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In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of the pretext that his relationship with

onship with his employer had already become

backwages and separation pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24 strained. 34
a.) G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as
place the wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee systems analyst is one that may be characterized as a position of trust and
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations
and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof statutory between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an
construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who
SALAZAR, respondents.
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This has been unlawfully dismissed.
plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner. est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by
words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or engaging in transactions that may have created conflict of interest situations?
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent. will and preclude the court from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits its
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used words advisedly, employees from involving themselves with any company that has business
and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed
statute. 27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute as a witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in
there should be no departure. Neither does the provision admit of any turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in an
qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.
for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of
exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a
ensuing strained relations between the employer and the employee.
circumstance did not create a conflict of interests situation. As a systems
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement
analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations involving the
and payment of backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development of
employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of position where he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it systems and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar
the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione positions etc. from is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval and purchase of
which one had been removed" 15 and in the latter, to give her back the income generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the supplies and company assets.
lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, employee concerned.
would perforce make her "whole."
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above confidence. As we have held countless times, while loss of confidence or
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when principles: where the employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, breach of trust is a valid ground for terminations it must rest an some basis
reinstatement has not been forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee enjoys the full trust and confidence of top management; 28 or is the Officer-In- which must be convincingly established. 35 An employee who not be dismissed
finds himself on the outside looking in. Charge of the extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is an on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that since
organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts to Salazar and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it "presumed
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying organize the workers in commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its
reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose primary purpose is to averment that Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was probably true,
reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not condone the acts of
(22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of the situation; 16 or that it organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of
would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that reinstatement may Sales. 32 suspicion derived from speculative inferences.
no longer be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best interests of the
parties involved; 19 or that the company would be prejudiced by the workers' Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be
continued employment; 20 or that it will not serve any prudent purpose as indiscriminately. Otherwisey reinstatement can never be possible simply most inequitous because the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her
when supervening facts have transpired which make execution on that score because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a friend's alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations'
unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant result of litigation. That is human nature. 33 support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's
atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations" or
special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge of
"irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the employee. 22
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private
asserting one's right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could respondent is wanting from the records.
be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar conceded that the details, spirit and intent of the law could only be carried The claim that the statute commits to the arbitrary discretion of the
had already resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have into effect through a board of commission. Secretary of the Treasury the determination of what teas may be
the opportunity to refute management's findings, the report remained imported, and therefore in effect vests that official with legislative
obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner dealt The case of Buttfield vs. Stranahan, 192 U. S., 470, is square in point. The law power, is without merit. We are of opinion that the statute, when
principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having had a there construed is as follows: properly construed, as said by the Circuit Court of Appeals, but
chance to voice his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination express the purpose to exclude the lowest grades of tea, whether
should have been carried out to ascertain whether or not there existed demonstrably of inferior purity, or unfit for consumption, or
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representation of the
independent legal grounds to hold Salatar answerable as well and, thereby, presumably so because of their inferior quality. This, in effect, was
United States of America in Congress assembled, That from and after
justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have been the fixing of a primary standard, and devolved upon the Secretary of
May first, eighteen hundred and ninety-seven, it shall be unlawful
unlawfully dismissed. the Treasury the mere executive duty to effectuate the legislative
for any person or persons or corporation to import or bring into the
policy declared in the statute.
United States any merchandise as tea which is inferior in purity,
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor quality, and fitness for consumption to the standards provided in
Relations Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. section three of this Act, and the importation of all such The St. Louis vs. Taylor (210 U. S., 281), construed the validity of an Act of
Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar merchandise is hereby prohibited. Congress, which is as follows:
and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2) years
only. Within ninety days from the passage of this Act the American
SEC. 2. That immediately after the passage of this Act, and or before February
fifteenth of each year thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury shall appoint a Railway Association is authorized hereby to designate to the
This decision is immediately executory. board, to consist of seven members, each of whom shall be an expert in teas, Interstate Commerce Commission the standard height of drawbars
and who shall prepare and submit to him standard samples of tea; . . . for freight cars, measured perpendicular from the level of the tops
SO ORDERED. of the trials to the centers of the drawbars, for each of the several
gauges of railroads in use in the United States, and shall fix a
SEC. 3. That the Secretary of the Treasurer, upon the recommendation of the
maximum variation from such standard height to be allowed
G.R. No. L-30783 August 27, 1929 said board, shall fix and establish uniform standards of purity, quality, and
between the drawers of empty and located cars. Upon their
fitness for consumption of all kinds of teas imported into the United States,
determination being certified to the Interstate Commerce
JUAN B. ALEGRE, petitioner-appellee, and shall procure and deposit in the customhouses of the ports of New York,
Commission, said Commission shall at once give notice of the
vs. Chicago, San Francisco, and such other ports as he may determine, duplicate
standard fixed upon to all common carriers, owners. . . . And after
THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, respondents-appellant. samples of such standards; that said Secretary shall procure a sufficient
July first, eighteen hundred and ninety-five, no cars, either loaded or
number of other duplicate samples of such standards to supply the importers
unloaded, shall be used in interstate traffic which do comply with the
and dealers in tea at all ports desiring the same, at costs. All teas, or
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellant. standard above provided for.
merchandise described as tea, of inferior purity, quality, and fitness for
Camus & Delgado and Jose M. Casal for appellee.
consumption to such standards shall be deemed within the prohibition of the
first section hereof . . . . And in its opinion said:
Construing which that court said: "It is contended that there is here an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
The petitioner for a number of years has been and is now engaged in the power to the railway association and to the Interstate Commerce Commission.
production of abaca and its exportation to foreign markets. November 8, This is clearly a Federal question. Briefly stated, the statute enacted that after
We may say of the legislation in this case, as was said of the
1927, he applied to the respondent for a permit to export one hundred bales a date named only cars with drawbars of uniform height should be fixed by
legislation considered in Marshall Field & Co. vs. Clark, that it does
ofabaca to England, which was denied, and advised that he would not be the association and declared by the Commission. Nothing need be said upon
not, in any real sense, invest administrative officials with the power
permitted to export the abaca in question without a certificate of the Fiber this question except that it was settled adversely o the contention of the
of legislation. Congress legislated on the subject as far as was
Standardization Board. He then filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a plaintiff in error in Buttfield vs. Stranahan, 192 U. S., 470; 48 Law. ed., 525; 24
reasonably practicable, and from the necessities of the case was
petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the provisions of the Sup. Ct. Rep., 349, a case which, in principle, is completely in point. And see
compelled to leave to executive officials the duty of bringing about
Administrative Code for the grading, inspection and certification of fibers and, Union Bridge Co. vs. United States, 204 U. S., 364; 51 Law. ed., 523; 27 Sup. Ct.
the result pointed out by the statute. To deny the power of Congress
in particular, sections 1772 and 1244 of that Code, are unconstitutional and Rep., 367, where the cases were reviewed." (28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 617.)
to delegate such a duty would, in effect, amount but to declaring
that the penalty power vested in Congress to regulate foreign
commerce could not be efficaciously exerted. It will be noted that section 1772 of the Administrative Code, as amended,
Hence, the question here is whether or not the law in question delegates to provides:
the Fiber Board legislative powers or administrative functions to carry out the
purpose and intent of the law for its more efficient administration. It must be
The Fiber Standardization Board shall determine the official The appellee has cited authorities of similar laws, which have been enacted by computing retirement benefits, are unavailing in the present case. Specifically,
standards for the various commercial grades of Philippine fibers that different States of the United States, that have been declared unconstitutional he pointed out that the pilot in Philippine Airlines, Inc. retired at the age of
are or may hereafter be produced in the Philippine Islands for in violation of section 8 of article 1 of the United States Constitution which forty-five (45), while he opted to retire at fifty-two (52). He further
shipment abroad. Each grade shall have its proper name and confers upon Congress the authority "to regulate commerce with foreign emphasized that the ruling was anchored on a finding that the retirement
designation which, together with the basis upon which the several nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." benefits that the pilot would get under Article 287 of the Labor Code are less
grades are determined, shall be defined by the said Board in a than those he would get under PALs retirement plans.19
general order. Such order shall have the approval of the Secretary of It must be conceded that within the meaning of the Constitution, the
Agriculture and Natural Resources; and for the dissemination of Philippine Islands is not a State of the United States, that it is not a Tribe of Apparently, the petitioner failed to appreciate the heart behind the ruling in
information, copies of the same shall be supplied gratis to the Indians, and that it is not a foreign nation. Philippine Airlines, Inc. To recapitulate, the case stemmed from PALs
foreign markets, provincial governors, municipal presidents, and to unilateral act of retiring airline pilot Captain Albino Collantes (Collantes) under
such other persons and agencies as shall make request therefor. the authority of Section 2, Article VII of the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan.
