enemy at the gates Hizbullah
against rebel forces holding the Qalamoun of the Syria campaign for Hizbullahs future
remains focused on conict with Israel
region, a mainly arid mountainous land- ghting capabilities rests with the invalu-
scape between Damascus and Homs, able combat experience in both urban and Author
and adjacent to Lebanons eastern border.
rural environments gained by hundreds of Nicholas Blanford is a Beirut-based
correspondent for IHS Janes.
Both Hizbullah and rebel sources have post-2006 recruits, an advantage that their
told IHS Janes that they have undertaken IDF opponents cannot claim. December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 19

014-019_JIR1312_F1_TI_Hizbullah.indd 19 14/11/2013 14:43:31


Boko Haram widens campaign against civilians
Attacks against schools and civilians in northeast Nigeria indicate that the Boko
Haram militant group is willing to escalate its campaign in reaction to the countrys
state of emergency. Will Hartley looks at the attacks and the governments response.

X KEY POINTS 2013, and represent a departure from the them from continuing to participate in
groups previous focus on targeting security initiatives such as the Civilian JTF. This has
Suspected Boko Haram militants force facilities and personnel. been particularly evident in the escalation of
carried out a series of high-prole The high number of civilian casualties has the groups campaign against schools, which
mass-casualty attacks in September undermined repeated government claims have been the target of a series of increasingly
and October, undermining government that the threat posed by Boko Haram was be- lethal attacks in recent months.
claims that security is being restored
ing contained following President Goodluck
in northern Nigeria.
Jonathans declaration of a state of emergency September massacres
Such attacks have escalated since the in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states in May. The deadliest of the September attacks
declaration of a state of emergency Indeed, this apparent trend towards attacks attributed to Boko Haram occurred on 17
in three northern states in May, with a
on civilians, particularly in rural areas, is itself September, when gunmen carried out an
number of deadly attacks on schools
seemingly a response by Boko Haram to the indiscriminate massacre of civilians travelling
in the region causing particular
concern. changing operational environment created by on the highway between Maiduguri, the pro-
the state of emergency. vincial capital of Borno, and Damaturu, the
Boko Harams recent targeting of Around 8,000 military and Joint Task Force provincial capital of Yobe. Militants disguised
civilians, and students in particular,
(JTF) personnel have been deployed to the in military uniforms set up a fake checkpoint
appears to be retaliation for the local
populations co-operation with the three states since May, where they have en- near the town of Benisheik, in Borno, and
security forces, and the emergence of gaged in search and destroy missions, backed then began executing travellers and burning
civilian vigilante groups. by air strikes, aimed at uprooting Boko Haram vehicles, including trucks carrying food to
from areas where it had established control. local markets.
Curfews and other restrictions on move- Locals also reported that the militants

n 24 October 2013, suspected Boko ment have been introduced, and the entire burned multiple residences and other build-
Haram jihadist militants launched telephone network across the three states ings in the area. An anonymous security
an attack on the Nigerian city of has been shut down in a bid to disrupt Boko source stationed in Benisheik told Al Jazeera,
Damaturu, capital of Yobe state, killing Harams ability to co-ordinate operations. The They came in droves, driving about 20 pick-
several soldiers, policemen, and civilians, and authorities have also encouraged the emer- up trucks, adding that they were armed with
burning at least four police and security force gence of local vigilante groups popularly anti-aircraft guns.
buildings. This attack came after suspected known as the Civilian JTF in towns across At least 143 people were killed in the at-
militants from the group had killed more than the region. tack, while a security source cited by Nigerian
200 civilians in a succession of high-prole Although Boko Harams shift towards at- newspaper This Day claimed that some of
mass-casualty attacks in rural areas of north- tacks on softer civilian targets is partly a sim- the victims had been decapitated. We found
ern Nigeria in September. These latter attacks, ple tactical adaptation to this more restrictive 10 corpses by the road side near Benisheik
which took place in Borno and Yobe states,
operating environment, and a means of as- just before Ngamdu village; the victims were
were the latest in a series of such operations serting its relevance, it also appears aimed at beheaded and their heads placed on their
against soft targets conducted by suspected punishing local populations for their co-oper- chests, said the source.
Boko Haram militants since early-to-mid ation with the security forces, and dissuading Two days later, on 19 September, suspected

20 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

020-023_JIR1312_F9_BokoTI.indd 20 14/11/2013 14:41:46


Boko Haram militants carried out a similar moved onto the next group and killed them, Restore Order, and Boko Haram spokesman
attack on the road between Maiduguri and said one survivor. The gunmen then went Abu Qaqa claimed on 26 February that the
Bamboa, with police sources reporting that 16 on to attack residents living in the area school attacks were retaliation for the alleged
civilians were killed. surrounding the school. harassment by security forces of teachers
Subsequently, on 26 September, suspected With the telephone network disabled, the and pupils at Islamic schools in Maiduguri.
Boko Haram militants killed six civilians in gunmen appear to have been able to take We attacked the schools because security
Gamboru, a remote town in Borno near the their time in carrying out the massacre. The operatives are going to Islamiyya schools
border with Cameroon. The following night, following day, bodies were found in dormi- and picking [up] teachers, he said, adding,
the militants returned to the town and killed tories, classrooms, and in the surrounding Unless [Islamic] teachers are allowed to be,
a further 21 civilians. Reports gave no indica- bush, and unconrmed reports claimed some we would be compelled to continue attacking
tion of any motive behind the attacks. had been decapitated. Forty students were [state] schools.
Finally, on 29 September, an unknown initially conrmed killed, but Nigerian news- Notably, Abu Qaqa stressed that the aim of
number of suspected Boko Haram militants papers claimed the death toll rose to at least such retaliatory attacks was not to cause casu-
attacked an agricultural college in Gujba, 78 following searches of the area. alties. We are attacking the public schools at
a rural area around 50 kilometres south of night because we dont want to kill innocent
Damaturu. According to a surviving student, School attacks pupils, he stated.
the gunmen arrived on motorcycles and in The massacre of students at Gujba was the Although the authorities insisted no such
two all-terrain pickup trucks at around 0100 deadliest in a series of escalating attacks harassment of staff and pupils at Islamic
local time. Some of the gunmen were wear- against schools that have largely crippled the schools was occurring, similar low-level arson
ing military uniforms, and they appeared to education system in Borno and Yobe. and improvised explosive device (IED) at-
know the layout of the compound, attacking Boko Harams systematic targeting of state tacks targeting unoccupied schools began to
the four male dormitories while avoiding the and private schools began in late February proliferate across the region from February.
womens dormitory. 2012, when four schools in Maiduguri were Evidence subsequently emerged suggesting
Inside the college, the gunmen executed destroyed in nighttime arson attacks. This that some attacks were being carried out by
anyone they found. They started gather- came against the backdrop of a security crack- children co-opted by Boko Haram. One Boko
ing students into groups outside, then they down by the JTF, which had been deployed to Haram prisoner among a group of child sus-
opened re and killed one group and then Borno state in June 2011 as part of Operation pects granted amnesty on 31 May 2013 told

Vigilantes of the Civilian Joint Task Force

TDemo mount a checkpoint on the streets of
Maiduguri in Nigeria with knives and clubs
on 7 August 2013. Civilians have joined the
local security forces in response to increasing
attacks from Boko Haram. PA: 1515075 December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 21

020-023_JIR1312_F9_BokoTI.indd 21 14/11/2013 14:41:52


reporters he had been given barrels of petrol attack but avoided claiming responsibility. drivers feeding the insurgency. School attend-
and paid NGN5,000 (USD31) to set re to Our religion does not permit us to touch ance gures in the northeast were already
schools in Maiduguri. small children and women, but we fully sup- among the lowest in the country, even before
However, the restraint evident in the initial port the attack on the school in Mamudo, as the attacks, with the 2010 Nigeria Education
attacks had been abandoned by March, when well as on other schools, he claimed. Data Survey reporting secondary school enrol-
arson attacks began to be punctuated by more Shekau also made clear that teachers were ment in Borno at only 28%.
lethal operations in which teachers appeared considered a legitimate target, and that the The government has pledged to rebuild all
to be the primary targets. In a signicant arson campaign against un-Islamic schools state schools destroyed by the militants, al-
development, on 18 March, suspected Boko would continue. Teachers who teach West- though no such funds are available for the pri-
Haram militants attacked three schools in ern education? We will kill them. We will kill vate schools that have been targeted. Further-
Maiduguri during class hours, killing one them in front of their students, and tell the more, Boko Haram is seemingly deliberately
teacher at each school, and wounding three students to henceforth study the Quran, targeting schools that are renovated after
pupils. Subsequently, on 9 April, two teachers Shekau said. We are going to burn down attacks, with the IRIN news agency reporting
were killed in their homes, and four officials the schools, if they are not Islamic religious in May that one school in the Gwange area of
from the Borno State Feeding Commit- schools for Allah. Maiduguri had been renovated and then burnt
tee were killed while they were inspecting down again on four occasions.
schools in Dikwa, Borno State. Deadly impact In what may be considered another success
In June, Boko Haram further escalated its Speaking in April, following the rst daytime for Boko Harams campaign, the collapse
campaign, with students themselves becom- school attacks in March, and shortly before in attendance at secular state and private
ing the focus of attacks. On 16 June, two schools were due to re-open in May after schools has been accompanied by sharp rises
teachers and seven students were killed in holidays, Musa Inuwa, the commissioner in enrolment in the regions Islamic schools,
an attack on a boarding school in Damaturu, for education in Borno State, said, We are which Boko Haram has explicitly stated will
not be attacked.

Jonathan acknowledged that the initial Security challenges

gains made during the state of emergency Reporting from the region has been heavily
restricted under the state of emergency, and
were in danger of being reversed the government has used this opportunity to
present a positive account of its successes in
degrading Boko Harams capabilities. How-
ever, the recent series of civilian massacres,
and the following day, nine students were appealing to parents to keep their children in and the school attacks in particular, have
killed as they sat an exam at a private school school and not to be intimidated. severely undermined popular condence in
in Maiduguri. However, with school attendance already the progress being made, and have prompted
In an audio statement sent to the Nigeria badly affected by the arson campaign, the mounting criticism in national media.
Newsday website on 18 June, Abu Zinnira, a daytime attacks convinced many parents to Following the attack on the agricultural
purported Boko Haram spokesman, claimed keep their children away from those schools college in Gujba, President Jonathan stated on
this escalation was retaliation for the increas- that still remained open, and many more have 29 September, I held a meeting with service
ing involvement of local youth in the Civilian followed suit as the attacks have escalated. chiefs on the killings of students in Yobe
JTF vigilante groups. We hereby declare an Although comprehensive gures are State... We discussed and resolved that we
all-out war on you because you have formed unavailable, in May a Borno education official must do more... I have asked the service chiefs
an alliance with the Nigerian military and claimed Boko Haram had burned or destroyed to meet again now and see what we can do to
police to ght our brethren, Abu Zinnira 50 of the states 175 schools, and that around stop these embarrassing attacks.
stated. We call on any parent that values the 15,000 children had stopped attending Reuters news agency cited a government
life of his son to stop him from exposing our classes, while in October a spokesman for the source present at the meeting who claimed
members. Otherwise he is dead. governor of Yobe reported that 209 schools that special security cover would now be
This targeting of students continued on 6 had been destroyed in the state. In some of provided in a bid to restore condence in state
July, when 41 students and one teacher were the worst affected areas, no schools remain schools, including the posting of soldiers at
killed in a small-arms attack at a boarding open, and in an October report, Makmid Ka- schools across the region.
school in Mamudo village near Potiskum, mara, Amnesty Internationals researcher for Jonathan also acknowledged that the initial
Yobe. Children as young as 10 were shot, Nigeria, stated, The attacks have generally gains made during the state of emergency
while survivors reported that others were crippled the education system in north- were in danger of being reversed as Boko
burned alive when militants torched the eastern Nigeria. There is a lot of fear among Haram adapted, and hinted that the secu-
buildings. students, teachers, and parents. rity forces would themselves adapt to the
The Mamudo attack caused public outrage,
Boko Harams success in attacking local evolving threat. When I declared a state of
and in a video statement issued days later, education is of particular concern in a region emergency things calmed down. Now they are
Boko Haram emir Imam Abubakar bin Mo- where under-development is viewed by the looking for soft targets... If the drum is chang-
hammed (alias Abubakar Shekau) praised the government as one of the key underlying ing, we must change steps, he added.

22 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

020-023_JIR1312_F9_BokoTI.indd 22 14/11/2013 14:42:11


In a subsequent speech on 13 October, Jona- stating, I saw the gunmen sneaking into the crackdown, and serve as an effective counter
than also acknowledged that Boko Haram had school compound in hordes but I couldnt call to the governments narrative that security is
exposed the countrys limited security capa- any soldiers for help. During the 24 October being restored in the region.
bilities, but stressed that this was being used attack on Damaturu, international media Furthermore, as suggested by Abu Zinniras
as an opportunity to overhaul the security reports cited residents as saying it took more June declaration of all-out war, it appears
services. Before the advent of Boko Haram, than an hour for the military to respond to Boko Haram or at least elements within the
our security infrastructure was very poor, our the attack, despite it being a regional capital. loose-knit movement is seeking to punish
security people, army, navy, air force, police Such calls were also renewed following the the population, and especially the youth, for
were all doing nothing. We were challenged attack on the college in Gujba, where again its participation via the vigilante groups in the
by Boko Haram to improve, he said. Every the disabled telephone network prevented governments counter-insurgency campaign.
day, security chiefs now think of how to con- the security forces being notied of the attack The leader of a vigilante group in
tinue to improve on capacity building. until too late, with the rst soldiers arriv- Maiduguri, Abubakar Mallum, told IRIN in
However, securing all schools across the re- ing two hours after the militants had left. June, We know the [school] attacks are
gion is likely to prove a signicant challenge, However, as yet the authorities have given no aimed at rattling us to abandon the task we
and also risks exposing small, isolated units of indication that the ban might be lifted. have started of exposing [Boko Haram] mem-
soldiers to attack. Nigerias Daily Trust news- bers in our area. They are just using students
paper cited several unnamed defence sources Conclusion as scapegoats.
on 7 October which claimed that the military Given that Boko Haram translates as West- However, there is evidence that this
had suffered heavy losses in September that ern education is forbidden, it is perhaps strategy is proving counter-productive, and
had gone largely unreported, and that opera- not surprising that Western-type schools is only strengthening popular resistance to
tions were being hampered by logistical prob- are increasingly a focus of attacks by the Boko Haram. The group has declared war on
lems as well as operational blunders. One group. However, it is unlikely that the recent youths in Maiduguri and Damaturu, which
source said, Almost all the units in the eye of escalation in school attacks, and the mas- has motivated many young men to join
the storm have under-stocked armouries. sacres of students in particular, are driven by [vigilante groups], Mallum stated. The bat-
The limited ammunition available to units ideology alone. tle line has been drawn. Youths have realised
on operations was identied as a particular Although Boko Haram has regularly criti- they either ght by exposing Boko Haram or
problem, with the sources claiming it had led cised the role played by Western-type schools they risk being killed by Boko Haram.
to security forces frequently being out- in undermining local Islamic values, schools As such, although the high number of civil-
gunned, and on occasions, routed. The sources were not a focus for attacks during the rst ian casualties in recent months has under-
cited a 13 September engagement in which years of the groups campaign, while state- mined condence in the progress being made
an officer and dozens of soldiers under his ments accompanying the beginning of the in countering Boko Harams insurgency, they
command were killed near Gubio in Borno arson attacks in 2012 emphasised that they are nevertheless indicative of a growing cleav-
State when they ran out of ammunition after were intended solely as reciprocity for the age between Boko Haram and the population
being ambushed. Similarly, speaking after the perceived harassment of Islamic schools, and within which it operates, a development that
17 September massacre of travellers near Ben- casualties were avoided for over a year after has the potential to signicantly constrain
isheik, General Mohammed Yusuf revealed the attacks began. the groups capabilities and inuence over the
that troops had run out of ammunition while Furthermore, Alkali Wakil, a lawyer longer term.
trying to repel the militants. who represents Boko Haram suspects and
There has also been mounting criticism of describes herself as a personal friend of the This article was first published online at
the telecommunications shutdown, which groups deceased founder, Mohammed Yusuf, on 12 November 2013.
was initially implemented in Adamawa, argues that the belief that Boko Haram op-
Borno, and Yobe on 15 May, the day after poses Western education is a misunderstand- X ON THE WEB
the declaration of the state of emergency. ing. She told IRIN in April 2012 that Yusuf
Subsequently, on 19 June, Borno State also wasnt against Western education, and nor Nigerian city raid undermines militarys
shut down the satellite telephone network, are his followers. What he was against is the claim that Boko Haram ghters cannot
which the military claimed was being used to inuence of Westerners on our culture The stage major offensives
co-ordinate the school attacks. leaders all have Western education, and their Burning curve Assessing Africas
However, the telecommunications children too are all in Western education. arc of instability
shutdown has heightened the vulnerability Whether this remains accurate is unclear,
Hard target Can Nigerias army cope
of targets in remote rural areas, which have but it is likely that the increasingly brutal tar-
with Boko Haram?
no way of alerting security forces in nearby geting of teachers and students evident since
towns in the event of an attack. Following mid-2013 is part of the broader trend towards Author
the 6 July massacre at the Mamudo boarding the targeting of the civilian population in Will Hartley is a freelance counter-
terrorism analyst specialising in Africa,
school, Yobe governor Ibrahim Gaidam called general, which itself seems driven by factors
for the shutdown to be lifted, blaming it for
associated with the state of emergency.
and a former head of IHS Janes
Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC).
the slow security force response. A farmer, Attacks on soft civilian targets, particularly
whose property adjoined the school, was in rural areas, are a pragmatic response to the
cited by The Guardian newspaper on 14 July as militarisation of urban areas since the security December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 23

020-023_JIR1312_F9_BokoTI.indd 23 14/11/2013 14:42:11



Prospects for UN Security Council reform

Discussions are ongoing about what form UN Security Council reform should take,
although such talks are characterised by a lack of consensus. IHS Janes examines
the various proposals and the implications of any of these being implemented.

destruction (WMDs) from the Middle East. authorising military action in order to resolve
X KEY POINTS This gesture by Saudi Arabia was timed to conict. In theory, such decisions are taken
create maximum impact. The country had by the 15-member Security Council and
Saudi Arabias refusal to take up a
seat on the United Nations Security just been elected as one of the 10 non-perma- must be supported by all 193 members of the
Council has reinvigorated discussion nent members of the Security Council; this General Assembly.
about potential reform of the council. was the rst time Saudi Arabia had been se- The Security Council has experienced
lected, and is a position for which it had been several success stories since its inception
However, there is a lack of consensus
on what this reform might involve, campaigning for several years. Turning down in 1946, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia in
meaning that there is little prospect of such a coveted role which would have sat the 1990s and 2000s, where it sanctioned
meaningful progress in the medium- it alongside the ve permanent members of peacekeeping operations that helped bring
to-long term. the Security Council (China, France, Russia, an end to civil conict, and overseeing the
Frustration with this lack of reform
the United Kingdom, and the United States separation of Sudan and South Sudan in 2011.
could encourage a shift towards known as the P5) for a two-year period UN peacekeepers are currently present in 16
using regional groupings to carry out signies a major gesture of protest and will countries, either as UN-led missions or in co-
peacekeeping operations, although add weight to the countrys call for Security ordination with other organisations, such as
still within the context of a UN Council reform. the UN/African Union (AU) Hybrid Operation
mandate. in Darfur (also known as the African Union -
Reform potential United Nations Mission in Darfur: UNAMID).

