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Every right comes with its own duties. Most powerful rights have more duties attached to them.

Today, in each country of globe whether it is democratic, capitalist, socialist, give right to strike
to the workers. But this right must be the weapon of last resort because if this right is misused, it
will create a problem in the production and financial profit of the industry. This would ultimately
affect the economy of the country. Today, most of the countries, especially India, are dependent
upon foreign investment and under these circumstances it is necessary that countries who seeks
foreign investment must keep some safeguard in there respective industrial laws so that there will
be no misuse of right of strike. In India, right to protest is a fundamental right under Article 19 of
the Constitution of India. But right to strike is not a fundamental right but a legal right and with
this right statutory restriction is attached in the industrial dispute Act, 1947.

Position in India
In India unlike America right to strike is not expressly recognized by the law. The trade union
Act, 1926 for the first time provided limited right to strike by legalizing certain activities of a
registered trade union in furtherance of a trade dispute which otherwise breach of common
economic law. Now days a right to strike is recognized only to limited extent permissible under
the limits laid down by the law itself, as a legitimate weapon of Trade Unions.

The right to strike in the Indian constitution set up is not absolute right but it flow from the
fundamental right to form union. As every other fundamental right is subject to reasonable
restrictions, the same is also the case to form trade unions to give a call to the workers to go on
strike and the state can impose reasonable restrictions. In the All India Bank Employees
Association v. I.T., the Supreme Court held,

"the right to strike or right to declare lock out may be controlled or restricted by appropriate
industrial legislation and the validity of such legislation would have to be tested not with
reference to the criteria laid down in clause (4) of article 19 but by totally different
Thus, there is a guaranteed fundamental right to form association or Labour unions but there is
no fundamental right to go on strike. Under the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 the ground and
condition are laid down for the legal strike and if those provisions and conditions are not fulfilled
then the strike will be illegal.

Provision of valid strike under the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947-

Section 2(q) of said Act defines the term strike, it says, "strike" means a cassation of work by a
body of persons employed in any industry acting in combination, or a concerted refusal, or a
refusal, under a common understanding of any number of persons who are or have been so
employed to continue to work or accept employment. Whenever employees want to go on strike
they have to follow the procedure provided by the Act otherwise there strike deemed to be an
illegal strike. Section 22(1) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 put certain prohibitions on the
right to strike. It provides that no person employed in public utility service shall go on strike in
breach of contract:

(a) Without giving to employer notice of strike with in six weeks before striking; or
(b) Within fourteen days of giving such notice; or
(c) Before the expiry of the date of strike specified in any such notice as aforesaid; or
(d) During the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer and seven
days after the conclusion of such proceedings.

It is to be noted that these provisions do not prohibit the workmen from going on strike but
require them to fulfill the condition before going on strike. Further these provisions apply to a
public utility service only. The Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 does not specifically mention as to
who goes on strike. However, the definition of strike itself suggests that the strikers must be
persons, employed in any industry to do work.

Notice of strike
Notice to strike within six weeks before striking is not necessary where there is already lockout
in existence. In mineral Miner Union vs. Kudremukh Iron Ore Co. Ltd., it was held that the
provisions of section 22 are mandatory and the date on which the workmen proposed to go on
strike should be specified in the notice. If meanwhile the date of strike specified in the notice of
strike expires, workmen have to give fresh notice. It may be noted that if a lock out is already in
existence and employees want to resort to strike, it is not necessary to give notice as is otherwise
required. In Sadual textile Mills v. Their workmen certain workmen struck work as a protest
against the lay-off and the transfer of some workmen from one shift to another without giving
four days notice as required by standing order 23. On these grounds a question arose whether the
strike was justified. The industrial tribunal answered in affirmative. Against this a writ petition
was preferred in the High Court of Rajasthan. Reversing the decision of the Tribunal Justice
Wanchoo observed:

" ....We are of opinion that what is generally known as a lightning strike like this take place
without notice..... And each worker striking ......(is) guilty of misconduct under the standing
orders ........and liable to be summarily dismissed.....(as)..... the strike cannot be justified at all. "

General prohibition of strike-

The provisions of section 23 are general in nature. It imposes general restrications on declaring
strike in breach of contract in the both public as well as non- public utility services in the
following circumstances mainly: -

(a) During the pendency of conciliation proceedings before a board and till the expiry of 7 days
after the conclusion of such proceedings;

(b) During the pendency and 2 month's after the conclusion of proceedings before a Labour
court, Tribunal or National Tribunal;

(c) During the pendency and 2 months after the conclusion of arbitrator, when a notification has
been issued under sub- section 3 (a) of section 10 A;
(d) During any period in which a settlement or award is in operation in respect of any of the
matter covered by the settlement or award.

