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State University College oi' Arts and Science , Plattshursh, Nt-vv York j
Noel W. Smith, Editor i PRECEDING
Faculty of Social Sciences SEGMENT
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BNTERBEHAVIORAL s u c c e:E.E>iN<5 f"

SE^^KNT I Volume 1

NEWSLETTER January 1970

"...the psychological Investigative event constitutes the interbehavior of the.investigator

with, & behavior segment or psychological event...Just as the event Investigated is condition"
ed by the interbehavioral history of the organism.and object, so the investigator is influ-
enced by his antecedent intellectual background*" -- J, R* Rantor
A Toast
The soul may be & mere pretense,
the mind makes very little sfense
So let us value CS.Kthe appeal rlr

Of that which v&Ataste and feel.

Piet Rein (Crooks. MIT Press, 1966)


It is a primary hope that the inauguration of Rollo Handy is correcting galley proofs'for
this Newsletter will help to promote an inte- his new The_ Measurement o|_ Value. He argues
rest in the development and dissemination of "for construing valuation as a field process
objective approaches to psychology and will involving both the organism and the environ"
facilitate efforts toward that end, especial^ ment, and agains<t views that attempt to
ly in cotraaunication and coordination. You account for valuing transactions in terras of
are invited and urged to send in any perti- the person isolated from an environmental
nent information, questions, requests, etc. setting or that postulate a supernatural'or
as indicated in the prospectus * nonnatural locus for values" (personal'com-
munication)'. Examination copies of Prontoss
The design of the Newsletter is an adaptation new Panorama of Psychology can be obtained
of one in Ranter's "Toward a Scientific Ana- from Brooks/Cole, 10 Davis Drive, Belaiontj
lysis of Motivation," Psychological Record, Calif. 94002. (This book has met with over-
1942, 5, 225-275. The accompanying quota- whelming enthusiasm by my students-=ed.)
tion is from the same source. The indication Lundin's Personality; 'A Behavioral
of media was omitted and the arrow off center Macmillan, 1969, is an interbehavioral
in the vertical segments and "field" is no- operant approach.
where to be found. If you can bear with
these inaccuracies until the supply of face Stan Ratner reports that Michigan State Uni-
sheets is used up, we can make the correc- versity has a graduate program in compara-
'tions or use an entirely new design that any- tive psychology with heavy emphasis in inter-
one is willing to provide. behavior of organism as illustrated 'in"Denny
***** & Ratner*s Cpiaparative Psychology, rev, ed.

Crude Date Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

State University of New fork at Plattsburgh has a two-year school psychology program
(M.S.) with emphasis n scientist first and practitioner second with exposure to inter-
behavioral and operant approaches; M.A in experimental and 'personality-clinical pt~
bably fall 1970. Also faculty petting in experimental and in personality.
The second annual meeting of The International Society for the History of the'Behavioral
and Social Sciences (ISHOBSS) will'be held at the University of'Akron, home o the
psychology archives. Information oa the meeting is available from Dr'John A, Popple**
stone9 Department of Psychology, University f Akron, Akron9 Ohio 44304 and on memBef-
ship frm Barbara Rosss Psychology Department. 003, University f Massachusetts-Boston,
100 Arlington Street,, Boston,, Mass,'02116. Several persons Interested"in"'interbehavioral
psychology are associated with the organization* It would be a good opportunity for
of us in the East and Midwest to meet. Date; May 8-10, 1970.
the inclusions in" the 'next issue will be a criticism"'of the 'establishment of the
Newsletter and an argument that a distinction between interbehaviorism and behaviorisms
is mythical~->an account "of the awards given by the Division of Clinical Psychology of
the American psychological Association in 1968 to two interbeh'avioral psychologists s
Jerry Carter "and "Julian Rotter--the" telegram sent to Dr. Kantor by the participants of
the conference (below) and his reply .

The Summer 'Community of Scholars

June 16-21, I960
The Emerging Role of Inter behavioral Psychology

Psychologists working in teaching , research, and applied settings will meet toge-
ther for a week of seminars and lectures related to their interest in interbehavioral
approaches that underlie their diverse specialities. The seminars are for the purpose
of exchanging ideas around 'some topic of special interest to the discussion leader of
the day. The leader may open with a short, tentative paper or a talk (15 to 20 minutes)
on an area of research in which he is currently involved* The lectures and semlra&rs are
pea to all interested parsons.
Noel W. Smith, Coordinator , , . ... . -
State University College of Arts and Sciences Sponsored with support from
Miner Ceater
Pittsburgh, New fork '
Interbehavioral psychology was formulated fifty years ago by J,R, Kantor who is
still continuing its development. He has often been decades ahead of his colleagues
in stseh topics as motivations instincts, intelligence , language behavior , physiologi-
eal psychology, perception,, covert or implicit behavior , numerous logical problems of
psychology, and even what constitutes psychology, Interbehavioral psychology has been
a rather subtle but definite influence and within the past decade has shown signs of
rapidly increasing importance as evidenced by the number of books and papers related to
r utilizing this approach and the rise in citations; the compatibility- with operant
conditioners is especially ...significant.
The basic assumption of "Interbehavioral psychology is that the datum of psychology
is the organism' interacting 'or' interbehaving with a stimulus object via media of con
tact in some particular setting or context. These factors together make up the inter"
/behavioral field,.....Psychological activity 'then is not locallza'Ble "in" nor reducible to
any single organ nor. even the entire organism bat is constituted by the entire field
of events . -There Is here neither "empty organism" not physiological' reductionism,
Nor is there any postulation of special, powers such, as "mind" or " ''will*'' or .animistic
brain powers that reside ins Me the organism nor assumptions .of vector's" or forces out-
side the organism that control it. Neither is there any borrowing of analogies from

of complex but concrete interactions

such as light and s<

Each of the participants in the program will- present his WE specialized area of
psychology within the orientation interbehavioral psyehlgy ..
participants! Samuel Campbells, fexas Technological University; Paul Fuller.
Siegler Co, Grand Rapids, Mich,I Louise Keats Program Director, Fort Ouster State Home,
Augusta, Mich*; Neil Kent, Western Michigan University; Wayne Laaar, Institute of
Behavior, Rutgers University; Paul Mountj0y Western Michigan University!"Neel
State University f New York "at .Plattsburgh* Formal papers s Wayne 'La"zar~-A comparison
the theoretical positions of JR,'Kntbr aid T*C*"Schhelrla; Louise Kent~A
ilysis of language and its'"'implications' for "Sirst language acquisition;
Animal' behavior"technologies the'history of psychology; Paul Fuller-
relationship between, interbehavioral psychology and system engineering.
Some Thoughts"on the "Summer Community of Scholars,"1969
State Waiversity of... lew,, fork/Miner Foundation
- Paul Fuller
The outstanding impression I came away with is that Miner' Institute"provides an
setting for coaferences of this type* "Quiet"and'"fustic 'surrounding's' provide/'a
of distractions* Facilities 'are"adeq'uate"b'u't"not lavish-conducive to thoughts
,ons scholarship,, and stimulating discussion*
Tbere was also the overall "impressiaB which confirme'3 a contention I ' have" made ' for
yer (vweptY years: Interbehavtoral psycholugy provides the systems frame wot fe in which
psyehrtiog j i>t;s can effectively work in every conceivable type of behavioral field. At
the conference were people studying all "types of human snd animal behavior problems,
including astronauts, ants, and falcons. There were those involved in verbal behavior,,
special cases of language development, all phases of clinical psychology , executive
selection tod development man/machine systems, selection and training of outstanding

fieally new problems,, new data, new combinations*

asd systems engineering, systems management, sad system analysis in the 1950's and"
i e Some of this develepment, was influenced by Kantr students such as Burt Wlias

It is my opinien that recent developments in mathematicss optimal" control theory,

omjmter technology and system science should new"be fed back' to systematic psychology*
these techniques will further"mensuration in a'more detailed field analysis and expe-
f interbehavioral field events.

P. E, Lichtenetein
Denison University
In 1920 the behavioristic revolution was sttll very much in the air.
Kantor was one of several psychologists who at that time saw much that was
promising in behaviorism* Yet Kantor already had found Watson's formula-
tion of stimulus-response psychology inadequate in certain respects. At
times Watson used the term stimulus crudely to refer simply to the object
responded to. At other times in an attempt at a more scientific formulation
the behaviorists fell back upon the earlier mentalistic account of the
stimulus as a physical energy impinging a receptor organ* Kantor did not
find either usage capable of yielding &n adequate account of complex beha-
vior,, He therefore began to work out a functional conception of the stimulus
correlated with a response function*
Stimulus functions and response functions are seen as distinct from
biological, stimuli and responses and as being evolved in the course of
what Kantor now refers to as the interbehavioral history* Stimulus func~
tions are elaborated on the side of the objects or events responded to and
response functions on the side of the organism* Stimulus functions are
clearly connected with stimulus objects but the two must not be confused.
Similarly response functions are not simply biological reactions or move-
ments even though without such biological participation there can be no
psychological event. Response functions, like stimulus functions, are
field components evolved through contacts of the organism with stimulus
Kantor (1933) made an impressive defense of stimulus-response psycho-
logy in reaction to challenges to the S-R conception by such writers as
Wood-worth, Thurstone, and Kluver. Kantor saw no reason to abandon the S-R
concept but rather an opportunity to modify it along interbehavioral lines.
This paper was described by Griffith (1943) as the clearest defense of S-R
psychology and Skinner (1938) commented that Kantor had shown the impossi-
bility of defining "a functional stimulus without reference to a functional
response, and vices ver_sa_," Even so Kantor*s approach had less impact upon
psychology than ought to have been the case. It is interesting to conjec-
ture as to why this was so and an examination of some of the possible rea-
sons should be profitable.
The traditional physiological stimulus had the characteristics of be-
ing manipulable and measurable in physical terms. The stimulus could
therefore be readily employed as an independent variable in scientific
investigation* Stimuli (light rays) impinge upon sensitive receptor cells
(rods and cones) in such a manner as to initiate neural impulses which are
carried along the optic nerve to the visual cortex. As a result of brain
action there may occur sensations or perceptions (mental activities?) and
eventually an effector response. This sequence assumes the operation of
causality of a traditional "billiard ball" type* The stimulus operates in
a pre-psychological manner and j-Ue slenificanee of the stimulus (in a psycho-
logical sense) is to be understood by reference to the mental reaction which
creates its significance (meatsli'sm) or in the response without* reference
to a mental, vent (behaviorism). Kantor broke with tradition when he made
the stimulus an essential part of the psychological event rather than a
i:o.eding cause. Because Kantor's approach involved a conception of c.nvwt*,^ ;
in psychology at variance with that generally acopfco<'i and *-Bljt, it
has not had the ready acceptance that its merits should have warranted,1
The Interbehavioral field and more particularly the stimulus function have been
poorly understood and their revolnt-lonary Imp!-teatlone too ot<su ignored or
certainly not fully appreciated.
A good discussion of causation may be found in Lerner (1965), See especially
the articles by Hagel, Mayr, and Parsons,
The stimulus function is, of course, a scientific construct derived
from the behavior of an organism observed to bes or assumed to bes in con-
tact with some object or event. In a sense it is improper to discuss the
stimulus function apart from its correlated response function since it is
the interaction of these two factors which constitutes the central focus of
an interbehavioral or psychological event. When we discuss the stimulus
function in isolation we must regard it as simply an analytical abstraction*
In a recent formulation Kantor (3.959) described the psychological event by
the following formula: PE * C (ks s, rf, his sts tad) where k symbolizes
the uniqueness of interbehavioral fields and C that the field consists of
the entire system of factors in interaction* Sf refers to the stimulus
functions rf the response function, hi the historical interbehavior process
in which are generated the stimulus function and response functions &t
setting factors and md media of contact such as light or air*
Kantor's interbehavioral event by bringing physical, biological,
cultural, and historical factors into system represents a field approach
to psychology quite different from traditional causal conceptions. The
psychological event is seen to consist of a constellation of interacting
factors rather than as a mental or biological dependent variable caused
by antecedent: physical events, Kantor, by making the stimulus itself a
part of the psychological event J?|"jwi_des_ an Slter_gat_iw_ to both reduct_i-
li MJi5!ii,!-J;:Sl 2GSL JE^HES!S.52l_o^, This is a difficult point for many
to grasp for reasons we have discussed, Physicalists tend to see the
stimulus function as a non-naturalistic factor while phenomenologists
prefer to interpret it in terms of internal mechanisms such as the isomorph-
ism of Gestalt psychology. The inability to appreciate Kantor's view as an
alternative to reductionistic behaviorism and phenomenology is clearly
revealed in a recent article by Thornton (1969) which discusses Kantor's
interpretation of Socrates,
Many psychologists make practical use of data from the life history
but Kantor appears to be the first to bring history into the. theoretical
structure in a significant way. He is able to do this because he is not
beholden to a physicalistic theory of causation. The writer (1950) has
discussed at length the reductionistic problem and the bias against
geneticism in psychology,
The experimental psychologist may properly ask what happens under an
interbehavioral point of view to the elaborate procedures which have been
developed for systematically varying the physical stimulus (independent
variable) and observing accurately the effect upon the subject's response
(dependent variable) as has been done perhaps most clearly in the typical
psychophysical experiment. Kantor'a (1.959) answer is clear. Procedures
under which the stimulus object is regarded as an independent variable are
"only operationally justified," "R - f (S) is,..a pragmatic device." The
same holds true even when additional factors such as the condition of the
organism are taken into account, Under controlled conditions certain
regularities may be found in behavior. Absolute and differential thresholds
may be established, effects of reinforcement schedules determined and the
like. In such instances the experimental procedure and the observed regu-
larity may be taken as special cases falling within a wider interbehavioral
frame of reference. Nothing in such situations should be taken as a basis
for misreading the general nature of psychological stimulation. Uniform*
ities in response to physical properties of stimuli under rigid conditions
of control do not negate the intetbehsvioral concept of the stimulus as
function,, Outside the experimental situation behavior is generally found
to be considerably more variable and responsive to a. greater variety of
conditions. Consequently under such conditions the physical definition of
the stimulus tends to be less useful* 2

It is sometimes said that the stimulus function has only postdictive

but not predictive value How, for example, can one predict from a variable
which is not independently observable? The clue to an answer lies in the
interbehavioral history. When this (i.e. a set of previously elaborated
sf - r correlations) is reasonably well understood one can predict quite
well what the stimulus-response function for an individual will be $,n a
given situation. Even small children are able to predict fairly accurately
the effects of their own verbal behavior on their parents.
Stimulus objects are important and the study of their physical, biolo-
gical, and cultural properties often sheds light upon their role in psycho-
logical events. Stimulus functions are not synonymous with these properties
which may be regarded as independent of particular psychological inter-
actions , The view which makes stimulus objects into objects known or crea-
tions of the mind stems from the causal theory which is set aside by an
interbehavioral construction,
It has been suggested that the stimulus function is a scientific con-
struct which has revolutionary implications,, It permits the development
of a psychology which neither reduces psychological activities to the bio-
logical responses of organisms nor holds them to be functions of an immater-
ial mind. Furthermore, it allows us to gain considerable understanding of
complex behaviors as they develop through an intricate and detailed inter-
behavioral history. When we cling to the physical or physiological defini-
tion of stimulus we may feel constrained to restrict investigation to those
behaviors for which such constructs appear most appropriate.

2. For an interesting discussion of some of the same points see Campbell

(1969) ,

1* Campbell, D.T. A Phenomenology of the Other One: Corrigible, Hypothe-

tical, and Critical, In T, Mischel, Hutnan_Action New York, Academic
press, .1969, pp. 41-69.
2, Griffith, C e R. Principles^ of ^Systematic .Pfxc.hologx* Urbana: Univ. of
Illinois Press, 1943........................"~~..................
3. Kant or , JR, In defense of Stimulus-Response Psychology, Psxchj^JRev,
1.933, 40, 324-336
^ _ .' Interbehavi.aral Psy_chology_ Granville, Ohio: The Principle
Press", 1959."" ~~". . . . . ".............~~...........
5. Lerner, I), (ed) , Cajue_anjd_EJEfect_, New York: The Free Press, 1965.
6. Liechtenstein, P.E. Psycho logy as a Genetic Science.
1950, 42 , 313-332,
7. Thornton, H. Socrates and the History of Psychology, JN
1969, 5, 326-339.
8. Skinner, B.F. ThjBelMiyi.OT_pJjOr^ajnist^. New York: Appleton-Century,

_-_. . ~~

Number 2
The activity of" the sensible 'object and that' of the percipient sense is
and'the same activity,'and yet the distinctIon between their being
remains* Take as illustration actual actual'hearing; a
may have hearing and yet not be hearing, and' that'which has"a sound is
always sounding 'But that vhich caa'feear is actively
and that which""can sound is sounding, then the actual hearing and the
actual sound are merged in (these call respectively hear-
keaing and sounding). -- Aristotle: Pe
That pfiysics of light is so frequently applied to color is indica-
tive only of' an inseverable relationship of data and not of their
identity.. JoR. Kantor: "Goethe's Place in Modern Science"

Instead of starting popular as "][ _see_ a_ "tree_",

let us attempt an event orientation in which seeing does sot arise
from the confrontation of an organism and' a tree. la fact,
and tree are onl/ *.. mn^torage points r^r s c'carreuce, situat
interaction or *ri">i-%ct * ^ th*r "r-'P'fp
frame-work th1?- c,*--- "--*,> f-j>-Ji " - - - ! ' --"'the organism
and within a t "'- *. .^T^he^si >~ ban the instant.
N.H. Pronfo.

The Newsletter to achieved to the
modest success in terras of number of sub- was mailed out response was the
scribers; 74 including 24 students following objection? "With regard to
to the Archives of American Psychology* We the PSYCHOLOGY NEWS-
mrrm.s I think the is right
buttons of sisterisls r questions that might to ''iaterbeha-vioral psychology8
provoke some replies. One student asked with ordinary everyday behaviorism as
for "a concise article of runo show-
the basis for interbehavioral psychology, ing increasing symptoms of 'inter-
showing its importance, the advantages behavioral' (ioeos naturalistic) think-
disadvantages of such a viewpoint ing. Is it then appropriate to perpet-
it could mean to the future of psychology" the 'distinctness1 myth? Will
which could be for explanation to an in^group newsletter tend to rein
force distinctions (often pseudo or
be an "straw maaish" in nature,, or at least
and if too long for the Newsletter it would caused by language differences) rather
be highly for the
ledge, etc.? la as much &s
Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction
founded the PSYCHOLOGICAL KEGOEDS would not'this "be an appropriate place to exchange'tid-
bits of IHTElBEli^VIdi&L Insights, news',"etc.? By "so doitigs' nbn-initiates'"'might happen t
read of an3 become.interested' la interb'ehaviorisu It would that- your newsletter
could'be 'included as a'supplement to, or' even a '""feature'' "of THE "PSYCHOLOGICAL "RECORD."
As editor, "I will leave a response to the first part 'to anyone who wishes to do so, but I
think''a comment on the 'latter .proposal Is appropriates It'seems doubtful'whether the'
informal'exc'Kange of information, in. a newsletter "would'be the'likely fodder for a profe-
ssional" Journal,' I see the' function^ as quite'different. However, if" the'RECORD should
it"'first resumed publication in" the '50'*sthe Newsletter would be unnecessary"arid could
very well cease, "But & is a'decision

A"job"opening for a social psychologist for which an laterbehavieral rieatatiea might be

appropriate is available at 'the University of Tennessee. Write to William S. Verplanck,
Hea'3, Uepartmeat'of Psychology, Kn3willes Tennessee 37916* Whether you apply r not'be
(, p. 6a.

Harry Mahan has a few remaining'copies of Ms" text; THE INTERACTIONAL 'PSYCHOLOGY'OF J'.R.
KANTdRY AN IHTROBUGTION which'he will send gratis to anyone' who writes for a" copy. Address?
Department of Psychology'j'palomar College,'San'Marco, California 92069. He has also just
published "a new'text in"question'and answer forms A"PRIMER OF lOTESACTlOjEt PSYCHOLOGY.
tt sells"for $1,5 'A wrkb@k will be available in May, He has the'material on
Jnd re'por8 that'adopt ions will either or workbook will be high-
ly suitable for by teaching'assistants. He also suggests that Pronko's PANORAMA F
PSYCHOLOGY would be a useful adjunct text. We'can'look forward to 'hearing more ab'out his
pioneering efforts la the "first college course outside of the language field to be com"
pletely programmed and on cassettes available to students."

for all f voltxme 1

provides delig'
University, KalamaEo0s Michigan 49001

May 9 at the'Second Annual Meeting of The Cheiron Society

for the History of the Behavioral Social Sciences. I;
Dr. Kaator write'immediately
Mc'PherSon, .
Ohd 44304.

(See first issue for description of conference awl Paul Fuller's aeeemiat,
Chazy, New fork, at Miner"institute
under the" joint auspices o the Miner Foundation, Fadulty'of Social Sciences'of
State 'University" College'of Art's and 'Science at g'h, NY.'S we 'are"discus'sing 'the

In addition to the stimulating"intellectual discussions centered on 'inierbehavioral

point up the interpersonal eori~
'gists. These emphasize the warm
Please kindest regards,,

Tii:et...conferenee on interbehavioral psychology seems to have been, quite successful*

was a great pleasure to be able to discuss topics n the basis of'a'common orients"
ind a common'understanding of principles* It was the interbehaviorsl principles
themselves f the discussion,, but the utilization, f principles
.n, such fields as linguisticss physiological psycfeolsgy, aad operant conditioning

As for fruitfulness' of the meetings, it was agreed

lifting 1 will be editing news*
letter and t get it underway by fall.

appealing and 1 hope that they will all work out t y@ur satisfaction and t that of
if conditions allow I would very saach like t e in and help farther the
work the group* Please keep me informed aew developments.

tiful gesture and I was very


'gists at Miner Institute at Chazy, Hew TTork3

@ discuss J. Ro

the teaching f interbehavioral fsychology9 During the affeernooass
Recreation, I' think, "was &n .'.important ingredient, of our'conference.'*', let only did
we "enjoy various sports' "and "sight -seeing. trips--l"let Paul" Fulled "me at'tennis',
for exataple'"but. the"atmosphere of our discuss ions was light".and,Vat times, "jocular "as
we'll as' serious. Probably becua'se "of the informality that this inspired,"and,'not" in"
the least, because the meeting turned but to'be like'tiomecomirig for'Indiana "University
scences about'"old times'* were there for the listening. Hot being of the era
until'then having'never seen or talked with Ktotor, 1 got a good, deal from these flash-
backs, I think it is important to know Ranter the man as well "as Rantor the scholar
because then we would be likely to read "truth4* likely to read

In the formal discussion, several points emerged: (1) We were ignorant about what
and a psychological event at early stages in behavioral development or in some specific
species, as well as some rather broad topics,, eseteric to moat psychologists, such a-ss
logic. '(2) None of us really knew about the influence Rantor has had evea thoughtwe
could Kaatorlaas who were interested in various specialties,, What, for
example9 was his specific contribution to the present state of affairs in physiological
or comparative psychology most of whose workers mow'subscribe to'non-dualistic tenets
fie expressed almost 'fifty years ago* Also, (3)' t put it simplys what more can
psyehelegists leara fro Kantor who, to be pragmatic, been "right" about so much?
In retrospect these kinds' of questions probably prompted us to have mere Summer
- good deal of enthusiasm about studying Ranter's works, criticizing thesis and demonstrat-
ing the extent o their influence. I think that this newsletter is objective proof of

but it doesn't know much. Experience is the, only thing that brings'knowledge, and
ar' nue&rth, the more experience you are sure to get,11 - Frank
State University College of Arts and Science , PIattsburgh, New York t
Noel W. Smith, Editor P-RECEOIfS

Faculty of Social Sciences


} |
8 01

-L O 1
& 2 M
Z h 1- I
- d^
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Number 3

Regarding the stimulus-response event as essentially a single behavioral

happening with the stimulus and the response as mutually necessary functional
features analyzed out for logical convenience, Organismic or Interactional
Psychology emphasizes the interactional relationship between these two varia-
bles. The psychological stimulus is considered an action or function perform-
ed by a stimulus object corresponding to the action or function of the whole
responding organism. A given interaction of these two variables is held to
be dependent on the former interactions of the two, so that regardless of the
physical properties of the stimulus object it takes on a particular stimulus-
function which evokes a characteristic response to the object. The response
is not conceived as a fixed or static configuration of bodily activity but as
the functional adjustment of the whole organism to the stimulus-function.
This view eschews descriptions of psychological stimulus-response exclusively
in terms of physical properties and corresponding anatomical or physiological
processes^ holding that though such descriptions may be satisfactory for
physiology and physics they are inadequate in any fundamental psychological
sense* The main objection to this concept is that it is confined to a purely
descriptive and analytic level in its approach to psychological problems,
Howevers what it lacks in ready explanations appears to be due more to the
limitations of our present knowledge than to any inherent defect. Moreover,
it has the recommendation of avoiding over-simplified, teleological, menta-
listic, and other scientifically fallacious implications, and of recogniz-
ing a psychology with its own unique, field without relying on wholesale
borrowings from its sister sciences.

--Jerry Carter: "On Experimental Study of Psycho-

logical Stimulus-Response."

Crude Data investigative Contact Scientific Construction


Two articles of considerable interest have appeared in the JOURNAL OF THE

EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR. In 1969, pages 329-347 was W.N. Schoenfeld's
"J.R. Kant or's ObJ[et:ive_J^^^ A
Retrospective Appreciation." This is a magnificent tribute to Dr. Kantor and
invites reading or re-reading of these two works. In 1970, pages 101108^appear-
ed J.R. Kantor's "An Analysis of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior (TEAB)"
which was his invited address to Division 25 at APA, September 3, 1.969. There
were approximately 300 in attendance and they gave a standing ovation at the
conclusion of the paper. This is perhaps one of the finest papers he has
written and is directly relevant to current psychological research in general
and operant research in particular.

T.-X. Barber has published a book that summarizes his extensive program of
research to date in. de-spooking hypnosis: HYPNOSIS: A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH, Van
Nostrand, 1969, $2.95 in paper. He has succeeded in producing all of the pheno-
mena of hypnosis without the so-called trance state and o f f e r s a naturalistic
account. Along similar lines is C.E.M. Hansel's ESP: A SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION,
S c r i b n e r ' s j 1966, which provides an on-the-spot investigation of many of the
alleged ESP events including those at Duke and provides plausible explanations.


There have been a few requests for lists of names of people and their areas
of interest for purposes of corresponding and exchanging information. If readers
will jot down this information and send it in (a postcard will do), a list will
be compiled and published. Other requests call for a list of readings along the
lines of interbehavioral psychology, especially for students. A future issue of
the Newsletter will contain such a list. In the meantime,, a perusal of issues
of THE PSYCHOLOGICAL RECORD will turn up a host of relevant items. The articles
appearing just before the book review section during the last couple of years by
"Observer" are especially noteworthy as are most of those under "Perspectives in

The Cheiron Society (International Society for the History of Behavioral

Sciences) meeting included quite a number of interbehaviorists. Dr. Kantor was
to receive an honorary doctorate from the. University of Akron but received a
postponement due. to the. closing of the university subsequent to the nearby Kent
State tragedy. The Society presented him with a certificate. Attending in the
honor guard were Sam Campbell, Jerry Carter, Arthur Kahn, Parker Lichtenstein,
Marion McPherson, Paul Mountjoy, Stanley Ratner, Noel Smith, Robert Topper, Irv

In this issue are reports (abridged) of the awards to Jerry Carter, the
first Ph.D. student of Dr. Kantor, and Julian Rotter, also a former Kantor
student, presented by George Albee from Division 12, Also included are two
contributions by students. Ronald Heyduk is at the University of Michigan
and Jacqueline Farrington at the State. University College at Plattsburgh, New

Distinguished Contributions to the Science and Profession of Clinical Psychology

Jerry W. Carter, Jr.

Jerry W. Carter Jr. is a familiar and beloved figure in clinical psychology; indeed,
in all areas of psychology.

Dr. Carter, despite his obvious youth, is one of the old-timers in the clinical
field in years of service. He completed his graduate training at Indiana University
in 1938, and so preceded the enormous influx of people into clinical psychology that
followed World War II.

In 1948 he began his career in the United States Public Health Service in the
Commissioned Officer Corps. During these years his travels took him up and down the
land where he visited every department and center and participated in every significant
conference which involved planning the ro.le of,psychologists in community service.

In 1962 he was appointed Acting Chief and Training Specialist in Community Mental
Health in the Manpower and Training Branch of NIMH, and in 1965 he became Chief and
Training Specialist in Community Mental Health in the Inservice Training Section of
the Manpower and Training Branch of the NIMH. Two years ago he was appointed Special
Assistant for Personnel in State Mental Health Programs at NIMH.

These formidable sounding titles do not convey the human warmth, and mature wisdom
and insight, that Jerry Carter has brought to Bethesda and to Chevy Chase. His wise
counsel and his sensitivity to the important issues in public health mental health have
been felt throughout the country and the world. He has been a leader of the Conference
of Psychological Directors and Consultants in Federal, State, Territorial Mental Health
Programs,, He has been actively engaged in nurturing a number of significant conferences
where the contributions of psychology to the mental health field have been examined in
detail. He currently has a monograph in press entitled "Research Contributions from
Psychology to Community Mental Health." He has written extensively on broad programs
for improving the care of the retarded, on the role of cottage personnel in residential
care facilities, and on mental health in the schools. In 1.956, long before the current
preoccupation with community mental health, he wrote a chapter on the training needs of
psychologists in community mental health programs.

During his early years Dr. Carter made important contributions to case study, to
the field of psychodiagnosis and to the development of the functioning of the psycho-
logist in psychological service centers.

Division 12 is by no means the first to honor Dr. Carter. He received the National
Defense Service Medal in 1964, and the United States Public Health Service Commendation
Medal in 1966.

This award expresses our appreciation for your long, devoted, significant and
continuing service to clinical psychology, to American psychology, and to psychology
throughout the world.
Julian B. Rotter

Professor Julian B. Rotter is professor of psychology and director of the clinical

psychology training program at the University of Connecticut where he has been a member
of the faculty since 1963.

He completed his Ph.D. at Indiana University in 1941 after service as a personnel

consultant in the United States Army and as an Aviation Psychologist in the Army. In
1946 he went to Ohio State University where he moved through the ranks from, assistant
professor to professor.

It is impossible for me to summarize briefly the enormously productive research

contributions which Professor Rotter has made to clinical psychology and the stimulat-
ing concepts he has added to the field. 'I am sure that everyone in this audience has
read with interest and profit his articles and chapters on psychological testing
assessment, or has used the Rotter Incomplete Sentences Test, or has been influenced
by his writings on social learning theory and clinical psychology. His books on clini-
cal psychology have been required reading for .graduate students for at least the past
fourteen years. I must, add that Dr. Rotter was one of the first clinical psychologists
to criticize the "illness model" and his eloquent writing on the defects of this model
anticipated by more than a decade the recent debate on this topic. His recent Psycho-
logical Monograph dealing with internal versus external control of reinforcement, in
the judgment of many in the field, is one of the most significant contributions to
heuristic theory of the past 20 years. Certainly it has stimulated tremendous interest
and research activity., and especially dissertation research, since its appearance. Dr.
Rotter's work and his writing have always captured the enthusiasm of students; many
of his students have gone on to leadership positions in the field.

This award signifies our appreciation for the distinguished contribution you are
making and will continue to make to our field.



Jacqueline Farrington

As an adult student returning to the world of "academeia" who attended the Summer
Community of Scholars' Conference on Interbehaviora 1 Psychology, my commentary is some-
what different than that of the attending scholars who have thus far reported to the
News letter .

For me, the conference provided a further impetus toward my own goal of inter-
relating knowledges and experiences in several fields. Informal and formal present-
-ations of those attending the conference assured me that the science of psychology
both should and could realistically encompass the innumerable major and minor strands
of human concern which pervade man's cultures, I recognize the broad idealism of
such a statement. However, when one considers the "specialties" within the field of
psychology which were represented by individuals who applied the interbehaviora 1
approach in experimental, historical, clinical, philosophical, industrial and linguistic
fields as well as in teacher-student situations, the simple fact that such an approach
is viable in areas which are often in practice treated as distinct, disciplines, becomes
a significant and meaningful event for the observing and participating student.

It is for such reasons that the student chooses to investigate further the writ-
ings of Dr. Kantor, and to continue to pursue a goal which is both an ideal and a
pragmatic path of discovery through observation. The interbehaviora 1 approach offers
a coherent and honest system which many students, were they given ample opportunity to
explore its principles and quite natural consequences, would comfortably and to advan-
tage utilize throughout lifetimes of study, vocations and avocations. Employing such
an approach, the long assumed dichotomy between arts and sciences disappears as readily
as does that of "mind and body". Concerns about "self" integration, curricular inte-
gration,, the generation gap, community integration and even world integration can be
turned from wordy actionless theory to constructive action as the human organisms his
individual and collective enterprises, experiences, relationships and concerns are
understood as continuing events within a broader field of organism interacting within
the total environment.

Last summer's conference was an exciting and broadening experience for me, I
sincerely hope that students, both undergraduate and graduate, will be enabled to
participate in the conference during this coming summer.


Ronald G. Hayduk'

A prevailing pessimism is often noted among interactional psychologists with

respect to the possibility of interbehavioral models of the organism serving as the
basis for general experimental research. Indeed, this pessimism is understandable.
Mahan (1970) notes in his Primer of Interactional Psychology that the psychological
laboratories are among "the last bulwarks to hold out in defense of the physiological
and dualistic traditions as explanations of behavior,"2 and contrasts this to the more
receptive and progressive attitudes among personality (Lewin), developmental (Piaget),
and social psychological (Mead) systematists

Fortunately, the outlook for the future of interactional models with "hard line"
researchers may not be so bleak. There is substantial evidence that a saccadic move-
ment in the direction of conceptualizing the psychological event as an interactive,
non-Localized process is occurring in experimental psychological circles. This shift
toward more naturalistic models has been catalyzed by the growing number of investi-
gators who are dissatisfied with the limited subset of psychological events which
have heretofore been subject to analysis,, There is increasing interest in modeling
the natural stream of behavior, and it has become apparent that new methodologies and
metatheories are required for this endeavor.

The exceptionally enlightening distinction between "behavior tesserae" and

"behavior units" drawn by Barker (1964) is relevant to the problems encountered by
these pioneering psychological researchers. On the one hand are the "fragments of
behavior that are created or selected by the investigator in accordance with his
scientific aims."3 These "tesserae" (pieces used in mosaic) have been the interest

My apologies to P.E. Lichtenstein, "The Significance of the Stimulus Function,"

January 1970.
Harry C. Mahan, A__Pjogiej:_j3fIn^^ (San Marcos, California, 1970),
p. 83.
Roger G. Barker, "The stream of activity as an empirical problem." In R.G. Barker
and H.Fo Wright, Thje_S^r^amof_]Behavj.or j (New York, 1963), p . L .
of a majority of experimenters, probably because, they fit neatly into a classical
methodology where manipulation of an independent variable (stimulus) is supposed to
produce some effect upon a dependent variable (response). Likewise, they are parsi-
moniously conceptualized within the framework of a "reactive organism" theory where
stimuli are the necessary causes of event initiation and termination,

Less popular with researchers are "behavior units , " defined by Barker as "the
inherent segments of the stream of behavior ."4 These psychological events, not
dependent upon the investigator for their duration or quality, demand new taxonomical
systems, experimental methodologies, and the sort of metatheoretical underpinnings
which can only be provided by in-terbehavioral models of the organism, models not
restricted by simplistic notions of causality, action, or reaction.

Barker's distinction aids in isolating the logical basis for the predominence
of "billiard ball" models in experimental psychology, but it has been the task of
others to evolve the methodologies and constructs required to appropriately study
the stream of activity in an interactional reference system. Progress is being made
on two fronts at the University of Michigan. Research in the laboratories of E.L.
Walker concerns the complexity interaction patterns of organisms in free-access
environments o Experimental techniques are being refined within the framework of a
compelling theory of motivation and choice sequences (see Walker, 1964). Simultane-
ously, J.W. Atkinson and J.D. Birch are formulating a highly ambitious "theory of
action" on the premise that the determinants of the fjlow of activity and not activity
er sja are the appropriate interests of experimental psychology. The kernel concept
of their behavioral system, the "persisting tendency," may be an example of a truly
interactional construct with heuristic value. Unique research into the determinants
of simple activity shifts is in progress.

Despite such, evidence for optimism, champions of the interbehavioral approach

can hardly afford to presume that naturalistic attitudes will prevail . Progress
reports from other laboratories at other universities are needed, and interbehavioral
psychologists are especially capable of detecting such progress. Also, the struggle
begun by Kantor (1923) against "mentalistic" attitudes toward the nervous system must
be intensified . The notion that stimulus-initiated neural events explain psycho-
logical events has not promoted an understanding of psychological phenomena any more
than chemical theory has helped to explain the rolling of a ball, but such a reduction
istic. view continues to be a powerful ally of stimulus-bound theories. If major progress
toward more naturalistic models as the basis for research is to be made, the assumptional
bases of dualistic interpretations of the nervous system must be undermined. The role
of the interbehavioral. psychologist is therefore clearly delineated if he wishes to
widen the cracks in the "billiard ball." organism.


Atkinson,, J 0 W. and Birch, J.D., 3l_^ZSSBis__-Ai2Il9 ^n print, 1969.

Barker, R.G. The stream of behavior as an empirical problem. In R.G. Barker and
H.F. Wright, ^_^^am_^_^ha_vir_3 New York, Appleton, 1963.

Kantor, J.R. The. organismic versus the mentalistic attitude toward the nervous system.
Psychological Bulletin, 1923, _20, 684-692.

Lic'htenstein., P.E. The significance of the stimulus function. -InterJbehajn.oi^l_News--

letter, 1970, vol. 1, No. 1.
Mahan, H.C. Appendix: Foundations of interactional psychology. In H.C. Mahan, A__Pr_in^r_
San Marcos, California: Project Socrates Press, 1970.

Walker, E.L. Psychological complexity as a basis for a theory of motivation and choice.
In D. Levine (ed), Nebjcajskj^Jiy^ 1964. Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1964.

Psychological constructs, like constructs in any other science,

are methods created by the scientist to describe and explain. If we
speak of _frji^trjjti.on^tlerancei or rat^__of__le_arning_, it is not nece-
ssary-^ fact it is fallacioustor think of some entity that exists
within the person like so much nickel in a steel alloy. When we
stop thinking this way, we do not seek to localize our constructs
in a part of the body or behavioral and physiological constructs in
set proportions or ratios. An understanding that the constructs
are instruments of the scientist, not entities, allows us to deal
freely with a logical, and useful set of wholly psychological and
scientific constructs.
--Julian Rotter: ScjiaJL Learning^ nd_ Cj.inica_l
p. 43.

Interbehaviora! Psychology Newsletter

Noel VV, Smith, Editor
State University College <Sf Afts &
Faculty of Social Sciences
Pittsburgh, New York


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State University College of Arts and Science, Piattsburgh, New York j
Noel W. Smith, Editor ' ^L__^___J
Faculty of Social Sciences SEGMENT
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Number 4
August 1970

Salviati: I shall say that that which makes the earth
move Is a virtue like that by which Mars and Jupiter are
moved, . . .
Simpllclus: The cause of this is most manifest, arid
everyone knows that It is gravity.
Salviati: You are out, SImpllcius; you should say that
everyone knows that It is alle_d gravity,, and I do not ques-
tion about the name but about the essence (essenza) of the
thing. Of this you know not a tittle more than you know the
essence of the mover of the stars In gyration, unless It be
the name that has been put to the former and made familiar
and domestic by the many experiences that we have of It
every hour of the day,,
There Is no word in modern philosophy repeated more
often than this one (force), none which is defined so In-
exactly. Its obscurity makes it so handy, that one finds
its usage is not restricted to bodies with which we are
familiar; an entire school of philosophy today attributes
to beings which have never been, seen a force which does
not manifest Itself In any phenomenon.

NSP did not regard the Second Inter- any distinction^ but elimi-
behavioral Conference favorably nate It. The distinction is there
enough to grant any funds. This already,, and though behaviorism should
plus the fact that very few people be merging into Interbehavloral psycho-
could break away from other commit- logy. It is not doing so. I fear that
ments and responsibilities forced a the author of the quotation, must be
cancellation. We hope to carry on just a little bit naive Distinct-
the planned projects by correspon- ness is certainly no myth, and there
dence o is nothing "straw manish" about it
whatsoever. One has only to take a
Harry Mahan replies to the criticism cursory glance at some of the most
of the Newsletter that appeared in recent elementary textbooks to'see
issue # 2: "it Is not the purpose of that this is true,,"
any of us,, I am sure,, to perpetuate
Crude Data investigative Contact - Scientific Construction
In the May 1970 Aine_^a2i_^s1v_ch^2i2Si^t Bevan makes a couple of
comments that intimate a recognition of factors that have long
been advocated by interbehaviorists: "I reviewed data demon-
strating the influence of context on such things as sensory and
perceptual judgment, expectancy and response latency,, effective
reinforcement magnitude,, and free recall. I might also have
included reference to affect and motivation and to social judg-
ment ... .Nowhere is the handicap of the classical physical model
clearer than in our failure, until recently, to recognize the
significance of the fact that the psychological experiment It-
self is a case of interactive behavior" (p ,,443)-, In. the July
issue Lachenmeyer states: "As Nagel arid Kaplan point out. the
reality of human.behavior is the interaction between a multi-
plicity of variables,, The most theoretically meaningful ques-
tions in the social sciences will probably deal with these
interactions." (p.,622).
T.X. Barber has published a new-book to be out this month: LSD,
MARIJUANA., YOGA, AND HYPNOSIS, Aldine Publishing Company,, 529 S.
Wabash Avenue,, Chicago,, 111, 60605= He writes "The book Is
harmonious with the interbehavioral viewpoint," It looks as If
he has successfully despooked another traditionally spooky topic.
Here Is an excerpt from the flyer:"The book differs from previous
work on these subjects in that It treats "psychedelics," yoga,
and hypnosis as continuous with other known psychological pheno-
mena and as part of social psychology,, Moreover, it questions the
substance of beliefswidespread even among psychologists--that
"psychedelics,," yoga,, and hypnosis can bring out unused mental
or physical capacities, can heighten awareness or give rise to
enhanced creativity,, or can produce an altered state of conscious-
ness, a suspension of conventional reality-orientation, changes
in "body-image," or changes In perception. These long-held
assumptions are critically analyzed In the light of available
empirical data and accepted only if they are clearly supported
by this data. Complete bibliographies of literature on each
subject are included at the conclusion, of each chapter. The
results of these studies are twofold. First, they show that
few of the alleged dangers or enhanced psychological effects of
LSD and marijuana exist when, carefully studied in the light of
empirical data, arid the feats and other phenomena associated with
so-called yoga and hypnotism can be explained by other factors.
Second, the studies illustrate the method of analysis that can
most effectively be employed when studying other similar psycho-
logical phenomena.
Vol.2 are beginning to appear. In S_ciejic_e_, May 1970 Richard
Lowry presents a very confused analysis,, He spends much space on
the metaphysical status of a toothache,, assets that Kantor would
consider it a theoretical construction, then declares that it
does not have spatial dimensions like a chair. He makes the
common erroneous assumption that Kantor Is to be identified with
John Watson. Finally, he contends that "transpati, al'; and
"fictitious" are not synonymous. In the April 1970 Journal of
: 3:

Kenneth Gibson offers a

review that indicates a good grasp of what Kant or is saying. .'He
has some reservations about some of his assumptions 'but is quite
fair in the overall appraisal, Robert We y ant has a review of
both volumes in the July 1970 issue of
He believes that the work follows the usual path of history of
psychology texts rather than, that of the stated intent of .the
author. He considers a major weakness to lie in his rebuke of
mentalism as a statement of fact rather than a hypothesise He finds
the work meticulously scholarly, evidencing a great breadth of
knowledge, and distinctive in. relying on primary sources
Harry Mahan will have a no ties in the to
the following effect: Available to graduate students arid psycho-
1'ogy majors only: two 1970 publications, "A Primer of Inter-
actional Psychology"' 'list $1, 95) and H A Primer of Interactional
Psychology/ Part II,, Socratic Workbook" (list $1.75) for $2.00
plus 24^ postage plus sales tax: to California addressees o Project
Socrates: Department of Psychology,, Palomar College, San Marcos
Calif. 92069. Offer expires December 31, 1970,, This offer
for allL readers o:
has grown a 'bit. It is
So far only two indications have-been received of areas of
interest for purposes of correspondence and exchange of informa-
tion. Jot it on. a postcard and send to Newsletter so that we
c an c o rap lie a list.
For features in this issue >f the .Newsletter we are printing the
statement-to Dr Kant or on the conferring of the Doctor of L
degree to him by The University of Akron and an excerpt from a new
book by Rollo Handy: THE MEASUREMENT OF VALUE, Warren H,
expected date summer 1970

Presented June l4, 1970

The author of numerous books, arid, the founder of the widely respect-
ed journal, The Psychological Record,, JACOB ROBERT KANTOR, Professor
Emeritus of Indiana University,., has been active for five decades.
Structuralist psychologists,, in ascen.den.ce when he began his work,
saw the advent of Watsonian Behaviorism and soon thereafter the
emergence of Gestalt psychology. Both, without and within the
academy questions were repeatedly asked, "What is psychology about
and " How
Winds of doctrine blew heavily from all directions. Professor Kantor
withstood these gales and maintained a victorious immunity to the
mandates of tradition, ever seeking to match- the label "scientific"
to the fact of scientific psychology . His endeavors have promoted
man's directorship of man,

Hence, it is fitting to honor this Nestor among psychologists


a personage of impressive academic accomplishments 'whose seminal ideas

may well yield the -richest harvests in the years ahead.

Discussions of the most fruitful way to approach the subject

matter of scientific inquiry have generated an extensive literature;
many of those Issues were mentioned in Chapter I. The topic of con-
cern in the present'section Is related to a host of Issues discussed
under such headings as "atomism-vs. holism," "reductlonlsm," "reality
of societal laws, "methodological Individualism," etc. Of Immediate
concern are questions relating to the unit of analysis chosen for
inquiry (especially in the behavioral sciences,) and on the structure
and dynamics of that unit. The view taken here is closely related to
the _tr^ns_a^_lonaJ1ism of John Dewey and Arthur P. Bentley, to Norman
Cameron's biosocial approach, and to J.R. Kantor! s Interactlonism, 1.2
For present purposes, using the Dewey-Bentley terminology seems
Dewey a n d Bentley differentiate sharply between _ _
j ^ ^ra^nsactioifi, Their preliminary account follows:

" S elf _-_ a_c ti on : where things are viewed as acting under
their own powers.

I_n ;tejr^ja.cj:i_on : where thing is balanced against thing

in casual interconnection.,

12. John Dewey and Arthur P. Bentley., Kj2icmguja,nji_J^

Beacon Press, 19^93 paperback ed.s 19600 Norman Cameron,, _
lj2SLJ2JLJ^!:^ Boston,
HoughTon~l4iffTin3 ig^rr"^ > B1 o o mi rig -
ton,, Principia Press, Vol. I, 19^-5,s Vol. II s 1950 Although Dewey
and Bentley differentiate sharply between a transactlonal and an
interactional approach,, there is a strong family resemblance between
Kantorrs illte_racti.on. and their j^,Hladiono The complex, of Issues
discussed in this -section is discussed In much more detail In my
^h 3
where systems of description and naming
are employed to deal with aspects and phases of action,,
without final, attribution to 'elements5 or other
presumptively detachable or independent 'entitles,1
'essences^ 1 or 'realities^1 arid without Isolation of
presumptively.detachable 'relations1 from such detach- *
able 'elementso! "13

They argue that a self-actional. approach dominated early physics,

and is illustrated by the belief that rain, is caused by Jupiter Plu-
vius. 'Substance,,' 'essence^,1 !actor3' ' creator,! etc,s are terms
often made heavy use of In self-actional approaches. Galileo's
inquiries marked the overthrow of that approach in physics In the
behavioral science areas., those who put primary emphasis on. motives,
intentions and purposes often use a self-actional framework. Inter-
actionism tended to dominate in scientific Inquiry until recently5 arid
is typified by Newtonian mechanics. Many such interactional framework
still work efficiently in that warranted assertions emerge. On. the
other hand., in many areas of Inquiry the use of that framework produces
problems that are primarily methodogenlc (i.e., artifacts of the method)
as is illustrated by epistemological systems which generate problems
as to how mind and matter,, assumed to exist in separate ontologlcal
realmsj, can interact.14- .

In many situations transactionalism seems a more appropriate

framework for inquiry. Take the case of a man hunting a rabbit:

"No one would be able successfully to speak of the huntejr

and the hunteji as Isolated with respect to hunting. Yet
it is just as absurd to set up hunting as an event in
isolation from the-spatio-temporal connections of all the

Dewey and Bentley go on. to compare a billiard game with a loan:

"if we confine ourselves to the problem of the balls on.

the billiard table, they can profitably be presented
and studied interactlorially But a cultural account
of the game in its full spread of social growth and
human adaptations is already transactional. And if one
player loses money to another we cannot even find words
in which to organize a fully interactional account by
assembling together primarily separate items. Borrower
cannot borrow without lender to lend,, nor lender lend
without borrower to borrow, -the loan being a transaction
that is Identifiable only in the wider transaction of
the full legal-commercial system In which It Is present
as occurrence."15.

13- Dewey and Bentley., ,2_i_ci-jfc p.lo80

14. rb_id.., pp. 108-112. I have borrowed the term ' methodogenlc!
from Marvin Farber, Basic Issues oj[_PMJmoj)hv_; New York,
Harper & Row_, 1968"s pp7B3~Tf7~~ ~
15. Dewey and Bentley_, o]D_.__c_it;_. .> P133
In the Investigation of many processes,, the inquirer himself in
common process with what is being inquired into For present purpos-
es., then, 'transaction1 designates the full ongoing process In a.
field In which the inquirer may be in reciprocal relation with many
aspects and phases of that -field. No mysticism should be attached to
'field1; it names the cluster of connected things and events found in
mutual (reciprocal) relation. In many situations5 a methodological
emphasis on presumed self-actors,, or on presumed separates interact-
ing, does not.seem as fruitful in facilitating prediction as does an
emphasis on the transactional system as a whole.

The holistic emphasis on a field or system in which the aspects

and phases are In common process Is sometimes associated with a "tender-
minded" or "hard-science" approach of more atomistic emphases The
view chosen here combines a hard-science.,, skeptical3 tough-minded out-
look with a holistic frame of reference,, because such an approach seems
the most fruitful for inquiry.. For example, I see nothing at all mystic-
al or tender-minded about viewing loans.,, borrowers, arid lenders as
aspects of a common transactional framework. Indeed,, leaving out the
"system" in which the behavior occurs is surely to make unnecessary
problems and difficulties. Separating the borrower from, the
transaction does not make inquiry more scientific;-It tends "
some Important relations.

As applied to measurement., a transactional framework leads one to

emphasize what often Is Ignored by philosophers: the methodological and
other problems of the data-collector or person who is trying to measure
something. Viewed transactlonally, many aspects or phases of" the whole
transaction have their importance,, including not only questions about
the formal structure of the.scale used arid related problems, but the
problems of calibrating the Instruments used, controlling the observa-
tion of the results., etc. This issue will be discussed further in the
context of fundamental vs. derived measurement; for the present I will
only point out that having a scale characterized by an impressively
neat and tidy set of formal properties -may be of no use at all to an.
investigator if the conditions encountered make it impossible, for him
to exercise adequate control over the observations necessary for the use
of that scale.
State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York j
Noel W . Smith, Editor F I E L D ! PRECEDING
Faculty of Social Sciences i SEGMENT

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Volume 1
SE(3MEHT Number 5
PSYCHOLOGY ! November 1970
Therefore everything In existence is, fundamentally, made out of two
things. There are bodies and there Is the void in which these bodies have
their places and through which they move in different directions., For
sensation which is common to everybody declares that body exists. And un-
less we hold fast to this original belief in sensation,, we shall find that
in matters beyond the reach of sensation we shall have no principle to which
we can refer and by means of which we can arrive at rational conclusions.
Next, if there were no such thing as space (which is what we mean by "the
void ) there would be nowhere in which the bodies could be situated and it
would be quite impossible for them to move about in different directions,.. ,
There is nothing else--nothing which you could say was distinct both from
body and from void and could be pronounced to be a third substance. For
everything that Is to exist must be something In Itself; if it is capable
touching and being touched,, however light and small the touch may be, it
...L.11, provided that it does exist,, Increase the quantity of body to some
extent,, whether great or small,, and be an addition to the sum of things.
If on the other hand it Is tangible and unable to prevent any object in
motion from passing through It at any point, then unquestionably It must be
what we call the empty void. Then again,, whatever Is to exist in Itself
will either do something., or else must remain passive itself while other
things act upon it, or else must be of the sort in which things can exist
and actions can take place. But nothing can act or be acted upon without
body and nothing can afford space except the void and the empty. Therefore5
apart from the void and bodies it is impossible for there to exist in the
sum of things any residual third substance. Such a substance could never
at any time come within the reach of our senses, nor could any man lay hold
of it by any process of reasoning.
Lucretius (First Century B.C.)
(Rex Warner, Translator).
How may the union of the corporeal with-the incorporeal be conceived?..
..How will that which Is corporeal seize upon that which is incorporeal, so
to hold It conjoined with Itself, or how will the Incorporeal grasp the
corporeal, so as reciprocally to keep it bound to itself....? I ask you
how you think that you, If you are 'incorporeal and unextended, are capable
of experiencing the sensation of pain?...The general difficulty always
remains, how the corporeal can have anything in common with the incorporeal,
or what relationship may be established between the one and the other.
Pierre Gassendi (Letter to
Descartes quoted in OBJECTIONS
Haldane G . R . T . Ross, T r . )
Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction
So far as I can gather from his own words, this is the opinion of that
distinguished, man (Descartes), and I. could scarcely have believed it possible
for one so great to have put it forward if it had been less subtle. I can
hardly wonder enough that a philosopher who firmly resolved to make no deduct-
ion except from self-evident principles, and to affirm nothing but what he
clearly and distinctly perceived,, and who blamed, all the schoolmen because
they desired to explain obscure matters by occult qualities, should except a
hypothesis more occult than'''any occult quality. What does he understand, I
ask, by the union of. the-mind and body? What clear and distinct conception
has he thought intimately connected, with a certain small1 portion of matter?
I wish that he had explained this union by its proximate cause. 'But he con-
ceived the mind to be so distinct from the body* that he,, was able to-, as sign
no single cause of this union, rior of the mind itself^ 'but was' obligeqt to
have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to say, to God,,
Baruch Spinoza: ETHICS
(W.H, White, Tr.)

In the race of the various phenomena with which this book is concerned,
the selection is determined iri past by the ancient distinction between mind
arid matter. Mind is mysterious, being, as the French philosopher Rene
Descartes said, "unextended substance,' Yet how can mind be in the body
and still occupy no space there? It seems reasonable to suppose that so
impalpable an essence could act in strange ways. For Instance, if the mirid
or the soul--the two used not to be distinguishedcan be here and yet take
up no room, may not the mind or its effects be both here, there, and every-
where, like light or, as now, the radio waves?
E.G. Boring in the Introduction

Now, matter obeys the principles of conservation of mass plus energy,

momenta and electrical charges Any influence upon matter implies the
variation of at least one of these quantities, 'If one material system
acts upon another, the changes of mass, momenta, energy and electric
charges of the second are compensated by equal and contrary changes in the
first. If mind is supposed to act upon matter, it would have to possess
mass, energy, momenta or electric charges. But according to the usual
psychological definition, it does not possess them. Therefore an action
of mind upon matter is possible,, It would mean the breaking of the laws
of physics,
E. Gaviola: The impossibility of
interaction between mind and matter1
Philosophy of Science, April 1936

What room has modern science Tor the dichotomy of man or of any other
natural object? There is no mind, and indeed, no body considered as an
adjunct of mind. As an organism the scientific worker is an observable
object In Interrelation with other thing's. His existence, his operations,
are as public and as stable as anything else in nature

With this issue we come to the end of 1970. The number of subscribers
now totals 1^5 The NwsjLe_tJ:_er_ will definitely continue for another year,,
and hopefully indefinitely into the future. Subscription forms for 1971 are
included with this issue.
A brief comment on the quotations: Gassendi, Spinoza, Gaviola, and
Boring offer incisive comments on the problems of dualism,, but fall victim
to it in their own writings. Gaviola1s paper is an object lesson on how
the clearest statement of the problem is not sufficient to obviate it when
the troublesome concept is not completely replaced by an event based
Cheiron International Society for the History of the Behavioral and
Social Sciences will meet April 29-May 2, 1971 in New York City. Several
interbehaviorallsts usually attend (see Numbers 2 and 3) For information
write Dr. Barbara Ross, University of Massachusetts, 100 Arlington Street,
Boston, Mass. 02116.
At the 1970 APA meeting Jerry Carter received from The Division of
Community Service a Distinguished Service Award for a "lifetime of signi-
ficant contributions to community mental health and community psychology"
and from The Division of Psychologists in Public Service the Hildreth
Memorial Award, In the May Number we reported an award to him by The
Division of Clinical Psychology.
The continuing tenacity of the brain dogma is illustrated by some
current material. ^|l^Xi2Z_-2^Z^ July 20, 1970 reports that Charles
Burkland, a neurosurgeon at the Omaha VA Hospital, found that nine of
twelve patients having hemispherectomles were able immediately after the
operation to perform movements with the side of the body supposedly con-
trolled by the excised hemisphere. But rather than abandon the old dogma
he proposes that such movements must originate in the lower brain rather
than the cortex. At the editor's institution a circular describing a new
graduate seminar in biology called The Neural Basis of Behavior reads:
'Many biologists have become convinced that we are on the verge of a
revolution in the understanding of neurophysiology as it relates to behavior,,
In this seminar students will examine the conceptual' basis for the coming
revolution by reading arid critically discussing some of the classic papers
in neurophysiology. Later in the semester each student will present a
report on the status of a currently hot topic of research. Some of the
topics to be'studied: perception,, learning and memory,, electrical stimulation
of the brain.;, attention, sleep, pharmacological effects on behavior." In
the sjho_logi_c_al Review, November 1970, Bindra takes Sperry to task for
the dualism in the latter's paper of 1969 "A modified concept of conscious-
ness." Unfortunately, Bindra gets as entangled in mentalistic constructs
and neurological surrogates as Sperry. Sperry rebuts by disclaiming epi-
phenomenalism, double aspect^ inner aspect of cerebral process, parallelism,
and other traditional mentalistic approaches; but the basic dualistic entities
and processes and their neural bases remain unchanged in that his theory
elies these disclaimers. At this rate the imminent revolution is still
^n infinity away.
* * * * * **
The spooks are now heavily funded. .August 31 Behavior Today reports
that Howard Shevrin received a grant of $157^900 from NIMH to study ttie__
unconscious o I_t_ is measured by fluctuations in electrical activity of the
brain during visual discrimination tasks.
In the Jourmilj::!^^ July 1969 <,
5 5 326-3395 Thornton published a critical review of the chapter on Socrates
and Smith have written a reply that will appear in 1971 > probably April or
July 5 along with Thornton's rebuttal if he chooses to provide one. Russell
arid Winograd have replied in S_cieric_e_3 September 1970 to Lowry's review of
Volume 2 (see August Ne2JS_le_ttrJ7~~~A point in common with the reply of
Mountjoy and Smith is a correction of the assumption that interbehaviorism
'is identical with Watsonian behaviorism.
* * * # # * *
Feature articles in this number consist of a reaction to the excerpt
from Handy's new book presented in the last number and a list of selected
readings in interbehavioral psychology as requested earlier. These repre-
sent a few of several possible areas. Several features are already lined
up for issues next year including a critique on intellectual "deficiency"
by Marion White MePherson and a defense of the interbehavioral position by
Jacqueline Farrington.


In the excerpt from the new book of Professor Rollo Handy in the last
number of" the Newslejbte^, the author avers that while Dewey and Bentley*
differentiate sharply between, transactional and interactional interpretations
of events there is a strong family resemblance between Kantor's Interaction
and their Transaction,, Thus Professor Handy joins other writers who have
denied the claims of transactionists to have invented a different and
superior principle of explicating events

Are these claims only rhetorical autism? That appears to be the case,
Still where there is so much clamor a look-in may be appropriate. Accord-
ingly, we Inquire briefly why there is such bombastic and strident emphasis
upon the term "transaction" instead of "interaction". If there is a problem
here it certainly must be examined upon two levelsa superficial semantic
one arid a deeper philosophic one, e suspect that this modern homo-homo!
issue, masks a great divergence between scientific interactions and meta-
physical transactions,,
Semantics first. As Professor Handy and other writers suggest, when
concrete situations are described there is no compulsion to prefer one term
to another. Words are seldom used descriptively, mainly they are metaphor-
ical. Those who are attuned to the commercial aspects of our culture--
merchants5 brokers5 fathers and sons of bankersalert to loans, borrowers,
and lenders favor the term "transaction". But those interested in analyzing
and describing events and not merely applying names cannot accept favored
terms as identical with confronted things and events. Transaction or Inter-
action? De gustibus,o,o.
Turning next to the deeper philosophical considerations we discover
that extremely different postulates underly the different usages. The
transactionists draw their intellectual sustenance from the bottomless well
of Hegelian objective idealism., in which actor and thing acted upon,, the
knower arid the known,, are interfused in one gigantic spiritual cosmochaos.
For them nature is only knowledge of nature, and in all situations naming is
identical with the named.
^Knowing and the Known, Boston, Beacon Press,, 1949,
To cozen themselves and their readers the metaphysical transactlonists
loudly proclaim that the names or the events^ hunter^, hunted,, and the hunt
j_ng do not exist in isolation but in a system. What need to blast the man
of straw who disagrees? Though Johnny may not know how to- read,, he does
know that "borrower cannot borrow without a lender to lend,, nor lender lend
without borrower to borrow,," He knows, too,, that no transaction creates
the interactors who by their actions engender the transaction. Moreover,,
he is quite aware that the borrower is riot the lender but usually the victim
of an exaction interaction. If ever the roles are reversed it is not
because the actors were identical to begin with but rather because two
separate and distinct people enter into an economic game in its various
phases. No great acumen is required to see that there is no connection
between any concrete transaction and any metaphysical transactionism,, and
no acumen is needed to conclude that the writings aimed at making such
connections are gossamer spun to support the vast concrete universal.

Since it appears probable that of the Dewey--Bentley couple it is the

latter who is mainly responsible for the great emphasis upon the power of
words and their identity with knowledge and with things it is instructive
to exemplify his mentallstic dialectic that is the basis of transactionism.
e return to a status of the world in the mind^ yet mind in the world.
e solve it by symblotaxis. The world is in the mind socially taken as
action (symbiotaxis). The symbiotaxium constructs the world-knowledge--i.e. ,
it 'is1 that world The world (knowledge) includes mind (mind as psycho-
logical technique)."*

In complete contrast to such transactionism the interactional view-

point stands firmly upon a scientific philosophy. That is to say,, all
premises are exclusively derived from descriptive and analytic confront-
ations with actual events. Specifically in psychology the term "inter-
action" is employed as a synonym for the interbehavior of organisms with
other organismss or things and conditions with which they come into contactL> ,
The interbehavloral scientist is completely justified In investigating the
components of Interacting fields since they also Interact with many other
different things in other behavioral fields. Moreover,, he may study how
he himself fits into the different behavior fields and how he influences
the various entire fields. The only "metaphysics" of the interbehavloral"]
scientist consists of the demand that he rid himself of all assumptions I
derived from, autistic constructionss Instead of from interbehavloral j

A, MItsorg

^Inquiry into Inquiries., Boston., Beacon Press,, 195^-? p.25


Bentley, A. P. BEHAVIOR, KNOWLEDGE, PACT. Prlncipla, 1935, Ch.12: "The
apprehensional space -segment : Kantor" .
Bucklew, Jo Complex 'behavioral units of the reactional biography ^_cho_-
LogLca^Jtecoixa, 1956 , 6, 44-77, '
Herman, D.T, What is the stimulus? Ps_^chlogia2-__Rord>5 1957., 7 , 70-72.
Herman, D.T, & Kenyon, G.T. A contribution toward interbehavioral analysis.
., 1956, 6, 33-38.
Kantor, J . R , How do we acquire our basic reactions?
1921, 28S 328-356,
Karitor, J . R . The nervous system, psychological fact or fiction?
1922, 19, 38-49.

Kantor, J.R, Preface to interbehavioral psychology. Z2il2i2^i^

1942, 5, 173-193.
Kantor3 J.R. INTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY., Principia, 1959.
Kantor, JR. An analysis of the experimental analysis- of behavior (TEAB).
1970, 13, 101-108,
Lichtenstein, P.E, Psychology as a genetic science.
, 1950, 42, 313-332.
Lichtenstein, P.E. Psychological Systems: Their Nature and Function.
17-, 321-340.
San Marcos, Calif.: Project Socrates Press, Palomar College, 1968.
Project Socrates Press, Palomar College, 1970.

Noris, 0,0. A preamble to an organismic theory of knowledge. PhilS2Ehy.

H_2ience3 193^, 1, 46-478,
Pronko, N.H. TEXTBOOK OF .ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY. Williams & Wilkins, 1963.,
(esp. p. 25-27 on field).
Pronko, N.H. PANORAMA OF PSYCHOLOGY. Brooks/Cole, 1969. :


& Kegan Paul, 1952.
1926, 23, 248-249.
Stephenson, . Postulates of behaviorism. Philosophy of Science , 1953,
203 110-120.
Swartz, P. -On the validity of the experimental approach to behavior,
^ 1957, 7, 119-122.

Biones, I.T, An experimental comparison of two forms of linguistic learn-

ing. Pxchlogj:aj^^ 1937, 1, 205-214.
Brackman, J.P. /An interbehavloral analysis of sensory preconditioning
1956, 6} 24-26.
Carter, J.W. An experimental study of the stimulus function. Psychological
Record, 1937, 1, 35-48,
Carter , J.W. An experimental study of psychological stimulus-response.
ZS2rcholoical_Record., 1938, 2, 35-91.
Foley, J.P. The effect of context upon perceptual differentiation. Ajrchlve_s_
of^_Ps_y_cholog^5 1935, Nr. l84, 67 pp.
Herman, D.T, Linguistic behaviors: I. Some differentiations in hearer
response to verbal stimulation. Journal of General Psychology, 1951j> 445
Herman, D<,T.<, Linguistic behaviors: II. The development of hearer inter-
action with holophrastic language stimuli. Journaj^oJI^ene^aj^Ps^ychology,
1951, 44, 273^291,
Lichtenstein, P.E, Studies of anxiety: II. The effects of lobotomy on a
feeding inhibition In dogs. ^^~]Q^^
P_sy_choloy_., 1950., 43., 419-427.
Mount joy,, P.T, Differential behavior in monozygotic twins, P^y_cliolOic_al_
_, 1957, 7, 65-69,
Pronko , N 0 H<, An exploratory Investigation of language by means of
oscillographic arid reaction time techniques. ^oiliSfLLj^jLJi^^
1945, 355 433-458.
Ratner, S.Ca; Gawronski, J.J.j & Rice, F.E. The variable of concurrent
actions In language of children: effect of delayed speech feedback.
Psychological Re corda 1964, l4, 47-56.
Ratner, S.C. & Rice, F,E The effect of the listener on the speaking
interaction. ^s^_cY}l^ic^lfJiec.oT^9 1963, 13, 265-268.
Wolf, I, S<, Stimulus variables in aphasia: I. Setting conditions. Journal
1958, 44, 203-22IL
//olf, I.S. Stimulus variables in aphasia: II. Stimulus objects. Journal
of the Scientific Laboratorie_s,Derii^ 1958, 44, 2l8~22cT7~~~~
Kantor, J.R. Suggestions toward a scientific interpretation of perception.
1920 , 27, 191-216.
Herman, D.T.; Lawless., R.H.; & Marshall, R.W. Variables in the effect of
language on the reproduction of visually perceived forms.
Motor__Skills_, 1957, 7, 171-186.
Lichtenstein, P.E, Perception arid the psychological metasystem.
logical Record, 1959* 9, 37-44.
Pronko, N.H. Some reflections on perception. Z^Z]l22^i^i_jM2Z^,.9 1961.,
11, 311-314.
Pronko, N.H.; Ebert, R.; & Greenberg, G. A critical review of theories of
perception. In A. A. Kidd & J.L. Rivoire (Eds). PERCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT IN
CHILDREN, International Universities,, 1966.

Brackman, J.F. Some comments on the definition of emotion.

Record, 1957, 7> 93-95
Howard, D,T. A functional theory of emotions. In E.L. Reymert (Ed),
Kantor,, J.R. An attempt toward a naturalistic description of emotions (I)
(II). Pl^ch^log^aaj^ej^ 1921, 28, 19-42^ 120-140.
Kantor,, J.R. The psychology of feeling or affective reactions.
y_,) 1923, 3^5
Kantor, J.R. Peelings and emotions as scientific events. Psy_clioloic_al_
Re cord3 1966, 16, 377-404.

Kantor, J.R. Can psychology contribute to the study of linguistics?
Morust, 19285 38, 630-648,
Kantor, J.R. Language as behavior and as symbolism. Joumal_^f^^
1929, 26, 150-159.
Kantor, J.R,, AN OBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRAMMAR. Indiana University, 19360
Pronko, N.H. Language and psychological linguistics: a review.
1946, 43, 189-239.
Ratner, S.C0 Toward a description of language behavior: I. The speaking
action. ZZ^l2l5^_^II^.5 1957> 7, 61-64.
Noel W. Smith, Editor Preceding

Faculty of Social Sciences

Setting Factors

Stimulus Object
Stimulus ["
Function j

Media L

Number 1
PSYCHOLOGY January 1971

State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

_____________Ji_ZZ^ly: a point of view that defines

psychology as the study of evolved events in which at
least one of the interacting or Interbehaving factors is
an organism. The event consists in the interbehavior of
an organism with other organismss things3 and relations,
which are structurally and exlsteritially independent of
the Interbehaving organism- (That is^ neither stimulus
objects nor their properties are cr_e_at_e_d_ in the inter-
behavioral acti but the characteristics of any particular
psychological ev_ent are derived from previous Inter-
behaviors ) The configurations or adjustments that con-
stitute events called psychological are evolved ~- i,e.<,
they are dependent upon or conditioned by previous inter-
behaviors .

