Knowledge as Idealisation John Dewey Mind, Vol. 12, No. 47 (Jul., 1887), 382-396, Stable URL: fip:flinks jstor-org/sici sici-0026-4423% 28 188707529 19A 12% 3A47H3C3BIG3AKALEIE2.0,.CO%SB2-M Mind is currently published by Oxtord University Press, Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at flip: feworwjtor org/aboutterms.htmal. ISTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in par, that unless you fave obtained pcior permission, you may not dowaload an cnt isus of @ journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe ISTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial uss. Please contact the publisher cegarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at baupsferwer,jstor.orp/jounals/oup.htal. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transtnission. ISTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to creating and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding ISTOR, please contact support @jstor.org- hup:thwwwjstor.orgy Moa fun 20 08:47:54 2005IL—KNOWLEDGE AS IDEALISATION. By Professor Jouw Dewey. Tra the word ‘ides,’ as canmonly used, is about as ambiguous a term as could well he invented, is an old story. Tneed here to call attention only to two connotations. It inaplios existence, and it implies maraing or the content af the psychical existence. When swe sposk of the idea of virtue, ‘we may mean either the ‘idea conveyed ’ by the term, its significance, or we may mean the partioular psychical exisi- ence, which ocours now and here in experience, and stands for the meaning. But this double connotation is not can- fined to abstract terms. Tt holds equally of the most definite peteeption,—aay, mino of my pen as Iwrite. ‘Phere is the idea in my mind,’ an existence coming after many ideas, and before many others; a psychical existence which ia a unique, tunshateable, ieréooverable experience. What con- stitutes it we need not here inquire, though our psychalo- gical research goes to show that it is a clustering of sensa- tions, visual, muscular and tactile, due to the immediate stimilation of my nervous system. Sinaar stimuli may » occur again doubtless, but the present existence endures only while tbe given stimulus is actually theze. How stands it with the other connotation of the term? Tt is evident that here we are dealing with meaning or significance—all hat would be inelidd i> tho dofntion, aay of pon, pl tho foot that i ig now present, which is, ‘flor oll, phe othe meaning, and not of the éxistence, To siate the whole matter simply, overy peychieal stato or ‘ides,’ in Locke's sense, is at once sensation and interpretation, of that eensa- tion or meaning conveyed. Tris sign and signification. We do not go here into the theoretical justification of the latter element, We do not ask whether there i# any pen really there, or whether, if there is, ovr’ idea of it corresponds to reality. Wo merely state the fact that in every psychical experience thave is the psychical existence, and there is what this existence stands for to the mind. It is an un- doubted fact that the meaning aceme to be objeative, perma- nent and universal; that the idea of existence, in other words, seems to us to report a reality which is there, aside ‘Our particular mental state, one which is equelly there for my intelligence at all times ‘under the same conditionsRNOWLEDGH AS IDRARISATION. 2383 and for all intelligences. ‘This apparent report is part of the complete peychieal fact, but. we, do not now ask whether it ‘hes any right to be, or whether itis an illusion unconsciously ‘ueraddod to the legitimate content of the fact. Reeognis- ing that every psychical fect does have these two aspects, we shall, for the present, confine ourselves to asking the nature, fanetion and origin of the aspeet of meaning or signifeanco— the content of the ides. as opposed to its existence.* ‘To develop what is meant let ns take Locke's favourite examnple—s perception of gold. Lt we ask what is psychically ezamlestetogin ofgld.. ewe aaa ell is only’ a group of sensuaus feelings-—some strong, some faint. Lf we inquire farther, we find that the stronger ones are due to a direct stimalstion of some orgen af sense, while the fainter are due to the indirect stimulation of same central organ. Tf wo simply look at the pices of gold, there aze the vivid Sensations of colour and museular tension only ; elus- tered about these may be less vivid feelings of contact, per Laps of slight motallic taste and odout, But it is a mistake to call these latter feelings ideal, and the former real. One class is just as real as the other: the only distinction is ane ‘ofstrength, Itis quite true that the weaker feelings my be found upon examination to be due to previous stimula fions, and fo bo due to connenions in the brain previously + establiched, co that now a dizeet peripheral oxeitation serves to set up a change in some connected part of the brain and awaken seusation, But as existences, there is no difference in tho feclings, whethor peripherally set up ox contrally excited. The stronger one, as existence, does not report that it is dus to present direct stimulation; the weaker one does not report that it is ultimately due to pest stimulations. ‘This is o matter of interpretation, and even as interpre- tation it does not enter into the garzeption of the gold. T repeat, as existence, we have only’ olustering of senstiows feelings, stronger and weaker. ‘But wiiat is perceived is not a clustering of feelings of any sort. It has taken cettnries of sclentife paychological