We have given this case the careful consideration which its importance
deserves, and are clearly of the opinion that the act in question, is not a Thereafter, ALPAP filed a Notice of Strike with the Department of Labor and
If it is considered expedient to change these standards at any time, delegation of legislative power to the Fiber Board, and that the powers given Employment (DOLE), asseverating that the retirement of Collantes constituted
notice shall be given in the local and foreign markets for a period of by the Legislature to the board are for an administrative purposes, to enforce illegal dismissal and union busting. The Secretary of Labor assumed
at least six months before the new standard shall go into effect. and carry out the intent of the law. jurisdiction and eventually upheld PALs action of retiring Collantes as a valid
exercise of its option under Section 2, Article VII of the PAL-ALPAP Retirement
That is to say, the Legislature has specifically provided for the creation of Plan. It further directed for the computation of Collantes retirement benefits
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the petition is dismissed,
"official standards for commercial grades of fibers," and that "the Fiber on the basis of Article 287 of the Labor Code.20 Acting on Collantes petition
without costs to either party. So ordered.
Standardization Board shall determine the official standards for the various for certiorari, the CA held that the pilots retirement benefits should be based
commercial grades of Philippine fibers," and that: on Article 287 of the Labor Code and not on the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan.
G.R. No. 181995 July 16, 2012 On appeal to this Court, we reversed the CA and ruled that Collantes
retirement benefits should be computed based on the PAL-ALPAP Retirement
All fibers within the purview of this law which are intended for
BIBIANO C. ELEGIR, Petitioner, Plan and the PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan and not on Article 287 of the
export shall be pressed in uniform bales. The approximate volume
vs. Labor Code since the benefits under the two (2) plans are substantially higher
and net weight of each bale, together with the manner of binding,
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Respondent. than the latter. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
marking, wrapping, and stamping of the same, shall be defined in a
general order by the Fiber Standardization Board.
DECISION WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The March
2, 2000 Decision and the June 19, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
And section 1788, as amended, provides that no fiber shall be exported in
REYES, J.: CA-G.R. SP No. 54403 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the
quality greater than the amount sufficient to make one bale, without being
Secretary of Labor in NCMB-NCR-N.S. 12-514-97 dated June 13, 1998, is
graded, baled, inspected, and certified as in this law provided. That is to say,
MODIFIED as follows: The retirement benefits to be awarded to Captain
the law provides in detail for the inspection, grading and bailing of hemp the This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court Albino Collantes shall be based on the 1967 PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan and
Fiber Board with the power and authority to devise ways and means for its seeking to annul and set aside the Decision1 dated August 6, 2007 of the Court the PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan. The directive contained in
execution. In legal effect, the Legislature has said that before any hemp is of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79111, which reversed and set aside the subparagraph (2) of the dispositive portion thereof, which required petitioner
exported from the Philippine Islands it must be inspected, graded and baled, Decision2 dated March 18, 2002 and Order3 dated June 30, 2003 of the to consult the pilot involved before exercising its option to retire him, is
and has created a board or that purpose and vested it with the power and National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08- DELETED. The said Order is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
authority to do the actual work. That is not a delegation o legislative power. It 06135-97 and NLRC NCR CA No. 015030-98.
is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber Board,
to carry out the purpose and intent of the law. In the very nature of things, the SO ORDERED.21 (Emphasis supplied)
The Ruling of this Court
Legislature could not inspect, grade and bale the hemp, and from necessity,
the power to do that would have to be vested in a board of commission. It bears reiterating that there are only two retirement schemes at point in this
The petitioners retirement pay should be computed based on PALs case: (1) Article 287 of the Labor Code, and; (2) the PAL-ALPAP Retirement
retirement plans. Plan and the PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan. The two retirement schemes
The petitioner's contention would leave the law, which provides for the
inspection, grading and baling of hemp, without any means of its are alternative in nature such that the retired pilot can only be entitled to that
enforcement. If the law cannot be enforced by such a board or commission, The petitioner maintains that it is Article 287 of the Labor Code which should which provides for superior benefits.
how and by whom could it be enforced? The criticism that there is partiality or be applied in the computation of his retirement pay since the same provides
even fraud in the administration of the law is not an argument against its for higher benefits. He contends that the CA erroneously resorted to the ruling Article 287 of the Labor Code states:
constitutionality. in Philippine Airlines, Inc. since the circumstances in the said case, which led
this Court to rule in favor of the applicability of PALs retirement plans in
Art. 287. Retirement. - Any employee may be retired upon reaching the benefits provided. Thus, even if there is an existing CBA but the same does not Plan pertains to the totality of PALs monthly contribution for every pilot,
retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other provide for retirement benefits equal or superior to that which is provided which amounts to 20% of the actual monthly salary. Necessarily, the
applicable employment contract. under Article 287 of the Labor Code, the latter will apply. In this manner, the computation of this benefit requires a record of the petitioners salary, which
employee can be assured of a reasonable amount of retirement pay for his was unfortunately not submitted by either of the parties. At any rate, the
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such sustenance. petitioner did not dispute the fact that he already received his entitlement
retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any under the PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan nor did he question the
collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: provided, however, Consistent with the purpose of the law, the CA correctly ruled for the propriety of the amount tendered. Thus, we can reasonably assume that he
that an employees retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and computation of the petitioners retirement benefits based on the two (2) PAL received the rightful amount of his entitlement under the plan.
other agreements shall not be less than those provided herein. retirement plans because it is under the same that he will reap the most
benefits. Under the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan, the petitioner, who qualified On the other hand, under Article 287 of the Labor Code, the petitioner would
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement plan providing for for late retirement after rendering more than twenty (20) years of service as a only be receiving a retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) of his
retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon pilot, is entitled to a lump sum payment of P125,000.00 for his twenty-five monthly salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months
reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) (25) years of service to PAL. Section 2, Article VII of the PAL-ALPAP Retirement being considered as one whole year. To stress, one-half (1/2) month salary
years which is hereby declared as the compulsory retirement age, who has Plan provides: means 22.5 days: 15 days plus 2.5 days representing one-twelfth (1/12) of the
served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be 13th month pay and the remaining 5 days for service incentive leave.27
entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary Section 2. Late Retirement. Any member who remains in the service of the
for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered company after his normal retirement date may retire either at his option or at Comparing the benefits under the two (2) retirement schemes, it can readily
as one whole year. the option of the Company, and when so retired he shall be entitled either: (a) be perceived that the 22.5 days worth of salary for every year of service
to a lump sum payment of P5,000.00 for each completed year of service provided under Article 287 of the Labor Code cannot match the 240% of salary
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half (1/2) rendered as a pilot, or (b) to such termination pay benefits to which he may be or almost two and a half worth of monthly salary per year of service provided
month salary shallmean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th entitled under existing laws, whichever is the greater amount.24 under the PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan, which will be further added to
month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service the P125,000.00 to which the petitioner is entitled under the PAL-ALPAP
incentive leaves. x x x (Emphasis supplied) Apart from the abovementioned benefit, the petitioner is also entitled to the Retirement Plan. Clearly then, it is to the petitioners advantage that PALs
equity of the retirement fund under PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan, which retirement plans were applied in the computation of his retirement benefits.
