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The RTC found that Neil E. Suyan (petitioner) had violated the conditions of his probation and thus,
ordered that his probation be revoked.

The CA ruled that the trial court had not complied with the Probation Law and the procedural requisites
for the revocation of probation under the Revised Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures,
enumerated as follows:

The CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings, for the purpose of affording
petitioner his right to due process pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 968, and the Revised Rules
on Probation Methods and Procedures.

Report: At the outset of his probation period, probationer showed manifested negative attitude by
incurring absences and not attending rehabilitation activities despite constant follow-up by his
supervising officers. He continued with his illegal drug activities despite counselling and warning from
this Office.
Aggrieved, petitioner again filed an appeal with the CA.28 This time, he alleged that he had been
deprived of his constitutional right to due process when his probation was ordered revoked.29 He
further alleged that he had not been given ample opportunity to refute the alleged violations committed
by him while on probation. The probation officer did not conduct a fact-finding investigation of the
alleged violations, and, consequently, petitioner was not furnished any results

ISSUE: The sole issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether the probation was validly revoked.

RULING: We rule that the probation of petitioner was validly revoked.

On the procedural grounds, we do not subscribe to his contention that his right to due process was
violated after the RTC had already conducted a full-blown trial on the Motion to Revoke, in compliance
with the directive of the CA.

On substantive grounds, we believe that there was sufficient justification for the revocation of his

Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has served out his sentence
for another offense while on probation.1wphi1 Consequently, his commission of another offense is a
direct violation of Condition No. 9 of his Probation Order,33 and the effects are clearly outlined in
Section 11 of the Probation Law.

As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to observe full obedience to the terms
and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of revocation of this privilege.34
Regrettably, petitioner wasted the opportunity granted him by the RTC to remain outside prison bars,
and must now suffer the consequences of his violation.35 The Court's discretion to grant probation is to
be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the
accused.36 Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power to
order its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.

Herein petitioner Joaquin E. David was charged with homicide and frustrated homicide for the fatal
shooting of Noel Nora and the serious wounding of the latters brother, Narciso Nora, Jr., on March 28,
1981, in Malabon, Metro Manila.

The antecedent facts of the event are as follows:

On March 28, 1981, at about 10:00 p.m., while the Nora brothers Arturo, Arnel, Noel and Narciso were
walking along Flerida Street in Malabon, they saw petitioner near the compound of his house.
Noel Nora, the deceased, confronted him about derogatory remarks allegedly made by the latter.
Petitioner ran to his house to get a gun.
When the Nora brothers reached the intersection of Flerida and Capitan Tiago Streets, he shouted at
them Putang ina ninyo (You sons of a bitch) and other epithets, and then fired four times at them. One
shot hit Noel, killing him. Another shot hit Narciso Nora on the ankle. Another nearly hit the zipper of
Arturo Nora.
Petitioner claimed self-defense. He alleged that on the night in question, he went to the corner of
Flerida and Capitan Tiago Streets because Noel Nora had earlier challenged him to a fight. However,
upon reaching the place, he found that Noel had brought along his three (3) brothers and other
companions who ganged up on him.
The Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and Frustrated
Homicide without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in both cases.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its decision rendered on October 29, 1992, modified the sentence
after crediting petitioner with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Then on July 29,
1992, the appellate court further modified the sentence on petitioner on the ground that the evidence
did not show that he had a police record or that he was incorrigible.

The claim of self-defense was denied by the court. However, the court pointed out one circumstance not
raised by the defense but evident from the record of this caseminority.

In his statement to the police given on April 2, 1981, petitioner gave his personal circumstances as
follows: Joaquin David y Ejercito, 17 taong gulang, 2nd year college, binata at naninirahan sa 12-C Flerida
St., Acacia, Malabon, Metro Manila. At the hearing on November 11, 1987, petitioners mother stated
that he was 16 or 17 years old when the shooting incident happened.

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of minority is applicable in the case at bar

Yes, herein petitioner is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
The court said, It is clear that on March 28, 1981, when the crime was committed, he (the petitioner)
was only 17 years old.
According to the court, if the accused alleges minority and the prosecution does not disprove his claim
by contrary evidence, such allegation can be accepted as a fact. And that any doubt in respect of the
accused is resolved in his favor.

FACTS: Father raped her daughter twice (12y/o), acts of lasciviousness (11y/o)

RULING: Guilty. Defense of alibi and denial cannot lie.

Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the felony of rape is qualified when the victim is under 18 years of age
and the offender is, inter alia, a parent.
In Criminal Case No. 07-0864, since AAA was only 11 years old when the lascivious conduct alleged
therein was committed by Baraga, the imposable penalty, as aptly pointed out by the CA, is reclusion
temporal in its medium period, that is from fourteen(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and taking the
alternative circumstance of relationship as an aggravating circumstance, the CA did not err in imposing
upon Baraga the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from thirteen (13) years, nine (9)
months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months
and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

In Criminal Case No. 07-0685, the Court finds that the CA erred in applying the provisions of Article 336
of the RPC. The CA applied Article 336 of the RPC on the sole ground that AAA was already 12 years old
at the time the lascivious conduct alleged therein was perpetrated by Baraga. It bears stressing that the
Information in Criminal Case No. 07-0685 specifically charged Baraga for violation of Section 5(b), Article
III of R.A. No. 7610. Thus, the CA should have applied the provisions of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610, and imposed upon Baraga the prescribed penalty therein for sexual abuse.

The penalty for sexual abuse performed on a child under 18 years old but over 12 years old under
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. The Court
likewise considers the alternative circumstance of relationship against Baraga as an aggravating
circumstance. Since there is an aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty
shall be applied in its maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetua.1wphi1 Besides, Section 31 of R.A. No.
7610 expressly provides that the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator
is, inter alia, the parent of the victim

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated May 14, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05304 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that Rolando Baraga y Arcilla, in Criminal Case No. 07-0685, is found guilty of violation
of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He is likewise ordered to pay interest on all monetary awards for damages at the rate of six percent (
6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully satisfied.


FACTS: According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice) at
the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. Born into their union were three (3) children.10

After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously married to another
woman[.]"11 She eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M.
Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National
Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds accused Norberto Abella Vitangcol GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of BIGAMY defined and penalized under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum imprisonment to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum


On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but modified the penalty
imposed in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 25, dated September 1, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the penalty to which
appellant is previously sentenced. Accordingly, he is now meted to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum.


Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed on
petitioner is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the minimum term of the penalty shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. The court then has
the discretion to impose a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower to the
prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances are considered.65

The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor.66 The penalty next lower to that is prision
correccional. Prision correccional ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years;67 hence,
the minimum penalty can be any period within this range.

As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period, there
being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Prision mayor in its medium period ranges from eight
(8) years and one (1) day to 10 years.

Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of
prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The
ranges of the minimum and maximum penalties are within the ranges as previously computed. The
indeterminate penalty imposed was proper.

Nevertheless, "[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law to uplift and
redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness[,]"68 we lower the minimum of the indeterminate penalty to six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional. Petitioner is, thus, sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.