-English & English: A COMPREHENSIVE


The demand for Kantor's LOGIC OF cation: Perspectives in Training
MODERN SCIENCE and Volume I of THE the Non-Professionals in Applied
has been so great that these are now 1971 It honored B.F. Skinner
being reprinted, Other speakers were Daniel 0'Leary5
Robert ahler5 Harold Cohens Sidney
Fred recent LEARNING RE- Bijou,, Teodore Ayllon.3 and Charles
INFORCEMENT THEORY , rev ed..5 appear- Ferster, Paul MountJoy is now on &
ed along with some other new books in semester sabbatical leave working
a brochure entitled,, paradoxically^ on a history of operant condition-
: "Mind Expanders from Random House- ing as animal technology- This was
Knopf !t Other ope rant news: Univer- inspired by Vol. 1 of THE SCIENTIFIC
sity of Veracruz in Mexico held a EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY,,,
"First Symposium on Behavior Modifi- ******
* Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction
A new publication of note is by T. R. Sarbin and J. C. Mancuso:
"Failure of a moral enterprise: attitudes of the public toward mental
Illness",, ]S22J!^LJ2JLJ22B^ > 1970, 353
159-173. The authors find that the public has not shown signs of
change in connection with the educational campaign to de-stigmatize
"mental Illness" while it is generally tolerant of concrete deviant
behavior. Apparently the public Is better grounded In events than,
the professionals: "The man in the street, particularly the occupant
of a low SES [socloeconomlc status] , has told us that his urihapplness
originates in identifiable problems. The mental health professional
insists on disordered minds as the cause of the slum dweller's conduct;
the public has not been willing to apply the myth of the professionals."
"The .mental Illness concept embodies a series of logical absurdities
which forestall, efforts to subsume certain classes of deviant behavior
under the category of mental Illness"
Some comments, occurred about the list of "Suggested Readings in. Inter-
behavioral Psychology" that appeared In, the last Issue to the effect
that there were important omissions The list was meant to be select-
ive rather than exhaustive but perhaps some useful additions--none of
which fit the categories given unless It would be "general"--would
include Lundlri's AN OBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF MUSIC, 1953, 196?;
Swartz's "Stimulus evolution in problem solving behavior: an inter-
behavioralM analysis", ^Psy^cjn^^g^aJ^J^^orpl, 1955 55 425-432; and
Carter's .A case of reactional dissociation (hysterical paralysis)", '
^!^LC^^ 1937.9 7js ,219-224. Carter's paper
is an application, of technical Inte rbehavloral analysis and planning
of therapeutic procedure that is still fresh and of vital .importance
In today's clinical settings as well as having theoretical importance.
If anyone wishes to place a notice about faculty openings, graduating
students looking for jobs or degree programs,, new or old degree pro-
grams of special interest,, or is seeking new horizons himself the
Nej^sJ^tt^r is available for such information.
~ ~" ******
The special features this Issue Include a short lampoon written by-
Hal Bauer when he was an undergraduate at SUNY at Plattsburgh and
attending a philosophy class in existentialism. He Is now In Tanzania,
East Africa, doing field studies on chimpanzees with Jane Goodall as
part of his graduate studies. The other item is a list of mentalistic
phrases with a corresponding list of attempted objective replacements.
It will be observed that the objective ones are often, rather awkward
or at least do not come tripping to the tongue,, an Indication of
the grip that our duallstic culture holds on us and which is abetted
In part by the same language habits it produces. Since the mentalese
is not objective there may be some disagreement about what objective
events the phrases do allude to if any. It makes a useful exercise;
for students to listen for arid colleqt these and attempt to write
objective equivalents
Anyone who might wish to obtain a 5x7 color'print of Dr. Kantor with
honor guard at The University of Akron may send a check for $1025
payable to Noel Smith. Orders" will be sent March 15
-; ;
****** ;
Harold Bauer

Once upon a time there was a kingdom called Boo! In the kingdom
were many experts on Boo-ology and they talked constantly in a language
of Booi One of these Boo-ologists taught at the University of Bool,
called Booi State. Dr. Theos was his name and he was well briefed on
Booisml , and by using it's neologisms fluently he made a strong
impression on many of his students They all wanted to study Boo-ology
so they could also impress people with the language of Boo! and
'understand1 Boolst thoughts One of his studentss Erutan^ an anti-
Booist,, asked why was Boo-ology necessary and on what observable events
was Boo-ology based. All through his course In Booism! he tried to
explain to Dr. Theos that he thought it was all unnecessary,, but the
problem was that the teacher could not understand anything in non-
Booist terms . So goes the Kingdom of Boo!


don't mind don't object
keep in mind r r
all in your mind imagine it
with, you in spirit think of you
bless my soulI I'm pleasantly surprised
mind over matter reactions diverted to substitute
have a mental picture imagine
has a mind of his own is independent
inner peace calmness
against my will. contrary to my preference
has all his faculties f unc t lorilng normally
out of sight., out of mind out of sight, forgotten
mindless without duly considering
mindful attending
mental giant highly Intelligent person
that's the spirit t h a t ' s the appropriate enthusiasm
spirits high elated
f e eble -minde dn.e s s developmental retardation
nervous anxious
ne r vy bold
nerve racking stressful
back of your mind readiness to recall
change your mind change your decision
make up"your mind decide
spirit is strong but body is weak passively desiring but insufficient!;
blow your mind (30 senior psychology majors could
not agree on a meaning )
mind's eye visually imagined
out of your mind Irrational
come to your senses b e have r at I onally
have spirit enthusiasm,
give up the ghost die
bring to mind stimulate to recall
speak your mind s p e ak f r ankly
have in mind Intend or thinking about
Mentales ectlvese
spirit of law intention of law * :
spirit of times orientation of times
spiritless listless
make mental note observe for later recollection
use your head think
gave a piece of my mind scolded
soul stirring experience intense affective reaction
weighs on the mind continually troubled reaction,
it's the spirit that counts attitude is important
a mindless act irresponsible act
conscious of attending to
picking your mind or_ brain questioning for specialized Information
a guts issue an affective issue
know the inner man know the individual's reactions intimately
brainstorm succession of unevaluated schemes
what ' s on your mind what are you thinking about
mentally alert readiness to respond
mind a blank. unable to recall or to react constructively
me n t al exercise th.lnki.rig exercise
a meeting of minds agreement
a closed mind refusal to consider something different
have rocks in your head be illogical ' .
mental block unable to recall certain things
cool head logical
psyched up excited
get it off your mind dispose of it so that it no longer stlmuf ':<
more brains that brawn. intelligent but limited muscular strength
put your minds together work jointly on a problem
level headed use 'Intelligent or rational approach
lost my mind acted i r r at1onal ly
keen mind Intelligent
slipped my mind forgot
lose your head a c. t i r r at 1 o nal ly
racked my brain tried to recall
don't know my own mind uncertain of my own reactions
the brains to go far the ability to succeed
let your heart lead the way- make your decisions affectively
fixed in. mind well established reaction
dampen spirits reduce enthusiasm
call to mind recall an event
put out of mind discontinue reacting to something
my mind is clear nothing is interfering with my thinking
have a mind to disposed to
one track mind preoccupation with single object
bear in mind remember
off the top of my head Impromptu
use your will power proceed resolutely
int e rnal s at 1 s f a c 1 1 on affe ctIvely s at is fying
internalize develop habitual response
mental arithmetic implicit arithmetic or covert arithmetic
raise your ego develop more positive reactions to your
own reactions ' ''
I have an idea I have developed a plan
soul music music constituting substitute stimulus
for social, conditions
Noel W. Smith, Editor
Faculty of Social Sciences

Stimulus Object


Number 2


State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

Prom my earliest professional concern with psychology I have been

a reprobative witness of the spiral development of the discipline
from pure mentalism couched in language that perpetuates auyayehis*
tic mode of thinking. What was plain consciousnesss self,, mind.,
or ego has recently become cognitive behavior.


(from the. Preface)

Since the notions of soul and consciousness undoubtedly were

derived from an interest .in one's own person and its destiny5
they became developed into the doctrine of absolute uniqueness
and individuality. In modern, this doctrine has taken'.the
form that one can only have knowledge of his own mind. The
existence of minds in others and the nature of what goes on in
those minds can only be matters of indirect inference. The famous
and perennial argument that only the possessor of the aching tooth
could have direct experience or knowledge of the toothache is
simply the product of the evolution of psychic doctrine Those
who accept the doctrine have always become influenced by the
dogma of mind to- overlook the fact that all events are unique
What A is digesting is not being digested by B, The fall of A
is not the fall of B. Nor does the fact that neither A nor B~~
can ee_ what the other is digesting nor observe the fall of the
other,, unless both happen to be in a favorable situation, Indi-
cate that psychic stuff or principle is involved. Again, the
subtlety of events lends no basis to their mentalization unless
background institutions demand this. Privacy no more helps to
establish transcendental mind than any of the other factors we
have considered
OF PSYCHOLOGY, vo!0 1, 1963, Pp.291-292
Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction
The Principia Press of Granville, Ohio, announces the early publication of
a new book of over 600 pages by Dr. J, R, Kant or to be entitled THE AIM AND'
papers classified into eleven sections each covering Important issues with-
in the general scientific or specialized psychological domain. In the case
of each of the articles which has appeared in an American or foreign journal
during an interval of almost half a century the aim has been to indicate
the direction psychology and the other sciences should move in order to
reach a genuinely naturalistic status .
A recent book by Arthur L. Blumenthal : LANGUAGE AND PSYCHOLOGY: HISTORICAL
ASPECTS OP PSYCHOLINGUISTICS, Wiley, 1970 (paperback) contains a major
portion of Kantor!s<, "Can Psychology contribute to the study of linguis-
tics?", Monls_t_,) 1928. Blumenthal notes that few except Roback, Karitor,
Esper, and Carroll have cited the early work in psycholinguistics He holds
that Kant or established a behaviorism more radical than Watson or Meyers ,
expunged both mind and physiological explanation, confined psychology to
"input -out put relations," held to a descriptive approach to language and
rejected "any underlying mechanisms or explanations" along with Bloomfield,
always maintained a greater interest in language than any other aspect of
behavior, and showed unusual acquaintance with philological literature of
Europe which possibly accounts for his remaining isolated from "the main-
stream of American psychology" although an intense supporter of behaviorism,
He considers AN OBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRAMMAR to be 'mlstltled because it
contains little of grammar and to be preoccupied with criticisms but to
effectively and distinctively show the American objections to the Wundtian
approacha denial of language as symbol or as outward expression of Inward-
cognition . While Blumenthal ' s treatment has a few misinterpretations It Is
an unusually satisfactory account on the whole and bears reading,

All five back Issues of the Newslet_te_r_ of 1970 are still available. Price:
$2,00 for the five or 50^ ea'cli~~T^|~~thos~e prices for students). Number five
might be of special Interest to new subscribers, for it contains a selected
list of readings in five areas of Interbehavioral psychology,

"A reply to Thornton's 'Socrates and the History of Psychology'" by Mount joy
and Smith mentioned in the Newsletter, vol.1, No. 5 a appeared in Tlie__
of_t_he_Jl^^ April/ 1971 . Offprints may be
obtained from either author, Thornton did not offer a rebuttal.

Correction: The January 1971 number should have given the

Iteort_s_ Instead of the ^X2il2i2Si^i_Ji2^^: ^or Swartz's "Stimulus evolu
tion in problem solving behavior: an Interbehavioral analysis

There will be a Summer Institute on the History of Psychology June 22 to

July 31 j 1971 at Lehlgh University directed by Josef Brozek and' supported
by NSF,, In 1969 it was held at the University of New Hampshire, A present
ation on interbehaviorlsm was made by Sam Campbell, Wayne Lazar, and Noel
Smith arid was tape recorded,

The feature article In this 'Issue is "A Case of Reactional Dissociation

(Hysterical Paralysis)" by Jerry Carter described In the last number as
a technical employment of Interbehavioral principles The "summary of
history" portion is by Jacqueline Farrlngton,
Jerry W. Carter^ Jr.

"To a surprising extent current psychiatric thought appears to mis-

conceive and over-simplify its data and then compensate for this short-
coming by unctuously elaborating its description and procedure. Remedial
to this, it is submitted that Kantor's Organismic Concept in Mental Patho-
logy-'- and the Meyer school in psychiatry^ afford a purely behavioral
approach of more substantial service than the pseudo-realities of mental-
istic dialectics by placing emphasis on inquiry into the individual's
developmental history. Abnormal behavior studied from such an objective
standpoint makes possible descriptive terms derived from actually observed
behavior conditions rather than from medical or psychological traditions.::
"The writer considers the case of reactional dissociation (hysterical
paralysis) presented here to be so ideally commonplace as to make up for
its spectacular deficiencies. It Is possibly of more than usual interest
for this reason particularized as follows: first,, the pertinent develop-
mental history of the patient's pathology is complete and distinct; second,
the Initial ease and suddenness with which this history was brought out Is
noteworthy; and finally, the patient's response to planned treatment was
Summary of History:
Kate, a 13-year old female with a medical history of excellent health,,
was admitted to the hospital presenting the following symptoms: (1) partial
paralysis of the left leg, (2) extreme nervousness, (3) marked loss of
apetite. Symptoms had occurred intermittently over a period of nine months,
Increasing in severity. Medical examination had suggested possible diagno-
ses of (1) hysterical paralysis, (2) post-poliomyletis, (3) post-polio-
Inasmuch as no emotional conflict prior to the onset of difficulties
was related during the initial psychological Interview,, Kate was requested
to recount all of her experiences up to the time of the Initial seizure,,
Over a period of several interviews,, the patient related having learned of
problems between the parents, Including extra-marital relationships on both

*Copyrlght5 the American Orthopsychiatric Association,, Inc. Reproduced by

permission from American Journal of Orthopsychiatry., 1937^ 7> 219-224,,
Originally publication of the Indiana University Psychological Clinics}
Ser. II, Number 12.
Kant or} J.R., Princip_les of Psychology, A. Knopf, New York, 1926, vol. ii,
p. 452 ff. '
Kanner, Leo, Child Psychiatry, Thomas, Springfield, 111.,, 1935 =
sides. Considerable disagreement , hostile behavior and discussion of divorf
between the parents., as well as an attempted shooting of the father by a
third man, a friend of the mother's paramour, had been witnessed by Kate.
During this time, an older sister had threatened suicide . The parient relat-
ed these events with considerable agitation and emotionality.

Although the parents had evidently been successful In returning the home
to normal conditions , the patient had continued to react to this period of
extreme stress by refusal to accept her parents' behavior. She had expe-
rienced feelings of "oppressive melancholy," engaged In compulsive behaviors
and become fearful and withdrawn in situations of social Intercourse both at
home and at school. The initial Incident of paralysis had occurred while in
school,, where she was an excellent student.

"A diagnosis of hysteria of the reactional dissociation type was made

on the basis of the above findings ,. ,l!

"It was considered essential that the patient return, figuratively

speaking, to the situation of the parental triangle and learn to meet it
with complete acceptance. This, it was believed, would eliminate the basis
of her hysteria and redirect her reactional biography towards a more normal
behavior picture. To this end a frequent and thorough review of the domestic
scene In question was prescribed, along with physical and occupational therapy
for the duration of hospltalization. " (Carter, 1937) .
Kate was Instructed to think frequently about what had occurred and to
do so as objectively as possible. During each visit to the clinic, she was
requested to describe the previous domestic strife in more detail, the
purpose of doing so being made 'clear to her. After a period of three visits
in two weeks time, all symptoms had disappeared and the patient was dis-
charged with Instructions to continue thinking about the events In question,
telling them either to a confidante or aloud to herself.
Follow-up visits of one month and -four months later demonstrated that
behavior had returned to normal. During the final visit, Kate was able to
recount the experiences with composure , She reported that she had done as
Instructed and that while it was still unpleasant, it no longer disturbed her,

"in the following discussion of the Fox case we will attempt to

Illustrate the efficacy of the organismic viewpoint when applied to abnormal
behavior of biographic origin. 3 It will be noted that the only limitations
Imposed by this logical technique are our powers of observation and breadth
of empirical experience .

^Abnormal behavior of biographic origin, e.g., Dementia Praecox, Mania,

Melancholy, Hysteria, etc., as distinguished from abnormal behavior of
organic origin, e.g., Paresis, Arterio-sclerosis, etc.
A refined objective description of our patient's behavior pathology
must first take into account the complexity of her developmental history,,
for5 therein lies the whole story of her difficulty. An adequate knowledge
of the developmental history leads to an understanding of the behavior
equipment which the patient used in interacting with various persons,,
objects and situations. More specif ically^ her abnormal behavior may be
described as a maladjustment between her behavior equipment and the situa-
tional surroundings . Prior to the violent domestic disturbances we find
the patient's behavior equipment developed well within a normal adjustment
range for a girl of ten years , as evidenced in that period by her excellent
health^ school progress and general societal adjustment :
into her developing reactional biography there Intruded a
parental triangle situation which was wholly foreign to and at violence
with anything previously experienced. From this point on this individual
was precipitated into an environment in which the various objectss persons
and situations did not constitute a homogeneous unity. The result was that
in the two years following she built up additional behavior equipment that
did not hang together very well." Then5 under the stress of a specific fear
of social intercourse (the recess period) a part of her reactional equip-
ment se joined., a specific reaction system (her left leg) became non-
functional. Hence our descriptive terrn^ reactional dissociation . 4
"Our plan of treatment for the patient was of course in accordance
with the above general and diagnostic observations. Since it was deter-
mined that the patient had built up behavior equipment maladjusted to her
later normal surroundings3 and had^ as a result of this5 later suffered a
loss of part of this equipments our problem was more fundamental than
merely restoring the lost reaction system. The real task was to replace
the undesirable part of the patient's behavior equipment with equipment
directed towards more satisfactory adjustment in the future. It is appa-
rent that a mere laying of the symptoms would have offered only temporary
relief to the patient.
"With this end in view, the patient was required to re-experience the
Incidents basic to her abnormal behavior equipment under conditions more
favorable to building up a hygienic basis for personality adjustment. As
already indicated,, this was done in a figurative manner by having the,
patient relate the disturbing incidents in detail,, and5 by guiding the
subsequent development of the new additions to her behavior equipment.
Due to the limited number of interviews} this procedure was ree'nfoced by
furnishing the patient a logical technique with which she could continue
treatment by herself over a long period of time with occasional help from
the writer."

.,.one of the special characteristics of this type of abnormality is

that the so-called lost equipment may be readily reinstated^ and become
functional again." Kant or3 J.R., op. cit.,, p. 495
Readers of the Newsletter might wish to subscribe to:


Regularly there are articles of interest to inter-

behavioral psychologists,, (Inexpensive reprints of some
of these,, eog,,, by Kant or5 Kellogg,, Homme,, Bljou5
Liechtenstein,, are also available for classroom use.) A
continuing feature in each, issue is a short provocative
paper by OBSERVER written from the interbehavloral point-
of-view. The RECORD is a low cost journal with each,
volume containing approximately 600 pages

Institutions 10.00 THE, PSYCHOLOGICAL

Individuals 6.00 Denison Univers1ty
Students 4.00 Granvllle5 Ohio 43023
Noel W. Smith, Editor
Faculty of Social Sciences

August 1971
State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

"it was a saying of Demetrius Fhalereus, that 'Meii, having often

abandoned what was visible for the sake of what was uncertain,
have not got what they expected.'"
Athenaeus, "The Deipnosophists"
VI, 23 (ca. 200)

In the January issue we noted an earlier formative experience as an
article by S art in and Mancuso on artiste In art, in creative work,
the problems with the mental ill- the mind often seems to work best
ness notion. In The Progressive,, when you are least conscious of it.
June 197!,. ap p e arF~~nT~TsyclTiatrTs t The mind does much of its work
Looks at the Uses of Abnormality" without your cognizant knowledge
by Seymour Halle ck, Professor of of its operation. In a sense, the
Psychiatry at the University of thinker doesn't sit down and think
Wisconsin. This article nicely about something, he puts something
complements and reinforces the into his mind and the mind goes on
Sarbin and Mancuso thesis . and thinks about it for him, This
is typical of the entire present-
Galloping mentalism: An article ation. But this beautiful flow of
appeared in University Review, pure animistic mentalism uncorrupt-
ed by actual events becomes tainted
Future as he proceeds, for eventually the
of the Mind." The author is John events start getting in the way of
McHale, labeled as sociologist, his verbal constructs. In another
artist, designer, director of the passage: "You can't literally change
Center for Integrative Studies at your mind because your mind remains
the School of Advanced Technology, the entity in your skull. You
University Center at Binghamton. change certain habits or patterns
In one passage he states "in of thinking, and the influence of
discussing the mind, I find it those patterns of thinking are pro-
helpful to think back to my bably much less evident in action
Crude Data ve Contact, Scientific Construction
than in the unconscious." Here he has allowed "action" to creep in. In-
evitably he gets to .brain as mind but decides that mind is more than that-
-it is "the effects of the whole body process." Mind seems to switch from
effector to affected.
Under a $120,000 grant from Office of Economic Opportunity a research team
has produced "A Theory of Cognitive Functioning and Stratification: What
the Brain Does., Who Makes It Do It, and Why." They conjecture that a left
dominant hemisphere provides functions of verbal abilities and conceptual
and prepositional thought and is characteristic of the white culture while
a right dominant hemisphere is strong in associative and perceptual abili-
ties and apposltional thought. These latter functions are characteristic
of blacks,, women,, youth and other subdominant members of our culture be-
cause of their lack of training in prepositional thought. While the beha-
vioral characteristics are event-oriented and descriptive , whether or not
veridical (are there not vast differences within each of these groups?),
the brain ascription is of the same genesis as McHale's approach: medieval
The feature article is the body of a letter from Ronald G. Heyduk, Univer-
sity of Michigan. It serves as an excellent critique of the foregoing
news-item. _ *:: ::-:>^-:: _

Readers of the Newslejtte^j might be Interested in the following four

passages relevant to the relationship between the nervous system and psy-
chology, spanning 1769-1970. I find them to be very revealing of the
extent to which an unrecognized and unacceptable assumption can "dog"
scientific enterprise., blinding scientists to the futility e>f their seem-
ingly objective pursuits The first two quotes are found in Kantor's
Problems of Fhysiologj.^j-_P^ycholog^ (19^-7).? while the latter two quotes
I came across recently,
Bonnet (1769):
The philosopher does not investigate how. the movement of a nerve
causes an idea to arise in the soul. He simply admits the fact
and readily renounces the attempt of discovering the cause. He
knows that it springs from the mystery of the union of two sub-
stances , and that this mystery is for him. inscrutable.
Ranson (1933) :
I shall leave out of account entirely the most difficult part:
how when these propogated disturbances reach the brain they give
rise to conscious sensation which appears to be something of an
entirely different order than a neural activity. I cannot under-
stand how such a thing as a sensation of warmth makes its appear-
ance as a result of as a concomitant of the activity of certain
nerve cells in my brain. I can only admit the fact and leave to
the future, perhaps the far distant future , the problem presented
by the relation of brain and mind.
John (1967):
Rejection of these speculations (i.e.,, about the "neural corre-
lates" of memory) on the basis that we know of no mechanisms at
present which could accomplish the sensing of its own state by
an aggregate would display an immoderate respect for our present
level of knowledge. We are ignorant of how the mind arises from
the brain. The answer to that riddle is the most challenging
unsolved problem for science.
Dember and Jenkins (1970):
...we have tried to give an account of how a pattern of electro-
magnetic radiation strikes the photosensitive retinal cells} and
is transformed into a pattern of electrical activity that is
eventually "displayed" in a specialized "visual area" of the
cerebral cortex. The question that naturally arises at this
point is: How does the electrical display in the visual cortex
get further transformed into the events that we call visual
experience? That is, while the neurophysiological and neuro-
anatomical bases of visual- experience can now be described in
impressive detail....a the problem of the relation between these
physical events and those we categorize as "mental," "experiential,"
or "phenomenal" remains to plague us.
It seems inconceivable that after a full 200 years of frustration,,
psychologists interested in biological influences upon psychological
events would still fail to recognize the "blind alley" of reductionism.
Dutifully they pursue a "scientific solution" to the mind-body problem.,
expecting momentarily to find the key to crossing some imagined
"physiological-psychological boundary" between the electrochemical
activity of neurons and the organismic interactions which are psycho-
logical events. It should be apparent by now, even if it were not be-
fore y that neither covert nor overt psychological events can 'be con-
ceptualized as "arising from" biological events. Yet,, in the absence
of a recognized alternative, the reductionistic model (and the "self-
actional" metatheory supporting it is self-perpetuating. It will con-
tinue to be so until a model 'based on interactional, principles is brought
forth with sufficient predictive power and research implications to
capture the fancy of the most skeptical experimentalist. Perhaps then,
.finally, psychologists will give up the notion that psychological events
"emerge from the depths" in favor of the notion that they are perfectly
naturalistic occurrences? receptive to the influences of events from
many other disciplines, but servant to none. The mind-body problem will
disappear as quickly as these interbehavioral views are accepted.

Rosenblith, .A, & Vidale, Eda B., "A Quantitative View of Neuroelectric
Events in Relation to Sensory Communication," in S. Koch (ed),
vol. 4, McGraw-Hill, 1962.
On the other hand, evidence pointing to the not-so-specific
organization of the nervous system has accumulated: Lashley's
experiments on mass action, experience with the re-education of
brain-injured patients, as well as the outcome of many ablation
experiments --all emphasized the futility of looking for a local -
izable structure in the nervous system whose normal functioning
is indispensable to alii discriminations within a specific sense
modality. In a given modality, deficits in sensory performance
that are attributable to neural dysfunction are rarely of the
all-or-none type; they tend to be task-specific rather than modality-
Specific o (p .344) .
'Readers of the Hewsletter might wish to subscribe to:


Regularly there are articles of interest to inter-

behavioral psychologists0 (Inexpensive reprints of
of these, ea g0, by Kahtor, Kellogg, Hmnie8 Bijou?
Liehtenstein*--are also available for classroom use.) A
continuing feature in each issue is a short provocative
paper by OBSERVER written from the interbehavioral point
of view9 The RECORD is a low cost journal with
volume containing approximately 600 pages,
Institutions |10.00 THE
Individuals I 6000 Denison University
Students I A. 00 Granville, Obio 43023
F ! t L D Preceding
Noel W. Smith, Editor
Faculty of Social Sciences Segment
__^._- _ _ .~.
Setting Factors j


j tovesUgafor
1 1
Stimu'tis Object
SI muijs
1 j

!1 i
i . __
i 1
Media i_
~ t- j

"SBgiiipf ^ 1
Number 3
PSYCHOLOGY October 1971

State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

Certain psychologists maintain .that structurally determined or "unlearned"

behavior falls outside of the scope of psychology. This is the position
taken by Kantor ({SURVEY OF THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY] Chp. IV), for
example, who holds that biological functioning follows directly from the
structural properties of the organism and the physical characteristics
of the stimulus, whereas psychological functioning depends upon the
individual's previous interactions with stimuli.

Physiological and biological conditions may thus be regarded as

"participating factors" in psychological reactions, rather than as
underlying determinants of any behavior function.

Ann Anastasi & John P. Foley: DIFFERENTIAL

PSYCHOLOGY, 2nd ed., Macmillan, 1949


T.X. Barber has produced another de- Harding, Massachusetts 02042.

spo.oking , of. hypnotism. His "Suggested ***************
(.'Hypnotic') Behavior: The Trance Dr. Kantor's new THE AIM AND PROGRESS OF
Paradigm, Alternative Paradigm", PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER SCIENCES is now
MedfLeld Foundation Report #103 provides available from Principia Press, Inc.,
a review of research and an analysis that Granville, Ohio, 43023 for $12.00. It is a
puts the whole matter on a naturalistic weighty book of over 600 pages and contains
footing... One of the logical problems of a selection of papers that span a half-
the traditional approach is that it does century. Many of them have been difficult to
not define hypnotic trance independently obtain. Even the earliest of them are quite
of what it is supposed to explain. Barber fresh and pertinent today and demonstrate
brings the whole matter to a status that how little we have advanced during that
is direct, uncluttered with constructs, period. We have often merely developed new
intelligible, and consistent with matter- and fashionable terms for old disreputable
of-fact well known characteristics of concepts that leave us in the same quagmire.
psychological interactions. Copies of The table of contents from the book is given
the report can be obtained by writing, overleaf.
Research Department, Medfield Foundation,
"Crude Data ; ,,.,.?- ,,-, - ; , - , Se i ent i f i c- Con s t ruW 6h

SECTION ONE: Theories and Data of Psychology SECTION SEVEN: Problems of Social
1. The Aim and Progress of Psychology Psychology
2. The Nature of Psychology as a Natural 21. The Institutional Foundation of a
Science Scientific Social Psychology
3. Preface to Interbehavioral Psychology 22. An Essay Toward an Institutional
4. In Defense of Stimulus-Response Psychology Conception of Social Psychology
5. Current Trends in Psychological Theory 23. Concerning Some Faulty Conceptions
of Social Psychology
SECTION TWO: Personality Traits, Potential 24. What Are the Data and Problems of
Behavior, and Covert Performances Social Psychology?
6. Intelligence and Mental Tests 25. The Current Situation in Social
7. Character and Personality: Their Nature Psychology
and Interrelations
8. An Objective Interpretation of Meanings SECTION EIGHT: Deviations of Behavior
and Personality
SECTION THREE: Operations and Interpretations 26. Conscious Behavior and the
In Psychology and Other Sciences Abnormal
9. Man and Machine in Science 27. Human Personality and Its Pathology
10. Can the Psychophysical Experiment
Reconcile Introspectionists and SECTION NINE: Problems of Motivation
Objectivists? 28. Toward a Scientific Analysis of
11. The Operational Principle in the Physical Motivation '
and Psychological Sciences
12. Interbehavioral Psychology and Scientific SECTION TEN: Behaviorism as Science and
Operations as Psychology
29. Behaviorism: Whose Image?
SECTION FOUR: Psychological Evolution and 30. Behaviorism in the History of
Interbehavioral History Psychology
13. How Do We Acquire our Basic Reactions?
14. The Evolution of Mind SECTION ELEVEN: The Relation of
15. Evolution and the Science of Psychology Psychology to Other Scientific
SECTION FIVE: The Nervous System in Psycho- 31. Anthropology, Race, Psychology,
logical Behavior, and in Theory and Culture
16. The Nervous System: Psychological Fact 32. Concerning Physical Analogies in
or Fiction? Psychology
17. The Organismic vs. the Mentalistic 33. Interbehavioral Psychology and the
Attitude Toward the Nervous System Social Sciences
34. Interbehaviorism, Social Psychology,
SECTION SIX: Psychological Linguistics and Sociology
18. Can Psychology Contribute to the Study 35. History of Science as Scientific
of Linguistics? Method
19. Language as Behavior and as Symbolism 36. Scientific Psychology and Specious
20. The R&le of Language in Logic and Philosophy
Defictency In Patients and Professionals

Marion White McPherson

University of Akron

Diagnosing patients as mentally defective involves a series of illogical

practices. First there are those, practitioners in psychology, psychiatry,
and social work who defect from their disciplines by failing to make a
search for experiental precursors in preference to ascribing the etiological
factors to biopathology. Ignoring the reactional biography not only
creates spurious agreement about both origin and outcome but is paradoxical
in as much as the responsibility is assigned to events outside the domain
of the promoters.

This inflated consensus is maintained even though, the indicted agent

has two incompatible qualities: potency and impotency. The causes, either
neurological or genetic, are interpreted as sufficiently powerful to make
mental deficiency as irreversible, condition, but at the same time they are
powerless in that they involve a deficit. The condition has been referred
to by a variety of terms,, .but common to, .them is a concept o,f ,dea,rth
Amentia, hvjxrphrenia, j3LLgphrenia, _febl_e_minded, mental ^ficienc^, and
behavioral deficits^

The parologism is nurtured for many reasons and conspipuous among them
is the (mis)identifying of scores on an "intelligence test" with the
presumed reason for the score, "intelligence",, For example, an IQ of 100
is misconstrued as evidence of an average amount of "native endowment".
In the case of less than average IQ's the cause gains efficacy as patient
default increases. Thus, an IQ of 25 is the result of a charge that is
more devitalized than is an IQ of 50,

Irrationality is compounded by the fact that the basis of the score

is the number of correct responses. In the case of grossly inept patients
these decrease with IQ - morbidity is judged by reference to what the subject
does not do!

The assessing of pathology by means of tests standardized on normals

and scored in terms of accuracy promotes a concept of patient under-
reactivity. Data obtained by means of instruments that facilitate the
demonstration of pathology do not support an identification of a lack of
effective behavior with a lack of behavior (McPherson 1964). Mentally
defective patients may be very active, even though they may be more
responsive to themselves than to externality and may indulge largely in
such self-centered activities as body rocking, mouthing, smelling, or toying
with objects. There is apt to be a dom.inan.ce of contact over distance
receptors. Such reactivity allows, theoretically if not currently
realistically, a matrix for the shaping of serviceable behavior.

These artifacts of illogical theory and diagnostic practices can be

permeated, and one arena in which to start this exercise is the plethora
of confusing and confused studies on learning and mental deficiency. More
than 100 studies have appeared in the last decade. Some of the research
on mental defectives demonstrates that they do learn and that although
mastery is often erratic, these patients do acquire, on, .occasion at a rate
and to an. altitude equal to, or in some cases superior to,..that achieved
by Ss who attain normal IQs (McPherson 1948, 1958). Such results may be
filed in. the curio cabinet, considered to be the offspring of inadequate
design or measurement, or serve as stimulants for the elaboration of
neurological and genetic myths.

The. dismissal, of research results is fostered by the common failure

to acknowledge the limited correlation between learning and IQ throughout,
the IQ range. Mental defectives are pervasively referred to as "slow
learners" and considered to be exceptions to the attentuated relationship
in the average and superior segments of the spectrum.

Performance in a learning experiment is, of course, a derivative of the

reactional biography. A relatively sound speculation in; the case of mental
defectives is a history of negative reinforcement for nat having acquired.
This may incorporate an anticipation of punishment, an alertness to pressures
to acquire, as well as an aversion to the process. The patients may prefer
not to have their self absorption interfered with, but in order to avoid
punishment may be sensitized to what is to be demanded. They may be both
egocentric and vigilant about external events. Such a dilemna provides a
framework on which to organize the laboratory data.

The egocentricity implies that learning is more probable when the

material to be acquired is clearly perceptible. This speculation is
supported by empirical data, e.g., Blue (1963) reported that more visual and
auditory items were paired when the interval separating them was brief and
the volume of the latter was high. The self-centeredness also suggests that
contact, as opposed to distance;, receptors facilitate mastery. This con-
tention Is promoted by an investigation by O'Connor & Hermlein (1960)
in which patients with IQ"s 30-50 were found to be more efficient in tactual
than in visual recognition of Greek letters.

The aversion to mastery indicates that acquisition is favored when

the j5s do not recognize the situation as a learning enterprise, that is,
when experimental procedures vary from prior learning contexts. An
illustration of this is seen, in the work of Harrison, ,et a.l. (1966). They
compared, scores on motor tasks when the Instructions were sung and When
spoken and found mental defectives to be more accurate under the former
condition. Most classical conditioning studies of mental defectives report
adequate conditioning. Do the patients see these as medical rather than
educational procedures?

The alertness to pressure suggests an awareness that would facilitate

incidental learning. The results obtained by Goldstein & Kass (1961)
support this contention. The Investigators compared mentally retarded
& "gifted" children of the same MA. on an incidental learning task and
found homogeneous scores between samples on an easy. Identification task
but on more difficult ones the. patients gave both more, responses and more
Inaccurate ones. Furthermore, forecasts of punishment may foster compliance,
for a time at least. Belmont & Ellis (1968) noted that patients were not
distracted, from learning two choice problems early in practice.

These examples do not deal with the relative dominance of egocentricity

or the alertness. For example, why did Belmont & Ellis' Ss react late in

practice to extraneous elements? Did the aversion mastery overcome the
aversion to punishment? Why did Goldstein & Kass1 Ss become more reactive
to difficult tasks? Did these obscure the clarity of the material and
indicate that patients when deprived of cues of accuracy intensify their
efforts to avoid punishment? Or had they also become satiated with the
aversive task and merely camoflagued their abandoning of it? Whatever
the answer(s), the topic is behavior - the subject matter of psychology.


Belmont, J.M. & Ellis, N.R. Effects of extraneous stlHiula.tion upon

discrimination learning, in normals and retardates. Amer ican
1968, 72, 525-532.

Blue, C.M. Performance of normal and ..retarded..., .s.ub.j:e,c:ts. on a paired-

associate task. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1963, 68_,

Goldstein, H. & Kass, C. Incidental, learning of.;uc,able mental retarded

and gifted children. American .Jurna_L_ af_ Mental Deficiency , 1961, _6_6_

Harrison, W. , Lecrone, H. , Temerlin, M.K, & Trousdale, W.W. The effect

of music and exercise up.o.n the .self-help skills, of non-verbal retardates,
American Journal, of. Mental DejEicienc^, 1966, _7_2, 279-282.

McPherson, M.W. A survey of experimental studies of learning in individuals

who achieve subnormal ratings on standardized psychometric measures.
Amer_lcan ,Journa_l o_f_ Mental Deficiency, 1948, 2_, 232-254.

McPherson, M.W. Learning and mental deficiency. American Journal _o_

Mental Deficiency, 1958, 62_, 870-877.

McPherson, M.W. Diagnostic problems in children. Progress Report No. 4,

July, 1964, Grant No. M 3568, National Institute of Mental Health.

O'Connor, N., & Hermelin, B. Learning and recognition in imbeciles.

Proceedings CK jthe_ London Conference _o_n jthe_ Scigritiji.c Study of_ Mental_
Deficiency. 1960, 1, 83-88.
In .a aeries of studies....... .-.control subjects were., asked to..imagine, that . .... ,,arm.,..wa.a_..laec,,ci!ning.....heavy. .and., then were given ..rep.ea.ted....s.ugges.ti.ons .. .
that .it. .was .becoming,,, jie&vy . ..("Imagine .that your,, right., arm ..Is ...feeling heavier.
and heavier ... It ' s becoming heavier and heavier ...") Similarly, each
control subject was asked to imagine that his left arm was becoming light,
his clasped hands were stuck together, he was very thirsty, his throat
was rigid and he couldn't say his name, and he was stuck in the chair and
couldn't get up. ...more than one-fourth of these control subjects who
were asked to imagine the suggested effects passed each of the test-
suggestions both objectively and subjectively, that is, they experienced
arm heaviness, arm lightness, hand lock, thirst 'hallucination1, verbal
inhibition, and body immobility.

...if a subject carries out a goal-directed fantasy when given a suggestion--that

is, if he imagines a situation which, if it actually transpired, would result
in the suggested effect--, he tends to feel that his response to the
suggestion is involuntary (e.g., "My arm rose by itself").

T.X-. .Barber: Suggested ('Hypnotic') Behavior: .

The Trance Paradigm an Alternative Paradigm
Noel W. Smith, Editor preceding
Faculty of Social Sciences Segment

Setting Factors

Stimulus Object


December 1971

State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

Field: In psychology, field is used to emphasize the complex totality

of interdependent influences within which an organism functions, the constel-
lation of interdependent factors that account for.a psychological event. See
field theory.

Field ^heory_: ....the properties of related phenomena are derived from, or .

dependent on, the tdtal field of which they are at that time a part. The
theory substitutes events for things having fixed properties, and s-ees events
as totalities in which parts of the event are what they are, qualitatively
and quantitatively, only in terms of the rest of the event. ...a field theory
may hold.,, that the organism and its surrounds form a unified interacting
totality and can only arbitrarily be considered separately.

--English & English: A COMPREHENSIVE



In this last issue of the Newsletter for 1971 but should have been 4. With the present issue
we finish with 176 subscribers. At the end we again have a quinterly. Would it be better
of 1970 we had 145. The number dropped off to have fewer issues that have more pages?.
at the first of the year due to non-renewals ***
and late renewals, but has continued building A translation is in preparation of a 25 page
to the present. In all probability it will analysis of interbehaviorism in LE BEHAVIOR-
again drop at the outset of 1972. We have ISME ORIGINS ET DEVELOPPEMENT DE LA PSYCHOLOGIE
subscribers from Mexico, Canada, South Africa, DE REACTION EN AMEftlQUE by Andr/Tilquin,
,New.,2'ealand, England, .and Tanzania. We are Paris: Libraire Philosophique, I960., The book
fighting .inflation by keeping,our rates the is available from Blackwell's (Broad Street,
e. as they were when we started two years Oxford, England 0X1 3BQ) for about $4.00. When
ago. the translation is complete we will publish it
*** in the Newsletter if permission can be obtained.
Correction: the last issue was numbered 3 There is another section in the book on Che

Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

operationism of Tolman, Kantor, and Stevens.
In the August: issue (#3) of this year we reported a heavily funded research project that :
conjectures that each brain hemisphere contains different psychological properties and
that one side dominates with thewhite race and the other with blacks and other subdominant
groups. The dominating hemisphere gives rise to corresponding psychological characteristics,
The November 22 Behavior Today reports that Jerry Levy of the Biochemistry Department of
Oregon. State University claims that, the left hemisphere is analytic and verbal while the
right: is synthetic and spatial. At a meeting in San Diego where that was reported, others
took issue and advanced their own conjectures; but no one questioned the basic assumptions
with all of the attendant contradictions.
The feature ariticle is by a graduate student. An item appeared by her as an undergraduate
in issue #3 in 1970. The present article bears directly on the first page design of the

"Im lo achshav, matai" . If Not Now, Then When?"

In Defense of the Interbehavioral Position,
Jacqueline Farrington
One cannot help but admire and commend the prolific and valuable contributions of those
investigating and practicing psychologists who have left behind the mentalistic concepts of
psychic energies and processes which are but circularly and deductively postulated construe t/
which defy empirical research. However, the seeming oversimplification of the investigatiori
and handling of the psychological event which mirrors the physiological model of reflex con-
ditioning is difficult to accept as representing the complexities of human as well as infra-
human behaviors. That such a venture was a necessary step in the evolution of the science of
psychology is understandable when one views the historical evidence of animistic and super-
natural belief systems which have pervaded mankind for centuries. Yet, in. a time when the
universe becomes rapidly smaller and the earth more crowded and tumultous, one wonders if the
somewhat narrow and isolated practices of some behavioral scientists are perhaps as unrealis-
tic as the oversimplification of an "act of faith".

Consideration of the behavioral and interbehavioral positions in terms of data collec-

tion, experimental and clinical observation and reporting of events points to the meaningful
and important question of interaction of factors and variables within behavioral events' and
the fields comprising those events.

The behavioral investigator operates upon the assumption that, R = f(S) or that R3sS.
Such a formulation appears logical as a. description of certain specific events, particularly
respondent, conditioning. The response of eating may well be a function of learning the maze,
particularly if the animal is hungry. Such behavior might better be diagrammed as PD (physio-
logical drive)^-B(learned behavior) 5*R(response). In terms of some human learning, in-
cluding the acquisition of skills, the model R^fc^>S may fit the event, although not. the situ-

As well as accommodating respondent procedures, the model fits also operant procedures,
but with essential differences. Consider whether the response of blinking the eye can be
considered as a function of a tone paired with an airpuff, or even the airpuff alone. In I
such an event, the formulation of J.R. Kantor (1970), S<^>R expanded to PE = c (k, rf, sf,
hi, st, md) appears to describe the actual event more incisively and completely. In such
instances and in innumerable others of more complexity, the inclusion of the media of contacts
and the behavioral history of the organism are as necessary concomitants of
description as are the recording of stimulus and response function. Even more
appropriate and objective would be such a formulation in clinical procedures
in terms of data collection, specification of treatment procedures, and re-
porting of outcomes.

Beyond these considerations is that of the interaction of the observer who,

whether in the role of experimenter or clinician, must, of necessity be. considered
and included in objective reporting of the events being studied. In fact, one
wonders if the observer's data collection is not a function of the psychological
event, to eliminate this interaction process is to encourage the distortion of
investigative events.

Differentiation between the psychological event, and the psychological

situation is required for adequate analysis of behavioral events. The function
of both the stimulus object (i.e., person or thing) and response observed within
a particular behavior segment, or event arises from the interactional history of
the organism and may well be governed by innumerable setting factors within
present and past situations or fields. The situation that the electric burner
is hot does not presuppose that the burner will generate either noxious or
appetitive stimulus or response functions. In interpersonal situations which
are more complex than object-organism situations, consideration;;1 must be given
to expectancies developed throughout the interactional histories of both or-
ganisms; that is, preceding, immediate and post-event segments must, be under-
stood by some reliable means before the events observed can be accurately an-
alyzed. The writer is reminded of a situation in which a young child drank a
DDT liquid solution. Upon discovering this, the mother hurried to give, the
child ipecac. While most, adults associate ipecac and vomiting behavior, the
child had no such expectancy and loudly proclaimed: "More candy, Mommy."

The task of utilizing the interbehav'ioral model which is both inductive

and yet deductive in at least the. commuta'tive sense, is not a simple one; in
fact, it is most difficult, particularly in the clinical situation which is
often fraught with subjectivity of verbal report, and semantic difficulties.
Yet such an approach is appropriate and tenable, particularly if the science
of psychology which includes clinical practice, is to become the discovery
and the reporting of "the characteristics of confronted things and events."
(Kantor, 1970)

Of major import are the manipulative techniques and tactics aiding such
discovery arid the philosophical underpinnings of manipulation. Briefly, the
philosophy is one of objective search for all variables which abandons mental-
istic concepts and concentrates upon investigation of the interactions within
a total field of events represented by the aforementioned formula. Manipulative
tactics include the consideration of the functioning of the whole organism as
a component of the field and as such, cannot be misleading in the use of iso-
lated independent and dependent variables which are in actuality correlative
and interdependent.

Multidimensional events, multiplicity of factors and interactional con-

text dre appropriate to an interbehavioral position and to be desired more
than isolated and unique cause-effect relationships. Such an approach removes
the stress of emphasis upon the view that nonhuman experimentation may provide
the laws for all psychological behavior including the human. Rather, emphasis
may be expanded to attempt to contend with the interrelationships of factors
in the origin and occurrence of psychological, events including those of imagin-
ing, perceiving, feeling, thinking, intercommunication, etc.
As Kantor has so succinctly stated: ". . . experimentation upon complex
human behavior involves tremendous difficulties, . . . . . but there is no
merit or profit in avoiding the hardships of urgent, necessities,'1 And as the
ancient Hebrew Hillel is said to have uttered, "1m l,o achshav, mataijf'11 . . .
If not now 3 when?

Kantor, J.R. An analysis of the experimental analysis of behavior (TEAR),
Journal of the Experimental AnalysisofBehavior, 197Q, 13, 101-108,

What is found experimentally is that certain vast regions of the. central

core of the neuraxis are neither sensory nor motor in character, but may
be in mutual interdependence with both sensory and motor systems. More-
over, patterns of convergence and divergence within these central regions
are not, altogether fixed in character but may change with time. Using
waking animals with implanted electrodes, observers have found that some, of
these relatively plastic systems can be, altered in. accordance with deliber-
ate environmental manipulations. (p. 67-68)

It has long been recongized that, when a. part, of the. central nervous system
is cut away, the distortion of capacities resulting from ablation is less
an expression of wha_t _the_ missing .!: jjj| than it, is an expression of
what. j:he a;indj2r of _th_e nj=ll[vous_ JStm can d_ in _the_ absence cxf .that p_at<
Something qualitatively different may be provided by certain small changes
in highly complex transactional mechanisms0 This is apparently true of the
nervous system of man. (p0 681

Robert B Livingston: How man looks at: his own brain: an adventure shared
by psychology and neurophysiology,, In S Koch (Ed,,),, jPgycho1.pgy:
a study of behavior, Vol. 4. McGraw-Hill, . 1962.

Noel W. Smith, Editor F I E L D Preceding

Faculty of Social Sciences Segment

J 1
Seu % Factors |

- 1 1

A 1'
Invfi$iiater <? j > j |


Stimulus Object
1 1
Function 1
_ __
1 1
, , ,. i |

~ 1- J
L Number 1

State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

To perfect Behaviorism there is also required, as the name Interbehaviorism

indicates, the rejection of the view which regards psychological events as
acts of or ganisms asymmetrically impelled by external stimuli or internally
determined by various hidden powers. The central hypothesis of Interbehav-
iorism is that psychological events consist of symmetric fields in which the
acts of or'"ganisms and the acts of stimulus objects are the simultaneously
occurring poles.,
OF PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. II, p. 377

Indeed, in some respects Aristotle's functional and contextual behaviorism

seems to be superior to our own biological and mechanistic behaviorism,
because it views human experience, not as the interaction between a "merely*!
biological organism and a wholly illogical world, but as a co-operation
between an intelligent biological organism and an intelligible world.

--John Randall: ARISTOTLE, p. 106


With this issue the Newsletter will change LIGENCE: GENETIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IN-
from a quinterly to a quarterly. Hopefully, FLUENCES, Grume & Stratton, 1971) con-
each quarterly will be a little fuller than tains the full gamut of positions. Arti-
the quinterlies; but that depends on how cles by Bijou and by Hunt are of special
much material we receive. interest to those uncommitted to an organ-
*** ism containing fixed entities or powers.
The Jensen attempt: to substantiate the no- Results were recently released from a five
tion of native intelligence seems to have year study at the Milwaukee Infant Educa-
the advantage along with the major dis- tion Center using children intellectually
advantage of giving ammunition to the. ra- stimulated from infancy as compared, with
cistsof stirring up some renewed criti- a control group. Differences in I.Q.
cal examinations of this old dogma. A scores between the group run on the order
new book edited by Robert Cancro (INTEL- of 50. Numerous other studies in the past
that were less systematically controlled.

Crude Data investigative Contact Scientific Construction

showed 5 to 20 points difference., and occasionally more. An excellent
analysis of the intelligence controversy occurs in the Psychological
Record, 1970, 20, 123-130 by Observer: "Innate Intelligence: Another
Genetic Avatar". Another noteworthy approach is by John P. Frank &
Gretchen Kagan in the February 1972 ]Prgres_s_ive_ : "The False Standards
of I.Q, Tests". It is a striking fact that occasionally we find (see
Newgj.etter Vol. 2, Nr . 1) non-psychologists bringing a more objective
view to bear than that of most psychologists perhaps because so many
of the latter are still wedded to the doctrines of inherited capacities,
failing to recognize the distinction between constructs and events,
while non-psychologists are not professionally indoctrinated and thereby
free to take a more straight- forward uncluttered 'view. . Frank & Kagan
point out the culture-bound characteristics of I.Q. tests and the effects
in specific situations. This should be glaringly obvious to all psychol-
ogists but gets pushed aside in the efforts to substantiate the old dogma.
The authors are remiss only in giving scant attention to the importance
of intellectual stimulation as a part of that cultural development of the
individual that we construct as intelligence. The article concludes with
a. quotation from Gunnar Myrdal that we can do no better than to .re-quote:
"When we approach those problems on the hypothesis that differences in
behavior are to be explained largely in terms of social and cultural fac-
tors, we are on scientifically safe ground. If we should, however, ap-
proach them on the hypothesis that they are to be explained primarily
in terms of heredity, we do not have any scientific basis for our assump-

The. Principia Press, Inc. which publishes the books of J. R. Kantor

announces its removal from Granville, Ohio to 5743 South Kimbark Ave ,
Chicago, 111. 60637

On February 11 the editor presented an invited colloquim address to the

Psychology Department at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro
entitled "Interbehaviorism: Roots and Branches." Most of the members
of the department already hall some acquaintance with the works of Kantor
and were quite receptive and interested. Graduate students also expressed
interest including requests for copies of the address,


Our feature article is a book review of Skinner's BEYOND FREEDOM AND

DIGNITY by John Sullivan that will also appear in Tgghes_Cpllege Record.
We will follow it in the next issue with an interb ehavioral article by
N. H 0 Pronko on that same controversy: determinism and free will.

John Sullivan

New York University

B F. Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity (Knopf., 1971) is clearly

an important book, but how important is difficult, to assess at this time.
Many books which have been historically influential have not, been acclaimed
when first published and many so acclaimed have not stood the test of later
historical judgment. Some historians suggest that the significance of an
event for the most: part does not depend upon events which precede or accom-
pany it. What follows is more important. For instance, Freud's J^nterp_r_e-
_ _
(1900) would have been an interesting contribution to the
explanation of dreams, but not much more. Because of the subsequent devel
opment of psychoanalysis and the drift of Western culture it has become one
of the basic books of our time. By contrast, James Mill's
(1829) marked both the culmination and the end
of the movement of simple association psychology, John Stuart Mill's doc-
trine of emergent properties, called h_em._sm , and the influence of Darwin
sim resulted in a basic reorientation of British psychology. Though the
historical importance of Bey^md^JFreedom and Dignity is impossible to deter-
mine today, I shall attempt to evaluate its contemporary significance.

Skinner's fundamental method in this book is to define in a behavior-

istic language a number of terms common in the humanistic literature. Mean-
ings and references of the humanistic terms are transposed from social con-
texts into paradigms used in the experimental study of learning. The intel-
lectual feat is to make these translations in. such a way that no meaning of
the humanistic terms are unaccounted for and the new definitions have a
practical use. Since he does not explicitly restrict his claims, it. is
assumed that Skinner has done both. An obvious advantage of his procedure
is that is he is able to make successful coordinations of terms from. the.
humanistic literature to his experimental paradigms, and he knows the rele-
vant: variables in these paradigms, then he is in a position to make signifi-
cant: analyses of social situations. Social contexts may thus be analyzed
in different ways than have been done in the humanistic literature. Skin-
ner's analyses lead, so the claim goes, to J^ey_orid freedom and dignity to a
social world based upon positive reinforcement that could lead to the devel-
opment: of man beyond the capability of our present social arrangements.

Such Utopian dreams are symptoms of the discontents of our social world.
These dreams have been called the "opium of the intellectuals.1' Dreams of
the conditions for social justice invariably have a solution in terms of the
particular thinker's favored paradigms. For Plato the solution was in the
recognition of the natural hierarchy of classes and the harmony of the func-
tions of each class. Christian tradition found the solution to living in
this world to be composed of fortitude and love in this world, and faith
in the Utopian character of the next world. For Marx the solution was found
in the abolition of class exploitation by a rearrangement of economic and
political power. For Freud the Utopian dream is viewed as a regressive wish
for the good mother who satisfies every need without making demands. Reality,
however, requires a. measure of stoicism and an attempt to extend conscious
control when conditions are propitious. For Skinner the dream is the design
of social controls without the use of aversive stimuli.

*Presented to the Graduate Student Psychology Colloquim at the New School,,

Jan. 1972.

Evaluation of Beyond Freedom and Dignity entails at least three com-

ponents: (1) an analysis of Skinner's specific reductive procedures, (2)
an analysis of the general empirical tradition, and (3) a review of alter-
native analyses. One who attacks, defends, or merely assesses the book is
taking a stand on the experimental analysis of behavior, empricism, and
the generality of the experimental analysis of behavior .


A network of interesting arguments is presented in Beyond Freedom and

DignjLty. They will be constructed here in a form slightly different from
Skinner's presentation in order to heighten their dialectical quality and
to stress their related character. The comments are my own.

The Technology Dialectic

Anta.goni_s^t : Man is an autonomous agent; thus prediction and control

of his behavior are impossible. Skinnerian Reply: All behavior is deter-
mined, that -"is, under some control. A technology of control of behavior
has developed as we have learned to manipulate environments which rein-
force behavior.

The Value s Dialectic

An_tagoni^t : The gap between what is and what ought to be is un-

bridgeable. This is the gap between science and ethics, a distinction
between description and prescription. There can be no scientifically
based, so-called naturalistic ethics,
Rejxjv: An ultimate value for humans is survival. What is good is what
contributes to long-term survival. To.-askif something is good is only to
ask if it: contributes positively to the fulfillment of human development.
Comment: This is the Darwinian metaphysic of the Skinnerian system. It
might better be stated as a hypothetical statement: If survival is our
ultimate value, then whatever contributes to survival is good.

The__Autonpm.ous Man_j3 ia 1 e c t, ic^

Ant agon is t : Man's behavior is controlled by his wishes, perceptions,

and ideas. Rep ly : To explain a person's actions by his ideas is simply
to push the problem of explanation back to the conditions which determine
the development of his ideas. Comment : A variation on this argument is
to hold that behavior is determined by a person's habits, motivational
states, individual differences like intelligence, and the environmental
stimuli. It might then be objected that it is not the stimuli
that are important but: how the stimuli are perceived. But this is to
require all over again that habits, motivational states, and individual
differences explain the perception of stimuli,

Some people deserve credit for their strength of character

and dignity. Reply : We tend to explain behavior in which the causes are
inconspicuous as due to the properties of the agent or his will. But all
behavior is under controls such that the person should be given neither
blame or credit for his dignity.

Th e Fr e e d om D i a 1.6 c tj. c.

Antagonist : Freedom is an unrestricted good, is the condition for the

development of the person to the fullest, and is incompatible with control
in any form. Reply: Behavior is always under control of some form or

another. The literature of freedom has arisen from a rejection of aversive

social controls. This literature is Largely concerned with avoidance or
escape from aversive controls. But this formulation distorts the problem.
The values of ppsitive social controls are denied in the wish to escape
from aversive controls. Since behavior is always under environmental con-
trol, the problem is to shift controls from aversive to positive stimuli.

The_Reinforcenient Dia 1 ectJLC

Antagonist: Reinforcement theory which is at the base of your psychology

cannot explain the behavior of people who are free, particularly their crea-
tive behavior. Reinforcement by its nature only increases the probability
of what has already occurred. Rejjljr: Creative behavior is under the control
of normative systems, like language is under the control of syntactic rules
which are learned. Such rules applied over and over again with different,
contents may generate infinitely varied sentences. Rule-mediated behavior
is ultimately under the control of reinforcing environments. Scientific
laws generally are learned by reinforcement principles and are maintained
by social and physical reinforcements.

The Empiricism Dialectic

Antagonist: Out of pure reason it is possible to construct concepts

that have an explanatory function in the physical world. Mathematical
concepts are standard examples. Re ply: All knowledge comes from experience.
In. order to have meaning theoretical terms must be reducible to terms of
direct experience. Comment: Skinner's work is in the tradition of radical
empiricism. His reduction of the terms "freedom" and "dignity" is compar-
able in method to Hume's reduction of "cause" and "self" to elements of
his psychology of impressions and ideas related by laws of association
(ATreatiseonHumanNature (1739). Skinner's reduction is also similar
in form to Mach's reduction to his psychology of the terms of Newtonian
science (Die JMechanik in ihrer... Entwicke lung his t or is^ch-hr i t iscti darge s tel, 11,
Leipzig, 1,883) and William James' reduction of "consciousness" ("Does
Consciousness Exist." 1904).
Much that irritates about Skinner may be traced to the bland assertive-
ness of his style. This assertiveness is also of an extreme position that
leads to paradoxical conclusions that are counter-intuitive and against
ordinary language usage.

A cluster of notions has been traditionally associated with empiricism.

The position was given a classic statement by Locke, who held that all know-
ledge comes from experience. This doctrine was aimed polemically at the
Platonic doctrine of innate ideas (first stated in the dialogue Meno). The
main thrust of Skinner's polemic is against abstract notions, with the
accompaning doctrine that all behavior is controlled (ultimately) by rein-
forcements. Skinner is concerned with behaviors, not ideas. Classical
empiricism concerned with knowledge and mind has been shorn of its mental-
istic trappings and given a new formulation in terms of experimental anal-
ysis of behavior. Skinner's version is that knowledge comes from rein-forcements
and further that ultimately the control pf behavior is to be found in reinforce-
ments and not in ideas or knowledge.
Skinner is thus giving us a modern experimental psychologist's version
of Ockham's Razor: don't multiply entities beyond reinforcements. Ockham's
(don't multiply entities beyond necessity) thrust was against the existence
of platonic universals and a preference for Aristotelian particulars. There
may be physical objects, white in color. These objects may be said to have
the property of whiteness. Since many different objects may have the pro-
perty of being white, whiteness is designated a universal. The problem is
to consider whether "whiteness" has an existence apart from the objects which
have it as a property. Nominalists like Ockham held that the only things
that existed were particulars; they were against the multiplying of entities
like Platonic universals. Freedom is also a universal of the Platonic type;
the. question is whether it is reducible to simple situations. Since it is
not a variable in an experimental situation, the problem is to translate
the term into behavioristic vocabulary. In performing this reduction, note
that Skinner refers to the behaviors of people and not the property of an

"Man's struggle for freedom certain behavioral processes...

the chief effect of which is the avoidance or escape from so-called "aver-
sive" features of the environment." (p.42). "The literature of freedom...
has been forced to brand all control, as wrong and to misrepresent many of
the. advantages to be gained from a social environment. It is unprepared
for the next step, which is not to free men from control but to analyze
and change the kinds of control to which they are exposed." (p. 42-43).
These two quotations, patched together as they are from Skinner's text,
do not, I believe, distort it. The core of his argument is contained
here. Briefly, in terms of the dimensions mentioned above, the literature
of freedom arises in conditions of strong aversive control, but, that we
are able to use controls non-aversively toward goals which have ultimately
good outcomes.

"We recognize a. person's dignity or worth when we give him credit, for
what he has done. The amount we. give is inversely proportional to the con-
spicuousness of the causes of his behavior. If we do not know why a person
acts as he does, we attribute his behavior to him." (p. 58).


My evaluation of Skinner's proposals is based upon a fundamental agree-

ment and a fundamental disagreement. The agreement is probably a professional
distortion, sort of a special knothole view on the world, that psychology
is the propaedeutic social science. This is the thesis that, most of what
is interesting in the social sciences can be given an explanation in psycho-
logical terms. The disagreement is on the question of how fat a reduction
can be made of any social phenomena. The question "how far a. .reduction?"
is connected with the question, "to what psychology will the reduction of
humanistic terms be most productive?"

It is reasonable to hold that even freedom implies the direction of

a person's behavior by his own set of values, ideas, etc. Thus the notion
of. freedom implies control. The argument is not about control or no control
but the loci of control. That there can be differences in the ratios of
external versus internal control of a person's behavior is difficult to
dispute. It is: important in evaluating actions to assess them as wise or
foolish, intelligent or not intelligent, compelled or relatively free.
These actions are to be judged in terms of criteria relative to the pursuit,
of goals, ends, values, etc. The region where it is important to preserve
the notions of freedom and dignity is precisely in the opportunity to have
behavior under the control of one's own values, etc. and not someone elses 1 .
No doubt, one's politics, religion, views on education, on love, life, etc,
are determined by one's background, ultimately by reinforcement from one's
own physical and social environments. To be controlled by someone else's
background values, etc. is to be unfree. The argument is not for ultimate
freedom but for freedom to control one's own behavior and environments in
terms of one's own states. The area in which terms like freedom and dignity
occur is not. in ultimate explanations but in immediate ones. This is a
thesis of levels of explanation and causal chains.

My fundamental disagreement is to which of the various psychologies

the terms of humanistic literature will be reduced. At this stage of our
understanding of psychological processes one cannot rule out competing
psychologies. Reduction of terms like "freedom" and "dignity" to a psychol-
ogy that does not admit of inner states of organisms inevitably ends by
dissolving these concepts. If one assumes the existence of mediating states
or cognitive processes, the chance of the survival of some of the ordinary
language meanings of these constructs is increased.

Skinner's Bey_gnd Freedom and Dignity is of great value for it sharply

illuminates the controlling features of our environments. As a result of
this book we ought to be increasingly sensitive to being controlled and
the opportunity to exercise counter control in our environments. How this
works in the miniature can be illustrated by the fact that copyrights of
Skinner's previous books were owned by the publishers. He, however, owns
the copyright to BeyondFreedomand Dignity. He probably would interpret
this behavior as rule-mediated which is reinforcing. I hold that this is
an advance in Skinner's freedom and probably a considerable contribution
to his worth.

"A man sees a forest, a coastline, or a prairie in a time frame-

work of the past, present and future; progress and decay; pro-
jects and prospects. His experiences is affected by duration--
the amount of time he spends in the setting; J^emp_o_-- a lake looks
different when he is driving past at 70 miles an hour from when
he is walking alongside it; sequence--certain paths provide
contrasts and surprises while others prepare him for what is
coming next; chronicity--several brief visits will produce an
experience different from one based on a long visit; and
familiarity--as a visitor, he and an old-time resident share
space but their experiences will be different."

--Robert Sommer
Natural History,
Aug/Sept. 1971
Noel W. Smith, Editor
Faculty of Social Sciences

oidg Fsc&rs

tawretlgtw I <' |"> 1



State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

It i clear that chance is an Incidental caus In theme

for the of something which involve c Intelligent reflection,
then, "arid chance are ''.in '.the sphere, for

the Indefinite ani to bg

in a way nothing oeeus's by chance^
they are well grounded Things < in a ways ecus' by chances, foy

The spontaneous on, the other hand

manyf.inariiraate objectgtt "We say,, ,exai the', horse .eame' sport
becausef though his coming saved come fosr the sake of
the tripod fall"*of when it fell it stood

it is deaf that events which

taay come to pass for the sake of (2) do not COM to pass
by the frera chance' if thy
the objects of deliberate Intention C e

Crude Data investigative Contact Scientific Construction


In January 1971 we described an article by Sarbin and Mancuso on some problems

with the concept of "mental illness". Jim Mancuso now writes that "Sarbin and
I are writing a piece on the failure of the diesease model in 'schizophrenia5
and are arguing that the failure is the result of applying mechanism at points
where a mechanistic paradigm is inappropriate,, We recommend that the approp-
riate paradigm would be a contextualist paradigm, which would regard the judge
and the subject's response to the judge as being as important to the 'diagnosis'
as is any condition in the past of the subject. Thus, the quotations you have
on the first page [Winter 1972]--from Kantor and Randall--could not have been
more appropriate to what we are doing..,"

In the fall of 1972 the editor will teach a senior seminar in interbehavibral
psychology* Are there other courses currently offered somewhere that are de-
voted exclusively to this approach?

Charles Maddox is looking for a new position in college teaching and counseling
or community psychological services. Prefers West coast. Box 202, Monterey
Park,.':Callf. 91754

Paul Mountjoy is working on a review of Kantor' s recent AIM AND PROGRESS OF

PSYCHOLOGY AMD OTHER SCIENCES which will appear in the Journal of the Scientific
Laboratories of Denison University,

Steven Brown of the Political Science Department of Kent State sent an offprint
authored by himself and Thomas Ungs entitled "Representativeness and the study
of political behaviors an application of Q technique to reactions to the Kent
State Incident" and published in Social Science Quarterly, Dec, 1970, It was
influenced by the position advanced by Egon Brunswik and later elaborated by
Kenneth Hammond that the stimulus population should receive the same represent-
ative sampling as does the respondents, (Although he is referring to a some-
what different research arrangement we might note that in vol. 2 of SCIENTIFIC
EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOLOGY Kantor writes "The interbehaviorist rejects the con-
ventional organocentric formula R = f(S) and urges,that, since the events con-
sist of a great complex of equally important factors of which the acts of the
organism are only some, the investigative procedure of varying one or a few
factors at a time applies equally well to responses, stimuli., media, and set-
ting factors" (p. 380),,) The approach attempts to overcome the shortcomings
of the Fisher-type systematic design. Also of influence on the paper was
METHODOLOGY that "Kantor's principles lie behind the main thesis of the chapters,
in a grass-roots matter,"

The feature article is bj Henry Pronko of Wichita State University, He is a

long-time interbehaviorist and is now working on the second edition of his
exellent P4NOMMA OF PSYCHOLOGY, e are also including in this issue a state-
ment requesting information for inclusion in an Inventory of Research
N e H 0 Pronko

To assert that every notion stems from a certain frame of discourse appears
.jto be a self-evident truth too obvious to require mention. Yet the history of
science is replete with common-sense truisms that have bedeviled and confounded
intellectual progress, I believe that the concept of "free-will versus deter-
minism" is such a concept. Certainly, an extensive literature has generated
much heat but little light on a topic which, in its usual formf demand a "lady-
or-the-tiger" type of choice,, The conventional "either-or" straight jacket
states that either there is free will or there isn8tj--behavior is either strictly
determined or it isn'to Take your choice,. You can't have both.

It is my contention that the traditional question of""free will versus

determinism" derives only from the traditional psychic orientation prevalent in
our '.culture down through the ages. According to this views man's thinking^
feelingj, desiring,, tasting, seeing^ and creating transpire inside the body in
a psychic theater with a "pseudo-location" somewhere within the brain. Such a
formulation iss essentially9 a onevariable theory according to which only grudg-
ing acknowledgement is ascribed to "external stimuli" Heavy stress is given
to the drama as it unfolds within "autonomous man" (Skinner), The mind within
the body is a kind of _deus ex machina which carries the bulk of the theoretical
burden in explaining psychological happenings, For example, the female rat
simply triggers a !'sex drive" within the male rat and it is the internal drive
which _realJj gets the credit for propelling(or driving) the male toward the
female,, Similarly, according to the conventional view9 it is the child's "I0Qo*%
an entity residing somewhere in the child's head, that, either facilitates or
prevents his answers on. an intelligence test. The "I.Q,," is the prime movers
the power behind the throne,

According to Handy's (1964) acceptance of the DeweyBentley definition of

self-action, self-action is found "where things viewed as acting under
their own powers" (p, 55) In extension of their definition,, I should also
mention such terms as "motives'% "intention'% "capacity'% "talent", "thoughts",
"sensations" and "feelings" and "instincts" as still other reification,, An
older faculty psychology has its "Will." However9 whether old or contemporary,
all of the above agents that initiate, influence^ or cause particular psycho-
logical responses have one thing in common,"they are self-actional,

By contrast, the interbehavioral approach views psychological happenings

as events. Certainly, the organism and stimulus object hold a nuclear posi-
tion in the event, as do the participating anatomical and psysiological factors
of the organism but the media of contact and setting factors and prior in-
terrelated events are also necessary conditions Since all factors play a
role, it is not possible to glorify one factor above another and assign it
a special role. As William James somewhere puts it with a prophetic insight,
when (in customary phraseology) "a person is reading a book," it can also be
stated that Ma book is being read by a. person." The second statement shows
the need for developing a language, that will keep all the participating vari-
ables of an event in neutral, perspective. None has a special or causal signi-
ficance in the total situation under behavioral observation),.,because .;each'.'.,and"
every one is essential. Let the reader look at a photo of a galaxy rotating
once around its axis every.210 million years in order to experience the futility
of ascribing causality to any of the component bodies of the astronomical
system No prime mover or power behind the throne can be detected. It appears
to be a field event.
An Interbehavioral orientation, then, would view psychological occur -
ences as events in which the role of all the component factors would be
assessed. Their relationship and the interrelationship of the flow of events
is the focus of such an orientation. There is no glorification of the
organism over the stimulus object. Consequently, there is no place for a
prime mover. In other words, in an interbehavioral approach, the question
of free will never comes up any more than it does in explaining the rota-
tion,, The free will-determinism controversy is an artefact of a self-action-
al procedure. If and where, in the distant future, such procedures should
be superceded by a field or interbehavioral type of theory 3 then the question:
"does man have a free will or is behavior strictly determined?" will be a
philosophical and linguistic fo&sil. It can only be nurtured by a self-acf;
tional approach in which it is embedded. The question never arises in field


1. Fromm, Erich. The Heart of Man9 New York: Harper & Row, 1964.
2. Handy, Rollo, Methodology _of thg Beh ayj. or a^l S^ienc_es Springfield,
111.: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1964
3. Skinner, B. F. Beyond Fjr^edom and Mjgmjty,, New York: Alfred A. Knopf,

Brief BibliographyFree will versus Determinism2

1. Townsend , John C , _Intr_oductj.on to_ 2EiSHtSi SSJillSfis McGraw-Hill

1953, p. 17 Principle of Determinism.
20 Rapppprt, Anatol, Operational Philosophy , Harper, 1954, Ch. 7,
Is there a choice? pp. 83-92,
3. Skinner, B. F., Walden: .Two, Macmillan, 1948. pp. 213-216
4. Rogers, Carl R. Freedom and Commitment in The_ Humanist, 1964, pp. 24,
5. Immergluck, Ludwig, Determinism- Freedom in Contemporary Psychology,
1964, 19, 207-281,
Grunbaum, Adolf, Causality and the Science of Human Behavior, American
Sc_ienti_st5 1952, pp. 665-676. Also reprinted in R. S. Daniel's Con-
H GjmeraJL Psychology, in Part IX0 Also in Fuge and
Brodbeck, Reading_s_ _in _the Philosophy of Science, pp 766-777,
7. Ayer, A, J., Chance, S^cienjtijic Amerl-can^ 1965, 213, 44-54,
8. Beckwith, Burnham PI, Religion, Philosophy, and Science:_____An Introduction
_to Logical Posit ivism , Philosophical Library, 1957, pp. 208-213,
9. Frank, Philipp, Mojlejrn_J:k;ju2nj^^ Braziller, 1955,
Ch 8, Sec. 3, Complementarity as an argument for Vitalism and Free Will,
pp. 165-169.
10. Russell, Bertrand, Our knowledge of the__external_ world, W.W. Norton,
1929, pp, 247-56. Also in Feigl and Brodbeck, Readings in the
pp, 402-407.

In his laudable attempt to displace "autonomous man" Skinner (Beyond Freedom

and Dignity;) seems to attribute the same autonomy to the environment when he
asserts that "environmental contingencies now take over functions once att-
ributed to autonomous man" (p. 215). If it is invalid to attribute autonomy
to the organism, is it any more valid to attribute it to the environment? Why
the reaction formation? To make the environment too powerful is equivalent
to ascribing too much power to the organism as when it is said to "emit be-
The above bibliography was contributed by my colleague, Grant Kenyou,
in whose seminar I participated when "Free Will vs. Determinism" was discussed.
Cause and causal relations...may simply be regarded as the interrelations of
field componentso Certainly, causation can be formulated as correlation. At:
first, correlations were primarily interested in organizing two-factor systems.
Later, the development of partial and multiple correlation techniques amplified
the original view. The above paradox is easily resolved by indica.ting that
cause is, after all, only a type of correlation, (p0 156)

According to our hypothesis that causal processes and relations constitute

factos in event fields, causal elements consist of objects, their combinations
and relations in particular systems. All things existing as parts or features
of a certain pattern of happenings may be said to 9/tici2ate_ as factors in
that particular causal field. In some causal events there are few factors, in
others many. In case there are many we find great variations in the proportion
of those factors that appear more prominent than the remainder. Again, in some
events there may be no outstanding factors at all. Whether there are many or
few, the factors may be either sequential, or coordinate in time. Causal situ-
ations must further be differentiated on. the basis of the relative availability
of the factors for observation and: experimental manipulation. In some instances
the factors can -only be hypothetically named and enumerated. (p. 158)


As far as science is concerned, its object is not to discover the ultimate na-
ture of reality, but rather to explore empirical relations and derive useful
generalizations from them. The question of what sort of causation is involved
in explanation is an unnecessary impediment, a, philosophical encumbrance, to
the conduct of science. It is futile for the scientist to be concerned with
whether an event occurred because some other event compelled it to occur;
much more to the point is that an event occurs and its occurrence can be cor-
related with certain sets of" conditions. (p. 7)


Boston City Hospital Psychiatry Service
(at) Mattapan Chronic Disease Hospital
249 River Street

Mattapan, Massachusetts 02126


An Inventory of Drug-Abuse Research Instruments (similar to the Research Refer-

ence Files in Alcoholism maintained by Ralph Connor, Eastern Washington State
College, Cheney, Washington) has been formed by the undersigned. Those using
such instruments are invited to submit a copy of them, as well as pertinent
bibliographies and citations of relevant references (articles, reports, and
books), for notice in the Inventory. The Inventory serves as an archival
source for the collection, storage, duplication, and issuance of pertinent
research instruments and related material (e.g., bibliographies) to aid in
drug-abuse research and in the development of more such instruments. A copy
of the Inventory will be sent to those who do submit such material,, Others
will_be_sent a copy of the Inventory upon their request'. Requests for instru-
ments contained in the Inventory will be promptly filled The Inventory is now
more than six months old, and includes some fifty items in the areas of: atti-
tudes, access and extent, measurementof subjective effects of drugs, differen-
tiation of abusers, education and knowledge, and; program-related evaluation.