It can be clearly inferred from the language of the foregoing provision that it is pertains to the retirement fund raised from contributions exclusively from PAL
applicable only to a situation where (1) there is no CBA or other applicable of amounts equivalent to 20% of each pilots gross monthly pay. Each pilot The petitioner should reimburse PAL with the costs of his training.
employment contract providing for retirement benefits for an employee, or stands to receive the full amount of the contribution upon his retirement
(2) there is a CBA or other applicable employment contract providing for which is equivalent to 240% of his gross monthly income for every year of As regards the issue of whether the petitioner should be obliged to reimburse
retirement benefits for an employee, but it is below the requirement set by service he rendered to PAL. This is in addition to the amount of not less than PAL with the costs of his training, the ruling in Almario v. Philippine Airlines,
law. The rationale for the first situation is to prevent the absurd situation P100,000.00 that he shall receive under the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan.25 Inc.28 is controlling. Essentially, in the mentioned case, this Court recognized
where an employee, deserving to receive retirement benefits, is denied them the right of PAL to recoup the costs of a pilots training in the form of service
through the nefarious scheme of employers to deprive employees of the In sum, therefore, the petitioner will receive the following retirement benefits: for a period of at least three (3) years. This right emanated from the CBA
benefits due them under existing labor laws. On the other hand, the second between PAL and ALPAP, which must be complied with good faith by the
situation aims to prevent private contracts from derogating from the public (1) P125,000.00 (25 years x P5,000.00) for his 25 years of service to parties. Thus:
law.22 PAL under the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan, and;
"The CBA is the law between the contracting parties the collective
The primary application of existing CBA in computing retirement benefits is (2) 240% of his gross monthly salary for every year of his bargaining representative and the employer-company. Compliance with a CBA
implied in the title of R.A. No. 7641 which amended Article 287 of the Labor employment or, more specifically, the summation of PALs monthly is mandated by the expressed policy to give protection to labor. In the same
Code. The complete title of R.A. No. 7641 reads: "An Act Amending Article 287 contribution of an amount equivalent to 20% of his actual monthly vein, CBA provisions should be "construed liberally rather than narrowly and
of Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended, otherwise known as the Labor salary, under the PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan. technically, and the courts must place a practical and realistic construction
Code of the Philippines, By Providing for Retirement Pay to Qualified Private upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and
Sector in the Absence of Any Retirement Plan in the Establishment."23 purpose which it is intended to serve." This is founded on the dictum that a
As stated in the records, the petitioner already received the amount due to
CBA is not an ordinary contract but one impressed with public interest. It goes
him under the PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan. 26 As much as we would like
Emphasis must be placed on the fact that the purpose of the amendment is without saying, however, that only provisions embodied in the CBA should be
to demonstrate with specificity the amount of the petitioners entitlement
not merely to establish precedence in application or accord blanket priority to so interpreted and complied with. Where a proposal raised by a contracting
under said plan, we are precluded from doing so because there is no record of
existing CBAs in computing retirement benefits. The determining factor in party does not find print in the CBA, it is not a part thereof and the proponent
the petitioners salary, including increments thereto, attached to the records
choosing which retirement scheme to apply is still superiority in terms of has no claim whatsoever to its implementation."
of this case. To reiterate, the benefit under the PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit
In N.S. Case No. 11-506-87, "In re Labor Dispute at the Philippine Airlines, Thus, the provision on age limit should now read: Admittedly, PAL invested for the training of Almario to enable him to acquire a
Inc.," the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), higher level of skill, proficiency, or technical competence so that he could
passing on the failure of PAL and ALPAP to agree on the terms and conditions Pilots fifty-seven (57) years of age shall be frozen in their efficiently discharge the position of A-300 First Officer. Given that, PAL
for the renewal of their CBA which expired on December 31, 1987 and positions.1wphi1 Pilots fifty-five (55) [sic] years of age provided they have expected to recover the training costs by availing of Almarios services for at
construing Section 1 of Article XXIII of the 1985-1987 CBA, held: previously qualified in any company turbo-jet aircraft shall be permitted to least three years. The expectation of PAL was not fully realized, however, due
occupy any position in the companys turbo-jet fleet.29 (Citations omitted and to Almarios resignation after only eight months of service following the
xxxx emphasis supplied) completion of his training course. He cannot, therefore, refuse to reimburse
the costs of training without violating the principle of unjust
enrichment.30 (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Article XXIII of the 1985-1987 CBA provides: Further, we considered PALs act of sending its crew for training as an
investment which expects an equitable return in the form of service within a
reasonable period of time such that a pilot who decides to leave the company After perusing the records of this case, we fail to find any significant fact or
Pilots fifty-five (55) years of age or over who have not previously qualified in
before it is able to regain the full value of the investment must circumstance that could warrant a departure from the established
any Company turbo-jet aircraft shall not be permitted to bid into the
proportionately reimburse the latter for the costs of his training. We jurisprudence. The petitioner admitted that as in Almario, the prevailing CBA
Companys turbo-jet operations. Pilots fifty-five (55) years of age or over who
ratiocinated: between PAL and ALPAP at the time of his retirement incorporated the same
have previously qualified in the companys turbo-jet operations may be by-
stipulation in Section 1, Article XXIII of the 1985-1987 CBA31 which provides:
passed at Company option, however, any such pilot shall be paid the by-pass
pay effective upon the date a junior pilot starts to occupy the bidded position. It bears noting that when Almario took the training course, he was about 39
years old, 21 years away from the retirement age of 60. Hence, with the Pilots fifty-seven (57) years of age shall be frozen in their positions. Pilots fifty-
maturity, expertise, and experience he gained from the training course, he five (55) [sic] years of age provided they have previously qualified in any
x x x PAL x x x proposed to amend the provision in this wise:
was expected to serve PAL for at least three years to offset "the prohibitive company turbo-jet aircraft shall be permitted to occupy any position in the
costs" thereof. companys turbo-jet fleet.32
The compulsory retirement age for all pilots is sixty (60) years. Pilots who
reach the age of fifty-five (55) years and over without having previously
The pertinent provision of the CBA and its rationale aside, contrary to As discussed in Almario, the above provision initially set the age of fifty-five
qualified in any Company turbo-jet aircraft shall not be permitted to occupy
Almarios claim, Article 22 of the Civil Code which reads: (55) years as the reckoning point when a pilot becomes disqualified to bid for
any position in the Companys turbo-jet fleet. Pilots fifty-four (54) years of age
a higher position. The age of disqualification was set at 55 years old to enable
and over are ineligible for promotion to any position in Group I. Pilots reaching
PAL to fully recover the costs of the pilots training within a period of five (5)
the age of fifty-five (55) shall be frozen in the position they currently occupy at "Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any
years before the pilot reaches the compulsory retirement age of sixty (60). The
that time and shall be ineligible for any further movement to any other other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense
DOLE Secretary however lowered the age to fifty-seven (57), thereby cutting
positions. of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him,"
the supposed period of recovery of investment to three (3) years. The DOLE
Secretary justified the amendment in that the "prohibitive training costs are
PALs contention is basically premised on prohibitive training costs. The return more than offset by the maturity, expertise and the experience of the pilot."33
on this investment in the form of the pilot promoted is allegedly five (5) years. This provision on unjust enrichment recognizes the principle that one may not
Considering the pilots age, the chances of full recovery are asserted to be enrich himself at the expense of another. An authority on Civil Law writes on
By carrying over the same stipulation in the present CBA, both PAL and ALPAP
quite slim. the subject, viz:
recognized that the companys effort in sending pilots for training abroad is an
investment which necessarily expects a reasonable return in the form of
ALPAP opposed the proposal and argued that the training cost is offset by the "Enrichment of the defendant consists in every patrimonial, physical, or moral service for a period of at least three (3) years. This stipulation had been
pilots maturity, expertise and experience. advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money. It may consist of some repeatedly adopted by the parties in the succeeding renewals of their CBA,
positive pecuniary value incorporated into the patrimony of the defendant, thus validating the impression that it is a reasonable and acceptable term to
By way of compromise, we rule that a pilot should remain in the position such as: (1) the enjoyment of a thing belonging to the plaintiff; (2) the benefits both PAL and ALPAP. Consequently, the petitioner cannot conveniently
where he is upon reaching age fifty-seven (57), irrespective of whether or not from service rendered by the plaintiff to the defendant; (3) the acquisition of a disregard this stipulation by simply raising the absence of a contract expressly
he has previously qualified in the Companys turbo-jet operations. The right, whether real or personal; (4) the increase of value of property of the requiring the pilot to remain within PALs employ within a period of 3 years
rationale behind this is that a pilot who will be compulsorily retired at age defendant; (5) the improvement of a right of the defendant, such as the after he has been sent on training. The supposed absence of contract being
sixty (60) should no longer be burdened with training for a new position. But if acquisition of a right of preference; (6) the recognition of the existence of a raised by the petitioner cannot stand as the CBA clearly covered the
a pilot is only at age fifty-five (55), and promotional positions are available, he right in the defendant; and (7) the improvement of the conditions of life of the petitioners obligation to render service to PAL within 3 years to enable it to
should still be considered and promoted if qualified, provided he has defendant. recoup the costs of its investment.
previously qualified in any company turbo-jet aircraft. In the latter case, the
prohibitive training costs are more than offset by the maturity, expertise, and x x x x"
experience of the pilot.