audi diplomacy is known for its dis- The fact that Saudi Arabia has pointedly However, there have also been some
cretion, its preference for negotiating referred to the Syrian conict comes as little high-prole failures, particularly in situations
through back-channel discussions, surprise. Riyadh has become increasingly where the Security Council might have been
and its unwillingness to come out strongly frustrated with the lack of UN action to expected to full its obligations to resolve
into the open. For this reason, it was particu- resolve the conict, most recently dem- conict but did not do so. Recently, these
larly signicant when Saudi Arabia turned onstrated in early October when Minister have included Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Syria, as
down a non-permanent seat on the United for Foreign Affairs Prince Saud al-Faisal bin well as more historical conicts such as Viet-
Nations Security Council on 18 October, Abdulaziz al-Saud refused to give a speech at nam, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
citing the bodys failure to full its responsi- the UN General Assembly, citing Syria as the in 1979, when an attempt to condemn the
bility to keep world peace, and specically its reason. Saudi Arabias frustration is grounded Soviet actions was prevented by Moscows
failure to resolve the situation in Syria. in the fact that the UNs founding charter veto. As with Syria at present, the main
The statement by the Saudi ministry of tasks the Security Council with maintaining reason behind the Security Councils failure
foreign affairs added that Saudi Arabia has international peace, but the council has been to act in these cases was its inability to reach
no other option but to turn down Security unable to agree on a common approach to the a consensus on what action to take, and
Council membership until it is reformed and Syrian conict. specically the inability of the P5 to reach
given the means to accomplish its duties. Technically, the Security Council is the an understanding.
As well as specifying the Syrian conict,
most senior body responsible for interna- Each of the P5 countries holds a veto,
the statement referred to the unresolved tional security operations, and is charged meaning that action by the Security Council
Palestinian issue, and what it termed the with establishing peacekeeping operations, cannot be authorised if even one P5 member
UNs failure to remove weapons of mass imposing international sanctions, and uses its veto. For example, China and Russia

24 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

024-027_JIR1312_F7_UNSC.indd 24 14/11/2013 11:44:47


have vetoed UN resolutions proposing sanc- Competing proposals it to inuence how these operations are
tions on Syria, leaving the Security Council Many of the reform proposals advocate ex- established and maintained.
little option but to seek solutions that the panding the Security Council from its current The G4 countries argument is also based
two countries will approve. In September membership of 15, which consists of ve per- on economic power, arguing that their grow-
2013, the Security Council voted unani- manent seats and 10 non-permanent rotating ing geopolitical power should be translated
mously to nd and destroy Syrias stockpile seats. The proponents of such expansion into representation within the Security
of chemical weapons, but ongoing opposition argue that the General Assembly has grown Council. Brazil and India also point to their
from China and Russia to further sanctions signicantly since 1946, from 51 members to roles as representatives of developing econo-
or military intervention in Syria means that 193, but the Security Council has only grown mies, while Germany and Japan indicate their
these are unlikely, leaving the internal con- from 11 to 15, with the permanent members economic and military power and, in Japans
ict largely unaffected. remaining the same. In this view, the current case, its position as a developed Asian power.
Frustration with the voting mechanism Security Council is anachronistic, as it does These arguments have sparked vitupera-
of the Security Council has prompted calls not reect shifting geopolitical realities. tive opposition from other factions calling
for reform from several countries, and both The leading proponents of reform along for reform of the Security Council. Indeed,
former UN secretary-general Ko Annan and these lines are the G4 (Brazil, Germany, India the Coffee Club (also known as Uniting for
current secretary-general Ban Ki-moon have and Japan); the Coffee Club (led by Italy and Consensus) group of countries has emerged
appointed panels to come up with reform currently comprising around 50 countries, in opposition to the G4 proposals and has put
proposals. In late 2004, the UNs High-Level including Argentina, Canada, Egypt, Mexico, together its own reform proposition.
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change Pakistan, South Korea, Spain, and Turkey); The group opposes the candidature of the
issued a report recommending the expansion and the Ezulwini Consensus (a position on G4 for permanent seats, arguing that this
of the Council to 24 members, with Annan international relations and reform of the UN reform would simply perpetuate the existing
calling for the General Assembly to back agreed by several African governments). two-tier system whereby a small group of
these reforms. Of these, the G4 probably has the highest countries are able to approve or veto deci-
However, the reform was not passed, and prole. Comprising four of the worlds largest sions without any input from other states.
the momentum for change slowed in the economies, the G4 countries are lobbying to Instead, the Coffee Club proposes expanding
aftermath of the failed initiative. Part of become permanent members of the Security the number of non-permanent members to
the reason for its failure was the inability of Council, as well as arguing for two permanent 20 in order to give smaller states a chance to
various groups to agree on what form the African seats. They also argue that this would sit on the council. This proposal was revised
Security Council reform should take. In this be more representative on a regional basis, in 2009 to suggest a new type of non-per-
regard, some factions within the UN have ensuring that all regions have a voice in the manent member that would sit for between
come up with their own reform proposals, Security Council and can inuence decisions. three and ve years, giving them a chance to
all with the stated aim of expediting the UN The group points to the fact that eight of the implement more long-term policies. In both
Security Council decision-making process UNs 16 current peacekeeping operations are cases, the non-permanent members would be
and making the council more representative taking place in Africa, but the continent has selected on a regionally representative basis.
of the global power balance. no permanent seat or veto right allowing Although the Coffee Club proposal claims

Security Council members at the UN head-

quarters on 27 September 2013, voting on a
resolution that would require Syria to give up
its chemical weapons. The Security Council
voted unanimously to secure and destroy
Syrias chemical weapons stockpile. PA: 1515074

TDemo December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 25

024-027_JIR1312_F7_UNSC.indd 25 14/11/2013 11:44:50


Proposals for Security Council reform

Group Proposal Date proposed Veto stance
UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Expansion of Security Council to 24 seats, either through model A or model B. December 2004 No new vetos but P5 retain veto
Challenges and Change Model A proposes six new permanent seats and three new non-permanent seats; (model A);
B suggests eight new non-permanent seats with four-year terms. P5 retain veto (model B).

G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan) Six new permanent seats. 2005 Allow veto to remain and extended
to new permanent members.
Coffee Club (led by Italy) Non-permanent seats increased to 20. The introduction of three-to-ve-year terms 2005, Several options, including abolition
for non-permanent members, selecting from regional groups on a rotating basis. revised 2009 and restricted use.
Ezulwini Consensus Two new permanent seats and two new non-permanent seats, all for African 2005 New permanent seats to have a
countries, to be selected by the African Union. veto.

to offer a more representative Security non-permanent seats were added. The most leadership within the UN structure.
Council, much of its rationale is driven by immediate impact would be political, as the Beyond Africa, greater regional represen-
regional geopolitical concerns. For example, sheer fact of the reform would assuage many tation on the Security Council could also
Argentina and Mexico are strongly opposed of the countries in various factions who have encourage countries who have not previously
to Brazils campaign for a permanent seat, been calling for greater representation on contributed many troops to do so. For exam-
as they view this as an attempt by Brazil to the council. However, given the Security ple, Brazil, which led its rst UN mission in
promote itself as the leading Latin Ameri- Councils peacekeeping mandate, it would Haiti in 2004, could encourage more Latin
can country on the global stage. As a result, necessarily have an impact on the bodys in- American militaries to follow suit. This would
Argentina Brazils traditional rival in South ternational security operations and decisions. have the cascade effect of providing more
America and Mexico, which is battling with Most immediately, reform might boost militaries with exposure to UN training and
Brazil for the position of leading economy participation in UN-led peacekeeping practices, therefore improving prospects for
in the region, are both unwilling to counte- operations, both in terms of funding and international security co-ordination.
nance any reform in which Brazil would gain personnel. Although many countries already Another ramication of Security Council
a permanent seat. Similar considerations participate, viewing this as a way of bolster- reform would be involvement by more states,
apply in other regions: Pakistan is opposed ing their international exposure and military whether permanent or non-permanent, in
to Indias Security Council bid, while South expertise, others have been unwilling to the decision-making process. In particular,
Korea opposes that of Japan. contribute troops to operations of which they more countries would be able to discuss and
Similarly, the reform proposal from the may not approve, or in which they feel they vote on issues such as Syria. As most reform
Ezulwini Consensus aims to boost the role have had little stake in the decision-making proposals suggest a regionally representative
of African countries on the Security Council, process. For instance, the UN has sometimes distribution for new members (formalising
without reference to other regions. The con- experienced problems in securing sufficient the current rough distribution of non-per-
sensus was reached by the 53 member states African troops to meet demands for opera- manent seats between ve regional blocs),
of the AU in 2005 and calls for two new per- tions in the region to be comprised primarily this would mean a greater likelihood that
manent seats and two new non-permanent of Africans. An example of this is the UN countries from the region of conict would
seats to be granted to African countries, with Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation be able to discuss the action to be taken. For
the specic countries taking these seats to Mission in Mali (Mission multidimension- example, in the 2013 conguration of the
be chosen by the AU. The new permanent nelle intgre des Nations Unies pour la Security Council, there are no Middle Eastern
members would have the same veto powers stabilisation au Mali: MINUSMA), which is countries represented in discussions of the
as the P5 as part of this proposal. currently 6,000 troops short of its authorised Syrian conict.
This AU position differs from the two other total deployment. Although this shortfall is a Involvement by more countries would
proposals previously outlined as it does not result of several factors, not least the rapidly potentially lend more legitimacy to decisions
aim to be a comprehensive reform proposi- growing number of African-based peacekeep- made by the Security Council. Although all
tion. Instead, it focuses on laying out the ing operations and weak capacity on the part UN member states are obliged to abide by the
reforms that the AU wishes to see adopted, of some African militaries, the lack of African decisions of the Security Council, this does
which could then be incorporated into a permanent representation on the Security not prevent erce criticism of controver-
broader reform proposal. This means that Council may also be a factor. sial decisions, nor does it prevent members
the Ezulwini Consensus is not necessarily For this reason, over the past decade, refusing to contribute troops to military
incompatible with other reform suggestions, the AU has begun to play a greater role in actions they do not approve of. Expanding
as long as the Africa-specic requirements initiating and leading peacekeeping opera- the council would not prevent dissent over
are met. tions, viewing conicts in Africa as matters its decisions, but it may lessen this dissent by
that should be addressed by African-specic ensuring that more countries are invested in
Impact of reforms organisations. A notable example of this the decision-making process and therefore
Should any of these reforms be adopted,
is the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). support its outcomes.
or another reform along similar lines, this These missions are approved by the Security Another area that could be affected by
would represent the greatest shake-up of Council, but reect an acknowledgement Security Council reform is the implementa-
the Security Council since 1963, when four that there is a greater desire for regional tion of International Court of Justice (ICJ)

26 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

024-027_JIR1312_F7_UNSC.indd 26 14/11/2013 11:45:04


decisions. At present, all UN members are by the P5 members, who would be likely to frustration such as that of Saudi Arabia in
obliged to abide by and implement ICJ deci- resist any attempt to remove the veto or regard to Syria.
sions and can be referred to the Security expand it to new members. All the reform In the absence of any reform, there is a risk
Council if they do not do so. In practice, proposals except that of the UN High-Level that such frustration will become increas-
this has proved difficult, as referrals against Panel propose amending the veto, with most ingly widespread and could begin to affect
the P5 countries or any of their allies can be arguing for it to be expanded to the new the functioning of the Security Council over
dismissed following a Security Council vote permanent members. the long term. In such a scenario, member
or P5 veto. Expanding the council would An alternative proposal albeit one rarely states would become increasingly unwill-
not necessarily remove this veto issue, but discussed is for the veto to be removed ing to contribute to military intervention
could mean that a vote by a large majority of altogether. Under this argument, it is the use or peacekeeping operations in protest at
council members in favour of implementing of the veto that most impedes the Security the lack of reform. As a result, international
an ICJ ruling would put greater pressure on Council from performing its mandated duty security operations could increasingly be
P5 members not to use their veto. As with to keep the peace, as just one veto can halt devolved to regional organisations, as has
other decision-making processes, more buy- any action, as in the current case of China already been the case with the AU. Given the
in from member states would further add to and Russias veto of UN resolutions proposing opprobrium that followed the US invasion
the legitimacy of ICJ decisions, potentially sanctions on Syria. of Iraq in 2003 without a UN resolution, it
discouraging countries from ignoring rulings. Although the use of the veto was particu- is extremely unlikely that frustration with
larly useful during the Cold War, when it the Security Council would lead to regional
Obstacles to reform helped ensure that Security Council action security organisations taking action without
Despite long-term lobbying by the various could not be forced over the wishes of either a UN resolution. Indeed, the military action
pro-reform groups, Security Council reform the eastern or western blocs, the mutual undertaken by NATO in Libya in 2011 might
has so far failed to move beyond the discus- deterrent effect of the veto might be less be a template for such devolution in future,
sion stage. There are several reasons for this, necessary in the post-Cold War era. Should with NATO effecting military interven-
not least the very existence of the pro-reform the veto be removed, Security Council ac- tion within the context of a UN resolution
groups, some of which such as the G4 and tion could then be approved by a two-thirds authorising action.
the Coffee Club are directly contradictory majority vote. Although this would preserve the primacy
in their proposals. Although the Ezulwini However, if it would be difficult to win of the Security Council as the pre-eminent
Consensus model could be incorporated into approval from the P5 for expanding veto decision-making body, devolving action to
a broader reform, the G4 and the Coffee powers, then removing the veto power would regional security organisations, whether
Club currently appear to cancel each other be all-but impossible, as no P5 member would planned or not, could eventually result in a
out: there has not yet been any substantive be likely to agree to losing this power. For less visible UN presence on the ground. With
dialogue towards establishing a compromise this reason, most proposals focus on expand- the blue helmets of the UN peacekeepers be-
reform proposal that could incorporate ing the veto to new members, although the ing replaced by a diverse selection of regional
elements of each. High-Level Panel is perhaps more realis- peacekeeping troops, the popular perception
In addition, support from the P5 has tic in suggesting that only the P5 should of the UN as the ultimate arbiter of interna-
been limited. The P5 countries are crucial retain veto powers, even with the creation tional security could begin to fade.
to passing any reform, as any one of these of new permanent members. Indeed, this However, this is a very long-term risk,
countries could veto a potential reform. might be the only form of reform that the and one that opponents of Security Council
There is perhaps an inherent contradiction P5 would seriously consider, as it preserves reform may view as worth taking in order to
in asking the P5 to approve any reform that their veto right while acceding to demands preserve the status quo. With no immediate
could be viewed as lessening their power, for an expanded and more representative risks forcing the council to consider reform, it
both within the Security Council itself and in Security Council. However, a reform of this seems likely that hopes of far-reaching Secu-
terms of the geopolitical great power status type would run the risk of frustrating even rity Council reform will remain unrealised in
that is bestowed on the councils only ve the new council members, as it could be the medium term and most likely beyond.
permanent members. seen as somewhat tokenistic, by expanding
All P5 countries have expressed their membership but not the use of the ultimate This article was first published online at
support for reform, such as US backing for voting right. on 8 November 2013.
Indias bid for a permanent seat, but the
repeated failure to advance a reform agenda Outlook
may indicate that such support is merely Given the conicting arguments, it is X ON THE WEB
rhetoric. Indeed, the P5 countries have little unlikely that Security Council reform will
Crossing the red line chemical
to gain and much to lose from a Security be achieved in the medium-to-long term.
weapons use in Syria
Council reform that could dilute their domi- Instead, proponents of reform are likely to
nance, particularly if the reform addresses continue lobbying for it, although no con- Highway to Sahel Mali develops
the veto issue.
sensus has been reached on what exact form road map for political transition
Reforming the veto is the most controver- this should take. This will ensure that the
sial part of any reform proposal and would status quo remains in place for the foresee-
experience the most difficulty in being passed able future, raising the prospect of further December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 27

024-027_JIR1312_F7_UNSC.indd 27 14/11/2013 11:45:04


Chinas military power grows in the Taiwan Strait
China is continuing to build up its military strength while increasing ties with Taiwan,
as Beijing maintains its claims on the island. J Michael Cole examines how the shifting
balance of forces raises the threat of blockade and armed conict facing Taiwan.

X KEY POINTS relinquished the military option to occupy Therefore, the MND reports claims of
Taiwan, which it regards as a province await- increasing Chinese military capability and
Despite growing ties between
ing reunication, by force if necessary. possibly hostile intent have offered a sober
Taiwan and China, Beijing has never The National Defence Report 2013 was counterweight to notions of improving rela-
abandoned the option of using force released at a time of growing exchanges be- tions. Such reservations within the Taiwanese
to bring about reunication and tween Taiwan an island of 23 million people defence establishment raise two important
continues to regard the island as a with a democratically elected government questions: rst, whether the MNDs assess-
core strategic interest. and China. Since the election of President Ma ment of Chinas future military capability is
The balance of military power in the Ying-jeou in 2008, representing the National credible and accurate; and second, whether
Taiwan Strait has shifted decisively to Peoples Party (Kuomintang: KMT), and his China even if it did possess the military ca-
Chinas advantage and will continue re-election in January 2012 for a second and pability to occupy the island would actually
to do so over the next decade, nal four-year term, relations between the consider it strategically within its interests to
making armed intervention by Beijing two sides across the Taiwan Strait have, on the pursue the option.
theoretically practicable.
surface, improved from previous years.
Nevertheless, strategic developments Since 2008, 19 bilateral agreements have China losing patience
will weigh on Beijing, including the been signed, including the landmark Econom- Unable to obtain the consent of the Taiwanese
extent of the USs rebalancing of ic Co-operation Framework Agreement signed public to move forward with more sensitive
policy towards Asia, the outcome of
on 29 June 2010. More such agreements are forms of engagement with Beijing, such as the
Taiwans 2016 elections, social order
on the island, and the situation in expected before Ma steps down in 2014. Tai- signing of a proposed peace accord or a mili-
Hong Kong. wans tourism industry has opened its doors to tary condence-building mechanism, Taipei
China, which now constitutes the islands top has been compelled to keep a certain distance
source of tourists. Co-operation now occurs from cross-strait talks and agreements that

overnment officials in Beijing, Taipei, on a regular basis, from cultural links to Track are political in nature. There is very low public
and Washington, echoed by main- II diplomatic exchanges involving academics, support for unication, alongside steadily
stream media, have hailed relations researchers, and officials from both sides. rising Taiwanese self-identity and support for
between the two countries across the Taiwan Yet, despite the undeniable signs of rap- the status quo or de jure independence.
Strait as the most encouraging in more than prochement, contact between the two sides A poll by Taiwanese cable news channel
60 years. However, an annual report issued by remains largely limited to meetings between TVBS released on 30 October indicates that,
Taiwans Ministry of National Defence (MND) KMT and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) given only two choices (unication or inde-
on 8 October offered an alternative outlook, officials at forums and, in the absence of of- pendence), 71% of Taiwanese would choose
claiming that China remains the greatest
cial relations, between Taiwans semi-official independence, against 18% who favoured
threat to the islands security and is acquiring Straits Exchange Foundation and its Chinese unication. Offered three options (unica-
capabilities to ensure a successful invasion counterpart, the Association for Relations tion, independence, and the status quo), 64%
and occupation by 2020. Beijing has never Across the Taiwan Strait. preferred the status quo, 24% independence,

28 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

028-033_JIR1312_F6_China-Taiwan.indd 28 14/11/2013 11:45:53


and 7% unication. Such public sentiment has to justify higher budgetary requests, there is benets from an immense hidden budget
forced the Ma administration to push political little doubt that the balance of power in the for arms acquisitions and development that
talks which Beijing has long sought into Taiwan Strait has shifted in Chinas favour and is not included in the official budget, adding
the future. that the gap will continue to widen over the that [Chinas] actual defence spending is
Chinese president and CCP secretary- next decade. [therefore] two to three times the amount it
general Xi Jinping now appears to be losing Speaking on condition of anonymity, one of discloses (roughly USD232349 billion).
patience with the KMT and fears a return to the consultants who was involved in drafting IHS Janes Defence Budgets assesses that
office in 2016 of the pro-independence Demo- the National Defence Report 2013 told IHS the Taiwanese MNDs claim is substantially
cratic Progressive Party (DPP), which ruled Janes that, with the document, the ministry overstated, while nevertheless believing
Taiwan during 200008. Consequently, while seemed to be aiming to sensitise the civilian total defence expenditure to be at least 15%
Beijing is striving to establish a peaceful leadership and the general public to a greater higher than stated in the official budget, at
atmosphere and, through sustained political extent than previously to the nature of the around USD132 billion. A total expenditure
warfare and propaganda efforts, to weaken
the enemys awareness, it has continued to
develop a military force capable of deterring
The Peoples Liberation Army already
Taiwanese independence and coercing Taipei has the capability to blockade Taiwan
into ending the delaying of political talks.
Such political warfare and propaganda and to occupy its outlying islands
includes the orchestration of visits by DPP
officials and retired generals to China by
Chinese intelligence, co-opting retired gener- threat from China and the serious challenges of two to three times higher as stated in the
als to support peaceful unication, and a that Taiwan faces in maintaining a balance of Taiwanese report appears unlikely, unless
worldwide campaign to shape perceptions forces in the strait. provision is made for expenditure on internal
about Taiwan regarding unication. In many ways, a more independent ap- security forces or some form of purchasing-
More openly than in recent years, the praisal of the threat from China is a major power-parity adjustment is made. Indeed,
National Defence Report 2013 contends that departure from the earlier years of the Ma ad- IHS Janes assesses that the official Chinese
the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), if called ministration. Formerly, military officials were defence budget gure may now be closer to
upon to resolve the Taiwan issue, could do often reluctant to refer to China by name, lest reality than it has been in the past. That said,
so successfully. Resolution of the Taiwan issue this conict with the Presidential Offices ef- the PLAs accounting systems do make it pos-
remains a core interest of the CCP and is an forts to improve relations with Beijing. sible to maintain a hidden budget, for example
essential stepping stone in Chinas emergence As the report notes, Chinas official defence by excluding research and development on
as a superpower, states the report. spending in 2013, set at CNY720.2 billion dual-use scientic projects that may have a
Although the report could be overstating (USD116.3 billion), is roughly 10 times that of military application or by excluding spending
the presumed adversarys capabilities in order Taiwan. Strikingly, it also claims that the PLA on defence pensions.

