REVISED CIRCULAR NO.

1-91
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, ALL MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT
PROSECUTION SERVICE, AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

SUBJECT: Rules Governing appeals to the Court of Appeals from Judgment or Final Orders
of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies.

1.SCOPE. These rules shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of
Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any
quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the
Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Office of the President,
Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National
Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act 6657, Government Service
Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board,
Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, and
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission.

2.CASES NOT COVERED. These rules shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued
under the Labor Code of the Philippines.

3.WHERE TO APPEAL. An appeal under these rules may be taken to the Court of Appeals
within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

4.PERIOD OF APPEAL. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
award, judgment, final order or resolution or from the date of its last publication, if publication is
required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only
one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the
full a mount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of
Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition
for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in
no case to exceed another period of fifteen (15) days.
5.HOW APPEAL TAKEN. Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in
seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the
adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the
Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner.

Upon filing the petition for review, the petitioner shall pay to the Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs.
Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be
granted by the Court of Appeals upon verified motion setting forth the grounds relied upon. If
the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful
fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial.

6.CONTENTS OF THE PETITION. The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of
the parties to the case, without impleading the courts or agencies either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds
relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified
true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified
true copies of such material portions of the record as are referred to therein and other supporting
papers; and (d) state all the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the
reglementary period provided herein; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum
shopping as required in Revised Circular No. 28-91.

7.EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS. The failure of the

petitioner to comply with the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and
other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and
the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient grounds for the dismissal
thereof.

8.ACTION ON THE PETITION. The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to file a
comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. The Court,
however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.

9.CONTENTS OF COMMENT. The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice
in seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by clearly legible certified true copies of such
material portions of the record referred to therein together with other supporting papers. It shall
point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioner's statement of facts and issues, and state the
reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be served on the
petitioner, and proof of such service shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.

10.DUE COURSE. If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings or documents as
may be required or allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of period for the
filing thereof, and on the bases of the petition or the record the Court of Appeals finds prima
facie that the court or agencies concerned has committed errors of fact or law that would warrant
reversal or modification of the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed,
it may give due course to the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The findings of fact of
the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the
Court of Appeals.
11.TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD. Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has
been given due course, the Court of Appeals may re-quire the court or agency concerned to
transmit the original or a legible certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under
review. The record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the
proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or permit subsequent correction of or addition to
the record.

12.EFFECT OF APPEAL. The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such
terms as it may deem just.

13.SUBMISSION FOR DECISION. If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals
may set the case for oral argument or require the parties to submit memoranda within a period of
fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of
the last pleading or memorandum required by these rules or by the Court itself.

14.TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. All petitions for certiorari against the Civil Service
Commission and The Central Board of Assessment Appeals filed and pending in the Supreme
Court prior to the effectivity of this Revised Administrative Circular shall be treated as petitions
for review hereunder and shall be transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition.
Petitions for certiorari against the aforesaid agencies which may be filed after the effectivity
hereof and up to June 30, 1995 shall likewise be considered as petitions for review and shall be
referred to the Court of Appeals for the same purpose.

In both instances, for purposes of the period of appeal contemplated in Section 4 hereof, the date
of receipt by the Court of Appeals of the petitions thus transferred or referred to it shall be
considered as the date of the filing thereof as petitions for review, and the Court of Appeals may
require the filing of amended or supplemental pleadings and the submission of such further
documents or records as it may deem necessary in view of and consequent to the change in the
mode of appellate review.

15.REPEALING CLAUSE. Rules 43 and 44 of the Rules of Court are hereby repealed and
superseded by this Circular.

16.EFFECTIVITY. This Circular shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general

circulation and shall take effect on June 1, 1995.

Aruelo, Jr. v CA
227 SCRA 311
October 20, 1993
Facts:
Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates in the May 11, 1992 elections for the office
of the Vice- Mayor of the Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan. Gatchalian won over
Aruelo by a margin of four votes, such that on May 13, 1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed him as the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan.
On May 22, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition
docketed as SPC No. 92-130, seeking to annul Gatchalian's proclamation on the ground of
"fraudulent alteration and tampering" of votes in the tally sheets and the election returns.
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is
in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated
bar, and legal assistance to the under- privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service
Law.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion by declaring that
Gatchalians answer with counter- protest and counterclaim was timely filed
Held:
We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE,
the petition is hereby DISMISSED. An election protest does not merely concern the personal
interests of rival candidates for an office. Over and above the desire of the candidates to win, is
the deep public interest to determine the true choice of the people. For this reason, it is a well-
established principle that laws governing election protests must be liberally construed to the end
that the popular will, ex pressed in the election of public officers, will not, by purely technical
reasons, be defeated.