Further, to allow the petitioner to leave the company before it has fulfilled the and fairness dictate that he must return to the company a proportionate operation of the contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an event,
reasonable expectation of service on his part will amount to unjust amount of the costs of his training. which, for that reason is a condition precedent, such may be established by
enrichment. Pertinently, Article 22 of the New Civil Code states: parol evidence. This is not varying the terms of the written contract by
extrinsic agreement, for the simple reason that there is no contract in
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any existence; there is nothing to which to apply the excluding rule (Heitman vs.
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense Commercial Bank of Savannah, 6 Ga. App. 584, 65 SE 590, cited in Comments
G.R. No. L-17820 April 24, 1963
of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. on the Rules of Court, 1957 Ed., 200), "... This rule does not prevent the
introduction of extrinsic evidence to show that a supposed contract never
LAND SETTLEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant, became effective by reason of the failure of some collateral condition or
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss vs. stipulation, pre-requisite to liability" (Peabody & Co. v. Bromfield & Ross, 38
of another, or when a person retains the money or property of another GARCIA PLANTATION CO., INC., and/or SALUD GARCIA and VICENTE B. Phil. 841).The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing,
against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Two GARCIA, defendants-appellees. does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence, to
conditions must concur: (1) a person is unjustly benefited; and (2) such benefit
show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the
is derived at the expense of or with damages to another. The main objective
Lucido A. Guinto, Alfonso O. Alindogan and Marcelino A. Yumol for plaintiff- parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the
of the principle of unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching oneself
appellant. written agreement contains reference to such collateral agreement (Robles v.
at the expense of another. It is commonly accepted that this doctrine simply
Bausa and Ampil for defendants-appellees. Lizarraga Hnos., 50 Phil. 387). In the case at bar, reference is made of a
means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself
previous agreement, in the second paragraph of letter Exhibit L, and although
inequitably at anothers expense.34 The enrichment may consist of a
PAREDES, J.: a document is usually to be interpreted in the precise terms in which it is
patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in
couched, Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may admit evidence of
money.35 It must have a correlative prejudice, disadvantage or injury to the
surrounding circumstances, in order to arrive at the true intention of the
plaintiff which may consist, not only of the loss of the property or the This is a case of specific performance of contract, instituted by the Land parties (Aves & Alzona v. Orilleneda, 70 Phil. 262). Rulings by the same effect
deprivation of its enjoyment, but also of the non-payment of compensation Settlement and Development Corporation, against the Garcia Plantation Co., were also announced by the United States courts (Payne v. Campbell, 6 E & B,
for a prestation or service rendered to the defendant without intent to donate Inc. and/or Salud C. De Garcia and Vicente B. Garcia, for the recovery of the 370; Wilson v. Powers, 131 Mass. 540; Blewitt v. Brown, 142 NY 357; Burke v.
on the part of the plaintiff, or the failure to acquire something what the latter sum of P5,955.30, representing the unpaid balance of the purchase price of Delany, 153 US 288).
would have obtained.36 two tractors, bought by the defendant Garcia Plantation Co., Inc. from the
plaintiff. Salud C. de Garcia was made alternative
co-defendant because of two promissory notes executed by her, whereby she Had the trial court permitted, as it should, the plaintiff to prove the condition
As can be gathered from the facts, PAL invested a considerable amount of
personally assumed the account of the company with the plaintiff, and the precedent to the extension of the payment the said plaintiff would have been
money in sending the petitioner abroad to undergo training to prepare him for
defendant Vicente B. Garcia was included as husband of Salud C. de Garcia. able to show that because the defendants had failed to pay a substantial
his new appointment as B747-400 Captain. In the process, the petitioner
The defendants, in their answer, admitted the execution of the two down payment, the agreement was breached and the contract contained in
acquired new knowledge and skills which effectively enriched his technical
promissory notes, but contended that the same had been novated by a Exhibit "L", never became effective and the extension should be considered as
know-how. As all other investors, PAL expects a return on investment in the
subsequent agreement contained in a letter (Exh. L) sent by Filomeno C. not having been given at all. So that, although the complaint was filed on
form of service by the petitioner for a period of 3 years, which is the estimated
Kintanar, Manager, Board of Liquidators of the LASEDECO, giving the February 20, 1957, three months before the deadline of the extension on May
length of time within which the costs of the latters training can be fully
defendant Salud C. de Garcia an extension up to May 31, 1957, within which 31, 1957, there would be no premature institution of the case. The lower
recovered. The petitioner is, thus, expected to work for PAL and utilize
to pay the account, and since the complaint was filed on February 20, 1957, court, therefore, erred in dismissing the case.
whatever knowledge he had learned from the training for the benefit of the
company. However, after only one (1) year of service, the petitioner opted to they claimed that the action was premature and prayed that the complaint be
retire from service, leaving PAL stripped of a necessary manpower. dismissed. The plaintiff in the reply and answer to the counterclaim, admitted G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994
the due execution and genuineness of the letter marked Exhibit L, but
contended that the same did not express the true and intent agreement of the MARTIN CENTENO, petitioner,
Undeniably, the petitioner was enriched at the expense of PAL. After
parties, thereby placing the fact in issue, in the pleadings. vs.
undergoing the training fully shouldered by PAL, he acquired a higher level of
technical competence which, in the professional realm, translates to a higher HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
compensation. To prove this point, his monthly salary of P125,692.00 was The subject of agreement alluded to in the second paragraph of the above Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10, and THE PEOPLE OF THE
increased to P131,703.00 while he was still undergoing training. After his letter, was the condition to be complied with or the consideration given for PHILIPPINES, respondents.
training, his salary was further increased to P137,977.00.37 Further, his the extension of time, within which the Garcia spouses pay their account. The
training broadened his opportunities for a better employment as in fact he lower court should have admitted the parol evidence sought to be introduced Santiago V. Marcos, Jr. for petitioner.
was able to transfer to another airline company immediately after he left to prove the failure of the document in question to express the true intent and
PAL.38 To allow the petitioner to simply leave the company without agreement of the parties. It should not have improvidently and hastily
reimbursing it for the proportionate amount of the expenses it incurred for his excluded said parol evidence, knowing that the subject-matter treated
training will only magnify the financial disadvantage sustained by PAL. Reason therein, was one of the exceptions to the parol evidence rule. When the
REGALADO, J.: expression "charitable purpose." While it is true that there is no religious The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape
purpose which is not also a charitable purpose, yet the converse is not equally punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of
It is indeed unfortunate that a group of elderly men, who were moved by their true, for there may be a "charitable" purpose which is not "religious" in the forbidden acts. 14 The word "charitable" is a matter of description rather than
desire to devote their remaining years to the service of their Creator by legal sense of the term. 9 Although the term "charitable" may include matters of precise definition, and each case involving a determination of that which is
forming their own civic organization for that purpose, should find themselves which are "religious," it is a broader term and includes matters which are not charitable must be decided on its own particular facts and
enmeshed in a criminal case for making a solicitation from a community "religious," and, accordingly, there is a distinction between "charitable circumstances. 15 The law does not operate in vacuo nor should its
member allegedly without the required permit from the Department of Social purpose" and "religious purpose," except where the two terms are obviously applicability be determined by circumstances in the abstract.