TDemo Taiwans navy launches a surface-to-air SM-2

missile from a Kidd class destroyer during the
Hai-Biao (Sea Dart) annual exercises off the
northeastern coast of Taiwan on 26 September
2013. PA: 1454455 December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 29

028-033_JIR1312_F6_China-Taiwan.indd 29 14/11/2013 11:45:55


IHS Janes assessment of military balance of forces The most serious case to date was the 2011
jailing of General Lo Hsien-che on charges of
IHS Janes gures are estimates of in-service materiel
[1] Include reservists of approximately 1,130,000 (Taiwan)
passing secrets to China from 2004 onwards,
and 510,000 (China)
[2] Includes only major surface combatants (corvette, in return for payment. The report notes that,
frigate, destroyer, aircraft carrier)
[3] Includes amphibious assault ships, landing craft (all over the past decade, Chinas military mod-
types), hovercraft
Source: IHS Janes Military Capabilities Module ernisation drive has involved the acquisition,
development, and modication of a variety of
platforms. These include main battle tanks;
reconnaissance, transport, and attack helicop-
1,370,000 2,115,000 ters; aircraft carriers; amphibious landing ves-
sels; warships; nuclear-powered submarines;
stealth ghters/bombers; unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs); new tactical ballistic/cruise
missiles with longer ranges and/or a smaller
circular error probable (CEP); anti-radiation
3,533 11,100 weapons; long-range electronic jammers; and
air defence systems.
Although not every platform is congured
for action against the island, it appears highly
359 2,213 likely, despite Chinas claims to the contrary,
that the PLAs principal focus remains Taiwan,
and that units could be reassigned rapidly to
address this requirement.
Looking ahead, China reportedly has plans
233 727 26 78
to build two or three aircraft carriers, and the
PLA Navy (PLAN) has begun training pilots
for carrier-based operations, currently on the
domestically produced J-15. Once operational,
aircraft carriers will provide the PLAN with
4 the capability to encircle Taiwan and attack
the island from all sides, which will greatly
57 enhance its ability to secure air superiority in
2013 IHS / David Playford: 1487002 302 269 the Taiwan Strait and beyond.
Meanwhile, the Second Artillery Corps is
Through annual double-digit growth in de- especially if US forces based in the Pacic were expected to continue replacing ageing short-
fence spending for well over a decade, China to intervene in the early phase of a conict. range ballistic missiles, such as the Dong Feng
continues to strengthen its military prepara- 11 (DF-11), with more accurate and longer-
tions against Taiwan, and is actively develop- War footing? range ones, such as the DF-16. These can be
ing and procuring new weapons platforms and It is apparent that [Chinas] thought on deployed further inside Chinas territory and,
precision weapons, so when a dispute arises in driving unication with military force and therefore, beyond the range of Taiwanese (and
the Taiwan Strait, it can deter or delay a for- military preparations against Taiwan were not US) counter-strike forces.
eign military force [the US and possibly Japan] adjusted as cross-strait relations improved, Even during the period of dtente that
from intervening, the report notes. It adds the report continues. It offers the evidence has characterised improved relations over the
that China plans to build comprehensive that the PLA has continued to carry out eld past decade, the number of missiles in Chinas
capabilities for using military force against exercises targeting Taiwan, with greater arsenal has grown at a rate of about 100 per
Taiwan by 2020. focus on joint services operations, while year. By continually increasing the number
Cheng Yun-peng, director-general of the modernising and augmenting the tactical mis- of missiles it targets at Taiwan, China will
Department of Strategic Planning at Taiwans siles deployed by the Second Artillery Corps further erode the islands ability to intercept
Ministry of National Defence, claried on against the island, which the report claims them with its PAC-3, Tien Kung II, and other
7 October that the date 2020 was a rough number 1,400. air defence systems. This will in turn leave Tai-
estimate derived from current trends in the Chinese espionage efforts targeting, for wans airelds, naval bases, command centres,
Taiwan Strait, not the result of a scientic ap- example, Taiwans defence acquisition pro- and radar sites more vulnerable to an initial
praisal of the situation. grammes and command, control, communica- missile attack by China, which is the most
Overall, with the current military balance tions computers, intelligence, surveillance likely rst phase of a full invasion.
of power, the PLA already has the capability
and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture have Aware that a US intervention on Taipeis
to blockade Taiwan and to occupy its outlying also continued, with major spy cases in recent side would greatly complicate PLA efforts
islands, although an amphibious assault on years undermining condence in the Taiwan- to subdue Taiwan, and in preparation to
Taiwan proper remains a daunting challenge, ese militarys ability to protect its secrets. counter the so-called US strategic foreign

30 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

028-033_JIR1312_F6_China-Taiwan.indd 30 14/11/2013 11:46:07


policy pivot to Asia, China has also actively Improved relations between China and
sought to develop and deploy anti-access/ Taiwan saw the holding of the rst cross-
strait peace forum of experts and scholars
area denial (A2/AD) technology, such as the in Shanghai on 11 October 2013. PA: 1454456
DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile. By delaying
or even deterring external intervention by a
third party, China would increase its ability to
isolate Taiwan by operating inside the Taiwan
Strait and in the western Pacic, where the
PLAN now routinely holds exercises, in part
to familiarise its forces with the areas sea
Although the ability of the DF-21D to target
a carrier battle group in the middle of the
ocean remains unproven, there is the possibil-
ity that it could score a hit and sink a multi-bil-
lion-dollar US aircraft carrier. That threat may
be sufficient to force the US Seventh Fleet
to re-evaluate the wisdom of sending forces
to assist Taiwan. This factor plays a part in an
ongoing campaign of political warfare insti-
gated by Beijing to undermine Washingtons Taiwans arms acquisition efforts have also paid dividends by adding extra friction to the
willingness to come to its allys rescue in the been undermined by growing reluctance in process of arms sales to Taiwan and, by doing
event of war, and so bolster the impression of Washington to supply modern weapons to so, Beijing has succeeded in furthering the
isolation and inevitable defeat within Taiwan. Taipei over fears of technology transfer or of perception in Taiwan that the island faces
Besides anti-ship ballistic missiles, China angering Beijing, which often retaliates by being abandoned.
has also made substantial investments in the threatening to suspend military-military ties Given the political signals represented by
development of fast-attack, radar-evasive or by implementing targeted sanctions against continued US arms sales to the island, China
missile corvettes, large surface combatants, defence companies involved. For example, in is likely to continue, and probably intensify,
ship-borne UAVs, and naval surveillance orbit- January 2010, China halted planned military its campaign to convince Washington of its
ers to increase its situational awareness and exchanges with the US and threatened to deleterious impact on bilateral ties.
bolster target-acquisition capabilities in the
western Pacic.
A growing reluctance in Washington to
Strategic uncertainties
The National Defence Report 2013 comes at a supply modern weapons to Taiwan is
time of great strategic uncertainty for Taiwan.
In its ve years in office, the Ma administra-
because of fears of angering Beijing
tion has not once met the target of spending
3% of GDP on national defence, with the
amount hovering around 2.2%. This has left punish the rms involved following the noti- Consequently, after orders for six PAC-3 air
the islands military insufficiently funded cation to Congress of a USD6.4-billion arms defence units and 30 AH-64E attack helicop-
to meet the challenge from China. It has package to Taiwan. Lockheed Martin, United ters have been delivered to Taiwan from late
accumulated nearly USD18 billion in arms ac- Technologies, and Boeing were singled out by 2013, no major new arms acquisition from the
quisitions from the United States since 2000, Beijing for retaliation. US is likely in the foreseeable future. Moreo-
which it must now pay for. Through propaganda and bilateral fo- ver, Taiwanese officials are not known to have
Added to the substantial costs associated rums, such as the Sanya Initiative (a series sought future arms packages from Washing-
with plans to end conscription and create an of exchanges launched in 2008 and involv- ton, with Taiwan now focusing its efforts on
all-volunteer force, an ongoing programme ing retired US generals, academics, and the indigenous development of a small asym-
to refurbish the Republic Of China Air Force their Chinese counterparts), China has also metrical force to counter China.
(RoCAF)s 144 F-16A/Bs, and the rising main- endeavoured to convince key constituents in With the exception of a 500-tonne stealth-
tenance costs to keep ageing equipment ser- the US usually retired military officials that missile ship prototype, Taiwans domestic
viceable, the amount of money that the mili- arms sales to Taiwan, despite the provisions defence initiative has centred on the develop-
tary will be able to spend to acquire modern of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) 1979, ment and mass production of cruise missiles,
platforms from the US is expected to be highly are harmful to US-China relations. The TRA namely the Hsiung Feng 3 (HF-3) ramjet-
limited in the coming years, barring a major
considers any effort to determine the future of powered supersonic carrier killer anti-ship
increase in defence spending or extraordinary Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat missile and the HF-2E land-attack cruise
budgets approved by the Legislative Yuan, the to the peace and security of the western missile (LACM), which has a range of about
islands unicameral parliament. Pacic and to the US. This Chinese effort has 650 kilometres (km). December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 31

028-033_JIR1312_F6_China-Taiwan.indd 31 14/11/2013 11:46:41


Road-mobile launchers for both the HF-3 the US, Taiwans indigenous programme has an all-volunteer force, Taiwans military nds
(currently ship-based) and the HF-2E are signalled a greater willingness by Taipei to itself in dire straits, something that Beijing
also in development. In December 2012, develop weapons that are more offensive in has surely noticed and will seek to exploit.
reports emerged in the Taiwanese media nature. If deployed in sufficient numbers, Taiwans MND suffered another serious
that Taiwans Chung Shan Institute of Sci- these could provide a more credible deterrent blow following the controversial death on 4
ence and Technology (CSIST), the militarys against China than a purely defensive posture. July 2013 of conscript Army Corporal Hung
main research centre under the Armaments Yet it is doubtful whether these efforts Chung-chiu. Hung died of hyperthermia-
Bureau, was developing a 1,200-km medium- would be enough to convince Beijing that induced disseminated intra-vascular coagula-
range surface-to-surface missile, with rst the cost of an attempted invasion would be tion while being held in the brig for bringing
deployment expected in 2015. The military too high. Furthermore, the balance of power a cell (mobile) phone with a camera onto the
has refused to conrm whether such a missile will be further widened in the coming decade military base.
is in development. as the number of combat aircraft the RoCAF His death led to two large protests in down-
Meanwhile, the RoCAF has launched a maintains in service drops following the de- town Taipei and the decision by Minister of
programme to equip its indigenous defence commissioning of its ageing F-5s and Mirage- National Defence Kao Hua-chu to resign on 29
ghters, which are currently undergoing 2000s, and as its F-16s undergo upgrade work July. On 6 August, just six days after replacing
mid-life upgrades at the Aerospace Industrial between 2016 and 2022. No new aircraft will Kao, the new minister, Andrew Nian-zu Yang,
Development Corp plant in Greater Taichung, replace the F-5s; efforts to acquire 66 F-16C/ also resigned.
with the Wan Chien long-range air-to-surface Ds from the US have been stalled for years. Yangs successor, General Yen Ming, a for-
missile. Also developed by the CSIST, the Wan Although it is difficult to quantify levels mer chief of the general staff, took over on 7
Chien will be specically designed to target of troop morale, there is no doubt that the August. He has assumed oversight of a military
airstrips in Chinas southeastern provinces, Taiwanese military is fully aware that it has force that, on 12 September, announced after
and its deployment could begin in 2017. lost the comparative advantage it enjoyed failing to meet enrolment goals that it was
The government is also encouraging greater during the 1990s. Added to Chinese political delaying by two years to 2017 its plans to end
participation of the private sector in defence- warfare and propaganda, damaging espionage conscription and create an all-volunteer force
related research and development. cases, a sense of having been abandoned by a of 215,000, down from 235,000 at present.
Besides being a cost-saving alternative to longstanding ally, extremely low birth rates, The loss of public condence in Taiwans
overly expensive defence procurement from and the inability to attract enough recruits for military that has resulted from the Hung
scandal could have long-term effects on the
Military occupation scenario islands willingness and ability to defend
itself against Chinese aggression. Only public
Based on forecast orders of battle, a Chi- to deter US and/or Japanese intervention. relations efforts in the coming years, as well
nese attack against Taiwan would begin Using large transport aircraft, PLA special as recruitment gures, will show whether the
with a sustained political campaign, over forces would be dropped at air bases and damage was temporary or lasting. Neverthe-
weeks, involving propaganda targeting other key areas in Taiwan to secure control less, the Taiwanese military arguably faces one
the island and its allies. China would then of military sites, prevent airstrip repair, and of its most serious crises in years.
move to embargo the island, followed by occupy government buildings.
efforts to disable Taiwans long-range A second wave of missile attacks, Outlook
early-warning radar at Leshan in the augmented by air strikes, would saturate Ultimately, two key developments would
northern county of Hsinchu, and other air Taiwanese army forces (artillery, main bat- determine whether projections of a possible
defence systems, using a combination of tle tanks, rocket launchers, road-mobile PLA invasion of Taiwan in or by 2020 are cred-
conventional missiles, anti-radiation mis- missile launchers, and attack helicop- ible. The rst would be engagement across the
siles, jamming, and sabotage. ters) gathered along the coast before an Taiwan Strait maintaining a course deemed
Chinas Second Artillery Corps would amphibious landing. Meanwhile, once the acceptable by Beijing and perceived as favour-
then be called upon to render air bases, risk to PLAN vessels had been neutralised, able to its ultimate goal of unication. The
ports, and command-and-control sites missile frigates and destroyers from the outcome of the 2016 presidential and legisla-
unusable through ballistic missile attacks, South and East Sea Fleet would cross tive elections in Taiwan will be an important
and could also attempt a decapitation the Strait and provide theatre air-defence factor in whether this develops, with a return
strike against the islands political leader- around Taiwan in case of an external of the DPP representing a major obstacle in
ship. Following that, PLA Air Force and intervention. Chinas campaign for peaceful unication
PLAN aircraft from Fujian province and Earlier, warships from the North Sea through economic, social, and cultural absorp-
other coastal areas would try to rapidly Fleet would have deployed to monitor US tion. If this were to happen, Beijing could be
establish air superiority in the Strait and Seventh Fleet and Japanese Navy move- prompted to adopt more coercive measures,
beyond Taiwan in the western Pacic. ments closely. Throughout the conict, including a military intervention, if a sudden
Simultaneously, Chinas A2/AD forces Chinese UAVs and surveillance satellites break in cross-strait exchanges were to occur,
would be kept at a high state of readiness,
would provide imagery and accurate which would be a possibility following a DPP
while submarines and aircraft carriers target-acquisition data about Taiwanese electoral victory. Likewise, a more cautious
would be deployed in the western Pacic and US military forces in the Pacic. incoming KMT administration, or a KMT
administration hampered by a DPP majority in

32 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

028-033_JIR1312_F6_China-Taiwan.indd 32 14/11/2013 11:46:50


the legislature, could also revive this scenario.

The second key development would
be the emergence of a situation in which
Taiwan were racked by social disorder amid a
political crisis, which could prompt the PLA to
intervene to restore stability within what it
considers to be its territory. Although such a
situation is unlikely for the time being, greater
pressure by Beijing on the KMT to engage in
political talks is likely to engender serious
frictions within Taiwan, where protests over
proposed pacts with China, as well as other
issues, have already become much more
commonplace since 2012.
A further variable will be the extent and
scope of the US rebalancing of policy towards
Asia, a project whose direction remains uncer- Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou on a P-3C Orion submarine-hunting aircraft at the Pingtung Air
tain as Washington struggles with nancial Force Base in southern Taiwan on 31 October 2013. Under Mas leadership, 19 bilateral agreements
difficulties and political deadlock. Even if have been signed with China since 2008. PA: 1454457

such a pivot fully materialises, its impact

on the islands security will be contingent a reminder of its century of humiliation at using small craft as well as large transport ve-
on Taiwan clearly being made a component foreign hands, Taiwan continues to exercise hicles, will probably be a high-risk endeavour.
of the US alliance. This remains unclear, an emotive effect on the Chinese political Having acquired the capabilities to launch
given Washingtons obvious preference for class and general public. a successful assault against Taiwan, pressure
ambiguity on the matter. By ensuring there Another related issue that will have an from an increasingly nationalistic Chinese
was no doubt that an attack on Taiwan would effect on the likelihood of China using force public on the hardline CCP and PLA to use
lead to a timely and credible response to against Taiwan by 2020 is the situation in that arsenal to resolve the Taiwan issue will
defend the island in other words, by reaf- Hong Kong. Strains between the Special grow. The temptation to do so will be even
rming the provisions of the TRA the US, Administrative Region and the central gov- greater should China experience high domes-
potentially with Japanese assistance, would ernment in Beijing have built over a range tic instability or an economic downturn.
create disincentives to Chinese military of issues, including rising tensions over a If the US pivot does not clearly include
adventurism, although there would inevitably perceived attack on civil liberties, Beijings Taiwan, and given that Taiwan is highly
be a cost in terms of Sino-US relations. supposed meddling in local politics, and foot- unlikely to agree to a political union under
Conversely, if the US indicated that Taiwan dragging on universal suffrage. the circumstances that are likely to prevail
no longer fell within its sphere of security Should the situation in Hong Kong con- during the coming decade, the possibility of
guarantees by failing to include Taipei in the tinue to deteriorate, Chinas one country, two armed conict involving Taiwan and China by
pivot, or by denitively ending arms sales to systems formula, which Beijing has touted as or around 2020 will be the highest it has been
the island, Chinas calculations would differ a possible mechanism for unication with Tai- since the 1950s.
markedly and it could judge that its chances wan, could be further discredited. That would
of absorbing the territory at a relatively low expose even more sharply the incompatibility This article was first published online at
cost are good enough to attempt an inva- of the political systems on the two sides of the on 8 November 2013.
sion. Although Beijing has long dreamed of Taiwan Strait. By fuelling already strong op-
retaking the island by force, the next decade position within Taiwan to any form of political X ON THE WEB
is set to be the rst in which the PLA will be union with China, such an outcome could, in
able to act with the condence that it can turn, add incentives for a military interven- Balancing act Elections spell
achieve its objectives. tion against the island. continuity in China-Taiwan relations
Although economic integration can Overall, therefore and barring a sudden Strait spying Chinas intelligence
diminish the risks of armed conict, it is no economic collapse of China or other regional strategy towards Taiwan
guarantee that political actors will always act conicts IHS Janes assesses that by 2020 the
Military might China develops its
rationally when it comes to the decision to Chinese military will have sufficiently wid-
strategic missile systems
use force. As a core interest of China, Taiwan ened the gap between Taiwan and the PLA to
arouses too many emotions within the CCP be able to successfully blockade the island and Author
and the PLA for predictions of rationality and secure full control of sea areas around it, as J Michael Cole is a Taipei-based defence
analyst and a former intelligence ofcer
continuity to be entirely valid. Indeed, as a well as to ensure air superiority over the Tai-
natural barrier against the PLAs extension
wan Strait. The ability of the PLAAF to do so
with the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service in Ottawa.
beyond the rst island chain a geographical will be a crucial component in Chinas ability
line comprising the Aleutians, Borneo, Kuri- to launch an amphibious invasion, although
les, Philippines, Ryukyus, and Taiwan and as even under such a scenario, an attack by sea, December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 33

028-033_JIR1312_F6_China-Taiwan.indd 33 14/11/2013 11:46:50


Conformity versus

Potential FARC integration poses new challenges

The Colombian government and the insurgent FARC appear to be inching slowly
towards a peace deal. Robert Munks assesses how the temptations of criminality and
modalities of demobilisation would be likely to act upon a post-conict FARC.

