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G.R. No.

152662 June 13, 2012


Ma. Theresa Pangilinan, the respondent in this instant case allegedly issued 9 checks with the aggregate amount of
P9,658,692 in favor of Virginia Malolos. But, upon Malolos' presentment of the said checks, they were dishonored.
So, on Sept. 16, 1997, Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22 against Pangilinan.

On December 5, 1997, Pangilinan filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents,
enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance against Malolos before the RTC of Valenzuela
City. Later, Pangilinan also filed on December 10, 1997, a "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of
Prejudicial Question".

On March 2, 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended Pangilinan's petition which was
approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Malolos, then, raised the matter before the DOJ.

On January 5, 1999, Sec. of Justice Serafin Cuevas reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor and
ordered the filing of the informations for violation of BP 22 in connection with Pangilinan's issuance of two checks,
the charges involving the other checks were dismissed. So, two counts of violation for BP 22, both dated Nov. 18,
1999, were filed against Pangilinan on Feb. 3, 2000 before the MeTC of Quezon City.

On June 17, 2000, Pangilinan filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance
of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City, alleging that the criminal liability has been
extinguished by reason of prescription. The motion was granted. Malolos filed a notice of appeal and the RTC
reversed the decision of the MeTC. According to the RTC, the offense has not yet prescribed "considering the
appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16
September 1997". Dissatisfied, Pangilinan raised the matter to the Supreme Court for review but it was referred to
the CA "for appropriate action".

On October 26, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and recognized Feb. 3, 2000 as the date of the
filing of the informations.

Issue: Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription
of such offense.

Held. Yes. Under Section 1 of Act No. 3326 which is the law applicable to B.P. 22 cases, [v]iolations penalized by
special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: after
four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years. Under Section
2 of the same Act, [t]he prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Since B.P. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the
aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of
proceedings against the guilty person.

The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases
reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil
case for accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground
of prejudicial question. The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved
the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the informations for
the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City.

Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings, which motion she
predicated on her civil case for accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in

People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa

FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During
their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple
would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her
husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband,
she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim
were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant
admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information for parricide against appellant, however,
alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self
defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty
of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the
Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the
examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the
time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case for
purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the
testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the
battered woman syndrome, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and
subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.

1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the battered woman syndrome as constituting self
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the battered
woman syndrome.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for
her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore,
in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any
woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in
the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence, which has
three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at
least, nonviolent) phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome.
First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering
episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the
killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from
her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the
accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these
circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however,
not all of these elements were duly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly characterizing the
relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to
prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did
appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the
woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our
jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and the
peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code
provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected
attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according
to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben
and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to
their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even
the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an
actual threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of
appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and
obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-
spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis,
which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of
consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced
passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result
of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so
powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there
is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from
the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal

2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.
Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot
be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to
have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault
adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The acute
battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8)
months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state,
which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the presence of two
(2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the
director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that
she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.

NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence Against
Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who
are found by the courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability
nothwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the
Revised Penal"


At the time of commission of rape, the accused was 13 years old while the victim was 6. The case was pending
when the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) was enacted amending among others the age of
criminal irresponsibility being raised from 9 to 15 years old. At the time of the promulgation of judgment, the
accused already reached the age of majority.


Whether or not the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied, in the resolution of the


The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344) should be applied. By virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of
criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old, this law is evidently favorable to the accused.
Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the
certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore,
petitioners age was never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at
the time of the commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from
criminal liability.

People of the Philippines v. Henry Arpon y Juntilla

G.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011

Accused-appellant Arpon was charged with one count of statutory rape and seven counts of rape. The RTC and CA
convicted accused-appellants of all counts of rape charged.
Records show that the first count of rape against private complainant AAA was committed by accused-appellant in
the house of the former when she was still eight years old (1995). In July 1999, she was again raped by accused-
appellant for five times on different nights. She avers that accused-appellant was then drinking alcohol with BBB,
the stepfather of AAA, in the house of AAAs neighbor. He came to AAAs house, took off her panty and went on
top of her. When asked again how the accused-appellant raped her for five nights in July of the said year, AAA
narrated that accused-appellant pulled down her panty, went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain as he put
his penis into her vagina. Every time she urinated, thereafter, she felt pain.

AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice in August 1999 at nighttime. He kissed her
and then he took off his shirt, went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain in her vagina and in her chest because
he was heavy. She related that the accused-appellant was her uncle as he was the brother of her mother. AAA said
that she did not tell anybody about the rapes because the accused-appellant threatened to kill her mother if she
did. She only filed a complaint when he proceeded to also rape her younger sister, DDD

Accused-appellant interpose alibi and denial as his defense. He further assails the credibility of AAA for having
inconsistencies in her testimony.