Welfare and Development. used synonymously, or where the distinction has been done away with by
statute.10 The word "charitable," therefore, like most other words, is capable Furthermore, in the provisions of the Constitution and the statutes mentioned
of different significations. For example, in the law, exempting charitable uses above, the enumerations therein given which include the words "charitable"
The main issue to be resolved here is whether the phrase "charitable
from taxation, it has a very wide meaning, but under Presidential Decree No. and "religious" make use of the disjunctive "or." In its elementary sense, "or"
purposes" should be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a
1564 which is a penal law, it cannot be given such a broad application since it as used in a statute is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. It often
religious purpose. We hold in the negative.
would be prejudicial to petitioners. connects a series of words or propositions indicating a choice of either. When
"or" is used, the various members of the enumeration are to be taken
I. Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express
To illustrate, the rule is that tax exemptions are generally construed strictly separately. 16 Accordingly, "charitable" and "religious," which are integral
mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This
against the taxpayer. However, there are cases wherein claims for exemption parts of an enumeration using the disjunctive "or" should be given different,
rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."
from tax for "religious purposes" have been liberally construed as covered in distinct, and disparate meanings. There is no compelling consideration why
Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may
the law granting tax exemptions for "charitable purposes." Thus, the term the same treatment or usage of these words cannot be made applicable to the
not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule
"charitable purposes," within the meaning of a statute providing that the questioned provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1564.
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified
succession of any property passing to or for the use of any institution for
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning
purposes only of public charity shall not be subject to succession tax, is II. Petitioner next avers that solicitations for religious purposes cannot be
and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. 7
deemed to include religious purposes.11 A gift for "religious purposes" was penalized under the law for, otherwise, it will constitute an abridgment or
considered as a bequest for "charitable use" as regards exemption from restriction on the free exercise clause guaranteed under the Constitution.
It will be observed that the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other inheritance tax. 12
statutes, treat the words "charitable" and "religious" separately and
independently of each other. Thus, the word "charitable" is only one of three It may be conceded that the construction of a church is a social concern of the
On the other hand, to subsume the "religious" purpose of the solicitation people and, consequently, solicitations appurtenant thereto would necessarily
descriptive words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which
within the concept of "charitable" purpose which under Presidential Decree involve public welfare. Prefatorily, it is not implausible that the regulatory
provides that "charitable institutions, churches and personages . . ., and all
No. 1564 requires a prior permit from the Department of Social Services and powers of the State may, to a certain degree, extend to solicitations of this
lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for
Development, under paid of penal liability in the absence thereof, would be nature. Considering, however, that such an activity is within the cloak of the
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation."
prejudicial to petitioner. Accordingly, the term "charitable" should be strictly free exercise clause under the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the
There are certain provisions in statutes wherein these two terms are likewise
construed so as to exclude solicitations for "religious" purposes. Thereby, we Constitution, it becomes imperative to delve into the efficaciousness of a
dissociated and individually mentioned, as for instance, Sections 26 (e)
adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal legislations statutory grant of the power to regulate the exercise of this constitutional
(corporations exempt from income tax) and 28 (8) (E) (exclusions from gross
that such interpretation should be adopted as would favor the accused. right and the allowable restrictions which may possibly be imposed thereon.
income) of the National Internal Revenue Code; Section 88 (purposes for the
organization of non-stock corporations) of the Corporation Code; and
Section 234 (b) (exemptions from real property tax) of the Local Government For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a
Code. against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the
extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of
considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of
That these legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and
offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the
"religious" in an enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely
interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion.
stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the
scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of Thus, the constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and
framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations for
the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second
religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it
contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society.
would not have so stated expressly.
under its provisions is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of The freedom to act must have appropriate definitions to preserve the
themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is a enforcement of that protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be
All contributions designed to promote the work of the church are "charitable" clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them such. so exercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the
in nature, since religious activities depend for their support on voluntary Whatever is not plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should be protected
contributions. 8 However, "religious purpose" is not interchangeable with the regarded as without its intendment. 13 freedom. 17
Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight perversity of petitioner's act which thereby caused damage to the gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking
inconvenience, in order that the State may protect its citizens from injury. complainant. It must be here emphasized that the trial court, in the dispositive and other vices;
Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by portion of its decision, even recommended executive clemency in favor of
requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit petitioner and the other accused after finding that the latter acted in good D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from
funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the faith in making the solicitation from the complainant, an observation with monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and
cause which he purports to represent. The State is likewise free to regulate which we fully agree. After all, mistake upon a doubtful and difficult question privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
the time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety, of law can be the basis of good faith, especially for a layman.
peace, comfort, or convenience. 18
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in
G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991 keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine
It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves
exercise of religion that everything which may be so called can be ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not
tolerated. 19 It has been said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners, abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside
interest is not necessarily invalid as one interfering with the "free exercise" of vs. technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.
religion merely because it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163
adherents of one or more religion. 20 Thus, the general regulation, in the (PAGCOR), respondent. SCRA 371)
public interest, of solicitation, which does not involve any religious test and
does not unreasonably obstruct or delay the collection of funds, is not open to
H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners. With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied
any constitutional objection, even though the collection be for a religious
Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners. in the cases before us, We hold that the same is satisfied by the
purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous restraint
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR. petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is
on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible obstacle to its
in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or
measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they are not
covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the
Even with numerous regulative laws in existence, it is surprising how many Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to
operations are carried on by persons and associations who, secreting their its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions
activities under the guise of benevolent purposes, succeed in cheating and PARAS, J.:
defrauding a generous public. It is in fact amazing how profitable the
fraudulent schemes and practices are to people who manipulate them. The A TV ad proudly announces:
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers
State has authority under the exercise of its police power to determine
were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
whether or not there shall be restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous "The new PAGCOR responding through responsible gaming." orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only
persons or for unworthy causes or for fraudulent purposes. That solicitation of
an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
contributions under the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes is grossly
But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties
abused is a matter of common knowledge. Certainly the solicitation of
seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these
contributions in good faith for worthy purposes should not be denied, but
(PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely,
somewhere should be lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits
public policy and order, and because brushing aside, if we must technicalities of procedure." We have
the worthy from the unworthy. 22 The objectionable practices of unscrupulous
since then applied the exception in many other cases. (Association
persons are prejudicial to worthy and proper charities which naturally suffer
A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian
when the confidence of the public in campaigns for the raising of money for
a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's Reform, 175 SCRA 343).
charity is lessened or destroyed. 23 Some regulation of public solicitation is,
therefore, in the public interest. 24 right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive
B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding issues raised.
To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper
regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's right to
bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But
within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy; the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the Government cannot
petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor. regulate it in the exercise of its police power.
C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it
As a final note, we reject the reason advanced by respondent judge for legalizes PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most other forms of The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been
increasing the penalty imposed by the trial court, premised on the supposed defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. (2) Income and other taxes. a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and
Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or kind or form, income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies establish, horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of
restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and gambling shall be issued by the national government upon proper
not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general collected under this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any application and verification of the qualification of the applicant . . .
terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of form or tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the
Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386). Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or
revenues or earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations permits" for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or
anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied,
the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra) established or collected by any municipal, provincial or national
(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
government authority (Section 13 [2]).
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the
owe its origin to the charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD
domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a reasons: 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus:
fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most
vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been (a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. The Corporation shall maintain a
credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall exercise all the powers,
citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and
the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and is most aptly Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power Exchange Commission over such affiliating entities mentioned under
termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). the preceding section, including, but not limited to amendments of
Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in corporate term,
of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent structure, capitalization and other matters concerning the operation
that enables the state to meet the agencies of the winds of change. power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code of
ed. p. 445). the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with
What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869? respect to original incorporation.
(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It
P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The
and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or
by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the
was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.
one corporate entity the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control
Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress by a mere Local government.
revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also
projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard,
control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of
of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices (c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the
and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4
eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
1896. P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus:
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government
Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the over local governments.
of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. authority of chartered cities and other local governments to issue
1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to license, permit or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to
Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of
the entire absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in
holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well gambling is hereby revoked.
that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United
as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."