Organizations and individuals submitting material to the Inventory will later

find that referring all future instrument requests received by them, to the
Inventory will save them much time, waste, and expense -- as has been the exper-
ience of those utilizing the Research Reference Files. In the same way, they
should also help to keep the Inventory up-dated with references, "spin-offs",
etc. Second- and subsequent- generation instruments should be promptly filed
with the Inventory. Such refinements are of particular value to those in the
field, I

Since the Inventory exists solely as a service to aid individuals and agencies
undertaking research in the area of drug abuse, it is very important that the
Inventory's existence and policy be as widely known as possible in order that
interested individuals and agencies can avail, themselves of the service that
the Inventory offers. We would, therefore, especially request those individuals
and agencies responsible for communication media in the field (newsletters,
bulletins, agency publications) if they would be kind enough to insert notices
in their publications, of the existence and operation of the Inventory so that
others may learn of it. Individuals and agencies may wish to put a copy of
this notice on their bulletin boards. Of course, we would be grateful if this
announcement would be passed on in as many ways as possible, and that we be
notified of others to inform of this archive.

Comments and suggestions will be gratefully received.

Copies of reprints of this notice in journals, bulletins, etc. will also be


Ernest W. Ferneau, Jr.

Clinical Psychologist
Noel W. Smith, Editor F I E L D !

Faculty of Social Sciences

i ^,rf^ _ ^ _ ^. ^H^.
'$) factors ; 1
Or^n,?^ , ;

: : Function

;X. ;' -;''| 1

hyssiigaio? 3 *^in" j J ! VI /|\
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Number 3

NEWSLETTER Summer 1972

State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

In this 'interactional' approach, Kantor makes use of the language of

stimulus and response. He distinguishes his technique, from that of others
by using the double-pointed arrow to connect "S" with "R". This is no mere
formality, but the positive characteristic of .his whole attack. "S" and "R"
are alike activity, one as much as the other. Stimulus never enters his
system in the form of a sharp isolation or -abstraction of some, form of physi-
cal energy. Response never occurs as a biological product or by-product
caused or excited by a train of physical energy. ...If the, organism shows
activity--function--in 'perceiving' the object, the object in its turn shows
activity, or function, to just the same extent in 'being perceived1....

The 'things', namely, organism and object, enter this construction as

'existing' in the same preliminary common-sense, way in which they enter into
any natural science. What psychology studies is their 'interaction'--not:
their physical interaction, and not their physiological interaction,, but.
positively and definitely their psychological interaction; it is exactly here
that the differentiation of the psychological from the physical and the physio-
logical can be secured. The psychological interaction requires both organism
and object, and it requires both of these in action such that, without their
mutual participation/ the expressly psychological would not appear,


In answer to the query in the last issue of about psychology: "The Universe"; (2) science,,
whether any other current courses are devoted scientific method, and delimitation of our
soley to interbehaviorism Henry Pronko replies field; (3) psychological events, their pro-
that such is the case for his introductory perties; (4) the behavior segment; (5) stimu-
pp"".hology course involving two sections of lus function and medium of contact, inter-
5i freshmen. His list of topics might be of actional setting; (6) the nervous system in
interest to readers: (1) misunderstandings relationship to psychology; (7) heredity in

Crude Data 1 Bvestigat i ve 'Contact 'Scientific Construction

relation to psychology and comments on race and psychology; (8) instincts,
imprinting, tropisms, pheromones, etc.; (9) reactional biography; (10) founda-
tion stage of reactional biography; (11) classical conditioning; (12) operant
conditioning; (13) basic stage of reactional biography; (14) societal stage of
reactional biography.


Steven Brown writes that a volume entitled SCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGY AND COMMUNICATION:
ESSAYS HONORING WILLIAM STEPHENSON was presented at ceremonies on May 4 at the
University of Missouri. All royalties go to a William Stephenson Prize for
outstanding dissertations in psychology and communication at Missouri. The
table of contents lists a bibliography of Stephenson's works. Publisher is
Teachers College Press, "Young might be interested in knowing that a journal
emphasizing Q methodology may soon be in the offing. Stephenson formally retires
in August and may then be able to devote more time to .this: it has been under
consideration for several months. Stephenson's more recent interests in the
foundations of communication theory are evidenced in the winter issue of P_sv_ch-
ipj|i_l. Record. He and I are collaborating on an edited book of original essays
on Aria.ljs_i_s in the Social ^c_ience_ in which the importance of the single
case--as opposed to the survey approach--will be given emphasis/1 The Winter
issue 1972 contains the article "Application of Communication Theory: I. The
Substructure of science" and Spring issue "Applications of Communication Theory:
II. Interpretations of Keats' 'Ode on a Grecian Urn'". This series shows the
means by which subjective behavior can be measured objectively. His article in
the October 1968 Recor_d perhaps expresses the point: "Consciousness outSubjec-
tivity In". The spooks of consciousness are abjured while the concrete activity
of subjective behavior is emphasized as an important matter of scientific inves-
tigation. In "Postulates of Behaviorism", Philosophy of Science, 1953, 20, 110-
120, the following points may be singled out as of interest to interbehaviorists:
(1) Hunter, Skinner, and Kantor "did not reject verbal report on proto-postula-
tory grounds, but merely provisionally" until "reliable operations became avail-
able; (2) "Kantor's efforts" and "John Dewey's notions about experience" leave
doubt about the objectivity of starting with "immediate experience"; (3) the
positions of Mace, Farrell, and Ryle concerning "rnentalistic fictions of psycho-
logists" have been "long sustained by Kantor"; (4) the systematic approach to
the study of behavior" should begin with simple segments of behavior as held by
Kantor and Skinner and emphasize interactions as indicated by Skinner, A.F. Bent-
ley, Cantril, and others; (5) Kantor "grasped the need for a monistic space, the
same for all empirical propositions"; (6) Kantor*s interactionism includes self-
observation as well as observation by others and the historical connections of
these behavior segments all being concrete behavior--but excluding "psychisms"
such as experience and phenomenal or private worlds which are not; (7) "What
seems important is concrete behavior, including the concrete subject,
Kantor has been saying almost alone, for many years."


The following paper by Jim Herrick consists of two chapters from his master's
thesis. The thesis consists of 16 chapters and 118 pages and was completed in
1971 in anthropology. He obtained his B.A. at Plattsburgh. The paper by A.
Mitsorg is his second in the Newsletter. The first appeared in the fifth number
Of volume 1, 1970S

James W. Herrick*

XIII. An Interbehavioral Approach to the Relationship Between Post-

Childhood Development and the Processes of Culture

As Kantor (1924) points out, it is extremely difficult to draw a line between

the "Basic" stage and "Societal" stage of development., There can be no exact or
correct way of doing this, since the use of stages is merely a way of trying to show
that particular types of behavioral reactions are more characteristics of certain
ages or phases in the development, of the individual than are others. One must .
therefore realize that any discussion of classes of conditioning stimuli (physical,
personal, and social) during the "Basic" stage differ from the conditioning stimuli
of the "Societal" (adolescence-adulthood) stage only in availability; i.e., an
adult or adolescent is subject to a greater range of physical, personal, and social
stimuli than a child. With this in mind, we may consider these three classes of
conditioning stimuli, concentrating on social, stimuli since we are. concerned with
similarities in cultural behavior.

Kantor (1924: 167) places under the heading of social and cultural stimuli,
"social situations...and social objects or institutions." Social situations
include such things as famines, epidemics, etc., and social institutions consist
of "any thing or conditions which operate as a common stimulus to a definite group
or series of individuals" (1924: 167). There are, according to Kantor (1924: 167),
two types of cultural stimuli: "those comprising the common reactions of members
of a group, such as the institutions we call manners and customs, or the products
themselves of social behavior, as buildings, roads, distinct wearing apparel, etc."
All of these stimuli are presented to the child in the "Basic" (primarily familial)
stage, and he is "brought to conform to the practices and ideals of the group in
which he lives by the authority of the group"--the group in this case being the
family (1924: 168).

We shall now consider what is termed the '^Societal and Cultural" levels of
personality development.

At the social and cultural stages of development the individual

acquires all sorts of equipment which are reactions to the social
institutions with which the child next, comes into contact. These
institutions are the. objects, situations, and conditions serving
as common stimuli to groups of individuals as well as customs,
manners, and other ways of acting of people (Kantor 1924: 82)0

As the child advances to adolescence and adulthood, interactions with social

stimuli increase. Since each culture or sub-culture or society or even community
will have either its own unique institutional stimuli, we begin to see similarities
in their behaviors--not because each of them has something inside of them which
guides their behavior (a personality or, when considered as a group, a group per-
sonality), but rather because they are interacting with the same cultural or
institutional stimuli.

Although cultural responses are not concerned essentially with the

preservation of the individual, we find that much of our cultural behavior
constitutes the functioning of the organism, in a very fundamental and
elementary manner. For it is such action that comprises a very large part
of the distinctly human activities This means to say that although

*State University of New York at Albany

cultural reactions are arbitrary and artificial they do constitute
the intimate adaptations of persons to most, of the specific con-
ditions and objects of their surroundings. Not only do such activ-
ities comprise the more elaborate responses that correspond to
historical institutional stimuli; such as religious, aesthetic and
mythological things, but they also have to do with the intimate
details of personal and private life. For instance, our cultural
behavior involves methods and manners of eating, of sexual activity,
methods of breathing, bodily carriage, etc. In such adaptations to
cultural stimuli our anatomical and physiological equipment consti-
tute the same means and instruments of adjustments as in every type
of response. Cultural conduct is therefore a very fundamental
feature of the person's total behavior equipment. As such these
reactions have a large and central place in the person's behavior
life (Kantor, 1924: 201). '

If we adhere to the interbehavioral approach and consider interactions with

institutional stimuli as that which accounts for similarities in cultural behavior,
then we are not faced with any great dilemma when we discover that not everyone
conforms to our postulates of homogeneity. We must simply realize that in more
complex societies, there may be one particular institution with which certain
people interact more than others (e.g., old people and religious institutions),
while in less complex cultures (where, for example, a religious institution may
play an important role in the lives of everyone--young and old) we may easily
observe a higher degree of homogeneity in behavior. Of course, the functions
of various cultural institutions may be interdependent (as they often are) and
we could therefore select out of the interactions with these interdependent
institutions certain behaviors which seem to be dominant in all institutional
interactions (e.g., older males assume leadership roles). In this case, we could
rely upon an abstraction such as a "theme" (as proposed by Opler 1946a who,
incidentally, cites Kantor?s notion of institutions as stimuli as influencing
him in his [Opler 1946a3 1946b^] theory). One should realize, however, that
"themes" must (as Opler's approach indicates) be dervied from overt behavior
(he calls them "expressions'**). One cannot postulate a theme and then go in
search of support for it.

One final quotation from Kantor (1924: 203, 204) should conclude our
argument for the interbehavioral approach to the study of culturally-similar
patterns of behavior. It deals further with the notion of instititions serving
as stimuli for cultural behavior.

The stimuli for cultural reactions differ from those of our

ordinary individual responses in that the objects or conditions
constituting the bases for cultural stimulation, are in a sense
officially or authoritatively, though not deliberately, determined
by the activities of the group. In other words, the functional
character of the objects is determined not by the manner in which
the individual left alone responds to these objects but by the
fact that these objects already have some kind of stimulational
function. They already have called out standard reactions in
other members of the group. The individual at present is merely
building up similar reactions to the same stimuli and therefore
his reactions are like the reactions of the other individuals.
This means that he Is merely attaching the same reactions to in-
stitutional stimuli in the identical way that his predecessors
have done.
XIV. Recapitulation II.

If we accept Spiro's (1951) notion that personality and culture are two ways
of looking at the same process, and if we reject traditional conceptions of culture
influencing the psyche or mind which then manifests itself in overt behavior; and,
if we further reject the unsupported contention that early childhood experiences
are most important in developing the "personality structure" of an individual, then
we are left with the ideas that: (1) the relationship between culture and person-
ality is one of interaction (with neither "causing" the other, since an inter-
action assumes a two-way process); (2) the process of personality development is
an interactive process which may not be ascribed to any one. particular stage of
development; and (3) after we have observed an individual or group of individuals
interacting with the various stimuli in their environments (objects, personal,
institutional)5 we must not reify this behavior (e.g., aggression), place it
within the organism, and then use it as a "determiner" (a personality structure)
of behavior. When considering group personalities specifically , we are dealing
primarily with Institutional stimuli ("any thing or condition which operates as
a common stimulus to a definite group or series of individuals" [Kantor 192,4: 167J) .
Of course, a thing or a person could also serve as a common, stimulus (e.g., hospital
or policeman).

Certain problemsarise when, after observing groups or cultural behavioral

interactions with institutional stimuli3 we attach a name to this behavior (even
if we do not place it within the organism, but merely describe such and such
behavior as, for example, "aggressive"). These problems, of course, relate to
questions of cultural relativism--what is considered aggressive in one culture
may not, be considered so in the culture under investigation or to other cultures.
This problem was discussed in Section II.

It: is therefore suggested that some sort of stand be taken when the inter-
actions of the people of Culture X with their institutional stimuli, are considered,
That iss are the people of Culture X "aggressive" according to our standards, to
their standards, or to whose standards? Or perhaps, we might do away with such
labels altogether and confine ourselves to descriptions of interbehaviors--thus
avoiding the projection of our standards of "aggressive," "witty," "paranoid,"
"sly," "guilt-ridden," etc., etc.:; while at the same time being in possession
of more exacting accounts of why the people of Culture X behave as they do
(i.e., their behavioral patterns are, in, some cases, highly homogeneous because
they are interacting with such and such an institutional, stimulus or stimuli) .
We must not shy away from exacting descriptions of human behavior (which may
eventually be converted into event-bound theories or laws)"...on the ground that
such problems require higher powers than science commands" (Kantor 1962: 326, 327).

A final word on the subject of labeling observed interbehaviors is given by

Kantor (1924: 167, 168) in the following quotation.

Let us not slight the fact that each name for social behavior,
such as awe or shame, must, if it is to mean anything at all, stand
for some concrete and specific action which of necessity is ab-
solutely different for each person and also culturally-defined],
and also varied within the different periods of the individual's
life. An act of charity, mercy, faith, hope, shame, or resent-
ment, is a specific, factual behavior situation and we must by no
means overlook the fact that, because for descriptive purposes we
apply a conventional term to such reactions, there is anything but
a conventional similarity in such behavior situations,, ...Social
conduct, we repeat again, consists of behavior segments developed
through contact with actual institutions or common stimuli; and
the nature of the behavior is a direct derivation of the stimulating
circumstances in which the person acquires it.

If the above propositions-are held, then it remains to make use of

Harris" (1968) argument that we provide a "material" base for the investigation
of cultural phenomenainstitutions and the concomitant institutional inter-
behaviors being a large part of what constitutes these cultural phenomena. A
knowledge of the foundation conditions upon which various institutions arose and
the subsequent evolution of these institutions is crucial to the understanding
of why things and events are the way they are today. It is hoped that this
point, has been made in the tracing of one area of that vast institution called
"science"-~namely, that dealing with anthropology's culture and personality

In effect, this thesis could be considered as an attempt to attach a group

label to those scientists called anthropologists. The label would read "Dualis-
tic," while Harris' label would read "Idealists," It is hoped that support has
been given for these labels on other than a priori grounds. It must be remembered,
however, that science is but one institution and that one could also deal with
religious, familial, economic, etc., etc. institutions, all of which may be seen
to be the product of divergences from pristine cultural-ecological conditions.
What cannot be emphasized enough is the idea that group labels must be derived
from the institutional interactions carried out by the people of a particular
culture, and that these institutions are not to be assumed to exist on a. priori


Harris, M. The rise of anthropolpgical '.theory. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell,


Kant or, J. R. Principles of psychology, vol. 1. Bloomington, Ind.: Principia,


Kantor, J, R. The logic of modern science. Chicago: Principia, 1962.

Opler, M. E. Themes as dynamic forces in culture. American Journal of

y_> 1946a: "'51: 198-206.

Opler, M. E. An application of the theory of themes in culture. Journal of

The Washington Academy of Sciences, 1946b: 36: (5)4

Spiro, M. E. Culture and personality. ; j^c Matry_ , 1951: 14: 19-46.

_ 7_

Nevertheless, the Earth is Flat

A Review of a Review

Fundamentalists who persistently maintain that the earth is flat bear

witness to -the great power of infallible intuition to outweigh the claims
of meticulous observation. That unfailing power Is the essence of funda-
mentalism, a trait which is manifested on every intellectual level. Psy-
chologists no more than other professionals escape the contagion of funda-
mentalism. The burden of their faith is the existence of mind. Overtly
and covertly they paraphrase the New York editor; "Yes, Virginia, there
jLs_ a mind", though in the succession of generations the same entity is
dominated by different nouns.

Clear as day are the mechanisms that fortify faith. At bottom is

ignorance concerning the nature of'things believed, and next is the vigor
of established cultural institutions when encapsulated in an amber of words.
Names support the conviction in the existence of nothings.

All the above is effectively illustrated in a recent book review by

Professor Neisser-'- who comments upon three books on Mental Imagery. He
waxes approvingly of the change of fashion in psychology which makes possi-
ble a renewed commerce with mental processes despite the demise of intro-
spective psychology. He says, "In the last, ten years...,the behavioristic
taboos have been broken and the mind seems worth studying after all." (p.628).

As is only to be expected Professor Neisser follows closely in the

footsteps of the early detractors of behaviorism and reiterates that "what
contemporary. ... .psychologists mean by "the mind'1', however, is very different
from what their predecessors meant. The definition is no longer in terms of
conscious, introspectively given phenomena. Instead it is in terms of a
flow of information in the organism. Theoretical terms like 'storage',
'retrieval', 'receding', and ' selection9.....refer to hypothetical stages
of activity or processing" (P. 628).

Note the glaring contradictions If behavioristic taboos have been

broken, what are the referents of the terms 'storage', 'retrieval1, 'recod-
ings', and "selection"? Can they be. other than the conscious, introspectively
given Noumena? So where is the shift in the meaning of mind? Can the
juggling with synonyms transform the transcendental into something else?
Can nonbehavioral imagery be anything else, than supernatural processes dis-
guised by other names? The camouflage fails to conceal. The reviewer
states that one of the three books is organized entirely in the classical
mode, another includes papers from both sides of the fmental-behavioralj
watershed, while the third is written from the perspective of association-
ism. The reviewer even points out that in one of the three books, images
"have become the psychological correlate of linguistic deep structure" (p. 630)

What else can one conclude but that the stream of psychological thinking
is heavily polluted by transcendental fallout? Though the labors of a
Hercules may not suffice to clear it, one is tempted to point out (1) that
to ignore the fact that imagery has only been rejected by reflexological
behaviorism, is really a sign of being influenced by supernaturalism, (2)
that though behaviorism is simply antimentalism in every form, it need not
be Pavlovian reflexology, and (3) that antibehaviorism despite verbal cam-
ouflage holds to "mind" as the age-old mystical conscious known only through
introspective intuitions It is only the prevalence of scientific work
and achievements of the other disciplines that influences psychologists
to presume that mind can be nonbehavioral and at the same time nonsuper-
A striking feature of the clinging to the flat-earth type of funda-
mentalism in psychology is the misinterpretation of the behavioral move-
ment. Instead of regarding it as an admirable attempt to comply with
scientific demands to deal only with the actual behavior of organisms,
it is looked upon as a fad in psychology to avoid the recognition of
mentalistic imagery, thinking, and other noumena. Those who unwittingly
accept the dogmas of the Church Fathers concerning the existence of two
worlds, two essences-minds and bodies, as well as other mentalistic dual-
isms decry Behaviorism despite the fact that their observations and exper-
iments never concern anything but the cognitive and affective interactions
of organisms with concrete objects through the mediation of direct or
substitute stimulation. By disregarding this fact they find it easy
to delude themselves that by a curtain of words they can conceal their
adherence to the fundamentalistic belief in the existence of the super-

A. Mitsorg

"...'science' is...a procedure of observation and postulation, with all

observation recognizing that it takes place under postulation, and with all
postulation recognizing that it arises out of observation."
A. F. Bentleys "Kennetic Inquiry",
Science, 1950, CXII, 775-783.
Noel W. Smith, Editor
Faculty of Social Sciences

Pall 1972
State University College of Arts and Science, Pittsburgh, New York


Thus the sense organs appear to be constructed and differentiated in relation
to specific differences in the stimuli which may affect them, while the
nervous system appears to be constructed and unified in relation to co-
ordinated activity by the organism. While the sense organs put the organism
in diversified interaction with its surroundings, the nervous system prevents
this diversification from resulting in disintegrated and isolated reactions,
it is thus apparent that the nervous system secures to: the organism individu-
ality and unity of life in spite of very great diversity of stimuli and envir-
onment. We have in these considerations, I believe, the means of stating
the relational view of consciousness in biological terms. An organism so
situated that it should be in differentiated interaction with the specific
differences in the world about it, but which should none the less, react in a
unified and co-ordinated manner no matter how it might be stimulated, might well
be defined as a conscious organism. Its consciousness would be a relational
term integrating and unifying its differentiated interaction with its sur-
roundings. Furthermore, its consciousness would naturally be marked by many
of the characteristics usually attributed to consciousness. It would for
instance, be what we call individual and personal, and, being unified, it would
present features often ascribed to a self'or mind.

--"Consciousness, the Sense Organs, and the Nervous System", 1909

Oooconsciousness is not a term, but a relation.

.....our life...manifestly appears to be an interaction between organism and
environment, and not an interaction between consciousness and objects...

"Consciousness and Object", 1912

Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction


On J-une 7,8, and 9 the Cheiron Society for the History of the Social and
Behavioral Sciences will hold its Fifth Annual Meeting at Plattsburgh. There
will be a symposium on "Contextual Interactionists". Hollo Handy from State ..
University of New York at Buffalo (now on leave at Behavioral Research Council,
Great Barrington, Massachusetts) will speak on Arthur Bently and John Dewey,
Paul Fuller at Western Michigan on J. R. Kantor, David Miller at University
of Texas on George Herbert Mead, and Clarence State Professor Emeritus at
University of Massachusetts on Aristotle. There are a couple of other pos-
sibilities for the meeting that are of special interest to interbehaviorists.
If they are realized they will be reported in later issues of the Newsletter.
It looks like an exciting meeting and hopefully many interbehaviorists will
attend. The meetings will be held at Valoour Conference Center on Lake
Champ lain, ' an idyllic setting. Those who wish to submit papers should send
them to .ifhis editor by January 31, 1973. We hope that a number of inter-
behaviorists and other interested persons will do so and add to the merriment
(with or without papers). Inexpensive lodging will be available. We will
provide information on that later. Papers will be considered which deal with
aspects of the history of any of the behavioral and social sciences, with
relevant historical or social science methodology, or with the philosophy
of history as applied to the study of the history of the behavioral and social
sciences. The emphasis of the meetings- will be interdisciplinary.

In the November 1972 Cojnte^goiwzJPS^SfeSiSSZ Norman Guttman reviews Kantor's

and is headlined "Interbehaviorisms Naturalism Radicalized". Guttman does
not seem to like naturalism and takes Kantor to task for it. He also has
Kantor as a devotee of William James and "under the impress of Freud".
to Adolf Meyer). Guttman finds Kantor's systematization weak while Roback in
1952 (A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY) wrote that "Kantor, who, for all his
explorations into logic, language, and allied fields, the boundaries of which
he delimits expertly may be charged with an over dose of systematization. "
Replies to Guttman in the form of letters to the editor might be appropriate,
These are printed under "On the Other Hand".

A new book by Robert Lundin has just been published by D, C, Heath and Co. 5
THEORIES AND SYSTEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY. It presents a prominent account of
interbehaviorism and even mentions the Newsletter. The book runs about 3^0
pages and would appear to be about right for a one semester course. It has
the additional merit of providing a good historical background five chapters
before Wundt. Lundin has previously published AN OBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF
MUSIC (two editions), PERSONALITY (two editions), and PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHO-
PATHOLOGY, All have an interbehavioral orientation.
We are publishing the first original research in the Newsletter with Jacqueline
Parrington's work0 It was conducted as a class project and a continuation
of her interests in construct usage and its influence as expressed in a paper
she published in the Psgchglogical Record. Bequests for offprints for that
publication have exhausted her supply. She is in the second year -of her
M.Ao program in clinical psychology, plans to spend a year working after com-
pletion, then look for a doctoral program. Hopefully, her journal publication
and her works in this Newsletter may help her in gaining admittance to a
satisfactory program. The second article is a whimsical piece by the editor,

In cutting down from five to four issues we have tried to provide as much
material as in the five and can now count pages and find that 1972 pages are
about one-third more than 1971 , Prices will remain the same as we go into our
fourth year of the Newsletter,, The feature articles coming in 1973 include
a comparison by a senior psychology major of a systems approach of D.L. Clark
and the field approach of J.R., Kantor and a lengthy article of exceptional
quality by a graduate student at the University of Denver,,


Jacqueline Farrington
Bollard and Miller (1950) have suggested that effective communist ion
and effective psychotherapy consist of verbal labeling and symbolic linguistic
manipulation of adult problem solving situations. Such labeling and manipula-
tive behavior is frequently observed in the use of constructs which are reified
into possessing existence and which often connote direction or force within
the human organism,, Additionally, such directors or forces are viewed as un-
derlying and causative factors of both implicit and explicit behaviors
McLuhan (1967) has suggested that humans engaged in social interaction
learn to use "the rite words in rote order. " This study was undertaken as a
pilot study of a series of studies by the author (Farrington, 1972) which
attempt to discover the ways in which "rite" words may be used in both des-
cription and explanation within a group setting concerned with problem .solving.
Previous studies (Ellis, 1967; Do Hard and Miller, 1950? Jourard, 1958)
have suggested that such constructs carry an assumed and implicit meaning
which is seldom defined or agreed upon by group participants.
Ss consisted of 25 members of an education subgroup of a Drug Awareness
Workshop, Summer, 1972, at State University of New York at Plattsburgh, Age
range of Ss was 17-68 years (median age = 36 years, X = 35 years). Twelve
Ss were public school classroom teachers; 4 Ss were nurse-teachers j 3 S_s were
employed by community drug programs | 4- Ss were students; 1 5 was a medical
technician in the US Air Force,
Ss were requested during the second grouo session to write a brief
definition of 10 constructs identified by 0 as high in frequency of use
during the first group session. The ten constructs were; (l) anxiety, (2)
ego* (3) mind, (4-) problem, (5) self-image, (6) identity, (7) paranoia,
(8) psychological, (9) physiological, (10) self-esteem.
During three 90-minu.te group sessions, the observer recorded the fre-
quency and context of constructs.,, Three conditions were observed; Condition
.A: discussion grouts,in dialogue with three high school student participants
centering.on students' perceptions of drug usage among peers; Condition B
discussion of adult attitudes toward the high school graduate who is classified
as a "drifter'8j Condition ; discussion led by educational consultant of
teaching techniques for school health education programs.
As is shown in Table 1, a wide diversity of meaning was found in written
definitionso A total of 120 definitions were given for the 10 constructs. The
words "ego", "anxiety5," and "psychological" received the greatest number of
definitions in that order The least number of definitions were given to
"physiological," "problem.," and "self-esteem" in ascending order.
Ss frequently gave more than one definition perword and occasionally
gave overlapping definitions,, For example, "self-image" was defined as
"identity" and vice versa0 One construct was also often defined by another
construct or part of another construct; e.g.,,. "ego" by "self," ^identity" by
"self," "paranoia" by "character disorder," "mind" by "intelligence," Addition-
ally, a construct was defined partially by itself; e.g. "self-esteem" by
."self-feelings", "self-pride",and "self-judgement."
The construct "self" demonstrated higher frequency than any other construct
as a definer of several other constructs, (frequency = 17)
Figure one demonstrates that behavioral use of constructs during the
three sessions showed extreme variability,, The construct "self-image" was
verbalized most frequently over the total sessions, followed by the construct
Of interest in considering such frequencies are the group setting
factors toder setting Condition A the most frequent constructs (in order
of frequency) were "self-image", "problem", and "paranoia;" under Con-
dition Bf "self-image'j" "problem", and "self-esteem;" under Condition C
"self-image,"."anxiety" and %ind0"
In Table 2 is given the verbal context in which the 6 most frequent
constructs were utilized* In all but one case ("the problem drinker"), the
construct is described rather than descriptive and is viewed as being
acted upon rather than acting,, That is, constructs, both in conversational
and in written verbal context, have been reified to assume existence as
concrete objects or events.
In a previous and better controlled setting of B Ss, the author'
(Fa'rrington, 1972) suggested that the utilization of constructs in group
discussion appeared to have the characteristic of an "anticipatory pre-
eurrent reaction" (Kantor, 1924., p0 39) which prepared participants for the
final act of avoiding discussion of particular o.vents0 It is unfortunate
that in the limited number of group sessions available, a single observer
in-a large group of 25 subjects cannot validate further the earlier findings.
It is suggested, however, that the "problem", whether an underlying cause or
an effect or factor contributing to behavior, was never specifically de-
fined. In fact, the "problem" was not defined as q group of factors,
though such was suggested occassionally. Rather, the information which emerged
from group discussion suggested that setting factors (societal, economic and
political) as well as innumerable specific stimuli with varying functions
had not yet been specifically identified,,
The construct "self/' so frequently utilized in both written definition
and verbal communication, was never operationally defined. Such is not
surprising, for the definition of self is far from succinct or singular in
any psychological dictionary Even holding constant the function of reference,
anxiety ego self-image Identity
need self** to others what I am
unrest self-esteem seen in mirror way viewed
nervousness knowing framework of ego self
worry** improving learned, tried, familiar
fear*** feelings** accepted self picture
uncoHsfortableness ** personality** outward anpearanc** sense of self
feeling of stress** determines behavior self picture** uniqueness
apprehension worth sense of self role**
concern mind opinion of self goals
madness conscious identity** philosophy
unhaopiness me evaluation of self what I think
frustration self-image what want to be self-image
motions dreams personal thing
uneasyness sense of self
tension things
insecurity process
psychic director
inner strength
psychological physiological mind paranoia

deal with mind physical** intelligence*** character disorder

mind effects vital organs non-physieal part feeling persecuted**
relates to mind** body processes*** thought processes irrational fear
relates to psyche inborn tendency where unconscious distrust
mental orientation body, not brain stored critical
brain body and mind memory suspicious feeling**
emotional effect subconscious ill feeling
feeling unconscious fear**
thinking reasoning seared
learned behavior judgement hostility
mind processes** personality discouragement
consciousness discipline feeling threatened
unconscious where I think insecurity
problem solving
mind directing
problem self-esteem

interfering factors stressful belief of self self-pride

situation*** circumstances ego-strength self-judgement
needs solving feelings of worth** functional relation-
obstacle hurdle self-feeling ship between iden-
idea favorable opinion tity and self

***given more than ten times

**given more than five times


- 30'




I i i f JL\_1_ J__L
1 2 3 2 3 1 2 : 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
anxiety ego self- identity psycho- physio- mind problem self-
esteem logical logical image

Figure1 Frequencies of Constructs observed in group discussions

Table 20 Yerbal context of most frequently used constructs.
. mind
damaging to a kid's self- image overtones in our roinds
high self concept the unconscious part of your mind
low self concept mind-expanding drugs
an evaluation of tK- 5\->if secure in your mind
self-image is what ?> < > " > in the back of the mind
thinks of himself a critical roind
activities used to develop
decisions are related to
one's self image
drug abuse o .depends upon
your self ~concept
2) 5) anxietj
abuse is symptomatic of a create anxiety
problem low anxiety
underlying nature of the high anxiety
problem emotional anxiety
an underlying problem
security ill having a problem
the drug problem
the Droblen drinker
problem is a thing that concerns
run into a problem
psychological problem
3) oaranoia
"^ * &&wt3afmm&a&t&msaxxz*X3
&wt3afmm&a&tmsxz3 .

eople get paranoid high self-esteem

eelings of"' paranoia low self-esteem
doing drug* gives paranoia teach self-esteem
to be paranoid provide self-esteem
self-esteem growth

Brown and Oilman (1966) have found that there remain differences in expression
which exist at a level of difficulty which demands time-and-painstaking effort,,
These authors have suggested that the repertoires of verbal responses of
individuals alter under varying conditions, appear to be descriptive of their
own reactions and have significantly different effects upon others What
may be reasonably inferred is that the construct "self" probably refers to
reaction patterns established by the individual using the word, these then
being imposed upon other individuals" observed behavior.
The purpose of a Drug Awareness Workshop is assigned to be that of placing
individuals in a setting in which they may discuss and attempt to find
adequate means of understanding and altering behavior patterns of drug usage
deemed undesireable and/or harmful to effective and satisfactory personal
and group functioning. As has been demonstrated, words acquire innumerable
functions or meanings., A relevant question posed by Lewis Carroll (1936)
then arises; "whether you can make words mean so many different things."
Phrased somewhat more bluntly, the question Is? what events or actual
happenings have we actually been talking about?
Such a question is not posed as either challenge nor Idle hair-
splitting, but rather with serious concern^, It has been oft said that
"psychologists don't know what they are talking about." The author sug-
gests that the disciples of psychology must take both credit arid blame for
the promulgation of reification of constructs and the implications of such
a practice. Psychology has aided the splitting of the human organism
into two parts000a questionably sound view of a whole organism which inter-
acts with and within an environment If indeed our constructs have no re-
ferent in crude datas that is, in actual behavior which is observable, it
would seem more than expedient to dispense withtheir use.
Rather than continue a practice which cannot facilitate the alteration
of behavior and may facilitate avoidance of such efforts, we would do well
to attempt to adequately describe and classify behavioral events. Only
then can we discover the conditions which may facilitate and encourage
alteration of behavior,, Such admits of our ignorance and simultaneously
suggests that systematic analyses of connected series of events could lead
to more favorable results than we presently see in most social institutions,,
It the meantime, we are spinning circular discussions with labels and con-
structs which have far too many referents and varied meanings and functions
to enable us to communicate with clarity or to adequately seek new directions,,
Our 'rite11 words have seemingly become a rite in themselves as we perpetuate
the circle, or as a young poet said at age seventeen! (published in'Verdi
Valley Review" in 1969, Verdi Valley School, Arizona),
"words learn themselves after a long time, after all
their cramped misunderstood falterings finally lead them
to some point (not in time) where they find space around
themselves and breathe full, ah0
which is not to 'say that they are suddenly free, as freedom is
generally misunderstood, but that they are free to be
created rather than merely found in the dark,,
which is very like other art and living, not only writing,,
which is where most of us haooen to be. right now.w
Perhaps the time has come to say; we are as much victims of our rites as are
our young friends,and our old friends0 <>whose rites are, after all, only
different,, That's all we know0 <,right now0


Caroll; Lewis, ThejCojK2iM-^feJEfe5J^iJ!^irJ2i- New lorks Modern Library, 1936-

Bollard, JY and Millers N 0 PjjB^n^.ity-_aj|d_PsjzghjQth^r^a^, New loyfes McGraw Hill, 1950*
Ellis,y A, *""'"""r?^^"'^'"rf?tr:''^^^
Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy.y New forks Lyle u
tj Stuart0
Farrington, J e K 0 Utilization of Psychological constructs in a group therapy setting
1972, 22, 291-312.
Oilman, A 0 and Brown, R 0 ThgJif^MIl^ll^ilSS^SSSSfJlMiiilS* ^nn Arbor? U Mich. Press
1966, pp0 87-122
Jourard, PC New lorks Basic Books, 1958.
Kantor,'j 0 Ro Pjliiile_oX_llI^ho]^^s Vol.I, Principia Press, 1924.
McLuhanj M 0 E21_.34SfeSaJk2,^lli1ilEi, ^e Yorks Random House, 1967.
Noel W, Smith
State University of New York at Plattsburgh

For many years we have been indoctrinated in the belief that we mast
convince children of the reality of Santa Glaus0 Never does a December
slip by without our local newspaper reminding us that "Yess Virginia, there
is a Santa Glaus" We are told in this chestnut that Santa Glaus is
necessary for "child-like faith" and for poetry, and romance, and joy.
And what we cannot is not nroof something doesn't exist; witness
fairies Further, "there is a veil cohering the unseen world" which can
never be removed except by fantasy,,
With, this belief which is so strongly entrenched and highly cherished,
do we even dare to question it or poke at it a little or try to lift a
corner of that veil with our fingers rather than our fantasy? Could we
possibly be so bold and undisciplined as to suggest some doubt about the
value of the entire concept and its mystique? We must, for there is
imich that we have learned in psychological investigation of children that
demands our scrutiny of this tradition,
First of all we must recognize that our attempts to convince children
that a fantasy is not a fantasy but a truth is the deliberate fostering
of a lie,, Yet the parent who so lies to the child would likely punish the
child for such a Iie0 We must be a truthful to children in all matters as
we expect them to be, for they follow examples of our behavior, not our
admonishmentso This is not to deny the value of imagination, but we must
distinguish between encouraging imagination and deliberately passing off
imaginative objects as trutho
Santa Glaus is commonly employed as a device to control children?
"You better not shoutj you better not pout, you better not cry0."
The song tells the child that he must not behave as a child if he ex-
pects to receive the potential gifts that have been dangled before him,,
He must give up his wicked ways and conform to an adult pattern of
being "good0M It is no wonder that some children seream with fright when
they encounter this bizarre creature in a department store. Others
merely assert to him that they have been "good" even though they have
necessarily and inevitably all shouted, pouted, and cried,
When the child finally discovers that the whole matter is a
monumental hoax perpetrated upon him in his innocence, thereis dis-
illusionment and confusion and. finally disapnointment and embarrass-
mento Up to this time his parents and other adults had been the repository
of total truth for him but now the story all falls -away as a deliberate
fabrication and his parents are found wanting,, Not only can the gift
receiving never be the same again but neither can his parents,, In
some cases he will be too embarrassed to admit to his parents either for
his sake or theirs, that he knows the truth, and so he goes along with the
hoax on himselfo This is similar to the situation in which the child
learns that his parents' story about the origin of babies is a lie but
never mentions it in order to embarrass no one including himself.
As adults we often view in retrospect our own belief in Santa Glaus
as pleasurableo But if we sort through our nostalgic memories of eager
anticipation we may find that we are confusing sentimentality with
enjoyment or we are desiring to continue believing what our parents told
us was true; we cling to the childhood belief rather than face the disillusion-
ment and we bolster this belief by vicariously living it with our children
on whom we have, in turn, perpetrated the lie. It is this kind of bond that

can account for the strong feeling of attachment we have for this hoax.
In a class of child psychology that I taught to college freshmen,
I raised some of these same objections to Santa. The outcry of protest
was loud and intense. Upon sorting through the students' various argu-
ments I found that they centered around these three assertions; (l) if
children are not taught that Santa is real they will tell other children
and that will cause problemsj (2) Santa Glaus is no different from any
other fantasy and children should be encouraged in the use of fantasy;
further^ children cannot be taught to distinguish between truth and
fantasy; (3) believing in Santa is fun and no child should be deprived
of this fun.
I asked the class how many thought it wise to tell children that
storks brought babies. Not a single student raised a hand. I then in-
formed then that their arguments for Santa would apply in precisely
the same way as that of storks and babies0 To be consistent they would,
have to accept both or relinquish both. But let us look at the argu-
ments one at a time
The first argument recognizes the inevitability that children will
pass on information no matter what it is they are told, whether truth,
fabrication, or folklore,, It was sxich information that caused Virginia
to write her letter to seek clarification. It seems hardly justified to
lie to a child in order to prevent his passing truthful information to
another child0 If a child can be informed by another child of truth as
opposed to fantasy it contradicts the argument that he eanst distinguish
between them. That leads us directly to the second argument0 Children
are constantly confronted with such ready-made fantasies such as personal-
ized animals| trains that have faces, feelings, and desires; and television
cartoon characters that fly through the air.3 Yet in their actual encounter
with these things they maintain constant awareness that dogs don't wear
hats or talk; that trains, cars, and other inanimate objects must be
made to function by humans; and that no one flies unassisted. I had tried
on several occasions to see if my twins at the age of four would believe
that a neighborhood squirrel was either the same as their favorite story-
book squirrel or at least behaved similarly,, They clearly informed me that
squirrels don't really do such things as the storybook describes and that
I should know better,,
In addition to their ready-made fantasies there is no dearth of
fantasies children themselves construct whether they be centered around
their creations in a sandpile, activities of dolls, or just sitting in
a chair pretending to be driving a car and producing some noise to
heighten the effect,, Yet the child constantly exhibits his ability to
distinguish between these and real objects,, What child would not leave
his fantasied car to sit on his father's lap behind the steering wheel of
a real, car?
These kinds of fantasies are desirable and healthy but they are of
a different kind from those proffered as truth by parents where the child
has no opportunity to test them against reality. In addition to Santa
Glaus and storks bringing babies there is the Easter bunny that lays eggs
and shovels, the fairy that replaces the tooth under the pillow with a
coin, the star that is a dead relative, the supernatural agents that
provide a constant surveillance of the child's behavior, and other veils of
an unseen world that we construct It is in the Santa Glaus Lie that we go
to the most elaborate extremes to lend credulity to the hoax. Both S. I.
Hayakaw and Brock Ghisholm have observed the problems in these distortions
of reality and have shown how imagination as a valuable tool of exploration

may be actually not having reliable information for comparison

until there I an emotional realization or a traumatic revelation. .When
imaginative behavior encounters inconsistent tests of reality It cannot
realize its potential as a tool of innovation and progress in adult life.
For there have been no reliable guidelines, nothing to trust. It seems
likely, then, that what is necessary for poetry and romance and joy is
not "child-like faith" but rather the freedom to engage fully in fantasy
while surrounded by a concrete world arid factual and true information
or factual and true to the best of our ability to provide it; at the very
least we should not Impede any child from discovering it. Any veil is
one that we have placed between our children and the truth. It consists of
lies and ignorance. Lies we can Immediately dispense with. Ignorance we
can overcomeo
As for the third argument, if we look at the childss reactions objectively
rather than nostalgically we are likely to find more eventual pain and
damage than fun,, His fun and pleasure can probably be more genuine and
freer of conflict if he is not the victim of a hoax however well meaning
it :Biay be intended
' -What are the real functions of Santa Glaus? There are twos (l)
a symbol for Virginia and others of "love and generosity and devotions"
(2) a commercial gimmick to increase sales The first one is probably
too abstract for small children, and we might suspect that it is also
a convenient alibi for justifying the lie. The second is a very concrete one
that children can understands Santa helps stores sell toysa Let us look
at some considerations that bring us to these two functions.
So far we have dealt largely with the negative issues. Let us add
one more-that leads us toward the first function. If Santa is really sup-
posed to be a symbol for our interpersonal relations as in (l), he
subverts that intent The gift giving that should be one of intimacy and
devotion between parent and child is handed over to a biaarre impersonal
creature who sneaks in during the night,, Certainly the excitement of finding
gleaming new toys is there but does this really represent the way oarents and
children feel about each other? Have they expressed any intimacy and devotion
to each other? Would not the whole matter of gift giving be more meaning-
ful and more directed toward warm personal relations if we gave our gifts
directly from each other to each other parents, children, grandparents,
sisters, brothers, friends with all of the meaning of fond personal
selection and cordial presentation?
What then do w tell our children about the many creatures in red
that they see in tip stores in December, 1 tell mine that these Santas
are men In costumes just like the clown at the circus. They are in the
stores to laugh and make us happy and to help us to select gifts for each
other. This is concrete and they understand it and accept it readily. It
is the utilization of the second function. As for the descent down the
chimney we tell them how this was derived from the Norse belief that the
goddess Hersa descended through the smoke and flames of a fire of fir
boughs and through her magic slippers gave gifts to obedient children.
This tale we compare with fairy tales and personified animals as "pretending"
and not real0 The fact of such a derivation is not quite so concrete and
clear but neither is it clear to them, how an automobile or a television
works or how paint sticks to the wall or trees turn color in the fall, or how
glass transmits light; but we keep helping them, with new information and
improving methods of explanation. Never are they told a deliberate lie
about anything. In the meantime they are free to pretend they are flying

through the air on a sleigh or coming down chimneys and to have all the fun
with the tale that it can provide, but they are quite clear about what is
fantasy and what is not0

"While It is clear that a person does acctiaulate and remember ways of behaving
and normally does behave in a way that is consistent with his present circum-
stances , there is no clear evidence in logic or in data that these behaviors
are really internal physical units that get storeds processed, searched for,
selected, and invoked by some set of internal storage or processing devices
That argument only leads to regressive questions about the mechanisms underlying
the mechanisms. It is not an aeeident that the description of symbolic
processes (the functions f some alleged symbolic device) is given in behavioral
termSj, such as storing, .sorting^ and selection,, That in itself i@ a strong
clue that, rather than being functions of a device at all, they are functions f
a person, i e0, part and parcel of or9 better^ parameters of his behavior
(p. 13)
Lyle E0 Bourne, B0 R0 Bkstrand, &
Prentiee~Hallj 1971,
Noel W. Smith, Editor Preceding

Faculty of Social Sciences Segment

Setting Factors
Function j

Stimulus Objecl
I Sti mlus
| Fu clion

Media |'



Volume 4

NEWSLETTER Winter 1973

State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

For insight into what human nature is, the Greeks, with Plato first of all,
are unsurpassed. They make our best modern psychologists often look very

Harry Mahan continues to make progress with colleges of California1 as the y are all I can
his Project Socrates* Some months ago he handle at this time I want to b in very
wrote? "It is arousing nothing less than a close contact with any installations at other
phenomenal Interest among the community campuses at first During the present year
colleges of California. I sent out a mailing I have had a couple of other people ttaehing
the first of the year Inviting visits to th course in addition to mystlf and am
our campus and I have been swamped with pleased with the results. It is a very easy
visitors ever since. I made a new set of assignment and works out ideally with th
study tapes just prior to the beginning of teacher having a couple of other courses which
the present semester and they contain con- are his and in which he can project his own
siderable tutoring material In addition to personality in his relations with his stud^
the content of the two manuals This makes ents.,,. Project Socrates i financed entirely
the taped course virtually completely through th sal of study manuals and easa-
self-contained^ which is what I have been ett@ which w @11 to students through th
aiming at* The economy aspect is a vehicle college bookstore,!( Inquiries can be addrtsse
which will put our type of psychology into i Dr. Mahan at Palomar College, San Marooi,
hundreds of introductory psychology class- California 92069.
rooms and will convert thousands of people
to our way of thinking. The accomplishments Corrections th laat issue should feav b@n
of Project Soerat are turning out to be Number 4* Volua 3~not Volume 4,. Stteh rrora
everything which I had hoped they might be, cause problems with our library subscribers.
I anticipate at least a oouple of pilot
programs on other campuses next fall with Th feature artlol is by Robert Martin? a
nore the second semester getting the snow doctoral student In psychology with a 0peeial-
ball under way. So far I am not approaching ization in higher dueation. The first two
institutions outside of the community parts (I & II; wssre abstracted in
Edjsgj|M,ojr| and are available from Educational
Crude Data Investigative ]
Toward Conceptualization of Learning Processes in the College Classroom Ills
Operant Psychology and Rotter's Social Learning Theory as a Basis for Research
Robert F. Martin
University of Denver

In this paper the basic processes of learning in the college classroom are
conceptualized according to two approaches to learning, operant psychology and
Rotter's social learning theory. These orientations are viewed as coimlemen-
tary in characterizing college learning* The theory and relevant research of
the operant orientation are reviewed and criticized.. Specifically, it is sug-
gested that operant theory, in its application to such complex human concerns
as the college classroom is limited in two waysj (a) it is difficult to deter-
mine the relevant contingencies of behaviors and reinforcers for individual
Students, and (b) it is difficult to determine what in fact is a reinforcement
for a given student. It is suggested that Rotter's approach may hold notential
in meeting these problems, A program of research is suggested to test the utility
of such a combined model for the college classroom,
In previous papers, this author (Martin, 1971,1972). has reviewed the literature generally
focused on the application of the techniques of operant learning to the college classroom,
These applications have been roughly dichotomized as programmed textbooks and related techni-
ques and an overall approach to the classroom, known as contingency management. Although the
previous papers have been somewhat critical of this research -literature in terms of both the
research designs and the limitations of the theoretical framework, the focus of this paper
is on the apparent limitations of the. operant approach in its application to a highly comp? :
human situation.
In order to focus on limitations of operant theory, a single research effort has been
selected. The study reported by Johnston and Pennypacker (lf>7l) was selected because it
to utilize the bulk of the onerant techniques and to answer criticism of research
design mentioned above. It also perhaps is more familiar to the general reader than is
most of the literature in this area.
After reviewing the general principles of operant theory and the particulars of operant
technology in the college classroom, the Johnston and Pennypacker article is used as a
vehicle to indicate how in fact the operant techniques have been employed. It is argued,
subsequently, that the failings noted in the Johnston and Pennypacker effort (and in similar
attempts) are attributable to the weaknesses of the operant approach, as it has been applied
to the college classroom. The limitations of operant technology are then further elaborated
alternatives based on Rotter's social learning theory (SLT) are suggested. Finally,
suggestions for testing the appropriateness and utility of the contributions of SLT to the
use of operant techniques as a model for learning in the college classroom are made*
The Operant Model
A survey of the Indexes for ^gyjiiolojglcaj. Abjtractg, through 1958 yields no references
by title to applications of techniques derived from the operant "camp" of
psychology to the college classroom. The.general lack of research on teaching was noted by
Beck and Shaw (i960), who have observed;
The study of the psychology of teaching is apt to involve disap-
pointment. The great number of studies in human learning generate the
expectation of a speedy introduction to important principles of practical .(
training^ Nevertheless, it is apparent that, although a great deal is
known about the many variables and conditions that affect learning,,
little is known about applying these to promote efficient training,
(p. 543)
Beck and Shaw's statement requires some modification because of th work in the deead
since it was made. During this period, there has been much effort in attempting to extend
the laethodology and principles of operant conditioning from animal laboratories to "real,
human" problems. This endeavor has been primarily within the "Skinnerian school" and is
manifested in education by "programmed instruction" and "teaching machines." The earliest
effort in this area was made by Skinner and his colleagues (Skinner, 1958j Holland &
Skinner, 1961), but was intimated by Skinner as early as 1948 in his novel. WaJ-deji Tj2<.
In spite of the rapid growth in this area since Beck and Shaw's (i960) statement,
remains much reason for such "disanpointment," As Lloyd and Knutzen (1969S p. 125)
point out, the us of programmed materials has been widespread, but has gone little beyond
the us of programmed textbooks (ef,, Lumsdaine, 1964} Gagne, 1965), Several volumes
dealt with programmed instruction (c, fe.g., Lumsdaine & Glaser, I960; Glaser, 1%5|
Galvin, 1969), yet applications to the college classroom of operant techniques have been
limited almost exclusively to programmed textbooks. This limited use suggests a need to
specify the foundations and mechanisms in the application of the operant technology to
the college classroom, so that these techniques may be more readily and widely apnlied.
The general procedures employed in the conditioning of operant behavior, that is the
behavior, that is the behavior by which the organism modifies or manipulates his environ-
ment, have been set forth by many authors, but roost extensively by the major proponent
of this approach, Be F. Skinner (cf., e.g., Skinner, 1953j Skinner, 1963). In this
section, the general procedures anplied in operant conditioning are presented: also,
procedures which are similar and aimed specifically at education and' programmed insinua-
tion are discussed*
Generally, five steps are delineated in the process of conditioning an operant be-
havior; (a) the final desired outcome is specified: (b) the pre-conditioning level of this
nporant is measured? (c) the appropriate reinforeers, discriminative stimuli, and
fjoatingencies of reinforcement are specified; (d) a suitable "learning snace" is ettabliihedf
mill (e) the desired behavior is "shaped up" and brought under the control of the pre-
viously specified discriminative stimuli and contingencies of reinforcement. The order of
steps 10 not'necessarily fixed. For instance, step (b) above may be better plaetd
(c) and (d) in specific situations; steps (c) and (d) might also be reversed where
appropriate. In addition, the final behavior is assessed to determine to what extent the
"desired outcome" was accomplished,
In specifying the "final desired outcome," the experimenter must define what behavior
or specific operant is to be the end-product of this conditioning. In defining the operant,
the measures by which the success of the conditioning is determined are also snecified. As
an example, in a typical conditioning study, an experimenter may have decided to establish
a C5olor discrimination in a pigeon. In such a task, the pigeon is to exhibit an operant
of pecking a key of only one color and not another. In defining the final outcome, the
experimenter also specifies the criteria, of !SffiiS That is to say, the measures where-
by the operant is said to be conditioned pr not are stipulated. In the present example,
the experimenter may be satisfied that conditioning has taken "lace if the nigeon pecks
the white key only 90$ as often as the red key is pecked in a 60-minute session,
In determining the "pre-conditioning level" of the operant, the exnerlmenter is
interested in the probability 01% 'operationally, the frequency, of the response In the
organism's existing repertoire of behavior. In so doing, the "base rate" for this particular
operant of the specific organism in the given situation is defined, against whieh the final
outcome of conditioning can be compared. In th example of conditioning a pigeon t
discriminate between a red and a whit k@y, this step is carried out by observing th
frequency of the pigeon's key-peaking behavior prior to any exnerlmental waninulatione,
la addition to determining the base rate of the perant in question, in this step th
experimenter takes note of behaviors which could be components of a more comnlex operant
or a "chain" of responses which the experimenter might wish to mtabllsh in the behavior
ropertoire of the organism and for which the base rate Is virtually gero. In the example
of the pigeon color-discriminating, if the desired ooerant were a circle turned in the , .
clockwise direction before necking the red key, the experimenter would note in the bass
rate determination those behaviors which were emitted frequently and could be components
of the turning behavior, such as tilting the head in the clockwise direction,
The third step noted above is most comnlex and deals with "motivational" variables of
learning, as well as the physical limits of the organism. In specifying the appropriate
reinforcers, the experimenter must be aware of or control the physiological state of the
organism. Motivation for learning, necessarily observed as the performance of an operant,
is typically operationalized by depriving the organism of some necessity of life such as food
or water, but not to such an extent as to impair the organism. Yet choosing, as a reinforce-
ment of the food~deprlved pigeon in the previous examnle, a pellet of dried meat would be
inappropriate, In addition to reinforcement delivered appropriately to meet deprivation,
other types of reinforcers may be useful. Secondary reinforcers, when they can be observed
or extablished for the organism, may be more appropriate in certain conditioning situations,
(This is apparent in considering the complex behavior of students controlled by grades OT
"being right"; a point considered in greater detail below.) In the examnle of the color-
discriminating, clockwise-turfing pigeon, many circles may be turned just to be able to peck
the red key, which becomes red only after n circles are turned by the pigeon.
In specifying the discriminative stimuli, under the control of which the experimenter
wishes to bring the operant, again the physiological limits of the organism must be re-
cognized* To require the pigeon in the, by now well-used, example to discriminate between
two shades of red, closely spaced on the sneetrum, would be nearly an impossible task to
learn. In addition, the discriminative stimulus may vary in its appropriateness to the task,,
(This point can be better exemplified in considering educational uses of operant techniques
discussed below,,)
The specification of the contingencies of reinforcement includes two nrimary considera-
tions s (a) the interval between operant termination and the presentation of reinforcement!
termed "delay of reinforcement" and (b) the number of onerants required prior to rein-
forcement or "schedules of reinforcement". In this regard, the physical limits must be1
consideredi a delay of reinforcement of five minutes is likely to have little effect on
the color-discrimination operant of the pigeon, yet a grade of 129/150 may have powerful
effects for a student several weeks after the behavior haa been emitted,, Likewise, expecting
a pigeon to emit ten circle-turnings for the first reinforcement is unreasonable. Both
the delay and schedules of reinforcement have been extensively researched in the laboratory
(of*, Ferster & Skinner, 1957), and hence, the experimenter in the laboratory dafi.fefidiiy
find guide lines for this step. This procedure when apnlled in the educational or thera-
peutic setting has been termed "contingency management," by some authors and Is discussed
below. Guide lines for the classroom, however, appear not to be so readily available.
In establishing a "suitable learning space," the experimenter attempts to control as
many as possible of the variables which may impinge on the organism and interfere with
conditioning. In addition, the environment most conducive to learning is sought. This
includes making the methods of response and reinforcement convenient to the organism. In
the example of the discrimination pigeon, this is generally accomnlished by utilisation of
an operant conditioning apparatus, the so called, "Skinner Box."
Finally, the experimenter shapes up the specified operant by reinforcing successive
approximations of the behavior. In addition, the behavior is brought under the control of
the specified discriminative (eliciting) stimulus and contingency of reinforcement. Shaping
is accomplished through the utilization of small increments in moving from more simple
to more complex behavior, in that the organism is first reinforced for gross approximations
of the desired operant and then only for finer and finer approximations. Resnonses which were
initially sufficient for reinforcement are subsequently not reinforced. By requiring one
simple behavior to follow another, prior to reinforcement, comnlex behavior patterns (the
whole of which may be termed an operant) are extablished, through chaining. In bringing
behavior under the control of specific stimuli or sets of stimuli and in establishing schedules
of intermittent reinforcement, the organism is reinforced only under certain conditions and
only after a certain number of operants have been emitted. More operationally, the response
probability for the specified operant comes to approach 1,0 under certain states, and 0.0
under others. Measures like rates of responding are Influenced by the schedule of inter-
mittent reinforcement, that is, the number of operanta required before reinforcement.
Several authors have delineated approaches'to applying, in the educational situation,
operant techniques similar to those discussed in the preceeding section. Reviews by
Barlow (1962) and Gagne (1965) represent and summarize such work.
Barlow has maintained much of the language of "Skinner's 'operant1 psychology," yet
taken it from the laboratory setting,, as is exemplified in the preceeding section, and
placed the emphasis on the classroom. Barlow states,
The task of the teacher is to (l) determine the current discrimina-
tive repertoire and effective reinforcers for the potential students; (2)
carefully specify the desired terminal behavior and conditions under which
this behavior is appropriatej (3) evoke and reinforce typical current
behavior that is relevant in order to "dipper" or "magazine" train the student;
(4) carefully sequence SDs (discriminative stimuli) and reinforcement In
order to shape the behavior of the student until the desired behavior is
emitted in the presence of SDs typical of the natural practical environment
in which the behavior is appropriate; (5) complete the sequence in such
a manner that the new behavior will be intrinsically reinforced and main-
taiaed after the sequence is completed (p. <403)
It should be noted -that, in addition to some differences in the order of the steps
outlined in the description of the operant procedures presented initially above and Barlow'0
there are some differences in emphasis, if not content* It should be helpful to indicate
just how Barlow's scheme relates to the more general one outlined previously. Barlow's
.first point corresponds roughly to the third point in the general scheme outlined above,
that 1,5 specifying the appropriate reinforcers, SDs, and contingencies. In addition,
this step of Barlow's scheme implies the determination of base rates which is the second
point in the general operant procedure* Barlow's second step also implies (c) of the
general scheme, as well as the specification of the desired final outcome, (a) of the
general scheme. The "general conditions under which this behavior is appropriate" can b@
taken us the relevant discriminative stimuli and contingencies of reinforcement* Barlow's
ihi rd and fourth points may be seen to correspond with the fifth noint of the general
procedure, shaping and establishing contingencies. The fifth noint of Barlow's scheme is
implied in (e) of the outline of the general procedure! "intrinsically reinforced and
unnfntnined" may be taken to correspond to "brought under the control of the previously
Bpecified discriminative stl-nuli and contingencies of reinforcements" Barlow's scheme
apparently does not specifically consider step (d) of the general procedures for operant
conditioning, the establishment of a suitable learning space. It is, however, implicit
in Barlow's whole description and most clearly implied in (e)a
Gagne (1965) has emphasized the importance of specifying the outcomes of c-mditioning
ttad the conditions for the behavior to be emitted (Barlow's second step^. In addition, to
the necessity of this step apparent in the statement of the operant approach in the
[.laboratory, that is step (a) of the general scheme, he has indicated some other and perhaps
wore practical considerations. To Gagnes the specification of terminal behavior desired by
the teacher is essential so that the "instructional designer" may know the nature of what
.la to be learned. That is to say, the "instructional designer" roust know the nature of the
terminal behavior so that he can correctly design the terminal stages of his nrogram. This
depends on the specification by the user of a program, the teacher, of "what the learner
is expected to be able to do" having gone through instruction. It is only with such a
criterion that the success of the program can be measured. Clearly, this terminal behavior
must be specified as an overt performance in order to provide a suitable criterion. In
addition to determining the terminal sequences of the program, Gagne points out that the
specification of outcomes in overt behavior allows the orogrammer to make inferences about
behavior modifications to be made through the program (pp. 23-24-)
Gagne notes two more reasons for specifying the desired outcomes of conditioning in
lonns of overt behavior. One such specification allows the evaluation of the effective-
ness of the program in comparisons of the effectiveness between -ire-grams. This is BO
Ixsnaua the specification of overt terminal behaviors medts the requirements of reliability
me! measurement, Finally, Gagne suggests that the most important function >\f specifying
of conditioning is the provision of a basis for the shaping of behavior (of.,
steps (c) and (e) oC the generaJ scheme), Distinctions among the class of behavior to
be established may serve ns a basis for modifying nievious oattermi of behnvior. Dif-
ferent claries of behavior require the application of different conditions for learning
(p. ?M For example, 1hc Icarninp oP a clars of behaviors such eu othlon] behavior
can be expected to lake place under different conditions (o p., different contingencies
aud rdnforcerr) than the Irnrninp, of a class of behaviors ouch as bmskot mMkinf, in
Gagne"r p3ie,coc)ingr treatment 'iiner" and "edue i t iona.i donipnor" ore d]ot1nf,ui shed. (ften,
however, a t !r the fare that in the d hoc uao of o>*ier<mt technique a J n tho r|-i;".roon
theno wo "toehn iolnar" (iff, I ho 'same. Never Iholosfr, i t should bo oim>hwi1'/od tluit the
spool f Jent Jon of clearly dciJned c net-product-) of the conditioning >'i aim; esaonllal,
Uagno emphasises one more lole for the speoifjcntion oT outcomes or Hefinlnf of ob-
jectives11! this has to do with the role of reinforcement jn applying operarit techniques
to human behavior. The .match:!ng of behavior to specified outcomes or "being correct"
appears to be a powerful reinforcer of human behavior (Gagne, 1965, p.26.). However,
Gagne adds that "reinforcement" has not been practically defined, beyond the conceptual
definition that a set of conditions coincident or closely subsequent to a behavior which
appears to the probability of that behavior is termed reinforcement. Reinforce-
ment is then taken to mean in programmed instruction the learner's matching of his own
response production to a response which is indicated as correct (p. 27}.
For the most part, to this point, the elaboration of Barlow's scheme has been
limited to his second point and to the additions to it suggested by Gagne. Skinner (1965)
has written an article which suggests some further clarification of Barlow's outline and
provides some additional translation from the statement of operant procedure in the
laboratory to. the Replication of these procedures in the classroom. Skinner offers the
following elaborations
An important contribution of operant research has been the so-
called "programming" of knowledge and 8kills~tho construction of care-
fully arranged sequences of contingencies leading to the terminal per-
formances 'which are the object of education. The teacher begins with
whatever behavior the student brings to the instructional situation; by
selective reinforcement he that'behavior-so that a given terminal
performance is more and more closely apnrpxiroated. Even with lower organ-
isms quite complex behaviors can be "shaped" in this w<y with surprising
speed; the human, organism is presumably far more sensitive (pps 6-7).
The notion, contingency, implies both reinforcement schedules and sequences of dis-
criminative stimuli; behavior is brought under the control of both. As Barlow suggests,
"Weaning" from the program is essential also, so that the behavior is maintained by the
appropriate schedules and reinforcers and discriminative stimuli in the "real world".
Reflecting the emphasis on specification of overt behaviors as the terminal outcones of
conditioning made by both Barlow and Gagne, Skinner (1965) also emphasizes the equally
straightforward, overt function of the program or instructor; "The task of the teacher is
to bring about changes in the student's behavior. His methods are equally consnicuous;
He makes changes in the environment. A teaching method is simply a way of arranging an
environment which expedites learning" (p. 13). This is the implication of the third and
fourth point in the discussion of operant techniques in the laboratory, that is the e*tabllsh
ment of a suitable "learning space." In addition to manipulation of contingencies of
reinforcement and discriminative stimuli, an environment "conducive to learning" Is neoded.
Skinner also suggests a dichotomy of the role which operant procedures' play in the
educational setting: producing new behavior or controls and maintaining behavior strength,
As he views this role of "programming," the arranging of contingencies of reinforcement by
the teacher to establish new forms of response, such as a handwriting and verbal and non-
verbal behaviors as in sports, arts and crafts, is fairly straightforward. However,
the manipulation of contingencies to bring existing behaviors under new stimulus controls,
such as with intellectual and ethical self-control has not been so widely attempted,
but requires the application of the same principles (1965, p. 13), This discxis.sion
corresponds roughly to Barlow's fourth point, but also incorporates part of Barlow's
final point.
. 7,
The sceond half of Skinner's dichotomy of the role of operant procedures in education
completes the fifth step of Barlow's scheme and reflects the "motivational" aspects in the
preceding treatment of laboratory operant techniques. Skinner has' emphasised the role of
schedules of reinforcement in suggesting that "a second kind of programming" results in
the maintenance of the strength or probability of a student's behavior. The form of the
response and stimulus control are not altered but the likelihood of resnonse is increased,
The introduction of new reinforeers or increasing the effectiveness of old ones can
strengthen behavior, as in Skinner's example of providing a student better reasons for
getting an education. He adds that another possibility is suggested by the experimental
analysis of behavior : available reinforeers may be scheduled more effectively. Ap-
propriate terminal schedules will yield a "motivated" student, or one who is "interested,"
"perservering, " "curious," and "Indus trious"| but less stringent schedules are required
first, in order to maintain the desired behavior at every stage. Skinner stresses that,
"The programming of schedules or reinforcement is a promising alternative to the avers ive
control which, in spite of repeated reforms , still prevails in educational practice"
(1965, pp. 13-U).
At this point, the juxtaposition of the laboratory techniques of operant conditioning
with the description of these techniques in the classroom is completed. With the theoretical
foundations of operant conditioning in educat on having been delineated, it is now in
order to consider an example of the application of operant techniques in the college

lSfeaiaiie ill
In this section of the paper, the effort to use operant principles and techniques, or
contingency management, in 'the college classroom reported by Johnston and Pennynacker (1971)
is used as an example. The principles of operant conditioning, as outlined above, are
Elaborated and exemplified using the Johnston and Pennypacker study,
The general scheme developed by Barlow (1962) and delineated above is used as the
criterion against which the example is compared. The criterion is one of comnleteness and,
although the Johnston-penneypaeker naper is criticised below, their caveat is well-noted?
The studies discussed here are a part of a long-term research pro-
gram which seeks definition and analysis of relevant variables affecting stu-
dent performance in undergraduate college courses and the development of
feasible methods of most efficiently and reliably producing optimal student
performance in a manner that is preferred by both student and teacher to
other methods of instruction. It should be noted that the efforts to be
reported here are only the beginning of such a program and have thus been
confined to certain facets of the entire program (p, 220).
Before considering the specific operant irinciples, the general procedures and character-
istics of the course are noted,, The course was an advanced course, focusing on principles
of behavior. The majority of the students were junior and senior psychology majors, but
other students ranged from sophomore to graduate levels and majors renresented all the col-
leges. of the University. Enrollment was from 60 to 70 students each quarter and class- '
work consisted of reading a textbook, lectures three days a week, and an lied labora-
tory sections usually on the remaining two days.
In Johnston and Pennypacker's operational! zation of onerant principles, students ner-
forraed verbally in answering questions for each study unit to criterion. Reinforcement
(i.e., being correct) was administered immediately by a more advanced student "manager,"
who aiso displayed the student's cumulative record. The course grade was determined by th
final correct and incorrect resnonse rates. Replications with variations such as silent
written performance and in various course content areas were also reported by Johnston
and Pennypacker . The specific points of their approach are n >w comnared with the schemata
developed by Barolw (1962), which has been nresented above.
The first step of Barlow's scheme, the determination of the discriminative renertdires
of students and the reinforeers effective in controlling their behavior, is apparently
not measured but only assumed,, In this anproaeh rather tban the deterrninat on of such
variables for each student, the following type of assumptions are mades
It has been suggested that instructions presumably substitute for
drive arid that knowledge of results presumably substitutes for reinforcement
In the ease of the human subject. Generally speaking, it appears that know-
ledge of results comes ordinarily to act as a secondary reinforcer; and, as is
true of secondary reinforeers at the infrahuman level, it is also true with
human subjects that knowledge of results come simultaneously to attain cue
or SD properties (Notterman, 1970, pps 194-195).
This approach is evident in the Johnston-pennypacker program (pp6 221-2; 23$). Prom the
standpoint of assessing individual .students prior to teaching, these assumptions appear
to be a major difficulty of the operant approach. This criticism is elaborated and
alternative approaches are suggested in later .sections of this paper*
Although the evaluation of "entering behavior'% as the information required in the
previous paragraph is sometimes referred to (cf., e.g.* Taber, Glaser,& Schaefer, 1965
p0 147) is not evident in Johnston and Penny-packer's program, the specification of the
desired terminal behavior, the second step of Barlow's scheme is evident,
^, s# he written and oral course-relevant verbal behavior
- of the
student was the primary response of interest in these experiments, al-
though other behaviors (such as attendance) were also considered (Johnston
& Pennypacker, 1971, p. 220).
In addition to this description, the particular response criteria were carefully specified
(pp. 222-3, 232-7; 238). Criteria for performances on the weekly quizes were stated in
terms of both correct and incorrect response rates so that "a quality and quantity of ver-
bal behavior with resoect to the subject matter that would be comnarable to the verbal
behavior that characterizes an 'expert1 in the area" would be produced. These criteria
equivalent to 90$ correct and 10$ incorrect. The cumulative performance criteria,
over quizes, were also stated. This was done to raise the probability of consistent
quiz taking behavior.
Barlow's third step, the evocation and reinforcement of behavior, currently in a stud@nt!
repertoire and useful in shaping, is not readily apparent in the Johnston-Pennypacker nlW
gram. This operation is related to the assessment of entering behavior and is subject to
the criticism noted above in that regard. The use of instructions arid the description of
the course provided to students (p. 223-A) appears to be an attempt to evoke the anpronriate
behaviors from the cJUiss,. The measurement of success of this manipulation for indj^WjifJ.
students is subject to the previous criticism. In addition, Johnston and Pennypacker's
attempt to balance "student-paced" with "instructor-paced" demands (p. 223) nay be an
Implicit recognition of the differences in the success of this attempt to shane existing
The first part of Barlow's step (4.), the sequencing of SDs and reinforcements is evident
on the level both of individual quizes and from unit to unit. The student is nrovided
cues and reinforcement from the display.of his behavior, cumulated by the manager after
each performance. In addition, an adequate performance on each unit is required nrior
to moving to the next (p. 222; 237-8). The second part of Barlow's fourth step, that is bring
ing the behavior under the control of the SDs in the individual's "natural, practical"
ecology, is apparently not considered by Johnston and Pennypacker,,
Likewise, Barlow's fifth step does not appear to have been taken into consideration
in the work reviewed,, The intrinsic reinforcement and maintenance of the newly acquired
operant is essentially the notion that the skills acquired in the particular course will
b maintained in strength in other courses and outside the classroom,, Skinner has auggenttd
that this process may also be a function of the scheduling of reinforcement (cf,* p, 13
As wan noted in the introductory remarks, the intent of the author is n <t to oriticlis
the research effort reported by Johnston and Pennypacker (1971), 'On-the contrary, their
approach has been viewed as comprehensive in its use of operant techniques. It is argued
that failings, if there are any, of such programs are not the fault of researchers, educate ,
or programers who are as careful as Johnston and Pennypacker evidently are, but are intrinsic
to the use of the operant orientation.
The utility for higher education of the operant approach has been summarized by
Martin (1971, pp, 24-34.)} if the goals stated for it can in fact be accomplished. As
Johnston and Pennypacker (1971) see it, the goals of the use of operant techniques is
the individual! zation of instruction in higher education (op. 2-41-2), They summarise
this goal and the attendant operations with the following?
The ideal guiding these efforts developing teaching nrocedures
which would allow each student to serve as his own control for the academic
purpose of evaluating the effects of individual procedural changes and for
the research purpose of evaluating independent variable manipulations was in
great part attained. The individual cumulative records served as a higtPy
sensitive representation of current individual activity. Such attempts will
accrue even greater success if material difficulty and other similar variables
can be held relatively constant to allow stable reflections in individual student
performance of manipulations of variables of primary interest. There would
seem to be considerable advantages to such a research tactic (Sidman, I960;
p. 243)*
Although this author has been critical of the operant approach on various grounds
(Martin, 1972, pp. 39-44-), it is exactly the limitations of the operant approach in
meeting such goals, which are now of focus. Although Johnston and Pennypacker (1971 )
report high levels of achievement, with over 90$ of the class receiving A's (p, 226),
and high student satisfaction (p. 224), some important considerations remain from the
standpoint of individualizing instruction.
First, there is apparently some variability in the number of students reaching
criteria in programs of apparently equal comprehensiveness (cf , , e.g., Malott and Svlnicki?
1969 j p. 550; Ferster, 1968, p. 523). In addition, the research literature may be
selectively distorted by falling to include studies reporting lower success rates. In
the author's own experience, the A~achievement is closer to 65$. Although this may be a
ftmction of less precise use of the techniques or of higher criteria for behavior, it Is
argued below that this variability is a function of the inability to assess individual
variation prior to the course of instruction with operant methods.
Secondly, the reportedly high student satisfaction may be an artifact of high drot>~
out rates from the class. Johnston and Pennypacker do not report relevant data, but
Ferster (1968, p. 523) has reported a dronout rate near 12% of the initial enrollment.
In the author's classes a rate from 4^-60$ has been evident and similar to that noted in the
personal experience of others (Todd, Anderson, Hodson, & Gregerson, 1972). Such variability
be a function of program differences or characteristics of student populations.
Again, it is argued in the next section, however, that the dropout rate is in part a function
of the inability of the operant an^roach to assess the individual prior to the _ course of