The principal object of this section seems to ensure a peaceful atmosphere to enable a
conciliation or adjudication or arbitration proceeding to go on smoothly. This section because of
its general nature of prohibition covers all strikes irrespective of the subject matter of the dispute
pending before the authorities. It is noteworthy that a conciliation proceedings before a
conciliation officer is no bar to strike under section 23.

In the Ballarpur Collieries Co. v. H. Merchant it was held that where in a pending reference
neither the employer nor the workmen were taking any part, it was held that section 23 has no
application to the strike declared during the pendency of such reference.

Illegal Strike

Section 24 provides that a strike in contravention of section 22 and 23is illegal. This section is
reproduced below:

(1) A strike or a lockout shall be illegal if,

(i) It is commenced or declared in contravention of section 22 or section 23; or

(ii) It is continued on contravention of an order made under sub section (3) of section 10 or sub
section (4-A) of section 10-A.

(2) Where a strike or lockout in pursuance of an industrial dispute has already commenced and is
in existence all the time of the reference of the dispute to a board, an arbitrator, a Labour court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal, the continuance of such strike or lockout shall not be deemed to
be illegal;, provided that such strike or lockout was not at its commencement in contravention of
the provision of this Act or the continuance thereof was not prohibited under sub section (3) of
section 10 or sub section (4-A) of 10-A.

(3) A strike declared in the consequence of an illegal lockout shall not be deemed to be illegal.

Consequence of illegal Strike-

Dismissal of workmen-

In M/S Burn & Co. Ltd. V, Their Workmen , it was laid down that mere participation in the
strike would not justify suspension or dismissal of workmen. Where the strike was illegal the
Supreme Court held that in case of illegal strike the only question of practical importance would
be the quantum or kind of punishment. To decide the quantum of punishment a clear distinction
has to be made between violent strikers and peaceful strikers.

In Punjab National Bank v. Their Employees , it was held that in the case of strike, the employer
might bar the entry of the strikers within the premises by adopting effective and legitimate
method in that behalf. He may call upon employees to vacate, and, on their refusal to do so, take
due steps to suspend them from employment, proceed to hold proper inquires according to the
standing order and pass proper orders against them subject to the relevant provisions of the Act.


In Cropton Greaves Ltd. v. Workmen, it was held that in order to entitle the workmen to wages
for the period of strike, the strike should be legal and justified. A strike is legal if it does not
violate any provision of the statute. It cannot be said to be unjustified unless the reasons for it are
entirely perverse or unreasonable. Whether particular strike is justified or not is a question of
fact, which has to be judged in the light of the fact and circumstances of each case. The use of
force, coercion, violence or acts of sabotage resorted to by the workmen during the strike period
which was legal and justified would disentitle them to wages for strike period.

The constitutional bench in Syndicate Bank v. K. Umesh Nayak decided the matter , the
Supreme Court held that a strike may be illegal if it contravenes the provision of section 22, 23
or 24 of the Act or of any other law or the terms of employment depending upon the facts of each
case. Similarly, a strike may be justified or unjustified depending upon several factors such as
the service conditions of the workmen, the nature of demands of the workmen, the cause led to
strike, the urgency of the cause or demands of the workmen, the reasons for not resorting to the
dispute resolving machinery provided by the Act or the contract of employment or the service
rules provided for a machinery to resolve the dispute, resort to strike or lock-out as a direct is
prima facie unjustified. This is, particularly so when the provisions of the law or the contract or
the service rules in that behalf are breached. For then, the action is also illegal.

Right of employer to compensation for loss caused by illegal strike-

In Rothas Industries v. Its Union , the Supreme Court held that the remedy for illegal strike has
to be sought exclusively in section 26 of the Act. The award granting compensation to employer
for loss of business though illegal strike is illegal because such compensation is not a dispute
within the meaning of section 2(k) of the Act.