States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no
state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in government in such a system can only mean a measure of by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited,
such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis supplied) does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.
responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment
of them. (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be
emphasis supplied) delegated to local government units remains a matter of policy, which overthrown because there are other instances to which it might
concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for have been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).
extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean
activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing that all occupations called by the same name must be treated the
Sanchez, 340 US 42). with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed
State to retain it or delegate it to local governments. as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure
destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact. (Dominican
instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to or express charter power is generally necessary to empower the local Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US 2651).
wield it. corporation to deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of express
grant of power to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution are inconsistent with the state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala Cory Government away from monopolies and crony economy and toward free
will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this
Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides: following in re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the
11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3 Ibid, p. 548, emphasis government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its supplied) to Congress its repeal or amendment.
own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other
charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only
may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. the Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR conducted gambling, while declare what the law is and not what the law should
Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and be.1wphi1 Under our system of government, policy issues are
government. (emphasis supplied) other vices" (p. 82, Rollo). within the domain of the political branches of government and of
the people themselves as the repository of all state power.
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).
"limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of
"operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:
Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is
of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public
therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair
autonomy. conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National Economy and
G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989). Patrimony)
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply
means "decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not
pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide whether
Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require public interest demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again,
sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio." situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide.
they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).
Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality
nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social
control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the
the government under the Philippine Constitution, local some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of
governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended principles and, policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning
sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local
a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such It appears that on August 31, 1939, Fidel Ariston was convicted of frustrated any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he
principles. murder by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur and sentenced to may impose; and to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any
suffer from 1 years and 8 months of prision correccional to 7 years of prision such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be mayor. After serving 2 years, 3 months, and 1 day of that sentence, he was condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of
self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. released on January 6, 1942, by virtue of a conditional pardon granted him by sentence. (Emphasis supplied.)
They were rather directives addressed to the executive and the the President of the Philippines, the condition being that he shall not again
legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the violated any of the penal laws of Philippines and that, should this condition be The only question to determine is whether the above quoted provision of the
directives of the articles the available remedy was not judicial or violated, he shall be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. Revised Administrative Code has been repealed by section 159 of the Revised
political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the Penal Code.
failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of On February 1, 1950, said prisoner was recommitted to the custody of the
the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2) Director of the Prisons after having been convicted of estafa and sentenced by The Revised Penal Code, which was approved on December 8, 1930, contains
the Court of First Instance of Manila to suffer 3 months and 11 days ofarresto a repealing clause (article 367), which expressly repeals among other Acts
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. mayor and to indemnify the offered party in the amount of P180, with sections 102, 2670, 2671, and 2672 of the Administrative Code. It does not
Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 sudsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. repeal section 64 (i) above quoted. On the contrary, Act No. 4103, the
SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be Indeterminate Sentence Law, which is subsequent to the Revised Penal Code,
nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the On April 10, 1950, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President and in its section 9 expressly preserves the authority conferred upon the President
Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the by virtue of the authority conferred upon the President by section 64 (i) of the by section 65 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Revised Administrative Code, ordered the Director of Prisons to recommit to
Comelec, supra) Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts prison the said prisoner Fidel Ariston to serve the remaining unexpired portion The legislative intent is clear, therefore, to preserve the power of the
thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a of the sentence for which he was originally committed to prison, in view of the President to authorize the arrest and reincarceration of any person who
declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised fact that he had violated the condition of his pardon in that he was violates the condition or conditions of his pardon notwithstanding the
by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds subsequently convicted of estafa by the Court of the Instance of Manila. enactment of article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. In this connection, we
that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of observe that section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code and article 159 of the
this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a The present petition for habeas corpus is premised upon the contention that Revised Penal Code are but a reiteration of Acts Nos. 1524 and 1561, under
wise legislation considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free the President has no authority to order the prisoner's recommitment to serve which a violator of a conditional pardon was liable to suffer and to serve the
enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of the unexpired portion of his original sentence, because violation of a unexpired portion of the original sentence.
youth and educational values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine. conditional pardon is an offense penalized by virtue article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code, and that, unless the prisoner is prosecuted for and convicted of It is contended by the petitioner that the power vested in the President by
G.R. No. L-3972 October 13, 1950 that offense, he cannot be compelled to serve the unexpired portion of his section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to authorize the arrest and
original sentence. reincarceration of a violator of a conditional pardon is repugnant to the due
FLOREA SALES, on behalf of her stepfather Fidel Ariston, petitioner, process of law granted by the Constitution (sec. 1, Article III). A similiar
vs. Said article 159 reads as follows: contention was advanced by the petitioner in the case of Fuller vs. State of
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent. Alabama (45 L. R. A., 502), and was rejected by the Supreme Court of that
ART. 159. Other Cases of Evasion of Service of Sentence. The state, speaking thru Chief Justice McClellan, in the following language:
Florea Sales on behalf of her step-father, petitioner Ariston. penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Martiniano P. imposed upon the convict who, having been granted conditional But it is insisted that this statute , in so far as it undertakes to
Vivo for respondent. pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of authorize the governor to determine that the condition of the parole
such pardon. However, if the penalty remitted by the granting of has not been complied with, and the summary arrest of the convict
such pardon be higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer thereupon by the direction of the governor, and his summary return
the unexpired portion of his original sentence. or remandment to servitude or imprisonment under the sentence, is
violated of organic guaranties of jury trial, that no warrant shall be
On the other hand, the President of the Philippines is authorized by section 64 issued to seize any person without probable cause, supported by
(i) of the Revised Administrative Code: oath or affirmation, etc. This position takes no account of the fact
This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of the prisoner that the person being dealt with is a convict, that he has already
Fidel Ariston, now confined in the New Bilibid Prison. been seized in a constitutional way, been confronted by his accusers
(i) To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either
and the witnesses against him, been tried by the jury of his peers
plenary or partial, conditional, or unconditional; to suspend
secured to him by the Constitution, and by them been convicted of
sentences without pardon, remit fines, and order the discharge of
crime, and been sentenced to punishment therefor. In respect of President by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to authorize the By virtue of section 64, paragraph (i), of the Revised Administrative Code of
that crime and his attitude before the law after conviction of it, he is recommitment to prison of a violator of a conditional pardon to serve the 1917, the President of the Philippines is empowered "to authorize the arrest
not a citizen, nor entitled to invoke the organic safeguards which unexpired portion of his original sentence, can stand together and that the and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to
hedge about the citizen's liberty. but he is a felon, at large by the proceeding under one provision does not necessarily prelude action under the comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension
mere grace of the executive, and not entitled to be at large after he other. Take, for instance, the case of the present prisoner Fidel Ariston. of sentence."
has breached the conditions upon which that grace was extended to Although under section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code he has been
him. In the absence of this statute, a convict who had broken the recommitted to serve the remitted portion of his original sentence 4 years, In the Revised Penal Code approved on December 8, 1930, but effective on
conditions of a pardon would, if there were no question of his 8 months, and 29 days for having violated the condition of his pardon, he January 1, 1932, article 159 provides as follows: "The penalty of prision
identity or the fact of breach of the conditions, be subject to may still be prosecuted under article 159 of the Revised Penal Code and correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon the convict who,
summary arrest, and remandment, as matter of course, to sentenced to suffer prision correccional in its minimum period. In other words, having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate
imprisonment, under the original sentence by the court of his one who violates the condition of his pardon may be prosecuted and any of the conditions of such pardon. However, if the penalty remitted by the
conviction, or any court of co-ordinate or superior jurisdiction, a sentenced to suffer prision correccional in its minimum period without granting of such pardon be higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer
purely formal proceeding. If the person arrested denied his identity prejudice to the authority conferred upon the President by section 64 (i) of the unexpired portion of his original sentence." The question that arises is
with the convict sought to be remanded, he might be entitled to a the Revised Administrative Code to recommit him to serve the unexpired whether the President can still, under section 64 (i) of Revised Administrative
jury trial on that issue alone. If he denied only the alleged breach of portion of his original sentence, unless such unexpired portion exceeds 6 Code, order the recommitment of a convict violating any condition of his
the conditions of his enlargement, he would not be entitled to a jury years, in which case the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period pardon. This should be answered in the negative. While it may be granted,
on that issue, but it would be determinable in a summary way by the provided by article 159 of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer be imposed. with some degree of plausibility, that even after the Revised Administrative
court before whom he is brought. But the statute supervenes to Code of 1917 had taken effect, the procedure prescribed in Act No. 1524
avoid the necessity for any action by the courts in the premises. The There is no dispute in the case as to the identity of the prisoner and as to the might be followed concurrently with the power of the President to order the
executive clemency under it is extended upon the conditions named violation by him of his conditional pardon. recommitment under section 64 (i) of said Code, because the result is the
in it, and he accepts it upon those conditions. One of these is that same, in that in both cases the convict will have to be recommitted for the
the governor may withdraw his grace in a certain contingency, and unexpired portion of his original sentence, the same consideration is not true
Wherefore, the petition is denied, with costs de oficio, the petitioner having
another is that the governor shall determine when that contingency after the passage of the Revised Penal Code which makes the violation of a
been authorized to litigate as a pauper.