Having considered the application of the principles of operant conditioning to college

learning as delineated in the previous section, one may conclude that there are serious
limitations to this orientation. For instance, if a college instructor wishes to manipulate
the appropriate contingencies of reinforcement in the classroom, he needs to know what
constitutes reinforcement for a given student; such knowledge requires information about
Ms individual history of reinforcement. This is the assessment required by the first
step of Barlow's approach described above. The failure of the onerant approach to nro-
vide a means for such an evaluation for coirralex human behavior, on an individual basis,
is the major criticism of this approach to this writer. It amears that events such as
being correct, receiving praise from the instructor, and receiving a high grade are not
reinforcing events and effective for all students. Likewise, discriminative stimuli, those
stimuli to which some behaviors are emitted and others withheld, are assumed to be the same
for individual students. Such stimuli as an open book, a study table, or a teaching machine
; may or may not exist as SDs in individual student repertoires. Whether these reinforcers
and SDs exist for every student in a given class and in equal strength is an emnirica'J
question, the potential evaluation of which is elaborated in the concluding section of
the paper .
Secondly, to apply the principles of operant conditioning, it is essential to estab-
lish the "base line" of behavior, or more technically, the probability of occurrence of
the behavior; that is to assess the student's entering behavior. The same assessment
is required for classes of behavior in the repertoire of the student. This corresponds
roughly to the third step of Barlow's scheme, as noted previously. The onerant approach
appears not to suggest methods for determining what is the current repertoire, including
the relevant contingencies, for an individual in complex, human situations. In the lab-
oratory or for simple behavior (including humans in some institutional situations, eg*>
profound retardation), one need only to observe the organism to determine the base rat
of the desired operant and any behaviors exist- nt in the organism's repertoire which
might be useful in later shaping.
To summarize, it has been argued that in the case of complex human behaVlor, occuring
in a very complicated ecology, the operant approach does not provide the tools for the
assessment of individual behavior, antecedarit to the goal of individualizing instruction.
Such limitations, it may be suggested, present serious difficulties for the prnctiCBl use
of the principles of operant conditioning in the college classroom. The assessment of
each student, even if it were possible using operant techniques, would require large
expenditures of personnel time, money, and equipment. In the present educational system,
it would appear unlikely that such assessment' is foreseeable. After reviewing social
learning theory (SLT) in the next section, specific suggestions taken from SLT for in-
creasing the utility of the operant model in individual! si ug the instruction in the college
classroom are discussed.
The Social Learning Ihodel
Variables like "history of reinforcement" and individual reinforcement contingencies,
as well .as response hierarchies, can be considered ns 3yin{ in the domrJn of the "per-
sonality" sub-area of psychology (JesEDer, Graves, Hanaon, & Jessor, 196ft, pp. &5-P9).
Rotter's (1954, 1955, I960, 1966) social learning theory (SLT) perhnor-s ixrovidoo a bnais
for meeting the limitations of applications of operont principles to the college cla,3B-
'rooro, in that the primary concepts of SLT are intended to ovnlnnte uh;il constitutes rein-
forcement for the individual, .SLT is directed as the coimlo* o" -H-rrnonal ity level, rnther
than derived -from principles developed in ninmle rviiyint.ion:-!. 'In tin:; ;ipction or the
paper, then, the basic formulations of Rotter's theory ;u*o *verRntfi<i nnd viitiona for
application of this conceptual framework to the college clnr.sroom ore dlccunru-id,

Rotter, at the Nebraska Symposium on motivation (1955), addressed the problem

learning theorists generally do not treat the issues raised above, that is, the measure-
ment of what constitutes reinforcement or what contingencies are ooer?>ting for the indivi-
dual',, It is argued that knowing the external environment is not suf"icient for prediction
of individual behavior; the "psychological situation" must also be considered. Itotter states
that, "any attempt to predict precisely or specifically what the human organism will do,
requires a knowledge of the cues present, internal or external, and the acquired meaning
or learned values that these cues have a^or the organism" (lr55, n. 245).
Rotter goes on (1955, pp. 245-254) to review theoretical positions which have treated
the "psychological climate" and concludes that thin consideration is never more than irn~
plicit. In this regard, Brunswik's approach is noted as an exception. In other specific
research areas the "psychological situation" has been considered somewhat more exnHcltly,
The role of anxiety In student performance (lr<55j, pp. 25'1~2'J2) and the rolo of experi~
nienter, examiner, or teacher bias (1955 pps 249} 251-25?; cf . , Nosonthal, 3966, J5-efreot)
are noted by Rotter as such research areas. He, however, concludes that the consideration
of the "psychological situation" generally has been lir lied to personality theorists and
social psychologists | the importance of the psychological situation in learning theory is
stressed by Rotter?
There are two basic aspects to the prediction of learned behavior. On
deals with the individual's past experience, from which we must abstract con*
stmota or. variables of different levels of generality for different nurpoaaa
and we attribute these to the individual or consider that he carries these around
with him* The other is the nresent, meaningful environment,, nayohologlcal alt-
, ' nation-or Lewin (1951) has called the "life space," this latter
variable the psychologist roust also abstract constructs at different levels
of generality for different purposes in to nrediot behavior (1955, p* 249).
Although Rotter *-s explanation is in terms of "behavior prediction^" the
orations hold for "behavior control*"
Rotter has sneoified the role of the psychological situation in the nredietion of
human behavior with the formal statement offunctional relationships. However,
considering theseg some basic definitions
are treated*
the discussion above of this general orientation*
it was noted that knowing both internal and external cues 10 considered essential in
to predict behavior. The definition of these variables has implications beyond .the
conmonrsense meaning;
By internal cues I mean that the individual is rennonding to stimuli
conditionsj arising in the body,, with learned associative meanings , such
EB to a parched throat, or a pain In the region of the atonach. By external
cues I refer to any asnect of the individual's environment, outside of the
body,'to which he is responding at. any given time,, and which for him has
acquired meanings as a result of previous experience,, A cue then is a psycho-
"': logical stimulus (Rotter, 1955, p* 251). ,'
It would appear that in this use "cue" is a somewhat broader conoeot than the 'atimulua" of
oparant theory (although^ c.f., and Staats, 1963).
The definition of the other basic eoneapts of SLT are most efficiently treated aa
appear in the statement of the functional relationships of the theory, SLT first was
comprehensively in the context of clinical psychology (Rotters 1954);
Social learning theory has been characteriatd in the following wayi
The fundamental concepts in tetter's learning theory arc the
following! (1) (E), which refers to the subjective probability
held by an individual that a spaeifie behavior will lead to the
of certain events or reinforcements! (2) fginffiSOTgnt yjluj, (RV), which
refers to the degree of preference for the events or reinforcements which
are contingently related to behavior; (3) (BP), which
refers to the likelihood of occurrence of'a bthavior^ or the relative strength
of the tendency to respond in a certoin wny; and (4) the EISb2^ffi4Si
Jfcfj2B (S), which refers to the immediate context of action described In s
psychologically relevant terms, that is, in terms reflecting the actor s
potential perception or interpretation of his confronting situation,
Thes basic terms generate tbe following dascriotive formula, which
constitutes the foundation for nredictJon or explanation at the.nersonality
leveli BP = f(E and KV). The formula reads: The potentiality of any be-
havior occurring in a Riven situation is nowe function (probably multiplica-
tive) of (l) the expection that it will, in that situation, lead to a narti-
oular goal and (2) the value of that goal in that situation* Note that the
"S" term is implicit in that each of the other terms in the fomul a is
variable or dependent u on the specific 'iroportiaa perceived in the p*yoho-
logloal situation Action, or acttal behavior, then, always involves a nro-
of selection or choice, from a repertoire of lhaviors, of that behavior
with the highest potential for 3( .-.(Tmg to gratification in a given context
(Jssort jjfe al., 1968, pp. 85-ft6).
fh four of this general expres^:ion require elaboration and lead to other
functional relationships.
What lessor et aj,. have termed " Ion" was In Rotter's original -
formulation "expectancy" (E). "Expectancy may be defined au the probability held by the.
individual that a particular reinforcement will occur as M function of n .-neeinc behavior
on his part in a specific situation or situations" (Rotter, l"r>4, p. \W; 1V55, p. ?''>)(
Additionally, it ia pointed out that expectancy is theorized to bo Independent of the
reinforcement's value or irnnortunce to the individual. The conct of rxnoctnncy ia Im-
portant also in moving from prediction of nneclflc events to- nretlict.lon or explanation
of classes of behavior^ as is elaborated below.
yjLLBS Originally this concent was defined "edenlly," lib: I ted to ex-
ternal reinforcemenTTTRottor, 1954? p. 107). In subsequent presentations of the theory
this qualification was dropped and reinforcement value (RV) defined "as the degree of
preference for any reinforcements are equal" (Rotter, 15^, p. 255). It is clear that
the referent of this concept is the individual and not experin enter-dcf 1 ned events in 'the
ecology, the nature of the reinvorcement concent ia operant theory,
Sfell he third concent of SLT and the one which provides the for
the prediction of behavior is behavior potential (BP). This is defined "fir, the potential! t
of any behavior's occurring in any given situation or situations as calculated in relation
to any single reinforcement or set of reinforcements" (Rotter^ 1954,, p. 15; cf , , 19S50 p.
2SS)S It is noted that ultimately the evaluation of the potentiality for the occurrence
of any specified behavior may be based on its actual occurrence in .a ft.ivem situation whtre
alternative behaviors are nossible. BP thus is a relative measure, being described on3y
as weaker or stronger than other potential behaviors present in that situation. This
relativity would hold also if the potential for the earn behavior were determined in seven
different situations (Rotter, 1954, p. 1^5). That is .to say that the obtained HP's would
be ordered relative to each other One
for each different situation,
concept ia implicit in all the functional relationships
presented below, the importance of which has been stressed by /Rotter. "Perhaps one of
the greatest weaknesses of current psychological theorizing and practice has '>een ita fail"
ure to deal analytically with the situations or contexts in which humans behave" (Rotter
1954> pp* 110-111), The psychological situation (S) functions to provide euea by which
the individual may determine which reinforcements he may expect to follow which behaviors
(Hotter, 1955,. p* 256). More specifically,
We mean by a psychological situation or any part of it to which
the individual is responding. Like lewin (1951 ) and Kantor (1924), we
define a situation as that which is experienced b the subject with the
meanings the subject gives to it. The situation must also be descrlbnble
in objective terms for scientific purpose B, W do not lot the matter rerst
with the statement that for each person the situation may have different
meanings, aince it ia necessary to describe in some communicable way what
it is that has different meanings for various persons (Rotter, I f 54 p. in).
The three variables defined above are viewed <>s functionally related in the context of
Hence, they provide a bus Is for predicting human behavior at the moat nimie Ivn3 und,
with reformulation, at thf complex levol, classes of behavior.
^ bejjgvioj:. ' At the most .dn^le level (i.e., a single behavior), expectancy
and reinforcement value are combined, in the context of the psycholopicnl situation,
to yield behavior potential, Formally, this relationship is stated:
B.P. = (E & ReV8 ).
x, s 1 f R& x, Rft, s1 a^ s1
Verbally, thls^ relationshin Is: the no'ential for the occurrence of n /^Ivrn btshav'nr
in a apeoific situation (l) In relation to a given reinforcement () In a function (nrobfibl
multiplicative) of the value of that reinforcement in that situation and of the ex nee ~
taney for the occurrence of the reinforcement a following the p?ivn behavior in that
specific situation (Rotter, 3955, p. 255; 195^7 P 3(F$ 1' 60, p. 302),
This initial formulation is of limited usefulness, however, in the prediction of
behavior because it takes Into account on"y n snecified reinforcement and nn other pos-
sibilities,, In order to predict the potential of all the possible behaviors ocetWTilnp;
in situation 1, a Bet of BP's must be obtained, each limited to a snecified reinforce-
ment,, This logic generates the following formulation: B.P.x, 3 1, H(a-n)=f(Ex S1 jRa-n'^'^'a-
which can be described verbally as the potential of the occurrence of a given behavior
(x) in a specified situation (l), considering all the potential reinfordements relevant
to the individual, is a function of the expectation that these reinforcements (a to n)
w:Ill occur in the given situation and the values of these reinforcements (Rotter, 1954 j
p.. 109).
In order to predict behavior at a more general level in a variety or group of sit-
uations, the formula for behavior potential is generalized:
n.p. =f (E & R.V. s
(ac-n) S(1_n) R<a-n) (x-n) S(1-n)R(a_n) (a-n) (l-n).
This is described by Rotter;
The potentiality of the functionally related Behaviors x to n to occur
Jn the specified Situations 1 to n in relation to the potential Reinforce-
ments a to n is a function of the expectancies of these behaviors leading
to reinforcements in these situations and the values of these rein-
forcements in these situations (Rotter, 1950, p. 302; cf., 1954. pp 109-110).
'ihlr formuJa is simnlified in the follow-in^; expression: NP=f(FM & NV) (Rotter, I960, p 3n3).
's'blH introduces three simplifying and more general variables than used In the preceding
foriiiuls Need potential (NP), freedom of movement (FM), and need value (NV) are de~
fi nod in the following description of this functional relationship: "The potentiality
of occurrence of a set of behaviors thnt lead to the satisfaction of some need (need
potential) 3s a function of the expectancies that these behaviors will leod to these
ro in for cements (freedom of movement) and the strength or value of these reinforcements
(utjod value)" (Rotter, 1954, p. 110). Rotter has emphasized that the psychological sit-
nation is implicit in this formula (i960, p9 303).
Rotter has further elaborated the theory and further specified the concents of SLT
(J9'54) In addition, he has indicated how SLT can be brought to bear in particular applied
.m-,w (clinical, 1954j personality testing, I960). However, since these do not appear
to bear directly in this effort to conceptualize college learning, only one additional
concept is considered,_
later development of SLT and in Rotter's research, the
concept of internal versus external control of reinforcement (I-JE) has received emphasis,
This concept has been most fully developed and a relevant nrogrsm of research reported in
a monograph (1966). I-E is in a sense n further generalization of the predictive function
of the theory as cr.ri be seen In definition nrovided by Jessor et fijL, (396?). I-E is
the "generalized orientation or expectation that the outcomes of one's behavior are
SESJl wJlisdi 2S6, [2. (internal control )_as, 2Egosed to bej_ng djt^nrdned^ bj; outside
sjjoh a 22iSZ]ii tners.,_jor imrnej^onal random forcg such a 2u2JS> siji. H fcSS
ternal cTjntrolT"" (italics in the original, p, 304).
Having completed the description of social learning theory, it is at this point ap-
propriate to note some of the apparent limitations to its intended use, vis a vis operant
techniques in the college classroom. The orientation of SLT has been highly theoretical
in the preceeding description; this is of necessity in that it has not been applied to the
processes of learning in the college classroom or to behavior and ecologies of similar
complexity. In addition, the appropriate measures a-ipear not to have been fully formulated,
There is, however, sufficient evidence on both counts to suggest the hueristic value of the
concepts of SLT in the present c< ntext; a suggested research program is developed in the -
concluding section of the paper,
With the basic conceptualizations of Rotter's SLT and the relevant limitations in
hand, a consideration of its potential role in research on college learning processes can
be undertaken. In what follows some suggestions as to the potential use of SLT in char-
acterizing and researching learning in the college classroom are described.

The potential contribution of SLT to research on conceptualization of college class-

room learning processes is in its specification of individual differences inherent in the
concept of psychological situations. The most effecient application of any reinforcement
paradigm to such complex human learning would appear to require elaboration as to how the
variables of stimuli and reinforcements affect individuals differently. This cnn be
elaborated in considering the potential role of each of the variables of SLT in concep-
tualizing the learning processes of the college classroom.
The concept of reward, value perhaps different potential information for pre-
dicting human behavior than the experimentally controlled reinforcement. Recalling that
RV is the extent to which an individual prefers reinforcements contingent on his behavior,
it can be suggested that experimenter- (teacher-) defined reinforcements will differ in
their effect dm controlling students' behavior. As an example, some students will "work"
best for grades, others fez? praise, and still others for freetime, For the teacher to
manipulate only grades, for instance, (i.e., to "contract" for the amount of work to be
completed by the student) would appear a less efficient way to handle a class, of students,
The RV concept of course broadens to need value in considering classes of functionally
related reinforcements (goals).
It would appear that determining the RV or NV for an individual student perhaps pro-
vides the same functional information as is essential in specifying or controlling the
history of reinforcement of the individual student as is n-ited above (p. 25). The dif-
ference between these two approaches would appear to be in the method of measurement (or
manipulation) by the teacher.
As with RV and history of reinforcement, a parallel between expectation and the
contingencies of reinforcement can be drawn, E, the individual's subjectively held pro-
bability that a particular behavior will be followed by the occurrence of a specified event
or class of events (reinforcements), can be viewed as the individual's apprnisnl of the
contingencies of reinforcement in his ecology. Whether such contingencies are chance-
controlled or they are personally controlled indicates the role of the I-K variable of
SLT. The E variable is generalized to sets of behaviors and goals as the merm expectancy
or freedom of movement.
An example of a classroom situation may help clarify the relationship suggested be-
tween E and contingency of reinforcement. The I-E concept is -also suggested in this
example. If a student perceives that the grade he will receive for a research renort is a
function of how well he approximates writing a paper acceptable for publication, it can be
predicted that ha will respond differently than if he perceives that his grade is determined
only by the instructor's whim. It is suggested that this is so, irrelevant o th_e ac_tual_
c^, of reinforcement. To specify this point; it is being suggested here that for
mature human subjects~Thopefully students) in complex situations of learning, the individual1
expectations of reinforcement will be a better predictor of behavior than the actual con-
tingencies of reinforcement. This is an empirical question and through learning it can be
suggested that expectations and contingencies of reinforcement may, in general , become
very similar, if not identical,
The probability of the occurrence of a. given behavior, that is the relative response
tendency (BP) strength, appears conceptually similar to the notion of response' hierarchy
(cf. , Staats and Staats, 1963, pp. 101-107). The concept of response hierarchy is an exten-
sion of basic operant principles. It, can be taken to suggest that for classes of function-
ally related behaviors, one behavior has a greater likelihood of occurrence in a given
situation than another behavior in the same class. This parallel is more explicit in
considering that the relativity of the strength of the tendency to respond In a cert win
way is with other behaviors. When BP is broadened as need potential, the probability of
occurrence of a set 'of functionally similar behaviors, the two concepts would appear to '
be identical. The determination of response hierarchies or of NP would appear to yield the
same information, at least conceptually.

A summary comment is in order for this section: In this treatment of Rotter's social
learning theory, the approach has differed somewhat from the previous onerant
conditioning. In the operant conditioning section,, relevant research was reviewed; none
wss available for applying SLT to the classroom. However, to the author, these two theories
do not appear to be antagonistic. On the contrary, they appear to be complementary, as
has been stressed above. SLT would appear to have potential contribution to reinforcement
paradigms in general, and, in particular, for conceptualizing learning processes in the
college classroom, if in no other way than notationa]. However, a broader contribution
bns boon suggested above.
Summary and Conclusions
Based on the thrust of the existing literature, the paradigm initialJy followed
in this paper to characterize learning in the college classroom Is that of onervmt condi-
tioning. The intent in this paper is tr. increase the effectiveness of learning in the col-
lege classroom through the more efficient use of operant techniques. Some apparent dif-
ficulties, impairing the efficiency of the application of this paradigm in a complex
situation, have been alluded to above. In addition, it has been suggested that social
learning theory may hold some potential solutions for these problems in specifying a?ein-
foreers and contingencies. In this concluding section these matters are more concisely
formulated and the nature of research relevant to these issues is indicated.
The two major difficulties in applying the operant approach in the college classroom
would appear to be in assessing, prerequisite to controlling, the contingencies of be-
havior and reinforcement and in manipulating the relevant reinforcers (steps 3 and 5 in
the general operant procedure outlined above). In complex human behavior, it is dif-
ficult (i.e., e.g., "unethical") to control the organism's history of reinforcement, or
even the most recent history, such as depriving a rat of water. In addition, recording
nuch history would ap ear to present insurmountable (at present) problems when the time
period is around 20 years. The difficulty in manipulating relevant reinforcers is similar
In the preceeding one for complex, human behavior: in order to manipulate the reinforeere,
one must determine what constitutes a relevant reinforcer. The E knows the relevant
reinforcer of the bar press operant, if the rat has been food deprived for 36 hours, and
thus can manipulate this reinforcer. Can a teacher, however, be so confident that the
promise of an "A" -grade is the relevant reinforcer for the operant of writing a research
paper, if the student has been "A" -deprived for two semesters?
As noted previously, the experimenter or teacher manipulation of relevant reinforcers
is dependent upon their specification. In the rat (or in simple behavior) the relevant
reinforcers are operationally "defined" when the exnerircenter deprives the organism, a
situation unlikely to be duplicated in complex, human behavior. Two basic concepts of
social learning theory may provide a basis for assessing the relevant reinforcers for
individual students in complex learning situations. Expectancy is the individual's
(subjective) probability that a given reinforcement will occur as a function of his
emitting aparticular behavior in a particular situation. This concept also provides a
basis for assessing what are the individual's perceptions of the contingencies of
reinforcement. Reward value, on the other hand is the concept which provides the bssls
for determining the relative strength of reinforcers for the individual. Thus, it may
be an indication of what reinforcer should be manipulated by the teacher in order to con-
trol the student's behavior.
Two ideas have been raised here which should be further stressed. The notion IB
implicit that what the student reports as the contingencies of reinforcement (his expectancy)
may be more useful in the control of behavior (learning) than the "actual" or toncher-
rle/flnod and -manipulated contingencies. Such an orientation is consonant with tho p-
pjrtuli of social learning theory. However, operant theory might b token to suggest the
contrary orientation to the .question of the Individual's awareness of the contingencies
updating In his learning (cf., e.g., Greenspoon, 1955), that reinforcers may operate
ooUIde of awareness. Research is required to rosolve this apparent difference in the two
l.hoorit'S, although recent research (Page, 1972) favors an "awareness" interpretation.
The question is whether or not the individual's perception of the contingencies of
16. ,.

behaviors and reinforcements, or at least his report of these is relevant to the effective-
ness of learning. In fact, if student-reported and teacher-defined contingencies differ at
all is an empirical question* The second notion is that what events a student nerceives
as reinforcing may not correspond in "value" (i.e.j, their effectiveness for the control of
behavior) to the teacher-defined and --manipulated events* In fact, the student may not
perceive as. reinforcing at all what the teacher manipulates. The question is again which
set of events or reported perceptions leads to better control, if they are different at
Specification of 2J!ich SHSM2M, Suggested Methods
In. specifying what ao^ears to be the critical research questions, the orientation
taken below is to focus on the apparent deficits in the operant paradigm and to suggest
how the concepts and methods of SLT may be utilized in providing the information necessary
for effective aoplication of operant techniques in the college classroom. The most im-
portant question for college teaching raised above would appear to be that of the nercention
of reinforcers in the teaching process* That is to say, do students perceive the same
events as reinforcing as do teachers in the teachers' effort to control the classroom
and academic behavior of college students?
At the outset it should again be noted that, in the terms of Rotter's theory, this
question involves the assessment of student's psychological situation. In the methods
typically used in SLT? a questionnaire for the expected outcomes or consequences of a set
of behaviors is developed. Adams and Ulehla (1969) have used a method for assessing
social learning variables in the framework of the theory of signal detectability (TSD).
This measurement model can be combined with an orientation toward social nercention
(such as Gibsonfst 1966 and Brunswik's 1955), which focuses on the individual's sufejectiv
perceptual parallels to the events of the ecology. Through Brunswik's notion of represen~
tative design, the complexity and real nature of the ecology is stressed. That is to say
that stimulus situations are used as they exist in the natural ecology, rather than as
they are delimited and simplified typically in the laboratory.
The TSD approach to the measurement of social perception yields unitless, ratio~
scaled measures from rating scale data, similar to Thurstone's (1927) approach. In the
intended application of this approach to social perception measurement, "stimulus sources"
may be read as the events in the ecology of students and teachers which are "considered
to be reinforeers" in the college classroom (Ulehla. and Martin, 1971). The method of
development of expected consequences questionnaires is suggested by several authors (cf . ,
e.g., Jessor, e_t al, 1968).
A second major question is implied in the proceeding paragraphs. This question too,
involves differing perceptions of the ecology but is centered around the problem of
specifying the contingencies of reinforcement and behavior, or expectancies in social
learning terms. That is to say, are the contingencies perceived by the teacher the same as
those perceived by the students? As an examole, does the student perceive his grade to
be contingent upon the "knowledge of the literature" demonstrated in his writing of a panr
or contingent upon the teacher's whim? For the teacher, is the grade given contingent upon
the "knowledge" demonstrated or on the "clarity or expression," the "style," the "form,"
for some combination of these or upon something else? Clearly, the control, of paper writing
behavior is in part a function of such. perceptions of the relevant contingencies, perhaps
aore so than the "actual" contingencies. This latter is again an empirical question, but
is not the curremt focus. A Methodological apnroach similar to that outlined for the
first basic question would apoear productive. That is to say, a questionnaire focusing
on the expected consequences of various academic activities, the contingencies of rein-
forcements on the student behavior, wouad be used. Items again would be developed ac-
cording to the principles of the ecological, functional amroach to perceptual measurement.
Sampling academic behaviors and their expected consequences from the ecology or what students
and teachers perceive of the ecology is required,
These two basic questions suggest supplemental research questions. Having discovered
to what extent teachers' and students9 perception of the reinforcers relevant to the c]asn~
room and academic behavior of college students differ, for example the next question might

bo to discover which events in the ecology of the college classroom are most useful in
controlling the target behavior. In social learning terms, the question is which events
of potential us e, have the greater reward value for students, within practical and ethical
limits. Another supplemental question witv a closer anchor in the ecology of the co23@R
classroom is to determine if the reinforeers and contingencies actually manipulated by
the teacher are the same ones the teacher perceives himself to be manipulating. These ar
only two of many possible questions which would be of exnerimental potential. The elabora-
tion of these questions and the appropriate experimental methods should be determined by
the answers to the more basic questions raised above.
Having raised the two basic research questions for assessing the utility of social
learning concepts in refining the application of operant procedures to the classroom,
several other questions of research interest may be generated, some of which have been
noted. The basic issue remains; Can the concepts of social learning theory be utilized
in complementing the basic operant paradigm for use by college teachers in controlling
the academic behavior of their students? Research directed at answerimg these basic
questions should clarify the utility of social learning concepts and methods in the effort
to improve the effectiveness of teaching in the col'lege classroom through the use of the
operarit paradigm. This goal is in harmony with those working to apply operant principles
to the college classroom. The goal is clear; Johnston and Pennypacker (1.971, p. 243)
The key to the success of any applications to other academic situations
is in the adherence to techniques that will give to all concerned precise
and continuous feedback on the individual effects of any or all procedures,
Only by having evidence as to what is happening and to what variables these
effects are related can reasonable development progress. The lack of such
evidence would seem to promote capricious variations more related to the
personal whiua of the teacher than to the lawful relationships between the
academic environment and student performance.

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Greenspoon, J. The reinforcing effect of two spoken sounds on the frequency of two
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Teaching machines and programmed learning: H^ajt j^_a_nd._j|irecJ^i^nTs^ . Washington
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Mass.; Addison-Wesley, 1965.

Thurstone, 1. L. A law of comparative judgement. Psy_c^jl_ogical_Rej[i^ 1927, 3_4, 273-286.

Todd, J. C., Anderson, D. R. , Hodson, G. D., & Gregerson, G. F. A college curriculum

using behavioral principles to train teachers of the exceptional child. Paper
presented at The First National Rocky Mountain Behavior Modification Conference,
Denver, April, 1972.

Ulehla, Z. J. & Martin, R* F0 Operating characteristic analysis of attribute ratings.

^ 1971, 3_, 291-293
Noel W. Smith, Editor F i E L D Preceding

Faculty of Social Sciences 1 Segment


Setting Factors
i i
i Function

! 1
Investigator <4 -|
Stimulus Object
Media 1

- hJ
Volume -4
Number 2
PSYCHOLOGY Spring 1973

State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

The fact that part of the Interactional event takes place in the physiology
of the reacting agent does not place the total event there any more than the
tides, which are part of the gravitational interaction between the earth and
the moon, place the total event of gravity upon the earth, A person's feel-
ings are not located within him, but in his relationship with the stimulating
agent. Love is a relationship, hate is a relationship, and so is every other
feeling. A stimulating agent and a situation, as well as a reacting agent,
are involved in every one0

...: .
~ ,
. ~_-, .,( r~~. ~J-.. j*wj".. p~~.~, ,
. __v-,,..-. .rf


As reported in the Fall 1972 Newsletter the gram. Those who are not on the Cheiron mail
Cheiron Society for the History of the Behav- ing list, but are interested in attending,
ioral and Social Sciences will meet in should contact the editor for a program and
Plattsburg June 7-9. Of special importance lodging information.
to interbehaviorists is a symposium on "Con-
textual Interactionists" that will consist The editor was invited to Lynchburg College
of Hollo Handy on John Dewey and Arthur where he presented an address on March 28 on
Bentley? Paul Puller on J. R. Kantor and B. "The Social and Psychological Development of
F. Skinner, David Miller on George Herbert Ancient Egypt with Some Preliminary Remarks on
Mead, and Clarence Shute on Aristotle. We Primitive Beliefs . " The attempt was to show
can now add that the discussant will be the naturalism of belief systems as they existec
Parker Lichtenstein,, There are hopeful in the ancient world before the supernatural-
plans of publishing the symposium. In add- ism of the Qrae co -Roman period came on the
ition, Drs Kantor will be present to give seen, the presentation was illustrated with
an invited address entitled "Segregation in slides. His address at the University of
Science: An Historico-Cultural Analysis." North Carolina at Greensboro in February 1972
He will be introduced by Henry Pronko. The on "Interbehaviorism: Roots and Brances" will
program also includes, of course, papers be published in the Spring issue of The Psy-
covering a great variety of other topics. chological Record, -^t offers a basic expositios
It promises to be quite an interesting pro- of the interbehavioral system and relates some
current developments that seem to be evolving a
similar approach.
Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

The second edition of SYSTEMS AND THEORIES OF PSYCHOLOGY by Melvin

Marx and William Hillix, McGraw-Hill, 1973S continues to have a short
section on Interbehaviorism that is worth readnng. It concludes on
an optimistic note for the approach.

Steven Brown & Richard Taylor, Department of Political Science at

Kent State,, will publish in June 1973 Social Science quarterly "Frames
of Reference and the Observation of Behavior" that may be of interest
to interbehaviorists. For example: "By taking the object, instru-
ment, and observer in context, the interactions themselves can become
objects of study within the total field and observer's extractions of
different meanings become the most immediate events which present them
selves for analysis and explanation," Questions will arise, however,
where a partition between observer and observed is discussed. The in-
terbehaviorist stresses interaction of observer and observed so that
there is no partition, but rather continuity or interdependence,

A new work that commands our attention is by Theordore Sarbin and Will
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1972, Sarbin writes: "This book is in
the tradition of contextualism and interbehaviorism. It challenges
the utility of such concepts as specialstates of consciousness, mental
states, and trance. The book is a culmination of almost 40 years of
research and study by the senior author, an early proponent of J. 8.,
Knator." We plan to have a review of the book in a later issue.

Dr. Kantor made colloquia appearances at Queens College on December 7

and at the University of Chicago on February 22. He indicated that a
scientific psychology required a special type of logical or systematic
foundation--one that would exclude postulates from traditional philos-

Robert Martin, whose lengthy paper we published in the last issue, will
be completing his Ph.D. this summer at the University of Denver. He
would appreciate any job leads.

The feature article in this Issue is by Chris Fowler, a senior psychol-

ogy major at Plattsburgh. In forthcoming articles Paul Mount joy replies
to Robert Martin's article and J s R^ Kantor examines the famous statement
by John Watson: "Give me a dozen healthy infants. ......"
, 3

A Comparison of the Field-System Approaches

D, L. Clarke and J. R, Kantor
Christopher M. Fowler

D L. Clarke, in Analytical Archeology (1968), has recently shown the value

of utilizing general systems theory (Ashby, 1954; Wiener, 1948) as a tool for the
analysis of interrelationships between culture and environment. Clarke outlines,
explains, and interprets for the reader the properties of qualities of a system.
It is these properties and his explanations and interpretations with which we shall
concern ourselves.
Inasmuch as "jLntera^ct^ons^ between living organisms and their environments
are the subject matter of ecological studies (Vayda, 1968, p. xi)," it is clear,
at least to those individuals intimately involved in ecological approaches (Bark-
er9 1969; Sells, 1969) that the most valuable approach to the analysis of human
behavior and the solution of human behavior problems must be an jJltejraj^imM,^ one.
Further, it is apparent that a fruitful framework to deal with interactions, es-
pecially those between an organism and its environment, should be
ary_ (Hall, 1966; Kantor, 1925; Sommer, 1969). To this end we shall develop a com-
parison of some of the larger components or important basic constructions between
Kantor 's interbehavioral psychology and Clarke's general system model for complex
(as opposed to simple) systems.

For Clarke, a system is "any intercommunicating network of attributes or en~

tities forming a complex whole (1968; p. 4)." That is, we have here a whole unit
of two or more integrated and interacting components. Thus, Clarke's "system" is
analogous to Kantor 's behavior segment and/or interbehavioral setting. Where
Clarke speaks of attributes or entities, Kantor uses stimulus objects and react-
ing organisms. Where Clarke talks about an intercommunicating network, Kantor
states that "all the specific acts and motions operate mutually and in concert.
The field is entirely symmetrical and reciprocal (1966, p. 383)." The nature of
interactions for both positions is similar: movement is constant; change is con-
tinuous; interactions are on-going. While Clarke refers to a complex whole, Kan-
tor refers to the behavior segment or unit psychological event.

contj-nui^, as Clarke sees it, is that "characteristic capacity for

change or transformation which is most often demonstrated as a process of
uus_ cha_nje_ . . . (p. 45)." Analogously, Smith (1972) in reference to oneof Kan-
tor's basic postulates, speaks of a "universe of interactions." Change generally
(yet not always) takes place in small, successive or incremental transformations.
That is, what brings about change in a system (generally speaking) is the effect
of an accumulation of small changes in many variables. For Kantor, change is a
function of the dynamic interrelationships or interbehaviors of many organisms
with events, objects, or other organisms, i.e., many variables. System continuity
further implies continuous movement of a system along a trajectory or path (i.e.,
a series of successive changes in the value of the essential or critical variables
of the system and, consequently, in the system itself) through time and space.
Similarly, the nature of interbehavioral fields, of course, as well as behavior
segments is "evolutional" (Kantor, 1966) . The nature of change in a system, as
Clarke understands it, is. determined by the initial state of the system (when com-
ponents, e.g., organisms of the system begin intercommunicating interacting)
equivalent to Kantor's preceding behavior segment; the terminal state of the sys-
tem equivalent to the succeeding behavior segment (Kantor uses the behavior seg-
ment as "an abstraction designed tofixate a definite spatio-temporal event (1938);"
(see Smith's motion-picture-frame analogy, 1972); field conditions (a term which Kan-
tor also uses) or setting factors, and the trajectory of the system through time
and space equivalent to the evolution of interbehavioral fields. Just as no two
systems can ever be identical nor can one system ever again be like it was at some
time in the past, Kantor tells us that.". . . behavior segments like all events
are unique and unrepeatable (1938)."

Concerning the system's property of feedbaclc (in complex systems, hardly a

mechanistic quality) Clarke says "it is more frequently the case that the attri-
bute or entity values are coupled or connected in such a manner that a change or
transformation in either one may produce a corresponding transformation in the
value of the other. In such a case a connecting line and arrow must be shown in
directions (p. 46)." This is analogous to the most fundamental behavioral
unit of Kantor's system: the relationship of the stimulus and the response, that
is, the S**R relationship indicating, of course, that the stimulus and response
are interdependent, mutual, and reciprocal factors (Smith, 1972). Both Clarke and
Kantor are very aware of the need to represent complex multifactor interactions ac-
curately and objectively.

Regulation and control is "another inherent capacity of certain kinds of com-

plex system . . . to act 'as if capable of self-control by self regulation (p. 53),
That is, complex systems have the capacity to regulate disturbances or variables
impinging upon the system. In a similar sense, " . . . the setting factors of in-
terbehavioral fields operate to give pattern and distinction to the specific be-
havior segments in which they are components. They also serve to facilitate the
occurrence of the particular response~stimulus coordinations or to inhibit their
performance. . . the setting factors regulate the probability of the actual oc-
currence of a particular behavioral field (Kantor, 1966; p. 387)." Neither Kan-
tor nor Clarke, however, is assuming an invariant, causative process here.

Next, Clarke speaks of limits, sjgecj^fjjcalj^, limits on component variability.

That is, there are factors (internal and external) that limit the range of values
that variables or components of a system can assume. This is not an unfamiliar
notion to Kantor. We have already discussed the limiting or regulatory nature of
setting factors (field conditions). Further, there are limits to the number of
functions attributable to both stimulus objects and responses. That is, Kantor
does not assume that either the stimulus or the response has an unj-J-tnited^, or jLn-
jrinlt:e_ number of functions. In fact, the number of functions a stimulus object
or response can assume is a function of stimulus evolution and reactional biography
respectively (Kantor, 1966). That is, the type and number of functions that stim-
ulus objects and responses acquire depends on their respective on-going interac-
tions. However, neither Clarke nor Kantor is imposing some form of preordained
immutability on the events with which they are dealing.

Finally, Clarke discusses ^^2tation_ and d_irec_tivie Oej^tion.- Adaptation

occurs when a change in one system (any intercommunicating network of attributes
or entities forming a complex whole) brings about & change in another system. Kan-
tor would see this as the interaction of one behavior segment or interbehavioral
field with others. However, in most situations only certain attributes in either
system need change. Kantor notes the similarity of certain behavior segments and
interbehavioral fields with others, yet recognizes that the particular or relevant
events occurring in either are not identical. Two behavior segments or interbe-
havioral fields may be similar, but the stimulus objects and response function to
be investigated in them need not be the same. Clarke refers to such relevant or
critical factors as "essential variables." Closely associated with the notion of
adaptation is that of directive correlation.

"In every system changing or adapting with time there is a certain limited
set of attributes or entities whose past and present variation is essentially rel-
evant to some future condition of the system . . . (Clarke, p. 58)." This set of
attributes or entities is said to be diec_tl.y_ rlted_ with some future condi-
tion of the system. Moreover, "the range of permissable variation in the set of
past and present states in order to attain a future condition may be taken as a
measure of the degree of directive correlation (p. 58)." In other words, the fu-
ture condition of a system depends on present and past conditions of the system
as it moves through time and space. This is essentially what Kantor means when
he says that "interbehavioral fields are evolutional (1966, p. 383)." That is,
the behavior segment under analysis in the present is influenced by the preceding
behavior segment with its interbehavioral history, and both the present and pre-
ceding behavior segments (with their interbehavioral histories) will influence
the succeeding segment. It must be well understood, however, that neither Clarke
nor Kantor is assuming simple causal relationships. Instead, they choose to
speak of c_or_re_l^tj.ori because both are concerned not with some simple A causes B^
paradigm, but with the interrelationship of factors, the matrix of dynamic inter-
relationships, and the contributions of various factors as they provide varying
amounts of influence (Smith, 1972).

Nearly half a century ago Kantor recognized the need for interdisciplinary

"Of all the instances in the domain of science in which particular ad-
joining disciplines can (and should) come to the cooperative assistance
of each other, no better can be cited than that which signalizes the
relation between anthropology and psychology. For here we have two
sciences converging in some of their studies upon different aspects of
the same set of phenomena, namely, human behavior. The domain of cul-
tural anthropology not only borders very closely upon, but actually
overlaps human psychology. Assuredly, if any two borderline sciences
can help each other we should find them doing so in the case mentioned
(1925, p. 267)."

Concurrently, we submit that aJJL. sciences (especially those concerned with

human social problems) should become aware of the need for interdisciplinary ac-
tion and should focus their energies in that direction. It is hoped that the com-
parison presented here shows the manner in which a field-systems approach may be ap-
propriate across disciplines as a means of obtaining a scientific analysis of the
events. Such an approach seems to be the goal toward which all sciences are moving
and may be appropriate for the analysis of all events.

Ashby, W. R. liduc>y.on__^o__^bernt2. London: Chapman and Hall, 1965.

Barker, R. G. Wanted: An eco-behavioral science. In E. P. Wtllems and H. L.

Raush, (Eds.) 3 MSj-ESSJ^yi!^ ^ew York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969, pp. 31-43.

Clarke, D. L. Anl^tacal_archeo_log^. London: Methuen, 1968,

Hall, E. T. TheJiiMeji_J,wverision. Englewood Cliffs, N.-J. : Prentice-Hall, 1969.

Kantor, J. R. Anthropology, race, psychology and culture.

1925, 27, 267-283.

Kantors J. R. The nature of psychology as a natural science.

1938, 4, 1-61.

Kantor, J. R. Feelings and emotions as scientific events.

1966, 16, 377-404.

Sells, S. B. Ecology and the science of psychology. In E. P. Willems and H. L.

Raush,, (Eds.), NaJ^uraJHj;^^ New York:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969, pp. 15-30.

Smith, N. W. Interbehavioral psychology: roots and branches. P^ZhJLoi.al_

Record_, 1973 (in press) .

Sommer, R. PJlSl_^SS.* Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, 1969.

Vayda, A. P. (Ed.)3 E_nvlrjDnmjjn^^ Garden City, N.Y.:

Natural History Press, 1969.

Wiener, N. 6ybe?netic.s. Cambridge,, Mass.: Technology Press, 1948.

Noel W. Smith, Editor Preceding

Faculty of Socia! Sciences

Selling Factors

Stimulus Object



Volume 4
Summer 1973
State University College of Arts and Science, Pittsburgh, New York

As the title implies, this is a presentation of the neuroses and psychoses

from a consistently biosocial point of view. It follows a prediction made
five years ago that psychopathology--or behavior pathology as I propose to
call itwill shift progressively in emphasis from speculations about a
psyche in a somatic container to the study of the operations of human organ-
isms in a social field.

This is essentially the biosocial point of view. It differs radically

from the contemporary psychosomatic approach to the behavior disorders by
breaking completely with the tradition of mind-body dualism. There is no
need to begin by accepting the ancient end gratuitous assumption that an
invisible and intangible psyche lurks within the soma, or is coextensive
with it. We begin instead with what we find, a biological organism oper-
ating in and by means of a social environment. We thus create no artific-
ial need to solve meaningless conundrums as, How does the soma affect the
psyche? How does the psyche influence the soma? And ho'- is the non-psy-
chic reality ever contacted and tested by an insubstantial psyche? These
questions are not inherent i,n the problems which our patients present.
They are the offspring of psychosomatic dualism and we can discard them with
their parent.
(from the Preface)


The symposium on "Contextual interactionists" with low flying aircraft from the nearby
as reported in prospect in the preceding issue Strategic Air Command Air Base that hap-
of the Newsletter will be published in the Psy- pened to be on alert that day, but they
chological Record, Summer, 1973. It will in- were indomitable in the end.
clude a brief introduction to the topic, a few * **
es of vita on each participant, and selected The new ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY in
questions and answers between audience and par- three volumes published in 1972 by Herder
ticipants as well as the five papers. The par- & Herder shows no advancement over the
ticipants' voices had to periodically compete usual animism in its treatment of the role
Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

of biological organs in psychological activities. It states under the entry "Cen-

tral nervous system" that "All afferent sensory nerve paths receiving information
from the sense organs regarding the state of the environment end in the CNS, where,
in terms of reflexes, reactions, behavior patterns and volitions, this information
is processed and conveyed once more by means of efficient motor nerve fibers to
the motor effectors, and hence to the environment." The section on "Brain" main-
tains that "the totality of neuronal activity In our brain represents our individ-
ual world," The view that the cerebral cortex is "the highest central unit on
whose activity the control of all more complex behavioral processes and the occur-
rence of psychic (mental) processes depend" is now revised so that the reticular
formation "controls the activity of the cerebral cortex and hence all experience
and_ behavior" (emphasis added--ed.). The entry "Brain pathology" provides a slight
inkling that the brain might be considered a participating organ, but that is soon
overwhelmed by the usual cultural beliefs about its controlling, directing, init-
iating, and interpreting functions. Similarly, under "Sense organs" we find that
these organs communicate information. The encyclopedists would have the organism
populated with a panoply of little homunculi who screen incoming "signals" and then
tell the master homunculus in the skull about them. He (she?) then provides the
final interpretations and decisions for all the little homunculi who then act ac-
cordingly. Nowhere is there the slightest indication of alternative approaches or
the merest recognition that science must start with actual events rather than cul-
tural presuppositions. The entries in the Encyclopedia that are definitions or
simple descriptions are, with a few exceptions, quite standard and differ little
from what can be found in an elementary text. Examples of entries that are signif-
icant include Lundin's "Music, psychology of" and Brozek's informative account of
"Soviet psychology." On the whole, the COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
TERMS by English & English published in 1958 with its critical analyses is far more
useful than this $75 triad.

* **

Ronald Heyduk has compiled for teaching purposes thirteen pages of material from
the Newsletter from the three years 1970-72. Copies can be obtained by writing
him at the Department of Psychology, Appleton Hall, Amherst College, Amherst,
Massachusetts, 01002. He contributed "Cracks in the 'Billiard Ball' Organism" to
the Newsletter in 1970 (Nr. 3) and some apt quotations and critique in 1971 (Nr. 3)
when he was a graduate student at the University of Michigan.

The Newsletter is singularly honored to have in this issue an original contribution

by J. R. Kantor whose inspiration is the Newsletter's bedrock. His contributions
loomed large in the Cheiron symposium on "Contextual Interactionists" and in David
Miller's guest address "Can Social Scientists Be Humane?" His own guest paper
"Segregation in Science: A Historico-Cultural Analysis" aroused considerable inter-
est as shown by the numerous questions that were asked; and his extensive ad lib com-
mentary throughout his paper was a delight to all.


In the continuing dialogue between nativtstic and empiristic psychologists con-

cerning the genetics of behavior, the classical statement of Watson turns up occa-
sionally. Even empirically inclined psychologists appear to regard Watson's claim
to produce desirable or undesirable types of personality, given his conditions of op-
eration9 as an unmitigated hyperbola. But what is the alternative? It is alleged
that to reject the extreme developmental hypothesis is to entertain an ungrounded be-
lief in occult determiners. Surely Watson's declaration and its validity deserves
careful examination. Despite its familiarity it may be worth quoting here for pur-
poses of ready reference

1 should like to go one step further now and say, "Give me a dozen
healthy infants, well-formed and my own specified world to bring them up
in and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train, him to become
any type of specialist I might select,--doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-
chief, and yess even beggarman and thief, regardless of his talents, pen-
chants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors." I
am going beyond my facts and I admit it, but so have the advocates of the
contrary and they have been doing it for many thousands of years. Please
note that when this experiment is made, I am to be allowed to specify the
way the children are to be brought up and the type of vorld they have to
live in.

It is not surprising in view of the circumstances under which Watson formulated

his argument that it comprises some opacities and even some paradoxes. For example,
fellow behairiorists have pointed out that Watson himself admitted that he was going
beyond his facts, and that he affirmed that some behavior is inherited. It may be
contended, however, that Watson's basic hypothesis is thoroughly sound and that an
analysis of the issues involved can illuminate the problem of behavioral genetics
as well as genetics in general and the process of biological reproduction.

In what way did Watson go beyond the facts? Surely, he as an individual had
not performed the experiments but is there any doubt that such an experiment would
succeed? How else bat by means of the variables of personal and social development
are personalities with all their traits evolved? Is it not through the conditions
of parental and familial circumstances, economic and ethnic conditions, and cultur-
al institutions that doctors, lawyers, merchants, artists, beggars, thieves, mur-
derers, and governors are produced? No events available to scientists are more re-
vealing that the modes of cultivating the many occupational, professional, and poli-
tical personalities of complex societies. As we have intimated above, the objection
to the evolutional theory concerning the origin of various traits and capacities may
be prompted by lingering notions that occult powers determine the characteristics of
persons and their later performances.

As to the paradoxes, in Watson's statement, it cannot be denied that he slipped

in asserting his disregard of talents, penchants, tendencies, and abilities. For
there is no evidence that such traits are not evolved in the interbehavior of grow-
ing organisms in their encounters with things and events. It is not special plead-
ing in defense of Watson's hypothesis to suggest that what counts are the observed
events and not the rhetoric used to argue for them. We turn now to some relevant

The Problem of Behavioral Inheritance

Geneticists in unending recurrence insist that no anatomical character is (

transmitted to offspring. What passes from parents to offspring are patterns of
genes which in interaction with environing factors result in certain structure-func-
tion traits. Gene patterning in interaction with environing conditions constitute
the mechanisms whereby offspring conserve the species similarities of successive gen-
erations of organisms.

Such being the case with anatomical structures and physiological functions, how
much less are behaviors transmitted? Surely we need here some critical analysis of
what is happening. And this is easily done by observing an organism as it begins
its life as a zygote and later as a neonate and as a developing personality.

The entire process clearly goes on upon several stages. In each we find defi-
nite interactions with copresent things and events. For the foetus these conditions
of development are located in the narrow confines of the uterus where the total sit-
uation does not allow for more than anatomical and physiological development. On
the whole it is proper to say that whatever psychological action is performed con-
sists primarily of the operation of cellular systems.

The development of the neonate is facilitated by the enlarged range of con-

frentable things and conditions. At the point of birth the foundation is laid for
a tremendous repertoire of action and action traits. The individual becomes the
speaker of a particular ethnic and dialectic language, a sectarian believer, a
unique type of craftsman or vocationist, a cultural male or female, a conformer
or unorthodox performer, a conventional moralist or transgressor.

In every case, whether the development is straight or oblique, smooth or rough,

difficult or relatively easy, rapid or slow, there is always development in com-
plex interbehavior with objects, persons, conditions, circumstances, aids and hin-
derances, all within the range of biological normality or abnormality of organisms
and their surroundings.

Does any unbiased observation of the actual development of organisms allow for
any alternative interpretation? The answer is, of course, no. Yet an alternate
one is proposed based not on observation, but on cultural indoctrination. It is
derived from the acceptance of historical transcendentalism, from the traditional
belief in occult powers and forces that are the creations of verbalistic imagina-
tion. In substance, such non-developmental constructions are blood brothers to
Orenda, Wakanda, and Mana of primitive peoples.

The Tabula Rasa Argument

Writers who unwittingly deny or are skeptical about the universal and inevit-
ably complete development of behavior and personality drag into the discussion the
red herring of the tabula rasa. They hark back to the seventeenth century debate
between those who affirmed that the soul was loaded with faculties and those who
held that the souls of individuals were only raw materials that had to be complete-
ly developed. However sympathetic we may be with those who believe they are espous-
ing the principle of nihil ex nihilo, we cannot but criticize them for dragging in
a metaphysical problem into biological and psychological situations. In both bio-
logical and psychological situations we perforce meet with transition conditions (
mr m

in which new things and actions are evolved. Surely at one stage in their devel-
opment organisms start at a psychological zero point. But this is not to say any-
thing about a metaphysical nothing. We are concerned with a growing organism,
which, if it interacts effectively with its surrounds, will develop psychological
behavior and psychological traits.

By the same token the organism has passed through a biological zero point
when it was only a prezygotic ovum and sperm. The evolutional process involves a
before and after, and the observer can see how it is that scientific potentialities
are actualities on a preexistent level. The evolutional process in biology and psy-
chology comprises discontinuities as well as continuities.

Psychological and Biological Relations

To stress observations rather than conjectural dialogue with little or no con-

nection with events is t o be able to solve many of the problems concerning the in-
timate relations of psychological and biological events. We consider the proximal
and divergent connections under the conditions of emergence and participation.

Emegene_, Psychological and biological events are continuous in the sense

that it is organisms and their behavior that are the locus of both. For most of
the prenatal life of even complex^ organisms behavior is purely biological, they
are only physiological functions of cellular structures. A definite, though par-
tial, differentiation begins in late gestation and in greater and greater ampli-
tude in post-natal development. The neonate enters a new world, so to speak, and
develops adjustments to the great variety and constantly changing things and
events with which it becomes surrounded.

Psychological events may truly be said to emerge from biological matrices, but
this fact in no wise obliterates the differences between psychological and biologi-
cal behavior. Evolutionally both may be variant performances of the same organisms.
The variation in development of the two types of events may be regarded as stemming
from either forward or backward reference points. Biological interactions are in-
fluenced by the continuity of individuals with the members of the species from
which they spring through the agency of their cellular organization. Psychologi-
cal interactions are cumulative adjustments developed under current conditions
with potential competence for acting in future similar exigencies.

Undoubtedly, an appreciation of the similarities and dissimilarities in the

two types of situations is important for the analysis of heredity problems.

Participation. Heredity problems, too, are illuminated by the inevitable par-

ticipation of biological factors in all psychological activities. Since all psy-
chological events are at the same time biological events, it is overlooked that
the two types can differ markedly. The greatest similarity is found in simple re-
flex behavior. But even here we must distinguish between biological reflexes of
tissue preparations and the conditioned reflexes of intact organisms.

Only concrete events are considered, and not philosophical speculations.

Plants and simple animals, of course, remain so during their entire life
The most striking difference between the participation of organisms in psy-
chological interactions are to be observed while comparing a conditioned reflex
with the complexities of a thinking or reasoning performance. In the latter it
is obviously an organism that interacts, but the interaction has been derived in
a cultural development and is not just the functioning of tissues or organs. Given
a particular anatomical part, say., a hand or foot, it can perform in enormously
different ways; the hand can hold somethings clap, play an instrument, transcribe
records, and so on. Similarly, the foot can support, kick something, walk, and in
rare cases draw and paint. Participation in all sorts of interbehavior is possible.
Comparable or variant anatomical traits--size, race, sex-can participate equally
well in crude or precise actions. Coexistence and participation when properly in-
terpreted are exact indications of how biology and psychology are interrelated.

Participatory Graduation

When we compare the participation of biological components in comparatively

simple reflexes and in the formulation of a mathematical law, we must be struck
with ranges of participation. Always a biological organism is the performer, but
the degree of cellular functioning must be considered in the ratio of anatomico-
phys iological contribution to the processes and adjustmental results as compared
with the cultural factors. Minus the cells and tissues and organism there is no
psychological behavior, but the evolution of a biologically competent organism--
upright walking and elaborately neuralized--must be followed by the invention of
a cultural environment and the accumulation of its products or it will remain a
metabolizing, maturizing, and reproducing animal.

Behavior and Behavior

Problems of innateness in biology and psychology are invariably beclouded by

the use of common names for the description of different types of events. Certain-
ly this is the case when the term "behavior" is used to mask the differences in
biological and psychological events. Here is the source of considerable misin-
terpretation. It may be helpful, therefore, to clarify some prominent terms in
the discussion of natvism and empiricism.

Bjahavior. Essentially biological behavior consists of the opera-

tion or functioning of cells as living entities or factors in various structures
or organizations as tissues, organs, and organisms, in ecological interaction with
energizing conditions as in reflex action, or with objects as evolved animals or
plants. Basically, biological behavior is localized in the phylogenetic, struc-
tural, reproductive, and mutational conditions of a line of cellular organizations.

Psychological Behavior. The identifying mark of psychological performances is

that they constitute adjustmental interactions with Immediately occurring events,
or adjustments based upon a number of encounters with other organisms or environing
objects and conditions ordinarily grouped as a class called stimuli. The emphasis
is upon individual developmental or historical contacts of organisms rather than
upon their evolution as members of species or cellular organizations. The cellu-
lar structures, that is, the organic or species traits of the interacting organ-
ism, may be central or peripheral in the behavior.

ZZlil2iSi iSSSJiMiSSJLi. This term is predominately linguistic and has no

correspondence with confrontable events. It is illicitly employed to refer to some
non-existent, non-developed power or force to act in a certain way. Nativists as-

sume that organisms are endowed with inherent characteristics such as intelligence,
morality, genius, creativity, affectivity, artistry, and so on,

DejveJ.otnenjt. Of the many kinds of behavior development we have only

to distinguish two types , the biological and the psychological. On the biological
level development begins with conception, the fertilization of an ovum, then the dif-
ferentiation and growth of zygote, and the gradual succession of foetus, embryo, and
a neonate organism. At each stage the developmental process involves contacts with
things and conditions which may directly affect organisms in their future responses
to similar situations.

The development of psychological behavior begins in the late prenatal stages of

biological development. Psychological acts and traits arise from single or serial
contacts' with stimulus objects under specific circumstances. After stimulus and
response fields are developed they may recur periodically when the original situa-
tion or some phases of them reappear. Psychological development by contrast with
biological development differs in the rapidity of the process and the increasingly
enlarged scope available for confrontations with organisms and other objects and
conditions .

L^arnln^. Properly employed, this term refers to a specialization and modifi-

cation of behavioral development mediated by contrivances of various sorts. Among
the many different kinds of contrivance that can be arranged are included rewardings
punishing, encouraging, cajoling, isolating, grouping, and general control of the
learning situation. The various contrivances may be singly employed or in concert.

Summary and Conclusion

Upon close examination Watson's hyperbola turns out to be no such thing. On

the contrary, what seems to Watson himself and others as overstepping the bounds of
observable data actually fall short of this process. Watson does not go far enough
when he asserts that his training procedures operate in disregard of talents, pen-
chants, tendencies, and abilities. These terms all refer to traits that are devel-
oped in their entirety during the individual's psychological development and are sub-
ject to control during the development of the social traits and behavior of persons
as doctors, lawyers, merchants, and so on.

It must be admitted that Watson reveals here his transition from a belief in
innate traits and tendencies toward the new emphasis upon biological evolution and
psychological development each from a zero point emergence from an -earlier embryo-
logical stage, but this is no impeachment of his new anti-innateness attitude.

It is sometimes implied that Watson could not give up a belief in the inherit-
ance of behavior because he shared the layman's belief that respiration, digestion,
elimination, growth, and random activity are inherited. This allegation merely
stimulated the study of the differences between the concrete reproduction processes
in species continuity and the putative similarity of such processes to the transfer
of property. When Watson says he is going beyond his facts, he is merely paying
tribute to the great complexity of developmental circumstances and the paucity of
economic, legal, and social control over the complex operations.

J. R. Kantor
Noei W. Smith, Editor Preceding

Faculty of Social Sciences Segment

Seising Factors

Stimulus Object


Volume 4


State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

KS^2SiS?S^^SSaS!!SSSS-SSSIS '* ' 'ft ' i t ^^^ ^^ * \*> i t -a f ) o I I

Every event in the realm of the terresfnal---tne realm of things which are
generated and perish---is to be understood in its relation to other events,
some immediate,, others in varying degrees of remoteness. ...[Aristotle]
contributes to what today we call interbahavioral psychology.

Clarence Shute


The above quotation appears in The Psych- Lynchburg, Virginia as Distinguished

ological Record, Summer 1973 in one of the Visiting Scholar. He will deliver two
five papers on "Contextual Interaction!sts: addresses and consult with students and
A Symposium." staff. A weekly discussion group is also
*** part of the program. Donna Cone who made
Harry Mahan has the following mimeographed the arragemerits has sabbatical leave to
articles and cassettes. He will send the study with him during this time. Present
mimeographed articles gratis and the reports are that students, psychology
cassettes for $1 each. (1) Dewey's 1896 staffs and Dr. Kantor are all greatly
Reflex Arc paper (mimeo and cassette), enjoying the experience.
(2) Excerpts from Dewey & Bentley's ***
"Knowing and the Known" (mimeo and cass- Dr. Kantor has been invited to be the
ette) , (3) Part of Kantor's paper "In Honorary Chairman at the first Mexican
defense of Stimulus-response psychology" Congress on Behavior Analysis. It will
(mimeo). He also has copies of "The meet April 8-10, 1974 at Xalapa, Vera-
Interactional Psychology of J.R. Kantor" cruz,. Mexico. His address will be "How
available in quantity^ gratis., and is Interbehavioral Psychology Related
"Interactional Psychology" (two volumes) to the Experimental Analysis of Behavior?"
for $1 each. Write Dr. Harry Mahan, Palo- ***
mar College,, San Marcos* California,,92069. The feature articles in this issue consists
*** of a response by Paul Mountjoy to the
Dr. Kantor has undertaken a sojourn of 6 article by Robert Martin in the Winter 1973
or 7 weeks at Lynchburg College in issue and a reply by Martin to Mountjoy.

Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

Paul T. Mountjoy
Western Michigan University

A response to Martin's (1973) discussion of the applicability of operant

analysis to the "complex11 behavior of the human college student in the class-
room is likely to appear to be an unnecessarily vigorous exercise in one-up-
manship. A somewhat elaborate disclaimer is s therefore, desirable. Martin has
paid his dues, done his homework, in the sense of having read those appli-
cations of operant analysis to classroom instruction which are most readily
available in the psychological literature. The purpose of this response ( which I
hesitate to dignify with the title cribbed from the Bard) is to call the attention
of this '.-pacific reading audience to recent developments in educational technology.
I am fortunate to be a colleague of a number of innovative and creative teachers,
and I merely report upon the exciting developments with which I am privileged
to be associated at Western Michigan University.
All human Intellectual activities are based upon assumptions , and Kantor
(1959) has stressed the of gymnological as opposed to cryptological
systems. In the interests of a gymnological approach I list the following assumptions.
(1) There are definite continuities between the behavior of human and non-human
organisms. A corollary is that the behavioral generalities derived from the study
of non-human organisms in an operant test chamber do have relevance to the under-
standing of" the behavior of human organisms in their everyday environment. (2) Eve-
nts are the ultimate criteria-not constructs. A corollary is that behaviorism is
scientific psychology (Kantor* 1963) and any particular scientist will use whatever
vocabulary he or she is comfortable with. At this point I' must remind my audience
that Skinner in 1938 ( p. 35) acknowledged his debt, to Kantor in a manner which he
has not since duplicated,, and that Kantor (1970) has indicated the potential of
experimental analysis for carrying out Kantor1 s own program.1 The rather convoluted
point of all this is that Interbehaviorism and Operant Analysis are quite compatibles
and that Skinner and Kantor respect each other as scientists, and also continue to
regard themselves as friends. (3) Human behavior may appear complex, as contrasted
to non-human behavior , but in actuality the continuities between human and non-human
behaviors are most compelling ( see number one above). The contrast between "complex"
human behavior and " simple" non-human behavior is assumed to be as specious as the
falsely elaborated contrast between the complexity of behavioral events and the
simplicity of physical events to which Kantor (1953) long ago drew attention. (4)
The learning events which occur in a college classroom may be analyzed within any
number of competing behavioral frameworks. However, the thinly veiled mental ism
of Rotter's ( 1954,1955,1960,1966) social learning theory confers no special advan-
tage upon analysis. The renaming of reinforcement history (or interbehavioral
history) as " expectancy" merely directs the interest of the psychologist away from
the actual historical ( and causal) events and towards inferred internal states of
the organism. The scientific disadvantages of this procedure have been documented
by Kantor for over 50 years.

During Dr. Kantor' s illness at the time of the 1968 Psychological Convention
at San Francisco I was asked to read the Invited Address "Scientific Psychology and
Specious Philosophy". B.F. Skinner arrived early, and despite my explanation that I
was substituting for Dr. Kantors remained to hear the paper read.
Perhaps this is the point at which I should launch into a description of my
own evolution as a teacher since there are undoubtedly parallels in the evolution
of many other college teachers. In the beginning I was convinced that I would be an
excellent teacher because I was highly motivated to be a successful teacher. Gradu-
ally disillusionment set in, as has happened to so many others (Skinner 1948, 1968).
There are obviously many alternative adjustments which one may select when teaching
fails to provide requisite satisfactions. One such alternative is analogous to the
varied behavior exhibited by non-human organisms placed upon extinction. I am fort-
unate in that during the time I was emitting trial and error teaching behavior I
was able to observe and model upon the behavior of three innovative and successful
teachers who remain my colleagues. These individuals are Fred Keller, Dick Mallet,
and Jack Michael. All three are firmly convinced that suitable arrangements.of the
educational environment will result in higher levels of educational achievement for
all students, but the actual arrangements which they advocate vary. For the purpose
of this essay I shall emphasize the dimension upon which they exhibit most variability.
Dick Mallot utilizes " pop culture" and multi-media presentations. Jack Michael relies
heavily upon remedial lectures at which difficult points are explicated. Fred Keller
is best known for the development of Personalized Systems of Instruction (PSI), which
are student self-paced. Within these variations all three remain committed to an
operant analysis of behavior. However, none of the three is committed to a formal
operant analysis of teaching in the sense implied by Martin (1973). Instead, they
approach teaching as a technological problem in which one manipulates variables
in an attempt to achieve a practical goal of approximating 100% mastery of subject
matter rather than attempting to demonstrate functional relationships between
independent and dependent variables. In other words, we deal here with applied
psychology rather than with science in the narrow sense of hypothesis testing. Thus
any college teacher may utilize "operant" teaching technology and may at the same
time give that teehnologywhatever label is most pleasing to him.
For the remainder of this report I shall concentrate upon PSI for a number
of reasons. Among these are: PSI is used by many non-psychologists. PSI is reported
upon in a large number of publications. PSI is a flexible approach which allows
variations to suit the personal life style of the instructor. Fred Keller, the
innovator of PSI, is a charming and urbane gentleman who has devoted his life to the
improvement of college teaching; most of us can greatly improve our own instructional
proficiency by applying the principles of PSI. A new campus of the University of
Texas at Odessa is being founded upon the PSI approach. As presently planned, every
course in every department shall be taught by the "Keller Plan" (PSI) on that campus.
The following principles characterize PSI9 but obviously details have been
1. Within limits the student is in a "free operant" or"self-paced" environment.
That is, the student schedules himself for examinations upon units when he is
prepared to take those examinations.
2. Responses which the student is expected to perform are specified in remarkable
detail by the distribution of "objectives". That is, students are instructed
toread certain pages in a book and to be prepared to perform specific response?
For example, the "objective" may instruct the student to differentiate
between operant and respondent conditioning, or to describe systematic
desensitization, or whatever is germane to the subjet matter of the
particular course under consideration.
3. Complete mastery of each and every unit is required prior to progression
on to the next unit. Some instructors set lower levels of mastery as
satisfactory for their purposes.
4. Mastery is demonstrated by a combined written-oral examination. N.B. , the
oral portion is designed to accomplish several ends, among them the
explanation of any unsatisfactory written answer and a social interaction
between student and instructor.
5. Failure to demonstrate mastery of a unit is not taken as indicative of
failure or stupidity, but as indicative of a need for further preparation,.
That is, remedial examinations are available as necessary.
6. Students are involved in the teaching process as proctors9 etc.
7. Final examination determines the grade in the course.
Frequentlys individuals respond to descriptions of the PSI with "mickey mouse"
or even more pejorative exclamations. It seems likely that PSI is not the answer
for every teacherlet alone for every student. Nevertheless, the flexibility
available does appear to allow instructors and students alike to find their own path
to paradise or to perdition. For examples does the instructor enjoy lecturing? Excellent.
He should schedule lectures. If the instructor prefers to write out his materials
and distribute them to the class, he may do so. Or, the instructor may both lecture
and distribute his own written materials.
Members of this reading audience who are desirous of learning more about PSI
should write: Dr. John H. Hess, Junior
PSI Clearinghouse
Eastern Mennonite College
Harrisonburq, Virginia 22801
Enclosure of $1.00 will be reinforced by receipt of "PSI ( Keller Plan) Biblio-
graphy". This lists 150 published and unpublished papers on the use of behavior
theory in college instruction.
The fSJ_Jiwsjliris available gratis ( except for lack issues which must be
purchased) from: Dr. J.6. Sherman, Editor
Department of Psychology
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C. 20007
I am indebted to Fred Keller for many conversations, and for allowing me to peruse
eertiari unpublished materials. I remain, however, responsible for all errors in the
description of PSI herein presented.
Two manuals (which will be found to be most useful in describing pitfalls
to be avoided) may be purchased from:
College Bookstore
200 University Street
Salt Lake Citys Utah 84112
Born, David G. IjnLMM!^ Mi^^
(1970) $6" 25. ' .
Born, David G. Prortor. Manual (1970) $2.25
Individuals who wish to explore PSI on a smaller budget will find Lewis and
Wolf's (1973) description of the application of PSI principles to Introductory
Chemistry to be most illuminating.
The present author has found PSI principles to be applicable to courses whose
enrollment is limited to advanced undergraduates and to graduate students as well
as to lower level courses in which PSI is usually implemented. In the case of the
history of psychology ( where I have taught by both conventional and PSI methods)
the advantage of the newer methodology is clear. The textbook has not changed, but
weekly quizzes ( with remediation) and written objectives have resulted in
virtually all students receiving a grade of A. In my opinion the students know more
about the history of psychology than they did when they were tested by the
conventional hourly examinations and also wrote term papers. In all honesty I must
admit that the majority of term papers were of such poor quality as to serve as ex-
tremely potent punishing stimuli and to drive me to seek a better teaching technology.
In conclusion I wish to reiterate that the events themselves are the fundamental
criterion. No matter whether one prefers the terminology of PSI or some other
terminology is irrelevent. The ethics of the situation are clear: The instructor
must teach the best course he is able to teach to all students at all times. The
conventional control group of experimental psychology is esentially unavailable
both for ethical reasons and because of the practical considerations regarding the
impossibility of meeting conventional design critera in higher educational situations.
I urge my readers to try out the modern teaching technology I have so briefly
described. With luck your department too may be criticized by your administration
for giving the grade of A to 69%^ of those undergraduates enrolled in your department!
Kantor, J.R. 1953. The _LoJc .of Modern Science. BloomingtonV Indiana: Principia Press.
Kantor, J.R. 1959. Ijite^behavioral Psychj3loy. Bloomington, Indiana: Principia Press.
Kantors J.R. 1963. Behaviorism: Whose image? s^hol_p^j_ca]_ Record., 13, 499-512.
Kantor, J.R. 1970. An analysis of the experimental analysis of behavior (TEAS)
Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 13,101-108.
.Undergraduate Grades 1966 to 1972 at Western Michigan University. Office of
Institutional Research, March 1973.
Lewis 9 O.K. and Wolf, W. A. 1973. Implementation of self-paced learning ( Keller method)
in a first year course. jJpjurn_a]_ erf ^Jin]Jal Idjuart1_on_., 50 , 51-56.