Conclusion- The right to strike is not fundamental and absolute right in India in any special and
common law, Whether any undertaking is industry or not. This is a conditional right only
available after certain pre-condition are fulfilled. If the constitution maker had intended to confer
on the citizen as a fundamental right the right to go on strike, they should have expressly said so.
On the basis of the assumption that the right to go on strike has not expressly been conferred
under the Article 19(1) (c) of the Constitution. Further his Lordship also referred to the
observation in Corpus Juris Secundum that the right to strike is a relative right which can be
exercised with due regard to the rights of others. Neither the common law nor the fourteenth
Amendment to the federal constitution confers an absolute right to strike. it was held in the case
that the strike as a weapon has to be used sparingly for redressal of urgent and pressing
grievances when no means are available or when available means have failed to resolve it. It has
to be resorted to, to compel the other party to the dispute to see the justness of the demand. It is
not to be utilized to work hardship to the society at large so as to strengthen the bargaining
power. Every dispute between an employer and employee has to take into consideration the third
dimension, viz. the interest of the society as whole.

Labour Law An Analysis Of Illegal Strikes

This paper will try to make an analysis of the understanding of illegal strikes as it has evolved
over time and what its status is at present and to do this effectively, the researcher will be
addressing a few issues distinctly. It will begin by briefly addressing strikes generally, before
moving on to the specifics- what do we understand by illegal strikes? In this part the researcher
will analyze Section 24 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to see how it covers the concept of
illegal strikes. Along with that, she will refer to judicial decisions that have developed and built
on the understanding of illegal strikes and the criteria to determine them, and the contradictions
among these decisions. In addition to Section 24, Sections 22 and 23 will also be discussed in
order to understand the scope of the prohibitions, that is, whether it is a blanket prohibition or
they prohibit strikes under certain conditions. The next part of the paper will look at the
standards set by the International Labour Organization which ought to determine, inter alia,
rights of workers, which includes the right to strike. The researcher intends to analyze the
parameters of a legal strike, and what would render a strike illegal, and whether the standards
followed in India correspond to the international ones. She will also examine the
recommendations and suggestions of the Second National Commission on Labour on legal and
illegal strikes to determine how useful they would be, and whether they correspond to the ILO
standards. Finally, the paper aims to see if the consequences of illegal strikes as provided under
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, act as sufficient deterrents.

Section 2(q) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter IDA unless stated otherwise),
defines strike [1] , and the common idea of a strike is that there is stoppage of work for a period
of time by the workers of an enterprise in order to make the management or employees accept
their demands or come with a viable solution for the dispute. [2] There are various types of
strikes, like, for instance, general strike, stay-in strike, go-slow strike, sympathetic strike and so
on. [3]

There is no provision in the IDA which defines the legality or illegality of a strike, but Section
24 lays down conditions, which, if contravened, would make the strike illegal, like contravening
provisions laid down in Sections 22-23, or Section 10(3) or 10A(4A) of the Act. [4] Section 24
provides for the conditions under which a strike will become illegal, and the two main clauses
under this Section (with respect to strikes) say that a strike will be illegal if it in contravention of
Sections 22 or 23 which lay down the grounds for prohibition of strikes. [5] This shows that a
strike will be illegal if these statutory provisions are breached, and not so much the purpose of
the strike, in India. [6] Section 10 of the IDA gives the appropriate authority power to determine
whether a dispute is in the nature of an industrial dispute and then refer it accordingly, and this
discretion or the factors which is used to determine the nature of the dispute cannot be
questioned in a court of law. [7] An issue of some significance here is what is the scope of
prohibition under Sections 22 and 23? In Section 22, which applies to public utility services
specifically, clause (1) lays down a set of grounds which needs to be complied with necessarily,
namely, giving the employer notice of such strike six weeks in advance, and not to be within
fourteen days of such notice, the strike has to be before the expiry of date specified in the notice,
and there can be no strike while conciliation proceedings are pending before a Conciliation
Officer and up to seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings. [8] A possible explanation
for this is that employers are going to get adequate time to prepare for the strike because of the
notice, and it also allows some time to find an alternative solution to the dispute. [9] However, if
there is a lockout already by employers, notice need not be given. [10] Section 23 refers to
general prohibitions and broadly states that there would be a breach of contract of employment if
a strike was called during pendency of dispute before a Board of Conciliation or Labour Court,
Tribunal, Arbitrator etc., and for a period after conclusion of such proceedings. [11] The three
main distinctions between Sections 22 and 23 is, first, that while the former deals specifically
with public utility services, which makes conditions more stringent for them, the latter applies to
all other establishments as well as public utility services, and second, providing notice under
Section 22 is mandatory, while it is not so under Section 23, and finally, unlike Section 22,
proceedings before a Conciliation Officer in the case of establishments other than public utility
services will not bar the declaration of a strike. [12]
While Section 23(c) states that there is a prohibition on strikes with respect to matters pending
for settlement or award, during the period of such pendency, Section 20 provides for the
commencement and conclusion of settlement proceedings. [13] Therefore there are basically two
broad types of establishments which are covered by these Sections, namely, Public Sector
Utilities and all other establishments.