Mateo v. CA
G.R. No. 113219 August 14, 1995
Facts:
Board Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private respondent Edgar
Sta. Maria, then General Manager, upon a complaint of some members.
On December 13, 1992, private respondent was placed under preventive suspension. He
was later dismissed on January 7, 1993. On January 18, 1993, private respondent filed a Special
Civil Action for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction 2 before the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 78, challenging his dismissal by petitioners.
Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has jurisdiction over a case involving
dismissal of an employee of Morong Water District, a quasi-public corporation?
Held:
No. MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 198, known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. Employees of
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of
the Civil Service Commission. Indeed, the hiring and firing of employees of government-own
and controlled corporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules
and Regulations. Presidential Decree No. 807, Executive Order No. 292, and Rule II section 1 of
Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out the
initial remedy of private respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the
party aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving
termination of services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter,
private respondent could go on certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the Civil Service Commission.

Lopez v Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 92140 February 19, 1991
Facts:
Petitioner Lopez, along with private respondent Romeo V. Luz, Jr. and Roberto
Abellana, was appointed as Assistant Harbor Master at Manila International Container Terminal,
Manila South Harbor and Manila North Harbor, respectively. A law was passed wherein the
DOTC was reorganized, and the number of Assistant Harbor Master in the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA) was reduced from (3) three to (2) two. After a careful evaluation of a placement
committee of the PPA, Luz was rated third. Luz protested/appealed the appointment of Lopez,
but the PPA General Manager said Luz was not qualified for the two slots. Luz then appealed to
the CSC. The CSC ordered for a re-assessment which the PPA complied. Still, the CSC found
that the re-assessment was not in order. It ruled that the immediate supervisor of respondent Luz
was in the best position to assess the competence of the respondent and not a psychiatric-
consultant who was merely a contractual employee and susceptible to partiality. It directed the
appointment of Luz as the Harbor Master instead of the petitioner Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CSC erred in nullifying Lopezappointment and instead substituting
its decision for that of the PPA.
Held:
The role of the Civil Service Commission in establishing a career service and in
promoting the morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and courtesy among civil servants is
not disputed by petitioner Lopez. On the other hand, the discretionary power of appointment
delegated to the heads of departments or agencies of the government is not controverted by the
respondents. In the appointment, placement and promotion of civil service employees according
to merit and fitness, it is the appointing power, especially where it is assisted by a screening
committee composed of persons who are in the best position to screen the qualifications of the
nominees, who should decide on the integrity, performance and capabilities of the future
appointees. The law limits the Commission's authority only to whether or not the appointees
possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing else. To go
beyond this would be to set at naught the discretionary power of the appointing authority and to
give to the Commission a task which the law (Sec. 6, Rep. Act No. 6656) does not confer. This
does not mean that the Commission's act of approving or disapproving becomes ministerial. The
Court has defined the parameters within which the power of approval of appointments shall be
exercised by the respondent Commission. The Commission cannot exceed its power by
substituting its will for that of the appointing authority. Petition is GRANTED.

Mamerto Sevilla v Comelec

March 19, 2013
The Facts
Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Sucat,
Muntinlupa City during the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
On October 26, 2010, the Board of Election Tellers proclaimed Sevilla as the winner with a total
of 7,354 votes or a winning margin of 628 votes over Sos 6,726 total votes. On November 4,
2010, So filed an election protest with the MeTC on the ground that Sevilla committed
electoral fraud, anomalies and irregularities in all the protested precincts. So pinpointed twenty
percent (20%) of the total number of the protested precincts. He also prayed for a manual
revision of the ballots. In response, So filed a petition for certiorari on May 31, 2011 with the
Comelec, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Judge. So faults the MeTC
for its non-observance of the rule that in the appreciation of ballots, there should be a clear and
distinct presentation of the specific details of how and why a certain group of ballots should be
considered as having been written by one or two persons.
Held:
We resolve to DISMISS the petition for having been prematurely filed with this Court,
and remand the case to the COMELEC for its appropriate action.The October 6, 2012 Comelec
en bancs Resolution lacks legal effect as it is not a majority decision required by the
Constitution and by the Comelec Rules of Procedure Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution
requires that each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members, any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the Comelec provided in Section 5(a), Rule
3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure the votes required for the pronouncement of a decision,
resolution, order or ruling when the Comelec sits en banc, viz.: Section 5. Quorum; Votes
Required. - (a) When sitting en banc, four (4) Members of the Commission shall constitute a
quorum for the purpose of transacting business. The concurrence of a majority of the Members
of the Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or
ruling.
PAGCOR V RILLOROZA
June 5, 2001
Facts:

During his shift of 6:00 a.m.2:00 p.m. on October 9, 1997, four personal checks with
a total value of Pesos: Five Million were issued by a small-time financier/player and were
facilitated by a COM with the Treasury Division which enabled the small-time
financier/player to withdraw and receive said amount. The facilitation of the checks was not
authorized by the Senior Branch Manager or the Branch Manager for Operations and the
COM who facilitated the checks was not on duty then. He even facilitated one of the
personal checks with a value of Pesos: Five Hundred Thousand. He failed to stop a top-
ranking officer from placing bets over and above the allowable limit of P5, 000.00 per deal,
he failed to stop the same officer from playing in the big tables and lastly, he allowed the
same officer to play beyond the allowable time limit of 6:00 a.m.
Issue:
Whether or not COURT OF APPEALS gravely erred when it failed and refused to
consider that respondent was a confidential appointee or employee whose term had expired
by reason of loss of confidence.
Held:
In the case at bar, we basically asked to determine if there is sufficient cause to
warrant the dismissal, not merely the suspension, of respondent who, petitioner maintains,
occupies a primarily confidential position. All positions in the Corporation, whether
technical, administrative, professional or managerial are exempt from the provisions of the
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and shall be governed only by the personnel
management policies set by the Board of Directors. All employees of the casinos and
related services shall be classified as confidential appointee. Such would not amount to a
removal but only the expiration of his term. However, there should be no lingering doubt as
to the true import of said Section 16 of P.D. No. 1869.

CSC, Anicia De Lima v Larry Alfonso

June 11, 2009
Facts:
Larry M. Alfonso is the Director of the Human Resources Management Department of
PUP. On July 6, 2006, Dr. Zenaida Pia, Professor IV in PUP-Sta. Mesa, and Dindo Emmanuel
Bautista, President of Unyon ng mga Kawani sa PUP, jointly filed an Affidavit-Complaint
against Alfonso for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 6713, charging the latter with grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Service, and violation of Civil Service
Law, rules and regulations. The affidavit-complaint was lodged before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). In their affidavit, Dr. Pia and Bautista alleged, among others, that
respondent repeatedly abused his authority as head of PUPs personnel department when the latter
prepared and included his name in Special Order Nos. 0960 and 1004 for overnight services,
ostensibly authorizing him to work for 24 hours straight from May 16 to 20, May 22 to 27 and
May 29 to June 2, 2006. As a result thereof, Alfonso made considerable earnings for allegedly
working in humanly impossible conditions 24 hours straight daily, for three consecutive weeks.

Held:
 Respondent was charged with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. A person charged with grave misconduct is put on notice that he stands
accused of misconduct coupled with any of the elements of corruption or willful intent to violate
the law or established rules.

Meanwhile, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is classified as a grave
offense with a corresponding penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1)
year for the first offense, and the penalty of dismissal for the second offense.

In addition to the charges against Alfonso, and equally relevant, is the opportunity
available to him to use his position as Director of the Human Resources Management
Department of the university to exert undue influence or pressure on the potential witnesses that
the complainants may produce, or to tamper with the documentary evidence that may be used
against him. Preventive suspension is, therefore, necessary so that respondents delicate yet
powerful position in the university may not be used to compromise the integrity and impartiality
of the entire proceedings.