Martin, R.F. 1973. Toward conceptualization of learning processes in the college

classroom III: Operant psychology and Rotter's social learning theory as a
basis for research. JQ]Jtej^bjli_a^j_oj^Q_ sj|^]i]j^ ^ewsjjtter, 4 (1), 2-19.

Rotter, J.B. 1954. .Socuf[ MlX!ling_jM. ^llnJ^M. fiy!}lP-9y' Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:

Rotter, J.B. 1955. The role of the psychological situation in determining the
direction of human behavior. In M. R. Jones (Ed.) JJhe Njb_ra_sj<a_ I^JJP^IUJILJJI
MpJJj\/aJJkm_, Lincolon: University of Nebraska Press. Pp. 245-269.
Rotter, J.B. 1960. Some implications of a social learning theory for the prediction
of goal directed behavior from testing procedures. s^hj)J_pjjjMl___rjejn^wJ 67 ,

Rotter, J.B. 1966 Generalized 'expectancies for internal versus external control of
reinforcement. P^ch]_PJliI I^Q^SIMbA' 80, ( 1, Who.Te No. 609).
Skinner, B.F. 1938. The_ Beha,yj_or of Orgair[sms_. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Skinner, B.F. 1948. Walden H.. New York: Macmillan.

Skinner 9 B.F. 1968. JJie ,Ijh]loloy_ f IeahJH9.' New York: Appleton-Century-Oofts.

But There Are Roses and There Are Roses
Robert F. Martin
University of Denver

Through the Kindness of Dr. Smith I was able to read'Dr.Mountjoy's reply to

my paper which appeared in this journal ( Martins 1973). I found the reply to be
helpful because it summarized an''obscure literature on teaching. I am.familiar with
this literature, and, in fact, have a paper listed in Dr. Mess's Bibliography, I also*
found DP. Mountjoy's report insightful for the development of a new teacher, which
I am. I, too, do not wish to engage in " one-up-manship," but there are three sub-
stantive points which I wish to draw.
Even with thehighly innovative instructors practicing PSI or other classroom
applications of operant technology, two bits of data aopear in nearly every report:
course withdrawals occur and at the rate above " regular "courses'9 and students still
fail to meet criteria of mastery. Why were there only 69% Aggrades in Dr. Mountjoy's
classes? These observations suggest to me that history of reinforcement and current
contingencies vary so greatly between students that some effort must be made to
assess these " where it's at" for the individual student.
This need for current assessment leads, I argue, to a non-historic approach
such as Rotter's (1955) social learning theory (SLT). " Expectancy," I still argue,
yields potentially more for the instructor's classroom use than generally manipulated
reinforcers, such as grades. People behave as if certain contingencies are operating
amd these may not be the same as teacher-controlled contingencies. The literature
to support this position is difficult to characterize, but consider the " non-learners'
in research like Levine's (1971) work.
Finally, Mountjoy's implication that the complexity of college classroom
behavior is readily subject to operant technology is contradicted by his statement
that, " The conventional control group of experimental psychology is essentially
unavailable both for ethical resons and because of the practical considerations
regarding the impossibility of meeting conventional design criteria in higher
educational situations." A point I made in my paper.
I have argued the complementarity of operant psychology and Rotter's SLT
and would extend this to Kantor's ( 1970) approach. I am also in basic agreement with
PSI and other operant applications to higher education. As an aspiring college teacher,
I amy be so naive as to believe that this approach may be improved by borrowing from
work such as Rotter's. The conceptual compatibility of these disparate developments
of psychology has been demonstrated, I hope, in my paper.

Kantor s J. R, ) Aruanalysis of the experimental analysis of behavior (TEAB).

.of. J-lli L iEll!!!MtaI JiDJlllsj^ f Miajin^T , 1970, 13, 101-108.
Levine 9 M. Hypothesis theory and nonlearning despite ideal S-~R reinforcement
contingencies. s^chiojpjj^l__jevj^w9 1971, 78 9 130-140.

Martin, R.F. Toward conceptualization of learning processes in the college classroom

III: Operant psychology and Rotter's social learning theory as a basis for research.
5 4 S 2-19..

Rotter, J. B. The role of the psychological situation in determining the direction

of human behavior. In. M. R. Jones ( Ed.), JJhe Nebas_ka ^yjip^slum cm Jiojtrvatijon,
1955. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1955. Pp. 245-269.
Noel W. Smith, Editor Preceding

Facility of Social Sciences

Selling factors

Stimulus Object

Volume 5
PSYCHOLOGY Winter 1974

State University College of Arts and Science, Pittsburgh, New York

.... If you start with the assumption that whatever the world is made of
must be inherently inert, you then have to go ahead and guess that it
changes only as force is applied to it. Here you are, saddled with two
distinct constructs; objects, and the force that makes them move. As
long as you are a materialistand nearly everybody is in spite of what
he says there is not much you can do except think in terms of primary
objects, such as the atoms of Democritus, being pushed around by secon-
dary forces. Apply this basic thinking to physiology, and you have the
notion.* a body being actuated by energy; apply it to psychology, and you
come up with the notion of a person either being propelled by motives
in spite of himself, or stuck tight in his fundament. . . Suppose we be-
gan by assuming that the fundamental thing about life is that it goes on.
It isn't that something makes it go on; the going on is. the thing itself..
It isn't that motives mak.e man come alert and do things; his alertness is
an aspect of his very being. Talking about activating motives is simply
redundant taIky-talk, for once you've got a human being on your hands, you
already have alertness and movement, and sometimes a lot more of it than
you know what to make of. There is another habit of thinking that Western
Man more or less fell into fortuitously. As long as he was assuming that
human beings are propelled by motives, it seemed reasonable to imagine al-
so that the motives give direction to the movement; if they push, they
must push in some direction. Now if we could only find out what is push-
ing, we could predict where everybody is going, as well as how soon he
would get there. So for two thousand years we have been looking for the
thing that is doing the pushing, and often trying to define it by the di-
rections it pushes. We haven't found it yet; naturally, we haven t found
it, but during the centuries we have built up a tremendous lexicon of push
and pull terms. Even our language has fallen heir to the design of our
quest, and we have committed ourselves to a grammar of motives that con-
trols our speech and channels our thinking about human behavior. Now we
can scarcely say anything about what a person had done, or is about to do,
without: using a language form that implies that he has been pushed into
it. We are even inclined to think that way about our own behavior, and
when we do, it usually means we are in trouble.

--George Kelley in Nebraska Syjnjgosium on Mcvtrvation, 1962.

<Chjdet>ata ,;.-/ - ^, , Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

The quotation from George Kelley is one of those admirable statements where
the author's own works do not follow his best precepts.

Two recent articles have appeared that suggest the importance of considering
the field or context in psychological situations. James R. Averill writes in the
Psjhoj.ogica 1 Bulletin, 19 73 , 80, 286-303 under the title "Personal Control Over
Aversive Stimuli and Its Relation to Stress" that conditions of stress and the ex-
tent to which the individual can control it "depend upon such factors as the na-
ture of the response and the context in which it is embedded and not jist upon its
effectiveness in preventing or mitigating the impact of a potentially harmful
stimulus." They also depend "upon the meaning of the control response for the in-
dividual; and what lends a response meaning is largely the context in which it is
embedded." Donald N. Bersoff in "Silk Purses Into Sows' Ears: The Decline of Psy-
chological Testing and a Suggestion for its Redemption," Amer_ic_a_n
1973, 28, 892-899, recommends that the usual artificial test arrangement be re-
placed by "psychosituation assessment" where "the aim is to 'contextualize1 be-
havior and discover what Fischer called the whe n /when - not_s of specific behavior.
In the classroom, both the child's behavior and that of the teacher are carefully
assessed before any changes in the instructional environments are made. The
child and his teacher 'co-constitute* this instructional environment, interacting
to evoke behavior in the other. Any assessment procedure that isolates the tar-
get person from the significant others who participate in his behavior can be
considered, at the very least, incomplete, and, at the most, unethical."

In a chapter on "Hypnotism and Surgical Pain" by J. F. Chaves & T. X. Bar-

ber in a new book by Barber, Spanos, and Chaves ('HYPNOSIS,' DIRECTED IMAGINING
AND HUMAN CAPABILITIES, N.Y. : Pergamon Press, in press, chapter 8) the authors
stress that surgical pain is primarily limited to outer tissues and that with a
local skin anesthetic along with low anxiety, positive expectations of minimal
pain, a>nd active imagining of insensitivity, surgical pain can be tolerated by
some individuals. These conditions are those used in hypnotic surgery and are
essentially the conditions of acupuncture surgery as well. The same authors
consider acupuncture surgery in more detail in Medfield Foundation Report #128:
"Acupuncture Analgesia: A Six~Factor Theory." These factors are "(a) the pa-
tients who are accepted for surgery with acupuncture strongly believe in its ef-
ficiency and are not fearful or anxious; (b) with few exceptions, narcotic anal-
gesics, local anesthetics, and sedatives were also used, singly or in combina-
tion, during surgery with acupuncture; . . . (c) the pain normally associated with
many surgical procedures is less than is generally assumed. .. (d) the patients are
typically exposed to special preparation and indoctrination for several days prior
to surgery, (e) the acupuncture needles distract the patients from the pain of
surgery, and (f) suggestions for pain relief are present in the acupuncture sit-
uation." They describe the Chinese Yin-Yang meridian theory and observe that
some Chinese surgeons disregard the traditional meridian locations and put the
needles anywhere. They find the neural gate theory equally unsatisfactory. This
theory fails because ( 1) the gate is a hypothetical entity having no observable
referent, (2) some of the acupuncture locations such as ear or head could not
close the spinal gate and would require postulation of still additional gates,
(3' It cannot account for failures, (4) it cannot account for the necessity of be-
lief la the efficacy of the needles, (5) it cannot account for the requirement of
localized anesthetics. By contrast, Ronald Melzack ("How Acupuncture Can Block
Pain," Impjacj; f ScJ.ence_ cm Soc_ietjs 1.973, 65-75) argues the traditionalist ap-
proach. He supports the gate theory as well as hypothesizing neural arrangements
that might give support to the Yin-Yang theory. He rejects hypnosis by assuming
the traditional trance notion and other discredited concepts about it. Ironical-
ly, he describes the importance of low anxiety and the probable role of suggestion
in a manner that approaches the account givenby Chaves and Barber. The view that
hypnosis is a mysterious and paranormal state rather than "DIRECTED IMAGINING" is
a tenacious one.

Among Bob Lundin's several books that incorporate an interbehavioral approach

is the new second edition of PERSONALITY: A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS, Macmillan Co.,

The author of the feature article in this issue is a graduate student at

State University of New York at Plattsburgh. In the next issue we will also car-
ry an article on motivation by a graduate student.
B. F. Skinner on Motivation: a Critique

Cynthia J. LaShier

B. F. Skinner never really said what he thought "drive" was. In 1938 he al-
lotted "drive" a whole chapter of heavy reading in experimental procedures and
charts, typical of The Behavior, o_f_ Orgaru.sms_. In 1953 the chapter heading "Drive"
did not appear. Rather, it had become "Deprivation and Satiation^" which was
much more appropriate to Skinner's operational approach in both The Behavior. f_
Organisms. (1938) and .ScjLencje and_ Hujnan jSehjrvlor (1953) . The earlier work is val-
uable as experimental report and as a basic statement of Skinner's position, the
latter as a readable digest of Skinnerfs system. In 1938 Skinner's concern was
statement and method; in 1953 it was interrelationship.

I3rive in 1938

Skinner's main purpose in 1938 was to demonstrate the usefulness of the re-
sponse as the "proper study of organism-kind" as the behaviorist saw it. From
the vantage point of the response-observer. Skinner began his discourse on the na-
ture of drive with the following inferential statement:

"The problem of drive arises because much of the behavior of an organism

shows an apparent variability, A rat does not always respond to food
placed before it, and a factor called its 'hunger* is invoked by way of
explanation. The rat is said to eat only when it is hungry. It is be-
cause eating is not inevitable that we are led to hypothesize an inter-
nal state to which we may assign the variability... As in any case of
variability in reflex strength, tha problem here is to find the variable
or variables of which the strength is a function and to express the re-
lationship in a set of laws." (1938, pp. 341-342.)

The inference is that response variability indicates the existence of some

cause of it. The use of the word "cause" was anathema to Skinner, but the best
he could do with "drive" at that time was to hypothesize an equivalent to an in-
tervening variable, which he preferred to call an "internal state." Although the
behaviorist strenuously objects (and Skinner not the least of them) to interven-
ing, immeasurable unobservables, Skinner did not seem at all uncomfortable with
"drive." The proof of its existence is, as he said, reflected in response var-
iability. In any case, "internal state" is a vague term for a behaviorist to be
using. His ultimate purpose was to include it, thereby legitimizing it, in a
set of behavioral laws.

Step one toward legitimization was the use of operational definition. Drive
level was a function of deprivation, expressed in number of hours. The drives
Skinner investigated were hunger and thirst; his subjects were rats. But he did
not call his studies investigations into "hunger drives" or "thirst drives" be-
cause he refused to speak of kinds of classifications of drives. All-important
were the effects of deprivations on the organisms*s response patterns; naming
the "drives" was not only irrelevant, but meaningless.

Skinner's "reflex strength" was close kin to Hull's "habit strength" in that
it was a result of conditioning, i.e., it is the learned component of performance.
The other component, also parallel to Hull's, was drive. In his two chapters on
drive in The Behavior. o_f Orga_nisms_, Skinner presents experimental evidence to sup-
port his multiplicative theory of performance, and comes to just about the same
conclusion as Hull. What he did was to observe the effect of different levels of
drive (deprivation hours) on instrumental learning, or operant behavior. The rat,
depending on how "hungry" (with apologies to Dr. Skinner) he was, was to press the
lever or perform some other task in order to receive a reward, or reinforcement.
The reinforcer was what, in ordinary operant conditioning, more or less assured that
learning would take place. Learning was measured in "reflex strength," assuming the
reinforcer really did increase the probabilityc a given response. To measure re-
flex strength or "learning," Skinner used the ingenious method of resistance to ex-
tinction. The more responses to "complete" extinction, the more the reflex strength.

It was probably Skinner's definition of "positive reinforcer" that helped lead

him to a rapid conclusion on the nature of drive. If the reader recalls, a "positive"
reinforcer is anything following a response which increases the probability of that
response's recurrence the next time the same or similar stimulus conditions are pres-
ent. If a positive reinforcer is really reinforcing, then it follows that a food-
deprived rat should show no significantly different level of reflex strength from
any other non-deprived rat, IF drive has no effect. It was no surprise to anyone
that Skinner found that, indeed, drive did have a tremendous effect on performance.
However, he also found that number of responses to extinction did not significantly
differ from deprived to non-deprived groups. He concluded, logically enough, that
drive had no effect on learning. Hull came to the same conclusions.

Drive j.n 1953,

By 1953 Skinner's attempt to pinpoint the nature of drive yielded both more pre-
cise and more vague phraseology. As was noted earlier, "drive" had now become "de-
privation and satiation," indicating his distaste for an all-inclusive concept. Of
"drive," he said, "The term is simply a convenient way of referring to the effects
of deprivation and satiation and of other operations which alter the probability of
behavior in more or less the same way." (1953, p. 144).

Further, drive was no longer a "state." It was "... a verbal device with which
we account for a sjtatei of strength, a nd it cannot answer experimental questions"
(1953, p. 144) femphasis mine]. It was now something (but not an entity) which helped
account for a "state," that state being learning. One gets the impression that Skin-
ner at this point had abandoned hopes of compromising drive and reinforcement and had
decided to concentrate wholly on reinforcement as essential to both learning and per-
formance. He seems to cling to drive as one answer to the response variability prob-
lem and, more specifically, as an answer to the behavior of individuals and their re-
sponses at any given time. In fact, he seems to have come around to the point Hull
did when Hull came upon his "oscillation" idea. It is an explanatory concept of the
last-ditch-effort type which is used in a mild state of conceptual desperation. In
any case. Skinner's frustration with the concept is obvious. He says, "No concept
can eliminate an actual diversity of data" (1953, p. 144), and he admits (see above)
that "it cannot answer experimental questions."

No, drive was neither physiological nor psychic state, nor was it a stimulus.
Nor could it be simply a state of strength. No, he said, "The prossibility remains
that the strength of the behavior is due to other kinds of variables not in thefield
of motivation." (1953, p.146). Drive is not the only source of behavioral variabil-

Having failed to solve the problem, Skinner resorts again to deprivation-as-

drive, which is inferred from "unexplained changes in probability." Unfortunately,
that which is inferred from these changes is also used to account for them. Such a
flaw in reasoning is an error of circularity and was not detected by Skinner, who
went on to address the question of categorization of drives in the following manner:
"Our question thus becomes: How many kinds of behavior vary in strength independent-
ly of each other?" (1953, p. 149)

Though lacking the formality of Clark Hull, Skinner approached the interaction
of learning and drive in a Hullian way--by using the reinforcing properties ofstimuli
which are drive-related. He would never have dared to call it drive-reduction or even
drive-stimulus reduction and avoided at all costs the mention of "goal." Other than
these omissions of what Skinner believed to be meaningless terminology, his theory is
very near Hull's and not so far from Tolman's. An example given in the text proceeds
as follows:

"The behavior of going to a restaurant is composed of a sequence of

responses, early members of which (for example, going along a certain
street) are reinforced by the appearance of discriminative stimuli which
cnntrol later responses (the appearance of the restaurant, which we then
enter) . The whole sequence is ultimately reinforced by food, and the
probability varies with food deprivation. We increase the chances that
sxneone will go to a restaurant, or even walk along a particular street,
by making him hungry." (1953, p. 150).

Skinner's emphasis here is on the probability of a given response, which leaves

us no alternative but to classify him under "Pure Behaviorists. " The influence of
Hull, however, is noticeable in Skinner's new inclusion of behavior-reinforcing
stimuli. And, though the implication of goal-direction is plain, in deference to
the "pure behaviorist" we shall not belabor the point. He concludes, as in 1938,
that "Behavior which has been strengthened by a conditioned reinforcer varies with
the deprivation appropriate to the primary reinforcer." (1953, p. 150)

Skinner launches into a discussion of "generalized reinforcers :" attention, ap-

proval, affection, and domination. He says these cannot be drives because they do
not show results of the appropriate operations of deprivation and satiation. Here
again we see the difference between the behaviorist and most motivation theorists.
Whereas the latter would describe attention and approval in terms of needs and secon-
dary drives attained by reinforcement, Skinner maintains that they themselves are re-
inforcers .

s Negative Rei_nforcemejit, and Punishment

Emotion: 1953

Skinner attacks the problem of "emotion" in much the same way as he did drive--
by looking for variables of which emotions are functions.

"We define an emotioninsofar as we wish to do so-*as a par-

ticular state of strength or weakness in one or more responses induced
by any one of a class of operations." (1953, p. 166)

"The behavior observed during an emotion is not to be con-

fused with the emotion as a hypothetical 'state'." (1953, p. 168)

As with drive, the proper subject matter inthe study of emotion is (1) the behav
ior and (2) the manipulable conditions for it. Also, as with drive, its "state" is
neither physiological nor psychic, nor is it a cause.
The relationship of emotion to drive is cousin-like. Behaviorally, an "extreme
deprivation probably acts as an emotional operation." (1953, p. 165)

Working with everyday words like "anger" and "sadness," Skinner discards them as
colloquial at best, but fails himself in his attempt to discover any really reliable
scientific definition of them. In this author's opinion, the fact that he worked with
them at all indicates that this is not the purely behavioristic Skinner of 1938.

Negative Rejjlforcement_; Avoida_ne

The confusion of negative reinforcement with punishment is well-documented. In

Skinner's negative reinforcement, withdrawal of the aversive stimulus increases the
probability of that response's recurrence under the same conditions.

Until 1953 Skinner managed to avoid any notion of drive-reduction. Even then,
he would have managed to avoid it altogether, were it not for his chapter on avoid-
ance learning. The following quotation suggests that, even enlisting the aid of con-
ditioned negative reinforcement, he just couldn't get around it any other way.

"in avoidance the conditioned and unconditioned aversive stimuli

are separated by an appreciable interval of time... A rapidly approaching
object rec_edes. painful contact. The sputter of the fuse rec_ed_es_ the ex-
plosion of the firecracker... When stimuli occur in this order, the first
stimulus becomes a conditioned negative reinforcer, and henceforth any ac-
tion which reduces it is strengthened through operant conditioning." (1953,
p. 176)

The key to the diminution of the conditioned stimulus is the diminution of

"anxiety," another concept Skinner has trouble putting his finger on. It is "... a
violent emotional reaction which is characteristic of all stimuli leading to avoid-
ance behavior." (1953, p. 178) Anxiety is an aversive emotion from which the or-
ganism attempts to escape and is, therefore, a necessary component of avoidance be-
havior. Without anxiety, the organism would probably not learn an avoidance prob-

The point to be stressed here is Skinner's involvement with immeasurable, unob-

servable concepts inferrable only by their effects on behavior. None of these is op-
erationally defined for any reliably accurate detection, nor are any characterized in
enough detail to differentiate among them. Skinner is an inductive theorist, but he
seems to be engaging in sloppy practice. Common to these aforementioned concepts is
their dependence on the "controlling environment" for stimulus cues by which the be-
haviors (the concepts) are supposedly characterized.


Punishment is described as "withdrawing a positive reinforcer or presenting a

negative." (1953, p. 185) The possible effects of punishment are three: (1) it
elicits responses incompatible with the punished behavior and suppresses it, (2) it
supplies its own aversive stimuli on later occasions, and thus interferes with the
punished behavioral act, and (3) most importantly, "If a given response is followed
by an aversive stimulus... any behavior which reduces this conditioned aversive stim-
ulation will be reinforced." (1953S p. 188, 189)

Note again the use of stimulus reduction as reinforcement. No mention is made

of drive; only of aversive stimuli. There is no goal stimulus involved, but there
are hints of persisting stimulus traces.
It is often mentioned that Skinner's position on punishment is similar to Thorn-
dike's in that punishment temporarily suppresses the response but does not permanent-
ly weaken it. This position has before and since received much experimental support.

Drive in 1966
In his Preface to the seventh printing of The Behavior^ of_ Pjrgjmisms_ in 1966 Skin-
ner acknowledged that his interpretation of "drive" as a third variable (first and
second are stimulus and response) was in error. Comparing his own usage of the con-
cept as a means of reference to environmental variables with Tolman's usage of it as
a full-fledged intervening, cognition-filled variable, Skinner criticized both Tol-
man's and Hull's preoccupation with internal states (see p. xi).

His "drive" of 1938, the reader will recall, consisted of carefully calculated
deprivation and satiation. By 1953, "drive" was an amorphous concept that often was
related to and included emotion, anxiety, and punishment. Consequently, the status
of "drive" as an operationally defined variable had become rather cloudy. Skinner
had, though, for many years stuck to his conclusion that some third variable must
necessarily be inferred whenever behavior (i.e., response) varied under externally
constant conditions. Now in 1966 Skinner admitted, of the concept "drive" that
"J. R. Kantor eventually convinced me of its dangers" (p. x). All mediating con-
cepts of S-R theories, he was to argue, suffer from such dangers, one of the most
lethal of which is that they can "serve no other function than to account for fail-
ure to relate the objective terminal events in a meaningful way" (p. xii). One might
state the problem more directly: mediating concepts are simply not operationally de-
finable either (1) in terms of stimulus and/or response or (2) in their own right.

At this juncture Skinner disassociated his Behavior of_ Oranlsins_ from the S-R
tradition, ostensibly because he believed stimulus, response, and reinforcer were
quite sufficient to "account for attending, remembering, learning, forgetting, gen-
eralizing, abstracting, and many other so-called cognitive processes" (p. xii). He
considers S + R + reinforcer inclusive of all relevant^ input and output, so that
"there is no need to appeal to an inner apparatus, whether mental, physiological,
or conceptual" (p. xii). Deprivation and satiation are relegated to a sort of peas-
antlike relationship of fealty to the "reinforcer" element of the basic triad.

Less ostensibly, but far more basically, Skinner pounds home what one is bound
to read between the lines of his Preface of 1966: "...Nor are mediating concepts
observable." For Skinner, input and output ought to be real data. Obviously, what
is unobservable cannot be real data.

What we see here is a full circular evolution of an interpretation of "drive," a

return to the old spawning ground. It was asif the old operational definition of 1938
had taken a swing at its perpetrator "to bring him back to his senses."

Perhaps the greatest difference between Skinner's attitude toward operationally

defined "drive" in 1938 and that in 1966 was that in 1938 Skinner intended to use sit-
uation-specific operational definitions of drive (i.e., degree of satiation arid hours
of deprivation) as a means to an end, that end being a scientific grasp of the real
roots of drive-in-general and a common meaning of the term, which might still permit
classification of types of drives. By 1966 Skinner had realized that there was to
be no common real root nor a drive-in-general and that his original approach in its
simplest form had been a correct one. The true sceintist was to define variables
concretely, specifically, and operationally. This is theon.ly_ way for the behaviorist
to approach accuracy in prediction, measurement, and experimental control. Once
again, Skinner had become the purist.
Skinner's position on reinforcements his methods, his operational definitions
have become litany to the contemporary behaviorist. Operational definitions provide
their own inherent methodology and are self-perpetuating. Their usefulness lies in
their purpose: meaningful observations and measurements. Skinner's system in 1938
was based on observation and measurement and his chapters on drive are methodologi-
cal and observational reports. Drive in 1938 was operationally defined as a func-
tion of deprivation. By 1953 Skinner seems to have beencaught up in the quest of
his contemporaries for the ultimate word on drive, emotion, avoidance, and punish-
ment. He was best prepared to handle drive, but his method and means of attack on
the other three problems (with the possible exception of punishment) were non-behavior-
istic, Thevariables of which such concepts were supposedly functions were vaguely
defined and observable only by inference and induction. Perhaps the "Behaviorist's
behaviorist" felt obligated to make a stab at these concepts, for the sake of Behav-
iorism, in answer to chiding from less "scientific" thinkers. If so, the challenge
was, in this author's humble opinion, poorly met.

The other, more plausible interpretation of Skinner's approach to motivational

theory is that he intended merely to represent the pervasiveness of the role of rein-
forcement and that ideas expressed in his motivation chapters are a means to that end.
Correspondingly, they were not to be taken as "'My Ultimate Word on Motivation1 by
B. F. Skinner." The Preface to the 1966 printing of The Behavior of_ Organisms seems
to confirm this. It is a reaffirmation of the original Skinnerian purpose: observa-
bility and predictability in the simplest, most elemental form possible. With that
reaffirmation and an alleged mending of his ways, Skinner abandoned further pursuit
of "drive" altogether, and returned to a behavioristic purism of observable, measur-
able, controllable stimulus, response and reinforcer.

Mediating variables are presumed by some to haw suffered, great losses in his wake.
*'Rescue"operations are in effect, however, under the supervision of those parties.


Skinner, B. F. The Beha_vio_r of_ Oj^gajilsms.: An Experimenta 1 Analysj.^. New York:

Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1938.

Skinner, B. F. The Behayi^or ojf Or_g_ajndsms_: A_n Experimental A_nj|J,_yjSJLs_, 7th printing.
New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. (Orig. 1938)

Skinner, B. F. S_cjjenc_e and Human Behavj.gir. New York: Macmillan, 1953.


Itfc widely held that a stimulus event, for example, a toucher vocalization or
some combination, is often treated as if it carries the same meaning regardless of
context. We maintain that this is not necessarily true, and that it is necessary to
study the contextual or situational setting as well as behavioral events themselves.
Thuss a stimulus event may change its meaning for both infant and caregiver, depend-
ing on the situation. A simple example may suffice. The infant cries--in one case it
has just been fed, in the other it is feeding time. The caregiver, through context-
ual cues, realizes that in the former case the infant is in need of a burp, while in
the latter the infant is hungry. The behavior of the infant is the same, but the
meaning of the behavior is quite different. Interestingly, comparable examples of a
caregiver's behavior are not as easily found. For example, a caregiver may pick up
an infant because she thinks the infant wants to be held, whereas another time the
caregiver picks up the infant because she wants to hold it. At issue then is the
meaning of behavior. One way this can be explored is to observe given behaviors in
given contextual situations. Parenthetically, it might be mentioned that context
may be very important for a developing organism. The infant may utilize behavior-
context situations to learn meaning.

^-Michael Lewis & Leonard A. Rosenblum: THE EFFECT OF THE INFANT ON ITS CAREGIVER,
Wiley, 1974, p. xxii.
Noel W. Smith, Editor F I E L D Preceding

Faculty of Socia! Sciences Segment

Setting Factors
Response i
Function j
i 1

:;-;;.: i M
investigator 1 ^j^ f

i *Object
i Stimulus
u.^, . , _
L Segment
Vo lume 5
Spring 1974

State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

The nub of the problem, I believe, lies in the following observation:

Psychologists and nonpsychologists invent and use motivational terms in the
same situations for the same purposes or reasons. They apply movational
terms to describe and ejcpj-^in the conduct of animals --human or otherwise.
Certain aspects or properties of behavior are called motivational in contrast
to others which are grouped and labeled by other words. The psychologist
(and the nonpsychologists too) tries to formulate the uniform and essen-
tial characteristics or properties of motivational phenomena. He attempts
to discover their mode of operation and their causal history and consequen-
ces. He especially tries to relate motivational phenomena and what he knows
of them to nonmotivational phenomena so that he can reach his objective of
explaining and predicting the conduct of organisms. In order to do this
properly he should be able to distinguish between motivational and nonmoti-
vational phenomena explicitly. So far, he has not been able to do this.

R. A. Littman in liebjrask
Symposium on Motivation, J[9J:>8_

The Agora

The following back issues of the dentiality of Social Science Re-

Newsletter are still available and search Sources and Data." This
will be sent gratis upon request: study developed as a result of
Vol. 1, Nr. 1, 2, 3, 4; Vol. 2, Nr. the imprisonment of Prof. Pop-
4; Vol. 3, Nr. 2, 4; Vol. 4, Nr. 2. kins ofHarvard for his refusal
to answer questions regarding
the publication of the Pentagon
papers. He had obtained infor-
The Newsletter has received a re- mation from confidential sources
quest to publish "Request for in- during his research on Vietnam and
formation: A Study of the Confi- refused to answer on the grounds

Data investigative Contact Scientific Construction


of the First Amendent and the failure of the government to show that his infor-
mation was relevant and necessary to the government investigation. To quote
from John Carroll's "Confidentiality of Social Science Research Courses and
Data: The Popkins Case," Political Science, 1973,6(3): "In the past scholars
believed that they were able to assure sources of anonymity because the release
of any information gained was deemed to be solely within the scholar's discre-
tion. Recently, however, with increasing number,, prosecutors, congressional
committees and grand juries have become interested in the sources of scholarly
research. As in the instant case these bodies have asserted the right to in-
quire completely into a scholar's sources of information. Notes have been sub-
poenaed and scholars questioned as to their research. As a result, scholars
carrying out their research are no longer secure in the belief that research
material provided them in confidence will be free from pressure of court-ordered
d i s c l o s u r e at a future point and as such are impaired in the collection of re-
search data. The problem has been aggravated by the widespread publicity given
to the instant case. Until limits of public inquiry are authoritatively settled
by this Court, scholars cannot be certain of what protection, if any, they can
assure their sources, and sources cannot predict the possible repercussions of
cooperation in furnishing information. The resulting uncertainty impinges up-
on normal scholarly inquiry and inhibits research into many social and behav-
ioral problems most in need of immediate research and enlightenment...Amici
support the position that before requiring a scholar to testify or furnish
documents, a court should balance the interest of the inquiring agency again-
st the First Amendment rights of the scholar." While psychologists are not
often involved in gathering data of a political nature, they often do solicit
information of a personal nature where the respondent is assured of anonymity.
Popkins has received support from a wide variety of professional organizations.
The Carroll article is recommended for a detailed account of the case and its
implications for research.


The feature article is by Steven Johnson and was written when he was working on
a Master of Arts in experimental psychology. He has now completed the degree
and is looking for a Ph.D. program.
The Springs of Action: A Fountain of Youth?

Steven L. Johnson

The approaches to the area of psychology called motivation are as diverse

as are the behaviors psychologists choose to study. Motivation has run the gamut
from learned drives to instinct to setting conditions to physiological needs and
has come out as a tattered, but still lively topic in psychology. Littman (1958)
proposes motivation as the category under which are subsumed the actives of psy-
chology. By this Littman means anything which does something to some other thing.
The definition of "actives" contrasts with "passives" in that passives are those
things which have something done to them. He, and Madsen (1968, p. 46) also, sug-
gest that motivation is categorized by those things and events which activate, di-
rect, and make persistent the behavior of an organism. Undoubtedly these 'Hefini-
tionsslof motivation include disparate topics in psychology and are not specific
enough or limited enough to easily distinguish motivated and non-motivated behav-
ior. However, more specific types of motivators (drives, incentives, physiological
needs, etc.) lack the generality to encompass the whole of what is meant by motiva-
tion. : .

Perhaps the problem of defining motivation is capsulized in the principle of

Gestalt Psychology--the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Perhaps, on the
other hand, motivation is a vapid area which has no real parts to be summed. The
latter statement seems to paraphrase Littman's (1958) conclusions about motivation.
He explicitly states that there is " hope for a master schema that will encom-
pass all motivational phenomena."

What is the goal of motivational psychology? Surely, it must be the same as

the goal of all psychology (and generally all science) to explain and predict be-
havior. This is essentially answering the question: how does behavior occur? It
is a description of the events which cause another event to occur. Once a complete
system of the interrelations of types of events which invariably precede or are pre-
ceded by other events can be constructed one is able to account, for any action which
occurs and to predict the subsequent events. The goal of science is then leached.

To ask for the reason for an action one either wants the mechanism of action
(how something works) or what initiates the action, (why it works). At low levels of
understanding the answer to why (what initiates) is often meaningless since to name
an initiator is of little aid in comprehending an activity unless the events which
are being started are understood. To say a man engages in friendly behavior due to
some force (need, drive, instinct) means little unless one understands the particu-
lar relationship of the events prior to a display of friendliness and the actions
during the display. If the interrelations are understood, speaking of the "force"
which initiates the behavior (the set of prior and current conditions) has meaning
as a summary of a set of generally correlated behaviors. It a s s u m e s the begin-
ning of an episode (activation) and t h a t the episode will continue in a certain
manner (direction) until the force is removed (persistence).

Motivation theorists are often attempting to use a descriptive term (a moti-

vating force) to describe the initiating conditions of a certain class of behaviors.
The question of the usefulness of the concept of motivation becomes relative to
the degree of understanding of the behaviors which are being initiated. To say

that a person eats due to hunger motivation simply means that hunger (deprivation
of food for a period of time) is correlated with eating. Nothing more is added to
an understanding of eating behavior than is added to an understanding of electric-
ical incandescence by the correlation of a switch position and a light bulb light-

The diversity of activities, behaviors and experimental methodologies sub-

sumed under the term motivation may well be due to an attempt of psychologists to
study both the "how" (the isolation of objective correlates of behavior) and the
"why" (the classification of groups of major correlates of behavior) questions con-
cerning the behavior of organisms simultaneously. It seems that many of the the-
ories of motivation discussed in psychology are concerned with trying to locate
the springs of action of behavior before the behaviors themselves are understood.
That is, psychologists tend at times to postulate motivating forces rather than
understanding the behaviors themselves.

He hedonistic theory of P. T. Young (1959) is a motivation theory which pos-

tulates principles of action which ultimately jjjojjld^ allow one to explain almost
any series of behaviors. Young's theory assumes the existence of affective pro-
cesses of positive and negative sign. Organisms try to maximize positive and min-
imize negative affects. This is, in Young's system, the guiding force or princi-
ple at the core of all behavior.

Young has presented empirical evidence for his hedonic theory through the
use of preference tests for various concentrations of sugar solutions (Young and
Shuford, 1954). It was found that well-fed and watered rats would run faster for
higher concentrations of sugar solution than for weaker solutions. If the ani- '
mals were presented with another concentration of sugar solution after training
with one concentration, their running speed, varied dir ectly with the change in
concentration. Because the animals were not in obvious need of nutrient or liq-
uid. Young discounts drive reduction or need reduction as the mechanism of this
change in performance. Rather, he believes the simplest accounting of the rats1
behavior is that contact with the sugar solution aroused a positive affective
process in the animals. This seems to account for the correlation of concentra-
tion of sugar solution and running speed.

Young s trengthens his case for hedonic process by reference to the work of
Olds (1955) on the effect of stimulation of areas of the brain and bar pressing
in rats. Si these studies rats were able, by pressing a bar, to deliver a pulse
of electric current to a certain area of their brains. The rate of bar pressing
varied with the area of stimulation. Stimulation of some areas produced in-
creased bar pressing, while other areas produced a reduction in the rate to zero.
Although Olds accounts for this relationship between an operant response and elec-
trical brain stimulation by reference to the reinforcing properties of the stimu-
lation, Young believes the stimulation produces a positive (negative) affective
process which sustains (inhibits) the patterns of behavior which are instrumental
in arousing the affective process.

What difference can there be between reinforcing and arousing affective pro-
cesses in this situation? The objective situation is the same, but two different
terms are being used as explanation. The difference seems to be the amount of
surplus meaning carried by the two concepts. Young opts for affective processes
which are physiological in nature and have behavioral correlates: "Whether or not

Dr. Olds has placed his finger upon the physiological basis of affectivity remains
to be seen. Apart from this, however, some physiological basis must be assumed to
account for the facts. Affective processes exist objectively within the tissues
of organisms" (Young, 1959). Olds, on the other hand, prefers tosay the electrical
stimuation is reinforcing. That electrical brain stimulation in certain areas of
the brain will increase the probability of an instrumental response occurring. This
statement does not imply that activity in a certain region of the brain is the na-
ture of reinforcement, but only that induced activity in a certain area acts as a
reinforcing stimulus. It seems the motivation theorist Young is more willing to
physiologize than the physiological psychologist Olds. Young's tendency to reduce
psychological functioning to biological process is an attempt to find out "how"
hedonic processes work whenall that is known is that an event (positive affect,
reinforcing stimulus, satisfying state of affairs), when paired with a behavior,
tends to increase the probability of the behavior occurring again. To postulate
as Young has done is like postulatingflatthe turning of a light switch in a certain
position causes vaporous excitations to be activated in the body of a light bulb
causing the bulb to become incandescent. The statement is mechanically incorrect,
but it does express the correlation of switch position and incandescence. So, an-
alogously, Young's hedonic process may express the correlation of certain events
and behaviors, but it may do so at the expense of adding misleading surplus mean-
ing to an analysis of the total situation. It: would s,eem more appropriate to state
the correlation directly, so that the relative importance of the various components
of the situation might be more clearly seen, without a fog of hypothetical motiva-
tors .

David McClelland also proposes a modern form of hedonism as the force behind
human behavior. His theory is based on the definition of a motive as "a strong
affective association, characterized by an anticipatory goal reaction and based
on past association of certain cues with pleasure.or pain" (McClelland, 1955,
p. 226). What McClelland seems to be saying is that every motive is a product of
the associations of present cues and the probability of a change in affective
state. When an organism is in a certain affective state, and the stimulus cues in
his environment indicate that an imminent change in affective state will occur,
the organism will thei instrument behavior to either maintain the affective state,
if it is pleasureable, or change the affective state, if It. is painful. (It is
interesting to rote that, in his definition, McClelland has strung together four
concepts inferred from behavior. Thus, the definition, of motivation,, itself an
intervening variable, is based on four other intervening variables, all of which
are presumably based on the same objective response, of the organism as an indica-
tion of their operation.)

McClelland states; "The presence of a motive may be inferred either (a) in-
directly based on knowledge of past cue-affective arousal associations or (b) di-
rectly based on imaginal goal states. Our inferences under condition (a) may be
based on our direct knowledge of the particular individual we are studying (as
when we infer that the rat has acquired a hunger motive based on the associations
during habituation of being handled by the experimenter and being fed) or by the
extrapolation from the experience of other individuals (as when we infer that this
individual has a high ri Achievement in other members of his group)." And, "...
the simplest measure we can obtain of the strength of the achievement motive in a
human individual is to observe the frequency with which he thinks about achievement
as measured through Imaginative productions" (McClelland, 1953, p. 232). Undoubt-
edly, these activities measure some reatlonship(s) between individuals and their en-
vironment, but the question was to whether it is motives which can be inferred is

dubious. Given a certain type response to several TAT cards (an instance of Mc
Clelland's simplest and most pure measure of motivation) and certain behaviors of
an individual )for example, his behavior t^nds towards competitive activities with
an. obvious standard of excellence) which are correlated with that certain type of
imaginal response, one would assume, from McClelland!s definitions, that the in-
dividual ha_s_ a high _n Achievement. According to definition this would be a valid
inference. But, might it not be just as valid, if not more exact, to say that the
individual's response to selected TAT cards reflects the general class of behaviors
in which he participates. McClelland assumes the imaginal response to the TAT
cards reflects certain affective states which are integral to the maintenance of
his behavior. It could be equally possible that a certain type of persistent be-
havior could result in TAT responses of a particular sort, without any particular
affective state directly correlated with the behavior.

Research has been completed which correlates child rearing practices and the
TAT responses from which n Achievement is inferred (McClelland, 1955). McClelland
has concluded that this correlation indicates that the child rearing models develop
n. Achievement motive in the children which leads them to respond in a certain way
on the TAT, and to tend to engage in a particular set of occupational activities
(business). It is entirely possible that these child rearing practices produce in-
dividuals who tend to engage in a particular class of behaviors which in turn tend
to produce a certain type of TAT response. Thus, the TAT response may be reflect-
ing the types of behavior in which a person will engage. But, what information is
gained from the assumption that the child rearing practices lead to the development
of a motive scheme which in turn produces a type of behavior pattern and a certain
TAT response? More efficiency could be obtained, it seems to me, if the observable
primary correlations were probed to find what other factors (or the specific factor"
which) influence behavior in addition to the child rearing practices noted by Me- l
Clelland. By postulating a motive which directs and activates behavior, rather than
assuming an active organism whose behavior is directed by past experience, a search
for the hypothetical entity of motives is begun which would seem to reduce the ef-
fectiveness of searching for the critical events, and combinations of events which
influence behavior. To say that a "rat has acquired a hunger motive based on the
associations during habituation of being handled by the experimenter and being fed"
(McClelland, 1955, p. 232) seems to be a complex and overly suggestive way of saying
that a rat tends to run faster to food, or eat faster if a certain stereotypical
behavior occurs just prior to feeding than if the events just prior to feeding are
not correlated with the receipt of food.

In summary, it might be said that although the review of these two hedonistic
theories is brief, the criticisms of Young and McClelland are general to most of
the statements which they make regarding their respective theories of motivation.
The essential nature of their propositions, I think, is expressed. Both of these
individuals have contributed significantly to the body of fact in psychology. How-
ever, the headings under which they classify their research and the inferences they
draw seem to be outside the bounds of a truly behavioral science. Their reliance
on hedonism as a source of action does not seem to be necessary to the advancement
of psychology. In fact, it may hinder the advancement of the science in that, by
postulating hedonistic motives, subsequent researchers may begin to reify the con-
cept of motivation and the search for the entity of motives may begin. As I stated
earlier, the hypothesis of a motive roe_ss_ may be useful jLf the use of a motiva-
tional term capsulizes some more microscopic analysis of behavior. As the research
of McClelland and Young stands, at this point, the use of motivational concepts do (
not infer anything more about behavior than does an objective statement of the be-
haviors which occur.
Littman (1958) concisely states this conclusion: "So, the final moral is that
psychologists should do as they have been doing-~determine what the properties are
of the things they want to study and ascertain what their laws of interaction are.
That they also feel constrained to call what they study "motivational" should not
be construed as saying very much, if anything, else about it."


Littman, R. A. Motives, history and causes. In M. R. Jones (Ed.), Nebraska Sym-

jn._jira^ University of Nebraska Press, 1958.

McClelland, D. C. .Th^_acjd.eyenient_Ti mo tiye. . Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953.

McClelland, D. C. S-tudj.es_jyLJig-tiya_tj.on. . Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955.

Madsen, K. B. Theories of motivation: a comparative study of modern theories of

mojtivatlon, 4th ed . Kent Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1968.

Olds, J. Physiological mechanisms of reward. In M. R. Jones (ed.), Nebraska sym-

:m_ji|0^ 1955. University of Nebraska Press, 1955.

Young, P. T. The role of affective processes in learning and motivation. Psycho-

logical Review. 1959, 66, 104-125.

Young, P. T. & E. H. Shuford. Intensity, duration and repetition of hedonic pro-

cesses as related to acquisition of motives. Journal of Comparative and Phy-
> 298-305.

"<,,<,we do not find in the literature any clear-cut distinction of a motivated

from a nonmotivated event."
J 9 R Kantors Toward & scientific analysis
of motivation. EsychoJ^gicjal^jiecordf 1942,
5, 225-275,

The Russell Sage Foundation is funding a study of events and problems

concerning the confidentiality of social science research sources and
data. The study will analyze such issues as the confidentiality of sur-
vey research data, and the obligation of a scholar to reveal his or her
research sources to other scholars,

The study is sponsored by the American Sociological Association, the

American Political Science Association, the American Anthropological
Association9 the American Psychological Association, and the American
Historical Association. (The Association of American Law Schools, the
Association of American Geographers, the American Economic Association,
and the American Statistical Association are considering sponsorship).

The study will begin in February, 1974, and end in December, 1975,

Individuals and organizations are invited to send to the director of the

study a statement of (1) any events of which they have knowledge that
have raised questions concerning the confidentiality of social science
research sources and data, and (2) any problems they have encountered
that have involved questions concerning the confidentiality of social
science research sources and data. The statement should specify the
time and the place and the individuals and the organizations and the
circumstances involved in the events and problems. Information provided
in response to this request will be treated as confidential unless the
individual providing the information consents to its release,,

The statements will be used by the director and project board to select
events and problems for further analysis.

Statements should be sent to the principal investigator,

James D. Carroll, Director

Public Administration Programs
200 Maxwell Hall
Syracuse University
Syracuse, New York 13210
Telephone: 315 423-2687

February 11, 1974

Noel W. Smith, Editor F I E L D

Faculty of Social Sciences


Volume 5
Number 3
PSYCHOLOGY Summer 1974

State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

..when the fingers are crosseds the one object [placed between them] is felt
fy'the touch] as two; but yet we deny that it is two; for sight is more author-
itative than touch,, Yet, if touch stood alone, we should actually have pro-
nounced the one object to be two. The ground of such false judgements is that
any appearances whatever present themselves, not only when its object stimula-
tes a sense, but also when the sense by itself alone is stimulated, provided
only it be stimulated in the same manner as it is by the object. For example,
to persons sailing past, the land seems to move when it is really the eye that
is being moved by something else [the moving ship]. From this it is manifest
that the stimulatory movements based upon sensory impressions, whether the lat-
ter are derived from external objects or from causes within the body, present
themselves not only when persons are awake, but also than, when this affection
which is called sleep has come upon them, with even greater impressiveness.
Aristotle: "On Dreams"


The long teaching career of Dr. Kantor parison of some theoretical proposals of
has its continuance yet today 15 years J. R. Kantor and T. C. Schnierla") both
after his retirement. In June Donna in the Spring issue of the Psvchological
Cone spent a period .of time with him Record.
working on papers and gaining a more
extensive understanding of interbehav- ##*
iorism. The enduring influence of Dr.
Kantor is indicated by the second gen- Jim has obtained a position at Mohawk Val-
eration of students who find great in- ley Community College in Utica, New York,
spiration and remarkable freshness in while completing his dissertation for a
his work. Examples can be seen in the doctorate in anthropology at the State Un-
publication of Jim Herrick ("Kantor's an- iversity in Albany. Wayne is in need of
ticipation of current approaches in an- a job in September and would appreciate
thropology") and of Wayne Lazar ("A com- any leads.

Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

Harry Mahan seems to be an inexhaustible source of inexpensive innovative teach-
ing materials of interest to interbehaviorists0 For a course in neuropsychology
he has ten tape study cassettes that include his own unpublished case materialsj
an illustrated study guide, and a textbookall for $10. He also has shortcut
procedures for the electronic calculator that he will send gratis. Write him at
the Department of Psychologyf Palomar Gollege? San Marcosf California 92060,,

The editor returned from 30 days in Greece and found greeting him in his mailbox
the summer issue of the Psychological Record with his article "The ancient back-
ground to Greek Psychology and some implications for today," Off prints are be-
ing distributed with this Newsletter* While in Athens he visited the namesake
of this column wherein are the ruins of the Stoa of Zeus where Socrates was tried
and the Stoa Poikile or Painted Stoa where Zeno began Stoicism and where other
philosophers as well liked to gather for discussions * The Painted Stoa had a
southern, exposure that made it especially attractive in the winter months. It
was in the Agora and in the vicinity of the Temple of Zeus on the other side of
Acropolis that Socrates conducted many of his discourses* A house that he
visited has also been identified. The several legendary locations said to be
his place of imprisonment during which the famous dialogue portrayed in the
Phaedo occurs vary from a cave on the side of the Acropolis to some cavities on
the nearby Hill of the Muses , They all seem to be apocryphal. The location of
Plato's Academy and Aristotle's Lyceum seem to be unknown to modern Athenians}
but research subsequent to returning indicates that they are buried under modern
city streets and buildings west of the Kerameikos (potter's quarters and entrance
to the ancient city). A number of color slides taken on the trip of Minoant My-
ceans and various stages up to Classical remains will be used in the fall to il
lustrate a bit of the first portion of a course in the history of psychology.
Outstanding in this respect are the various measures used in the Parthenon to off-
set perceptual illustions. These are incredible from the point of view of both
psychology and engineering.

Readers may be interested in the article by Endel Tulving? "Cue-Dependent For-

getting" in the January-February 1974 MSSLSJffi; iiii.' Through use of differ-
ent terminology he emphasizes the nature and function of stimulus objects in for-
getting as opposed to strictly internal determiners and even hints at a concept
of substitute stimulation. A book that may elude the notice of psychologists in-
terested in learning and intelligence is THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF LEARNING AND THINK-
Glickf and Donald Sharp published by Basic Books in 19 6l. The authors' view
"denies the existence of a general deficitf denies the existence of a social pa-
thology (in the sense intended by psychologists and educators) and relies on ob-
servational and linguistic evidence to claim that the poor ^rforinance, of minor-
ity groups on psychological tests is the result of various situational factors"
(p 223)e They conclude that "cultural differences in cognition reside more in
the situations to which particular cognitive processes are applied than in the
existence of a process in one cultural group and its absence in another" (p233)

A number of reprints are available from the Psychological Record at nominal cost.
Because they may be of interest to readers either for personal use or class adop
tion, the current list is being reproduced in this issue. Write The Psychologi-
cal Record,, Denison University? Granvilles Ohio 43023,* The feature article is
one given by David Miller at the 1973 Cheiron Society meeting. He is Professor
of Philosophy at the University of Texas and gave the paper on George Herbert
Maad at the symposium on "Contextual Interactionists,," The paper on Mead is
available among the reprints listed* In the present paperf the term "nrlnd" is
used centrally* It is a difficult term to use without construing it as an en-
tity or allowing it to revert to a role in historical dualism. The reader may wish
to see how it fares in this work*

Offered @ $100 each. Ten or more (assorted) @ k? discount. No handling charge

if prepaid.,
Contextual Interactionistss A symposium. (A group of 5 papers authored by Clar-
ence Shute, David Miller, Rollo Handy, Paul Fuller, Parker Lichtenstein)
Bijou, Sidney W e : 1. Theory & Research in Mental (Developmental) Retardation
2. Methodology for Experimental Studies of Young Children in
natural settings.
Chunf Ki Taek & Sarbin, T. R.: Methodological Artifacts in Subception Research

Ferster, C 9 B e s An Experimental Analysis of Clinical Phenomena.

Feister, C. B 8 ? & S. Culbertson, A Psychology Learning Center.
Greenspoon, Joel & Simkin, L. : A Measurement Approach to Psychotherapy .
Guertin, W* H. et al: Research with the Wechsler Intelligence Scales for
Adults? 1965-1970,
Homme, Lloyd et al: What Behavioral Engineering Is
Kantor, J e R* 1. Behaviorism in the Histdry of Psychology
2* Feelings & Emotions as Scientific Events
3 Newton's Influence on the Development of Psychology
k* Scientific Psychology & Specious Philosophy
5. Segregation in Science: A Historico-Cultural Analysis
6. System Structure & Scientific Psychology
Kellogg, W. N e s Chimpanzees in Experimental Homes.
Kuo? Zing-Yang & Yut-hang, Lam? Chinese Religious Behavior & the Deification
of Mao Tse-tung.
Lichtenstein, P a E 8 2 1. Pschological Systems: Their Nature & Function
2 A Behvioral Approach to "Phoenomenological Data"
3. Genius as Productive Neurosis
Morris, Charles & KLmbrell, G. McA.s Performance & Attitudinal Effects of the
Keller Method in an Introductory Psychology Course
Ratner, Stanley C 6 s Comparative Psychology: Some Distinctions from Animal Be-
Rice f Charles E e : Perceptual Enhancement in the Early BlincU
Schoefeld, W. N. , Note on a bit of Psychological Nonsenses Race Differences in
Smith, Noel ,,? Interbehavioral Psychology? Roots and Branches
Stephensonf Williams Applications of Communication Theory? (3 separate papers)
1. Substructure of Science
2. Interpretations of Keats' - -
3. Intelligence & Multivalued Choice
Weiners Harold? Human Behavioral Persistence

S -R
David L. Miller
University of Texas, Atistin

In connection with,this subject I want to refer at least obliquely to the

philosophy of George Herbert Mead. But first let me point out that in the Wes-
tern world, especially from the time of the Renaissance to the present, much
progress has been made toward recognizing and openly acknowledging the value of
the individualf the person. This theory is exhibited in especially our political
theory and in scientific method, or in democracies and in the experimental sci-
ences. Often we speak of such things as civil liberties, individual rights, free-
domf self-actualization, self-determination, ingenuity, new hypotheses, creativ-
ity, and individualism* All of these are based on the implicit or explicit as
sumption that a new baby has been born in the West, that at last the individual,
the person, subject or self, has been severed from the umbilical cord of the tribe
and from restraining static customs or stagnant institutions.
In fact, that baby, prized so dearly, is the basis for modern science and
for what we call self-actualization or self-development. And I am suggesting
that paradoxically several of our so-called social scientists have emptied the
baby with the bath water.
To be more explicit, I am pointing out what everyone knows| namely, that
some social scientists, including especially some psychologists, anthropolo-
gists, and sociologists, in their zeal for being scientific and objective, have
adopted categories and conceptual explanatory terms that belong properly to phy-
sics, chemistry or biology exclusively, but these concepts by themselves are in-
adequate in explaining the subject matter of the humanities. But rather than un-
derstand and admit this inadequacy, many would rather deny that social scien-
tists have a subject matter of their own* , That subject matter is human beings
with individual minds and selves, something, I believe, that is irreducibly and
qualitatively different from the objects of physics, say.
Here your first reaction may be that I am suggesting that this new baby,
this new self that emerged first in the West, is a sort of supernatural, mythi-
cal or mystical entity, and that we should try to understand it from a mediaeval,
pre-Renaissance point of view, or that we cannot treat it scientifically. Not
at all. It both belongs to the natural order and it is humane. My complaint,
rather, is that some of us have assumed, probably unwittingly, that if anything
is natural, it is the same kind of thing that is treated by the physical scien-
tists, and, of course, such a treatment empties the baby with the bath.
Can we be scientific and also humane in the sense that we can offer a sci-
entific understanding of a kind of process in nature? I mean the symbolic pro-
cess, nind, or the self. My answer is yes. And despite my lamenting, I am most
encouraged to find that some know what this involves and are working strenuously
toward that end.
I have studied several of the important works of the honorable Professor
Kantorf and I quote most approvingly only a few of the relevant passages by him,,

In I^ertehavlor^l Ps^clral^^ Professor Kantor sayss

"Psychological events are adjustments of organisms to environing things"
p. 86, '

Alsos " , , [A]ny factor dissected out for research purposes must always be
handled with direct reference to the entire unit from which it was taken" Ibid*
Againf "We must place ourselves on an interbehavioral foundation" Ibid 25 *
Once more, "...mind is not a substance or quality,, but action - - the ways
in which an individual adapts himself to the things and conditions in his milieu
now psychological action is interaction" (The Evolution of Mind," P^22teM&Si
Rgvlews 1935, vol. 52, 455-465.)
Finally, "The specifically psychological activities are intimately connec-
ted with what, for want of a better term, we call social phenomena - - those es-
sentially human features of an organism' s surroundings" Ibid.,, f p* 464
Nor should we forget the laudable work done by Professor Noel Smith, I
quote from his work only one passage relevant to the purpose at hand* He writes s
"Interbehaviorism starts with events, and holds that all events occur in a field
of other events, never in isolation." (interbehavioral Psychology, Roots and
Branches/ a paper, 1972, p. 3 [Psychological Record, 1973, 23, 153-16? --.ed.])
Professor Kantor and his students are committed to the thesis that there
are minds, selves, persons, but they exist only- in connection with biological
organisms and environment* They agree also that although minds operate in a
field, and that mind involves action and interaction, still we cannot assimilate
the individual mind, the self, or the person to those social and environmental
conditions in which it operates.
This is quite a contrast to B. F. Skinner's view. He sayss "I am a radi-
cal behaviorist in the sense that I find no place for the formulation of any-
thing which is mental" (Behaviorism and Phgnomen^.g^;f ed by T. W. Mann. Uni-
versity o f Chicago ~
In his writings, Noel Smith has illuminated a point that seems almost ob-
vious, but its implications are profoundand very extensive* He shows that one
cannot define or even conceive clearly of the meaning of "response" apart from
stimulus, organism and environment. He is not claiming that a response as re~
sponse ij> a stimulus or a part of the biological organism |>er _se or a part of
the environment of the organism* Rather, he is saying that a response is a
phase of an act of adjustment, a phase that must be explained in terms of other
phases and conditions, but it cannot be assimilated to them. This view is at
the very basis of what has been called inter actionism, organicism, or, in gen~
eral, process philosophy*
Skinner is not an organicist. He is an atomist in the sense that he believes
that the phases of behavior are in reality parts that can exist in isolation. No
wonder he cannot get these analytic, atomic? parts together into an organic whole
Ho miatokoo abstractions for concrete reality. Hume saw clearly that if one starts
with atomic, analytic parts as real, no connection, necessary or otherwise, can
be found between them* But even Skinner has never touched a habit, he has never (
smelt one, nor has he ever seen one.
Now if we should go to the opposite extreme from Skinner we would find an
almost perfect exemplification of it in the attitude of Robert M. Hutchins of
1930, then president of the University of Chicago. Partially under the influ-
ence of J. Mortimer Adlers Hutchins believed that the sciences could not offer
an understanding of man, of the self, of the person He recommended that we re-
turn to a pre-seientific Mediaeval approach for that understandingf and apparent
ly he thought of the self as some kind of mythical entity* One of Mr. Hutchins'
most unfortunate limitations consisted in his inability to see that under his very
eyes and within his own university there was a manf George Herbert Mead, who was
offering a naturalistic account of the self, an account that took into considera-
tion the scientific method and all of the latest findings of biology? neurology,
psychology, anthropologyf and the physical sciences.
All I want to say here is that Mead conceived of mind and the self as a pro-
cess, but a process that is a phase of a more inclusive processf which is the so-
cial process of adjustment*
The organism has experiences before it has awareness. Awareness grows out
of experience and awareness is essential to the existence of both minds and sel-
Mind is a case in which one can respond to stimuli in their absence orf it
is a case in which one can by use of language gesturesf indicate to himself and
to another both the character of the stimulus and the form of the response made
to it in its absence. That is, the minded organism canf on the basis of prior
experiencef anticipate or predict, and consequently, it can select in advance,
or in the absence of stimuli, the kind of stimulus to which it will later re-
Mind emerges out of a social process; it is in nature, and nature is not
in mind.
If we are to evade Cartesian dualism (which precludes a functional relation-
ship between mind and body) or if we are to evade parallelism, which is a species
of dualism, without resorting to mysticism, then we must conceive of mind as a na-
tural emergent, as a phase of the social process.
Mind must be conceived of as a culmination of that evolutionary process
which is found throughout the universe.
Our problem is to explain precisely how mind arises out of an earlier pro-
cess in which there was no mind and how, consequently, mind is a phase of, or
interrelated with, other natural phases including other men? biological organ-
isms, and an environment. When this is done, then we will be on the road to giv-
ing a scientific account of the nature of individualism, freedom, blame and re-
sponsibility. We will be in a position to justify or offer reasons why it is
possible for each of us to enter into the process of changing our social insti-
tutions and in taking the initiative in determining our own future both at the
personal and social level* This is the task of the social scientists* If they
succeed, they will have cleansed that baby that was born in the West so that it
canf under the influence of science, be nurtured to adulthood* They can do so
only if they accept organicism, interbehaviorism and process philosophy as a foun-
dation Through this approach they can be both scientific and humane and they
will not empty the baby with the bath*
Noel W. Smith, Editor F 1 E L D Preceding

Faculty of Social Sciences Sugrnont

Sottmj; Factors

I 1
! 0&
1*1 i
invpstigatoi c
1 1

SUmuU ^ Object 1 o
! a

Fviict or
Media |
- fcJ

Yolyme 5
Number 4-

State University College of Arts and Science, Plattsburgh, New York

...the psychological investigative vent constitutes the interbehavior of

the investigator with a behavior segment or psychological event......Just as
the investigator is conditioned by the interbehavipral history of the org-
anism and object, so the investigator is influenced by his antecedent intel-
lectual background,
J. R. Kantor
A Toast
The soul may be a mere pretense,
the mind makes very little sense
So let us value the appeal
Of that which we can taste and feel.
Pie't Hein (Grooks)

With this final issue of the Newsletter for The Newsletter started out with about 40
197A we complete five years of publication. subscribers, at one time hit H5 then
As a commemoration we are reprinting the settled down to about 100. The number
quotation and quatrain from the first issue, of institutional subscribers, especially
the former being the basis for the design. libaries, has been gradually increasing.
We improved the design in the second year
and mad minor improvements in the fourth. The Newsletter represents one of the projects
Beginning in the third year we changed from recommended at the Summer Conference of
a quinterly to a quarterly. Articles or Interbehavioral Psychology held at Miner
other features hav been included regular- Institute, June 16-21, 1969. Another
ly and perhaps we should rename the pub- recommendation, that of some collaborative
lication, inasmuch as it has been some- book publishing, is now receiving some
what more than a news medium. A tentative attention. Efforts are underway to develop
possibility is "Quarterly" to replace a book of original papers on selected
Newsletter". Suggestions would be welcome. topics, tentatively entitled INTERBEHAVIORAL

Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

solutions. If anyone who has not been contacted feels he or she would like
to offer a paper or to explore the possibilities, please contact this editor.
There are several areas in which we have no writers and others that could
use additional development.

In 1933, J. R. Kantor published his basic textbook SURVEY OP THE SCIENCE OF

PSYCHOLOGY. This has been an excellent source of his concepts in a very
readable form covering a broad array of topics. It has now been revised
and brought up to date and will appear in 1975 under the title THE SCIENCE

In this issue , we are providing a Bibliographic Index for the five years
of the' Newsletter. It includes feature articles , works referred to In th
news8 and quotations ,-, Several offprints or "reprints" have been distributed
with the Newsletters. Most of these have not been mentioned in the text
itself and so have not been listed. The following back issues of the
Newsletter are still available and will b sent gratis upon request: Vol. 1,
Nr. 1, 2, 3, 4; Vol. 2, Nr. 4j Vol. 3, Nre 2, 4| Vol. 4S Nr. 2.


The editor is grateful to those who have subscribed to the Newsletter and
those who have submitted news, articles , and quotations over the past
five yearst for these have made the advent of the publication and its
continuation possible* We continue to be anti-inflationary by keeping the
prices the same as those of five years ago. Accompanying this issue is a
resubscription form and attached to the back a subscription form, the
former, of course, for current subscribers. The latter might be used to
induce a friend to try us out or even to subsidize him for a year's trial.
If you have occasion to refer students or others to articles in the News-
letter, you might wish to request your library to order a subscription.

F = feat-ore
N = "from news section"
Q = quotation

1) Albee, George? 1970, 1(3), Ps Awards and Citations

2) Anastasij Ann and John Poleyi 1971, 2(4), g' DIFFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY
3) Aristotle^ 1970, 1(2), g*. DE ANIMA
1972, 3(2), gi THE PHYSICS
1974* 5(3), gt ON DREAMS
4) Athenaeus, 1971, 2(3)* gt THE DEIPNOSOPHISTS
5} Averill, James R. 1974., 5(1), N: Personal Control over Adverse Stimuli and Its
Relation to Stress
6) Barber, T. X.; 1970, 1(3), N: HYPNOSISs A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH
1971, 2(4), N: Suggested ('Hypnotic') Behavior: The Trance
Paradigm versus an Alternative Paradigm
1974, 5(1), Ns Acupuncture Analgesia: A Six-Factor Theory
(see Chaves, note 25)
7) Bauer, Harold5 1971, 2(1), F: The Kingdom of Boo!
8} Baum, Frank; 1970, 1(2), g: THE WIZARD OF OZ
9) Bentley, A. F.; 1972, 3(3), : BEHAVIOR, KNOWLEDGE, FACT
1972, 3(3), fi: Kennetic Inquiry
10) Bersoffs Donald N.; 1974., 5(1), N: Silk Purses into Sow's Ears? The Decline
of Psychological Testing and a Suggestion for its Redemption
11) Bevan, William; 1970, 1U), N: Psychology, The University and The Real
World Around Us
12) Bindra, Dalbir; 1970, 1(5), N: The Problem of Subjective Experiences Puzzle-
ment on Reading R. W. Sperry's "A Modification Concept of Consciousness"
13) Blumenthal, Arthur L.; 1971, 2(2), N; LANGUAGE AND PSYCHOLOGY: HISTORICAL

1 Sequencet,of entries; author, date of Newsletter, volume, designation (see

key above), title. N.B.: Oct. 1971, vol. 2, rir. A was mlsnumbered as 3; Fall
1972^ vol. 3S nr. 4 was misnumbered ss vol. 4; Spring 1974, vol. 5, nr. 2 was
misnumber'ed as 1.
14) Bolles, Robert C.; 1972, 3(2), g*. THEORY OF MOTIVATION
15) Boring, E. G.;.1970, 1(5), ^ from the "Inroduction" in ESPs A SCIENTIFIC
16) Bourne, Lyle E,, B8R. Ekstrand and R.L. Dominowski; 1972, 3(4), fi: THE
17) Brenner, Donald J. (ed.); 1972, 3(3), Ss SCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGY, AND COMMUNICATIONS:
18) Brown, Stephen, (ed,); 1972, 3(3), Ns INTENSIVE ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES,
(see Stephenson, note 99)
& Donald Brenner (ed); 1972, 3(3), fi: SCIENCE, PSYCHOLOGY AND COMMUNICATIONS:
& Richard Taylor; 1973? 4(2), N; Frames of Reference and the Observation
of Behavior
& Thomas tings; 1972, 3(2), Ns Representativeness and the study of
political behaviors an application of the Q technique
to reactions to the Kent State Incident
19) Cameron, Norman; 1973, 4(3), <*: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS
20) Campbell, Sam; 1970, 1(2), Nj (telegram to J. B. Kantor)
21) Cancro, Robert(ed.); 1972, 3(1), Ns INTELLIGENCES GENETIC AND EWIRQNMENTAL

22) Carroll, James D.; 1974, 5(2), request

23) Carroll, John'; 1974, 5(2), Ns Confidentiality of Social Science Research
Sources and Data; The Popkins Case
24) Carter, Jerry; 1970, 1(3), ,: An Experimental Study of Psychological
1971, 2(1), N: A Case of Reactional Dissociation (Hysterical
1971, 2(2), P: A Case of Reactional Dissociation (Hysterical
25) Chaves, J. H., T. X, Barber, & Spanoesj 1974, 5(1), Ns Acupuncture Analgesia?
A Six-Factor Theory
1974, 5(1), N: HYPNOSIS, DIRECT

COMMUNICATION, (see Sarbin, note 89)
27) Cole, Michael, John Gay, Joseph Click, & Donald Sharp; 1974, 5(3), Ns THE
2g) Denny & Ratnerj- 1970, 1(1), N: COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY
29 ) Devey, Joteif 1973S 4(4), N; The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology
& Arther Bentley; 1973, 4l4)? N: KNOWING AND THE KNOWN
30) Dominowski, R. .L.; 1972, 3(4)* . THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING, (see Bourne,
note 16)

31) EkstrandU B. R.; 1972* 3(4), fi: THE PSYCHOLOGY OP'THINKING,, (see Bourne* note 16)
34) Farrington, Jacqueline? 1970S 1(3), Fs A Student's View of the Interbehavioral
1971, 2(5), t "Irn lo ach shav, matai".....If Not Now,
Then When?
1972, 3(4), j Rite Words../..But Are They Right?
35) FernsaUj, Ernest W.; 1972, 3(2), notice

36) Foley, John P.j 1971, 2(4), gi DIFFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY, (see Anastasl, note 2)
37) Fowler* Christopher M; 1973, 4(2), F; A Comparison of the Field-System '
Approaches of D. L. Clark and J s I,5 Kantor

38) Frank, John P. & Gretehen Kagan; 1972? 3(1), Ns The False Standards of I.Q.