The provisions of Section 20 has been given a restrictive interpretation, that only on receipt of
conclusion report by the Central Government will it be assumed that settlement proceedings have
concluded. In the case Workmen v. Industrial Colliery [14] there was a delay in receipt of the
conclusion report by the Central Government which the Trade Union did not know about, and it
declared a strike. The Court held this to be an illegal strike on the basis of a strict interpretation
of Section 20. [15]

Also, the Court has held in Ramnagar Cane and Sugar Co. v. Jatin Chakrabarty [16] that
conciliation proceedings between one Union and the employer will act as a bar against all other
Unions striking on the matter. [17] But on the question of striking during conciliation
proceedings on separate issues altogether, there have been slight contradictions. Justice Krishna
Iyer in Gujarat Steel Tubes v. G.S.T. Mazdoor Sabha [18] by obiter said that it would be
unreasonable to assume that a strike on an unrelated matter should be barred because there is
conciliation proceedings going on regarding another matter altogether. [19] However, the Patna
High Court and the Calcutta High Court have said that Section 23 prohibits strikes on all issues,
whether related, or unrelated, when there are proceedings going on before a Conciliation Officer,
Board of Conciliation or any Industrial Tribunal. [20]

Another dimension of importance is how the courts have looked at justification of strikes, and
that has mostly been used to determine whether and in what situations should striking employees
be entitled to payment of wages for the period. Justification as a concept, or a measure, is alien to
the Industrial Disputes Act and more popular in civil and criminal law to determine severity of
an act or its consequences. [21] And yet the courts have tried to define the concept of
justification of a strike. In Chandramalai Estate, Ernakulam v. Its Workmen [22] the court
observed that though a strike is legitimate action on the part of the labour, it cannot be used
indiscriminately. Still, there may be situations of emergency when there may not be time to wait
for references and in such instances a strike will be justified. [23] This was added on to in a
number of other cases where they said that the justifiability of a strike would depend on whether
the intentions were bona fide, and justifiability would be viewed as to whether the demands are
fair and reasonable, and in various situations strikes have been held to be justified, like in an
instance of using strike as a method of protest against unreasonable attitude of the management
and so on. [24]

The researcher believes that introducing the concept of justifiability of a strike makes the
situation even more subjective than it already was because no court has been able to give a
standard definition of the term, and it has been interpreted differently in various circumstances.
The very terms used to authenticate justifiability themselves are subjective terms like fairness
and reasonableness of demands, and the courts will have to first look into them. Also, this
means that the courts are now bringing in the intention of the striking party, thus moving away
from strikes being determined solely by adherence to statutory provisions, which one can safely
assume was the legislative intent behind enacting the IDA, given the provisions it contains.