X KEY POINTS is now aiming to conclude a peace deal before territorial spread is also vastly diminished,
the presidential election in May 2014, and to down from a presence in more than 50% of
Lucrative involvement in the drug put the agreement to a public referendum on Colombias municipalities at the turn of the
trade and illegal mining mean that the day of the election itself. However, what millennium to just 11% currently, according to
many members of Colombias currently seems to be more feasible is that the gures provided to IHS Janes by the Colom-
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias agreement over the rst points of the agenda bian Ministry of Defence in 2013.
de Colombia (FARC) insurgency land distribution and FARCs political Many of the groups leaders have been
might not take part in any eventual
participation helps the talks to stay on track, killed, captured, or have died since 2008, and
disarmament, demobilisation, and
reintegration (DDR) process, opting followed by a referendum. those who remain are aware that the Colom-
instead to work within criminal Moreover, neither the government nor the bian military whose intelligence capabilities
structures. FARC have suspended their military opera- have improved considerably since the early
tions while the negotiations have been taking 2000s stands ready to neutralise more high-
Several areas of the country notably
the Darin Gap bordering Panama,
place. Aside from a two-month unilateral and mid-ranking insurgents should the gov-
the central Pacic seaboard, and the ceasere that the FARC declared between 20 ernment give the order. Indeed, in response
southwestern border with Ecuador November 2012 and 20 January 2013, both to the FARCs latest offensive, the Ministry
contain FARC formations that are sides have maintained an intense tempo of of Defence has launched a major operation
currently most likely to morph into military activity. in southeast Colombia, backed by 50,000
criminality in the event of DDR. Indeed, in October the FARC launched troops, to target leading FARC commanders.
In a worst-case scenario, increased a campaign dubbed Black October by Moreover, the international context is now
insecurity in some areas of Colombia Minister of Defence Juan Carlos Pinzn that more favourable, with substantial backing
may be fuelled by criminally-motivated has been marked by an extension of its of- from key Western countries such as Norway,
FARC splinter groups clashing with fensive across the country. This has included the United Kingdom, and United States, as
other criminal organisations. an armed lockdown in the northern depart- well as crucial regional facilitation by Cuba
ment (province) of Choc, and more frequent and Venezuela. The FARC can no longer rely

fter nearly ve decades of violent attacks on coal, energy, and oil infrastructure. on the support both explicit and tacit that
internal conict, Colombia may The FARC also stands accused by the govern- it formerly received from officials in regional
nally be close to concluding a lasting ment of fomenting unrest by inltrating left-leaning governments.
peace settlement with the countrys largest other social protests, most notably in the The range of indicators therefore suggests
left-wing insurgency, the Fuerzas Armadas northeastern region of Catatumbo. that, despite the uncertainties and undoubted
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). Formal However, despite the twin tracks of peace reversals that lie ahead, the prospects for a
negotiations that began in October 2012 have overtures and continued operational activity, peace deal to be concluded in the medium
reached agreement on the rst two points of the portents for an eventual peace deal to be term are high. Incumbent president Juan
a ve-point agenda, and talks are ongoing be- signed are arguably better than at any time Manuel Santos, who announced the initial
tween government and FARC representatives since the FARC rst emerged as an agrarian- exploratory dialogue with the FARC in August
in Havana, Cuba, with international support. based Marxist insurgency in 1964. The FARC 2012, will almost certainly stand for re-elec-
The slow pace of the talks means that the
is militarily weaker now than ever before tion in May 2014, hinting that he needs a fur-
governments initially stated desire for a com- down from a peak of around 17,000 ghters ther mandate to bring the process to a close.
prehensive peace deal to be signed by Novem- during its 1990s heyday to around 8,000 Hence, while a nal deal before mid-2014
ber 2013 is now out of reach. The government now, according to government estimates. Its is a slim possibility, if the talks are given an

34 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

034-038_JIR1312_F4_FARC.indd 34 14/11/2013 14:40:52


injection of momentum, the possibility of set- Colombias FARC and criminality

tlement of all ve agenda points later in 2014
or even into 2015 also remains high.
Such a scenario would raise the issue of 59
what sort of disarmament, demobilisation,
and reintegration (DDR) process the Colom- 41
bian government might enact to bring about
the FARCs denitive dissolution, and what Panama City 33rd Front: key for maintaining
33 cross-border mobility for senior
a post-demobilisation FARC might look like. PANAMA FARC commanders
Many of its 67 active fronts (combat units) are Gold
heavily involved in lucrative criminal activi- 57 36 Cocaine VENEZUELA
ties, such as drug trafficking and illegal min- 34 45
Gold 10
ing, and many members would therefore be
loath to voluntarily forgo the sizeable prots
to be gained from such criminality if demobili-
sation incentives were insufficient. Bogot 16 Coltan
Therefore, the transition to a durable peace Cocaine
Fronts with particularly COLOMBIA
in Colombia would not be settled even if close links to BACRIM 30
6 Cocaine 44
a FARC demobilisation were secured. The Marijuana
FARC could yet atomise into any number
of splinter groups, with many members Cocaine 29 7
opting to join the criminal groups desig-
nated as bandas criminales (BACRIM) by the 48 Cocaine 1
Colombian government with which they BRAZIL
currently work. Many BACRIM members are
FARC front at high risk of
former right-wing paramilitaries of the Auto- mutating into criminal
defensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), which enterprise
underwent a demobilisation process between Close operational links
2003 and 2006. Fronts on Venezuelan border PERU
However, many AUC members moved Key criminal interest 0 260 km
directly into criminality. Jerry McDermott, Source: IHS Janes/InsightCrime 2013 IHS: 1486992

co-director of the Colombia-based security

thinktank InSight Crime, told IHS Janes, 67 fronts, although this is not a denitive departments of Cauca, Caquet, and Valle del
There are two issues at play: which FARC assessment and the chance for localised Cauca, which are key corridors for drug traf-
fronts will criminalise and which will opt to involvement of factions of fronts is also high. cking. Andy Webb-Vidal, CEO of Latin-IQ, a
continue the armed ideological struggle as The more expansionist of the FARCs drug risk consultancy specialised in Latin America,
a sort of Continuity FARC. Many high- trafficking fronts also appear to maintain links told IHS Janes, The problem is that the FARC
ranking FARC commanders would probably with international criminal gangs, such as the already is as much a criminal organisation
buy into the peace process, but many of the Mexican Sinaloa Cartel. as it is a political one. A number of fronts
mid-ranking commanders and rank-and- Illegal mining, particularly of gold, may are already deeply involved in drug traffick-
le members could equally be seduced by a have surpassed drugs as a revenue-generator ing and other illegal activities with [former
continuing life of crime. for some illegal groups, with the Spain-based AUC] paramilitaries, who demobilised only to
Toledo International Centre for Peace claim- morph into criminal gangs.
Temptations of criminality ing that gold mining now constitutes the The situation is further complicated by the
Organised criminality in Colombia is big main income for many fronts in the north and presence of Colombias second-largest insur-
business. Pinzn claimed in October 2012 that west of the country even though cocaine gency, the Ejrcito de Liberacin Nacional
the FARC could be earning USD3.5 billion remains the main source of funding over- (ELN) in many areas of high criminality. The
annually from the drug trade, money it earns all. Colombian police attribute a tripling of approximately 2,000-strong ELN is currently
from providing protection to drug producers, violent deaths in the northwestern province on the sidelines of the peace process, albeit
charging a gramaje (a tax on coca leaf cultiva- of Antioquia in 2012 to a struggle for control agitating to be included as a full participant,
tion) and, in more extreme cases, trafficking of illegal gold mining between the FARC and and would most likely be included in a future
drugs directly to export points for onwards the nationwide BACRIM, the Rastrojos and DDR programme either alongside or in addi-
transhipment. the Urabeos. tion to the FARC should the FARC process
There are no empirical studies of the exact However, elsewhere, the FARCs local prove successful.
number of FARC fronts or cadres that may
co-operation with BACRIM can be close, Heavily criminalised FARC cadres are
be involved in drug trafficking. IHS Janes has most notably in the northern departments among the least likely members to demobi-
identied references in open sources to drug of Antioquia, Arauca, Choc, and Norte de lise if the peace talks with the government
trafficking for at least one-fth of the FARCs Santander, and in the western/southwestern are successful. However, evidence about December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 35

034-038_JIR1312_F4_FARC.indd 35 14/11/2013 14:40:53


Colombias previous DDR experiences dispersed fronts and lower ranks, for reasons
Insurgents/group Date Process Outcome both practical and ideological.
Autodefensas Unidas de 200306 Many former right-wing paramilitaries of the AUC have Limited success
The FARC has suffered from severe com-
Colombia (AUC) moved into criminality and are now visible in the countrys
BACRIM. However, the AUC itself has been dismantled as
munications difficulties in recent years,
an organisation. which have been driven by the Colombian
Ejrcito Popular de From 1991 Some former members transitioned into criminality, Partial success militarys success in exploiting vastly im-
Liberacin (EPL) particularly drug trafcking, in the northeast of Colombia, proved capabilities in signals intelligence in
and a small rump force of the EPL remains. order to penetrate the insurgents electronic
Movimiento 19 de Abril From 1989 The group was pardoned, demobilised, and then became Largely successful communications. This has left many FARC
(M-19) a legal political party. It reached a political high watermark fronts communicating via human runners to
in the 1990s; some former members joined the Alternative
avoid interception.
Democratic Pole (Polo Democrtico Alternativo: PDA)
Yet the extent to which the secretariat has
individual fronts exact involvement in the departments of Antioquia and Choc been hampered in communicating with its
criminality and the level of control that is appears to present numerous elevated risk eld commanders may be overplayed. The
exercised by the central governing secretariat factors. Topographically, the immediate FARC ceasere of November 2012 to January
of the FARC remains uneven. border consists of the largely impenetrable 2013 was adhered to by the majority of fronts,
Some FARC commanders would be likely to Darin Gap, a forested region that represents with local non-governmental organisation
accept demobilisation terms precisely because the only physical break in the continental Nuevo Arco Iris recording an 87% reduction in
they resent the drift towards criminality of Pan-American Highway. Two fronts with insurgent attacks during the period.
many fronts that takes the group away from close operational ties are based in the area; the Notably, two attacks were carried out by
its ideological underpinning. Such was the 250-strong 57th Front, closer to the border, the Antioquia-based 36th Front shortly after
case of Medarno Maturana Largacha (alias El which is heavily implicated in cocaine traf- the ceasere came into operation, but the
Negro Toms), who surrendered to authori- cking and illegal gold mining; and the 34th Front claimed that this was due to a delay in
ties on 20 September and denounced the Front further inland, which has substantial receiving notication of the suspension of op-
increasing connections of his 18th Front mining interests. erations. IHS Janes Terrorism and Insurgency
which currently operates in the northwestern A third formation, the 36th Front, also op- Centre (JTIC) recorded six possible FARC at-
departments of Crdoba and Antioquia with erates in the area, albeit with apparently loos- tacks during the period, while 13 ceasere vio-
local BACRIM. er operational connections to the other two. lations were noted by the Colombian Conict
Yet although many senior commanders Signicantly, according to InSight Crime, the Research Analysis Centre, including three
who retain ideological motivation may choose 36th Front is one of the FARCs most adept attacks in Antioquia and four in Cauca. FARC
to accept a potential peace deal, maintaining units in the construction and deployment of operations in Cauca are largely controlled by
the leaderships position that the FARC is not improvised explosive devices (IEDs), meaning Jorge Torres Victoria, alias Pablo Catatumbo, a
involved in the drug trade, a large number that it poses a high-risk threat to local security hardline military commander and secretariat
of lower-level cadres will undoubtedly be force deployments. In addition, McDermott member who was formerly one of the highest-
tempted by the potential nancial incentives told IHS Janes, Drug trafficking operations ranking FARC cadres not to be included in the
that criminality offers. Fronts located in or on a massive scale are also run by four fronts Havana peace talks, although he subsequently
close to areas of substantial coca leaf cultiva- in the east of the country, the 1st, 7th, 16th joined in April 2013.
tion may logically be most tempted by this and 44th, which are all under the command Yet the overall number of attacks dur-
option. Such areas include parts of Antioquia of one man, Albeiro Crdoba. Webb-Vidal ing the ceasere, even at the upper limit of
and southern Bolvar in the north; Choc, concurs that, The regions where there would estimations, is low compared with the normal
Cauca, and Valle del Cauca in the west; Arauca be least interest in DDR among FARC groups tempo of FARC activity. Moreover, the
and Norte de Santander in the northeast; and are those where illegal business activities such resumption of attacks after the ceasere tar-
the southwestern departments of Nario as drugs trafficking, fuel-smuggling, and other geting a wide range of security outposts and
and Putumayo. forms of contraband are most prevalent and energy installations hints at a high degree of
Plotting areas of high drug cultivation or lucrative. These are border areas where the pre-planning and co-ordination probably com-
trafficking against areas of high prevalence of Eastern and Caribbean Blocs operate. ing directly from the secretariat.
illegal mining operations suggests that there Overall, therefore, IHS Janes assesses that
are potentially six hotspots in Colombia Central control the level of control exercised by the secre-
where a conuence of drugs and illegal min- A key variable that will dictate the success or tariat is sufficient to ensure that the majority
ing could give rise to greater incentives for otherwise of any DDR process is the extent of fronts will abide by the provisions of any
criminality. Those areas parts of Antioquia, to which the FARCs seven-man central peace process. However, this does not mean
Bolvar, Cauca, Choc, Norte de Santander, secretariat is able to maintain control of its that localised dissent will be eliminated.
and Valle del Cauca contain some of the various fronts, particularly those that could Moreover, there is likely to be a high degree of
most peripheral territory in Colombia, located be tempted by criminality. An agreement secretariat control over operations carried out
near border or coastal areas that are among
signed by FARC commander-in-chief Rodrigo under the FARC ideological badge, which will
the countrys most ungoverned spaces. Londoo Echeverri (alias Timochenko) and not extend to members who choose to move
Of particular note, the northwestern area of the secretariat could prove ultimately dif- into criminality or to splinter groups whose
Colombia bordering Panama and comprising cult to enforce through the geographically motivation is primarily criminal.

36 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

034-038_JIR1312_F4_FARC.indd 36 14/11/2013 14:40:55


Modalities of demobilisation AUC members, suggesting that it would be Northern Ireland parliamentarians
The government body tasked with overseeing well-positioned to tackle the 40,000 further attended the Havana talks in May, and the
demobilisation in Colombia is the Agency for demobilisations that could occur with a FARC largely successful DDR process in North-
Reintegration (Agencia Colombiana para la peace process. ern Ireland appears to be of interest to the
Reintegracin: ACR), whose director, Alejan- However, this stage of DDR will be prob- Colombian government.
dro Eder, gave an interview on 3 October in lematic precisely because of the criminality Where the Northern Irish experience may
which he claimed that any peace agreement aspect. Despite a booming legal economy be relevant to a FARC DDR programme is
could lead to as many as 40,000 demobili- and a drive by the Colombian government in the area of weapons decommissioning.
sations. In addition to a percentage of the to attract foreign direct investment as the The Irish Republican Armys (IRA) internal
approximately 8,000-strong main FARC security climate improves, large swathes of constitution specically advocated armed
force, this would include a further number of the country remain beholden to criminal in- struggle, and the FARCs leadership which
people applying to gain the benets of DDR terests. Work within the legal economy, often has made references to the Northern Ireland
who formerly worked in loose FARC support in low-paid jobs with little security of tenure, experience on more than one occasion may
networks. may be less appealing to many former FARC initially be reluctant to surrender its weapon-
Any future DDR process in Colombia cadres than the illicit alternatives. Therefore, ry in a country where the high overall levels
could, in the disarmament and demobilisa- any mass-implementation DDR programme of gun ownership could then leave it feeling
tion phases, be concluded relatively swiftly, would need to actively reduce the appeal of threatened.
possibly within a matter of months. Colombia criminality by ensuring that the legal option In this situation, historical precedent
has experience of previous demobilisation offered a long-term, viably remunerated will be weighing on the leadership: the
initiatives most notably the AUC, a small solution. FARCs previous attempt to be involved in
leftist insurgency known as the Ejrcito Notable within the domestic framework, the formation of a legal political party, the
Popular de Liberacin (EPL), and the 1980s the demobilisation of the M-19 may offer Patriotic Union (Unin Patritica: UP), failed
guerrilla group the Movimiento 19 de Abril a model for potential success. After being in the late 1980s after a spate of political
(M-19) and it would be able to draw on those Colombias second-largest insurgent group in violence and targeted assassinations, which
experiences to design a programme aimed the 1980s, after the FARC, the M-19 moved were attributed to right-wing paramilitaries
at avoiding previous pitfalls, particularly the away from direct action after a bloody siege and drug gangs.
chance of former insurgents moving into at the Palace of Justice in November 1985, in Hesitancy on the part of the FARC to
criminality. McDermott told IHS Janes, On which around 100 people died. By the early decommission comprehensively at the start
the DDR front, the paramilitary [AUC] model 1990s, the group had demobilised, and had of a DDR process is therefore not surprising,
was not very successful and the rebels have transformed itself into a legal political move- and is likely to be a stumbling block that could
rejected it. This is one of the key issues at the ment that renounced violence; the current require international mediation. Webb-Vidal
negotiating table. mayor of Bogot, Gustavo Petro, is a former agrees that the nal DDR model is likely to
Reintegration, the third element of DDR, M-19 member. be a hybrid of many precedents. Santos
presents greater challenges in terms of Internationally, of the more than 60 formal negotiators have been looking at different
reinserting former combatants into society DDR initiatives that have been identied models and examples, including the Northern
through assistance with nding employ- worldwide since the early 1990s by Robert Ireland peace agreement, and others closer
ment, welfare benets, training, education, Muggah, the research director of the Rio to home, such as those that occurred in El
and psychological support. The ACR claims to de Janeiro-based Igarap Institute security Salvador and Guatemala, he told IHS Janes.
have successfully reintegrated approximately thinktank, the experience in Northern Ireland But every situation is different, and I doubt
46,000 former combatants during the seven is one that is likely to inform some aspects of they would attempt to import one particular
years of its existence, many of whom were DDR modelling. model wholesale.

Chief FARC negotiator Ivn Mrquez talks to

the media at the close of a round of peace
talks with Colombias government in Havana,
Cuba. It is thought that a peace agreement
may be reached, but not until after the next
election. PA: 1515433 December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 37

034-038_JIR1312_F4_FARC.indd 37 14/11/2013 14:40:57


Alleged rebels from FARC are escorted by police in Cali, Colombia.