39) Fuller, Paul; 1970, 1(1), Fr Some Thoughts on the Summer Gonranity of Scholars,
1969 *~ '
1970, 1(2), N: (telegram to J 9 R. Kantor)

40) Galileo; 1970, 1(4), g

41) Gassendi, 1970, l(5),-ai letter to Descartes, quoted in OBJECTIONS

42) Gaviola, E*; 1970, 1(5), E! The Impossibility of interaction between mind
and matter

. AN II (see Cole, note 27)

44) Gibson^ Kwmeih; 1970, 1U), fs (took review)

45) Glick, Joseph; 1974, 5(3), N; THE CULTURAL OF LEARNING AM) THINKING:
46) Guttman, Normanj 1972, 3(4), Ns. Interbehaviorism:'Naturalism Radicalized'

47) Handy, Hollo; 1970, 1(1), Is THE Of VALUE


48) Hansel, C, E, M. ; 1970, 1(3), N: ESPs A SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION

49) Hein, Pietj 1970, 1(1), : CROOKS

1974, 5(4), gi GROOKS
50) Herriek, James . ; 1972, 3(3), s The Collective Mind and Its Influence Upon
Culture Personality Research! An Application of the
Interbehavioral Model
1974, '5 (3), N: Kantor's anticipation of current approaches
in anthropology
51) Heyduk, Ronald G.j 1970, 1(3), Ps Cracks in the 'Billiard Ball1 Organism
1971, 2(3), ES (a letter)
52) Hilliat, William; 1973, 4(3), N: SYSTH-1S AND THEORIES OF PSYCHOLOGY, (see
Marx, note 73)
53) Johnson, Stephen L.j 1974, 5(2), Fs The Springs of Action: Th Fountain of
Youth "~
54) Kaganf Gretehen, 1972, 3(1), Ns The False Standards of I.Q. Teats, (see
Prank, note 37)
55) Kantor, J. R. ; 1970, 1(1), fit Toward a soientifio analysis of motivation
1970, 1(2), : Goethe's Place in Modem Science
1970, 1(2), Ns reply to letter, (see Smith, note 94)
1970, 1(3), It An Analysis of the Experimental Analysis of
1971, 2(2), Ms Can Psychology contribute to the study of
1972, 3(2), i* PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC, vol. II
1973, 4(3), t i Propos Watson's Hyperbola
1973, 4(4), S* How ia Interbehavioral Psychology Related to
the Experimental Analysis of Behavior?
1973, 4(4 ), Nt In defense of stimulus-response psychology
1974, 5(4),' s Toward & scientific analyaia of motivation
56) Keller, Frd| 1971, 2(1), Ns LRiRWNGi RBIKFORCMEST THEORY, 'rev. '-ed. ;

57) Kelly, George? 197-4, 5(1), fis in Marshall Jones (ed.), NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM
58) Kent, Louise; 1970, 1(2), Ns (telegram to J. R. Kantor)
59) Kent, Neil} 1970,, 1(2), Nt (telegram to J. R9 Kantor)
60) Laehenmyer, Charles We; 1970, 1(4), Ns ExperimentationA Misunderstood
Methodology in Psychology and Social-Psychology Research
61) LaShier, Cynthia J.; 1974 5(1), F: B. P8 Skinner'on Motivations A Critique
62) Lasar, Waynef 1970, 1(2), F$ Account of Conference at Miner Center, Chaay, N.Ye
1970, 1(2), N; (telegram to J. R. Kantor)
1974., 5(3), N: A comparison of some theoretical proposals of
J.R. Kantor and T.C. Schnierla
63) Lewis, Michael & Leonard A* Rosenblumj 1974, 5(1), s THE EFFECT OF THE
64) Liehtensteln, P. E.j 1970, 1(1), F: The Significance of the Stimulus Function
65) Littnian, R, A.| 1974, 5(2), g: in Marshall Jones (ed.), NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM
66) Livingston, Robert B.j 1971, 2(5), Ss How aan looks at his own brain: an
adventure shared by psychology and neurophyaiology
67) Lowery, Richardj 1970, 1(4), N$ The Straight and Narrow Path in Psychology,
(book review)
68) Lucretiusf 1970, 1(5), : ON THE OP THE
69) Lundin, Robert? 1970, 1(1), N; PERSONALITY: A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH
1972, 3(4), Is PERSONALITY ,
70) Mahan, Harry; 1970, 1(2), N: THE INTERACTIONAI PSYCHOLOGY OF J.R. KiNTORj
71) Mancuso, J a C.| 1971, 2(1), N: Failure of a moral enterprize: attudes of
the public toward mental Illness, (see Sarbin, not 90)
72) Martin, Robert F.; 1973, 4(1), Ft Toward Conceptualization of the Learning
Processes in the College Classroom Ills Operant
Psychology and Better's Social Learning Theory
as a Basis for Research
1973, 4(4)t Fs But There Are and There ire Hoses
73) Marx* Melin & William-Hillix; 1973, 4(2), NJ SYSTEMS .AND THBORI1SS OF PSYCHOLOGY
74) Maupertiusj 1970, 1(4), a
75) McHale? John; 1971, 2(3), N: The Future of the Mind
76) McPherson, Marlon White; 1971, 2(4), F: Deficiency in Patients and Professionals
77) Melzak, Ronald; 1974, 5(1), Ns How Acupuncture Can Block Pain
78) Miller, David; 1974, .5(3), F: Can Social Scientists Be Humane?
79) Mitsorgs A.; 1970, 1(5), Fs Interactions Transactions Which?
1972, 3(3), Pi Nevertheless, The Earth is Flat
80) Mountjoy, Paul; 1970S 1(2), N: (telegram to J. R. Kantor)
1973, 4(4), Ft A Hose By Any Other
& Noel Smith; 1971, 2(2), N: A reply to Thornton's 'Socrates and the
History of Psychology1
81) Observer, 1972} 3(1), Ns Innate Intelligences Another Genetic Avatar
82) Pronto, Heneryj 1970, M(1), Ns PANORAMA OF PSYCHOIOGY
1970, 1(2), : Some Reflections of Perception
1972, 3(2), F: Notes for a Freshman on the Free Will Versus
, Determination Controversy
83) Randall, John; 1972, 3(1), a* ARISTOTLE
84) Ratner; 1970, 1(1), Ns COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY, (see Denny, note 28)
85) Rotoaek; 1972, 3(4), N: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY
86) Rosenbliths W. A. and Eda B6 Vidalep 1971, 2(3), &'. A Quantitative view of
Keuroelectrie Events in Relation to Sensory Communication
87) Roeenblum, Leonard A. j 1974, 5(1), g'. THE EFFECT OF THE INFANT ON ITS CAREGIVER
(see Lewis, note 62)
88) Rotter, Julian; 1970, 1(3), a* SOCIAL LEARNING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY
89) Russell, I. Steele & Eugene Winograd; 1970, 1(5), N: Mental Events in Psychology
90) Sarbin, 'Theodore & William Coe; 1973, 4(2), Ns HYPNOSIS: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
& J..C. Mancusbs 1971, 2(1), Ns Failure of a moral enterprise;
attudes of the public toward mental illness
91) Schoenfeld, W N 0 ; 1970, 1(3), Si J.R. Kantor's OBJECTIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF GRAMMER
and PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGICs A Retrospect Appreciation
93) Shute, Clarences 1973, 4(4)* Sl! Aristotle's Interactionism and ita Transformation
by some 20 Century Writers. In N.W. Smith '(ed.) "Contextual Interact-
ionistss A Symposium"
94) Skinner, B.F.: 1972, 3(1j, : BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY
95) Smith, Noel . ; 1970, 1(1), F: The Emerging Role of Interbehavioral Psychology
1970, 1(2), N: letter concerning Conference at Miner Center
1970, 1(2), Is (telegram to J.R9 Ranter)
1971, 2(2), N: A reply to Thornton's 'Socrates and the
History of Psychology,f(see Mountjoy, note 80)
1972, 3(1), N: Interbehaviorism: Roots and Branches
1972, 3(4), F: An Interbehaviorist Looks at Santa Clause
1973s 4(2), N: Interbehavioral Psychologyj Roots and Branches
1973, 4(2'), NJ Social and Psychological Development of Ancient
Egypt with some Preliminary Remarks on Primitive Beliefs
96) Sommer, Robert; 1972, 3(1), *'' Natural History
97) Spanoes| 1974$ 5(1), Ns Acupuncture Analgesias A Six-Factor Theory, (see, note 25)
(see Chaves, note 25)
98) Spinoza, Baruch| 1970, 1(5), 2? ETHICS
99) Stevenson, William; 1972, 3(2), Ns THE STUDY OF BEHAVIOR; Q-TECHNIQUE AND
1972, 3(3), fir Applications of Communication Theory? I.
The Substructure of Science
1972, 3(3), Ns Applications of Communication Theory; II.
Interpretations of Keat's "Ode on a Grecian Urn"
1972, 3(3), N: Consciousness OutSubjectivity In
1972, 3(3), I; Postulates of Behaviorism
& Stephen Brown (eds); 1972, 3(3), N: INTENSIVE ANALYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
100) Suggested Readings in Interbehavioral Psychology! 1970, 1(5), F
101) Sullivan, John; 1972, 3(1), F; Skinner's Razor ' . ' .
102) Swartzf 1971, 2(1), Ns Stimulus evolution in problem solving behavior? an
interbehavior analysis
1971, 2(2), Ms Stimulus evolution in problem solving behavior; an
interbehavioral analysis
103) Taylor, Richard; 1973* 4(2), I; Frames of Reference and the Observation of
Behavior, (see Brown, note 18}
104,) A Theory of Cognitive Functioning and Stratifications What the Brain Does,
Mho It Do It, and Why, 1971, 2(3), N

105) Thornton; 1970, 1(5), S* Socrates and the History of Psychology

107) Tulving, Endelj 1974, 5(3), N: Cue-Dependent Forgetting
108) Ungs, Thomas; 1972, 3(2), Ks Representativeness and the study of political
behaviors an application of the Q-technique to the Kent State incident,
(see Brown, note 18)
109) University of Akron ; 1970, 1(4), F: Doctor, of Letters, Presented June 4, 1970,
to Js R, Kantor by the University of Akron
110) Vidale, Eda B. ; 1971, 2(3), g% A Quantitive View of Neuroelectric Events in
Relation to Sensory Communication, (see Rosenblith, note 86)
111)' Weyant, Robertj 1970, 1(4), Ns History Painted with a Biased Brush, (review)
112) Winograd, Eugene; 1970, 1(5), N: Mental Events in Psychology, (see Russell,
note 89) ""
114) Woodbridge, Fredrick 3, E. ; 1972, 3(4), % SELECTED ESSAYS OF J.E. WOODBRIDGE
F I E L D Preceding

Spiling Factors
1 Or gam sm
1 Function
Volume 6 - 1

'Numtier 1 1 , |

investigator j <' "} fo M -$-

Winter 1975 j I 1
i Stimulus Object

Succeed! ng


Interbefiavtoral NOEL W. SMITH, EDITOR




Intei-behavioral psychology* a system of psychology which emphasizes the inter-

action between the organism and the environment. ^h& subject matter of psy-
chology is the &vnt (perceiving, learning, discriminating, etc.), which is
studied in terms of the history of its relations to stimuli and to other events.
Psychology, interbehavlorals The definition of psychology as the study of
evolved interaction between organism and the environment. The unit of study
is the event consisting of the interbehavior of the organism with other or-
ganisms and objects which are existentially and structurally separate* Con-
figurations constituting events are determined by previous interbehaviors.

In addition to the above definition Wolman After five years as the Interbehavioral Psy-
has other entries on Interbehavioral psych- chology Newsletter we begin our sixth year
ology including one under its older name of as the Interbehavioral Quarterly. We will
"organismic psychology". Unfortunately, continue much as before with news and inter-
Wolman's work is given to errors. Under the behavioral papers, but the possibility of an
entry "vitalism" he gives Kantor as well as improved format is being explored for some-
MeDougall as influenced by it and in his time in the future,
OM3GY he attributes the origin of Kantor's In this issue Paul Mountjoy attempts to clar-
work to Adolf Meyer, associates him closely ify his position vis-a-vis Robert Martin in
with Goldstein and Lewin, and avers that he the Fall 1973, 4- U) Newsletter. Lila Good-
the notion that "mental functions son compares Watson and Kantor on concepts
-6 accompanied by physiological ones". In of emotion. She wrote the paper as an under-
^viewing the DICTIONARY in Contemporary graduate at Lynchburg College and is now in
H&Slog$r, 1974* 19, 660-661, Josef Brozek graduate studies at University of New Orleans,
notes otter errors and shortcomings.
Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

A Rose is a Rose is a. Rose

PaiO. T.Mount joy
Western Michigan University

It was a pleasure to discover substantive areas of agreement between

Martin (1973) and myself (1973) during our recent interchange. However,
one area of disagreement remains unsolved! and in my effort to write con-
cisely I became so terse as to lose intelligibility. It is hoped this brief
note will help to clarify these issues.
Martin askss "Why were there only 69% A-grades in Dr. Mountjoy's
classes?" In my undergraduate classes over 90$ of the students earn the
grade of A. I referred in footnote 3 to an official university report which
criticized the Department of Psychology for giving the grade of A to 69% of
the undergraduates who completed courses in our department. Let us assume
for simplicity that grades represent interbehaviors between students and in-
structors. All behavioral events are fieldsf i*e.f determined by the inter-
action of numerous factors,
One factor which determines grades is the behavior of the instructor.
Some instructors in this department distribute grades according to the bell-
shaped normal probability curve (e.g.,10% A, etc.). Another factor which
determines grades is the behavior which the student performs. By the time
they enter psychology courses, some students have learned that grades can be
attained by behaviors other than mastering course content. A carefully de-
signed course contains limited hold contingencies such that by the end of
the second or third week a student may have lost sufficient points to pre-
clude earning an A. Bern's Manuals (see Mount joy, 1973) explicate these con-
tingencies. Thus, students who enter a course with well-developed "confi-
dence man" behaviors will end up with less than an A, at least in their first
psychology course.
My view regarding the renaming of the historical component in behaviors
as expectancy remains unchanged. Others may wish to state that the possession
of highly developed "confidence man" behaviors indicate that the individual
expects to be reinforced for these behaviors. That is their privilege, but
I feel that it violates proper scientific procedures. It seems to be much
more in line with the rules of science to remain as close to the data as pos-
sible. For example, the student who has lost sufficient points to preclude
earning an A during the first few weeks may very well exhibit 100% mastery
during the remainder of the course. Such a case would be illustrative of
the development of a new and different historical factor, a response func-
tion of mastery replacing the response function of being a confidence man.
It would be instructive to examine the changing behavior of students as they
progress through a series of well-designed courses.
A brief comment on the differences between laboratory research (hypo-
thesis testing) and classroom technology (problem solving) appears to be in
order. The classroom teacher who attempts to apply psychological principles
to his own teaching has, because of his problem solving orientation (How should
a course be designed to produce mastery of course content?) left the arena of

hypothesis testing. Now non-scientific factors become important variables.

From a scientific standpoint the question of what factors are responsible for
students failing courses is every bit as important as the question of what
factors are responsible for students earning an A. Yetf because of cultural
considerations we concentrate on the factors which are responsible for stu-
dents earning an A, and are unable to meet conventional design criteria. The
fact is that operant technology is not synonomous with psychological science.
Operant technology is the practical application of a type of scientific psy-
chology, dn a problem solving manner. The fact that a technological applica-
tion does not meet the standards of a laboratory science is irrelevant to the
issue of whether the behavior of college students in the classroom is readily
subject to operant technology. The empirical finding is that operant technol-
ogy does change the behavior of college students. The present state of the
art is such that there is still a greal deal of room for improvement. In the
not too distant future there will be more improvement.
I hope that Martin and I shall both be able to contribute to the improve-
ment of classroom instruction.

Martin, R. F. But there are roses and there are roses,. Int^e^e^aviGral Py_-
Newsletter f 1973 i 4? 6-7.
Mount joy, P T, A rose by any other name. Interbehayipra.! Psjjchologx; News-
letter, 1973 4 1-5.
Emotions vse Emotional Behaviors
Comparing Watson and Kantor
Li la Goodsori

When the wordf or a derivative of the word, emotion is verbalized, var-

ious thoughts or ideas are probably experienced depending on the organism's
history of responding to these terms as well as the setting factors. The
definitions and explanations of emotions as given by J, B, Watson and J. R.
Kantor are to be compared and contrasted.
For Watson, human action is divided into two parts: the acquired modes
of responses and the hereditary modes of responses. Emotions along with in-
stincts are paired together in the latter group. He reports that the human
undergoes a process of organization whereby the hereditary and acquired reac-
tion modes separate to a certain extent, but never completely.
An emotion for Watson is "a hereditary pattern reaction" involving pro-
found changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly of the vis-
ceral and glandular systems. In referring to pattern-reaction he gives the
example of a sooty-tern feigning death in reaction to a human intruder, but
running away and giving an instinctive cry when the chance for escape arises,
Watson differentiates emotions and instincts with respect to the adjustments
of the organism. If the adjustments are internal and confined to the sub-
ject's body, emotdstnoccurs; if the organism as a whole makes adjustments to
external objects , instinct has occurred. This is clearly an example of or-
ganocentric ideology in which sbimuli are assumed to elicit reactions from
within the organism.
Watson's almost exclusive lase of children as subjects was a deliberate
move because he felt that not enough work had been done in this area. He
grouped emotional reactions into the categories of fear, rage, and love, at
the same time warning students not to find anythingin these words that was
not statable in terms of situation and response. He named four principal
situations as producing fear; loss of support, loud sounds, an abrupt in-
terruption as sleep is overtaking the organism, and pulling a blanket out
from under the subject who is falling asleep. The observed reactions are
catching the breath, the grasping reflex, closing of theqjre lids, puckering
the lips, then crying. The common belief that children are instinctively
afraid of the dark was shown not to be true according to his evidence. In-
cidentally, Watson stipulates without reference or experimental support that
children reared in the South exhibit fear of the dark far more than others.
Rage is said to occur as a result of "hampering of the infant's movements."
The exhibited behaviors are crying, screaming, slashing movements with the
arms and hands, drawing up and down with the feet and legs, and flushing of
the face as a result of breath-holding. Love involves smiling, cooing, gurg-
ling, etc. as a result of stroking or manipulation of the erogenous zones
by tickling, shaking, patting, or gentle rocking. The Freudian emphasis in
relation to this emotion is minimal.
Different kinds of infrahuman organisms were exposed to the infants in
order to see if generalized emotional reactions could be obtained. Relatively
little fear was observed in the infants even after contact with such organ-
isms as rabbits, pigeonsf catsf dogs, white ratsf as well as observation of
a fire in a nearby bucket.
In the attempt to detect emotional responsesf Watson considered the im-
plicit portions to be more important than the explicit portions. He listed
two methods of detections l) gee t2E,t where "significant" words are random-
ly interjected with neutral words? and 2) contdnmus, t^ge where a subject is
given a key word from an emotional situation and told to freely relate to it.
This method is used to detect blockage as related to dreams which Watson con-
sidered to be good indicators of one's personality, stressesf strains, and
general emotional life.
Watson's famous conditioned emotional reaction study with little Albert
was an example of the eliciting properties which can be taken on by the habit
influences to "call out" emotional responses. The phenomenon of transferred
conditioned emotional reactions was exhibited when Albert made fear responses
to objects similar in texture to the white rat. A control procedure was used
in which the infant was given blocks to interact with between stimulus presen-
In dealing with emotional outlets, Watson describes diffusion which is
equivalent to the concept of displacement. He viewed it as a threat to so-
cietyf but rationalized the occurrences as resulting in relaxation. Atti-
tudes are considered to be a consolidation of emotions, instincts, and habits.
Examples such as "tenderness," "shyness," "shame/1 "jealousy/' "hate," "em-
barrassment," "suspicion," "anxiety," etc. are said to represent combinations
of the three reaction modes.
Physiological factors are considered to be strong components in the ex-
pression of emotions. Secretions from duct glands are reduced with contrac-
tion nf smooth muscles occurring in reaction to emotionally exciting stimuli.
The effect on the- ductless glands is increased production of adrenalin re-
sulting in glycosuria. This conditionis caused by excess sugar passing into
the urine* In addition, the pulse accelerates and dilation of the pupils
occurs. The post emotional state may leave the organism either poorly ad-
justed or better adjusted, depending on the sHuational factors.
Watson summarizes his discussion of emotion by saying that emotions
must be recognized as part of human life rather than being discarded or over-
looked. He suggests that further investigation into the control and manipu-
lation of human behavior in relation to emotions should reveal more knowledge
about the area. The faults as well as good points of Watson's theory will
be openly discussed after a challenging alternative system is presented.
Emotional behavior for Kantor "consists essentially of interruptive
forms of action stimulated by rapidly changing circumstances and in all cases
involves various slight or intense general organic and visceral processes."
He considers emotional conduct to be a momentary condition of "no response"
with this cessation of activity differentiating emotional behavior from af-
fective or feeling behavior. Bringing in the aspects of Kantor's field
theory, one might say that the emotional conduct is a failure to adjust
based on past reactions and the environment. By breaking emotional behavior

segments, specific characteristics can be examined such as the absence of

the consummatory or final responses which are blocked by the occurring be-
havior. Unless these consummatory responses occur In the proper sequence,
the behavior pattern will be disorderly. It is this lack of order which
characterizes the emotional conduct amprovides the only observable parsi-
monious method of detection, Kantor supports this view with various obser-
vations? the failure of psychologists to classify emotional acts, the inabil-
ity of the observer to detect which tyjae of emotion the person under investi-
gation is experiencing, the blunder of replacing emotions with reflexes
which are not equivalent in detection of emotional behavior* and in credit-
ing infrahuman organisms with human qualities in relation to emotions.
In order to more thoroughly investigate the various types and degrees
of emotional conductt Kantor systematically anlyzed the emotional behavior
into four segments. These separate sequences ares Pre-Emotional Behavior
Segements, Emotional Behavior Segements Proper, First-Proximate Post-Emo-
tional Behavior Segements, and Second-Proximate Post Emotional Behavior Seg-
ments. The Pre-Emotional Behavior Segment consists of whatever situation
sets the occasion for the emotional segment. It, therefore, involves the set-
ting factors and movements of the subject and stimulus object preparing to
interact. The Emotional Behavior Segment Proper is characterized by the ab-
sence of the final reaction system and the presence of visceral and general
organic functioning which operates in the absence of the consummatory re-
sponse. The emotional act involves a disintergration process of the response
pattern along with inhibition and suppression of any overt adjustments to the
situation. An emotion is, therefore, a negative form of behavior even though
it may precede an adjustment. The biological functions are also taken into
account including such factors as disturbances of digestive secretions and
respiration, contraction of blood vessels, acceleration or retardation of
the heart beat, and induction of various secretions. The First Proximate
Post-Emotional Behavior Segment is considered to be directly conditioned by
the surrounding stimulating circumstances of the moment. The type of re-
sponse is dependent upon the stimulating situation which initiated the emo-
tional act* Hth primary emotion, the acts are most likely to be large, overt
responses which involve the skeletal muscles as in the case of running or
jumping. The secondary or social emotional situation involves a gradual
transitional from a confused state back to equilibrium. The Second Proxi-
mate Post-Emotional Behavior Segment sometimes carries over to a subsequent
behavior segment. It's considered a very transitional stage bridging the
gap between isolated sequences of behavior.
Kantor feels it is necessary to distinguish emotional behavior from
non-emotional feeling behavior which have been mistakenly paired together
in the past. Feelings do not meet the criterion of the presence or ab-
sence of an organized response system and are, therefore, not classified as
emotional behavior. He especially wishes to separate emotions from passions
which operate continuously in some form constituting an autonomous system.
Unlike Watson, Kantor places love and hate under the category of passions
which can be brought about by substitute stimuli as well as by stimulating
objects such as other organisms. Sentiments are also distinguished from emo-
tions, being "prescriptive and limiting types of activity developed under
the influence of social approval." Sentiments are considered to be directed
responses resulting in some complex social behavior examples of which are
modesty, cleanliness, and charitableness. Sentiments have a broader range
of exciting stimuli, while passions are more closely linked with the surround-
ing environment,
Kantor finds the utilitarian theory of emotions to be an invalid one.
He deals with this on the organic levelf finding no utilitarian value in bio-
logical functions* The participation of an parts of the organism in bring-
ing about responses is what matters. In classifying emotional behaviorsf Kan-
tor feels that there is only one type of emotional act. By finding the spe-
cific circumstances under which an organism responds, more information can be
obtained about the process of human reaction. He singles out the errors of
giving excess meaning to a name which is similar to a symbol. Because all
reactions depend on the characteristics of the individual and the surround-
ing conditionss an investigation of the conditions is considered necessary.
The distinction between emotions and expressions is made on the assump-
tion that there is no room in Kantorfs analysis for the "expression of an emo-
tion," He claims that the doctrine of emotional expression is based onthe di~-
chotomy that divides emotions into an inner state of emotions themselves and
an outer expression of them. In dealing with emotions in infants and infra-
human organisms he considers the social experience of adult humans to be an
important factor in emotional behavior. The continuity theory begun by Dar-
win is as much in error as the doctrines initiated by the non-continuity
theorists. Kantor resolves the two opposing views with his field approach
which concentrates on the circumstances which are appropriate for responses
to be made by each organism.
While both Watson and Kantor were writingin the same decade, one can
see from the two view points given, that Watson still clumg to the tradi-
tional theories of psychology. Even though Watson was considered a radical,
Kantor was the true revolutionary, the difference being in the size of the
audiences. While introducing Behaviorism as a new school with emphasis on
the environmental effects on behavior, Watson did not shed such archaic
ideas as the nature-nurture conflict. Watson's organocentric ideology was
also fully apparent, as was his reductionistic attitude towards isolated or-
gans of the body.
Kantor brings in a field approach to deal with the problems left by
Watson and others. With his emphasis on the environment containing setting
factors and media of contact, as well as the stimulating object which exgitej?
rather than elicits, responses in the organism based on the past history, any
aspect of behavior can be dealt with objectively.

Kantorf J. R. Prijwrglgsi-_of_Pgy^feg^g5r, Granville, Ohio! The Principa Press,
Watson, J B 'S^l^Q^S^SlSB^S^^SI^^^L^^^^^^iS^^e Philadelphia
and London; J* B Lippincott, 1919.
*Volume 6
(Number 2 Preceding

Spring 1975

SUituiius Object


Interbefiavloral NOEL W. SMITH, EDITOR




e can analyze a given instance of behavior in its relation to the current setting and
to antecedent events in the history of the species and of the individual.
B. F. Skinner; "The steep and thorny way to a
science of behavior", American
1975f 30, 42-49.
The response of the animal to a stimulating object is not determined by the object
alonef but by the nature of the environmental context; under two different environ-
mental contexts, two "mutually exclusive" behavior patterns may be developed.
AN EPIGENETIC VIEW, Random House, 196?,
p. 169.
The results of these experiments prove one important point; when a bird is brought
up in an environmental context in which he does not have to fly, he may not acquire
a behavior pattern of flighteven though flight is not inhibited or restricted-
while other patterns.are being developed and fixated. This failure to form an
actual flight pattern is not due to a lack of appropriate stimuli for the "instinct
of flight" at its "critical period," nor to a lack of exercise or of strength in the
neuromuscular system for flight, for many could fly when frightened by the chasing
dog. The important fact to, be borne in mind is that the combined factors of devel-
opmental history and environmental context alone are often sufficient to reduce the
range of behavioral potentials, a reduction that does not necessarily involve ana-
"-omico-physio logical factors; it is a reduction of plasticity in the formation of
.ew patterns without any need for reference to mythical pre-determined neural organ-
Kuo, ibid., p. 174-175
Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction

Some new and recent works that may be of interest to readers include Barber, Spanos,
and Chavess HYPNOSIS, IMAGINATION, AND HUMAN POTENTIAL, Pergamon Pressf 1975. The
de-spooking work of these authors for hypnosis and acupuncture has been previously
reported in this publication. R*G Heyduk published "Rated preference of musical
compositions as it relates to complexity and exposure frequency" in
1975 17? 84-91, which examines the influence of situational or
setting conditions and individual differences* Rollo Handy and E.G. Harwood attempt
to clarify the Dewey-Bentley concepts in reviewing John Spiegel's TRANSACTIONS;
"Transactional procedures misunderstood" and appears in
1975? 34? 103-112, In an article entitled "Eye contact
as a setting event for infant learning"s -
1974 17? 250-263 , Kathleen Bloom notes the important but neglected role of setting
events in S-R relationships and undertakes an experimental study that examines them
specifically. Among the social learning theorists the setting or context is receiving
increased attention as a factor in accounting for changes in responses when successive
stimuli are the same. Several studies by J,L. Gewirtz are of this nature. It is
encouraging that he has dropped the drive abstraction and replaced it with the
events of set ting j e.g., "Some contextual determinants of stimulus potency" in
R9Da Parke (ed.) RECENT TRENDS IN SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY, Academic Press? 1972.
The recognition of the distinction between stimulus object and stimulus function
would also be useful in these studies.
y y y

Editorial Trillas? a publishing firm in Mexico City, and the Principia Press of
Chicago have contracted for a Spanish translation of Kantor: 1NTERBEHAVIORAL
PSYCHOLOGY. A revision by Kantor and Smith of Kantor' s A SURVEY OF THE SCIENCE
OF PSYCHOLOGY is now in the final proof-print stage under the new title: THE
information in the next issue.
We are pleased to announce that Ronald Heyduk of Kenyon College and Donna Cone
of Lynchburg Training School & Hospital, Lynchburgf Virginia will be joining the
Quarterly as associate editors. We hope that with their assistance and the continued
contributions of our readers we will be able to improve the medium,,

Introductory psychology books are one of the best indicators of current orientations,
directions, and emphases in psychology. A sampling of the current crop of which
there is a plethora is not encouraging for those who wish to see the discipline
established on events. Those that seem to stray somewhat less from an event-based
approach than others are Whittaker: INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGYf Saunders Co., and
Morgan & King, same title, McGraw-Hill. Ken Dallett's IT'S ALL IN YOUR MIND? UNDER-
STANDING PSYCHOLOGY, National Press, 1973, offers much of the usual doctrine and then
surprisingly describes the absurdity of much of it, often with the same assumptions,
however, that produced the initial difficulty. For example, "Our language describes
external actions well, but cannot describe the inner workings of man without popu-
lating him with littler men who hide inside, do our thinking, and pull our strings"
(p. 5l) In most of the texts, the two areas that seem to give rise to the most
doctrinaire assumptions are perception and brain function and neither Whittaker nor
Morgan and King escape them. There is growing emphasis in the textbooks on "cognition",
"information processing", and popular topics such as "expansion of consciousness"
which all continue to confuse constructs with events. To indicate the orientation
of a few of these works a page of quotations entitled "Shades of Medieval Theology"
is provided. If readers have run across others that singled out either
'positively or negatively we would offer the information in this column. Statements
,/hat would make useful quotes either from introductory texts or others that could
be used under "Shades" would be gratefully received*


An article in the ^2^2SSli 2iiiiiB? 1974i &1 1026-1028? by a Swedish psychologistf

Bo Ekehammers entitled "Interactionism in personality from a historical perspective"
gives prominent place to Kantor's contributions. However, the author seems to confuse
the interaction of inter-behaviorism with the notion of mental or phenomenal inter-
actionism. He sees much commonality with Koffka, Lewins Murry? Sullivan, Mischelf and
Angyal: their "central idea" "is essentially the same."
It seems to be very difficult to convey the vital difference between the interbehavioral
event-based approach and the traditional const rue t-based approach. Our thinking is
so conditioned by Western dualism that totally disparate alternatives are seen as
modifications or new developments within the same old metaphysics. For example,
Ekehammer attributes to Kantor the importance of distinguishing "between the physical
and psychological world." How can it be made clear that interbehaviorism holds
the entire world including human interactions to be physical, that a psychological
^vent is the interaction of organism and object , not something occuring inside the
_ndividual that is different from or additional to the interaction? How can it be
made clear that interbehavior comprises a field of object -organism interactions
(interbehaviors) in a setting or context and not a phenomenal field ("psychological
world") inside the organism interacting with the physical world? And how can it be
made clear that interbehaviorism holds to these interacting field event^ and does
not impose ^conBtructs,?
It is misleading to speak of a "psychological world" or a "psychological environment ."
Such reference to verbal construction denotes working from an organism-centered and
construct-based approach. It implies that there is meaning or knowledge or awareness
that is additional to or different from the interactionf that these are inputs to
the interactions rather than being constituted by them* The interbehaviorist insists
that meaning is the interactional eventf an interaction of a physical organism with
a physical object in a physical setting* There is no psychological world or
psychological environment that is somehow different from a physical. world or physical
environment. Psychological events are distinguished from other classes of ejjrents, by
the level of organizations and characteristics of those events? not by being non-
physical* The term "psychological world" implies the existence of such non-events
as phenomenal field or mind in addition to physical organism and physical object .
As we quoted Lucretius in the November 1970 Newsletter (Vol. 1, Nr. 5): "Therefore
everything in existence is, fundament ally? made out of two things. There are bodies
and there is the void in which these bodies have their places and through which they
move in different directions., .nothing can act or be acted upon without body and
nothing can afford space except the void and the empty. Therefore, apart from the
void and bodies it is impossible for there to exist in the sum of things any residual
third substance. Such a. substance eould never at any time come within the reach of
our senses, nor could any man lay hold of it by any process of reasoning." It is
such a "third substance" that pheno'meno legists assume and which must be distinguished
from the events that interbehaviorists adhere toa Assuredly interbehaviorism 'can
make a contribution to personality theoryf but only when it is understood that the
interbehaviorist * s interaction consists of confrentable events and that of the
phenomenologist? s of verbal constructions that involve a confusion of such constructions
with ongoing events.
Jerome Kagan & Ernest Havemann: 2nd ed.f Harcourt? Brace?
Javanovich, 1972.
Psychology is the science that systematically studies and attempts to explain
observable behavior and its relationship to the unseen mental processes that
go on inside the organism and to the external events in the environment, (p. 9)

Roger Brown & Richard J. Hernstein: Lf Little, Brown, 1975.

Mental Processesthe bridge between stimulus and responseare obscure because
they occur out of sight, (p. 438)
We can experience external stimuli only as they are transformed by our senses
and perception, (p. 438)
The first stages of response to a physical stimulus are triggered automatically
by activation of a sense organ. Then attention rehearses and analyzes some
aspects of the icon [after-effect of stimulus removed] and not othersf supple-
menting them with information stored in memory, (p. 438-439)
W e Lambert Gardiner: Brooks/Cole, 1970.
The psychologist is concerned with the internal processes of the organism and
with the function of the organism, (p. 4)
The system studied by the psychologist is unique in that it can be viewed from
the inside as well as from the outside. The manifestation of the processes within
the organism as viewed from the outside is behavior anci as viewed from the inside
is esgDejrijenee. (p. 4)
Experience must ultimately be based on the various forms of physical energy that
impinge on our receptors. Physical energy is transformed into nerve impulses and
then into sensations. Although some psychologists have attempted to explain all
experience in terms of sensation, others have argued that it is necessary to go
bevond_sensation. (p. 5)
Psychology is the science that studies the nervous system. This system is unique
among all the systems studied by scientists in that it may be studied from the
inside as well as from the outside. The manifestation of the functioning of the
nervous system as seen from the outside is behavior; the manifestation of the
nervous system as seen from t he inside is experience, (p. 127)

Richard Lazarus : The_M.ddle_of_Man; ^_J^Od^^on_to_P^chl^? Prentice-
Hall, 1974.
There is no way for man to know what the environment is really like out-
side of what he mentally constructs of this environment by his sense
organs and perceptual activity. Perception is "true" only in the sense
that the knowledge obtained serves us well in our interactions with the
environment . .....*....*......................................*.......
In shortf our perception of the external world is a schematic affairs
based on what has been required for species survival during evolutionary
history, rather than a direct mirroring of all that actually exists.
Our perceptual experience is so compelling, subjectivelyf that it is
difficult to divest ourselves of the literal view that perception is
the discovery of how the environment truly is and to adopt a relativistic
view that we detect some of the qualities of objects and events but
probably cannot know all of reality* (p. 58~6o)
Anthony Davids & Trygg Engen: IntrjOjduc;borX-ZgMlo^f Random Ho usef 1975.
Chapter 7 deals with sensations. All approaches and theories of psychology
have considered them the gateways to the mindf the channels of information
through which humans acquire the knowledge and the content of1 their con-
sciousness. (p. 143)
For all our unique thoughts, hopes, and behaviors, without exception,
can be traced to activity in the brain, (p. 145)
Ernest R. Hilgard, Richard C. Atkinson, & Rita L. Atkinson: Introduction^tg
Psjhc>loj2r, 6th ed., Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1975.
Neural impulses from your eye are related to your brain where various
features of the stimulus are analyzed and compared with information
about past events stored in your memory, (p. 32)
Our perception of events depends on how our sense organs detect
stimuli and our brain interprets information coming from the senses, (p. 32)
To understand behavior we need to know something of how the sensory
mechanisms are constructed and how they mediate the sensations of
light, sound, touch, taste, and the like. But perception goes beyond
the discrimination of single stimuli; the human organism must be able
to interpret and react to patterns of stimuli. He must be able to
extract information from the changing array of stimulation provided
by the environment.

CRM Books: ^22^^SI^l2^LL^^3i^^I2^^^2,t 2nd ed., 1972.

The visual informationthe lights and the musical notes are the
injDutj whatever transformations occurred between them is the (p. 153)
Robert E8 Silverman: PsjYhoJ.g, 2nd ed., Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1974.
Once the brain interprets a stimulus event, it relays a message through
the nervous system to the muscles and the glands; this message dictates
to the body how to respond to the stimulus, (p. 62)
Bouquets of Roses: A Final Reply to Mount joy
Robert F. Martin
Jamestown College

I have been struck by the honest sincerity and open friendliness of the
recent series of exchanges between Martin (l973t at bj and Mountjoy (1973?
1975). It is apparent that we are in agreement in our goal to improve the
technology of higher education (teaching) and even that an operant-psychology-
derived technology is productive in that effort. An important area of dis-
agreement remainsy however.
Mountjoy (l975 p.3) points accurately to the distinction between the
technology and science of college teaching,, a distinction previously drawn
by Martin (1974). Mountjoy states; "The empirical finding is that operant
technology does change the behavior of college students* The present state
of the art is such that there is still a-great deal of room for improvement."
Agreed! This is where the discussion started, with one approach of the
science of psychology, presented by Martin (l973t a).
It is precisely because the learning (behavior) of college students
is an interbehavior between students and environmental variables, including
instructors, that the science (and, ultimately, the technology) of college
teaching must take into account the individual*s contribution to the event.
It is this transaction that operant psychology does not concern itself
withf rather concentrating on the environmental conditions. In an effort
to improve the technology of college teaching, Martin has described a
research program (l971 1972, 1973, a, b, 1974, 1975) which focuses on
the transactional context and the individual's perception of the event,
Mountjoy and, I are in total agreement in our hope to make a contri-
bution to the improvement of classroom instruction* The application of
operant technology to college teaching may be viewed as an interbehavioral
transaction with scientific psychology, each contributes to and defj.n^s the
other, as London (1972) has pointed out in another context. Both Mountjoy
and Martin serve heuristic purposes in this transaction (event), I look
forward to meeting Dr. Mountjoy in person to exchange ideas, after the
long-running and congenial discussion through Dr. Smith' s S^&Zi6^^'

London, P. The end of ideology in behavior modification. American
Psephologist, 1972, 27, 913-920.
Martin, R.F. Toward a conceptualization of learning processes in the college
classroom I: A review of operant research. Rjssjsarch in Education, 1971,
6, 31 Educational Resources Information Center number Ed04o044.
Martin, ReF, Toward conceptualization of learning processes in the college
classroom II: Considerations from operant and social learning theory.
Research in Education, 1972, 7, 65<
Martin, R.F, Toward conceptualization of learning processes in the college
classroom Ills Operant psychology and Rotter's social learning theory
as a basis for research* Interbehavlorj.1. Psv^cJiDj-Ogjr Nejreljitter, 1973,
4 (1), 2-19. (a)
Martinf R*F, Bub there are rosesf and there are roses.* Intgrbehfivloral
4 (4) f 6-7. (b)
Martin? R e F Toward a learning theory of college teaching; Student and
teacher perceptions of contingencies and reinforcers in the classroom
(Doctoral dissertation, University of Denver, 1974)
? 1974f 35, 74-1?? 0?88
Martinf R.F. The theory of signal detectability and Implications from
functional theories of perception for its application to social
perception. The Jojrnal Jll!hi0Jf 1975f 89? 53-63.
Motmt joy, P.T. A rose by any other name. Intertehjig-Oral
Newsletters 1973? 4f 1-5.'
Mount joy? PT e A rose is a rose is a rose. Interbeh^yj.oral
1975* 6 (l), 2-3.

A Critique of Kohlberg' s Theory of Moral Development
from the Viewpoint of Interbehavioral Psychology
Sidney L.
L@high University
Donna M, Gone
Lynchburg Training School Hospital

Developmental psychologists typically concern themselves with progress-

ive changes in the behavior of organisms,, Working primarily with humansf
these investigators attempt to single out behaviors in which the changes
observed can be systematically and reliably related to the passage of time.
Among1 the "age-developmental" actions that have been studied are grasping,
walking, speaking, and many other skills>,usually displayed by humans
during their first few years of life. The majority of developmental psy-
chologists are concerned with the growth of humans from birth to adoles-
cence, simply because that period encompasses rapid and noticeable changes
in many different kinds of behavior; and because widespread public inter-
eat in child education makes it useful for politicians to channel public
funds into child development research.

So long as developraentalists observe and describe changes in the

behavior of their subjects and try to show that such changes are correl-
ated with the age of the organism, they may be respected as psychologists
and scientists. Unfortunately,, some have been unable to resist the tempt-
ation to seek recognition by imposing elaborate mentalistic theories upon
their data, instead of presenting their findings in the context of inter-
behavioral events. Even more unfortunate is the fact that they have achieved
recognition. This is probably as much the shortcoming of the people these
workers seek to impress (their peers and the money-controllers) as of the
developmentalists themselves! for mentalism is extremely pervasive in our
society, and even otherwise well-educated men have been unable to free them-
selves of this barrier to progress in science. The result has been a coll-
ection of developmental theories which have scientifically indefensible non-
entities as their central referent,
An example is Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development* It is
this theory, as described by Kohlberg in Hoffman & Hoffman (1966, pp. 383-
431) that provides the subject of the present paper. Selected aspects of
Kolhberg' s orientation, theory, and conclusions will be outlined, with cri-
tical comments interspread throughout. The critical perspective will be
that of scientific naturalism, as exemplified by the interbehavioral ap-
proach to psychology (see Kantorf 1963* 19&9) I* seems appropriate, there-
fore, to devote several paragraphs to a brief description of the principles
which form the nucleus of the interbehavioral system of scientific psychology*

Kantor's Psychology

Interbehavioral psychology was founded by JeR. Kantor, a philosopher

of science and historian of psychology* Kantor recognized that the widely
accepted S-R formula of behaviorism could not adequately represent a psy-
chological event, simply because it implies that the stimulus affects, and/
or effects, the response while the response has no effect on the stimulus*
But responses do have effects on the associated stimuli! stimuli and res-
ponse j1njtract. Thus the name terbehavloral oholo v&s used to iden-
tify this new approach, and BS was adopted to symbolize the only legitimate
basic datum of psychology! an event consisting of an interaction between
a stimulus function and a response function* The term "function" is append-
ed to the two key words to emphasize the fact that the effect of a given
stimulus or response need not remain constant across or within situations.
Thus the "function" in a given interbehavioral situation is just as impor-
tant as the response and/or stimulus.

Another core concept of interbehavioral psychology is that of an

inter-behavioral field. No psychological event occurs in a vacuum. Each
is surrounded by an interbehavioral field consisting of getting factors
(including the variables usually manipulated in experimental settings as
"dependent variables", such as age, sex, and deprivation) s the j.ntgr-
behavioral history of tjie organism (including both phylogenetic and onto-
genetic history), and the medium of ontat between the stimulus function
and the response function (sdrTlight, or direct physical contact, for

A third basic idea of Kantor' s system is that of the gcj-gntist-"

observer, who is himself operating in a larger interbehavioral field. In
this larger field, the scientist-observer constitutes the response func-
tion and the inter-behavioral field-event he is observing can be regarded
as the stimulus function. Again, the same kinds of setting factors men-
tioned above are present with respect to this larger interbehavioral field.

An important point is that the scientist-observer always interacts

with the field-event itself; never with constructs or other abstractions
imposed on the original event. When an observer turns to the study of
such abstractions, he can no longer be called a scientist, nor can his
activity be called scientific. Instead, he becomes a rationalistic phil-
osopher, often engaging in the invention of ever more abstract construc-
tions which are inevitably offered as (or taken to be) explanatory prin-
ciples. Unfortunately, the original event is very likely to be completely
forgotten in the process of building models from these abstractions. The
end product is often an elaborate edifice which, though purporting to ex-
plain the original event, succeeds only in demonstrating the model-building
skill of the inventor. In the words of Kantor, "This amounts to a shift
in the problem of investigation. Instead of asking what the original events
are like and how they may be subsumed under precise laws, attention is
directed to the behavior of the experimenter. Even if such a shift results
in the collection of precise and predictable results, it still bespeaks a
weak understanding of the task of research " (1969s P 381). As for ex-
planatory value, the resulting abstractions are worthless hypostatizations
which attempt to explain events by simply re-naming them a procedure that
often fails to satisfy even small children,

Interbehavioral psychology insists on studying events " e without

entangling itself with purely traditional constructions " (Kantorf 19699
p. "576) . The scientific psychologist allows neither hia choice of a re-
search problem nor his interpretation of events to be warped by the myth-
opeic transcendentalism that has dominated Western thought since the inven-
tion of spiritual man by the Church Fathers He resists the efforts of
others to impose the traditional autistic construction "soul" or any of its
many derivatives and surrogates (such as "mind", "will", "character" and
"inner capacities") on his findings,, Instead, the scientist seeks natur-
ajj-jgtic explanations of his data; and the constructs he employs as descrip-
tive aids are always tied directly to the original events or to summations
of them.

Kohlberg' s Orientation

Now that the elements of Interbehavioral Psychology have been pre-

sented a.a the basis for the critical remarks to follow, the discussion of
Kohlberg1 s theory can be undertaken,,

Kohlberg' s description of hia efforts begins with a look at the

past and current approaches to the study of children' s morality* He says
that an interest in morality itself has recently reappeared after a period
of absorption in concern for social adjustments* Here, Kohlberg suggests
that he regards morality to be different from social adjustment. He makes
this very plain when he states;

This increased interest in moral development seems to be

partly the result of recent history, which has sharpened
awareness of the distinction between internal moral devel-
opment and outward socialization and social adjustment.
The barbarities of the Nazi and Stalinist systems and the
hollow lives apparent in our own affluent society have made
it painfully obvious that adjustment to the group is no sub-
stitute for moral maturity. (p. 383) .
To the naturalistic scientist , the phrase "internal moral develop-
ment" raises an immediate and basic question! How can a scientist con-
front internal moral development? The obvious answer is that he cannot.
Internal moral development cannot be an observable event or series of events,
so it must be a construct. As a construct , there is only one way it can
be defensible from the viewpoint of the natural scientists it must be
derived directly from interbehavioral events, and defined very strictly
in terms of such natural events* It must be asked whether Kohlbergfs
idea of internal moral development meets this simple criterion,, In several

statements Kohlberg reveals that he regards internal moral development
as anything but a derivation from natural events* For example,, he asserts
that "Morality has generally been defined as 2Si5f as a set of cul-
tural rules of social action which have been jlntegmlized by the individual.
Moral development has been conceived as the increase in such iniM2.alizati.on
of basic cultural rules " (p. 384? emphasis added)* More to the pointt
Kohlberg says that the focus of recent (his own) work and that of Piaget has
been upon the judgemental side of moral developments "...the internaliza~
tion of a standard implied a csajaajxLty. to judgements in terms of that
standard " (p 384) In these two quotes there is no reference to any
natural event; no hint that such terms as "internalization of rules" and
"capacity to make judgements" have any references in the world of observ-
able events. These items are apparently offered as common sense entities
which everyone knows exist, but which no one can define* It appears, then,,
that Kohlberg departs from natural science at the outset of his investiga-
tion, by choosing a mentalistic non-entity as the central focus of his re-
search. The fact that he regards morality as something apart from naturally
occuring events is underscored heavily when he says that much moral research
has not been specifically addressed to a "distinctive set of questions basic
to researchers, and educated men alike", but rather "has viewed morality as
a type of social behavior learned like any other social behavior " (p 385)
It could not be plainer that Kohlberg believes he is dealing with a trans-
spatial entity, which, like the soul, has the miraculous ability to influence
environmental events while remaining perfectly isolated from them* His sel-
ection of a research problem has been profoundly affected by traditional
Western spiritism.

Kohlberg' s View _of_JMoral_Cha.racter

After outlining his opinions regarding the meaning of morality,

Kohlberg devotes several pages to a consideration of moral character and
moral conduct. He begins by offering several definitions of "character"
which have been used by psychologists at one time or another! from the
vacuous evasion "sum total of a set of virtues", to the more precise "ad-
hering to cultural norms of action where such adherence involves effort,
self-control, or sacrifice." He then says that "Psychologists have agreed
with common opinion that moral character traits should be assessed from
actions, rather than from judgements or feelings " (p. 386). Ciiting the
work of Rau (1965) and Hartshorne & May (1928-1930), he admits that experi-
mental evidence gives no basis for the notion of stable character traits
such as"honesty". For example, these experiments demonstrated that sltua-
tional factors (setting factors) were more important than supposed "honesty"
in predicting cheating behavior* But Kohlberg is not satisfied. He cites
Burton's (1963) factor analysis of the Hartshorne & May data which "...
indicated a snail general factor in the various experimental tests of class-
room cheating " (p. 38?) Kohlberg takes this as evidence for a stable
"personality factor" which is "more general than a specific attitude toward
honesty or fear of getting caught " (p 367). As if this were not a suffic-
iently Olympian leap of faith, he goes on to assert that "These findings sug-
gest a core of truth to common senae notions of general good character,, and

provide some justification for adding up measures of various aspects of
moral conduct into a total assessment of moral character " (p. 387)

Here we have seen an example of how the mystical transcendentalism

of the Patristics continues to enthrall twentieth-century thinkings In the
face of hard data to the contrary, Kohlberg still managed to rescue the
cherished notion of a supernaturally-existing "character" which is just
another name for the construction dreamed up by Hellenistic thinkers as
Man's answer for alls the soul*

Having saved "moral character" from death due to the demonstration

of its non-existence, Kohlberg is then able to go on to a discussion by sosie
different ways of defining it,, He begins by considering the notion of charac-
ter as "superego strength", another name for "strength of conscience*" He
says this conception fares badly because "Conformity to a moral rule has not
been found to bear much relationship to the strength of stated belief in that
rule " (p. 388) He does not let this pass unqualified, however^ In a
footnote he states "The relationships between moral judgments and moral con-
duct are more complex than these negative findings suggest, and will be dis-
cussed in detail later" (pe 388)* The promised detail consists of a rather
artful argument in which Kohlberg attempts to convince his readers that while
moral judgments and moral conduct are very different, it is still possible
to infer a common developmental process for them. He saysi "The fact that
when the chips are down children do not do what they say does not mean that
development of judgment and developjnent of conduct go along on two indepen-
dent tracks, however. Verbal judgments may not be trustworthy reports of
conduct but they may still reflect the same basic developmental process "
(p, 408). This statement occurs right after Kohlberg has stated that moral
judgment does not show until early adolescence while moral conduct appears
to develop earlyi that moral judgment seems to exhibit general and stable
individual differences while conduct is situation-specific! and that moral
judgment develops in the same direction across cultures while moral conduct
develops in line with social groups* In spite of careful re-readingf it is
impossible to escape the conclusion that Kohlberg has seriously contradicted
himself with respect to a fundamental.hypothesis of his theory* In one state-
ment he points out three major differences between the development of moral
judgment and that of moral conduct; and in the next he blithely says they
reflect the same basic developmental process. This behavior indicates that
it is highly unlikely that an^ event could have led Kohlberg to abandon his
exceptionally strong insistence on the existence of a transcendent moral

Following his dismissal of the "superego" view of character, Kohlberg

looks at the interpretation of moral character as "good habits". This view,
he says, is typified by the parental faith that exposure to Sunday school,
Boy Scoutse and other character-education situations will build character.
He cites 'several studies which fail to support such an idea* He goes on to
say that there are contradictory findings with respect to the effect of

of punishment and reward on resistance to temptation* True to his spiritual-
istic philosophy, he concludes by asserting that "e,direct training and phys-
ical types of punishment may be effective in producing short-run situational
conformity but do not directly produce general internalized habits of moral
character carried into later lifes carried outside the home, or carried into
permissive situations,," (p 589) Once again Kohlberg proclaims the existence
of a mystical entity, which transcends situational factors. The argument seems
to bei "If it can be affected by environmental variations, it can't be the real
thing." This is the same iraperviousness to scientific investigation that was
given to the soul of Man (and to the essence of God) by the Church Fathers in
the first and second centuries after Christ. As Kantor (1963? p. 228) put it,
"...the greatest and most authentic realities are those that cannot be grasped,
pictured, or understood. It is such realities that are of interest to Chris-
tianity in its philosophic aspects. And it was interest in these realities
that engendered the Christian scorn for evidence and reasoning based upon obser-
vation," Kohlberg stands as an example of a present-day victim of this anti-
scientific philosophy which has either stifled, misdirected, or controverted
naturalistic investigation in every field of scientific inquiry for nearly nin-
tfe&n centuries.

Having demonstrated once again the primacy of faith ovettlatas Kohlberg

turns to the merits of viewing character as "ego strength". This, he says,
roughly corresponds to what is commonly termed "strength of will", and is pre-
sumed to include the ability to assess long-range outcomes of actions and to
delay immediate gratification in favour of greater future reward. Also included
is the ability to put oneself in the place of another, Kohlberg says that
"In psychoanalytic theory, these factors of will, foresight, and empathy are
included with other aspects of decision-making and emotional control in the
concept of "ego-strength." (p. 390),

Kohlberg then cites some studies which he views as supporting the ego-
strength interpretation of moral character. The first is a factor analysis
of character ratings among adults done by Webb (1915) which yielded a "will-
factor". Next, he points out that Hartshome and May'(1950), founfl persistence
and nondistractibility on achievement tests to be correlated with the moral
traits ofhonasty and service. He says these early findings are supported by
more recent factor-analytic investigations and by a study by Peck and Havi-
ghurst (i960) in which ego-strength ratings given by psychologist to 35 small
city adolescents "...correlated well (r = .69) with total moral character
scores (honesty, responsibility, loyalty, courage, friendliness) as rated by
community informants (schoolmates, teachers, and other adults) " (p 390).
Kohlberg admits the obviousj that it is "...quite possible that these correl-
ations were inflated by halo effects, since the raters had some knowledge of
the moral character ratings " (p. 390). In spite of the admission, he insists
on the validity of the ego-strength idea by adding, "Nevertheless, the correl-
ations with any other 'good1 aspects of personality " (p. 390). This estab-
lished, he lists five different types of ego-strength variables, and describes
correlational studies which relate each of them to some aspect of moral behav-

ior. As might be expected, the five classes of variables are all as amorphous
as ego-strength itself Consider the list; Intelligence, capacity to antic-
ipate future events, capacity to maintain focused attention, capacity to control
unsocialized fantasies, and satisfaction with self and environment* All five
types of ego-strength variables refer to some inner capacity or state of the
individual Though such constructs may be interpreted as having been derived
from natural events, the following quote leaves no doubt that Kohlberg follows
the mainstream of spiritistic philosophy by forgetting (or ignoring) the events
while giving the constructs an existence independent of them;

The above findings (those outlined above by the present

authors), in the aggregate, provide some support for the
interpretation of moral character as ego, rather than super-
ego, strength. This interpretation implies that the major
consistencies in moral conduct represent decision-making
capacities rather than .fixed behavior traits. It is thus
consistent with the findings on situational variation, which
suggestedthat moral conduct was the product of a situational
decision,, (pp. 391-392).

Kohlberg has not only reified the construct "decision-making capacities", he

has put it in actual control of the very behavior from which it was originally

At this point in Kohlberg1 s chapter, it is clear that he subscribes

to the ego-strength view of moral character. Kohlberg is then ready to discuss
attempts to fix the age at which moral character is formed. He concludes that
although experimental investigations have indicated that moral behavior as
measured by stealing and cheating are not age-related, and although adult's
ratings of moral character-traits of children also fail to vary regularly
with age, these negative findings could result from the fact that "...morally
conforming conduct poorly represents underlying moral attitudes or 'moral con-
trol1" (pp 59?-393) Yet again, Kohlberg has implied that events are
nothing compared to mystical constructs.

The Developmental Theory of Moral

. Judgement

It is from this philosophic orientation, steeped in the transcend-

entalism of Plotinus and St. Augustine, that Kohlberg approaches his inves-
tigation of morality. At the outset, he declares his intention to ignore
events in favour of constructs: "While moral behavior has not lent itself
to age-developmental analysis, the study of moral judgement has readily
suggested basic stages of development " (p. 394). This is underscored by
another statement made by Kohlberg in the same paragraph, in which he says
that moral knowledge scores (presumably based on the behavior of saying the
rules) "... seem primarily to indicate intelligence, cultural background, and
desire to make a good impression, rather than basic moral development " (p. 394)

It could not be plainer that Kohlberg regards events as superficial and unim-
portant compared to spiritistic constructions such as "basic moral development".
Yet he is forced to rely on events (verbal iriterbehavior) as the fundamental
data of his investigations. As an example of this kind of data, Kohlberg offers
the reply of ten-year-old Danny, who was asked whether he ould tell his father
about a transgression of his brother. Danny's reply was ambivalent, pointing
out that if he didn't, he might be spanked by his father; but if he did, he
could get beaten up by his brother. Kohlberg lays his "other-wordly" orienta-
tion bare when he declares? "Obviouslyf whether Danny decides it is right to
maintain authority or right to maintain peer 'loyalty' is of little interest
compared to the fact that his decision will be based on his anticipation of
who can hit harder " (p, 394). It is apparent that Kohlberg has exactly re-
versed the priorities of interest. Danny's behavior in an actual conflict sit-
uation (the ultimate outcome of any decision he makes) is what must be dealt
with, not "internal processes" inferred from his verbalizations,

Kohlberg's Goal and Method

Kohlberg indicates that his research has as its immediate goal the
understanding of responses to hypothetical moral conflict stories-which are
characteristic of an age group. Such research, according to him, involved
analysis of the underlying thought structures found at differentages in order
to discover general developmental directions. Both the goal itself and the
type of analysis employed raise serious questions.

Regarding the goal, what is meant by "understanding"? Kohlberg

implies that "understanding" goes hand in hand with the ability to isolate
contributing factors. Thus "understanding" implies "ability to manipulate".
Perhaps Kohlberg would object strongly to so utilitarian a view of the
term "understanding", but it must be admitted that such a view removes the
undesirable vagueness inherent in the term. It may now be inferred that
Kohlberg proposes to discover variables that influence children' s statements
concerning hypothetical moral conflict situations. This is an entirely comm-
endable proposal, consistent with naturalistic investigation. Unfortunately,
it will later become clear that Kohlberg completely loses sight of the simplic-
ity and boundedness of the original behavioral field-events he observed, and
somehow convinced himself he was dealing with such transcendental non-entities
as morality, conscience, a.nd universal human values.

His intention to analyze underlying thought structures simply reflects

his spiritistic approach. Even though he has no choice but to study verbal
behavior, he says he is examining "thought structures". Again, a rejection
of events in favour of constructs is apparent. For Kohlberg, the construct
has become the basic stuff of research possible because constructs may be
divorced from theevents they were originally intended to summarize or illuminate,
and can be linguistically tailored to fit theoretical orientations much more
readily than data. (Perhaps this is the basis for the expression "hard data"
-- data is "hard" in the sense that it cannot be stretched or compressed by
linguistic machinations as can fluid constructs).

Kohlberg'a Categorization of Moral Judgement

Kohlberg defines six general types of moral orientation, each of which

"could be defined in terms of its specific stance on 32 aspects of morality"
(p. 400).

The three "stages of morality" and the six orientations subsumed under
them stand out as an example of imposing' constructs on events,, In the ordinary
practice of science, it is perfectly legitimate to derive constructs from events
so long as the events retain their primacy and the constructs remain merely sum-
marizing agents. In the present case, the events are verbal responses of boys
to hypothetical conflict situations imposed under specific conditions by specific
persons. It is highly unlikely that such grand and complex constructs as "naive
instrumental hedonism" and "morality of individual principles of conscience" can
be shown to have been deriygd from such circumscribed events. Instead, mythopeic
constructions founded in the folklore of the sociocultural matrix were imposed
on the events, so that the boundedness of the original interbehavioral event-field
is forgotten in favour of the nearly limitless scope of the spiritistic constructs.

To show how each orientations might be defined in terms of its "specific

stance on 32 aspects of morality", Kohlberg offers an example of the definition
of the six orientations in terms of aspect 10, "Motivation for Rule Obedience
or Mpral Action."s

Orientation Is Obey rules to avoid punishment.

Orientation ?:.' Conform to obtain rewards, have favours
returned, and so on.
Orientation 5s Conform to avoid disapproval, dislike by others.
Orientation 4: Conform to avoid censure by legitimate author-
ities and resultant guilt.
Orientation 5s Conform to maintain respect of impartial spec-
tator judging in terms of community welfare.
Orientation 6: Conform to avoid self-condemnation.
(p. 400)

It will be noticed that each "definition" can be derived linguistically

from each orientation, in complete absence of any contact with events. As such,
they do not constitute definitions at all, but are merely re-statements, expan-
sions, or reconstructions of the constructs.

Kohlberg then presents a figure which shows how the percentage of re-
sponses reflecting each of the six orientations changes as age changes (p, 403).
On the whole, the figure shows that the greater percentage (more than 70%)
of the responses of seven-year-olds were classified as reflecting Orientation 1,
while practically none reflected Orientation 6, and only slightly more reflected
Orientation 4 For boys of age 10, Orientation-1 responses were only about
3?% of thetotal, while Orientation-4 responses accounted for more than 15%
Orientation-6 responses were still essentially non-existent for these boys*

In the 15-year-old group, Orientation-4 responses accounted for about 32%,
while Orientation-1 commanded only about 12%. Some Orient at ion-6 responses ap-
peared in thisgroup, comprising about, 4% of the total. Among boys of age, 16,
the last age shown, Orientation-4 responses were still the moat prevalent,
taking around M% of the total, with Orientation-1 taking only about 11% and
Orientation-^ about 5% One should be careful not to forget that these data
do not represent successive observations of the same boys at four age levels.
Rather, the data at each age level is obtained from a different group of boys*

Kohlberg asks how "level of maturity of moral judgement" (as disting-

uished from "intellectual maturity") might be defined. His answer is; "...a
more mature judgement is a more moral judgement . This does not mean that a
child who utters mature judgements is a more moral person, as judged by the
standards of his community,, It means that his judgements more closely corres-
pond to genuine moral judgements as these have been defined by philosophers. "
(p. 405). According to Kohlberg, most philosophers agree that moral judgements
are those which concern the "good" and the "right" of actions. Kohlberg himself
takes this definitions a step further by suggesting that many pronouncements
about the "good" and "right" are not moral judgements; rather, they are esthetic^
prudential, or technological evaluations. In contrast to such statements, he
says, "...moral judgements tend to be universal, inclusive, consistent, and to
be grounded on objective, impersonal, or ideal grounds " (p. 405) He cites
his own work (Kohlberg, 1958) in support of that statement.

The usefulness of Kohlberg 1 s definition of a moral judgement as dis-

tinct from esthetic or other judgements lies in the fact that a statement may
be labelled a genuine moral judgement without regard to whether the examiner
agrees with the judgement.

Developmental Trends in Moral Judgement

Kohlberg says that the trend of development in Western culture is to-

ward a greater frequency of genuine more judgements, &e further states that
"...such an interpretation of the direction of moral judgement implies that the
development is in many ways the same, regardless of the child's nation (in
western culture), social class, peer group, or sex While such a belief flies
in the face of prevalent notions of unlimited cultural relativism, it is somewhat
supported by empirical evidence " (p. 406). The evidence is inferred from
studies of various groups by Piaget (specific studies notcited) and Kohlberg
(1964). Kohlberg adds that "The statement that the same stages of judgement
were found means that children's answers could be categorized the same with-
out overlooking obviously new kinds of responses, that individual children
were consistent in stage regardless of group membership, and that the age order
of the stages was the same in all social groups " (p. 406).

Here, Kohlberg is to be commended for remaining close to the original

interbehavioral events he observed (the children's answers) and his own inter-
behavior with them (catergorization into stages). Nevertheless, it is doubt-
ful that his discovery of age-related differences in the count of verbalizations

that he considers to fall into certain self-created categories "flies in the
face of prevalent notions of unlimited cultural relativism," regardless of
whether or not such -differences are observed across many cultural groxips.
Few people are likely to dispute that age-related differences in the count of
moral statements which "tend to be universal, inclusive, consistent, and to be
grounded on objective, impersonal or ideal grounds" (pe 405) will be found
across cultures. But the most parsimonious explanation of these differences
is that a child must jlearn to verbalize about hypothetical constructs such as
"universal ideals" ; further,, a child must jLearn to verbalize in a manner that
will be described by others as "inclusive, consistent, objective, and imperson-
al." There is no reason to believe that such learning would not be age-related
in any and all cultures.

jBocial Influences on the Development of Moral Judgement

Kohlberg continues to take issue with the idea that social groups deter-
mine moral development by asserting that his findings indicate participation
in various social groups merely stimulates the "development, of basic moral
values", rather than causing "conflicting developmental trends in morality "
(p. 407). As he puts it,

The child lives in a total social world in which

perceptions of the law, of the peer group, and of
parental teachings all influence one another. While
various people and groups make conflicting
damands upon the child, they do not seem to present
the child with basically con Licting or different
general moral values. In the course of "normal"
development, the conflicts between the demands of
groups and individuals constitute the material for
the discrimination and development of such general
moral values."
(p. 407)

The problem here is that Kohlberg has yet again deluded himself into
believing he is examining the unexaminable. His reference to "conflicting
immediate demands" made by various groxrps seems to be a reference to a con-
crete interbehavioral event. But in spite of his own admission that different
groups make conflicting demands on the behavior of the child, he maintains
that these different groups share the same basic set of "general moral values."
This can be seen as a denial that general moral values influence the behavior
of the group. If such values had any effect, the behavior of the different
groups with respect to these values would be the same .(because they share the
same "general moral values"), and no group would make conflicting demands on
the behavior of its members. Apparently, Kohlberg has again contradicted
himself while trying to make a crucial point. It seems very inconsistent with
ordinary logic to assert that different groups will demand different kinds
of moral behavior if their definitions of moral behavior are the same. Con-
versely, the fact that they do demand different kinds of moral behavior nec-
essarily implies that their definitions of moral behavior differ.

The difficulty here probably stems from the fact that Kohlberg has
simply ignored actual events (behavior labelled as "moral" and the act of
defining and labelling such behavior) in order to discuss impressive-
sounding mystical nonentities like "general moral values". One of the most
useful properties of such transcendent constructions is their complete immunity
to scientific and logical practice. With this immunity,, they can be endowed
with whatever attribute seems convenient. In the present case, one finds
that "general moral values" do not affect the behavior of groups (because they
behave differently even though they ostensibly share the same values); nor
are the ".general moral values" of a group member affected by the behavior of
the group. Yet the behavior of the groups "constitute,5 the material for the
discrimination and development of such general moral values" of the member
(p. 4-07). So it can be seen that "general moral values" are shaped by the
behavior of groups while remaining unaffected by that behavior* In addition,
"general moral values" are the same across the groups that provide material
for their discrimination and development* Such contradictory attributes cannot
be denied, because they describe a linguistic invention, a name without a
referent in the naturalistic world. It is the privilege of the inventor of
such constructs to endow them with any attributes he wishes} without regard to
the logical restrictions associated with mundane events. These non-entities
transcend all such restrictions , and their users take full advantage of this
property to make their arguments unassailable. Whether known to their users
or not, these constructs can always be exposed as thinly-veiled linguistic
substitutes for the soul. These autistic constructions continue the purpose
of the soul: they give the human his godlike attributes, separating him once
and for all from non-human creatures.

Satisfied that he has made his point with respect to the development
of moral judgement, Kohlberg turns next to the development of "guilt" and
"other reactions to transgression". He considers these to be important aspects
or morality, but not central components. The story is much the same| the basic
data (responses of children to hypothetical situations) are largely ignored,
while menfcalistic constructs like "capacity for internal guilt" assume central
importance. Thus story-completion responses of children are seen as indicating
either "moral anxiety", "true guilt", or something in between the internal
moral reaction of self-criticism and the externally focused anxiety represented
by a preoccupation with punishment" (p. 4-11).
After discussing the effects of punishment on the development of guilt
reactions, Kohlberg concludes that "successful study of the role of early
punishment and genetically primitive forms of guilt in later conscience devel-
opment may require extensive longitudinal study" (p. 413). It is doubtful
that the most extensive longitudinal development will do more than clarify
the effects of early punishment on later behaviors. The development of conscience
will remain a matter for dualistic philosophers and tieologians to discuss.
There is no way for natural events, no matter how carefully and extensively
observed, to yield information concerning supernatural inventions.

Kohlberg turns next to a. discussion of the theory that guilt is depen-
dent on the child's identification with, or taking the role of, the wronged
or punishing other. In general, his interpretation of these theories is that
"...positive and affectional relations to others are in general conducive to
role-taking and acceptance of social standards " (p. 414). He also states that
such a relationship need not be with a parents "...a child should more readily
accept the values of an adult who is liked or accepted..." (p. 414) He then
says, "The greater acceptance of moral standards by warmly treated children does
not appear to lead to greater moral control in terms of these standards, how-
ever." (p. 414).

The problem with Kohlberg's interpretation of the "identification" the-

ories of guilt acqtiisition is that it centers on the child's acceptance of the
"moral standards" of the adult, which according to Kohlberg, is not reflected
by "moral control". One is led to the inference that "acceptance" is gauged
by verbal interactions with the child, while "control" is measured by situa-
tional behavior and ratings. Seen this way, the assertion that "acceptance"
does not, lead to "control"-is very similar to the earlier statement that "...
when the chips are down, children do not do what they say..." (p. 408).
It is not surprising to find Kohlberg emphasizing what they say ("acceptance
of moral standards")over what they do("moral control").

Summary and Conclusions

The present paper has offered a critical review of Lawrence Kohlberg's

theory of the development, of moral judgement as he described it in Hoffman A
Hoffman (1964). Criticisms were presented from the viewpoint of interbehav~
ioral psychology (Kantor; 19^3 19&9) ^ne central concepts of interbehavioral
psychology were outlined, including the interbehavioral field-event, the
scientist-observer, the primacy of events over constructs, and the rejection
of dualistic assumptions. Following the sketch of Kantor's psychology, Kohlberg1s
orientation to the study of morality wa0 examined and found to be grossly spir-
itistic. Next, Kohlberg's developmental theory of moral judgement was analyzed
on the basis of his own description of it. Included in this analysis were an
example of his basic data and a brief look at his methodology. Then attention
was given to his categorization of moral judgement, and the notion of develop-
mental trends in moral judgement. Finally Kohlberg's views concerning the devel-
opment ofguilt were briefly mentioned.

At every point in the analysis, Kohlberg's work was seen to be thoroughly

inundated with dualistic assumptions. Such assumptions were apparent from the
outset, when Kohlberg implied that, "internal moral development" must be under-
stood, rather than "outward social adjustment". This spiritistic orientation
removes his work from the realm of scientific psychology and relegates it to
idealistic philosophy. In the words of Kantor (1969* PP. 376-377)

While scientists in their investigations can hardly escape
contacts with events, they can be so influenced by historical
traditions as to select data andproblems prejudicially and to
employ methods that tend to distort the knowledge gained by
the research. The worst consequence, obviously, is the emer-
gence of the belief that what one is studying is something
entirely different from the original events which suggested
the problem to be investigated in the first place,

In addition to continually giving mystical constructs primacy over

natural events, Kohlberg was found to have seriously contradicted himself
with respect to the major points of his theory. The most serious contradiction
occurred when he asserted that the development of moral judgement and the devel-
opment of moral conduct are the same, after previously listing three dimensions
along which they show different developmental patterns* Other contradictions
appeared when he argued that moral judgement ia unlearned, yet arises from efforts
of the child to "make sense" of his environment,, One further contradiction
occurred when he stated that different groups make conflicting moral demands on
a child, but that these groups share the same moral values*

In each instance, it was pointed out that the contradictions arose as

a consequence of Kohlberg' s insistence on dealing with ethereal constructions
rather than with the field-events he actually observed. When dealing with ling-
uistic constructs that name spiritistic non-entities, such contradictions can
be termed "paradoxes" (as if calling them paradoxes added anything to knowledge),
But .in the world of natural events, contradictions are a warning that something
is wrong. In Kohlberg1 3 case, the thingthat is wrong is his attempt to force
events to correspond to prefabricated autistic construction.

Though his enthrallment by traditional Christian doctirnes prevented

him from seeing his data in its naturalistic field, his data stand out as a
valuable contribution to psychology. His records of the verbal responses to
hypothetical moral dilemmas of many children of different ages living in var-
ioTis societies can be used to clarify the factors influencing such interbehav-
ior and to illuminate the relation between these verbalizations and the acts of


Burton, R . V , The generality of honesty reconsidered, Psvcholgl_cal

Jteview, 196?, 70, 481-500.

Hartshorne, H. and May, M. A. Stiuyjgg^jji^^jy^^ s

Vol. I, StudJ_esJ.n__Dcei_t; Vol. II, Studies in Self-Control;
Vol. Ill, Studies in the Organization of Character^ jjew yorks
MacMillan, 1928-1930,

H o f f m a n , L.W. , and Hoffman, M.L., (eda.) Revj.ew_j>f_J]hijLd_J)evelogmgnt
f Vol. ?. Hartford, Conn.; RuaselL Sage Foundation, 1966.

Karitor, J . H . ZtiLJi2JJ!ILLLlllJELJ^ Vol.. J . Chicago?

The I ' r i n o i p i a l'r<8n, 19&9*

Kohlherg, L. The development, of modes of moral thinking and choice in

the years ten to sixteen. Unp\iblished doctoral dissertation,
University of Chicago, 195^.,

Koh-lberg, L. The development of children's orientation toward a moral

order: T.I. Social experience, social, conduct, and the develop-
ment of moral thought, Vj1ta.Huniana!, 1964^(in press at time of
citation in Hoffman & Hoffman) ~.

Peck, R.P., & Havighurst, R . J . ^2^S^S^122^L^I^^^l^L^^S}^S^[lie

New Yorks Wiley, I960.

Ran, L. Conscience and identification. In R . R . Sears, L. Rau, & R. Alpert,

Identification and_^ Stanford, Gal.: Stanford
University Press.