In Crompton Greaves Ltd. v. Workmen [25] , the court said that whether a strike is justifiable or
not depends on the facts of the case and has to be determined on a case to case basis. It then went
on to say that a strike cannot be said to be unjustified unless its reasons are entirely perverse or
irrational. [26] So on one hand the court says that it has to be determined on a case to case basis
depending on the facts, yet on the other, in the same decision the court lays down a parameter
that justifies pretty much all strikes except those which on the face of it would be of entirely
perverse intentions. In yet another case, India General Navigation and Railways Co. Ltd. v. Their
Workmen [27] , the Supreme Court, no less, declared a public utility services strike to be illegal,
then proceeded to discuss whether it is justifiable or not, and held it to be perfectly
justified! [28] So certain decisions appear to have bordered on the ridiculous when courts have
gone into the discussion of justifiability of strikes. While it can be argued based on the earlier
parameters of justifiability that though a strike has contravened statutory provisions such a
situations may have arisen which necessitates a strike, thus making it justifiable, but the
researcher is of the opinion that the whole reason behind putting in stricter pre-conditions for a
strike by employees of any public utility service is so that the common mans well-being is not
jeopardised, and justifying illegal strikes by employees of such services cannot be validated.
At the international level, the body working on freedom of association and collective bargaining
for workers worldwide has been the International Labour Organization, founded in 1919 whose
main objective is to promote opportunities for productive work with dignity in equitable and
secure environments. [29] No international convention explicitly recognizes the right to strike,
but it has been referred to and such a right could be implied from some of the provisions of two
major international conventions, namely, Convention No. 87 which is the Abolition on Forced
Labour Convention, 1957 and Convention No. 98 which is the Right to Organize and Collective
Bargaining Convention, 1949. [30] These two conventions largely intend to give workers
security through the right of collectivism, by allowing workers to join trade unions with very
minimum requirements for membership, Convention 87 has the right to strike as an inherent
element [31] , and Convention 98 builds on the scope of protection extended to the workers and
labour unions. [32] India has not ratified either of the conventions, and optimists say that non-
ratification is not proof of the nation not adhering to the core labour standards, and it could
simply mean that there is a different mechanism of protection in place and substantive or
procedural technicalities may prevent such incorporation in the national legal system, or even
that while the standards are implemented the nation just chooses to not undergo the costs of
ratification. [33] Unfortunately, experience has shown that more often than not, even the
developing countries which have actually ratified the conventions not conformed to the
standards, leave alone those who have not. [34]

The Committee on Freedom of Association has accepted seven major guidelines that would
demarcate the legal strikes from the illegal ones, and failure to abide by these guidelines would
render a strike illegal. [35] These guidelines are, first, the union has to mandatorily give notice
prior to the strike, second, as long as conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration
proceedings are fair and both parties have adequate representation and participation, and it is
speedy, the employees are obligated to first try these measures before declaring a
strike. [36] Before striking, the decision should be taken by the majority of a pre-decided
quorum, and the decision should be by secret ballot, and also, there should be adequate measures
taken to prevent accidents, because the ILO principles recognize the right of non-strikers to work
and this guideline is to ensure that they are allowed to do so, and violent reactions to this are
prevented. [37] The guidelines also talk about establishing a minimum safety service in some
cases, that is, a certain minimum level of production is to be maintained so that there is no
damage to materials and machinery which may happen when they are left unused for periods of
time, and the determination of minimum service is to be done by taking into considerations not
just governmental stand, but also the views of the public. [38]

In India, as discussed earlier in the paper, the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 provides for
conditions to validate a strike as legal. While a lot of these principles and those provided in the
Act are more or less the same, there are some very prominent distinctions. One is with respect to
compulsory arbitration, where the difference is that in India if conciliation, arbitration, etc.
doesnt work out, a failure report is sent to the government which can make a reference to an
appropriate court or tribunal, but the position of ILO is that no such compulsory modes of
adjudication can be imposed in the initial stages before a strike is to be called, unlike India where
failure to follow the conciliation and mediation procedures would render a strike
illegal. [39] However, in the case of essential services, such an imposition would not be invalid,
and in all instances when such compulsory adjudication has been imposed, it has to be speedy
and just. [40] In Nirmala Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v. Second Punjab Tribunal [41] it was
observed that the court cannot scrutinise the grounds of reference, but only whether it was in
keeping with the objectives of the IDA and whether it was for the benefit of industrial peace and
harmony. [42] Cases have set this precedent, and still others have reiterated this
standpoint. [43] Another distinction with respect to ILO standards is that while they accept that
government employees can go on strike, in India, striking is applicable only to workers and
government servants are excluded because of the nature of their work, and according to the
policy-makers, if they were to go on strikes it would be against the sovereign which should not
be allowed as it may not only not affect the government, it may end up affecting the general
public. [44] Another reason may well be that the amount of control and authority that public
servants have in their work, in comparison to the workmen as defined by IDA and interpreted
by the judiciary is a lot more. A third divergence has been with respect to Essential Services
Management Act (ESMA), 1981 by which strikes are banned completely in a number of public
utility services, though strikes in this field have already been made difficult by the provisions of
the IDA, [45] and the ILO has been trying to bring about some compromise on that ground by
making a distinction between essential services and public services, and their stand on the matter
states the need for a speedy and effective dispute resolution mechanism, but it does not appear to
have been very effective. [46] The researcher agrees with the stand of the ILO and the
Committee of Freedom of Association (CFA) on this ground because extremely harsh penalties
to striking would only be acting like a festering wound, rather than resolving the dispute, and it
may lead to tyrannical behaviour from the government which is not prevented from including
many more services as part of essential services thus acting against the interest of the workers
and their right to collective bargaining. The final difference is with respect to consequences of
the strikes. While the CFA does not recommend sanctions for strike action as it will only further
impede industrial relations, [47] the IDA provides for penalties in the form of imprisonment and
fines for illegal strikes and for financing or furthering illegal strikes. [48]