Although a FARC-government deal looks likely, the FARC will continue
operations to reinforce its military negotiating hand in Havana, Cuba.
PA: 1515435

Outlook Cauca that are under the control of Catat- insurgency (to be addressed largely through
The prospects for a successful conclusion of umbos Western Bloc, where control over the military means) to one of widespread organ-
a FARC-government deal remain relatively strategic drug-trafficking corridors into the ised criminality (to be countered by police-led
strong, despite a high possibility that the port of Buenaventura will continue to offer law enforcement measures), there would be
whole process will be delayed until after the disincentives to demobilisation; and areas of a substantial risk of continued high levels of
Colombian election in May 2014, and poten- the southwestern border area neighbouring violence in the country due to turf battles be-
tially into 2015. In the meantime, the FARC Ecuador, where the nancially solvent 48th tween new allegiances of criminal and former
will continue operations targeting energy Front will be loath to relinquish its drug- FARC groups.
infrastructure and security forces in order to related activities. The northern areas of Norte
reinforce its military negotiating hand in the de Santander and Magdalena Medio also carry This article was first published online at
Havana talks. a higher risk. on 5 November 2013.
If a peace deal is agreed, a potentially Should a peace deal be concluded, it is also
signicant number of FARC cadres will not highly likely that the secretariat will exercise X ON THE WEB
accept demobilisation incentives, opting sufficient control to make DDR viable in
instead for continuing lucrative interests in many of the non-peripheral areas of the coun- Extracting peace FARC targets
criminal operations, either as FARC splinter try. Moreover, with the ideological goal of energy and mining
groups or moving into already established an armed agrarian uprising no longer in play, Rise of the Urabeos Colombian
criminal groups. future criminal rumps of the FARC would be drug gang bids for market dominance
IHS Janes assesses that three areas of the more likely to abandon politically-motivated
Hybrid cartels Colombian organised
country are likely to present a particularly attacks against security forces and economi-
crime networks
high risk of FARC operatives morphing into cally symbolic infrastructure.
criminality. These are the northwestern However, there is no assurance that a suc- Author
area comprising rural areas of Antioquia and cessful DDR process would lead to an immedi- Robert Munks is Deputy Editor of
IHS Janes Intelligence Review.
Choc, in particular the region abutting the ate or sustainable diminution in violence,
Darin Gap, where the overlapping drug and
particularly in rural areas where control is
Additional research by IHS Country
Analyst Grant Hurst.
mining interests of the 34th, 36th, and 57th contested by numerous illegal armed groups.
fronts will make criminality tempting; areas Indeed, in a scenario in which Colombias
of the western seaboard Cauca and Valle del security environment transitions from one of

38 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

034-038_JIR1312_F4_FARC.indd 38 14/11/2013 14:41:11


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039_JIR1312_Subs_page.indd 39 14/11/2013 11:47:32


Russias response to insecurity in Central Asia
Russia has announced its concerns about potential threats from Afghanistan
spreading into Central Asian countries. Roger McDermott and Zhulduz Baizakova
assess Russias efforts to bolster security in the region.

X KEY POINTS followed, including the development of and placing Afghanistan on the agendas of
supporting infrastructure within Central the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation
Russia has publicly outlined its Asia, Moscow has attempted to balance its Organization (SCO).
concerns about insecurity in support for the stabilisation efforts with its Due to Turkmenistans policy of neutrality
Afghanistan spreading to Central anti-Western rhetoric. Nevertheless, the and Uzbekistans exit from the CSTO in late
Asia following the withdrawal of NATO drawdown from Afghanistan by the 2012, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan
international forces in 2014.
end of 2014 transferring combat and security are the three Central Asian states prioritised
Although Moscow has undertaken responsibility from the International Security by Russias security planning.
various efforts to bolster security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghan security An interconnecting theme in Russias secu-
in the region, including securing forces appears to have opened an opportu- rity agenda in Central Asia links to promoting
basing rights, transferring
nity for the Kremlin to reassess its strategic the underlying message that, unlike the West,
equipment to Central Asian states,
interests in Central Asia post-2014. Russia can be relied upon to stay the course.
and strengthening the multilateral
Collective Security Treaty Organisation Russia frames its security planning for This is reected in its military basing agree-
(CSTO), the security capacity of the the ISAF drawdown in terms of the need to ments in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which
regional states remains low. strengthen its southern periphery against effectively cement existing Russian military
transnational threats including drug traffick- infrastructure in these states until 2042.
The likelihood of Russia becoming
militarily involved in response to a ing, religious extremism, and terrorism, which Russia also plans to donate a total of
crisis in Central Asia remains low, it believes will weaken security in Central Asia USD200 million to Tajikistan and USD1.1
especially as Moscows primary post-2014, as stated in a number of official billion to Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan not only
interest in the region is retaining its reports published over the past two years. obtains USD4.5 million annually for the lease
political dominance. The Kremlins political narrative criticises of its Kant air base to Russia, but Moscow has
the West for its intervention in Afghanistan, also promised to sponsor the construction

ussian president Vladimir Putin an- while also reserving the right to castigate of a hydropower plant, while also erasing its
nounced in late September that the NATO for its withdrawal before fully com- USD180 million debt.
multilateral Collective Security Treaty pleting the stabilisation mission. Neverthe- Russia has secured an extension to its air
Organisation (CSTO) would help Tajikistan less, this narrative, convenient for the Russian base at Kant near Bishkek, which contrasts ge-
reinforce its borders with Afghanistan, provid- leadership to appeal to a domestic audience, opolitically with the nearby US transit centre
ing a further example of the concern Russias contains some elements of the countrys real at Manas, which is scheduled to close by June
political-military leadership has about the threat perception, while exaggerating its prog- 2014 due to opposition from the Kyrgyz gov-
potential insecurity in Central Asia after the nosis of the potential impact on Central Asia. ernment. The underlying political message is
withdrawal of international forces in 2014. that Russia is a more durable security partner
However, Russias policies in the region fre- Russian preparations than the United States. In Tajikistan, the Rus-
quently only address some of the symptoms Russia is actively preparing its Central Asian sian 201st military base has been secured until
of these issues, rather than their underlying
allies for the post-2014 security environment 2042 following the ratication of an extension
causes. Since United States military forces by strengthening the CSTO, promoting its deal by the Tajik parliament in October 2013.
entered Afghanistan in 2001 to unseat the bilateral security relationships in the region, Equally, Moscow used the CSTO summit in
Taliban, and the NATO involvement that boosting its military and security inuence, Sochi on 24 September to offer border security

40 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

040-043_JIR1312_F5_Asia.indd 40 14/11/2013 11:48:03


assistance to Tajikistan. By 21 October, the the CSTO and is therefore unlikely to permit Afghanistan; the spillover of radicalism from
CSTO secretary-general Nikolai Bordyuzha any CSTO forces on its territory. Afghanistan to neighbouring Central Asian
was describing such initiatives as being Additionally, there is no agreement in place states; increased drug trafficking; and the
about bigger nancial investments aimed at between Russia and Tajikistan, or between return of Central Asian militants, who had
supplying armour and vehicles, as well as at Tajikistan and the CSTO, for the deployment been operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
setting up electric signalling systems or special of forces to its borders. Bordyuzha claimed to their home countries.
means for protecting the state border and that Russia sees no need to dispatch Russian Central Asian governments generally lack
building border posts. Russia has also sought border guards to Tajikistan as all Tajik border popular legitimacy, as illustrated by reports
to develop, train, and enhance the CSTOs Col- guard services are fully manned. Neverthe- from international election observer teams
lective Rapid Reaction Force (CRRF), which less, in reference to the poor capabilities of the suggesting a lack of democracy in elections
was established in June 2009. Tajik security forces, Bordyuzha has argued held in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmeni-
Russia completed the deal with Tajikistan that Tajik border guards need extra and better stan, and Uzbekistan over the past decade.
regarding the 201st base in exchange for per- equipment and hardware, and that this should These governments therefore seek to keep
mitting Tajik labour migrants to work in Rus- be provided not only by Russia but by all CSTO a tight grip on power through the authori-
sia for up to three years (compared with only members. No such assistance plans have been tarian suppression of dissent. For instance,
one year previously). However, according to announced by any other CSTO member states. the Kazakh security forces responded to
Tajik minister of defence Sherali Hayrulloyev, an outbreak of civil unrest in the western
the presence of the 201st base in the country Central Asian threat environment region of Zhanaozen in December 2011 with
meets the spirit of strategic partnership Many Russian experts who spoke to IHS Janes lethal force, leaving 11 people dead. From the
between Tajikistan and Russia and is aimed at in October view the post-2014 Afghanistan Russian perspective, this increases the risk
providing stability in the region. Hayrulloyev security environment through the prism of that the regional populations will be driven
also claims that the base can be used during confrontation with the West. Those experts to increased radicalism as a result. Russians
terrorist incursions into the country. Accord- still retain the idea that a new Great Game predominantly see the roots for Islamist ex-
ing to the bilateral agreement, Russia also is unfolding between Russia and the West in tremism and radicalism in Central Asia in the
committed to provide technical assistance to Central Asia, which limits the scope for secu- poor socio-economic conditions of the region
modernise the Tajik army. Since 2005, Russia rity co-operation. and the construction of a volatile atmosphere
has provided technical assistance to Tajikistan Russias actual approach appears para- of distrust among the youth populations.
worth a total of USD411 million. doxical; on the one hand Moscow complains Constitutionally, all Central Asian coun-
The weakest points in Central Asias secu- about ISAF leaving Afghanistan while failing tries are secular. However, each of them has
rity are its southern borders, particularly the to stabilise the situation completely, but on their own disadvantages and specics when
156 kilometre-long Uzbek-Afghan border and the other some believe Russian geopolitical it comes to being vulnerable to possible
the 1,344 km-long Tajik-Afghan border. In this interests will benet from Western forces radicalisation and the inuence of Islam-
regard, Russia plans to dispatch forces located leaving Afghanistan. ist extremism. Each country has a majority
in the 201st and Kant airbases to strengthen Nevertheless, the same Russia experts also Muslim population: in Kazakhstan this is
and reinforce the borders in the event of an agree that Moscow is focused on the threats 68-72% of the population; in Kyrgyzstan 75%;
emergency. However, such plans are subject to facing Central Asia post-2014. These include: in Tajikistan 85%; in Turkmenistan 93%; and
change. Uzbekistan is no longer a member of a possible return of the Taliban to power in in Uzbekistan 96%. Islam in Central Asia is

Kyrgyz soldiers in operation during CSTO military manoeuvres at the

Koitash army base outside Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on 19 September
2011. Russia has sought to strengthen the CSTO as a means to provid-
ing a security response to emerging threats in Central Asia. PA:1515438

TDemo December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 41

040-043_JIR1312_F5_Asia.indd 41 14/11/2013 11:48:06


senior militants such as Makhanov, who are

able to garner supporters within the country,
points to a dangerous trend that is likely to
increase in the future.

Drug trafcking
Perhaps the most substantial interest Russia
currently has in Central Asia is combating drug
trafficking. According to estimates from the
UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) in
2012, 90 tonnes of Afghan-produced heroin
passed through Central Asia towards Russia,
where 21% of the worlds heroin is consumed.
However, this concern has not translated into
close co-operation with the West, and particu-
larly the US, on countering the problem. The
Russian president Vladimir Putin speaks to Tajik president proposed Central Asian Counternarcotics Ini-
Emomali Rakhmon during a meeting outside Moscow, Russia, tiative by the US was not warmly received by
on 1 August 2013. Russia is concerned with boosting border Moscow. In January 2013, Russia, in retalia-
security in the Central Asian countries. PA: 1515962
tion against the US over human rights and the
Magnitsky Act, also withdrew from a 2002
predominantly Sunni, but a small minority of The area therefore presents a complicated agreement providing USD6 million per year in
Shia Muslims live in Tajikistan. Despite the mixture of disputed border areas and inter- assistance from the US for combating human
focus on external threats emanating from ethnic tensions. There is not currently any trafficking and the drug trade.
Afghanistan, there is a risk of radicalisation single group that is capable of unifying radical Currently around 30% of Afghan drugs
and destabilisation emerging from within the sentiments in the region. Despite the publicly nd their way into Russian and European
region. This risk is inuenced by a number of expressed concerns among the regional gov- markets through the Central Asian states. The
factors: the poor economic situation, weak ernments regarding the radical Islamist group UN estimates that up to 80 tonnes of heroin
governmental structures, corrupt leadership, Hizb ut-Tahrir, this organisation remains and 20 tonnes of opium is trafficked from
absence of constructive political succession avowedly non-violent, instead calling for the Afghanistan through Tajikistan annually. The
procedures, weak civil society, the lack of overthrow of secular governments through main transit points are located in Tajikistans
comprehensive religious education, growing peaceful action. Kunduz and Gorno-Badakhshan provinces.
urbanisation, a growing gap between rich and However, should militant groups such as Another escalating development is that
poor, exploitation of the available natural the IMU seek to return to Central Asia, utilis- increasing amounts of the drugs transited now
resources by the elite minority, and little ing a potential lack of security in Afghanistan remain within Central Asia, with the transit
transparency or true democracy. post-2014, then areas such as the Ferghana countries turning into consumers. This carries
With Central Asia having been effectively Valley could offer an attractive staging post. serious political, economic, social and military
closed off from the rest of the Islamic world According to the head of the Kazakhstan Insti- implications for the region.
during its 70 years under Soviet rule, the re- tute for Strategic Studies, Bulat Sultanov, who
gion has only relatively recently been exposed spoke to IHS Janes in September, one of the Russias red lines in Central Asia
to external inuences, including certain radi- greatest threats emanating from Afghanistan Threat perceptions, perspectives on the secu-
cal forms of Islam such as Salasm. The idea of is ethnically-Central Asian militant organisa- rity implications of the NATO drawdown in
constructing an Islamic caliphate in Central tions that have been maintaining close links Afghanistan, military capabilities, and security
Asia as espoused by certain militant groups with the militant groups that do operate in capacities all differ widely between Russia
such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Central Asia. An indication of this potential and its Central Asian allies. For instance, IHS
(IMU), which has been primarily based in threat was witnessed in Tajikistan on 23 Sep- Janes assessment of Kazakhstans security
the Afghani-Pakistan border regions since tember, when the security forces announced doctrine, as well as discussions with strategists
2001 could gain greater traction among the that they had uncovered an audacious plot and specialists on Afghanistan, shows that
domestic populations of Central Asian states to bomb a series of transport, political, and Kazakhstan expects no deterioration or major
as a result of growing unrest. security force targets in the capital Dushanbe shift in its security or in regional security
In this context, the Ferghana Valley can ahead of the 6 November presidential election. dynamics post-2014. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan
be seen as an area at particular risk of radical According to the security forces, the leader of and Tajikistan show little sign of preparing for
Islamist inltration. The valley is located at the group, Alimurod Makhanov (alias Ustod), a possible worsening security situation, and
the intersection of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, had operated with the IMU in Pakistan before Russia ostensibly exaggerates the NATO exit
and Uzbekistan. Furthermore, the regions
returning to Tajikistan. Although it is unlikely for its own political purposes.
increasingly young population exerts that this small group of militants would have Seen from Moscows vantage point, as the
demographic pressure, a factor exacerbated been able to launch an attack on the scale al- Western military footprint in the region mark-
by high levels of unemployment and poverty. leged by the authorities, the presence of more edly declines, 2014 represents an opportunity

42 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

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to tie its Central Asian partners into its Eura- Red lines for intervention involving Russian military units in combat
sian Economic Union project, which is due to within Central Asia are paradoxically the
commence in January 2015. An enduring serious threat to the least likely to occur: Moscow would undoubt-
Despite its bellicose rhetoric, the secu- disruption of energy supplies from edly act militarily to protect its strategic ally,
rity crises in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in Central Asia to Russia; this would have Kazakhstan, if the state was either under
May-June 2010 and August-September 2012 to be distinct from a small-scale attack imminent danger of collapse, or threatened by
respectively revealed Moscow to be surpris- causing minor disruption, representing systemic instability.
ingly circumspect about authorising armed an actual persistent source of threat Even though neither Kyrgyzstan nor
intervention in Central Asia. That pattern is to Russias energy interests such as Tajikistan can provide sufficient security for
likely to persist well beyond 2014. This raises oil and gas production and pipelines themselves, it is widely assumed by officials
an obvious question as to where the Kremlin in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, or interviewed by IHS Janes in both countries
draws red lines in its Central Asian security Uzbekistan. that Moscow will come to their aid. As such,
policy, what the scenarios and pathways Wide-scale attacks on Russian citi- there is little prospect of Western involve-
towards intervention may involve, and how zens, as distinct from ethnic Russian ment in aiding the security of Central Asia
closely this is reected in real preparations Central Asians, and failure of the host beyond relatively limited supplies of equip-
(see box, right). country to respond sufciently. ment and training. Until the political elite
Nonetheless, a closer analysis of Russian Localised militant activity, for instance ruling Central Asia changes, there is unlikely
security policy in Central Asia, including its in the Ferghana Valley or Tajikistans to be any change in the total trust and con-
basing agreements, raises questions as to remote Gorno-Badakhshan region, dence the Central Asian leadership places
whether the counter-terrorist capabilities which escalates beyond the host upon Moscow.
of the host countries are actually beneting. countrys capacity to contain it. Russia and its Central Asian partners do not
Planned weapons and equipment donations Insurgency or revolution, the latter share a common or uniform perspective on
to Kyrgyzstan, which will be valued at an esti- most likely with foreign backing, result- the threat environment in the region post-
mated USD1.1 billion, extend only to materials ing in a threat to the host regime. 2014, and consequently plans to strengthen
from Russian military stockpiles, meaning A large-scale militant attack on Ka- security remain merely rhetorical. The limited
this is a mechanism for Moscow to pass on zakhstan threatening its sovereignty or steps Moscow has taken to date are aimed
old hardware. According to a statement by domestic stability. at reassuring the region that its overarching
Russian minister of defence Sergei Shoigu in priority is to consolidate its geopolitical pres-
June 2013, these supplies might start by the ence in Central Asia. Russian policymakers
end of the year. This will include small-arms, serving conscripts, and consequently, ahead are much more interested in putting as much
armoured vehicles, artillery systems, and of major Russian military exercises the base weight behind its Eurasian integration plans
communication systems, although Russian is reinforced by more experienced contract as possible, and the narrative of deteriorating
officials have failed to reveal the exact type, personnel from Yekaterinburg. In a security security after the ISAF mission changes in
number, and class of the military hardware crisis that left the Tajik security forces over- 2014 ts that agenda. Thus, Moscows security
and equipment. Although Kyrgyzstans stretched in the Rasht Valley in northern Ta- planning is inexorably linked to the reasser-
military and security forces will undoubtedly jikistan in August-September 2012, there was tion of its geopolitical power in the post-
benet from receiving even relatively obsolete no Russian security involvement; although Soviet space.
Russian equipment, the deciencies in the the former barely coped in operations to deal
training and organisation of these forces will with the armed groups operated by regional This article was first published online at
not be addressed. strongmen and the alleged Islamist militants on 8 November 2013.
Russias own military assets within supporting them, Dushanbe made no request
Central Asia are not trained or equipped for for support to the Russian base. X ON THE WEB
counter-insurgency operations, and its wider Moscow could deploy military units to
conventional forces possess limited strate- support Special Forces operations, including Touching the void Security vacuum
gic mobility to deploy into Central Asia and Federal Security Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba issues in Central Asia
sustain operations over a protracted period. Bezopasnosti: FSB) Alpha units, to protect its Northern exposure Afghan heroin
Russia maintains air force assets at the CSTO energy supplies in Central Asia; however, such trafcking through Central Asia
air base in Kant, though it is unclear how a crisis would need to outstrip the capacity
these might be effectively employed during of local security forces to cope, necessitating
Roger McDermott is an afliated senior
a regional insurgency. In a crisis, the air base Russias direct assistance. analyst at the Danish Institute for
could hypothetically be used to receive units International Studies, Copenhagen,
from the elite Russian airborne forces. Outlook specialising in Eurasian defence
Similarly, the 201st military base in An insurgency within Central Asia that may and security. Zhulduz Baizakova is a
Tajikistan consists mainly of combat infan- invoke a Russian response could only realisti- research afliate at the Institute for
try and military engineers, unsuited as rst
cally occur in Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, as Security and Cooperation Studies, Al-
responders in the event of a crisis triggered these smaller, economically weaker countries Farabi Kazakh National University.
by militancy. Indeed, many of the person- have a much lower security capacity than their
nel serving in the 201st base are 12-month larger neighbours in the region. Scenarios December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 43

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Criminal groups turn to cyber technology
As awareness of the need for online privacy grows, technology is
increasingly becoming available to help internet users maintain
anonymity. Robert Pritchard investigates illegal activities facilitated by
such technology and the inherent problems in tackling it.
Shutterstock: 1450624