has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full competency to bind himself conditional pardon a crime, punishable by a specific penalty, namely,prision
in the premises, had expressly contracted and agreed that, correccional in its minimum period or, if the penalty remitted be higher than
whenever the governor should conclude that he had violated the Moran, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
six years, imprisonment for the unexpired portion of his original sentence.
conditions of his parole, an executive order for his arrest and
remandment to prison should at once issue, and be conclusive upon
Under article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, violators of conditional pardons
him. Of course, if, in the execution of the order of arrest, the wrong
will therefore receive the uniform penalty of the prision correccional in its
man should be taken, he would be entitled to enlargement
minimum period, or from 6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months, or, if
on habeas corpus; but there is no question of identity in the case
the penalty remitted be higher than six years, imprisonment for the unexpired
before us. Upon such determination by the governor, evidenced by
portion of the original sentence. if a 6-year termer has served one year before
the executive order of arrest, the parole is avoided, and the person
being conditionally pardoned, and subsequently violates the condition of his
who has been at large upon it at once falls into the category of an
Separate Opinions pardon, he will have to be recommitted under section 64 (i) of the Revised
escaped convict, so far as measures for his apprehension and
Administrative Code for the unexpired term of five years, whereas if he is
remandment under the original sentence are concerned, and he is,
pardoned after serving 5 years and 10 months, he will have to be recommitted
no more than an escaped convict, entitled to freedom from arrest,
for the unexpired term of only two months. Under article 159 of Revised Penal
except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, nor
Code, the term of imprisonment he will have to suffer, if convicted, will be
to a trial by jury, nor to his day in court for any purpose. Kennedy's
PARAS, J., dissenting: within the range of only from prision correccional in its minimum period,
Case, 135 Mass., 48; Conlon's Case, 148 Mass., 168; Arthur vs. Craig,
whether the unexpired term is five years or two months. If we admit the
48 Iowa, 264; 30 Am. Rep., 395; State, O'Connor vs. Wolfer, 53
With reference to the power the Governor General (now President ) of the proposition that section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code and article
Minn., 135; 19 L. R. A., 783.
Philippines to grant conditional pardons, Act No. 1524 or the Philippine 159 of the Revised Penal Code may co-exist, cases will arise in which, either to
Commission, approved on August 9, 1906, provides for the procedure by favor or to prejudice a violator of a conditional pardon, the Government may
A similar ruling was laid down in Kennedy's Case (135 Mass., 48); and in or may not choose to exercise the power granted to the President by section
which a person conditionally pardoned is recommitted to prison for the
People vs. Dudley (173 Mich., 389). 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. In example already given, where the
unexpired portion of his original sentence if guilty of a violation any condition
of his pardon. The procedure, in substance, was for the proper court of first unexpired portion is only two months, the violator may be recommitted to
We are of opinion that article 159 of Revised Penal Code, which penalizes instance to investigate, in the presence of the accused and the proper favor him. Reserving the situation, if the unexpired term in five years, he may
violation of a conditional pardon as an offense, and the power vested in the prosecuting official, whether any condition was in fact violated. be recommitted to prison to prejudice him. The objectionable feature, in
addition to the circumstance that the Revised Penal Code requires a SEC. 3. Whenever the provincial fiscal, or the prosecuting attorney of As the Administrative Code of 1916 and Revised Administrative Code of 1917
hearing which is not necessary under the Revised Administrative Code, the City of Manila, as the case may be, shall ascertain that any of the did not repeal and incorporate the provisions of Act No. 1524, but repealed
warrant the conclusion that the two provisions cannot be harmonized. conditions of a conditional pardon, heretofore or hereafter granted, Act No. 1651 and incorporated its provisions in section 80 (i) of the
has been violated by the person so conditionally pardoned, he shall Administrative Code of 1916, which is section 64 (i) of the Revised
The same considerations may have impelled the Constitutional Convention apply to the court of first instance for an order of arrest against the Administrative Code, the word "pardon" in the last line of said section must
not to adopt the recommendation of the Committee on Executive Power to person so conditionally pardoned to have him brought before the have been inserted through inadvertence, and according to the maxims "utile
include a proviso empowering the President to authorize the arrest and court. The court of first instance shall issue the order of arrest and par inutile non vitialur," and "surplusagium non nocet," it must be disregarded,
reincarceration of such person who in his judgment shall fail to comply with proceed with the investigation of the facts, in the presence of the for the following reasons:
the condition or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of the accused and the proper prosecuting official.
sentence, it being noteworthy that the convention merely provided that the (1) Section 80 (l) of the original Administrative Code of 1916 expressly cites 1
President "shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and SEC. 4. If the court shall find from said investigation that one or and 2 of Act No. 1561, and not Act 1524, as the only source thereof, while Act
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, more of the conditions of such pardon, heretofore or hereafter No. 1524 was not repealed, either totally or partially, by the Administrative
except in cases of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such granted, has been violated by the person so pardoned, the court Code of 1916 or the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. If it were the
restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose." (Constitution, shall order the recommitment and confinement of such person in intention of the Code Committee to amend the provision of said Act No. 1524
Art. VII, sec. 10, par. 6; Aruego, Framing of the Constitution, Vol. II, p. 435.) the proper prison for the unexpired portion of his original sentence. and do away with the hearing and investigation of the charged violation by the
Such order of the court shall be sufficient authority to the custodian court, it would have repealed said Act No. 1524 and expressly incorporated its
It should be remembered also that the Revised Penal Code, in article 367, has of any public prison designated therein to receive and safely keep provisions in the Revised Administrative Code.
repealed all laws and parts of laws which are contrary to the provisions of said the body of the person so conditionally pardoned during the
code. Having shown the inconsistent results of section 64 (i) of the Revised unexpired portion of his original sentence. (2) It is a well known rule of statutory construction that statutes introduced in
Administrative Code and article 159 of the Revised Penal Code were these Islands under the American sovereignty like Act No. 1524 and Act No.
considered co-existent, the first provision in so far as it refers to the power of Section 2 of Act No. 1561, authorizing the Governor General to parole 1561 as incorporated in section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code,
the President to recommit a violator of a conditional pardon for the unexpired prisoners and providing for the enforcement of the conditions of such parole, must be construed and applied in the lights of the rules, principles and
term, must be deemed repealed. provides: doctrine of the common law (Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil., 308).
Therefore, the question whether or not Act No. 1524 has been repealed by
My vote is, therefore, to grant the petition for habeas corpus, without No. 1561. An Act authorizing the Governor-General to parole and incorporated in section 64 (i) of Revised Administrative Code must be
prejudice. prisoners and providing for the enforcement of the conditions of answered in the negative; because "In nearly every jurisdiction wherein the
such paroles. question has been raised it has been held that a convicted defendant released
under suspended sentence (parole or conditional pardon) is entitled to notice
FERIA, J., dissenting:
and hearing on the issue whether he has broken the conditions or the
xxx xxx xxx
suspension before the suspension may be revoked" (54 A. L. R., Ann., p. 1471).