Navarro v CSC
226 SCRA 522

Facts:
Cable drums worth P21,250.00 owned by Takaoka Engineering Construction Co., Ltd.,
were stolen from the Ford Stockyard inside the Bataan Export Processing Zone in Bataan. One
suspect in the heist, petitioner Mario A. Navarro, then a Police Officer of respondent Export
Processing Zone Authority at Bataan Export, was administratively charged with grave
misconduct. Upon recommendation of Bataan Export Local Board of Inquiry, Discipline and
Promotion finding him guilty as charged the Senior Deputy Administrator of Export Processing
zone, with the approval of the Administrator, issued on 18 October 1990 an Order terminating
the services of Navarro.

Issue:
Navarro claims that respondent CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in relying in part on the sworn statement of Rolando Lapitan which
was totally rejected by the Regional Trial Court of Bataan for having been taken in violation of
the constitutional rights of the accused.

Held:
It is clear that both public respondents acted without jurisdiction Export processing zone
authority, for appealing Merit System Protection Boards decision exonerating Navarro from the
administrative charge and CSC, for taking cognizance of, and deciding, the appeal the
issuance of the writ of certiorari is inevitable. The complainant is not the party adversely affected
by the decision so that she has no legal personality to interpose an appeal to the Civil Service
Commission. In an administrative case, the complainant is a mere witness. The phrase "party
adversely affected by the decision" refers to the government employee against whom the
administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of
suspension, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office. In the instant
case, Coloyan who filed the appeal cannot be considered an aggrieved party because he is not the
respondent in the administrative case below.

Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113,
September 3, 1991
Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission
on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engagedin the practice of law
for at least ten years.On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of
office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the
validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and theconsequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Issue:
Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1),
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution?

Held:
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that there shall be a
Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in
the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. At this point, it might be helpful to
define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization
engaged in the business of delivering legal services." Lawyers who practice alone are often
called" sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a
partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of
the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced
salaried attorneys called "associates. Hence, the Commission on the basis of evidence submitted
doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the
necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Art. VIII, Sec.
1 Constitution. Only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the
exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion,
that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs
prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Brillantes vs. Yorac

G.R. 93867, 18 December 1990
Facts:
 In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact
finding commission which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate
his chairmanship of the COMELEC. Yorac was temporarily placed as his substitute. Brillantes
then questioned such appointment urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution in no case
shall any member of the COMELEC be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity. Brillantes claimed that the choice of the acting chairman should not be appointed for
such is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the
intrusion of the president violates the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional
commission.

Issue:
Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional
independence of the COMELEC.

Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially
executive in nature, they are not under the control of the president in the discharge of their
functions. The designation made by the president has dubious justification as it was merely
grounded on the quote administrative expediency to present the functions of the COMELEC.
Aside from such justification, it found no basis on existing rules on statutes. Yoracs designation
is not valid and unconstitutional.

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 207264,

Facts:
The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction resolution of the Commission on Election
ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the
Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who is proclaimed as
winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of
Representative of Marinduque.
Held:
 Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only
after the candidate is considered a member of the House of representativews, as stated in section
17, Article VI of the Constitution. for one to be considered a member of hosuse of
representativce, there must be a concurrence of these requisites:
1. Valid proclamation;
2. Taken oath;
3. And assumed into office.
Therefore, petitioner cannot be considered a member yet, for he has not assumed office yet
nor validly taken his oath with the proper venue: taken his oath before the speaker of the house
of representative and in an open session.