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X KEY POINTS while also being condemned in the inter- being used to facilitate drug trafficking. His
national media for the way it was evading comments highlighted a cyber attack against
Real world criminals are increasingly law enforcement. Meanwhile, the Antwerp the port of Antwerp, which had been carried
utilising cyber techniques to aid their incident demonstrated how hidden dependen- out to facilitate the removal from the facility
activities, with examples including cies on internet-connected infrastructure can of shipping containers holding drugs before
the uncovering of an online drugs be exploited by criminals to evade physical they could be inspected by customs and law
marketplace and the hacking of a
security measures. The tools and techniques enforcement officials. Europol reported that a
major European ports computer
that have made enterprises like this viable are drug gang had hired a group of hackers to gain
systems to allow drugs to ow
through unimpeded. becoming more common and more resilient, access to the ports computer systems. The
and pose a signicant and growing challenge suspicious activity was rst noticed in 2011,
Criminal groups are able to utilise to law enforcement. when port workers reported that entire ship-
online anonymity tools and currencies
ping containers were going missing.
to disguise their activity and confound
attempts by law enforcement Drug trafcking activity Initial access to the computer system was
agencies to break up such networks. In October, after two-and-a-half years of op- gained using a common technique called
eration, the Silk Road was seized and closed by spear phishing. Spear phishing involves
The ability of criminal groups to hire
the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). sending spoofed emails to staff at the target
hackers and utilise relatively new
online technologies means that the The founder, known online as Dread Pirate organisation that contain malicious attach-
threat posed by such groups is likely Roberts, has been identied by US prosecu- ments or links to malicious websites, which,
to increase in the future, particularly tors as Ross William Ulbricht, a 29-year-old when opened, provide the hackers with access
as law enforcement agencies are originally from Texas. He has been charged to the computer network. Once control of a
facing a constantly shifting target. with drug trafficking, money laundering, and computer on the port network was obtained,
computer hacking, and is currently being held the hackers were able to use other tools to ex-

yber crime is big business. In July in a detention centre in New York City. He has pand their access, eventually gaining access to
2013, a report from antivirus com- denied all of the charges against him. the systems that tracked shipping containers.
pany McAfee estimated that the The Silk Road was founded in 2011, and in With that access, it was possible for the gang
global cost of cyber crime (including cyber June of that year featured in a report in the on- to locate shipping containers with the drugs
espionage) was between USD300 billion and line blog Gawker, outlining the easy and open hidden inside them and remove them before
USD1 trillion. However, this is a mercurial availability of drugs. This brought the Silk any inspection. This was apparently possible
topic, and concrete, widely accepted gures Road to the attention of millions of internet due to the size and volume of traffic in the
are hard to nd. users, attracting a large amount of traffic to port, which processes 8.63 million containers
Notably, current estimates tend to focus on the website. Further publicity followed, with each year.
the costs to society associated with tradition- numerous news articles over the following Once the original compromise of the
al online criminal activity intellectual prop- two years. By the time of the FBI raid, US law port computers was discovered, access was
erty theft, credit card fraud, identity theft, enforcement estimated that USD1.2 billion removed, although the purpose of the hacking
and more esoteric crimes, such as procuring of trade had been processed through the site, was not understood and it was not immedi-
and running botnets (a network of compro- providing those running it approximately ately associated with the broader smuggling
mised computers that can be used for a variety USD80 million in commission. activity. To maintain access, the criminal gang
of criminal activities). Essentially, these are The Silk Road acted as a marketplace, with resorted to breaking into the offices and physi-
crimes that exist entirely online. vendors getting star ratings and reviews from cally connecting hardware to the network that
However, cyber crime is changing, and it is customers, in a similar model to that used by restored its remote access.
beginning to be used to facilitate real-world legitimate online marketplaces such as eBay. In many ways the Silk Road and the attack
criminal activity. For example, an online Silk Road specically prohibited items that on the computer networks of Antwerp are
marketplace for drug dealers called the Silk caused harm or were intended to defraud, not surprising developments. Legitimate busi-
Road demonstrated the ease with which sticking to the founders principles that noth- nesses are constantly looking for new ways to
criminals can anonymously offer services over ing that is not harmful should be prohibited. use the internet, and criminals are doing the
the internet, and also how easy it is for buyers Despite the high prole and large turnover, same, nding ways to exploit the internet to
to nd and procure these services. Another the Silk Road and its approximately 1 million their advantage.
example of cyber crime having a real-world registered users operated for a lengthy period
impact involved the hacking of the control of time seemingly out of the reach of law Online anonymity
network at the Belgian port of Antwerp, rst enforcement. There were two key elements to A key enabler of the crossover between the
reported in October 2013, allowing drug traf- the success of the Silk Road: a tool called TOR physical world of the drugs trade and black-
ckers to retrieve shipping containers carrying (originally The Onion Router), which enables market online retailing, as demonstrated by
illicit shipments before they were checked by anonymous internet browsing; and Bitcoin, the Silk Road, is technology designed not for
customs officials. an entirely online, de-centralised currency. criminal activity, but for entirely legitimate
What made the Silk Road remarkable was
Both of these tools are widely used for entirely purposes. This technology includes decentral-
Shutterstock: 1450624

the fact that, unlike most drug networks, it legitimate purposes. ised currency and tools that provide anonym-
was famous and was lauded among certain Also in October, head of Europol Rob Wain- ity when browsing the internet.
internet user groups as a libertarian enclave, wight warned the media that the internet was Anonymity online is something many December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 45

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historical record of the currency used prop-

erly it is in reality extremely difficult to link
specic transactions to actual people. Bitcoins
initial popularity may well have been fuelled
by its suitability for black-market purchases,
but it is now accepted as payment by many
legitimate sites. The underlying principles be-
hind Bitcoin are complex but mathematically
provably robust, and have effectively provided
a currency that is extremely resistant to law
enforcement or government scrutiny.
The Snowden leaks and the raid on the Silk
Road have both had a signicant impact on the
development of technologies such as TOR and
Bitcoin. For instance, it was revealed during
a hearing following Ulbrichts arrest that the
An employee of the Bavarian Criminal Investigation Department holds a seized FBI had inltrated the Silk Road website, with
envelope and a bag of amphetamine in front of a table with further seized drugs one of the top-rated sellers actually working
and money in Munich, Germany, on 9 July 2013. Investigators arrested a group
that had specialised in trading drugs anonymously online, with payments made
for the authorities.
in Bitcoin and drugs being sent by mail. PA: 1515079 Despite the fact that the Silk Road was
uncovered by the FBI, the case illustrates that
people strive for, sometimes for specic rea- robust. The leaks of classied national security the technologies work well. The weakness in
sons, but often simply because they see it as material by Edward Snowden in 2013 dem- the system will always be people, and their
being important and a human right. TOR was onstrated that both the US National Security fallibility. Understanding how the Silk Road
born out of a United States Naval Research Agency (NSA) and the United Kingdoms ultimately failed will inform future projects,
Laboratory project aimed at protecting gov- Government Communications Headquarters making them more resistant to the efforts of
ernment communications, which ultimately (GCHQ) had put resources into defeating TOR. law enforcement investigations. Just over one
grew to encompass a much broader user base. The leaked documents appear to support the month after the seizure of the Silk Road, a
TOR is an entirely free service, available to assumption that, used properly, TOR provides new version of the site was launched, branded
anyone, that is simple to use. The TOR project a very strong level of anonymity. Silk Road 2.0, promising improved security.
maintains a website providing support, and The ability to transfer large amounts of However, it is the Snowden leaks that may
the necessary tools can be downloaded. Once money and to buy and sell goods without ultimately be of most signicant benet to
installed, all user requests for internet services governments or banks being able to interfere the online criminal. Snowden has certainly
are forwarded onto the TOR network. This has long been a desire of criminals. It is also provided useful information on the operations
network consists of a large number of comput- something in which many computer scien- of the NSA and other agencies. Although there
ers, or nodes. Each request from a TOR user tists, mathematicians, and cryptographers is much that can be learned from the leaked
is passed from node to node, being encrypted have been interested, motivated either by documents about staying anonymous online,
each time. The only information any single libertarian ideals or simple scientic curiosity. and the documents appear to have veried
node knows about any individual request Although numerous currencies that would al- that TOR is effective, the most potent results
is the identity of the preceding node in the low this level of freedom have been theorised, will be the general distrust and suspicion the
chain, and where the request needs to be sent and some implemented, few have ever caught leaks have engendered.
next. Only the nal node knows the destina- the publics imagination or become trusted Previously, those believing in pervasive on-
tion website, but it does not know where the enough to be used on a large scale. line intrusion by government agencies were in
request originated. Multiple layers of encryp- Bitcoin was rst outlined in an online paper the minority, whereas now that the reality ap-
tion therefore ensure user anonymity. in 2008, with software implementation fol- pears to have been conrmed albeit possibly
The anonymity provided by TOR depends lowing in 2009. The true identity of Bitcoins a distorted, one-sided version of that reality as
on the goodwill of individual contributing creators remains unknown. The paper and told through selected releases by newspapers
nodes (the TOR project provides specialised software were released onto the internet more people will start to take online privacy
software to allow people to turn their comput- under a pseudonym, Satoshi Nakamoto, seriously. The fallout from the Snowden leaks
ers into contributing nodes); the more nodes which has never been concretely linked to an immediately led to a number of new secure
there are, the better the security provided by individual or group; indeed, the quality and ro- email projects, as well as wider discussion on
the network. More nodes also means TOR bustness of the rst software release strongly the effective implementation of a range of
becomes more usable. TOR has been slowly in- suggested that it was the work of more than other means of hiding user identity online.
creasing in popularity since its release into the one person. These discussions are often led by extremely
public domain in 2002, but has suffered from
Bitcoin is completely distributed, without well-informed and well-meaning individuals.
the fact that few users are willing to contrib- any centralised infrastructure. Although The results will be improved secure online
ute computer resources to the network. strictly speaking it is not anonymous as its tools that are easier to use, and an increase in
Nevertheless, it is extremely effective and strength relies on the transparency of the online services being hosted from jurisdictions

46 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

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that are traditionally less co-operative with those services mean attacks like the one on these weaknesses, they were able to create
Western law enforcement, such as Russia. Antwerp port will happen more frequently. As fake vessels, alter the position and declared
the use of technology to manage global trade cargo of real vessels, and cause a variety of
New threats and provide security at borders grows, a bigger other malicious effects. They were ultimately
The hacking of Antwerp port shows that drug attack space is being presented to would-be able to undermine almost all of the data the
smuggling gangs are willing to embrace new hackers, and there is more opportunity for system provides. The implications of this re-
technology, and are also willing to hire tech- malicious activity. search are signicant, and the xes non-trivial:
nological capability when needed. Drug smug- Since 2004, a convention issued by the AIS was built to be practical and resilient,
glers are traditionally not afraid to embrace United Nations International Maritime Office rather than highly secure. As use of the system
new technologies, and are often well funded. (IMO) has required that all commercial vessels has become more prevalent, the system has
Reports from Colombian law enforcement of- over 300 tonnes, and all passenger vessels, become more trusted. By the time the output
cials on drug gangs have detailed submarines carry a technology called Automatic Identica- is aggregated onto a website showing the loca-
developed specically for drug smuggling, tion Systems (AIS). AIS broadcasts the identity tions, identity, and cargo of shipping all over
with the designs evolving from small breglass of the vessel, its current location, and other the world, it is impossible to verify all of the
semi-submersibles to far more capable steel- details including cargo and course, to other data, but it is used by shipping companies, and
hulled vessels. In light of innovation and risk- nearby ships and land stations. This informa- more importantly by governments.
taking on this scale, the adoption of computer tion is aggregated, and is publicly available Shortly after the Trend Micro research
hacking should not come as a surprise. on a number of websites (usually as a paid-for was released, an Iranian crude oil tanker
Hacking as a service is a relatively new but service). However, despite wide adoption, was detected obscuring its AIS identity off
growing market. There is some evidence that there are issues with the AIS service. It has al- the coast of Singapore, masquerading as a
the Chinese state uses established domestic ways been reliant on the honesty of the users, smaller vessel. The reasons for this are unclear,
hacker groups as part of its own campaign of and has not been entirely popular with some although the Iranian vessel was registered to
state-sponsored cyber espionage. A report by shipping companies; some AIS beacons have a company that has been sanctioned by the
security company Symantec in September de- been congured to broadcast ship names such US Office of Foreign Assets Control due to
tailed the activities of a Chinese group it called as Dont be nosey, while others have simply connections with the Iranian oil trade, and the
Hidden Lynx, and because of the range and been disabled. identity it adopted had no such connections.
diversity of targets discovered, it concluded In October, researchers with security rm This demonstrates how AIS could be misused
that the group was offering services for hire. Trend Micro presented ndings demonstrat- to disguise or even fake entirely vessels
The increasingly easy availability of hack- ing more signicant issues with the protocol potentially involved in illegal activity such as
ing as a service and the improving quality of itself, and also the aggregating services. Using drug trafficking.


The modern world is completely depend- The next Silk Road is already up and groups can be located anywhere and offer
ent on technology, which is increasingly running; indeed, although it had the highest services globally. Managing these new
trusted implicitly. As has been demonstrat- prole, it was never the only such service in threats will require signicant co-operation
ed by recent events, these technologies operation. Disrupting TOR websites offer- between law enforcement bodies and new
can be exploited. Western and developing ing drugs and other illegal services is made approaches to conducting investigations,
states have all pushed to increase the pool very difcult by the rapid emergence of which limits hopes of achieving success
of people with technical computing abilities new sites offering the same services. over the short term.
skills that are vital to modern econo- It is not currently clear how governments
mies. However, this has also increased the will respond to these new tools. The leaks This article was first published online at
pool of people who have the knowledge detailing the capabilities of the NSA have on 13 November 2013.
and experience to exploit weaknesses in undoubtedly provided valuable guidance
modern technology. to criminals, yet it may be the long-term re-
Bitcoin and other similar currencies sponse to the level of government intrusion
make it possible to safely charge for hack- into internet activity that is more damaging.
ing services. TOR enables transactions to The sudden surge of interest in privacy Digital diplomacy Working towards a
be undertaken almost completely anony- tools will bolster TOR services and lead to cyber code of conduct
mously. The ability to operate anonymously renewed development of tools specically
Virtual reality China takes industrial
at a distance and yet with condence designed to evade detection. espionage into cyber space
in the payment mechanisms is a new The challenge for law enforcement re-
phenomenon. As more legitimate services mains signicant. The tools used in organ- Author
Robert Pritchard is a cyber security
accept Bitcoin, it will become easier to turn ised crime have legitimate uses and large
Bitcoins back into local currency without
groups of knowledgeable people work-
expert and founder of Abstract Blue
looking suspicious, making detection of ing on them, making the results of their
money laundering extremely difcult. work available for free. Likewise, hacking December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 47

044-047_JIR1312_F11_cybercrime.indd 47 14/11/2013 15:14:39


Trading air defence systems and cruise missiles
The increased proliferation of cruise and air defence missile systems is providing
smaller states with advanced military capabilities. Sean OConnor outlines the key
proliferators and the impact this trade is having on strategic thinking.

X KEY POINTS of advanced air defence and cruise missile them is changing the strategic landscape and
technology can have. Indeed, the danger that creating a world in which traditional military
The increased proliferation of proliferation of advanced missile systems can tactics and pressures may no longer apply. As
advanced air defence systems and pose has been highlighted before, perhaps these systems effectiveness increases, future
cruise missiles is altering the strategic most notably with the use of an advanced conict zones will become far more danger-
landscape, allowing smaller states anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) by Leba- ous, potentially representing a deterrent to
to yield greater deterrent power
nese militant group Hizbullah against the military intervention.
in response to potential military
Israeli frigate INS Hanit in July 2006. These
incidents underscore the fact that prolifera- Key proliferators
The main proliferators of cruise missile tion efforts, which were previously focused The chief proliferator of advanced missile
and air defence systems are Russia
primarily on ballistic missiles, now include systems is Russia. The countrys weapon
and China, while current international
the supply of advanced air defence systems systems feature prominently in various
treaties only provide real export
controls for cruise missile systems, and cruise missiles. international defence exhibitions and are
and not air-defence proliferation. At the end of the Cold War in 1991, cruise tendered in most acquisition processes. The
missiles and advanced air defence systems primary market for Russian weapon sys-
The impact of cruise missile and air
were found in the inventories of a select few tems is traditional Soviet-era states such as
defence proliferation has been clearly
demonstrated by Syrias development states, primarily Russia, the United States, Armenia and Azerbaijan, or export partners
of deterrent capabilities, and the and larger Western European countries such such as North Korea, Syria, and Vietnam
likely expansion of such proliferation as France and the United Kingdom. Their countries that are already familiar with
will provide similar capabilities to a proliferation was limited because of their Russian systems or possessing infrastructure
growing number of states. nuclear delivery role (in the case of cruise to support such weapons. In addition, Russia
missiles) or their high cost. However, by the is also making inroads into regions formerly

etween 2011 and 2013, Western gov- turn of the century, proliferation of these tied to Western alliances, including countries
ernments reacted very differently to advanced weapon systems began to expand in Latin America and Asia.
two separate attempts at the internal beyond the native operators and their closest Signicant Russian systems offered for
regime change of a potential adversary. Rapid allies. With the partial or total breakdown export are variants of the S-300PMU (SA-
Western intervention in Libya has contrasted of old political and military alliances, these Grumble/SA-20 Gargoyle) strategic sur-
with the approach to the Syrian conict. systems found their place in an expanding face-to-air missile (SAM) system, advanced
Although the reasons behind these different export market, as systems once intended tactical SAM systems such as the Buk-M2E
approaches are numerous and complex, the to provide defence or deterrence against a (SA-17 Grizzly) and Antey-2500 based on
primary difference in military terms is that powerful adversary instead became weapons the S-300V (SA-23 Gladiator/Giant) and
Syria possesses advanced missile systems that
on the new battleeld of economics. the Klub (SS-N-27/30) and Bal-E (SSC-6
are unavailable to Libya. The result of the increased proliferation of Stooge) cruise missile systems. Apart from
This situation illustrates the strategic and advanced offensive and defensive missile sys- traditional export sales, Russia also en-
operational impact that the proliferation tems to countries previously unable to access gages client states in the co-development of

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advanced weapon systems, with examples be- selection of Chinas FD-2000 strategic SAM Restricting trade
ing the Russo-Indian BrahMos cruise missile system for its long-range air and missile International agreements restrict the capa-
a development of Russias native Yakhont defence programme. bilities of exported weapon systems, and in
(SSC-5 Strobile) missile system and assis- Although offering air defence systems and some cases restrict export entirely. However,
tance rendered to South Korea regarding the cruise missiles with similar performance to inconsistent or incomplete accountability
KM-SAM system. Russian or Chinese systems, Western states under these agreements enables proliferation
China also represents one of the newest are not generally traditional proliferators. to continue.
and potentially most signicant prolifera- Western states primarily export advanced One of the most important anti-prolifer-
tors of advanced missile systems. Although weapon systems among themselves, largely ation agreements is the Missile Technology
Chinas technological base suffered during
the cultural revolution of 196676, a signi-
cant leap in capability has occurred since the
late 1980s, assisted in part by the withdrawal
The increased proliferation is creating
of expected Western assistance. a world in which traditional military tactics
Chinese missile proliferation has largely
been composed of anti-ship missiles and and pressures may no longer apply
more traditional systems such as short-range
ballistic missiles. Initial strategic SAM ex-
ports failed to secure a signicant share of the to other countries that are technologically Control Regime (MTCR). This is intended to
market, with only the ageing HQ-2 exported capable of developing a similar capability but restrict the proliferation of systems capable
to Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan. More choose to import for economic or political of carrying weapons of mass destruction
successful were exports of ASCMs, with the reasons. As such, Western export activity is (WMD) payloads, including ballistic and
C-802 exported to nine countries, including often not viewed as proliferation, although cruise missiles, as well as other systems
Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, and Syria. it can have the same destabilising effect as such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
At present, Chinese missile exports are in- proliferation by non-Western exporters. The MTCR is a non-binding agreement with
creasing as the countrys arms industry gains The most commonly exported Western no international legal penalty for non-
inroads into new markets. Although allies systems that are relevant to proliferation are compliance, instead relying on enforcement
such as Pakistan remain regular customers, strategic SAM systems and various ASCMs, through internal legislation composed by the
the diversication of Chinas proliferation such as the US Patriot SAM system and the signatories. The oft-cited effect of the MTCR
efforts is best expressed in Turkeys recent Harpoon ASCM. is to restrict the sale of included weapons