Webb, B. Character and. intelligence. Bri_tish_jlol!^

J^nographSup^plement, 1915? 1

folume 6
Number 3
Summer 1975


It is a commonplace that psychology as one of the sciences is the study of

sueh activities as seeing^ hearing! learning, remembering, thinking, desir-
ing, reasoning, and so on* It is also common knowledge that whenever an
organism performs psychological activity, it is interacting with something
under specific conditions. Normally one does not see or hear unless one sees
some object or hears a sound,, One does not plan unless one plans some action,
some work, some project or some vacation. These things and conditions with
which one interacts are conventionally called stimuli. Such stimuli are
said to elicit or incite the organism's behavior. It is more accurate, how-
ever, to think of stimuli as coordinate actions which occur in a single com-
plex event. Because all psychological events consists of just such inter-
actions of organisms and stimlus objects we may therefore describe psychology
as the study of the interbehavior of organisms with things and events. Since
the interbehavior of organisms and objects consists of specific reciprocal
actions called function we may describe psychology as the investigation of
the interbehavior of responses and stimlus functions,
J. R. Kantor & N. W. Smiths THE SCIENCE
Principia Press, Chicago, 1975* p. 3.

The precise nature of human nature has over the ages been the target of
thinkers. As a symbolic reference to an early date we may refer to the
delineation by Theophrastus (370-287 B. C.) of various human traits. From
the standpoint of interbehavioral psychology, the invalidity of all such
attempts is owing to the organocentrism of locating essential qualities
solely in the organism* Scholars sought for causes in responding organisms
without regard to the events in which they participate. According to inter-
behavioral psychology, human nature is interbehavior and interbehavior is
always a complex event that can only be described as ways organisms adjust
themselves to things, whether organic or inorganic. It follows then that
the capacities of organims and their performances are evolved during their
contacts with stimulus objects in the various stages of their interbehav..
ioral histories,....Human nature is experience and circumstance* The char-
acter of a person is a function of his interbehavioral history and the im-
mediate circumstances that surround him It is these two factors that in-
fluence his character as an idealist, pragmatist, man of honor, thief, ex-
pert j dunce, compiler, protestant, thinker, practitioner, and so on through-
out all the categories of mankind.
Ibid., -492-493

Crude Data investigative Contact Scientific Construction



The revision of A SURVEY OF THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY published in 1933

and now revised under the title THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTERBEHAV-
IORAL SURVEY is now available. A separate announcement is being included
with this issue of the Ooaarterly.

William Stephenson whose views have many points in common with inter-
behaviorism has published "Methodology of the Single Case Studies", Journal.
I,Q. by Leon J.' Kamin, published by Wiley, can be added to the .list of
those beginning to question the absoluteness of intelligence, David Layzer
provides a worthwhile review of the book in Scientifi^J^^rica^if July 1975.
Layzer himself has an article on the subject in ScJ.ence? 1974., 183 , 1259-
1266, Stephenson considers the Layzer work in his article.
Beginning with this issue the Quarterly is enhanced by the services of
two new associate editors ; Donna Cone and Ronald Heyduk. Any commentaries
or contributed materials may 'be addressed to any of the three editors.
Even with additional assistance this periodical must continue to rely on
its readers for contributions. If a book or article strikes you as news-
worthy positively or negatively or you wish to comment on anything on the
current scene or see something quotable please let the editors know,. If
a student writes a paper that might be suitable it could f;nd its place
beside those of other students that have appeared in these pages.

The Midwestern Association of Behavior Analysts has asked us to make the

following announcement*,

The Midwestern Association of Behavior Analysis announces its Second Annual

Convention to be held at the Blackstone Hotel in Chicago, May 1-4- , 1976.
FiABA is an interdisciplinary group of professionals, paraprofessionals, and
students who are interested in the experimental and/or applied analysis of
behavior. The purpose of the convention is to provide a forum for the
presentation of papers, symposia, and workships concerning all aspects of
behavior analysis. Included in the program will be invited addresses, con-
versation hours, slide shows, and films. The First Annual MBA Convention
was successful in bringing together over 1200 persons interested in behav-
ior analysis. Attendance for the Second Annual Convention is estimated to
be approximately 2000. Those persons interested in making a presentation
or attending the 1976 convention should write for information to: MABA,
Department of Psychology, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan

The paper by Jacqueline Farrington Kelley is the fourth to appear in the

Newsletter/Quarterly. The earlier ones were 1970, 1(3), 1971, 2(5), 1972,
COMMENT; Operatlonism vs. Operational Definitions

Modern psychologists seem to be always on the defensive when dealing with

members of the more traditional sciences. Somewhere near the beginning of the
course, students of introductory psychology are given a detailed list of the rea-
sons why psychology is a science. If one of the fledlings possesses the temerity
to ask how psychology can measure mental events, the typical answer is "We can
measure anything as long as we define it operationally".

Since 1928, when the physiciist P.W. Bridgman first discussed operationism,
scientists as a group and psychologists in particular have felt obligated to oper-
ationally define their terms. The difficulty of doing this has largely been for-
gotten although it was clearly recognized by S.S. Stevens in Chapter I of what has
surely emerged as the King James version of the modern experimental psychologists'
Bible, Handbook of Experimental Psychology. On page 3 of this 1951 work, Stevens
makes the following observation:

"It is generally accepted that semantical rules should be in the nature of

operational definitions but the problem of contriving definitions that meet the
operational test of meaning is, as Bridgman showed in 1928, a serious, difficult
business. It is easy enough to say "Let jc represent the ratio of responsibility
to liberalism', but it is hard to know what, if anything, we are talking about."

Certainly one of the most famous, and most ridiculous, misuses of operational
definitions is: "Intelligence is whatever intelligence tests measure". The sole
value of that statement is to remind the psychometrician of the limits he places
on himself by the particular test he chooses.

The problems of misuse of operational definitions in psychology can be largely

avoided if the psychologist derives the operationally defined terms at the proper
time in the sequence of events comprising an experiment. Step 1 in the planning
of a psychological experiment is crucial. The behavior which constitutes the
subject of study must be p sychologically meaningful, as determined by observation
of the organisms involved. The study then must be designed to further elucidate
natural events known to be of interest and importance and must not be designed to
demonstrate the existence of some traditional concept which non-scientists have
used to fill the gaps in their explanations of behavior. The writings of such
early intelligence testers as Sir Francis Galton reveal that the latter was their
purpose. Intelligence tests were to be used to confirm the inferiority of women
and savages, indeed, all who were not of the noble class. While somewhat less
chauvinistic in intent, the early intelligence tests of Ebbinghous, Binet, Terman,
Wechsler and others were designed to provide a "scientific" means of classifying
individuals. Too often these instruments have been used to confirm the traditional
biases of special interest groups.

What then is the proper way of defining intelligence? First, it must be ask-
ed if intelligent behavior is a type of behavior one notes when observing people
interacting with certain stimulus objects in certain settings. If there is some-
thing there, such as adeptness at dealing with a variety of formal problems or
quicktiess at learning new tasks, then controlled situations must be set up to study
these phenomena. After extensive study, it may be possible to derive tests which
will identify individuals who will respond in a predicatable way in a given setting.
Operational definitions are to be used in setting up the conditions for study and
in specifying the exact role to be played by the observer or experimenter. This
constitutes good technique and guarantees that undesired fluctuations from setting
to setting are kept to a minimum.

When operationism is used by the psychologist as a part of his definition of

the experimental or observational set-up and of his role in it, it is being used
properly. Operationism is also being used properly when it serves to remind the
scientist of just how far he can validly generalize his results. Operationism is
being improperly used when it makes it possible for the scientist to create events
which exist only as verbalizations of individuals working in the dualistic tradition
of our culture.

Operationism is also a poor servaftt of the scientist when it leads him to

doubt the reality of the world around him. In a recent article published in the
Mexican Journal of Behavior Analysis (1965, 1, 31-38), J.R. Kantor discusses how
Bridgman himself practiced "the worst kind of metaphysics" (p.36). Kantor details
Bridgman's move to a nihilism in which he concludes in his 1936 work, The Nature of
Physica.1 The_ory_: "What we mean by physical reality is to a large extent a matter
of convention and convenience" (p.120). The same can be said for what psycholo-
gists have meant by intelligence.

As stated earlier, the key to the proper usage of operationism lies in the
scientist's manner of planning and executing an experiment or observation. Op-
erational (i.e., measurable) definitions of the participants and their roles must
be made in order to realize good technique. But this technical skill must not be
allowed to shake the scientists' basic assumption that the world, including him-
self, is a conglomerate of natural events subject to study by the most mundane

Donna M e Cone

That existence is, the single case in operation should9 of course? be the
primary concern of psychology and psychiatry.
William Stephenson:
"Methodology of Single Case Studies"

As one whose inclinations never allow for issues relating to the

history and systems of the discipline to be ignored for long, the psy-
chologist with an interbehaviora1 orientation is compelled occasionally
to reflect upon current trends in the conceptualization of behavior and
its determinants, and especially upon the status of the interbehaviora1
perspective with respect to the psychological Zeitgeist. Following my
recent acceptance of an associate editorship of the Quarterly, I took
some time to collect my thoughts on these matters, much as I did five
years earlier as I neared the end of my graduate studies. In great
contrast to the optimism about the future of interbehaviorism in scien-
tific psychology that I expressed then in the recently initiated News-
letter (Volume 1, Number 3, May 1970), my more recent conclusion is a
less hopeful one, and only partly, I suspect, as a.result of my loss
of graduate school innocence!

It appears to me now that any inroads the interbehaviora1 perspec-

tive may have made in recent years are more than balanced by movements
toward a more widespread acceptance of mentalistic descriptions and
explanations of psychological events. In fact, a survey of current psy-
chological media led me to conclude that mentalism, in its disguise as
brain reductionist^ has a wider appeal now than a few years ago as a
result of the proliferation of new introductory texts and popular psy-
chology magazines that capitalize upon the dramatic appeal of recent
discoveries in physiological psychology. The common characteristic of
these publications is that the brain is firmly entrenched as a surrogate
for the mind, endowed with the same supernatural abilities to independent-
ly determine, initiate, and even perform acts of the whole organism.
Furthermore, given the existing reductionistic bias, new discoveries of
intraorganismic influences upon interbehavior are interpreted as addition-
al "proof" that the brain is the locus of behavior determination, and
thus the initial assumptions effectively direct their own strengthening
in a never-end process.

As much as the interbehaviora1 psychologist might wish to observe

and report the rampant mentalism of modern psychology with the objectivity
of a scientist, it is difficult to avoid discouragement over the fact
that after a full half-century of spiritualistic preconceptions muddling
the research and conclusions of empirical psychologists, we are no closer
to eliminating them than we were when behaviorists first offered their
hopeful but finally inadequate antidote. If, then, psychologists have
failed and continue to fail so miserably at basing the science of behavior
on naturalistic principles, in what direction should interbehaviorists
channel their energies and special competence in an effort to influence
the course of events within our discipline?

Obviously, the task of influencing the psychological Zeitgeist is

a formidable one, but perhaps not hopeless if we make our goals as inter-
behavioral psychologists clearer than we have made them previously. I
do not presume to have a unique, insight into what those goals might best
be, but from my perspective at a small teaching-oriented liberal arts
institution, I would suggest that a more systematic consideration of the
relationship between interbehavioral notions and. teaching would be well
worth the effort required.

My experiences with presenting interbehavioral conceptions in several

introductory psychology classes and in a philosophy of psychology course,
as well as my experiences as a student, have convinced me that inter-
behavioral psychology can be a valuable teaching tool. The. interactional
way of describing psychological events offers a dramatic contrast to the
predominant orientations of modern psychology (e.g., behavioristic,
physiological, cognitive) and thus provides students with a better under-
standing of the notion of a psychological system while freeing them from
standard patterns of thinking about psychological issues associated with
the more popular systems. Perhaps most impressively, I have noted that
an appreciation of interbehavioral psychology leads to an appreciation of
scientific psychology as an empirical but philosophical endeavor; that
is, in understanding the interbehavioral approach it becomes clear that
psychologists are pursuing answers to the same important questions about
man that have always stimulated the interest of philosophers, but are
doing so using the powerful tools of empirical science. Most psychological
systems either entangle the student in such a web of constructs and pre-
suppositions that the data of behavior are lost, or else stress the em-
pirical while denying or not clarifying underlying assumptions and ignoring
the meaningful questions concerning behavior that might be answered by the
data. In contrast, the interbehaviorist never loses sight of the impor-
tant issues concerning man's complex interbehavior in natural environments,
but prizes above all else the objective approach to their resolution.

In light of the fact that the interbehavioral approach to psychology

may have its greatest and most positive impact in the classroom, I
propose that in succeeding issues the Quarterly provide a forum for inter-
action among its readers about the teaching of interbehavioral psychology
or teaching psychology from an interbehavioral perspective. I urge every
reader actively involved or interested in teaching to contribute something
in the coming months, whether it be suggestions about teaching aids, a
reading list for the student of interbehaviorism (or the instructor), a
report of positive or negative teaching experiences, a discussion of a
psychological issue or issues that lend themselves to an interbehavioral
treatment, or an interbehavioral analysis of teaching* The Quarterly will
attempt to evolve a suitable presentation format in response to the nature
of the contributions made, with the hope of better serving its intended
purpose as a coordinator and communicator of ideas about objective approaches
to psychology (Volume 1, Number 1, January 1970).

In our efforts to be more systematic about the teaching of inter-

behaviorism, we should be encouraged by the fact that interbehavioral
psychology had its origins in classrooms at Indiana University, just
as most of us developed our enthusiasm for the approach in that setting.
If it is not within our capabilities to influence the psychological Zeitgeist
more directly and immediately, we should at least dp our best to insure
that our understanding of and excitement about interbehaviorism will be
communicated to those in our classes as effectively as possible. Perhaps
we can make no more important contribution to the advancement of an
objective, naturalistic psychology.

Ronald G. Heyduk
Book Review



In this book Valenstein provides a critique of the notion of man as

a machine controlled by his brain that appears in much of the popular lit-
erature and even some of the professional. While Valenstein does not aban-
don the brain doctrine he goes far toward giving it a more proper role as
one factor among many.
In reviewing the studies on electrical stimulation of "pleasure centers"
he notes that the animal engages in operant responding to obtain more stim-
ulation not just when a single point or center is stimulated but from exten-
sive areas of the brain. When humans are stimulated their reports about what
they feel are rather vague. Sometimes for both males and females sexual
stimulation is reported thus suggesting biological rather than psychological
implications In stimulations that attempt to obtain muscle flexion the
result is single muscle contraction or mere twitches, rarely an entire limb.
In Delgado's work in which a remote control signal to a brain electrode
changed a charging bull into a docile bull the feat was accomplished by stim-
ulation of motor responses that caused the bull to turn to one side. Other
studies indicate that such stimulation disrupts brain functioning generally
so that confusion ensues. These two factors Valenstein sees as responsible
rather than "behavioral inhibition" contended by Delgado whose "propensity
for dramatic9 albeit ambiguous demonstrations has been a constant source for
those whose purposes are served by exaggerting the omnipotence of stimulation"
(p. 99). "He also takes him to task for his declarations about the inhibitions
of aggression from stimulating the caudate nucleus: "Delgado's argument that
there may be a number of specific loci in the caudate nucleus cannot be dis-
missed out of handj but he has presented evidence from controlled behavioral-
studies that his electrodes have tapped into separate centers from the inhib-
ition of aggression, appetites and other motivational states. Instead he
seems to capitalize on every individual effect his electrodes happen to pro-
duce and presents little, if any,, experimental evidence that his impression
of the underlying cause is correct" (p, 103). He further observes in Delgado's
work that there are no consistent responses with different animals from "a
given electrode" and no "specific behavior in response to stimulation" (p. 88).
The results are quite variable. "Electrodes that seem to be in the same brain
locus in different animals often evoke different behavior , and electrodes
located at very different brain sites may evoke the same behavior in a given
animal" (p. 89}. Valenstein adds that in humans personality factors are also
In further considering the human side of brain stimulation Valenstein
becomes almost interbehaviorals "The evidence is not completely cone?, usivej
but it strongly suggests that the contents of the experiences evoked by stim-
ulation are greatly determined by the personal reactions of the patients-
reactions which are influenced by their past history and the present setting"
(p. 106).
He reviews Penfield's studies where electrical stimulation of the
cortex during surgery was supposed, to have evoked memories. He finds that
the memories were "very abbreviated and sketchy fragments. The more com-
plete reports by the patients were very few in number -and, because they
were obtained in a surgical setting , the evidence that the patients were
actually reliving a past experience could not be verified" (p0 110 ). Fedio
& Van Buren who made similar studies did not obtain the kinds of reports
given by Penrod, Further , Penfield himself noted that the same point
restimulated after a short time will result in different responses. The
responses also depend' on the situation: "responses are influenced by the
setting. Responses depend upon who is present, what has just happened , and
whether it is a hospital (or laboratory) as contrasted to a life' (or a field)
situation" (p.

Valenstein argues that animal studies of aggression and brain stim-

ulation to produce it are hardly applicable to man. Animals kill for food,
and this is more properly predation that aggression, the two being not
highly correlated. The killing is usually between species rather than within
species whereas warfare is within species and is usually based on complex
economic and political factors rather than person to person confrontation.
When brain areas that elicit aggressive behavior in animals are destroyed the
aggression is not eliminated. The author brings out again and again this lack
of specificity and the complex interplay of other factors. "If drug-related
crimes are excluded , most of the present upsurge in violence can be related
to a rejection of previously accepted values and social roles and to the
existence of large groups of people who feel that they have no vested inter-
est in the stability of the society in which they live. It may not be easy
to find or to implement the changes that are necessary, but there is a great
danger in accepting the delusion that biological solutions are available for
these social problems" (p. 353).
The book offers a discussion on chemical stimulation, psychosurgery,
and ethical and social considerations of brain alteration. All of these
are given against a background of the historical factors that led up to each
type of brain expe rimentation. Detailed accounts of the experiments are
often given as well as extensive quotations from original sources. This is
a book that reads easily. It is an important critique that can be valuable
f or ' the layman, student , and professional brain researcher or neuro- surgeon.
It is often directly supportive of interbehavioral contentions.

Some Advantages of Interbehavlorism

Jacqueline Farrington

Interbehavioral psychology as conceived by J.R. Kantor appears to

"get it all together" as the popular soft drink advertisement says. For the
first time since the decline of Greek classicism, there is within Kantor* s
psychological system the possibility of studying the human as well as nonhuman
organism as a complete, unified and observable reality within the context of
observable situations or fields of events.

It is the event itself which is of prime importance in the consideration

of the interactive organizing and functioning ofany organism,, rather than the
etiology, the course or structure of events which is the realm of the physical
sciences. Kantor' s system appears to be process-oriented rather than object
bound. As such, it remains naturalistic, positing no special or separate
entities such as mind, soul, tendency^ entity,, or essence which can be studied
or observed apart from a physical organism. Events are specific in terms of
the psychological situation, implying specific stimulus and response functions
which match, and in terms of an observable field of events which includes pre-
ceding events '(interbehavioral history), media of contact and environmental
(including cultural) setting factors. The as sumption is made that the total
field can be observed . That which is not observed in the field and which seems
not capable of observation may require skills, technologies or knowledges
either not available or not being utilized,

Just as the event is observed asthe interactive functioning between

stimuli which perform both the functions of stimulating and responding, so the
observer is, in the very process of observing, interacting with the event under
observation. The observing then is not separable from the went, and is induc-
tive in manner rather than deductive. Thisapproach eliminates the artificial-
ities of postualted. independent and/or dependent variables which can be objec-
tively manipulated, by an outside observer and considered as cause-effect varia-
bles providing construct-like explanation for real happenings. Rather, factors
are assumed to be in an associative relationship; that is t one factor if isolated
from its present relationship would not be capable of the same description either
in isolation or in a different relationship,

While the observation of events (and the reporting?) is inductive, the

bridging of gaps between sets of observed events is deductive, and hypothetic-
ally links one set to another. Such bridging does not imply a closed circular
system, but rather the utilization of tentative orientation (attitude) toward
unknown or partially known occurrences,, Deduction here is built upon defined
concepts observed within the field, the symbolic structure being derived from
interbehavioral operations or acts. As such, deduction is both an abstracting
and hypothesizing process rather than an absolute to be employed in inductive
approaches to further event segments to be studied...

Utilizing the interbehavioral approach and understanding the assumptions

underlying the approach enables the psychologist to more effectively contend
with the miltiplicity and the interrelationships of factors in the occurrences
of such psychological events as imagining, perceiving^ feeling, thinking, inter-
communication, desiring, etc* Within the system of Kantor, such events need
not be relegated to metaphysical entities of consciousness and unconsciousness,,
innate qualities of good and evil or physical connect ionism and reflex action
theories. Rather, events may be studied as functions of an organism whose
biological structure at any given spatio-temporal moment may or may not be a
factor in the psychological functioning which is observed within the context
of cultural , social and physical interactive environments.

What differences may then be noted in the practical application of the

interbehavioral approach? Perhaps most important, the position proposes a
distinguishing between the actions of interbehavior, the products resulting from
these actions, and the things and events being observed (Kantor, 1958> P 186),
Here the knower and that known are not parties to a mystical union of entities
called ' experience, ' but rather, experience is the result of interaction with
things and events in everyday living. Within the reporting of events, the
observer, experimenter or clinician is free to identify and define "circum-
stances surrounding things and events before and after manipulation and des-
cription" (ibid). The observer is never separable from his surroundings.

Particularly valuable in clinical and experimental practices, this

freedom of identification and description eliminates the traditional, obstructing
assumption that characteristics of things and events "thingevent" (Appendix,
ibid) are placed in them by the various constructs mind, emotion^ unconscious,
etc. Inferential hypotheses may then be closely tied to actual inter-behavioral
events which are more readily observable than are intellectual constructs of
hidden quality, quantity, and meaning. And similarly, events need not be projected
upon a specific organ or system of organs such as the brain, nervous system or
glandular systems, thus ignoring the contextual field,

In the observation and application of learning, the relevance of which

today occupies the forefront in educational, social .and political arenas, the
interbehavioral approach emphasizes the coordination of stimulus and response
functioning as the core of the learning event. Additionally, setting factors
and conditions, of learning which are specific to the -learning event do not,
become abstract principles. This enables the problems of individual differences
and unpracticed learning to become suitable ventures for observation and for
scientific rather than metaphysical study. Learning may profitably be considered
as interbehavior which leads to new behavior segments, or event fields. Process
rather than an abstract principle of adjustment and adaptation is stressed, per-
mitting realistic description of the relational aspects of events. Prediction
and deduction then may remain close to actual events rather than to fictional


J. R. Kan tor; Isiri^SZi2E^_Z2ll2l2'' Prlncipia, 1968.


...when a person is afraid, he is afraid all over, '
feels afraid, but his heart, his stomach, and his muscles react in
characteristic ways. All of the changes that occur constitute the
pattern of fear* Fear does not cause the heart to beat faster, the
stomach to stop digesting, and the muscles to become tense. They are
all components of a single unified pattern. Fear does not cause con-
stipation; gastrointestinal immobility is rather an integral part of
the pattern of fear.
There is an appealing but oversimplified view of the individual
which conceives of each organ as performing its own special function
in the corporate whole, much as the separate iinstruments comprising
an orchestra make their individual contribution in the performance of
a symphony. According to this viewj the heart is a pump, the lungs
are bellows, the stomach and intestines are organs of digestion and
elimination, the hand is a tool for grasping and manipulating objects,
the eyes are organs of sight, and the brain is the seat of mental
This is a false conception. No disembodied brain can think, no
disembodied lungs can breathe. They can only function as constituents
of the total organismic system. The process of breathing is influenced
by the biochemistry of the blood and by electro-chemical impulses in the
nervous system. Blood chemistry and neural impulses, in turn, are affec-
ted by a number of organic conditions including secretions of the endo-
crine glands, processes in the sense organs, and metabolism. The person
is able to breathe not merely because he has lungs, but because the lungs
function as part of the total organic system.
This can be easily verified by observing the changes in the brea-
thing pattern as the state of the whole organism changes. The waking
person breathes in a manner quite different from that of the sleeping
person. The frightened person does not breathe in the same way as does
the joyful person. When one engages in strenuous activity, his breathing
is faster and deeper than it is when he is relaxed and resting. Any
emotional disturbance affects the rate and amplitude of breathing. This
is one of the measures used in the "lie-detector" test.
Calvin S. Hall: PSYCHOLOGY
Howard Allen, I960.



Crude Data investigative Contact Scientific Construction



The Archives of the History of American Psychology makes two announce-

ments %
(1) This year marks the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Archives
of the History of American Psychology. During that time more than 500
separate collections have been accessed. Present holdings include 1200
linear feet of documents as well as 600 pieces of pioneer laboratory and
teaching equipment. The finding aids include an inventory of each deposit
as well as a reference file noting the location of materials relevant to
psychologists represented in any deposit. The current roster includes
approximately 30,000 individuals. There have been at least 223 guests
who have traveled to Akron to visit the Archives and the last two years
has been one of dramatic increase in the on site use of the resources.
The post-; to pre-doctoral ratio of scholars is 2:1. There is diversity
in the professional identification. For example, in a sample of 27, 15
were psychologists, 10 historians, one a philosopher, and one an educator.
(2) A stipend of up to $500 will be awarded. This is considered as aid
to a scholar wishing to utilize the primary resrouces of the Archives.
The stipend is intended to defray travel and research expenses and the
recipient is expected to reside in Akron while using the materials of the
Archives. Candidates should submit a prospectus of the work planned, a
vita, and two letters of recommendation. It is particularly important
that there be evidence that the Archives is the most suitable place for
the work to be undertaken. Preference will be give to advanced graduate
students and younger post doctoral scholars. Applications should be
completed by March 1st. The award will be announced not later than April
15th and will be in effect until December 31, 1976. Applications should
be sent to the chairman of the University of Akron awards committee; Mr.
John V. Miller, Jr., Director of Archival Services, University of Akron,
Akron, Ohio U325.

Work continues on the joint enterprise INTEBBEHAVIOPJtL APPROACHES TO

RECURRING PROBLEMS IN PSYCHOLOGY though progress is very slow. Seven
manuscripts are now complete. It appears that another two or three will
be the maximum. That will provide a more limited sample of areas for
interbehavioral approaches than originally envisioned but a slimmer vol-
ume may have its own kind of advantages.

The editor has been offered a Visiting Fellowship to Hull College in Hull,
England for 1976-77. In order to work publication of the Quarterly
around that schedule it will be published as a single volume for the cal-
endar years of 1976 and 1977, two issues in each year. Subscription price
will remain the same for the volume.

Lila Goodson, author of the feature articles wrote it as a senior at Lynch-

burg College. The "R.evisitations" by Vieki Thompson we hope to run as a
feature series.
Emotions Versus Emotional Behaviors A Comparison
of J. Be Watson and J e Re Kantor
Lila Goodson
When the word, or -& derivative of the words emotion is verbal--
ised, various thoughts or ideas are probably experienced depending
on the organism's history of responding to these terms as well as
the setting factors. The definitions and explanations of emotions
as given by J.B. Watson and J.R, Kantor, are to be compared and con-
For Watson, human action is divided into two parts; the acquired
modes of responses and the hereditary modes of responses. Emotions
along with instincts are paired together in the latter group. He re-
ports that the human undergoes a process of organisation whereby the
hereditary and acquired reaction modes separate to a certain extent,
but never completely*
An emotion for Watson is, "an hereditary pattern reaction" involv-
ing profound changes of the bodily mechanism as a whole, but particularly
of the visceral and glandular systerns, In referring to pattern-reaction
he gives the example of a sooty-tern feinting death in reaction to a
human intruder, but running away and giving an instinctive cry when the
chance for escape arises, Watson differentiates emotions and instincts
with respect to the adjustments of the organism. If the adjustments are
internal and confined to the subject's body, emotion occurs; if the
organism as a whole makes adjustments to external objects, instinct has
occurred. This is clearly an example of organocentric ideology in which
stimuli are assumed to elicit reactions from within the organism,
Watson's almost exclusive use of children as subjects was a deliber-
ate mov because he felt that not enough work had been done in this area.
He grouped emotional reactions into the categories of fears rage, and love,
at the same time warning students not to find anything in these words that
was not statable in terms of situation and response. He names four prin-
ciple situations as producing fears loss of support^ loud sounds, an abrupt
interruption as sleep is overtaking the organism, and pulling a blanket out
from under the subject who is falling asleep* The observed reactions are
catching the breath, the grasping reflex, closing of the eyelids, puckering
the lips, then crying. The common belief that children are instinctively
afraid of the dark was shown not to be true according to his evidence.
Incidentally 3 Watson stipulates without reference or experimental support
that children reared in the South exhibit fear of the dark more than others,
Rage is said to occur as a result of "hampering of the infant's move~
meats," The exhibited behaviors are crying, screaming, slashing movements
with the arms and hands, drawing up and down with the feet and legs, and
flushing of the face as a result of breath holding. Love involves smiling
cooing, gurgling, etc. as a result of stroking or manipulation of the
erogenous zones such as tickling, shaking, patting, or gentle rocking. The
Freudian emphasis in relation to this emotion is minimal.
Different kinds of infrahuman organisms were exposed to th infants
to se if generalized emotional reactions could be obtained* Relative-
ly little fear was observed in the infants even after contact with such
organisms as rabbits, pigeons, cats, dogs, white rats, as well as observa-
tion of a fire in a nearby bucket,,
In the attempt to detect emotional responses, Watson considered
the implicit portions to be more important than the explicit portions.
H listed two methods of detection! 1) .free tjge, where "significant"
words are randomly interj ected with neutral words, and conttogias. tyjj
where a subject is given a key word from an emotional situation and
told to freely relate to it. This method is used to detect blockage
as related to dreams which atson considered to be good indicators of
one's personality, stresses, strains and general emotional life.
Watson's famous conditioned emotional reaction study with little
Albert was an example of the eliciting properties which can be taken on
by the habit influences to "call out" emotional responses. The pheno-
menon of transferred, conditioned emotional reactions was exhibited when
Albert made fear responses to objects similar in texture to the white rat
A eontrol procedure was used in which the infant was given blocks to inter-
act with between stimulus presentations,,
In dealing with emotional outlets j, Watson describes diffusion "which
is equivalent to the concept of displacement,, H viewed it as a threat
to society, but rationalized the occurrences as resulting in relaxation*
Attitudes are considered to be a consolidation of emotions, instincts and
habits* Examples such as, "tenderness% "shyness", ^shame^ "jealousy",
"hate", "embarrassment", "suspicion", "anxiety", etc. are said to repre-
sent combinations of the three reaction modes
Physiological factors are considered to be strong components in the
expression of emotions, secretions from duct glands are reduced with
contraction of smooth muscles occurring in reaction rto emotionally ex-
citing stimuli. The effect on the ductless glands is increased production
of adrenalin resulting in glycosuriaK This condition is caused by excess
sugar passing into the urine. In addition, the puls accelerates and dil-
ation of the pupils occurs, The post emotional state may leave the organ-
ism either poorly adjusted r better adjusted, depending on the situa-
tional factors*
Watson summarises his discussion of emotion by saying that emotions
must be recognized as part of human life rather than being discarded
or overlooked,, He suggests that further investigation into the control
and manipulation of human behavior in relation to emotions should re-
veal more knowledge about the area The faults as well as good points
of Watson'!s theory will be openly discussed after a challenging alter-
native system is presented*
Emotional behavior for Kantor "consists essentially of interruptive
forms of action stimulated by rapidly changing circumstances and in all
cases involves various slight or intense general organic and visceral
processes," He considers enotional conduct to be a momentary condition
of "no response" withthis cassation of activity differentiating emo-
tional behavior from affective or feeling behavior. Bringing in the
aspects of Kantor's field theoryt one might say that the emotional con-
duct is a failure to adjust based on past reactions and the environments
By breaking emotional behavior into segments, specific characteristics
can be examined such as the absense of the consumma:tory or final responses
which are blocked by the occurring behavior* Unless these consummatary
responses occur in the proper sequence j, the behavior pattern will be dis-
orderly . It is this lack of order which characterizes the emotional con-
duct and provides the only observable parsimonious method of detection.
Kantor supports this view with various observations! the failure of
psychologists to classify emotional acts, the inability of the observer
to detect \hloh J2e of emotion the person under investigation is experien-
cing i the blunder of replacing emotions with reflexes which are not
equivalent in detection of emotional behavior, and in crediting infra~
human organisms with qualities in relation to emotions.
In order to more thoroughly investigate the Yarious types and degrees
of emotional conduct j, Kantor systematically analyzed the emotional beha-
vior into four segments,, Tfaes separate sequences are; Pre-ensotioHi-1
Behavior Segments, Emotional Behavior Segments Proper, First-Proximate
Post-Emotional Behavior Segments, and Second-Proximate Post Emotional
Segments,, .The Pre-Emotional Segment consists of whatever situation sets
the occasion for the emotional segment,, It therefore involves the setting
factors and movements of the subject and stimulus object preparing to
interact. The Emotional Behavior Segment Proper is characterized by the
absense of the final reaction system and the presence of visceral and
general organic functioning which operates in the absence of the eon-
suimnatory response. The emotional act involves a disintegration process
of the response pattern along with inhibition and suppression of any
overt adjustments to the situation An emotion is therefore a negative
form of behavior even though it may precede an adjustment,, The biological
functions also taken into account including such factors as distur- '
bances of digestive secretions and respiration, contraction of blood
vessels, acceleration or retardation of the heart beats and induction of
various secretions. The first Proximate Post-Emotional Behavior Segmant
is considered to be directly conditioned by the surrounding stimulating
circumstances of the moment* The type of response is dependent upon the
stimulating situation which initiated the emotional act. With primary
emotion^ the acts are most likely to be large overt responses which in-
volve the skeletal muscles as in the case of running or jumping. The
secondary or social emotional situation involves a gradual transition
from a confused state back to equilibrium. The Second Proximate Post-
Emotional Behavior Segment sometimes carries over 'to a subsequent
behavior segment,, It's considered a very transitional stage bridging
the gap between isolated sequences of behavior.
Kantor feels it necessary to distinguish emotional behavior from
non-emotional feeling behavior which have been mistakenly paired to-
gether in the past6 Feelings do not meet the criterion of the presence
or absence of an organized response system and are therefore not clas-
sified as emotional behavior,, He especially ishes to separate emotions
froB passions which operate continuously is form constituting an
autonomous system. Unlike Watson, Kantor places love and hate under the
category of passions which can b brought about by substitute stimuli
as well as by stimulating objects such as other organisms Sentiments are
also distinguished from emotions, being ''prescriptive and limiting types
of activity developed under the inflmence of social approval". Sentiw
ments are considered to be directed responses resulting in some complex
social behavior examples of which are modesty,, cleanliness, and charitable-
ness. Sentiments a broader of exciting stimuli while passions
are more closely linked with the surrounding environment^,
Kantor finds the utilitarian theory of emotions to be an invalid one,
He deals with this on the organic level, finding no utilitarian, value in
biological functions* The participation of all of.the organism in
bringing about responses is what matters. In classifying emotional be-
haviors 3, Kantor feels that there is only one type of emotional act. By
finding the specific circumstances under which an organism responds, more
information can be obtained about the process of human reaction. He singles
out the errors of giving excess meaning to a name which is similar to a
symbol,, Because all reactions depend on the characteristic of the indi-
vidual and the surrounding conditions, an investigation of th conditions
is considered necessary*
The distinction between emotions and expressions is made on the
asstanption that there is no room In Kantor "*s analysis for th "expression
of emotion"* He claims that the doctrine of emotional expression is based
on the dichotomy that divides emotions into an inner state of emotions
themselves and an outer expression of them* In dealing vith emotions in
infants and infrahuman organisms he considers the social experience of
adult humans to be an important factor in emotional behavior. The con~
tinuity theory begun by Darwin is as much in error as the doctrines in-
itiated by the non-continuity theorists, Kantor resolves the two opposing
views with his field approach which concentrates on the eire-urnstances
which are appropriate for responses to be made by each organism,
While both Watson and Kantor were writing in the same decade, one can
see from the two view points given, that Watson still clung to the trad-
itional theories of psychology* Even though Watson was considered a radi~
calj Kantor was the true revolutionary, the difference being in the size
of audiences., While introducing Behaviorism as a new school with em-
phasis on the environmental effects on behavior, Watson did not shed such
archaic ideas as the nature-nurture conflict. Watson's organocentric
ideology was also fully apparent j, as was his reductionistic attitude to-
wards isolated organs of the body*
Kantor brings in^a field approach to deal with the problems left by
Watson and others. With his emphasis on the environment containing set-
ting factors and media of contact, as well as the stimulating object which
excites ratfeer than elicits responses in the organism based on the past
history, any aspect of behavior can be dealt with objectively.


Kantor, J. R. PrjB^iEle^^of^P&xcholasZs Granville, Ohio 5 The Principia

Press, 1926
Watson^ J e Be PjsjjcJMJojxJ^
Philadelphia and London? J* Be Lippincott^ 1919.

Revisitations of J. R. Kan tor's _-

Part I
Vicki Thompson

Although written in 1924., Kantor's Principles, explores many areas of

behavior only recently being studied by other psychologists and some of them
not yet touched upon. Two chapters of his work that involve topics rarely
dealt with yet comprising large portions of human day-to-day activities,
namely, "Implicit Action as Responses to Absent Stimuli Objects" and "Wishing,
Desiring, and Kindred Forms of Responses" are recounted. The complete object-
ivity with which he deals with these interbehaviors, many of them subtle and
treated in the past as "mental" or internal and private, arid his success in
showing the way to an analysis can be a source of continuing inspiration.
EEiS2llS. will never age,,

Mediate reactions comprise a large number of human responses. For

example, an individual may respond to an object indirectly, as in speaking
about something or someone standing before him. Sometimes when completing a
response, changes occur within the organism itself. This type of mediate
reaction occurs in feeling behavior. Implicit responses, a third type of mediate
reaction, result when an organis^ responds to an absent object through a sub-
stitute stimulus object.
Kantor distinguishes between perceptual or semi-implicit action and full-
fledged implicit responses,, In perceptual action the stimulus object is in partial
or complete contact with the reacting individual. However, in a full-fledged
implicit response an entirely different object must serve as the stimulus.
Implicit responses play a significant role in everyday human behavior,
The language response which can substitute for an overt reaction is the most
common form of implicit activity,, The importance of the implicit response is
again evident when considering thinking and remembering activity. For example,
when planning a party the arrangements are considered implicitly before any
overt actions are carried out* Implicit behavior allows us to make use of our
past actions in present situations .to profit from our experiences. It also
makes possible complex responses which depend upon the delay of the final
reaction as in all thought and voluntary conduct. The detachment of meaning
functions developed by perceptual contact with objects is a final indication
of the importance of implicit reactions.
Implicit reaction systems are all in some sense representative or symbol-
izing activities. They derive directly or indirectly from overt actions and thus
contain the same component factors as any overt response system. Although the
original stimulus is not present a substitute stimulus results in a reaction
which may be quite similar to the original response. For example, in recalling
the death of a friend one may experience his throat tightening and actually shed
tears . Although implicit reactions may be only partial or diminished forms of
responses they are often lacking in vividness,
Most often implicit responses are precurrent or anticipatory reaction
systems,, The following illustration indicates their precurrent character. One
reads the return address on a letter and it reminds him of a friend The
implicit response of remembering the absent friend mediates between the stimulus
and the final adjustment of the behavior segment, namely, writing to the person.
Implicit reactions not only allow us to respond to objects and persons we are
not in direct contact with but also allow us to adjust to surrounding conditions.
An individual may rehearse similar circumstances, comparing the results of each
before deciding how to handle the present situation,,

Although occurring less frequently, implicit reactions do operate as final

adjustments of a behavior segment. Such activity is commonly referred to as day-
dreaming. When hallucinating an individual responds not on the basis of surr-
ounding conditions but upon implicit reactions which may have been derived from
completely different circumstances.

Kantor distinguishes between two classes of implicit reaction. A repre-

sentative implicit reaction is similar to a response performed in the presence
of a stimulus object and now occurring without the stimulational arousal of that
object,, ' One example of such behavior is the imagery responses performed by an
individual^ The second class of implicit responses is the substitutive reaction.
These responses do not resemble the original reactions to the objects for which
they substitute. They may be totally symbolic. Illustrative of substitutive
responses are denominated concepts or thoughts. Lying between the fully rep-
resentative and substitutive reactions are the language responses, a most eff-
icient form of detached reaction.
Probing further Kantor discusses seven different forms of implicit typess

(1) Repetitive implicit responses In this instance the original res~

ponse is essentially repeated but without the presence of the original stimulus
object^ An example of this would be the acting out of some past event.

(2) Incipient implicit responses These are simply partial performances

of some original action. For example, almost everyone has experienced the sit-
uation of nearly being able to pronounce a name but not quite able to hit upon
it correctly. The inability to do so because of the absence of an adequate
stimulus is quite clearly a different matter than stuttering due to interference
with the verbal response,,

(3) Vestigial implicit responses -~ In this case substitute stimuli objects

elicit a response which contains parts of actions left over from the original
reaction. We may distinguish between two different forms of vestigial implicit
action, (a) Image responses are reaction systems left over from original per-
ceptual responses to things* Images are sometimes so vivid that one may seem
to see or hear things even though the original stimuli are no longer present,
(b) Vestigial movement responses are derived from original non-perceptual res-
ponses. A good example is that one may blush or shudder when thinking of a
previously experienced unpleasant activity.

(4) Organizational implicit action Some implicit acts have no resem-

blance to the original contacts with stimuli but are connected to such original
actions in an essential and important manner. Implicit behavior of this sort
is conceptual activity. Concepts are reaction systems which operate when we
must make use of our past experiences in a rapid and effective manner. Our
ability to develop concepts depends upon verbal aids which allow us to build
up meaning functions such as concepts are* A concept is a standardized and
definite implicit response which substitutes for and sums up the person's
experiences in a form useful for present purposes.
(5) Combinative implicit responses The detaching character of implicit
responses makes it possible to combine previous activities into new forms of
behavior as in the development of an aspiration or ideal of some sort.
(6) Fanciful implicit responses This refers to daydreaming or engaging
in the sheer functioning of implicit activity without any intimate contact with
(7) Referential implicit actions Some implicit activities substitute
for behaviors which cannot occur or which the individual does not wish to do or
dare to do for some reason. These are apparent to an observer and thus may be
used to induce someone else to perform the work. The most obvious form of ref-
erential implicit action is verbal activity.
Since the original stimulus is not present it is difficult to know just
what sort of implicit reaction a person is performing,, Each individual responds
differently in his implicit behavior and since implicit responses occur in the
absence of the original stimuli they can be indefinitely varied and modified.
Thus, the study of implicit behavior depends upon our knowledge of the person's
previous conditions of stimulation and his mode of response to those stimuli.
Another type of mediate activity is the desire response. Here again there
is a detachment of the individual from the adjustment stimulus. Desire responses
are peculiar to a specific individual making them a more personal activity. Cer-
tain objects can be desire stimuli for people only under given conditions.
In examining desire reaction systems we discover several essential char-
acteristics. Since an individual may wish for a. particular object with certain
qualities, cognitive or discriminative factors must play a prominent role. Ob-
jects do not become desire stimuli by forcing themselves upon the person. Rather,
they are actualized into desire stimuli by the individual as a result of previous
experience with such objects* Here we see the importance of the attention factor.
Sortie desire reaction systems involve various affective factors. Others involve
the operation of neural mechanisms as in cravings and appetitive forms of desire
Desire reaction systems may be of a precurrent or anticipatory nature. In
such behavior segments they precede and perhaps determine what the following
reaction system will be. They may be present to an effective response in which
case the individual who desires something wishes to touch, manipulate, possess,
or perform some other effective response, or they may be precurrent to informa-
tional reactions in which case the final response is some type of informational
activity. On the other hand, the desiring reaction system may serve as the final
or consummately activity in the behavior segment. Such is the case when a person
desires an object even though he can in no way secure it.

Desires are the foundations for behaviors such as striving to reach some
goal or end and attempting to modify one's self or one's surrounding, conditions.
Our beliefs and values are largely affected by our desires for particular objects
and interactions. Undoubtedly desire behavior segments assume a large role in
everyday behavior.

Although some desire response may be gradually acquired over a period of

time others may be accidental occurrences. An individual may come in contact
with an object and momentarily desire it while in its presence. Developed de-
sires may be referred to as desire attitudes.

Conditions influencing desiring reactions may be divided into two classes,

reactional or personality types and stimulational types. Reactional conditions
of desire refer, to such things as an individual's behavior equipment, his
knowledge, attitudes, etc. One's capacity to obtain the thing he desires may
also affect the desire response or even determine whether there will be a desire
response* Interests and character traits developed through past experiences
naturally influence these reactions. Other significant reactional conditions
include institutional factors such as custom, law, and public opinion, and
conditioning circumstances in an individual's cultural development and surr-
The second type of condition influencing desire reactions, stimulational
conditions, refers to the stimuli surroundings. Desire for a particular thing
necessarily depends upon the presence of such an object in our surroundings or
in past contact with this or a similar type of object.

Any object or condition that may serve as a psychological stimulus may

serve as desiderata stimuli for desiring behavior. Kantor distinguishes between
goal and goalless desire stimuli. Both elicit desire reactions that lead to
specific satisfactions, but only desire stimuli necessitate a complex of behav-
ior to bring this satisfaction about.

The degree of intensity of a desiring rection depends upon the nature of

the reacting individual and the particular situation involved. Characteristics
of an object or situation or circumstances surrounding the object may affect the
intensity of the reaction. For example, one may desire an object because of its
importance for carrying out a specific task.

The satisfaction of desire responses depends upon the individual's know-

ledge of his desires and the objects stimulating them. Some may be easily and
effectively satisfied while others may be impossible to satisfy. In many cases
only apparent gratification is obtained as when one settles for an inferior pro-
duct or a copy instead of the original.

It is necessary at this point to distinguish between desiring activity and

purposive conduct. While the desiring behavior situation is quite definitely
limited in time, purposive behavior is practically indefinite in its duration.
Also desiring reactions consist of simple or complex behavior situations whereas
purposive conduct involves a broader scope of activity.

A major difference between desiring and purposive action is the importance

of the stimulus factors. In desiring activity reactionistic emphasis is placed

upon the response rather than the stimulus condition. Whereas the character-
istics of things have a hold upon the individual in purposing conduct, in
desiring activity things exert an influence only because the individual is
interested in them or desires them.

Desiring reactions differ from purposive behavior in yet another way.

They are much more localized than purposive conduct, more.personal and intimate.
Purposive reactions always require additional activity in order to be accom-
plished themselves whereas desiring reactions may or may not require other act-
ivities to be completed. Finally, it must be pointed out that every complicated
desriring reaction is convertible into a purposing response*

Thus far we have considered desiring conduct as a general type of psy-

chological activity, Kantor further analyses desiring behavior and classifies
it into several different types as listed below.

(1) Craving activities are desires for the performance of action. The
stimuli for such responses involve conditions of the organism such as hunger and

(2) Appetites resemble craving activities but the stress is on the nature
of the stimulus objects rather than the performance of action. Thus the appe-
tite is always a specific desire and not a general craving.

(3) Organic functioning is absent in universal desires. These are more

concerned with an individual's ability to obtain comforts and conveniences.
Although based upon the person's biological organization, universal desires
are greatly influenced by cultural features. Included among them are the wishes
and wants concerning shelter, health, and well-being.

(4-) Idiosyncratic desires are peculiar to an individual on the basis of

his past interactional history and his unique present circumstances.

(5) Institutions within each .--culture determine that man shall desire cer-
tain objects and conditions. Among the cultural desires are desires to attain
certain positions, to be respectable, etc.

(6) As desiring behavior wishing is characterized by an inability to sat-

isfy the desire. For example, one may wish he had not performed some behavior
which he regrets.
(7) Yearning responses are desires of a very intimate and personal sort.
The satisfaction of these desires may be very drawn out and problematical.
Yearning responses are passive and hopeless activities such as an individual
yearning for the personal affection of another person.

(8) Although very similar to yearning; the stimuli conditions for longing
responses are not such definite objects and conditions. They are aroused by
various lacks and needs. An example is longing for love, happiness, etc.

(9) Wanting is essentially a desire of occasions. Objects become desid-

erata for a particular moment bedause of some use or need for them.

In concluding his chapter on desiring behavior Kantor considers two com-

monly held misconceptions. First, the term desire is often used to signify
forces or powers within the individual which cause him to reach out for certain
objects or conditions. Secondly, the powers which supposedly condition desire
responses are attributed to a particular biological organ or organ function.
Kantor, however, establishes desiring behavior not as any type of mystical force
but as a definite psychological activity to be objectively studied and understood.
r leebehavioral
Volume 7
Number 1

Reinforcement is a law which itself is lawfully related to a number

of setting factors which multiply the number of experimental treat-
ments affecting a particular experimental outcome. Not the least of
these setting factors is deprivation or, if you will, time between
access to scheduled reinforcement. Kantor (1963) has called atten-
tion to just these kinds of issues in his arguments that interbehav-
iorism is the only means whereby one can effectively deal with the
scientific investigation of setting and field variables, as opposed
to keeping them constant and thus unclarified. Much of the effects
of setting conditions may be consumed under past history, thus bring-
ing to the forefront such issues as multiple paradigming effects on
behavior. Evidence of the import of this for conditioning comes
from data generated concepts such as "conditioned helplessness"(Maier,
Seligman, & Solomon, 1969), "internal-external locus of control" pers-
onality-learning labels (Rotter, 1966), and certain forms of pavlovian
conditioned inhibition and facilitation (Ray, 1973). Compared to con-
ditioning, what we know about setting factors is almost nothing.
Setting conditions, situational factors, species differences, and
specificity of response measures will all most likely be found to have
much more profound influences on conditioning than current research
would lead one to suspect. Thus a translation from current research
models to more ecological models not only seems feasible, but necessary.
Roger D. Rays "Conditions Conditioning Conditioning",
Paper Presented at the Southeastern
Psychological Association Meeting, New
Orleans, Louisiana, April 6-8, 1973



Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction



Regarding the quotation from Ray, we also published statements from Skinner
and from Kuo on setting factors in the Number 2 issue of 1975. Observations
and studies by others are quoted in Smith , Psj^h^l^acj-l^ecord, 1973, pages
164 and 165. Direct research on this topic is beginning to develop as in the
work of Kathleen Bloom in the Jojurri.aljDf_^^ 1974t
17, 250-263 and W. H. Redd, same journal, 1974, 17, 61-78. J. L. Gewirtz has
several studies in which he initially equates drive and setting but gradually
abandons drive in his later work as it becomes obvious to him that it implies
a special internal force which setting does not while the latter accounts for
variation in response to a given stimulus His papers . appear in MINNESOTA
AND RESEARCH, 1969; Deye lopmen,ta3L_ Psychologyt 1969, 1, 2-13; RECENT TRENDS IN
SOCIAL LEARNING, 1972. Barker1 s ecological psychology is also largely a study
of setting factors. Gibson's interest in the ambient array in perception is
still another indication of a growing recognition, at least in some quarters
of psychology, of the multiplicity of factors that constitute a psychological
event. Perhaps the mechanistic S-KR. will one day give. way to a field approach,
However, there is the disquieting fact that as the mechanistic approach is seen
wantingthat the organism is not passively shaped by environmental forces
other quarters of psychology rush in with consciousness,: will power, genetic
determiners, and other intangibles conjured up from the metaphysical past.
Those who recognize alternatives to mechanism or mentalisia are all too few,
but there does seem to be enough growth in that direction that such an alternative
might eventually become visible 'enough to gain some larger consideration by
entering into the mainstream of debate. Then psychologists can at least make
an informed choice.

We regret the duplication of the Goodson article in Number 4 of 1975. It was

inadvertently interchanged with another article that we intended to run. Some
of the articles in Number 3 must have been of special interest. We have received
so many requests for extra copies that additional copies will have to be printed.
The editor of HjfflaB_Dejrelojement requested a revision of the Sanders and Cone
article in Number 2 for publication in that journal.

On April 9, 1976 Dr. Kantor was the guest of honor at a dinner party given by
the Department of Psychology at Western Michigan University. Other guests
included the following graduates of Indiana University :. Frederick P. Gault,
David 0. Lyon, Louise R. Kent, Richard W. ^alott, Marjorie P. Mount joy, and Paul
T. Mount joy. A central topic of conversation was the golden days at Indiana
University. After the dinner Dr. Kantor presided at a conversation hour. Over
75 students and faculty made up the standing room only audience. Because of Dr.
Kantor!s hearing loss he requested that questions be submitted in writing. He
responded to them with his customary analytic acumen and lively wit. Those who
were fortunate enought to attend this conversation hour were in agreement that
his visit was an intellectual high point in the academic year.
About two and one-half years ago we began a project (reported in 197-4, Nr. 4
and 1975 , Nr. -4) of putting together a book make up of original papers to be
PSYCHOLOGY: ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS. The Prospectus read.; the book "will under-
take the comparison of traditional approaches to a variety of topics with the
interbehavioral approach and attempt to show how the latter can more effect-
ively treat the problems that have been recurring for decades or even cen-
turiesperhaps even resolve them so that they need not. be recurring* These
recurring problems often grow out of theories and research that (l) offer
interpretation of data in terms of constructs inherited from the past (e.g.,
drivest mental states, instincts ), (2) are directed toward solving issues of
which the basic assumptions have not been clarified or even carefully examined
(e.g., heredity versus learning), and (3) are misdirected (, the search
for engrams) because of those same unsatisfactory and unexamined assumptions .
The papers will indicate the advantages of an approach which insists that
psychology must start with events, not traditional constructs, and must interpret
its observations in terms of thos e same events events assisting of interactions
of factors in a field involving organisms and objects developing historically in
a setting or context. Research and theory can then proceed to expand knowledge
rather than repeatedly tripping over ensconced tradition." We now have eight
completed manuscripts and hope to receive two or three more. Here are the
papers we now haves
Marion McPherson & John Popplestone; Is "Intelligence" Intelligent?
Donna Cone; An Objective Analysis of Species-Typical and Other Behaviors
Donna Cone? The Historical Development of Scientific Psychology
Hollo Handy: Methods of Inquiry
Ronald Kidd & Luiz Natalicio: An Interbehavioral Approach to Operant Analysis
Paul Mountjoy: A History of Psychological Technology
Henry Pronkos The Current Status of Physiological Psychology
Noel Smith? Perception: Inner Representation of the Outer World or Organism-
Object Interaction?

In this issue we are beginning a two-part series involving a translation of a

treatment of interbehaviorism by Andre' Tilquin. It is as literal a translation
as is consistent with accuracy and good English. The next issue will begin with
section III on "'Interbehaviorism'" and conclude the account. It will also con-
tain the references. Also in this issue we have Donna Cone's editorial notes.
Le Behaviorisme Origins et Developpement de la
Psychologie de Reaction en Ameriqtw?
(The Origin of Behaviorism and Development of Psychology of Reaction in America)
Andre Tilquin
Paris? Librairie Philosophique? 1942
Translated by Nanette Weissinger and Lucien Leduc
In Consultation with Noel We Smith
Book II, Part II
Chapter I.
Behaviorism and Biology: The Organic Psychology of Kantor
I. The Organic Point of View

The "organic psychology of Kantor stands in opposition to physiological

behaviorism quite as much as to traditional psychology, and for the same reasons.
Eacfaj, instead of taking acts themselves as objects for studyall acts, just as
they occur, and at their face valuedraws an inadmissable distinction between
them and substitutes artificial, occult, inobservable entities for them,, The
mental states of traditional psychology have none of the properties of the
observable phenomena studied by natural sciences* Assuming that mental states
exist, they could be known only by their manifestations. From this one has some-
times been led to think of them as internal hidden forces which motivate organ-
isms to do what they do (4, v,I, p. xiii-xiv)* As for the object (of study] of
physiological behaviorism, it is equally artificial and inobservable. Although
it is concerned with paired stimulus-response, the stimulus is defined physi-
cally, the response is considered as a system of muscular contractions, and the
link between these two components of behavior is ensured by a neural process.
Thus the real content of animal and human behavior is neglected for the study of
abstractions, occult entites and hypothetical phenomena-... The stimuli to which
vre respond are not physical or chemical agents, stripped of every quality, but
"objects1* things, animals, people, institutions possessing concrete properties
which are the origin of and the reason for our responses (p, xv). Similarly,
our responses are not, by any means, simple muscular contractions. They are
acts, each having a special character expressed by the terms used to refer to
it, such as walking, swimming, riding, reading, getting married, etc.... As
for the nervous system, the mission of which would be to ensure the appro-
priate relationship between stimulus and response, to it are attributed powers
just as occult and inobservable as psychic powers. All that traditional psychology
attributed to psychic states interpolated between stimulus and response, physio-
logical behaviorism attributes to the nervous system. The processes which occur
in the nervous system are -without any doubt, factors in behaviorbut not the
only factors. To consider them to the exclusion of all others is to take the
part for the whole (p, xv, 30).
The Watsonian attribution of psychological functions to the whole organism,
rather than to the nervous system, leaves the position basically unchanged, for
the organism is no more than an abstraction. It cannot, either from the biologi-
cal or from the psychological point of view, be separated from its surroundings.
To tie behavior either to one part of the body, or to the body as a whole is still,
then, to consider only a part of a reality which must be considered in its entirety*
Behaviorism has been the victim of the prestige of the earliest established
sciences* %e general view of chemistry and physics as the model of science has
resulted in the assumption that only those phenomena which have been reduced to
their ultimate unitsdifferent from observed and observable acts, but susceptible
to mathematical measurement.can be objects of scientific study. This analysis
and quantification are acceptable in physics because details of phenomena are con-
sidered unimportant. In psychology it is altogether otherwise. How is it possible
to -understand a case of loss of memory without attempting to know what the person
had previously learned, the conditions of ^Learning] acquisition, and the circum-
stances of forgetting? It can even be said that if the physicist is concerned only
with motion and energy, then he is abandoning to the psychologist the qualitative
content of his experience* If psychology refuses this gift, then science is
deprived of all that human experience contributes (4., p. 2-3).
V must neither exaggerate the role of mathematics in sciences nor take
mathematics for "a machine for making facts" (p. 2). Mathematics serves only as an
auxiliary to express relationships between facts in a very precise manner. However,
mathematics is not applicable in all domains. "When the object of study is complex,
mathematics can participate only in the form of statistical organization of the
results of observation. TO put it to any other use would involve the substitution of
artificial, empty schemes for observable acts. If the goal is to obtain uniform-
ities, then the formation of schemas and concepts, together with the reduction to
units, is obviously indispensable; neither abstraction nor analysis is condemnable
in itself (p. 2). But, indeed, to substitute schemas for acts from which they
neither arise nor follow, to reduce acts to units from which they cannot be composed,
would be to mistake the nature of scientific thought (3, p. 67). Now this is just
what one does when on claims to describe human behavior by utilizing concepts of
physical stimulus, of muscular and glandular reaction, of physiological processes in
the nervous system, or of the organism as a whole. Such a description and such a
reduction have nothing to do with the concrete events which they are supposed to
represent. The Concepts utilized do not spring from the acts such as they are given .
in the experience of the observer. And if one attempts to capitalize on them, it
is impossible to find again the acts which they assertedly symbolize. Similarly,
physiological elements used to explain behavior do not provide an analysis of
behaviors themselves, just as they are given in experience; and it is impossible to
reconstruct the behaviors by composing them. Therefore, of what interest can they
possibly be as a scientific instrument? (4, p. 2-3; 3, p. 5).
Will it be said that these ways of proceeding permit prediction, the goal of
all science; Certainly if the word "prediction" is given the meaning it has in
physics, of certain prediction of an event which is in some way required to occur,
then such a prediction is possible in psychology only on condition that the behavior
be reduced to empty abstractions. But of what value can such a prediction be? All
that the psychologist can make are uncertain anticipations, analogous to those of
the meteorologist, which require a detailed knowledge of the reactional history of
an individual and of the precise circumstances with which the individual is con-
fronted (3, p. 9). That is to say that one must consider the behavior itself,
describe it as it occurs with the greatest possiblemmber of details, and refrain
from seeking elsewhere than in the behavior itself for the categories and units to
to use to describe and explain it (4, p. 2-3).

Quote from original English Whenever a quotation from Kantor occurs that
was originally in English, the original statement is used rather than a retranslation
from the French. Quotations that were originally in French are translated.con.
Kantor, one sees, maintains science in general and psychology in particular
on a purely descriptive level. Acts, nothing but acts and not artificialities,
but all acts without discrimination, seem to be his motto and the conception he
develops of science* If he admits an explanation, it is on condition that the
explanation operate., not as a function of general laws, but as a function of the
particular behaviors. Explanation is then only the history of the behavior being
considered, which is the procedure of description,,
Physiological behaviorism was .-justified in breaking with traditional
psychology and in rejecting mental states; but in conceptualizing behavior physio-
logically, it was led to deny observable characteristics of it. If consciousness
does not exist,, conscious behaviors do Consciousness is not a substantial reality
tied in any manner whatever to the nervous system or to the whole organism; it is
an aspect of certain behaviors, an aspect which is neglected in a purely physio-
logical conception of human activities (6, p a 75). Under the pretext that intro-
spection is not the only method permitting direct observation of psychological acts,
behaviorism has been excessive in deciding to renounce all factors of behavior
which relate to this method. The only legitimate conclusion to draw from the
inadequacies of introspection is the necessity of improving and perfecting it.
Renouncing it and holding that conscious behaviormemory, thought, emotion, language,
for examplecan be studied only by an objective method, leads to supposing that this
behavior is purely physiological (3, p. 7). And again, acts are given only a biased
and incomplete description, and human experience is emptied of its human content.
The consideration of psychology as a natural science can not have this paradoxical
consequence of the rejection from the field of observation of events which really
take place there, however subtle or hidden they be. "The point of view that consists
of considering psychological phenomena as phenomena of nature does not exclude the
most refined desires, anymore than strong emotion, profound pain, the most compli-
cated activities of discovery, or the profound speculations to which certain indiv-
iduals are so attached" (6, p. 81).
This desire to not neglect any act in no way implies a return to the doctrine
of states of consciousness. Kantor does not accept the dilemma with which psychol-
ogists thiak they are faced: to accept an objective point of view, and consequently
reduct human behavior to simple muscle twitching; or to consider human behavior
in its concrete and original aspect, but then to have recourse to states of con-
sciousness,, This dilemma implies dualism, which he rejects for the same reasons
which led him to condemn traditional psychology and physiological behaviorism.
Dualism does not express a fact (6, p. 85). Observation of animal and human activ-
ities reveals behaviors which certainly have more or less different characteristics,
but it does not reveal mental states as opposed to activities in the nervous system
or muscles contractions. Observation, however, does reveal organisms that are real
and concrete, rather than double artificial beings made up of mind and body
expressed as body, "Mind" and "body" are metaphysical, entities which represent
nothing that is real (4-, p, xiv, 30). "Although men ostensibly sought to justify
the entire dualistic problem by physiological or neurological facts, it was never
founded on real observations. It represents purely and simply only a traditional
interpretation supported by cultural attitudes" (6, p. 80). It is a historical
accident originating from this, that psychology "instead of developing in the
direction initiated by Greek rationalism, has undergone the influence of mystic
imagination from the Orient. The only positive basis that it could ever have had
is reduced to the fact that every act of psychological being is at the same time
the behavior of a biological organism, that is to say the function of certain
structures" (6, p. 80).
It seems probable that, with James, Kantor admits only one sort of stuff,
the world qualified by pure or immediate experience^ and that this experience,
for him as for the phenomenolgists, contains "things" as well as "thoughts".
Kantor!s concept of experience is confused both with introspection as redefined
by the gestaltists and with naive observation, the point of departure of all science.
However, there are abstract sciences, such as physics, physiology, and traditional
psychology, which transcend the given with their explanatory schemas, their
"constructions", electrons, neural processes, and psychic states; and there are
concrete sciences which limit themselves to describing the given. It is in the
second group of sciences that Kantor places psychology. It is the study of
observable interactions between the organism and its milieu. The milieu,3 in a
neo-realistic manner, is made up of concrete objects possessing qualities, just
as naive observation reveals them, and not artificial entities invented by the
physicist and the chemist. The organism, which can not be separated from its
environment, is not only the organism such as the biologist^ the physiologist and
the mentalist create, but is a concrete, real, living, acting organism which stands
in opposition to the twin dichotomy mind-body and organism-milieu, -^t is in order
to make this new unity salient, this uniquely truly given unity, that Kantor calls
psychology as he understands it organic psychology or, better, organismic_jBsy_cho.logy,
and that he gives it interactions, interbehavior between the organism and its milieu,
as the object [of study].

II: Characteristics of Psychological Activities

The expression "organismic psychology" is perhaps an unsatisfactory choice

because it seems to join with biology a psychology which wishes to be autonomous.
However Kantor admits that a sane biological conception of behavior would lead to
organic psychology U, ve 1, p. 78). And he is certain that he conceptualizes the
psychological problem in the spirt of, if not in the same manner of, biology. This
science does not reduce itself to anatomy, but it studies also the functions of the
organism. But how can one treat of these functions if one does not take account of
the milieu in which the organism lives and without which the organism cannot live?
Life implies without doubt an internal harmony, but it requires also an adaptation
to external conditions, ^he respiratory apparatus, for example, and the function
of respiration have neither the same structure nor the. same workings depending upon
whether the milieu in which the organism is plunged is gaseous or liquid. The organ
and the function are adapted to normal conditions of the milieu and they tend to
adapt themselves to variations of these conditions. How the psychological activ-

Kantor speaks of interactions between an organism and a stimulus object that

occur in a setting, Tilquin sometimes uses milieu to apparently include both
stimulus and setting although in a context in which Kantor would refer specifically
to a stimulus object. To render mlieu as stilffiiSS.or iilSyisM~SSZ213MiM_-
here would more accurately reflect Kantor's position but somewhat misconstrue
Tilquin1s interpretation. At other times milieu seems to refer to stimulus objects
or to surroundings and at still others to what Kantor calls the field. Field
comprises the interrelated and interdependent activities of an organism,
stimulus object, setting, and media of contact. To be accurate to Tilquin,
inilieu, a word also used in English, is retained in all these instances but with
notes to a term more appropriate to Kantor, In this instance "stimulating sur-
roundings" might be more appropriate.con.
3 .
ities of organisms for Kantor have precisely this for their functions to adjust
the individual to external conditions which naturally are quite different froin
biological conditions., In the degree to which he accents the adaptive character
of psychological activities, Kantor is influenced by a biological approach as are
Watson and Weiss. But he goes much farther than they in his faithfulness to the
spirit of this science. He holds that the organism, either from its biological
or psychological viewpoint is inseparable from its milieu. To distinguish the
organism on one-hand, and the milieu on the other, can be a useful distinction.
Indeed it is an abstraction,, the consequence of which is the substitution of a
new dualism for the old: a completed organism and a so-to-speak inalterable mil-
ieu are set up in opposition to each other like two unrelated realities. One
neglects thms the fundamental fact, as much of biology as of psychology, which
is the inseparability of the organism from its milieu, and the continual inter-
actions with which each fashions the other. It is to put in relief this dynamic
organism-milieu unity that Kantor has chosen to designate his psychology by the
expression organic psychology.
In treating adaptive interactions between the organism and its milieu
psychology tends to be confounded with biology (6, p. 79). How is it disting-
uished from biology? To say that organic psychology is the study of activities
or "psychological organisms" (6, p. 75) can only be a tautology as long as what
it is that differentiates a psychological from a biological organism is not pre-
cisely defined. Sometimes Kantor seems to see in this distinction only the dis-
tion of functions and structures. The biological organism would in some way be
the organism at rest, considered in its potentially active state5 the psychological
organism would be the organism in action. Psychology would occupy itself "prim-
arily with reactions or behavior, and the independencefvis-a-vis biology) of psych-
ology as a science depends in part upon keeping the reactions distinct from the
biological organism that performs them. Briefly, psychological organisms, as
differentiated from biological organism, may be considered as a sum of reactions
plus their various integrations" (4-, p. 3).
There evidently is a distinctive characteristic there which implies an
admissible reduction of biology to anatomy. If one were to admit it, psychology
would be confused if not with physiology in the strict sense, at least with a
physiology carried to the point of understanding the extra-organic causes and
effects of functions. Now Kantor is vigorously opposed to physiological behav-
iorism, and thus to this confusion. On the other hand psychology is not the
only science which treats of activity. All the sciences, -Kantor recognizes
(4.5 p 8 3-5), treat behavior, that is to say actions executed by an inert or
living body following actions undergone by it; and one may speak of physical
behavior, biological behavior, and psychological behavior.
Thence the problem comes back to knowing what differences there are between
these three types of behavior and particularly between the last two. It is
inertia which characterizes the first, irritability the property of the second,
and spontaneity that defines the third. In the domain of raw matter, reaction
which is not a response in the proper sense of the word because it is not adaptive-
depends entirely for its existence and its quantity on the action undergone. There

^stimulating surroundings
stimulus object
is an equality between action and reaction, and the laws of physical behavior on
which certain prediction is founded are expressible mathematically. Even though
the state of an inanimate body is practically invariable such that its movements
depend entirely on exterior conditions, living beings in contrast are entirely
different. They are constantly changing. The substances of which they are made
are continuously being renewed. There is at every instant a reconstruction of
unstable substances which are at every instant destroyed. In addition, the org-
anism is a reservoir of energy accumulated by metabolism. From these continual
variations in the state of the organism and from this accumulation of energy
there results a. certain independence of reaction with regard to the action under-
gone and a disproportion in energy between the stimulus and response. However
every organism executes, in answer to external conditions more or less complex
responses which are tied in a constant manner, if not to these conditions, at
least to anatomical physiological organizations. The role of the stimulus is
solely to set in motion the anatomical physiological mechanisms. Such are the
tropisms. Depending exclusively on the structure of the organism, they are con~
etant modes of adaptation to -.determined stimuli and are the object of precise
prediction. As a. result of the disproportion between the action and the reaction,
these behaviors cannot be expressed in a mathematical equation. With higher org-
anisms and with man the reactions are more highly adaptive and more indepen-
dent still of external conditions. They appear to be unpredictable. More accur-
ately, they depend less on actions presently "being undergone than on past inter-
actions,, historical and biographical relations between the individual and the
milieu. In brief, in the domain of physics reactions depend on actions presently
being undergone, in. the domain of biology on the structure of the organism, in
the domain of psychology on the experience of the individualthat is to say, on
his personal and historical contacts with the milieu, (4., v. I, p. 3-5? 6, p. 76-

This general characteristic of psychological activities can be described

more precisely by underlining a certain number of traits that they possess through
which are manifested their spontaneity, their relative independence with regard to
immediate exterior stimuli,, and their adaptive nature. Psychological reactions
are variable, varied, differential, modifiable, organized, and susceptible of being
postponed or inhibited.