Is the accused-appellant guilty of all counts of rape charged against him?

NO, the testimony of AAA was only able to establish three instances when the accused-appellant had carnal
knowledge of her.

The first incident of rape was alleged to have occurred in 1995 when AAA was only eight years old. Article 266-A
(1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime of statutory rape, the elements of which are: (1) that the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented.
Contrary to the posturing of the accused-appellant, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential
element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. Inconsistencies and
discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal. As regards
the first incident of rape, the RTC credited with veracity the substance of AAAs testimony and the Court sees no
cogent reason to disturb the finding of the RTC.

Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been committed in July 1999, the Court disagrees with
the ruling of the trial court that all five counts were proven with moral certainty. AAAs testimony merely
described a single incident of rape. She made no reference whatsoever to the other four instances of rape that
were likewise supposedly committed in the month of July 1999. The same is also true for the two (2) counts of
rape allegedly committed in August 1999.

Accused-appellants defense of alibi cannot stand. Hence, accused-appellant is proven to have committed three
counts of rape against AAA. He is, however, exempted from criminal liability for the first count of rape (statutory)
on account of him being a minor when he committed the crime. As such, he is only guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two counts of qualified rape with his relationship as an uncle to the victim as a qualifying circumstance.

People of the Philippines vs. Madali

Facts:On April 13, 1999, said accused, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each
other, did then and there by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, strike with a coconut frond and llave inglesa and strangle with a dog chain, one AAA,
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds in different parts of his body which caused his untimely death! "he
suspects, Raymund and Rodel were minors 14years old and 16years old respectively. The lower court found them
guilty of homicide! Petitioners elevated the case to the CA and during the pendency of the appeal, RA 9344 took
ISSUE: Whether petitioners should be exempted from criminal liability.
HELD: Yes! At the time of the commission of the crime, petitioners were minors! By provisions of RA 9344,they are
exempted from liability but not from criminal liability! Their exemption however differs. In the case of Raymund,
the case is dismissed as to him since he was below 15 years old! He is to be released and custody is given to the
parents by virtue of RA 9344 Secs 6and 20 setting the minimum age of criminal responsibility and who will have
custody respectively! In the case of Rodel, who was 16 years old at that time, it is necessary to determine whether
he acted with discernment or not! Sec 6 provides that children above 15 but below 18 will be exempt from
criminal liability unless he acted with discernment. He, however, should be subjected to an intervention program!
Sec 38 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence!

G.R. No. 162052 January 13, 2005


On November 14, 1995, P/Supt Joseph Castro received an information from an unnamed informant that a big
time group of drug pushers from Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of shabu at Chowking. Acting on such report,
SPO1 Bonifacio Gueverra was assigned to act as a poseur buyer.
They positioned their cars at the parking area where they had a commanding view of people going in and
out. In the afternoon a Toyota Corolla arrived, Sonny Zarraga was the driver with Alvin Jose. The unnamed
informant approached and talked to Sonny Zarraga. Then, the informant called SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra and
informed the latter that Sonny Zarraga had with him 100 grams of shabu. SPO1 Guevarra offered to buy the shabu.
Sonny Zarraga asked SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra if he had the money. Guevarra said yes. He showed the aforecited
bundle of "money bills." Sonny Zarraga then asked Alvin Jose to bring out the shabu and handover to Guevarra.
SPO1 Guevarra, in turn, handed the bundle of "money bills. Then the other police approached and introduced
themselves as Narcom Operatives. They arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose.
The RTC finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty beyond reasonable doubt, for violation of
R.A. 6425.
On appeal to the CA, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision appealed from with modification. The
appellate court reduced the penalty imposed on appellant Alvin Jose, on its finding that he was only thirteen (13)
years old when he committed the crime.
Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for review on certiorari, alleging that under paragraph 3,
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine (9) and under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the
commission of the crime is exempt from criminal liability.

Whether or not Alvin Jose can be exempt from criminal liability under the mitigating circumstances of

Yes. Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age and under fifteen is
exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony. The law applies even if such minor is charged with a crime
defined and penalized by a special penal law. In such case, it is the burden of the minor to prove his age in order
for him to be exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the exemption is that a minor of such age is presumed
lacking the mental element of a crime.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner, who was
thirteen (13) years of age when the crime charged was committed, acted with discernment relative to the sale of
shabu to the poseur-buyer.
Aside from bringing out and handing over the plastic bag to accused Zarraga, the petitioner merely sat inside
the car and had no other participation whatsoever in the transaction between the accused Zarraga and the poseur-
buyer. There is no evidence that the petitioner knew what was inside the plastic and soft white paper before and
at the time he handed over the same to his cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner
his age because he knew that pushers used young boys in their transactions for illegal drugs.