At the outset it is important to observe that parole and pardon are two And "it seems to be the more general rule that in the absence of a statute to
different things. Parole is a conditional release of a prisoner with an unexpired SEC. 2. Upon the failure of any convict to observe the conditions of the contrary, on an express reservation in the parole or pardon of the power
sentence, or suspension of his sentence, without remitting the penalty his parole to be determined by the Governor-General, the Governor- of summary revocation, a convict who has been released under a parole or
imposed upon him; while pardon is a remission of the penalty imposed upon a General shall have authority to direct the arrest and return of such conditional pardon is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before
defendant together with all the accessories appurtenant thereto. convict to custody, and thereupon said convict shall be required to some court or body of competent jurisdiction, either by writ of habeas
carry out the sentence of the court as though no parole had been corpus or otherwise, on the question whether the conditions of the parole or
Sections 3 and 4 of Act No. 1524 providing for the enforcement of condition granted him, the time between the parole and subsequent arrest conditional pardon has been violated before it can be effectively revoked." (54
made by the Governor-General in the exercise of his discretion in granting not being taken as a part of the term of his sentence in computing A. L. R., Ann., p. 1474.)
conditional pardon, read as follows: the period of his confinement.
The cases of Fuller vs. State of Alabama on parole (122 Ala., 52 ) quoted,
No. 1524. An Act providing for the enforcement of conditions Evidently the reason why under Act No. 1524 an investigation of the facts by Kennedy case on conditional pardon (173 Mich., 389) cited in the decision in
made by the Governor-General in the exercise of his discretion in the courts is necessary for the purpose of the determine whether the support thereof, are exceptions to the above quoted general rule, and based
granting conditional pardons. condition of a pardon has been violated by the person so pardoned before he upon express statutory provision authorizing such procedure. (54 A. L. R.,
can be recommitted to prison, while in the case of violation of parole no such Ann., p. 1479.)
investigation is required and the sole judge of any violation of the parole is the
xxx xxx xxx
Chief Executive, who may, summarily, order the arrest and reincarceration of
(3) Act No. 1941, creating a Code Committee, authorizes the Committee to
the convict, is that the violation of a conditional pardon is more serious than
revise and amend the Civil, Commercial, Penal and Procedure Codes in force in
that of parole, since pardon is more beneficial than parole.
the Philippine Islands, and to prepare new Codes upon said subjects, in
accordance with modern principle of the science of law and with the customs not be guilty of any misconduct as in the case of U.S. vs. Ignacio (33 Phil., 203), The provisions of the section 9 of Act No. 4103 creating the Board of
of the country. But section 7 of the same Act No. 1941 only empowers the or of any infraction of the law punishable with a certain penalty as in the case Indeterminate Sentence to the effect that "nothing in this Act shall be
Code Committee, "whenever the Governor-General shall decide that the of U.S. vs. Villalon (37 Phil., 325), or in any other, in which cases it would be construed to impair or interfere with the powers of the President as set forth
public interest requires it and shall so order, to revise, compile and codify the necessary to make an investigation of the facts before the conditional pardon in section sixty four (i) of the Revised Administrative Code," can not be
existing general statutes of the Philippine Commission and Philippine may be revoked. construed to ratify a power not granted to the President by said section, or if
Legislature," not to alter or amend them. So although the Administrative Code granted already, withdrawn by section 159 of the Revised Penal Code, as
was adopted and enacted into law by Act No. 2657 effective upon the final (b) Under section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code a person charged above stated.
day of July, 1916, "the bill for a code occupies no different position that a bill with violating his conditional pardon may be summarily arrested and
for any other law, and it is common knowledge that many bills enacted by the recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the original sentence The contention of the respondent that "the legislature has intended the two
legislature have in fact been prepared by person with no official status before by order of the President, even though in fact he may not have violated the legal provisions article 159 of the Revised Penal Code and section 64 (i) of
it .. nevertheless, there is much practical reason for denying the conditions of his pardon or has a good and valid defense, and the action of the the Revised Administrative Code to coexist as two alternative proceedings
commissioners the power to affirmatively alter the law. For in spite of Chief Executive is conclusive upon him and the court have no jurisdiction or against those who violate the conditions of a conditional pardon, and the
legislative care in examining the commissioners' proposal , it is inevitable that power to interfere with the action taken by the President of the Philippines in State may choose either, is not supported by the letter and spirit of those
the legislature can not give the same detailed care to the consideration of a the exercise of his authority. While if the same person is prosecuted and provisions and the rules of statutory construction as above shown. Besides it is
bill for a code that it can to an ordinary bill." (2 Sutherland, Statutory convicted under article 159 of the Revised Penal Code for the same violation, against the public policy of not penalizing a defendant charged with the
Construction, third edition, pp. 252, 253.) the defendant may appeal from the judgment of conviction and be acquitted commission of an act which constitutes a public offense without a previous
by the court of last resort. hearing, and also against common sense. Of course, it is but natural that the
And (4) this Supreme Court, in the case of People vs. Caraballo (62 Phil., 651), prosecution would not choose to prosecute a defendant under section 159 of
held that "Prior to January 1, 1932, the date when the Revised Penal Code (c) The penalties which must be imposed by the courts upon a defendant the Revised Penal Code, If he can have the prisoner summarily recommitted to
took effect there was no law punishing the violation of a conditional pardon as convicted of violation of conditional pardon under article 159 of the Revised serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence by order of the Chief
crime, the only law then in force being Act No. 1524 which merely provided Penal Code are to suffer (1) the unexpired portion of his original sentence if Executive under section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
for the enforcement of conditions made by the Governor-General in the the penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon be higher or more than
exercise of his discretion in granting conditional pardons.". six years, or (2) the penalty prision correccional in its minimum period, that is,
from six months and one day to two years and four months, if the penalty
Even if the Revised Administrative Code had repealed Act No. 1524 and remitted be less than six years, irrespective of whether the unserved sentence
incorporated the provisions thereof in section 64 (i) of the Revised be one day or six years. (People vs. Sanares, 62 Phil., 826.) If article 159 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 as contended, the latter in so far as it refers to Revised Penal Code "and the power vested in the President by section 64 (i) of
the enforcement of conditions made by the Chief Executive in the exercise of the Revised Administrative Code to authorize the recommitment of a violator
his discretion in granting conditional pardon, should be considered as of a conditional pardon to serve the unexpired portion of his original
repealed by section 159 of the Revised Penal Code because it is contrary or sentence, can stand together and the proceeding under one provision does
repugnant to the provisions of said section 159. For section 367 of the Revised not necessarily exclude action under the other," as gratuitously held in the
Penal Code provides that "all laws and part of the laws which are contrary to decision (we say gratuitously because it is not supported by any reason or
the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed." They are repugnant to each authority), a person conditionally pardoned, may be administratively and
other and can not stand together, as a cursory comparison of their respective judicially punished twice for one and the same violation of his conditional
provisions will show: pardon. For example, if the penalty remitted by the conditional pardon be less
than six years, the prisoner may, by order of the Chief Executive, be arrested
(a) Under section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, a defendant who and incarcerated to suffer the unexpired portion of his sentence under section
is charged with having violated his conditional pardon may be arrested and 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; and, besides, he may be prosecuted
reincarcerated to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence by order of the and convicted by the courts to suffer prision correccional in its minimum
Chief Executive, without notice or previous hearing for the determination degree under section 159 of the Revised Penal Code. And if the penalty
whether the condition of the pardon has been violated by the defendant; remitted by the granting of the conditional pardon be higher than six years,
while under section 159 of the Revised Penal Code such hearing or the person violating the pardon may be arrested and reincarcerated to serve
investigation of facts is necessary as part of due process of law. It is to be the unexpired portion of his sentence by order of the President of the
observed that the condition of a pardon may consist, not in that the Philippines under section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; and
defendant shall not violate any of the penal laws as in the present case, where besides he may also be prosecuted and convicted by the courts to suffer again
a certified copy of the final judgment of defendant's conviction would the unremitted portion of his original sentence under section 159 of the
generally be sufficient, without any further investigation, to show that the Revised Penal Code.
defendant has violated his conditional pardon, but in that the prisoner shall