Psychological reactions are highly adaptive. First of all, they relate to

the situation which provokes them. They are directed, aimed, dependent on it.
Above all, reactional activity which manifests itself on the occasion of and with
regard to a situation, continues and persists up to a. well defined conclusion, that
is to say, up to the point where one of the following four events occurs. Either
the organism modifies its relation with respect to the situation, or it modifies
the situation, or the situation disappears by itself, or the exhausted organism
coases to react Most of the time persistence in reacting does not express itself
by repetition of the same responses the organism on the contrary, varies its react-
ions by executing successive different reactions. This diversification of reactions,
which depends on the details of the situation, contributes to a growing efficiency
on the part of the organism in its adjustment to this situation. In more complex
cases the behavior ought to be described as pursuit of a goal by a deliberate var-

stimulating surroundings
7stimulus object

iation of means. Under the name of diversification of reactions we see Kantor

describe in fact two characteristics! the first, which does not seem to him the
most important, will be for Tolman the essential descriptive trait: it is the
intentional characteristic of behavior which is, in higher activities, pursuit
of a goal and ordering of means to that goal; and in lower activities, persistence
of reactional activity tip to the supression of stimulation. The second charac-
teristic which Kantor holds to be fundamental, since it is with it that he resumes
his description, seems to be a consequence of the first; if an outcome is to be
obtained^ and if a first reaction does not obtain it, the organism is lead to
change and to vary his response.
Psychological behavior is then adaptive in a first sense because responses
are directed toward the situation and became they have the function of making
the action of the organism cease* But they are adaptive in a second sense. They
are always differential, that is, different for different objects, or for diff-
erent properties and positions of the some objects (4,' v. I; 6, p. 77), If the
necessity of diversification of responses is explained by the intentional char-
acteristic of behavior, the possibility of this diversification, Kantor notes,
depends on the capacity for discrimination. It is in directing its responses
toward different properties or phases of a situation that the organism is lead.
to vary its responses; and this diversification depends on the discriminations
of which it is capable and on the discriminatory behaviors which it possesses.
If it possesses them it has acquired them. Without a doubt there are innate
discriminatory behaviors: different properties set in motion different behaviors
without apprenticeship, but most behaviors are the result of experience of previous
contacts of the organism with the milieu.
Psychological behavior manifests again its adaptive characteristic by its
plasticity. It is modified as a function of the earlier experience of the indiv-
idual. It depends both from the point of view of the stimulus and from the point
of view of the response on the earlier contact of the organism with the objects
which have composed its milieu. The same response is attached to different ob-
jects , or else the first response is transformed and is modified. These are the
phenomena of conditioning and of habituation; they presuppose a unification of
behaviors that are at first isolated; contraction or fusion of stimuli, which from
that moment on will act as a totality; and an integration of reactions which coor-
dinate themselves to form a single act.
Another characteristic made conspicuous by Kantor comes from the capacity
which psychological organisms possess of discriminating or postponing their res-
ponses and even of inhibiting them completely. In the first case the objects
which stimulate the organism don't produce their effects immediately; certain of
them only produce their effects long after the cessation of the stimulation, either
because their response is blocked by a detail of the situation as in the experience
of deferred reactions, or because the situation is not complete and does not offer
a point of application to the reaction. Whatever the cause of the delay, the delay
between the stimulation and the response is filled in by secondary reactions excited
by the stimulus,.such as the orientation of the body, attitudes, etc. which con-
stitute the reaction itself, but only the incipient phases. The principle reaction
is then provisionally inhibited. It can be definitively inhibited. In the case of
total inhibition we are dealing with a preferred reaction and not a real lack of
reaction. Two reactional systems are simultaneously excited by different aspects

of the same complex situation. Whether one of the two aspects is prepotent, or
the organism is momentarily more sensitive to it its associated reactional system
is actualized and this actualization makes the realization of the other system im-
Such are the general charaeeristics of psychological activities according to
Kantor. They permit one to distinguish between psychological behavior and biol-
ogical behavior, but at the price of such a narrow definition of biological behav-
ior that no reality corresponds any longer to this notion. Biological behavior
would be the function of anatomico-physiological organization and would depend
exclusively on present stimuli. By contrast, psychological behavior would be less
the function of structure and of immediate stimuli than of earlier behavior arid
previous personal contacts of the organism with its milieuin a words of the
experience of this organism.
To accept this point of view is to take sides in favor of Loeb against
Jennings. It assumes belief in the existence of tropisms, forced inevitable reac-
tions, entirely conditioned by the structure of the organism, by the physico-chem-
ical composition of its tissues, and by the lines of the field of force on which
the living organism would be held. To speak truly, .Loefe himself has shown that the
sign, the threshold of the beginning or of the reversal of a tropism, are affected
by the variations of external or internal conditions: growth, modification of tissues
by the influence of nourishment, of dehydration, of hydration, of the presence of
certain chemical substances in the changing milieu, of the temperature, etc. But
in opposing tropisms to acts due to "associative memory" Loeb has denied the depen-
dence of tropisms with regard to earlier experience. Now it is a fact that a tro-
pism is modifiable to a certain extent, that even the lowest animal is capable of
overcoming its trerpisms, of forming habits (conditionings), of learning,, And with-
out admitting with Buytendijk that tropism is abnormal, one must recognize that
reflexes and pure stereotyped tropisms play only a very limited role in the behavior
of a living being. "It is evident", wrote Jennings (2, p. 178), "that the anatomical
structure of the organism and the different physical or chemical action of the stim-
ulating agents are not sufficient to account for the reactions. The varying physio-
logical states of the animal are equally important factors.,..
,. The present physio-
logical state of an organism depends on its past history.... n9
Between biological and psychological behavior there is no clear line of de-
marcation. The same characteristics, in different degrees, are found in the two
sorts of behavior. It is consequently impossible to place clear limits on a psy-
chology of behavior without forming narrow and poor ideas of the biological. Kantor
has succeeded in distinguishing his psychology from physiological behaviorism, but
he fails to separate it from biology. And it is not surprising since his conception
of psychology is inspired by biology.

stimulating surroundings
9Quotation taken from original English.

Notes From a Comparative Animal Behaviorist In Exile

What Observations of Retarded Human Adult Behaviors Can Teach the
Student of General Animal Behavior

In recent years comparative psychologists have been careful to specify

that behavior is part of their subject matter. Yet few studies have
appeared in which human behavior is viewed comparatively,,

Since December of 1974 1 have served as the chief administrative officer

of a 350-resident living unit within the largest institution for the mentally
retarded in North America. As I left behind nine years of colleg teaching and
fifteen years of research with non-human animals to interact solely with humans,
a friend and fellow interbehaviorist advised ma to make the most of this oppor-
tunity to study the human animal. In reflecting on seventeen months of informal
day-to-day observations, I find that my thinking about at least four topics
within, the general area of animal behavior has been clarified*

The subjects of my observations ar@ multihandicapped adults of both

sexes, most of whom are classified as either severely or profoundly retarded.
Since they have been institutionalized for most of their lives (i. e., for
periods of from 10 to 65 years), I hve been interacting with thra in their
"natural" environment.
The first aad most general lesson I have learned relates to the inter-
relationships between biological and psychological interbehaviors. The contri-
bution of biological. intrbahaviors to adult human activities has been generally
played down in favor of an emphasis on psychological interbehaviors, specially
learning. IE retarded,, mjltxttandieapped adults, however^ the importance of
properly functioning biological'systems is clearly apparent, For sample,
swallowing is ordinarily: viewed as a chain of biological events, which, by
definition, is unlearned. When swallowing is inefficient constant drooling
o saliva occurs and the person is unlikely to ingest food effectively or to
make thos vocalizations which are the primitive forms of human speech. Through
a laborious s@ri@g of steps involving a number of stimulating conditions (e. g.,
ic is applied to the area just outside the lips; a cold metal object is pressed
on the back of the tongue), efficient swallowing can be conditioned in the
profoundly retarded, multihandicapped adult, luckily for the behavior modifying
agent, the ice and fluidsoused to stimulate swallowing are sufficiently rein-
forcing, together with praise sad hugs, to maintain the new interbehaviors. Tne
individual can then proceed through a series of training steps'to sucking,
blowings ^istling, and sometimes, forming recognisable vocalizations.
Secondly, the vital role f precursory psychological interbehaviors
has been brought into ocus. toother psychologist and.I'found that the Foxx-
toilet training program which works so well with normal toddlers and
with pradolscent retarded children was not Imndiately effective with retarded
males over 18 years of age* They had simply Acquired too many competing

responses In the presence of a full bladder or colon. To solve this problem,

a preliminary program was written specifying procedures for conditioning the
resident to go to the bathroom, lower his pants and sit on the commode* Here
the reinforcing liquids aid the conditioning process by filling the bladder.

Another example of the importance o "normal" pt@ertdry psychological

interbehaviors was experienced by my husband, Dr. Al Cone, when he worked with
severely retarded proAdolescant males at Lynchburg Training School & Hospital
(LTSfffi) in 1970, One youngster had quickly acquired a series of self-help
skillshe used the bathroots properly; he fed himself adequately; he dressed
himself neatly. The flaw in the conditioning program became apparent as Dr.
Gone proudly escorted his immaculate subject across the institution grounds to
meet his parents in the visitor's waiting room. As they approached a curb,
the resident suddenly stopped. M@ stared at the 4-ineh rise* He stepped
back and then lunged forward, raising his foot 12 inches into the air. While
this overreactton served to propel the subject safely over the obstacle, it
al-'so led to a new program in which residents received M fk M's for subtly nego-
tiating a staircase*
The third area for which I have acquired more appreciation is the im-
portance of the setting in which learning occurs. The myrnalization of institu-
tionalized retarded individuals is often, seen in terms of promoting proper
discriminations (e, g., teaching them not to attempt to hug strangers). The
converse, promoting proper generalizations, is equally important. The best
example of this ubiquitous lesson comes from my husband's experience.with the
young boys. One such boy with a typical history o helplessness became ill
and was taken from the living unit where he had recently learned to feed him-
self to the hospital. At supper-time of the first day, the nurse called the
aide on duty at the living unit to say: "You told me T.i'my could feed himself
but he just sits there staring at his tray,," By the tine the aide could walk
across the parking lot to the hospital, Timmy had solved the problem himself.
When the aid and the nurse entered Tiramy's hospital room, he was carefully
ingesting small raouthfuls of his supper and periodically wiping his lips with
a hand towel which he had taken from a rod near the sink attd draped'across
his lap. The hospital had thoughtlessly failed to provide a dinner napkin and
Timmy would not eat until he had located an adequate substitute.
The fourth lesson the residents of LTS&H have taught me is that certain
behaviors regarded as relatively easy to learn because they develop in all nor-
mal children are very difficult to condition in adults. Toileting and rudimen-
tary interactions with others, such as tossing a ball, are prime examples. Con-
versely, certain behaviors regarded as indicative of high levels of phylogenetic
development are apparently very easy to -acquire^. Imitation of seemingly com-
plex social interbehavior9 LS a clear example. It is a rare newcomer to the
professional staff of an institution for the mentally retarded who does not
quickly sense that these "pathetic" residents are conditioning hitnl

Donna M. Cone, Lynchburg Training

School and Hospital
ISSl 4.0 .
Volume 7
Number 2


(Amer0 interbehavior)
Action reciproque et simultanee de 1'organisme sur le milieu et du milieu
sur 1'organisme. Cette double correlation est toujour fonction des mont-
ages anterieurs du comportement de la biographie reactionelle (Kantor).


Henri Pieron, editor. Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1973


In. Volume 2, Number 1 of 1972 we reported a the latter part of 1977. Those who might
study by Sarbin & Mancuso on the profession- wish to correspond are invited to do so at
al myth of "mental illness" and the more Kingston-Upon-Hull College of Education,
appropriate public attitude, but the latter Cottingham Road, Hull HB6 7RT, United King-
being adversely swayed by the "mental ill- . dom.
ness1" construct. A new experimental study ###
by Yaffe & Mancuso finds a similar result as James Herrick, a portion of whose M. A.
reflected in the title "The Effects of Ther- thesis was published in these pages in Vol-
apist Behavior on People's Mental Illness ume 2, Number 3 of 1972, a Ph.D. candidate
Judgments". For a preprint write James C. in anthropology from SUNY at Albany, author
Mancuso , Dept. of Psycho logy , SUNY, Albany, of "Kantor's Anticipation of Current Approa-
New York 12222. ches' in Anthropology" (reported 1974, Nr. 3),
** has had a fiction paper accepted for publi-
Mexico seems to have a continuing interest cation in an anthology of futuristic cultur-
in interbehaviorism. Dr. Kantor delivered al fictions edited by Magoroh Maruyuma and
two public lectures to large audiences at Arthur Harkins. The story is entitled "How
the University of Mexico and several addit- John ^ennol Saved the World". It was also
ional lectures to other centers of the Univ- selected for presentation at the 1975 Amer-
ersity around Mexico City. ican Anthropological Association's annual
meeting's Symposium on Future Cultures: Im-
This will be the last issue of the Quarterly aginable Alternatives for Terrestrial and
for 1976. As previously reported , the vol- Extraterrestrial Communities. *t is a re-
ume will be extended over a two-year period. freshing departure from the usual mentalis-
The editor will be in England from Sept. 7 tic and mystical science fiction. The ab-
until mid or late summer 1977. The last two stract prepared for the meeting is presen-
issues of the volume will be published in ted here. Another story he wrote, "Penum-



Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction


bra" was on of the winners of the AAA competition again this year and
is projected for publication in a paperback anthology. The second and
final installment of the translation rom Tilquin is printed in this
issue. Tilquin presents a number of problems or questions concerning
interbehavidrism. The editors would like to urge readers to offer res
ponses to them that would be printed in forthcoming issues. The quota-
tions on page 14 are relevant to Tilquin's critique.

How John Nennoi Saved the World

This fictitious story attempts to show how one individual comes to realize that West-
ern people are being victimized by their "thing-based" language. It is discovered that
this "thingness" quality of Western thought has prevented a recognition of and an apprec-
iation for the interactional, processional nature of nature with the result being a stat-
ic, hierarchically arranged, tripartite (natural, man-made, and supernatural), cause-effect
conception of the universe. This biased perception of events in the universe is thought
to be responsbile for the failure of the modern-day "scientific-medical" establishment to
find a "cause" and a cure for that disease labeled "cancer". The notion that cancer may
not be a disease (in the traditional sense) at all, but rather, may be the result of the
human organism rapidly and uncontrollable adjusting biologically to new materials in its
environment is explored.
Also treated is the idea that medical practices in all cultures serve the sick indiv-
idual on more or less of a "placebo" basis owing to the fact that biologically Homo Sapiens
has evolved as an efficient, disease-resistant organism. H is further suggested that the
belief that someone or something will enhance recovery is more important than the actual
treatment-with the removal of treatment leading to an auto-suggestively worsened condition
for the patient. This erroneous belief in having control over "disease" (a thing) has re-
sulted in Western medical researchers searching in vain for a causative agent for a disease
(cancer), which, in actuality, is merely evolution (an event).
Once Hennol understands what is being said, he is strongly moved and attempts to make
Westerners realize through his music the trappings of their conception of the universe. He
extends what he has gained regarding Westerners' biologically self-destructive, static con-
ception of the universe to all constructions which are really events, but which have come
to be treated as things in themselves -(e.g., love, honor, integrity, justice, aggression,
etc.). He succeeds.
The following anthropological themes are presented in this story: (l) the superorganic
nature of culture; (2) the role of the individual in cultural change; (3) the role of acci-
dent in culture change; (4) operant learning principles in the development of cultural be-
haviorsespecially as they relate to medical behaviors; (5) language as a guide to social
and cultural reality; and (6) the contemporary and future biological evolution of man.
Le Behaviorism Origins et Developpement de la
Psychologie de Reaction en Ame^rique
Andre Tilquin
(Conclusion of Translation)

Kantor is opposed like the Gestalt psychologists to a conception of behav-

ior which would make it depend strictly on anatomical physiological organization,
of a fixed connection between a receptor and an effector so that the nature of
the response would be the function not of the nature, of the meaning, of the
importances of the interest, of the value, of the stimulus, but of the nervous
mechanism that was aroused. An electric bulb lights up because the installation
of wiring is made in such a way that every press of the button permits current
to pass through the wire hooked up to the lamp. The lamp is illuminated each
time that one turns the button, and it is illuminated only when one turns the
button* The movement can be executed by the tenant of an apartment or by a
burglar thanks to an intentional pressure of a finger or to a mistake of an
accidental bump. The lamp lights in every case without being concerned about
the concrete living being which carries the stimulus or about the context in
which the stimulus is initiated. Similarly, the same stimulus , turning the but-
ton, according to the effector which is found at the other end of the wire, will
put in action a motor9 an electric iron, a tea kettle, or an oven, radio, etc.
In other words if such a response is set in motion by the stimulus, this corr-
espondence arises from an extrinsic relation between a stimulus and a response
represented by the sensory-neural-muscular structure concerned.
That, fcr Kantor, is the model of biological behavior. Psychological be-
havior is quite otherwise. Whereas gestalt theory explains the union of stim-
ulus and response by a reciprocal conformity, a myserious affinity, an unintell-
igible "direct dynamic determinism, " Kantor seeks the cause of this correlation
in the earlier experience of the organism, in its reactional history which has
conferred on the objects of the milieu the power to excite the reactions which
they presently start up. Current responses depend on functions of stimulations
taken on by objects of the milieu in the course of interactions which have been
earlier exercised between the organism and the milieu.

Psychology is, in fact, for Kantor the study of adaptive interactions of

the organism and its milieu, the study of interbehavior. The milieu1^ gicts
on the organism stimulates it. The organism acts on the milieu^ responds to
it. Actions and reactions are woven together and condition each other. The
word "interaction" or "interbehavior" expresses precisely this reciprocal and
simultaneous action of the organism on the milieul3 and the milieul^ on the
organism. If the milieu-^ excites our responses, our responses in their turn
not only are directed to the milieu but even modify it. "When he is contem-
plating this action of responses on the mi lieu, 1? Kantor is not thinking strictly
of human endeavor which creates objects and consequently new stimuli. He takes
this recurrent action in its most general significance t by the simple act of
responding to an object we modify it, not strictly in itself, but always in its
psychological function which is to put a behavior into gear,

The stimulant value of an object depends, in fact, on the series of ante-
cedent responses made with respect to it. The execution of a response at a
given moment evidently implies that a well defined object5, capable of stimulating
it., exists in the environment, but it still implies that this response has behind
it all .the experience which the individual has formerly had with regard to the
present stimulus object (6, p. 8l). When a cat learns to get out of a cage, the
correct response which he finally makes, depends on earlier reactions without
which the correct reaction would not be attached to the situation. The phen-
omenon of conditioning shows us how objects, neutral with regard to a certain
reaction, can acquire the power of putting it in gear. In any case, it is thanks
to "contacts" that the organism has had previously with the situation that this
situation has acquired its present motivating power. But these contacts do not
limit themselves to shifting reactions, to making them pass from one object to
another from a total situation to one of its elements or vice versa. They have
a formative function; they give rise to responses, they modify them, they trans-
form them, mold them, dissociate them, organize them. Would our habits exist,
would they be what they are if the objects to which they relate had not existed
in our surroundings, if we had not had all the contacts which we have had with
them? The development and the assembling of responses, i. e. the formation of
the response as well as its attachment to a certain stimulus, depends then on
the reactional history of a given individual, of his reactional biography. The
difference in environments in which they have lived and consequently the diff-
erences in their reactional biographies explain the differences in behavior
between different individuals better than an originality of genetic constitution.
If the form of the response depends on the sort of object with which the organism
is in contact, that is to say, on the nature of the present and past contacts,
that perfection of the response, the ease with which it is accomplished is a
function of the number of these contacts. The accent is then put by Kan tor on
the environment, on the objects, or rather on the functions of stimulation which
they assume according to the reactional history of the subject* It is the reac-
tional history of his interactions with his milieu which explain the capacity of
stimulation of a particular object, the form of the response put in gear, its
immediacy, its perfection and the differences of behavior between different
individuals. This conception had some affinity with that of Lewin, who also
located the source of actions not in the organism under the form of impulsions,
but placed them outside in the surrounding environment in the form of vectors
which correspond to the stimulating functions which Kantor assumes for the
objects. And these vectors of Lewin, like the stimulating functions of Kantor
result from an interaction which is exercised between the organism and its
Since the present existence of a behavior has as a condition the earlier
interactions between certain objects and the reacting organism, psychological
phenomena are not in any way predestined (6, p. 82). They depend in their
existence on a multitude of real circumstances which have led to their formation
of which the oldest go back to the very beginning of the life of the organism.
Then the development of behavior continues according to the particular circum-
stances of the time and place in which they are produced. One can consequently
consider the reactional biography taken in its totality as a series of levels,
one above the other.
"Let us take the example of an architect who is making plans for a building.
His present abilities and the work which he is doing now are dependent on sit-
uations that are somewhat similar to the ones that have preceded them and in

which he had to design similar plans for buildings comparable to those which
occupy him today. Here is a level which itself depends on a lower level which
has immediately precededed it, that is the period of apprenticeship during
which the architect was working only on partial plans. This level in its turn
depends on the period during which he was studying his trade at the school of
architecture and. this period itself had for a base the stage where the archi-
tect as a child was learning to make elementary drawings and to appreciate
diverse objects? (6, p. 82-83).
The development of a .behavior depends then on the series of interactions
which have preceded its on wcontacts" which the organism has had with his
milieu,-*- of his reactional biography* The formative action is incumbent on
the conditions of stimulation* Kantor insists on the causality of-objects or
situations. "Because in recent times the causes or conditions of psychological
action have been transferred from the mind, which produced an effect on the body5,
to some phase of the body, it seems difficult for the idea to gain currency that
such causes or conditions lie only in the stimulation circumstances. Decidedly
it is the latter that bring about the development of reaction systems and their
later operation" U-, v. I, p. 73). "...the development of the individual and his
activities depends upon the coordinate development of his contacts with objects
and situations. The cause or influence of development is then the series of
stimulating situations with which the person is in contact..." (Ibid., p. 77).
To attribute then all formative action to situations, is to reduce the role
of the organism to the extreme. In actual fact, biological factors have little
importance for Kantor. Organic characteristics exercise above all, a negative
influence; they are incapable of producing by themselves well defined behaviors,
but they can render some behaviors impossible. On them are uniquely based the
possibility or the impossibility of the behavior. Thus, an athletic musculature
does not at all force him who possesses It to become an athlete. On the other hand,
it is impossible for a lame man to run a race or for a one armed man to do gym-
nastics on apparatus or to engage in boxing. It is true that such physical
deficiencies can become stimuli and push the individual to construct systems of
behavior which mask them by compensating for them. Again,, it is necessary to
know this, that the form of the compensation is determined not by the nature of
the handicap, but by the conditions of the milieu in which the individual lives
(Ibid.,p. 81).
1 more positive influence is exercised on behavior by certain physiological
phenomena, particularly by internal secretions, but these phenomena, most of the
time have no formative value at all. They do not determine any special behavior.
They determine only the speed and the vigor of all behaviors. However* the
action of these physiological phenomena goes farther. Concurrently with external
stimuli they have an influence on the development of an operation of systems of
reaction under the name of needs, desires, and so on. But'this positive action
is reduced by Kantor as by Levin to a simple modification of the stimulation
values of the ^valence", of external objects. As fr heredity, whatever be the
manner in which one conceptualizes it, it is clear by the above that its part is
altogether restricted* Outside of the minimal contributions indicated above,
which concern the possibilityf the impossibility, the speed and the vigor of
behaviors, heredity manifests itself by several reflexes and above all by random
movements which are put in gear by all sorts of very light stimuli, in which are

18stimulating surroundings

the gross, primitive material with which complex behaviors of the adult are
constructed under the incitement and the control of objects in the environment.
This conception which has some close connections with that of Lewin is not
in opposition to the behaviorism of Watson or even to that of Kuo. They have
the same recognition of the enormous role of habit, the same affirmation of the
weak role of heredity, the same underestimation of the importance of organic
maturation and of these psychological states which constitute the needs and the
tendencies which Tolman will consider as motivating forces, the instigators of
behavior. Consequently they have the same accent placed on the action of external
conditions. Only what has been called the simplistic approach of the Watsonian
explanation is here masked by vague words about interaction and above all about
contact. Contact does not necessarily imply an activity of the organism; it can
be passive* In these cases the objects would be the causes of development of
behavior, if such a development was possible. In fact, an object would not be
able to produce anything more or different on the second contact than what it
produced on the occasion of the first. One does not see how existing reactions
would be able to be modified, how new reactions would be able to become estab-
lished. At the very most a transfer of reactions would be produced, put in
motion by an object, to another object which was not putting them in motion
before. Watson stays consistent with himself in making conditioning play a
capital role in his psychology. But Kantor has seen and affirms that not every
acquisition leads to a conditioning. Consequently passive contact between
organism and object would not be able to suffice. The organism responds, which
is a long way from passivity, and by its response it tends to adapt itself. If
the behavior is adaptive, the initiative for adaptation can belong only to the
organism. It is not the object which from outside adjusts the organism to that
object, it is the organism which adapts itself to the object. Kantor has pointed
out justly that it is not the possession of an athletic musculature which leads
its beneficiary to become an athlete, but similarly, it is not the presence of an
object in the environment which by itself produces the assembling of a behavior
which relates to it. There is, it seems, a contradiction in considering objects
as the causes of behavior while affirming the adaptive character of responses.
t is true that Kantor speaks of interactions between organism and milieu,19
attributing thus the initiative of adaptation not to the object alone nor to the
organism alone, but to the dynamic relation which ties them together. But then
how does one reconcile this conception with numerous assertions which present
without ambiguity, objects as the causes not only of the operational responses,
but even of the assembling of responses? The fact is that Kantgr locates in and
pjojj3gt_s_ into the, pjresent obje_ct the result of earlier in teractions which are
exercised between this object and the organism and which it would be more natural
to localize in the organism under the form of a modification of physiological
states of behavior, in the sense of Jennings (see Section II, p. 115. But would
this not be then to abandon the concrete point of view, to come back to the point
of view of physiological behaviorism? To avoid this renunciation, Kantor is
obliged to realize in the object, where it< certainly is not, the earlier exper-
ience of the organism. ,
Kantor continually insists upon the idea that the stimulus is not a thing,
a state. It is a "function" assumed by a thing. And he sees in this transfor-
mation of an object into a stimulus the definition itself of physiological process

^stimulus object

(4, v. I, p. 4-8). An object does not inevitably have stimulation capacities

from the first contact of the organism with it which it will have later: it
acquires some and it loses some also* Thus a little cube of wood loses for
the child the property which it was having for the baby, i.e. of being suck-
able. Classical psychology certainly does not misconstrue the fact that the
universe of an adult is not that of a child , that the repertoire of acts of
the former is infinitely richer than that of the latter., But classical psy-
chology tends to reduce the phenomenon of development , the becoming aware of
qualities, to an actualization of behavior that potentially exists from the
beginning whereas development is the phenomenon of acquisition and enrichment.
The universe of the child would contain that of the adult both in its sensory
aspect and in its motor aspect, as the engraved plate contains the photographic
image. Experience would be a simple progressive revealer. This thesis, espec-
ially as with regard to the world as it is perceived and which is only an
interpretation, would not be able to satisfy a psychologist who is above all
concerned about facts. The fact is that every object acquires new properties
progressively as we respond to it. It is the motivating experience which we
have of it; it is our reactions with regard to it which enrich it with new
properties or which impoverish it, sometimes in taking away properties which
it had formerly possessed. The cube becomes something to push, to take, some-
thing to throw, and ceases to be something to stick. "Whereas classical psy-
chology holds that experience reveals to us pre-existing properties of objects,
Kantor affirms or holds that experience confers on objects new properties.
This thesis is very behavioristie and Kantor only insists on a conviction
which is, if not expressed, at least shared by all the b@havlorists. In posing
the fundamental stimulus-response formula, the behaviorist appears to do to the
stimulus the same thing as to the response. Much more, the stimulus and response,
being reciprocal terms, appear co-extensive. The response supposes a stimulus
which puts it in motion and to which it responds and the stimulus can only be
such when it causes a response. In fact, all or nearly all in a behavioristie
universe is constituted by responses, >r as soon as one seeks to qualify the
stimulus, to describe it, to say of what it consists, what is its nature, one
responds to it. It is then definable only as a bundle of capacities for stim-
ulation; it can have only a functional significance.
However, isn't it necessary to give sttpport to these capacities and func-
tions? If the stimulus is "this", which puts a response in gear, isn't it
necessary to pose something which assumes this function of stimulation? This
philosophical problem has not escaped the philosophical mind of Weiss, who in
being well acquainted with .the subject, has constructed this something with the
responses of the physicists. He has made of it a configuration of electrons
and protons denuded of every quality which our responses confer to it. This
turning towards physics, is no more permit ^.ed to a behaviorism which wishes to
be concrete and autonomous than the previous turning toward physiology. Kantor
is thus obliged to accept the conception 0? common sense. What assumes the
functions of stimulation, he says, are ob;i?cts such as they present themselves
to the common sense: trees, rivers, people * laws, rules, morals, institutions;
not only objects taken in their totality, but also the natural qualities of
which they are made: colors, odors, forms, sizes (4., v. I, p. 48; v. II, p. 29).
The realism of Kantor is not the learned pseudorealism of Weiss, but a true
realism, the naive realism of the man in the street and it is not surprising on
the part of the psychologist who claims to take facts at their face value. This
silence on the difficulties of such a position has without doubt the same origin.
Kantor j, preoccupied above all with observing and with describing, is not concerned
at all about metaphysical implications of his descriptions.
Does not the distinction,, the neat dichotomy made by Kantor between the ob-
ject and its functions of stimulation, lead to attributing to the object the
properties which form the nature of it and which nave no behavioristic status,
being independent of the functions of stimulation? To conceive these properties
as primitive functions of stimulation that the objects would possess before having
any contact of the organism with them would not resolve the difficulty. They
place themselves only with the responses which they put in gear and they can be
nothing more or different from this inciting action. How would one know them
independently of the provoked responses, since to know in a coherent behaviorism
can only be to respond? These difficulties are not unique to the system of Kantor.
They are met with in all behaviorislm which wishes to be concrete and autonomous,
without external support. Psychologically the object can only be a system of
reactions, a bundle of stimulating capacities, a possibility of reactions; and
Kantor says very justly, the psychological phenomena consists largely in the trans-
formation of objects into stimuli (4-, p. 48). But for this very reason it is im-
possible for psychology to define the object as it is. Psychology can only borrow
from another science, physics for example, for its definition of the object,
It is impossible for Kantor to tell us what the "natural" objects are in
themselves, independently of the stimulus functions they possess or take on. He
cannot identify the "natural" qualities that would characterize them without con-
sidering our reactions to those objects. "Organic psychology does not accept the
idea according to which a stimulus provokes in the 'mind' a sensation of quality.
For organic psychology such a mind and such qualities do not exist. Sensations of
quality are really properties of things...." But this realism contradicts itself
immediately, for Kantor continues: "...there are properties of things which incite
a person to distinguish betweem them, to act differently towards them, to like
them, to say that they are different, etc..." (A, v.,I, p. 93| 6, p. 78).20 Thus
these qualities which are proposed at first, as forming the nature of the object
are in fact only functions of stimulation possessed by objects of which one can
say absolutely nothing.
The danger of adopting vis-a-vis the exterior world, the attitude of common
sense, is that one resolves without posing them, and perhaps without knowing it a
a certain number of problems which are possibly only pseudo-problems. But it is nec-
essary to examine them if only to dissipate them. Some phenomena that classical
psychology holds for constructions or interpretations are here posed as immediate
givens and as raw facts. Thus the qualities that are said to be sensible are,
for Kantor, in the object,not in the subject* It is probably that with neo~realism
Kantor recognizes also in things the spat3al~temporal relations and logical
relations. He postulates that the objects exist in their unity and distinction.
The object which is a construction for classical psychology,and which is the result
of an organization of sensory field into figure and ground for the gestaltists, for

The first quotation does not occur in the place cited. Therefore the pres-
entation here is a translation rather than a substitution of the original English.
The second quotation is written in French and is consequently also a translation.
Kantor is posed as the immediate given. The problems of unity, exteriority of
the nature of the object, are resolved thanks to the decision to ignore them.
It is the same with the problem of localization. Kantor distinguishes the
stimulus object from what he calls "the medium of stimulation". When we respond
to a visual stimulus, what stimulates us is not the succession of light waves
which emanate from the object but the object itself* The train of waves are
only an intermediary, a medium, thank? to which a functional contact is estab-
lished between the object and the reacting organism. In a general way every
object, whatever be.the receptor concerned, and whatever be its distance or near-
ness with regard to this reeeptorjhas its medium of .stimulation. Thus a thorn
could stimulate a reaction of pain only by the intermediary of being in touch
with our tissues; a savory object can stimulate us only by the intermediary of
a chemical process, etc. (5, p. 5A-55). The reason for this distinction is
evidently that our. responses are always addressed to the object, never in normal
conditions to the medium which is otherwise ignored by most people. But if
the reaction belongs to (or refers to) the object, is it immediately directed
to it? Does it reach it immediately and right there where it is? Maybe all
these problems have been poorly posed by classical psychology. To adopt the
common sense solution is more to ignore them than to solve them.
The behaviorism of Kantor insofar as it is an autonomous psychology is nec-
essarily led to this realism of the concrete object. Since it has been decided
to ignore the other sciences, since one is concerned about "acts" rather than
"abstractionsf% one cannot conceive the object as a substrate made of vibrations
t which the functions of stimulation would be latched on as so many properties
of the object. One is forced to recognize,if not all the qualities,at least cer-
tain numbers of them. There are qualities which define the object, and which are
the object; and there are qualities which are functions exercized by the preceding
qualities and which correspond to the capacities of stimulation of the object and
which are the properties of the object.
One of the most grave limitations of behaviorism is the impossibility attrib-
uted to it of taking account of the quality as it is. Doesn't it seem tied to a
consciousness, to a mind? If one eliminates this consciousness or this mind in
order to consider only a reacting organism by its contractions or secretions to
these physical stimuli, doesn't it show at the same time every quality? One sees
how Kantor triumphs over this difficulty. Leaning on common sense, in the name of
direct concrete observation he places, if not all the qualities, at least certain
of them in the things; he makes of them the stuff of things. One can reproach him
since it is a matter of psychological cjLence,, and not of metaphysics. One can
reproach him with preferring intuitions to the information of physics and of
physiology, of preferring ingenious intuitions of common sense and of experience

[Author's footnote:] This Kantorian distinction between the object and the
medium corresponds to the distintion of Holt, between the object and the stimulus.
[Author's footnote3 Is this distinction made by Kantor? One can doubt
before the assertions that follow which are in bad accord with the notion of stim-
ulating functions acquired in consequence of earlier experience: perception is an
"interaction between the total organism or person and objects existing with all of
their qualities, whether or not these qualities can all be reacted to or not" (A,
v e 1, pe 293. "None of these qualities of the object or the object as a whole
depends upon our reaction to them" (Ibid.). The Kantorian idea that stimulus and
response are developed in a concommitant manner (already exposed by Bode) (l, p. 59)
hardly agrees with the preceding assertions.

called immediate, direct, or pure. Above all, can one not accuse him of getting
along without consciousness all the more easily because he at first reified a
part of the content of consciousness?
lYs The "Segment of Behavior"
Kantor does not content himself vith reifying in stimuli the content of
conscious experience that relates to objects; he also reifies in the responses
the other portion of this content whicb relates to the subject. If one runs
through his psychology, it is impossible to avoid the impression that his behav-
iorism merits the reproach addressed to behaviorism in general, of being a simple
word game that is to say, of running the good old traditional psychology in th ,
stimulus-response mold. One finds again in. the two volumes of his
all the chapters of classical psychology: sensation, perception, attention* assoc-
iation, affection, emotion, desire, imagination, memory, intelligence, knowledge,
reasoning, Volition, and so on. However, antor puts himself or believes he puts
himself in order with the behavioristic credo by following these designations
with the words s behavior, conduct, activities, responses. Attention becomes atten-
tion behavior, volition becomes voluntary conduct, emotion becomes emotional act-
ivities, and he treats not of pleasure and pain nor desires but feeling reactions
and desiring responses; this is exactly as functionalism believed that it broke
with structural psychology, by limiting itself to adding the magic word process
to the heads f chapters Psychology of consciousness distinguishes three aspects
in psychological life; cognitive, affective, and conative aspects. Kantor retains
this distinction but the aspects of psychological life become "phases" of the
response. Mould organic psychology, then, not be a mere translation of the whole
content of classical psychology into behavioristic language?
The task of psychology is not to explain behavior, more or Jess systematized,
but to give a faithful description of concrete behaviors. The general notions of
stimulus and response are evidently insufficient to express all the nuances and
all the details of real behaviors. It is necessary to specify them, but the spec-
ifications ought to arise from specific observation of acts. It is from there
that Kantor makes numerous distinctions among stimuli and responses according to
their functions; distinction of stimulus object arid its stimulating functions, of
the stimulus and of the medium of stimulation, of the stimulus and of its situation
or context, of primary stimuli (unconditioned) and secondary (conditioned), direct
and substituted, adequate (total) and partial, dominant and auxiliary, exogenous
and endogenous, apparent and inapparent. Similarly, he makes the distinction
between primary and derived reactions, informational, performative and affective,
explicit and implicit, apparent and inapparent.
But to take behavior .apart into simuli and responses would be to misunder-
stand the intimacy which unites the organism and its milieu. The fundamental
descriptive element cannot be the duality stimulus -response; it can be only their
union, their unity, what Kantor calls the segment of behavior. Therefore , the
psychological life, which for Kantor as 'for Vatson, is a stream of action, Is decom-
posable not into stimuli and response but into elementary acts, into segments of
behavior in which each constitute a definite adaptation. Examples would be the act
of pulling back the hand from a burning fire or the act of throwing one's self out-
side the trajectory of a missile. Every action is without doubt "bi-polar": it
presents two phases of which one is the stimulus and the other is a response, but

these phases are inseparable and the segment of behavior constitutes ultimate
descriptive element of' organic psychology (4, p. 36-37)
Actually/ in the study in which Kantor formulates the segment of behavior
he is mostly concerned with the response. And we should not be surprised about
thats since the stimulus, as it is, being a function* can be defined only by the
reactions produced, A segment of behavior contains at least an elementary reac-
tion or reaction system as in the examples above, but it can contain several of
them, as in behaviors manifested during experiments on reaction time. In this
case, the response contains the following elementary reactions; (l) waiting for
the expected stimulus, (2) perception by sight or hearing stimulus, and (3) act-
ivating the "registering apparatus"; and these three reactions which constitute
as many adaptations are temporally organized. One .sees in fact a subordination
of the first reaction systems to the last. There are at first "preeurrent" reac-
tions, reactions of attention and waiting, and perceptive reaction, then a final
reaction or "consummatory" reaction; this subordination is the one that we notice
touching off the registering apparatus. The expressions "precurrent" reactions
and final or "consummatory" reactions do not need, according to Kantor, to-be
explained* "In every behavior segment," he says, "we can fairly well determine
what reaction system finishes and rounds up the act or characterizes it as an
adaptation... is the final reaction system which gives the name to the
entire behavior segment" (4, v. 1, p. 38). The term fjjial^reaction can be used
for every action which ends a segment. When the final.action is an explicit
reaction executed with the muscles, Kantor reserves for it the name of consum-
matory action. As to the precurrent reaction, be there one or many, it can be
limited to preceding the final reaction but generally it acts to determine it.
Moreover,this determination presents degrees and varied forms.
Certain precurrent reactions relate to past contacts that the person has had
with stimulating aspects of the situation or refer to a phase of this situation
which is not presently playing the role of stimulus. Their function is "to
appreciate the nature" of the stimulus, to function in identifying it and recog-
nizing it ("meaning reaction"). Sometimes this appreciation is without effect on
the final response as the consciousness which we have of a blow in the crural
reflex. Sometimes in fact, it can be absent without this absence jeopardizing the
response, such as in acts that are called subconscious Sometimes, finally, this
appreciation is a determining factor of the final response which would not be pro-
duced without it. In this case the precurrent response is not limited to preceding
the final reaction but it conditions it by preparing it, by putting the person in
the state of executing it, and even sometimes by beginning it. In the example of
reaction time these include the reactions of perception, of recognition, of atten-
tion. Other examples are attitudes or movements which are merely sketched or out-
lined, reactions which are little bits or pieces of the final reaction, touching
it off at the occurrence of the signal. Still others are auxiliary reactions
which deal with the means where execution is required for the execution of the
final reaction (going to the study and opening the Bookcase to take out a book)
or which apply to instruments of which the manipulation is necessary for the oper-
ation of the final action (putting the gun to the shoulder and holding it to draw
a bead). In these cases the function of the precurrent reaction is to render
possible, to prepare the final reaction of which the form is determined above all
by the stimulus. But sometimes it is the precurrent reaction and not the situa-
tion which directly conditions the form of the final reaction; the person can acc-
omplish in a muscular way the final readtion only after having anticipated it and
only after having executed it implicitly in advance, and having foreseen the

the results. Such Is the case with Intelligent and voluntary acts and with act-
ivities in which the person can be said to pursue a goal. The precurrent res-
ponse is not here simply preparatory; it is anticipatory (4, v 1, p. 39-4-7).

Ys Critical Examination
Thus after having reified along with neo- realism in the world of stimuli,
all that part of the subjective experience which relates to objects, Kantor pro-
vides in the responses the remaining portion of this experience , that which con-
cerns the subject. The division of the segment of behavior into precurrent or
preparatory reactions and into final or consummatory reactions may well come from
Sherrington; it has no objective foundation. Objectivity there is only one succ-
ession, a purely temporal order of reactional systems . To establish between them
relations of subordination , to call the first systems precurrent or preparatory or
auxiliary, and the last final or consummatory is to mask under the words which one
believes neutral the subjective relation of means to an end* To speak of apprec-
iation, of choice, of preference, of intention , etc. is manifestly to use cate-
gories which concern states of soul, to characterize the responses , that is to say
movements. One understands then how Kantor "while denying interior life does not
deprive psychology of human experience" (6, p. 75). Rather he exteriorizes inter-
ior life by projecting it into stimuli and responses-, and he makes stimuli and
responses that are objective phenomena undergo a "subjectivation".
This manner of preceding can have a metaphysical interest but it implies a
complete reversal of the movement of scientific thought,. If science has progressed
toward its state of true science only by "desubjectivizing" its objects, to load
the stimulus-response pair with the remains of interior life is then to make of
psychology a metaphysics of behavior, and not a science,
It has been said that science eliminates all that the universe contains of
quality, of signification, of value and retains of it only a skeleton of spatial-
temporal relations leaving thus to psychology the care of assuming what it had
despised (4, vo. 1, p. 2). But this confounds psychology with metaphysics, with
metascience* Psychology aspires only to be a science like the others. So it is
not concerned with leftovers of science, if in reality there are leftovers. In
admitting that sciences, of nature despise certain aspects of the universe, it is
certainly not the job of another s_cience_ to occupy itself with it. A concrete
behaviorism, that is to say a science of behavior that interests itself in qual-
ities, meanings, values of stimuli and responses is a contradiction in terms.

1. Bode, Boyd H. The method of introspection. JiiSSl^lL^iiSS2PfeZ? 1913, 10,
2. Jennings, H. S. Behavior of Lower Organisms 1906.

3. Kantor, J. R. At attempt toward a naturalistic description of emotions (I),

(II). ^sycMQEics.lJsvi&w, 1921, 28, 19-42, 120-140.

4. Kantor, J. R. PrincJ.E3B_oJllsjsJolo.g2; , Vol. 1, 1924, Vol. II, 1926, Knopf.

5. Kantor, J, R. AnJ>utlJjie__c^^ Follett, 1929.
6. Kantor, J. R. La psycho logie orsranique.
1929, 1, 75-88.
rtefbefiavloral quarterly
NOEL W. SMITH, Volume 7

The start of the present wave of and environmental components has deep social and political under-
genetic determinism, which claims of differences in perfomance if) tones and is reflective of important
that differences in intelligence, sex very tightly controlled plant and ideological issues. Its purpose is
differences in behaviour, even animal breeding programmes Is to provide a biological rationale for
social poise ", " conformity " and applicable to the distribution of a the status quo: IQ is
political radicalism ", are largely behavioural character across a wide along class and race lines ; atber
genetic, may be dated from the range of complex human environ- types of desirable behavioural
writings in the late 1960s of Arthur ments. Both these theoretical characteristics are unequiuly dis-
Jensen in the United States and assumptions are fallacious; the 10 tributed between the saxes (the
Hans Eysenck in Britain. Its pro- test is a social construct, as much only reason why IQ isn't as that
ponents have laid heavy claims to . a measure of the built-in assump- test items which show sexual differ-
scientificity by their reliance upon tions of the testers, as of the innate ences in scores are deleted from the
complex statistical procedures and ability of those being tested; the test !). The hereditarian position
the algebra of the heritability famed heritability estimate which would have us believe thftt' xtjte
equation. The discrediting of the emerges from the biometry is a working class, the Blacks, <th Irish,
Burt results is but one example of .figure without theoretical meaning are genetically stupider lehan the
the inadequacy of the data on which or practical significance. The entire middle class, the Wliit&s, the
the hereditarian position is based. exercise is best summed up in the English ; that women halve: series
But the fundamental issue is not computer people's phrase " GIGO-r- for being secretaries and stten for
the validity of this or that empirical " Garbage InGarbage Out". being executivesand therefore
survey; it is a theoretical one. All Exceptand this is a point which that the explanation and justifica-
claims of the " heritability of those of us, biologists and psycho- tion of a class bound, racially and
intelligence" depend on two prior logists, who haye discussed these sexually divided society, lies not in
theoretical assumptions: that the questions extensively over the past social institutions and structures
IQ test measures an absolute eight years with students, ethnic (which we can change) but in our
quantity, " intelligence " ; and that minority groups and trade unionists, genes (which, we cannot).
the algebra derived by biometricians have been anxious to point out
for the study of the genetic that this type of hereditarianism
Professor Steven Rose, Biology Dept.The
Open University, United Kingdom. Letter
to "The Times", Nov. 9, 1976.


While the editor was spending the academic ucation Act provided that at age eleven all
year in Britain the storm over Cyril Burt children would be* divided in their further
developed. The disclosure that he had fals- educational pursuits by an examination which
ified data to support a hereditarian view would send them to a grammar school, tech-
of intelligence provoked a spate of letters nical school, or secondary modern school.
to The Times. The line of influence of Ey- Grammar school was a preparation for higher
senck as a student of Burt and Jensen a stu- education while the other two were usually
dent of Eysenck was among the information terminal, ^he division was assumed to be
that emerged from it. The issue is no mere based on inherited intelligence. About two
academic exercise<, The British educational years ago the system was replaced by "comp-
system was largely based on the hereditarian rehensive schools" which are similar to Am-
view until recently and that view was heavi- erican schools,
ly influenced by the "research" of Burt who *
served as a government adviser. He was Several papers have been recently published
knighted in 1946 for his work. The 1944 Ed- in the

Crude Data Investigative Contact Scientific Construction


which will be of interest to readers. Of these three are fairly closely

related; (l) P. Te Mouritjoy,, "Science in Psychology; J. R8 Kantor's Field
Theory", 1976? 2, 3-21; (2) J, R Kantor, "The Origin and Evolution of Inter-
behavioral Psychology", 1976, 2S 120-136; (3) N. W. Smith, "The Works of J, R.
Kantor; Pioneer in Scientific Psychology", 1976, 2, 137-148.
In Number 1 of this volume we commented on the developing interest in setting
factors as part of the psychological field. Sid Bijou's new book also makes
extensive use of the concept-. CHILD DEVELOPMENT; THE BASIC STAGE OF EARLY
CHILDHOODs Prentice-Hall, 1976. It also utilizes concepts of stimulus functions
and interactional history. James VI. McKearney, Senior Scientist at the Worcester
Foundation for Experimental Biology, has been giving considerable emphasis to
multiple factors in his research,, In "Punished Behavior: Increases in Responding
after d-Amphatemine'% PsjchoEhSS2laia9 1975, 411 23-26, he reports the
effects of "eo-existing behaviors" and "environmental context" with respect to
drugs. In "Drug Effects and the Environmental Control of Behavior",
j 1976, 27 (3), he explores some of the varied factors that
influence the effects of drugs as reinforcers. In a paper to be published in
PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE, "Asking Questions about Behavior", he
develops a position about causation, biological factors in behavior, settings,
and functional meanings of objects that is entirely interbehavioral. For
example,' "Knowing the physiological concomitants of a behavior could be very
useful information and yet not be an explanation. Since behavior is a complex
product of many interacting f actors , it is erroneous to attribute primary
causal status to any one of these acting in isolation". Still another paper,
"Interrelations among Prior Experience and Current Conditions in the Determination
of Behavior and the Effects of Drugs" to be published in Volume 3 of ADVANCES IN
BEHAVIORAL PHARMACOLOGY, Academic Press, states "although there has been a trad-
itional recognition of the importance of prior experience and of situational or
contextual, factors in the determination of behavior, these factors have not been
much emphasized in the experimental analysis of behavior and analysis of the
behavioral effects of drugs". For offprints and preprints write the author at
the Foundation, 222 Maple Ave, Shrewsbury^ Massachusetts 0154-5. The interest
in setting factors has also appeared in Germany; M i Setting factors* (Kantor,
1959) sind ebenfalls unmittelbare Umstfl.nde, unter denen sich ein Individuum
verhfllt, und erleichtern oder unterdrftcken bestimmte Reaktamen. Ein setting
factor kann z. B, die Anwesenheit einer anderen Person sein, aber auch der
Zustand, in dem sich die Vp befindet^ z. B. ihr Alter oder ihre gesundheitliche
verfassung". Source; Monika Rennert, "Der Einfluss der Versuchssituatlon bei
Imitationsexperimenten", Archly fttr,J?s_ycholQgle ., 1975* 127, 70-77. Also in num-
ber 1 Roger Ray was quoted on the subject of the role of setting and situational
factors in conditioning. He predicted that future research would demonstrate
the "profound" influences of such factors and. force a shift to "more ecological
models" of conditioning. Readers should know that in the years sinee that 1973
statement, Ray (with several associates) has been active in fulfilling his own
prophecy, i seris of papers entitled "A Systems Approach to Behavior" report
an impressive variety of experimental and field studies of animal and human
behavior (including but not limited to conditioning) establishing relationships
between subtle and often ignored setting factors and a variety of behavior par-
ameters. In addition to drawing attention to the importance of such setting
factors, Ray is consistent with the interbehavioral field orientation in his
philsophical and methodological commitment to the notion of a continuous
behavioral flow. Two of the papers in the series have already appeared in the
Ps]rcholoical_fecoTdl (1975, 25, 459-478; 1976, 26, 147-180) and a third (which
includes a particularly delightful study of the behavior of a killer whale at
a sea amusement park) will appear in the jRecord shortly. All three papers dem-
onstrate that interbehaviorism is far more than a stimulating exercise in phil-
osophical psychology! it has revolutionary potential for empirical psychology
as well, drawing the behavioral scientist toward relatively unexplored determ-
inants as well as novel measures of behavior. Along these same lines another
paper of interest is the lead article in the July 1977 AmerJ.cOT._P&ychologit
entitled "Toward an Experimental Ecology of Human Development" by Urie Bron-
fenbrenner. The interactional flavor of this manifesto for "broader perspect-
ives in theory, method, and substance" of research on human development is
demonstrated by Bronfebrenner's proposed definition for his new "ecology of
human development":

The ecology of human development is the scientific study of

the progressive, mutual accommodation, throughout the life span,
between a growing human organism and the changing immediate envir-
onments in which it lives, as this process is affected by relations
obtaining within and between these immediate settings, as well as
the larger social contexts, both formal and informal,, in which the
settings are embedded.

In numbers 1 and 2 of this volume we published a translation of Tilquin's account

of interbehaviorism. In this number we publish a translation of Foulquie" & Delle-
dalle's account. In the case of Tilquin he offers an overview that has only
occasional misunderstandings. But he ends with conclusions that are totally in-
consistent with what he reports about it. He is unable to recognize that one
need not assume an "interior life" as opposed, to an exterior one, tiat there is
no evidence that nature has divided humans or other organism into "inner" and
"outer". He also fails to recognize that one may regard all events as part of
the physical universe, that none are "leftovers" or objects of "despise", that
all are subject to scientific investigation, and that his includes "qualities,
meanings, and values" constituted by organism-object interactions. Assertions
about "desubjectivising" or "exteriorizing" are based on dualistic assumptions
invented by medieval theologians, Foulquie & Deledalle agree with Tilquin's
conclusions but give them a slightly different twist. By some rather obscure
logic they arrive at a "subjective world". For these authors to analyze a
naturalistic approach to psychology with fair accuracy and then return to meta-
physics that do not follow from it indicates the tenacious grip that this cul-
tural doctrine has even on diligent scholars. Without metaphysical assumptions
the doubts and criticisms fall away and psychology can be a true natural science
dealing with the observed events of valuing, developing meanings, etc.a part
of human activity, these activities in turn being as much a part of the domain
of the physical universe as are falling rocks. A similar confusion was analysed
in some detail in "A Commentary", Volume 6, Number 2.

Paul Puller once mentioned that there is a Russian book that has an account of
interbehaviorism but that he had lost the reference. If anyone knows of it
please send us the particulars. Perhaps we could locate a copy, find a translator,
and present it in these pages.

After eight years and seven volumes of the Newsletter/Quarterly the editor
would like to turn the job over to a successor. If anyone is interested in this
enterprise please contact him.

In the final number of Volume 7 we will include information about Dr. Ranter's
new book on language behavior.

The following essay, a revision and expansion of a portion of an under-

graduate sophomore's examination in a History and Systems of Psychology course
at Kenyon College, grapples with the relationship between behavioristic and
interbehavioristic perspectives. This relationship is, of course, intriguing
in its . complexity : as befits close siblings, the behaviorist and the inter-
behaviorist are at once the most f a i t h f u l of allies (in their efforts to establish
a naturalistic psychology) and the most irreconcilable of opponents (in their
analyses of the psychological event and the interrelations of its parts). The
essay also draws humanism into the comparison of psychological perspectives,
and in the process aptly raises questions about whether the "humanistic
revolution" is truly as revolutionary as promoted.

Interbehaviorism, Behaviorism, and Humanism:

A Comparative Analysis of Three Psychological Systems
Steven A. ZLeiser and Ronald G. Heyduk
Kenyon College

This essay is a brief attempt to contrast and compare three psychological

systems of the twentieth century: behaviorism, interbehaviorism, and humanism.
This will be done by examining first the similarities and differences between
behaviorism and interbehaviorism, and then discussing the similarities and
differences between interbehaviorism and humanism.

Interbehaviorism and Behaviorism: Similarities and Differences

Both behaviorism and interbehaviorism reject mind-body dualism. Both

systems strive to create a psychology that is monistic, that takes as its subject,
matter only natural, observable acts of the organism. Behaviorists and inter-
behaviorists believe that the "mind" does not exist; that it is just a cultural
imposition upon psychology. Psychologists of both schools want to study what
really exists, what is natural and observable, not some artificial, intangible
construct. Another similarity between the two systems is that each is opposed to
physiological reductionism as a solution to mind-body dualism. Each believes
that psychological events can never be fully explained in neurological terms;
such an effort is not only futile, but misdirected because in spite of his monistic
intentions the physiological reductionist maintains a dualism, simply substituting
for "mind" a new term, "brain", with the same spiritual properties. The brain
perceives, thinks, learns, and directs behavior exactly as the mind did. Thus
the organism is still not unified: "lower" aspects of the organism are sub-
ordinated to the omnipotent "mind-brain51.

A basic difference between behaviorism and interbehaviorism is the way in

which each tries to rid psychology of "mind" and thereby create a monistic
psychology. The behaviorist's solution is to focus on overt behavior and deny
or ignore "mental functions" such as perceiving, thinking, and remembering.
In the process, however, says the interbehaviorist, dualism is maintained, because
by ignoring "mental" events, one is tacitly admitting to their non-natural
status. In contrast, the interbehaviorist, rather than regarding the acts of
perceiving, thinking and remembering as unobservable functions of an ethereal
"mind", views them as natural functions of a whole organism, no different in
kind than "overt" behavioral accomplishments in that they represent an inter-
action between an organism and an environment. This leads to the second essential
difference between behaviorism and interbehaviorism. The behaviorist treats
the psychological event as an action-reaction, a sequential process beginning
with a "cause" (a "stimulus" or environmental situation influencing an organism)
and ending with an "effect" (the response of the organism to that situation),
while the interbehaviorist believes behavior is the result of a complex inter-
action between organism and environment, with no single, localized cause.

* The former author contributed organization, style, and most of the content of the
essay; the latter author exerted his prerogative as the former's teacher by
suggesting several modifications, mainly editorial in nature.

The most fundamental difference between the two schools (the difference
from which the other differences derive) concerns the definition of the two
components of a psychological event, "stimulus" and "response." The behaviorist
defines a stimulus as an environmental object (or the flow of energy it produces),
and a response as a movement or a secretion. The stimulus occxirs first, in the
environment, and elicits a response from the organism. Stimulus and response
are separate and distinct, and the environment is said to control the organism.
The interbehaviorist, when viewing the psychological event, concentrates not
on physical stimuli and responses, but on stimulus functions and response functions.
What matters is not the physical stimulus but its function ("meaning") for the
stimulated organism. A clinched fist and a glaring look, though different
physical stimuli, may have the same stimulus function. Similarly, what matters
is not the muscle activity comprising a response, but its function ("intent").
A glance at one's watch and a yawn during a lecture can have the same response
function. The interbehaviorist notes that while physical stimulus and response
occur as isolable units in a cause-effect sequence, stimulus and response
functions are not so isolable: they can be understood only in terms of their
relationship. One cannot determine a behavior's "intent" (response function)
without knowing the behaving organism's interpretation of the current environ-
ment (stimulus function); conversely, an organism's interpretation of the
environment (stimulus function) is only defined or revealed by the organism's
action in that environment (response function).

Interbehaviorism and Humanism: Similarities and Differences

Interbehaviorism and humanism are similar in that both systems are reactions
against what are viewed as oversimplifying characteristics of behaviorism.
Humanists and interbehaviorists agree that man is a complex and active organism
that should not be treated as an object controlled by the environment or by his
physiology. The similarity between the two systems ends there, however.
Humanists, in rejecting the behavioristic conception that man's behavior is
determined by the environment, assert in polar opposition that man determines
his own behavior. A fundamental belief of the humanist is in the free will of
man, in man's ability to control his own behavior, and in man's inherent goodness.
Interbehaviorists do not argue that man is basically good or evil, nor do they
believe in simplistic control of behavior, either by the environment or by man's
'Will". Interbehaviorists believe that causes of behavior can be determined,
but that "first causes" or "prime movers" do not exist. Instead of simple
cause-effect determinism, interbehaviorism posits an interaction between the
organism and the environment, with each dependent upon but neither controlling
the other. Humanism and behaviorism espouse opposing theories of behavior control,
while interbehaviorism is in the center, believing neither in strict environmental
nor organismic control but rather in an interaction of behavior determinants.
Humanism, in attempting to make a complete break with behaviorism, reintroduces
the mind and dualism, and strives to make psychology unnatural and unscientific
once again. Interbehaviorism also rejects the simplistic elements of behaviorism,
but interbehaviorist still believe in a scientific, naturalistic, and monistic

Matson, Floyd W. Humanistic theory: ehe Third Revolution in psychology. The

Humanist, March/April 1971.

Murphy, Gardner, & Kovach, Joseph K. HjjLtJd,aJLJntrj^^

Third Edition. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972.

Watson, John B. Psychology as the behaviorist views it. Psychological Review,

1913, 20, 158-177.

Paul Foulquie*
with the collaboration of
Gerald Deledalle
Parisj Presses Universitaires de France, 1951

Le Behaviorisms Organismique de Kantor*

The behaviorist Jacob Kantor (bom in 1388), professor at Indiana University,

leans heavily on the modern behaviorists but also seems to have been influenced
by the psychology of form: arid because of the importance that he attributes to
environment he is reminiscent of the concept of the psychology of man represented
by certain contemporary phenomenalegists.
He calls his concept organismic psychology which we will translate as "Psy-
cho logie organismique" although in one of his articles that he published in 1929
for the short-lived RgyjM_AJ^ZM3SiS_^2SI!k^.''" this was translated as "organic
psychology". That review states "Organic psychology is the study of the activities
of psychological organisms. It has no relation to traditional psychology which is
concerned with psychic or mental states". It does not call upon introspection
and considers states of consciousness to be a fiction. We consider that the object
of psychology is concrete reactions of an organism to its surrounding stimuli (Ibid.),
"The data of organic psychology are soley the concrete interactions of psych-
ological organisms and of objects acting upon them as stimuli. The concern then
is with a type of interaction absolutely analogous to the interaction of objects
as they are studied by the natural sciences" (Ibid.). For Kantor, the terms
"spirit" and "body" are only metaphysical abstractions which do not represent
anything real (3PrjilS. ^> P- 30). Holding to that reality which is perceptible
to the senses, the psychology he limits himself to analyzing and describing is
"the intervention of an organism which responds to an object which stimulates it"
(Ibid., p. 182).^
But Kantor is very careful to point out that psycho logy, as he conceives it,
is distinguished not only from the properly biological sciences but also from
classical behaviorism represented by Watson. Although for him, psychism is no
more than organic reactions, organic psychology should not be confused with biology
or with physiology. Indeed, while these natural sciences only study organisms,
psychology concentrates its attention on the interaction of the organism with the
stimuli which stem from the environment in which the organism lives. Rooted in

*This translation was corrected and improved by Lucien Ledue* ill footnotes
are by the editor.
"L'etat actual du behaviorisme'% 1929, 2, 136-137.
This statement does not occur on the page indicated.

biology, psychology has a special object and one can consider it as an ecological
(or bionomic) science (Ibid., p. 20). Moreover, psychological reactions differ
essentially from physical or biological reactions; they vary with the circumstances;
they integate themselves into complex behaviors; they can be put off or even in-
hibited (Ibid., p. 5-9).
In additiony in psychology it is essential to observe one's own behavior be-
cause a large number of facts cannot be known in any other way. Let us imagine,
for example, a person leaving his house, taking a few steps on the street, then
returning home, only to emerge again with a book under his arm. Anyone observing
this will understand that the person had forgotten the book and then had suddenly
remembered it (p. 8-9). But how did he remember it? Only that person can answer
the question by observing his own behavior. This type of information which sing-
ularly resembles introspection is unknown to biology.
Lastly, besides physical or biological there are psychological stimuli that
the biologist is not concerned with; among the former one must include geographic,
climatic, and ecological conditions.
Although he stated in his Principles of Psychology that this book somewhat
shares the view of authors who "sail together under the pennant of behaviorism"
(I, p. 72)3 he dOes not want to be confused with those for whom psychology is
only the study of organisms considered as a whole. "Organic psychology is the
science of a specific form of interaction among real personsor animalsand the
objects and situations which constitute their natural and social milieu" (Revue,
1929). For Kantor as for Watson the primary object of psychology is reactions
or behavior. But organismic psychology considers behaviors as separate from the
biological organisms that produce them and it integrates them in increasingly
complex structures whose development is described in the Principles. Also in
rejection of the mentalist attitude and introspective method, Kantor claims to
avoid the mechanisms by which all is reduced to reflexes. His work even begins
with this declaration; "The domain of psychology comprises the phenomena which
we call conscisousness or psychological reactions" (p. l). He further specifies;
"By psychological reaction we mean the responses which psychological organisms,
such as human individuals and higher types of animals perform when they adjust
themselves to the various stimulating objects surrounding them" (p. l). He deems
it impossible to explain these psychological reactions by analyzing the organic
activity ending in the reflex-arc, the basic unit of psychism. "Psychology can-
not take as its unit anything less full of content than the actual response of a
person to a stimulus object" (p. 2). Every response is the response of a person-
ality (p. 36). "Personality constitutes one of the essential psychological
data" (p. 7,4). In fact, Kantor admits only of an empirical personality. It
amounts to systems of reactions or to behavioral equipment acquired by the
individual in the course of his past experience; it seems that there is something
that transcends the purely organic.
Be that as it may, it is interesting to note his insistence in affirming
the effect of an individual's past in his present conduct; "One of the best
established of all psychological principles is that the activities of an indiv-
idual depend upon his reactional biography or behavior history" (p. 159). Whereas

quotations from the Principles are here presented from the original
English rather than being retranslated.
on the one hand biological behavior is rigorously determined by the present
disposition of the organism and on the other by environment, psychological behav-
ior depends even more on the past contacts of the organism with the surroxmdings
and subsequently is seen to be highly personal.
Further, Kantor1s points are not in agreement with the rigourous methods
that experimental psychologists claimed to acquire from physics. Introspection
is rejected and one must be content with exterior observation which appears in
two principle forms: (1) field observationwhat one would call naive or popular
observation and which consists of the study of psychological organisms as they
are found in spontaneous or free activity; (2) laboratory Research or experi-
mentation. Mow it is interesting to note that it is to the first that Kantor
gives more importance, just as do the traditional psychologists. Field obser-
vation he says is irreplaceable such fiat psychology is essentially a field science
and supplies us with first notions of thought, feeling, wanting, etc; it is only
by this that we have an understanding of complex facts that laboratory analysis
would distort. Psychology is none the less a science; for it is a critical
attitude which makes for a scientific attitude^ and thanks to it these ^.wo modes
of observation are separated only very tenuously (p. 15).
Of even more interest is the Kantorian concept of stimulus. The stimulus
does not identify with a physical phenomenon that is identical for all. What is
identical for all is the object. For example, a white ball has natural proper-
ties which act in a similar fashion on the retinas of the eyes which perceive
it| but this is only a small part of the stimulatory properties of things. The
stimulus is created rather than given in natural objects. Indeed, transformations
occur which add to the latter powers what they did not originally possess. In
other words, where classical behaviorism supposes that experience nodifies the
organism, but not the environment which acts upon it, Kantor teaches that the
environment is also modified and that the objects are enriched by new stimuli.
For a child, for example, a red ball viewed from a distance, is characterized
only by its round form and colorj but when it is placed in his hands and he
senses its freshness, when he caresses it with his fingers, when he feels its
smoothness send its hardness and weight, the original stimulus will be singularly
enriched. Thus, to the mysterious object in itself is progressively substituted
the object for us which is reminiscent of the world of phemenologists. The study
of the interactions which result in both the adaptation of the behavior of organ-
isms and the constitution of a new world becomes for Kantor the object of psych-
Association one would guess plays a major role in what one may call
"psychologization" of the material world. But Kantor does not fall into assoe-
iational psychology that prevailed in the 19th century, which concerned assoc-
iation of ideas. For it, everything occurs within the subject; it is pure
mentalism. For Kantor, on the contrary, it is not ideas or states of conscious-
ness which are associated but more or less complex stimuli and responses,, "Pre-
cisely as in the case of an earlier psychological period, associated processes
today may be looked upon as fundamental and universal mechanisms for all psych-

authors use quotation marks for this clause but have actually summarized
"is it not this critical attitude in observing and interpreting phenomena in what-
ever way it may be employed^ which constitutes science?" They have also rendered
"attitude" as esprit, "spirit" or "mind". "Attitude".is the same word in French
from which it was borrowed.

ological phenomena. But unlike the earlier period in which association was
considered as having to do only with mental states, we must today consider it as
referring to the organization of actual stimuli-response situations" (p. 343).
Kantor made substitutions to Watsonian behaviorism which he called inter-
behaviorism and for the psychology of reactions he substituted the psychology of
interaction. On the one hand the beings that he calls "psychological organisms"
do not merely react to the actions of stimuli; their reactions are responses in
the sense of human relationships; they consist of new attitudes in which the
individual faces a situation, and which little by little gives him the "psych-
ological equipment"; and tiat equipment is more or less independent of the organ-
ism and of the surroundings. On the other hand the stimuli arriving from the
surroundings don't remain indifferent to the responses which are made to them;
their powers of stimulation can either increase or decrease, There are therefore
more than two terms having bearings a being capable of reactions and objects
capable of provoking reactions. Beyond these assumptions that one may consider
as the structure of psychic activity, there arises in the life course of the
individuals complex superstructures which result from the interaction of the
two terms in relation. The object of psychology is the study of these super-
For Kantor, psychological analysis could not go beyond the stimulus-response
pair, which he calls a "segment of behavior" and which constitutesra determinate
adaptation. The primary forms of behavior are reflex and instinct-'to which ex-
perience imposes "basic behavior" which constitutes the framework of personality.
Finally, with social behavior appears psychological behavior. Under the name of
psychological behavior Kantor goes on to analyze, with a profusion of divisions
and subdivisions unknown to classical psychology, the varying psychic functions,
emphasizing their characteristics of behavior or reactions attentive reactions,
implicit actions as responses to absent stimuli (thought), affective reactions,
cognitive responses, volitional conduct, etc, (p. 307).
Thus the images (or rather the imaginal responses) consist of vestiges of
perceptual reaction systems. To this observation the author adds this profound
remark: in great measure, to imagine means to verbally analyze the manner in which
we react to absent objects (p. 307).
He rejects the realist concept that intelligence is a special power; it is
only "the particular way the individual adapts himself to his surroundings,". (p
128) and this "particular way" consists in predicting and varying the reaction
systems. However, for Kantor these predictions and these attempts at varied
reactions are the business of implicit behavior and not of thought; classical
psychology says the same thing.
The description that Kantor gives us of the free act or rather of idiosyn-
cratic activity singularly recalls the Bergsonian theory of freedoms there ares
he says, contingential reactions whieir'depend not on the organism but on the
"psychological equipment*. In these-situations the individual derives his response
from his personality, from his "reactional biography" (p. 195).

This is misleading. See "Principles., I, P. 155-158. Kantor was one of the

earliest critics of the instinct doctrine.
Kantor rejects any hypothesis that goes beyond immediate data, and it is
in the name of scientific positivism that he rejects Watsonian materialism as
well as classic spiritualism. Claiming to limit himself to what is immediately
verifiable he considers psychology as a descriptive science and he does not seek
any explanation of observed facts,,
In fact he reconstitutes the contents of consciousness and interior life on
a new plans which are so vilified by objective psychology. In their place he
speaks of psychological behavior and psychological environment, all the factors
of interbehavior. As M. Tilquin accurately said "One understands then how Kantor
'while denying interior* life does not deprive psychology of human experience*,
Rather he exteriorizes interior life by projecting itinto stimuli and responses,
and he makes stimuli and responses fiat are objective phenomena -undergo a
subjactivation" (p. 354).
For the author we have just quoted a return to subjectivity constitutes a
fundamental error for he says "Psychology only aspires to be a science like the
others" (p, 355). One can, on the contrary, believe that in becoming a science
like the others,, it no longer attains its goal; because of this we have indirect
constitution of & subjective world.

r "(T o >
A proper understanding of psychological events will only come when
researchers change their conception of them. For one of the most
eloquent of the group of cognitive theorists, Neisser (1967), the
task is to "trace the fate of tie input" (p. 4.), what happens to the
stimulus once it has entered the body. Such an approach clearly
views psychology as what happens inside, and so it is essential to
fill the organism with psychological functions. Behaviour is not
seen as being a function of the stimulus context but as a function
of organism!, c processes, which are recognised as being hypothetical
constructs (p. 4-} Behaviour is merely a manifestation of these
underlying processes. Cognition is no longer something which a
person does but is something performed by cognitive structures,
which have no existential reality,, How can it possibly be justi-
fied that one can explain a phenomenon by referring to something
which does not exist? Only by recognizing that psychology is the
study of the interaction of an organism and an. environment will any
progress be made in the understanding of its events. The environ-
ment does not somehow enter the organism and be processed; it merely
comes into contact with the environment. And it is the study of the
various types of relationships with which psychology is concerned.
In brief, psychology is not the study of what occurs between stim-
ulus and response in the CNS (Conceptual Nervous System); it is
the study of the interaction between the two factors. Stimulus and
response now play a central rather than a peripheral role in the
eventthey are the event,, Reference to the CNS does not account
for the event, it merely provides us with a more detailed descrip-
tion of the response phase, Viewed in isolation from the stimulus

contextj the responding of an organism is a purely biological event-

psychological events are not located in biological structures
and it only attains psychological status when it is linked with the
stimulus context.
Edward Blewett
Letter, June H, 1976
folume 7
Nussber 4-

Language in not an i^g_trumgnt of communication between speaker and hearers it

Is their c^wffiiati2S"-''feheir transactionas speaker and hearer,,
A corollary of the constant code of the linguists is that the forms of language
ar not altered by the meanings of the speakers, and the forms themselves do not
properly "mean" anything,, But it can be shown that forms and meanings continually
affect one another. In my opinion, these linguists do not understand how language,
has meaning. Meaning is the end-in-view of speaking and .hearing; It is not some-
thing extrinsic to speech* Meaning is not thoughts or purposes in the heads of
speakers, and It is not-, as Bloomfield said, the relation of events prior to their
speaking and consequent to their speaking. Meaning is what needs to be said in
coping with the actual situation of the speaker and hearer, so far as it can be
done by saying. Meaning is not conveyed by speech or EOjhjtedjto. by speech; it is
speaker and hearer making sense to one another in a situation, (p. 34.)
Again and again I find myself dissenting from the main line of the scientific
linguists of the past fifty yearsthe anthropologists, the posltivists, and the
structuralists.,.. It seems to ae that in abstracting language from speaking and
hearing in actual situations, they make three fundamental,, ted connected mistakess
(l) they exaggerate constancy and supra-individuality as against the variability
and interpersonal!ty of natural language; the wlanguage8 that they discuss, with
its contstant forms and self-contained rules, is sometimes an artifact of their
method of investigation., (2) They say that the forms of language can rarelyf If
ever, be explained by meanings in experience and practical use,, and the forms
themselves do not have meaning,, (3) They have a disposition to treat language
and communication as a calculus of forms and processing of information that could
dispense with human speakers and hearers altogether, (p. 86-87)
e cannot use words to cope unless we believe in their meaning and assert it, and
this belief depends on utterance, grammar, history, the existence of speakers and
hearers. Conversely, we cannot finally describe a language, its pronunciation,
grammar, and meaning of words, unless we take into accountjfcs uses in spakinge.e
(p. 85)


DEFENSE OF POETRY, Random House, 1971



Crude Data