A Russian Klub-K anti-ship

cruise missile, in containerised
form, at a defence show near
Moscow. Such systems can
be easily disguised on civilian
vessels, creating a dangerous
proliferation problem. PA: 1331944

TDemo December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 49

048-053_JIR1312_F3_PP.indd 49 14/11/2013 14:20:01


Belarusian S-300PMU mobile air defence

missile systems seen during a parade marking
Independence Day in Minsk, Belarus, on 3 July
2013. Similar systems have been exported to
other countries by Russia. PA: 1515070

possessing a range greater than 300 kilome- contrast to Russia, for example, which as a covering most types of weapon systems,
tres (km). However, this is not technically an signatory of the MTCR will often offer export with a recent addition including small-arms.
accurate interpretation, as actual implemen- variants of native systems with a limited Although ballistic and cruise missile systems
tation depends largely on the will and legisla- range or payload in order to comply with are catalogued, most SAM systems are not,
tion of the signatories. MTCR restrictions. with the only exception being man-portable
Existing as an agreement constituted Although counter-proliferation agree- air defence systems (MANPADS). Missile sys-
outside the United Nations, the MTCR is only ments begin to have greater effect within the tems fall under Category VII of the UNRCA,
with published UN guidelines stating that
Category VII does not include ground-to-air
Modern, long-range strategic SAM missiles, apart from MANPADS.

systems effectively limit the options an Therefore, although international agree-

ments and legislation restrict or bar the ex-
adversary possesses during engagement port of cruise missiles, strategic SAM systems
and their potentially destabilising effects
are wholly unregulated. Russia initially cited
UNSCR 1929 as the reason for cancelling a
effective among signatories complying with UN, signicant loopholes remain. UN arms planned sale of S-300PMU-2 strategic SAM
the agreed-upon limitations. China one sanctions normally reference restrictions on systems to Iran in September 2010, only to
of the chief proliferators is not an MTCR weapons covered within the UN Register of later admit that it agreed with the US that
signatory. Although most missile exports fall Conventional Arms (UNRCA), restricting the the resolution did not specically prevent
within MTCR guidelines, this is a function sale of some or all of the weapons therein. the sale.
of the design of most systems rather than An example is UN Security Council Resolu- UNSCR 1929 does require member states
a desire to comply with the international tion (UNSCR) 1929, passed in June 2010 to to exercise vigilance and restraint over the
arrangement. With its export of the DF-3 enhance existing sanctions against Iran. supply, sale, transfer, provision, manufac-
intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)
UNSCR 1929 states that weapon systems ture, and use of all other arms and related
to Saudi Arabia, in addition to the fact that banned from export to Iran consist of those materiel, referencing items not explicitly
is has not signed the MTCR, China proved as dened for the purpose of the UNRCA. covered by the UNRCA, but this is not an
willing to act as it sees t. This is in direct The UNRCA catalogues arms transactions outright restriction.

50 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

048-053_JIR1312_F3_PP.indd 50 14/11/2013 14:20:14


Proliferation impact
The impact of proliferation of SAM and Battalion administrative
cruise missile systems varies depending on facilities and barracks
the importer. Modern cruise missiles are de-
signed for either land-attack or anti-shipping
missions. Whereas land-attack cruise missiles
96L6E EW radar
(LACMs) are traditionally subsonic, as this
allows increased fuel efficiency and range,
ASCMs are either subsonic or supersonic.
Supersonic weapons provide an advantage
by limiting the reaction time of anti-missile Entry control point
defences. Coupled with sea-skimming ight
proles intended to reduce radar detection, Empty TEL revetment
supersonic ASCMs represent potent anti- Battery garrison
shipping weapons.
Advanced strategic and tactical SAM 30N6E2 engagement radar
systems represent far more capable systems
than the extant Cold War-era systems em-
ployed by many countries. Advances in com-
puting power and radar technology combine
4 x 5P85TE2 transporter erector launchers
to provide modern SAM systems with the
capability to engage targets ranging from tra- Astrium imagery depicts a Chinese S-300PMU-2 strategic SAM complex of the 16th Battalion, 4th SAM
Brigade, near Longtian in the Nanjing Military Region. Strategic SAM imports helped jump-start Chinas
ditional combat aircraft to incoming missiles domestic missile industry, resulting in the HQ-9, an S-300P series equivalent, which was recently selected
and low observable targets such as aircraft by Turkey in favour of Russian and Western SAM systems. Image dated 27 January 2013.
CNES 2013, Distribution Astrium Services / Spot Image S.A./ IHS: 1486999
employing stealth technology. A modern,
long-range strategic SAM system such as the as evidenced by Hizbullahs 2006 operation. a country with a highly developed defence
S-300 serves as an airspace denial weapon, The impact of proliferation also often industry, access to those advanced systems
effectively limiting the options an adversary goes beyond an increase in military capa- often provides stepping stones for increasing
possesses during an engagement. bility. When military capability increases, domestic capability. The leading example of
The July 2006 attack on the INS Hanit the threat picture associated with the host this method of development is China.
highlights a proliferation issue made pos- country is altered, an action that typically Iran also represents an importer of both
sible by advances in technology. As weapon resonates throughout the associated region. Russian air defence missile systems and
systems gain increasingly higher levels of Prime examples of this are Iran and China. If Chinese ASCMs. Following the 198088 war
automation, the experience required for their a proliferator exports advanced systems to with Iraq, Iran reconstituted portions of its
effective operation can diminish drasti-
cally. This attack during the war in 2006 was
Kapustin Yar
undertaken by Hizbullah militants using a
suspected Chinese-made C-802 subsonic Kapustin Yar, situated in Russias south- checkout facility requires detailed analysis
ASCM sourced from Iran. The attack left four west region of Astrakhan, is home to the of overhead imagery and a thorough
crew members dead, but did not sink the 4th State Central Test Range, established knowledge of identiable system com-
vessel. The proliferation of modern ASCMs to in 1946 to begin testing captured Ger- ponents. High-resolution satellite im-
Iran made their transfer to Hizbullah, and the man missile systems and developmental agery provided to IHS Janes by Astrium
subsequent attack on the INS Hanit, possible. Russian designs. depicted S-125 Pechora-2M systems on
Future ASCM proliferation may result in Currently, the centre hosts development a checkout pad at Kapustin Yar on 7 June
additional opportunities for the transfer to and test work for strategic and tactical 2013. The Pechora-2M is a modication
and employment by non-state actors. The SAM systems, naval missile systems, of the Soviet-era Pechora SAM system
latest version of Russias Klub-K ASCM is of- cruise and ballistic missiles, and associ- intended for the export market, with recent
fered in a containerised variant, with system ated components. customers including Egypt and Venezuela.
components, operator stations, and launch The 4th State Central Test Range Kapustin Yar is not the only proliferation-
tubes concealed inside shipping containers. represents a signicant area of interest for related complex requiring monitoring, with
Such a concealment method potentially proliferation analysis, particularly in the others including system production sites,
makes the system much harder to track and case of strategic SAM systems. South of additional test ranges in Russia and China,
target, adding a signicant unknown to the the strategic SAM development complex and port facilities known to serve as
threat environment of a given region. With is a system checkout complex, where transhipment points for arms shipments.
computer-based control interfaces and high
complete systems undergo evaluation Monitoring and analysis of these facilities
degrees of automation, the transfer of such a before service entry or export. is critical to developing a full understand-
system to a non-state actor will not result in a Identication of export systems at the ing of the proliferation problem.
signicant reduction of system effectiveness, December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 51

048-053_JIR1312_F3_PP.indd 51 14/11/2013 14:20:19


Pechora-2M checkout pad and Greece do not enjoy close diplomatic

SNR-125M-2M target relations due to various ongoing disputes,
engagment radar including the Cyprus question. As Greece op-
erates the S-300PMU-1 and Patriot, Turkeys
EW radar checkout pad
selection of the FD-2000 possibly indicates
a desire to deploy a defensive system that is
unfamiliar to one of its potential adversaries.
According to international media reports, the
2 x 5P73-2M launchers
FD-2000 also represented a cheaper option
when compared with the other competitors.
staging area
Proliferation of advanced missile systems
does not necessarily represent a simple arms
checkout pads
sale. The capabilities these systems offer
their new owners can allow the seller to exert
a degree of inuence over a given region.
Following the sale of refurbished S-300PT
and S-300PS SAM batteries to Armenia in
2004 and 2010 respectively, Russia exported
the S-300PMU-2 to Azerbaijan in 2011. Arme-
Target launch complex
nia and Azerbaijan are in opposition concern-
64N6/91N6 checkout pad ing Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnic-Armenian
Astrium imagery depicts the SAM checkout complex at Kapustin Yars 4th Central Test Range near majority region located within Azerbaijans
Volgograd, Russia. The Pechora-2M checkout pad hosts components probably intended for proliferation to borders but held by Armenian forces since a
a foreign user as Russia does not operate the system. Image dated 7 June 2013.
CNES 2013, Distribution Astrium Services / Spot Image S.A./ IHS: 1487000
1994 treaty ended a bilateral conict. Neither
side enjoys a signicant qualitative military
military with Soviet/Russian arms, often key example is Chinas Shenyang J-11B, a advantage, although Azerbaijan has sought
gaining new capabilities as a result. domestically equipped version of the Sukhoi to redress this through greatly increased
While failing to import advanced Russian Su-27SK combat aircraft. Initially procur- defence expenditure over the past eight
strategic SAM systems due to the interna- ing Su-27SK ghters from Russia, followed years. Through the supply of advanced SAM
tional pressure exerted on Russia, Iran has by a licence production agreement, Chinas systems to Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia
succeeded in acquiring the Tor-M1E (SA-15 aviation industry obtained knowledge and was able to strengthen its diplomatic position
Gauntlet) low- to medium-altitude SAM previously unavailable technology, eventu- with both countries, while enabling each to
system. Currently emplaced around nuclear ally eliminating the need to keep importing deter the other from aerial encroachment.
and missile-related complexes, the Tor- or license-producing the Russian aircraft. The System mobility also allows for rapid rede-
M1E provides a credible, albeit limited, air same practice takes place within Chinas mis- ployment near Nagorno-Karabakh, deterring
defence, with the advertised ability to engage sile industry, where the HQ-9 strategic SAM either side from offensive aerial operations in
low-observable targets and precision guided system has been designed from Russian SAM the region.
munitions potentially preventing a limited technology imported in the 1990s.
strike on these facilities. The drawback to such activity from the Libya and Syria
More signicant are Iranian imports of proliferators standpoint is that, although Perhaps the most profound example of the
Chinas C-802 ASCM. Original imports of proliferation provides an immediate source impact of advanced missile proliferation is
the 120-km range C-802 ended during the of revenue, the end result can be a new found in the context of the ongoing Syrian
mid-1990s following international pressure, competitor on the market. This is illustrated conict. The effect of proliferation is also
forcing Iran to begin a reverse-engineering by Turkeys recent selection of the FD-2000, noted when comparing the differing Western
programme. The reverse-engineered weapon an HQ-9 export variant, as its next strategic approaches to the Libyan and Syrian crises.
system is known as the Noor. Initial efforts SAM system over the European SAMP/T, US The Libyan uprising began in early Febru-
proved technologically awed, achiev- Patriot, and a variant of the Russian S-300. ary 2011, with UNSCR 1973 backing Western
ing a range of only 30 km, but subsequent Continued competition between Chinese military intervention beginning that March.
upgrades provide the current iteration with a and Russian manufacturers represents a po- The Western goal the establishment of a
range of 170200 km, the latter applying to a tential proliferation problem; as contracts are no-y zone ostensibly to protect civilians
derivative referred to as Qader, designed for a negotiated and price terms debated, a result- from government forces targeting rebels
land-attack role. ant drop in price to secure a sale or a foothold necessitated the degradation of Libyan
Although China continues to import in a new market only serves to increase the air defences. Lacking modern air defence
advanced Russian weapon systems, it also proliferation of such systems. systems or ASCMs capable of threatening
expends signicant effort enhancing its
However, in the Turkish case, selection Western naval forces employed as cruise
own domestic military capabilities. Often of the FD-2000 may not relate entirely missile platforms, Libyan air defences fell
these developments build from experience to a cost-related advantage over the other rapidly. Before the conict, in 2010, Libya
with imported Russian weapon systems. A competitors. Ostensibly NATO allies, Turkey had sought to purchase Russian S-300PMU-2

52 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

048-053_JIR1312_F3_PP.indd 52 14/11/2013 14:20:35


strategic SAM systems as part of a large-scale the September 2007 attack on the Deir ez- systems that are fully compatible with
military upgrade, but it had failed to nalise a Zour nuclear complex. With China exerting international agreements has provided Syria
sale before the outbreak of hostilities. signicant efforts in cyber warfare, imported with the security to conduct its internal
The Syrian crisis began with anti-gov- sensors are potentially more robust in the affairs with a reduced chance of external
ernment protests in March 2011, escalating face of Israeli inltration efforts. intervention. Furthermore, the presence of
to a civil war one month later, with Syrian Russian proliferation to Syria consists of Syria as a signicant arms trade partner with
military forces launching offensives intended advanced SAM systems and modern ASCMs. Russia served to harden Russian resolve in
to suppress pockets of resistance. Although The Buk-M2E and S-125 Pechora-2M (SA-3 denying UN approval for offensive operations
international condemnation of the govern- Goa) SAM systems represent signicant intended to hinder the Assad government.
ment of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad capability increases over extant Soviet-era For the rest of the world, the lesson of the
quickly followed, Western efforts to establish systems, combining advanced sensors with Syrian example is clear: advanced SAM sys-
a no-y zone or gain approval for UN-sanc- high mobility. The Bastion coastal-defence tems and cruise missiles represent potential
tioned military action faltered. A number system employs the Yakhont ASCM, a su- deterrents to Western military interven-
of complex political and diplomatic factors personic, sea-skimming weapon designed to tion. The less advanced air defence networks
inuenced this lack of action. However, from defeat modern anti-missile countermeasures of Iraq, Libya, and Serbia failed to deter or
a military perspective, the lack of Western deployed by surface combatants. signicantly hamper offensive military
intervention in Syria is traced to two sides The result of Chinese and Russian prolif- operations against them. Syrias upgraded
of the proliferation argument: the presence eration to Syria is the presence of a far more network, coupled with the presence of
of advanced weapon systems in the Syrian robust offensive and defensive network than advanced ASCMs, remains untested outside
military, and the relationship between the previously faced by Western militaries. Its of limited Israeli cross-border operations, de-
proliferator and its client. presence presents one explanation for the spite the international outcry regarding the
As part of a programme to modify its age- perceived Western shift in attitude compared Assad governments alleged actions during
ing military, Syria ordered various military with Libya. The import of advanced ASCMs the present crisis.
systems from Russia and China between serves to limit Western targeting options It is therefore in calculations about the
2006 and 2010. Deliveries began in 2008 within Syria, forcing LACM-ring surface strategic balance of forces that the prolifera-
and continued into 2012, after the outbreak vessels to remain further offshore. Ad- tion of such systems is of notable interest to
of hostilities. ditionally, advanced SAM systems provide de- military planners. The relatively permissive
Chinese proliferation to Syria is limited to fensive capability against LACM strikes and cost of the systems means that even coun-
advanced air defence radar systems providing aerial incursions, with advanced EW sensors tries with relatively modest conventional
signicant increases in capability over extant providing indicators and target track data for military forces can potentially have access to
Soviet-era systems in service. Little men- older, less advanced weapon systems, increas- a force multiplier that will have a dispropor-
tion of Chinese radar sales to Syria is found ing their effectiveness as a result. tionately dissuasive effect against even the
in open sources, apart from a Stockholm In this case, the proliferation of weapon worlds most advanced militaries.
International Peace Research Institute refer-
ence to a Type 120 radar sale in 2009. The
Type 120 is a 2D early warning (EW) system
deployed with Chinese HQ-9 SAM batteries The continued proliferation of both ad- improvements to anti-proliferation agree-
as a battery-level asset. The presence of the vanced SAM systems and cruise missiles ments or greater attention to the issue in
Type 120 in Syria became known when rebel represents a destabilising inuence that is the UNSC, the threat will only increase.
forces captured the Dar Ta izzah EW complex capable of potentially limiting or deterring
northwest of Aleppo in June 2012, releasing military intervention in a given scenario, This article was first published online at
video and handheld images of the complex on as illustrated by Syria. As these weapon on 4 November 2013.
the internet. Located at three additional EW systems become more capable and more
complexes in Syria, the Type 120 is joined by survivable, their comparatively cheap price
the JYL-1 3D radar (one example co-located and substantial automation make them ex- XON THE WEB
with a Type 120 at the Kafr Buhum EW tremely sought after on the export market.
complex), and the JY-27 (Wide Mat) 2D radar, Currently, their proliferation and deploy- Collision course Israel and Hizbullah
located at two additional EW complexes in ment reaches into the potential tinderbox maintain readiness for war
central Syria. of the South China Sea. Vietnamese im- Military might China develops its
Advanced sensor presence provides the port of Russian SAMs and ASCMs stands strategic missile systems
Syrian EW network with modern systems with Chinese import and production of
End of an era The future of Russia-
enjoying more robust electronic counter- similar systems to create the potential for a
US arms control
measure characteristics, and in the case of destructive confrontation. With little to no
the JY-27, a legitimate counter-stealth detec- restriction on the export of these systems, Author
tion capability. Chinese sensor incorpora-
the arms race in the South China Sea Sean OConnor is an IHS imagery
tion possibly results from alleged network represents only the latest example of an
inltration by Israel, which rendered Syrias expanding proliferation problem. Without
Soviet-era sensor systems ineffective before December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 53

048-053_JIR1312_F3_PP.indd 53 14/11/2013 14:21:55


Suspicious smiles
Sino-Russian relations
Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev visited China in late October to hold
high-level talks and oversee a major new energy deal. Mark Galeotti reports on the
countries economic, political, and security relations, which appear to be blooming.