As far as the Second National Commission on Labours recommendations on legal and illegal
strikes are concerned seems to be fairly controversial in some respects. They recommend that in
essential services strikes cannot be called without a strike ballot in which there is at least a 51
percent majority, and it can only conducted by the recognised negotiating agency who is also
supposed to be the only recognized body to call for such a strike, and the ballot would be
supervised a hierarchy of officers headed by the Registrar. [49] The difference with respect to
ILO standards is that they advocate secret ballot but the labour commission decided on having a
check-off ballot instead, and this was in spite of most of the recognised labour unions wanting a
secret ballot as well. [50] Another problem that emerges is that now the system is a lot more
complex and time consuming, and it would require a significant amount of co-ordination. Also,
surely there are concerns about the negotiating agent, [51] like if the government is the
recognizing body, and there is only one such agent does it not become sort of like a trade union
of trade unions? This would simply be inserting a middleman and increasing transaction costs.
Most of the above-mentioned procedure also applies in the case of general strikes, that is for
non-essential services, except, the negotiating agent shall send notice of such strike to the labour
commissioner and conciliation officer and the procedure would be the same then as it exists
now. [52] The Commission recommends that Section 66 would deal with illegal strikes [53] and
penalties for the same. [54] First, to be valid, a strike cannot in be in contravention of the earlier
two Sections 63 and 64, next, three days wages shall be deducted for each day of the illegal
strike by each striking worker, and finally, any Trade Union leading such illegal strikes would be
derecognised and the office bearers of that union will not be allowed to hold any other office for
any other union for three years. [55] This seems to be an inordinately harsh measure, especially
when one compares it to the existing provisions in the IDA [56] and it is very much in
contradiction to ILO standards, which prescribe that it is best for industrial peace and harmony if
sanctions are not imposed at all. [57]

The Commission appears to have taken into consideration that there was a bit of confusion with
respect to payment of wages during the strike period which required the justification of the
matter looked into, and these provisions ensure that if a strike is illegal by failing to comply with
statutory provisions, wages will be deducted. Perhaps the penalties are supposed to act as much
as a deterrent as a punishment, but it seems more like a method to strangle the right to freedom
of association and collective bargaining because these harsh measures would ensure that unions
and workers think twice before declaring a strike, and if they are to follow the new complicated
and time consuming provisions, especially with respect to essential services, to the t, they will
probably never get around to actually going on strike! As far as the adequacy of the
consequences for illegal strikes under IDA is concerned, they do not appear to be too serious, but
they are not entirely inadequate either. Though it makes prosecution difficult because prior
permission of the government has to be sought, the penalty may be in terms of imprisonment or a
fine or both. [58] While at first glance it may appear that a fifty rupees fine in todays age and a
one month imprisonment is peanuts, for an industrial worker, even today, that would be quite a
bit. To send across a stronger message perhaps it can be amended to be slightly more forceful, a
longer period of sentence perhaps, but not to such an extent that it hinders the process of
collective bargaining altogether.

To conclude, the researcher has in this paper dealt with the understanding of illegal strikes by
analyzing Section 24 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and consequentially, Sections 22 and
23 of the same through judicial decisions. The researcher then proceeded to look at the core ILO
labour standards, and tried to understand how far they are followed in the Indian scenario, and
what the major distinctions are between the two, and with this as the backdrop she discussed the
Second National Labour Commissions recommendations and suggestions on illegal strikes and
its penalties in its 2002 report. Finally, she addressed the issue of adequacy of the already
existing provisions with respect to penalties for illegal strikes in the IDA, 1947