Relampagos vs. Cumba,

243 SCRA 690,
April 27, 1995

Facts:
In the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the petitioner and private respondent were
candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The
latter was proclaimed the winning candidate. Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an
election protest with the RTC of Agusan del Norte. On June 29, 1994, the trial court, per Judge
Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the private
respondent and rendered judgement in favor of the petitioner.
The private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC which was later on given
a due course by the trial court. The petitioner then filed with the trial court a motion for
execution pending appeal. The trial court granted the petitioner's motion for execution pending
appeal despite the opposition of the private respondent. The corresponding writ of execution
was forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private respondent filed a motion for a reconsideration
which was later on denied. The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a
petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid order of the trial court granting the motion for
execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. The COMELEC granted the petition on
February 9, 1995, ordering the petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position as
Municipality Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, upholding its exclusive authority to
decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus where the COMELEC maintains that
there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in
full force as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).
Issue:
 Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions
for, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction
Held:
Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where,
under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Facts:
The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint committee
with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the
alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a
Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud
and manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial report,
the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial
elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed
perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.
After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution ordering
that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while that the
charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint
Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.
Issues: Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid? Whether or not
Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection clause?
Held:
Petitions are dismissed. The creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid. Section 2,
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and functions of the Comelec. The
grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to
the enforcement and administration of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to
effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections.
The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in Section
265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Under the
above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with
the Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same provision of law the authority to avail
itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. Thus, under the Omnibus
Election Code, while the exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had been
lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors had been conducting preliminary investigations
pursuant to the continuing delegated authority given by the Comelec.
Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint Committee and
Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional bodys
independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation and
prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections.
With regard to Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate the equal protection clause.
Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in violation
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because its sole purpose is the investigation and
prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They insist that the Joint Panel was created to target
only the Arroyo Administration as well as public officials linked to the Arroyo Administration.
While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary investigation,
not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public officers who were
investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance of their official duties. Private
individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint Committee.
The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to
eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real
differences among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons
under like circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.

Dumarpa v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 192249 : April 2, 2013
Facts:
Dumarpa was a congressional candidate for the 1st District of Lanao del Sur at the 10
May 2010 elections. The COMELEC declared a total failure of elections in seven municipalities,
including the three Municipalities of Masiu, Lumba Bayabao and Kapai, which are situated in
the 1st Congressional District of Province of Lanao del Sur. The conduct of special elections in
the seven Lanao del Sur municipalities was originally scheduled for 29 May 2010.

On 25 May 2010, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8946, resetting the special elections
to 3 June 2010. Subsequently, COMELEC issued the herein assailed resolution which provided,
among others, the constitution of Special Board of Election Inspectors in Section 4 and
Clustering of Precincts in Section 12. Dumarpa filed a Motion for Reconsideration concerning
only Sections 4 and 12 thereof as it may apply to the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao del Sur. The
COMELEC did not act on Dumarpas motion. A day before the scheduled special elections, on 2
June 2010, Dumarpa filed the instant petition alleging that "both provisions on Re-clustering of
Precincts (Section 12) and constitution of Special Board of Election Inspectors Section 4affect
the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao del Sur, and will definitely doom petitioner to certain defeat, if
its implementation is not restrained or prohibited by the Honorable Supreme Court."
Parenthetically, at the time of the filing of this petition, Dumarpa was leading by a slim
margin over his opponent Hussin Pangandaman in the canvassed votes for the areas which are
part of the 1st Congressional District of Lanao del Sur where there was no failure of elections.
A temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction was not issued. Thus,
the special elections on 3 June 2010 proceeded as scheduled.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic
Held:
Yes. Under Remedial Law a moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of
no practical value. Indeed, the special elections held on 3 June 2010 mooted the issues posed by
Dumarpa. The opponent of Dumarpa, Hussin Pangandaman, was proclaimed winner in the 1st
Congressional District of Lanao del Sur. We see this as a supervening event which, additionally,
mooted the present petition as the issues raised herein are resolvable in the election protest.
In any event, the petition is unmeritorious. COMELEC's power to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election
The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do everything in its
power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In the performance of
its duties, the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods
that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created - to promote
free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections,
unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered
with.
Dumarpas objections conveniently fail to take into account that COMELEC Resolution
No. 8965, containing the assailed provisions on re-clustering of the precincts and the designation
of special board of election inspectors, was issued precisely because of the total failure of
elections in seven Municipalities in the Province of Lanao del Sur, a total of fifteen
Municipalities where there was a failure of elections. Notably, the COMELEC's declaration of a
failure of elections is not being questioned by Dumarpa. In fact, he confines his objections on the
re-clustering of precincts, and only as regards the Municipality of Masiu.
 Plainly, it is precisely to prevent another occurrence of a failure of elections in the fifteen
(15) municipalities in the province of Lanao del Sur that the COMELEC issued the assailed
Resolution No. 8965. The COMELEC, through its deputized officials in the field, is in the best
position to assess the actual condition prevailing in that area and to make judgment calls based
thereon. Too often, COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances
that threaten to subvert the will of our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not
be impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable.