X KEY POINTS expanding bilateral trade from USD88 billion China and Russia have been conducting joint
in 2012 to USD100 billion by 2015. military exercises since 2005, but the scale has
Ties between Moscow and Beijing go The visit also marked the signing of two been steadily increasing.
beyond economics, and bear witness new energy deals. State-owned Rosneft, In mid-2013, Russian and Chinese troops
to increasingly close security and Russias largest oil producer, agreed to supply fought alongside each other in the Peace
political co-operation. Chinese rm Sinopec with 10 million tonnes Mission 2013 military exercises wargaming
Russia continues to have misgivings of crude oil a year over the next decade, worth combat scenarios against insurgents sup-
about Chinas growing economic around USD85 billion. Novatek, Russias ported by unspecic foreign forces. Even more
leverage, particularly in its oft- second-largest natural gas producer, has assertive were the July 2013 Joint Sea 2013
neglected Far East region and in concluded a 15-year deal to provide lique- naval exercises Chinas largest-ever exercise
Central Asia.
ed natural gas to China National Petroleum with a foreign partner in which one subma-
Divergent long-term aims mean Corporation (CNPC), Chinas largest oil and rine and 18 surface vessels were deployed into
that the current pragmatic alliance gas company. Combined with a USD270 bil- the Sea of Japan, including Russias Pacic
between Russia and China is not a lion, 25-year deal signed between Rosneft and eet agship, the Slava-class cruiser Varyag.
relationship that can last indenitely. CNPC in June, this makes China the largest The joint forces staged a simulated boarding
hydrocarbons market for Russia. of a pirate vessel and tested tactics to defend

fter Russian prime minister Dmitry themselves against air and underwater attacks
Medvedev returned from Beijing Beyond economic from an enemy closely resembling the US
and his latest meeting with Chinese This is not purely an economic relationship. Navy. This follows Februarys simulated cruise
president Xi Jinping the fth since 2008, One of the bases of recent closer co-ordination missile attacks by Russian Tupolev Tu-22M
when the last outstanding border disputes between Beijing and Moscow has been their Backre long-range strategic bombers on
between the two countries were resolved he shared determination to constrain what a US Aegis-equipped cruiser deployed near
reiterated what has been a common assertion they regard as US efforts to shape the global Japan and a ground-based US missile defence
in recent years: that relations between the agenda. This was clearly behind Xis asser- site in Japan. It also comes after the decision
two countries have never been so cordial. The tion that both countries should continue to to deploy a new Project 18280-class electronic
two leaders last met in March, when Xi went enhance strategic co-ordination, maintain intelligence ship, the Yuri Ivanov, of the mili-
to Moscow on his rst foreign visit, just eight the authority of the United Nations and its tary Main Intelligence Directorate (Glavnoye
days after he became Chinese leader. Moscow Security Council, and safeguard the purposes Razvedovatelnoye Upravlenie: GRU). This will
has repeatedly compared this with United and principles of the UN Charter and the basic begin service in the Pacic in 2014.
States president Barack Obamas failure to norms governing international relations in a Taken together, these examples of co-
arrange an early summit after his own inau- bid to jointly promote world peace, stability operation certainly seem to show an impres-
guration. After the March meeting, Russian and development. sively close relationship. It is one that has
president Vladimir Putin hailed relations Such an attitude is not symptomatic of encouraged Putin to be more confrontational
between China and Russia as being the best Chinese and Russian reverence towards the in his dealing with Washington. His willing-
in their history. UN. Rather, Moscow and Beijing juxtapose ness to take a strong line against intervention
There is some truth in these upbeat as- their outlook with what they perceive as US in Syria, for example, was undoubtedly in part
sessments. China is hungry for energy and willingness to act unilaterally. because of Chinas open backing.
resources to fuel its continued development, These closer ties are also visible in security
while Russia nervously watching its own co-operation. Under the terms of a major arms Beneath the surface
attening economic growth rates is desper-
deal concluded in March, Russia is selling It is an interesting sign of Russian attitudes to-
ate for exports. Consequently, the economic China 24 Sukhoi Su-35 multirole combat air- wards China that Medvedev used a television
foundations for closer ties are strong. The craft, while joint production will begin on four interview on his return home to encourage
two countries have committed themselves to Lada-class diesel-electric attack submarines. people not to fear China and its rapid growth.

54 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

054-055_JIR1312_F2_CW.indd 54 14/11/2013 14:22:53


Reading between the lines, his efforts to

convince viewers that China could be
Moscows strategic partner with whom
co-operation was indispensible may hint
at misgivings within the Russian leadership
about the relationship.
In part, these are fears based on the widen-
ing economic and demographic gap between
the two countries. There are fears in Russia,
based only partly on realities on the ground,
that Beijing will become dominant in the Rus-
sian Far East, given the steady drift of Chinese
investment and migrants into the under-
populated and under-capitalised region. This
has been exacerbated by oods since mid-2013
in the Russian Far East that were badly and
belatedly handled by the government. Two Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev (right) with
criminal cases were opened in late September Chinese premier Li Keqiang as he arrives for a state
visit in Beijing, China, on 22 October 2013. The two
against local officials for alleged negligence in
leaders held high-level talks. PA: 1515436
the disaster response.
Medvedev has pledged RUB40 billion
(USD1.26 billion) in aid to the region, as well economic strength and that time is on its side. unspoken reason behind efforts to bolster
as a long-term plan to encourage businesses It has shown that although it is happy to buy Russian forces in the Far East.
to move there and to stimulate much-needed Russian oil and gas, it has continued to stall The Russian Pacic Fleet is to get new ships,
investment in infrastructure. However, this on one of Russias greatest goals: a long-term including a Mistral-class amphibious assault
seems to have done little to reassure local deal to sell natural gas to China through a ship, Steregushchiy-class corvettes, and a
elites that Moscow is genuinely committed to dedicated pipeline. Borey-class ballistic missile submarine. Land
developing the region. Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom forces in the theatre are also being upgraded,
In the absence of such reassurance, the sent a sizeable delegation to Beijing with and a major exercise in July was implicitly
money owing in from China, as well as the Medvedev but, once again, left empty-handed. geared towards assessing how well they could
substantial opportunities in both legal and China is aware that new producers above be mobilised against a threat from the south.
illegal business across the border (especially all the US will soon be entering the market, In short, at present, Beijing and Moscow
the export of timber) ensure that the Beijing and as a result it is unwilling to lock itself into are successfully managing an asymmetric
connection is a powerful one. In 2010-11, for a xed price. Russia, meanwhile, is worried relationship. However, they still have very
example, Moscow allocated only around USD1 about the shape of the market in the future, different long-term aspirations. Russia appears
billion in federal support for the Russian Far and the risk it may pose to its present stake in to regard China as a pragmatic ally for now,
East, but investment from China totalled Europe, and is therefore keen to buttress its but a rival in geo-strategic terms in the future.
around USD3 billion. position in China. China considers Russia a convenient supplier
Beijing and Moscow are also engaged in and investment opportunity, but a waning
power plays over Central Asia. Of all the coun- Outlook power. This is not a relationship that can last
tries of the region, only Uzbekistan trades While Moscow is parading its friendship with indenitely in its present form.
more with Russia than China does. In Septem- Beijing, it continues to regard China as the
ber 2013, Xi toured Central Asia, consolidating most serious long-term threat to its territo- This article was first published online at
Chinas position with almost USD100 billion rial integrity and its hegemonic position over on 31 October 2012.
in deals for Turkmen gas, Kazakh oil, an Uzbek Eurasia. Yet Russia has very few options at its
gas pipeline, and investment in Kyrgyzstan. disposal. It needs Chinese support in order to X ON THE WEB
Russian deputy minister of foreign affairs resist what it sees as Washingtons unipolar
Igor Morgulov appeared sanguine, saying that ambitions in the world, and it has to sell its United at sea China and Russia
Central Asia is an important area of Russia- latest weaponry to China for diplomatic and demonstrate naval capabilities
China relations in which the countries are economic reasons, even though it knows the Russian evolution The modernisation
not competing with each otherbut adjusting Chinese will immediately seek to reverse- of strategic capabilities
[their] policies to reect mutual interests. engineer, copy, and export the materiel.
However, one source in the Russian Ministry There is still a deep-seated suspicion of
Dr Mark Galeotti is Professor of Global
of Foreign Affairs told IHS Janes that he feels China in Russias political leadership, and an
China is increasingly trying to buy Central
assumption that some day the relationship
Affairs at New York Universitys SCPS
Center for Global Affairs.
Asia from under [Russia]. will sour. This helps to explain why the inux
These grounds for suspicion matter far more of money and migrants across the border
to Moscow than Beijing. China is aware of its is treated as a strategic issue, and is also an December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 55

054-055_JIR1312_F2_CW.indd 55 14/11/2013 14:22:54


Marking territory
Baku-Supsa pipeline charts conictive course
As a borderisation process takes place in northern Georgia, the potential for conict
between Moscow and Tbilisi has risen. Mamuka Tsereteli examines the impact this
will have on a section of oil pipeline that passes briey through a disputed region.

X KEY POINTS of the region who need to trade, cultivate it remained unclear whether this was a perma-
land, or cross the separation line for medical, nent or temporary cessation of the activities.
A small section of the Baku-Supsa educational, or other humanitarian reasons.
oil pipeline passes through Russian- As a result, a major depopulation process is Pipeline dilemma
supported separatist territory in underway in the region, with native Georgians This process also creates other problems. As
northern Georgia, where a process leaving for other areas of Georgia and Osse- a result of the 2008 war, a 1.4 kilometre sec-
of borderisation has raised tensions
tians moving to the Russian republic of North tion of the Western Route Export Pipeline
between Moscow and Tbilisi.
Ossetia, which borders Georgia in the north. (WREP), also known as the Baku-Supsa oil
The demarcation of controlled territory Russia, meanwhile, claims that it is follow- pipeline, passes through an area controlled by
in the region does not have a direct ing a 2009 intergovernmental agreement with separatists and Russian troops around the vil-
physical impact on the pipeline in the
South Ossetia, which delegates the protection lage of Karapila. The 829 km-long Baku-Supsa
short term, but could change the risk
of South Ossetian borders to Russian border pipeline begins at the Sangachal Terminal near
prole in the longer term.
guards. Russian deputy minister of foreign the Azerbaijani capital Baku, and then passes
Even if the internal situation in affairs Grigory Karasin declared in June that through Georgia to the Supsa Terminal on the
Georgia were to deteriorate or South Ossetia and Abkhazia had the right to western Georgian Black Sea coast.
security problems were to increase
take such measures because any country According to IHS World Markets Energy,
in the restive North Caucasus region,
Russia would remain constrained must move to control its territory and ensure Azerbaijan has three pipelines transporting
in its actions by its dependence on the security of its borders and its citizens. crude oil to customers: the Baku-Tbilisi-
European energy markets. Georgian authorities and the international Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, a northern route from
community have condemned the activities of Baku to Novorossiisk on Russias Black Sea
Russian forces in the region. EU High Repre- coast, and the Baku-Supsa pipeline. The major-

ince the Russia-Georgia conict of sentative for Foreign Affairs and Security Poli- ity of oil produced in Azerbaijan is exported as
August 2008, the Russian military cy Catherine Ashton on 1 October 2013 called crude oil, predominantly via the BTC pipeline.
has deployed to two separatist regions for the barriers to be removed and expressed The Baku-Supsa pipeline which began op-
of Georgia. On 17 September 2013, Russian profound concern over the continued and erations in 1999, initially serving as the main
troops based in the breakaway region of South increasing activities by Russian security forces export outlet for Azerbaijan International
Ossetia began erecting barbed-wire fencing to erect fences and other obstacles along ad- Operating Companys (AIOC) early oil output
alongside administrative borders separating ministrative boundary lines in Georgia. Such lost its export primacy to the BTC once the
the region from the rest of Georgia. activities which contravene Georgias terri- latter became operational in 2006. Neverthe-
The region is considered by the United Na- torial integrity create signicant hardship for less, exports via the Baku-Supsa pipeline stood
tions to be part of Georgia, while Russia and residents on either side of the administrative at 2.74 million tonnes in 2012.
the Ossetians living in the region consider it boundary lines and seriously challenge stabil- BP Georgia, which manages the pipeline on
to be an independent state of South Ossetia, ity and security in these regions. Georgian territory, had to suspend right-of-
which was itself brought denitively under This EU statement was echoed by the US way patrolling activity along the section of the
separatist control along with Abkhazia in Department of State, and NATO secretary- pipeline that passes through separatist-con-
the 2008 conict. general Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who said trolled territory. In May 2013, Russian military
According to the de facto South Ossetian the fence-building does not contribute to a forces and the South Ossetian de facto govern-
authorities, the new boundary follows the peaceful resolution of the conict. He also ment began demarcation of the administrative
administrative borderline between Georgia called on Russia to reverse its recognition border in the area through which the pipeline
and the so-called South Ossetia Autonomous
of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of passes. This activity has since ceased.
Region created by the Soviet authorities in the Georgia as independent states. The actual demarcation of the border in this
1920s. This borderisation process restricts By the end of October, the process of area may not have a direct physical impact for
movement for ethnic Georgian and Ossetians erecting barbed-wire fences had stopped, but the WREP, but could change the risk prole

56 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

056-057_JIR1312_F12_RW.indd 56 14/11/2013 14:23:18


in the longer term. Although BP Georgia has Baku-Supsa oil pipeline

no physical surface access to this short section
of the pipe, it has pipe integrity monitoring
capability through intelligent pigs (clean- RUSSIA

ing and inspection devices) that can monitor Abkhazia

anomalies in the system such as metal loss North Ossetia
through corrosion or illegal hot-tapping. Fur-
thermore, there are no overground facilities in
this section of the WREP, which reduces the
South Ossetia
overall risk prole of this section.
As a sustainable solution for safe access to Karapila
the right of way, sponsors are considering Supsa
re-routing this section of pipeline outside GEORGIA
the South Ossetia administrative border.
This would be included within the scope of
the WREP Sectional Replacement Project, Baku-Supsa oil
and would eliminate the incremental risks
associated with the lack of access to the right oil pipeline
of way because of any conict. Currently, any Separatist
response activities taking place within this Georgian region
disputed territory would require diplomatic TURKEY
support from the government of Georgia and
most likely the international community. Yerevan

0 80 km
Georgia is the only neighbouring state of 2013 IHS: 1487003 Note: Boundaries and course of pipeline are indicative only and imply no jurisdictional recognition
Russia that has fought a military conict
with Moscow since the collapse of the Soviet smooth functioning of the energy transit Georgia nevertheless remains aware that
Union. The fundamental reason behind the infrastructure in Georgia in the immediate a key element of its strategy is close engage-
Russia-Georgia conict was Georgias strategic future. Russia, for the time being, is not inter- ment and the concerted management of
desire to join the Euro-Atlantic security and ested in direct confrontation with the West. its relationships with the European Union,
economic space, while Russias objective was However, in the longer term, Russian ac- Russia, and the US. Russia greatly depends on
to prevent a sizeable Western military and tions will depend on internal dynamics within European energy markets, and maintaining its
security presence in the former Soviet space. the country, as well as the pace of Georgias European energy market share against the
For Russia, the conict was an opportunity NATO integration process. If the internal po- backdrop of a growing supply potential from
to demonstrate that former Soviet territory litical and economic situation remains stable, other regions of the world is a decisive driver
remained its strategic domain. The outbreak Russia will continue to avoid confrontation for its actions. That could therefore serve
of armed hostilities signalled to the entire with the West, and there will be no threat to as a key balancing factor for Tbilisis future
world including Russias other neighbours, transit infrastructure crossing Georgia. dealings with Russia.
Western powers, and most importantly, the Under this scenario, Russia would calculate
United States that Moscow was not ready to that it is in Russian security interests in the This article was first published online at
see that sphere of inuence diminish. North Caucasus region, which is beset by an on 14 November 2013.
Russia also wanted to avoid provoking insurgency, to have a strong and stable Geor-
any confrontation with the West in 2008. gia on its southern borders. Such an approach
Russia attacked military airports elsewhere in should lead to greater security for the transit X ON THE WEB
Georgia, the naval base at Poti, and the radar infrastructure in Georgia.
system in Tbilisi, but did not target pipelines, However, if the internal situation in Georgia Reform challenges ahead for new
Georgian Dream government
pumping stations, or any other major com- were to deteriorate due to negative political
mercial assets in Georgia. This approach was and economic developments, complemented Armed clashes on Russian-Georgian
designed to deliberately avoid direct confron- by security problems in the restive North Cau- border kill 14 as Tbilisi cracks down
tation with European countries, Turkey, and casus region, Russian actions could become on instability
the US, all of which had vested interests in the more unpredictable. Rebuffing Russias strate- Author
operation of the major transit infrastructure in gic designs would be risky for its neighbours, Mamuka Tsereteli is Director of Research
Georgia. Indeed, this infrastructure served as a including Georgia, but Tbilisi would probably at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of
partial security deterrent for Georgia in 2008.
adopt a hedging strategy in this eventuality, Advanced International Studies at Johns
Following Russias logic of 2008, it is which would include strengthening its territo- Hopkins University.
unlikely that Russian military or security rial defences, substantially increasing the cost
forces will seek to cause any problem for the for Russian intervention. December 2013 Janes Intelligence Review | 57

056-057_JIR1312_F12_RW.indd 57 14/11/2013 14:23:18


NAME Bernd Borchardt

POSITION Head of the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)

BACKGROUND The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Its efforts were tested on 3 November when
Kosovo (EULEX) became fully operational in the rst municipal elections were held under
April 2009. It has a total of 2,250 staff, and an Kosovo law in the north, triggering violence
annual budget of EUR111 million (USD148.8 at polling stations that forced police and elec-
million), with which it carries out monitoring tion observers to ee. Bernd Borchardt took
and executive functions. These focus particu- over as EULEX head in February 2013, having
larly on countering corruption, investigating previously served as German ambassador to
war crimes, and establishing the rule of law in Albania and deputy head of the Organization
the Serb-majority enclave of North Kosovo, for Security and Cooperation in Europes
PA: 1515081

which has been effectively cut off from the Verication Mission in Kosovo, investigating
rest of the country since the 199899 war. human rights violations.

iven the emotional load on this frustration which has to do with unreal- time in September. The easier cases are
these elections, overall I con- istic expectations, he said, adding that there those with material proof wire-tapping,
sider them to be a remarkable is no proof that EULEX has refused to carry computer forensics, said Borchardt. When
success story for Kosovo, Bernd Borchardt out investigations where there was evidence. you have to rely on witnesses who have often
told IHS Janes. There were 18 people ar- He commented, If someone came up and been very traumatised, then its hard to come
rested for fraud and intimidation attempts in said you didnt arrest Mr X even though you to a conclusion where everyone thinks its a
the whole of the country but real problems in have perfect proof, then this is something I good verdict.
only two polling stations in the north. could deal with. I havent received any calls Borchardt says much of the missions most
Borchardt visited the north of Mitrovica from [the European Union in] Brussels to vital work is less headline-grabbing, such as
the largest town in North Kosovo, where the stop any investigations. returning property stolen during the war (for
attacks took place just a few days before the Nonetheless, the outgoing deputy head of which all 40,000 cases are due to be conclud-
poll. He blames the breakdown in security on EULEX, Andy Sparkes, stated in an interview ed by mid-2014), and establishing a digitised
a simple lack of manpower. Each polling sta- with the Balkans Investigative Reporting population register (due by March). A lot
tion had between two and six police officers Network in January, There are occasions of these things are not so visible, but for the
stationed outside not enough to prevent an when [stability] can sit very uneasily with the day-to-day lives of the public they are hugely
attack by a gang of 30 men, as occurred in the requirements of the rule of law. important, he said. Another major focus has
two largest stations in northern Mitrovica. Borchardt says he has taken steps to been nding and returning the remains of
There are extremely limited resources. We improve action against corruption, hiring a 355 victims from the war, using aerial pho-
feel recruitment is too slow every time I former Transparency International officer tography from before and after the conict to
meet them, my Kosovo Police colleagues ask and identifying gaps in Kosovos anti- identify grave sites, and carrying out joint ex-
when they will get reinforcements, he said. corruption system. Rome wasnt built in a cavations with Serbian authorities. Borchardt
The reason is that the integration of the for- day, he said, accepting that EULEX raised said, There are still 1,700 cases open and this
mer parallel police has not yet taken place. expectations too high when it rst arrived. I is still very important for the families.
Under an EU-brokered agreement to strongly believe that we have to do more PR
normalise relations between Kosovo and [to show how effective EULEX has been]. This article was first published online at
Serbia signed in April, Serbia has agreed to Nonetheless, he believes EULEX can be on 12 November 2013.
dismantle the parallel security structures in proud of its achievements so far, with 430
North Kosovo that it has funded since the cases adjudicated, including many against
end of the war in 1999. Many of those officers high-ranking politicians and business gures,
are reluctant to operate within Pristina-run and 240 more ongoing. Among its more
Dissenting vote Kosovo prepares for
institutions, and so far there have been very notable successes was the conviction of an its rst elections
few applications to transfer. There is not yet organ-trafficking gang in May. We feel it has
agreement on the process of that integration. questioned this feeling of impunity that is Radical route Salasm in the
We expect applications once that process is prevalent in parts of the population.
completed, said Borchardt. War crimes trials have been more problem- Author
He admits that EULEX faces frequent atic. Fatmir Limaj, a senior member of the Eric Randolph is a freelance analyst
criticism in Kosovo for its perceived failure to
ruling Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia who was based in Kosovo during the 3
take effective action against government cor- Demokratike e Kosovs: PDK) and a former November elections.
ruption and war crimes. On a regular basis, Kosovo Liberation Army commander, was
when I meet Kosovo friends, I am met with acquitted of war crimes charges for the third

58 | Janes Intelligence Review December 2013

058_JIR1312_F10_INT.indd 58 14/11/2013 14:23:40

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