Case Digest: Cagas v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 194139
January 24, 2012
Facts:
The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista) contested the position of
Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local
elections. Results led to the completion by May 14, 2010 of the canvassing of votes cast for
Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner was proclaimed the winner. Alleging fraud,
anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions,
Bautista filed an electoral protest on May 24, 2010. In his answer submitted on June 22, 2010,
the petitioner averred as his special affirmative defenses that Bautista did not make the requisite
cash deposit on time; and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or
omissions complained of. COMELEC First Division issued the first assailed order denying the
special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground
that the order did not discuss whether the protest specified the alleged irregularities in the
conduct of the elections. He prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC en banc.
Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to
the COMELEC en banc pursuant to the ruling in Panlilio v. COMELEC.
COMELEC First Division issued its second assailed order, denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration for failing to show that the first order was contrary to law. Not
satisfied, the petitioner commenced this special civil action directly in this Court.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the protest
for insufficiency in form and content

Held:
No. Petition Denied. Supreme Court cannot review a decision of a COMELEC Division
The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the
last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

SARMIENTO V. COMELEC
Facts:
Sarmiento v. COMELEC Summary Cases: Rodulfo Sarmiento vs. Commission on
Elections Subject: Election cases, Pre-proclamation controversies, Decision of COMELEC En
Banc, Hearing of cases by COMELEC Division
Nine special civil actions for certiorari, hereby jointly resolved, seek to set aside the
resolutions of respondent COMELEC.

Issue:
Petitioners impugn that the challenged resolutions were issued with grave abuse of
discretion, in that the Commission, sitting en banc, took cognizance and decided the appeals
without first referring them to any of its Divisions.
Held:
Election cases Section 3, C, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that
the Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules
of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.
Election cases include pre-proclamation controversies and as such, must be heard and
decided by a Division of the Commission. The Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the
authority to hear and decide the same cases at the first instance. In the COMELEC rules of
procedure, pre-proclamation cases are classified as special cases and by its very nature, the two
Divisions of the Commission are vested with the authority to hear and decide these special cases.
Hearing of cases by COMELEC Division SEC.9, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of
procedure provides that appeals from rulings of the Board of Canvassers are cognizable by any
of the Divisions to which they are assigned and not by the Commission en banc. Decision of
COMELEC En Banc. Appeals are deemed pending before the Commission for proper referral to
a Division. 7. However, R.A. 7166 provides that all pre-proclamation cases pending before a
Division shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved.
National Press Club VS. Comelec
201 SCRA 1; G.R. NO. 1026653
March 5, 1992
Facts:
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are
prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2)
individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in
the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be
informed of election Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally
argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the
constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the
prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out
for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content,
namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is
asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide
adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further,
petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the
suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the
Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would
bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning
candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to
information and opinion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.
Held:
Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which
enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in
conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable
during a specific limited period In example "during the election period." In our own society,
equality of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of
financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the
basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the
egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service
and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The essential question is whether or
not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information
enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible
supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not
gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during
election periods.
Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the
operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in
time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by
newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates,
their qualifications, political parties and programs of government.
Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or
opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or columnists in respect of
candidates, their qualifications, and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments,
opinions and beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In
sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that,
in responsible media, is not paid for by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed
to cover only paid political advertisements of particular candidates. The limiting impact of
Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves is not unduly repressive
or unreasonable.

Social Weather Station v Comelec

May 5, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout
the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish
them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present
danger to justify such restraint.
Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and the
dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional?
Held:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because
1 it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression,
2 it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period, and
3 the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public
convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient
to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic
institutions.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES,

INC. and GMA NETWORK, INC v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 132922
April 21, 1998

Facts:
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an
organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as
citizens, taxpayers and registered voters. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in
this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or
threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears to
have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and
television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Sec. 92 of B.P Blg.
881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to provide free air time to the
COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political purposes. Petitioners
challenge the validity of Sec. 92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of
law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies
the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC
to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information during the
period of election. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in
providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995
senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this
year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is
the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to
authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost
P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it
stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30
minutes of prime time daily for COMELEC Time.

Issues:
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws and whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881
constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation.
Held:
Petitioneners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are
more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television
broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary
privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate
broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable
public funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air
time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the
print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry
requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the
broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the
industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken
by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC. The use of property bears a
social function and is subject to the states duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast
media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may
render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.