observation even to ascertain that sensations af these kinds are involved at all : so far is their presence fom being an element of the content of perception. ‘What is perceived is ho hig gold, wit ita various properties, which the sensa- tions stand for. And in our anxiety to get ab meaning, ta 2 In thas alling artention to the distinction of the avo weves of the term Fides Tar, of coutse, but mepeating what many others hai itt “anor them moat deat te © A hraey, In his Prise of Lagi wp dam384 5. DEWEY find out what is symbolised, we actually neglect utterly that which is the eymbol, the psyehicsl existence. ‘What is por. ceived is, in short, ‘significance, meaning. The amount of perception one has, whether as 2 babe or adult, as layman, , is precisely the meaning that one finds signi fied by one's sensations: the senaations, as euch, may he pre- izcly alike in tho four oasis, Pareiving, to foiat a pe chological commonplace, is interpreting. ‘The content of the perception is what 1s signified. Now, it is to be noted that the meaning constitutes for us the whole value of the experience. As a physiological fact, the ocenrrence of nerve tremars of some sort may be the important thing, But as a fact of human experiance, the important. thing is that the experience has significance. Tt means something to us. It reports sometining to our ine telligence, Absolute nonsense and nonentity are synony- mous ae matters of conscious experience. Tb is trae enough that without the idea as existence there would be no ox perience ; the sensuous clustering is a condition sine gua, nom of all, even the highest spiritual, consciousness. Bat it is none ‘the less true that if we could strip any psychical existence of all its qualities excent bare existence, there would be nothing left, not even existence, for our intelligence. ‘Even the fact that there és an experience, aside fram wa it is, is not the sensation itself; it is the interpretation of the + sensation. Tt is part of the mocning. If we take out of an ‘exporience all that it means, as distinguished from what it — a particular occurrence at a certain time, there is no psychical experiencs, The hatest fragmont of consciousness thet cam he hit upon bas mesning as well as being. ‘Take away the meaning, and eoiisciousness vanishes, ‘We may seem to be dwelling needlessly upon the veriest teuism of psychology—that its subject-matter is conscious experience, for that is all that is really meant when we say that significance constitutes the worth of an idea. Bat, perhaps becatiee it is such a truism, there is no faot a0 often overlooked. ‘The fandamental distinction between physical facts and psychical facts is not that the former oxist in space, the letter in time, or any other specific distinction of mode of occurrence, Tt is that physical facts as such are {aes of exiatonco; peychical facts ao facts of mesning. Physical facts have" meaning, but they have it. as psychical, in relation to intelligence; psychical facts have existence, Dut the existence does not ‘constitute their express value in human experience. An idiot has.as many ideas, qué exist ‘eness, as Shakespeare ; the delirious petiont has, in all probability, more in. a given time than his physician,RNOWLEDGE AS IDRALISATION, 885 What then is the nature of mecning, of significance, of that which is conveyed by every fact of consciousness, and Which constitutes the value of that fact? Tt is, of course, & mediate factor ; it is due to inference. In passing, I must ‘coramend this statement to those who are telling us that the ‘only realities which we can ultimately admit are those ‘which are immediately present in come state of conscious. ness, and thet we must reject all inference if we ars to get the fact. For my paxt, it seems that when the mediate elemant is gone, meaning is gono, and eansciousness itsalf disagpears. Tf someone takes away from me all the infer ance contained in a fact, hunt 95 hard as T will, [ cannot, find but, that he has teken with him the fact also.” He ma} have let me with nervous tremors in my brain, but all significance, i.., conscious experioncs, is gone. So far ie it from being’ true that we mow only what ts immediately present in consciousness, that it should vather be said thet what is dmmadiadely proseat is never known. ‘But we must leave these general stasements and come to particulars. ‘That which is immediately présent is the sensuous existence; that which is known 1s the content conveyed by this existence. ‘The sensnons material is of worth only a9 it is a sign; it isa sign only se it signifies oF pots ont meng, 'Phis menning is proto as mediated. ft fs not there aa existence; it is there as pointed towards, ag symbolieed. If we owe nothing else to what is called Bhystcloginl peychotogy, the oxpeximontal resol resched by jelmholtz, that we always meglect sensations, ox pay no attention to them ag existence, in behalf of the meaning conveyed by them, gives physiological psychology « higher Scone sland theo hlucepectes, psychology has yet steaine for introspentve poychology is elways descriptive, while Hebaholtz's generalisation explains. It is true, for example, that every experience of tone is complex, contain ing the fundamental and the partials. Yet we are entirely unconsaioas of this complexity, which as raatter of sensors existence is the all-important thing. Why? Because this complexity is taken solely as a sign of the instrument to hich the tore ig referod— human voice, vsin, piano, We interpret the various combinations of sensations as siguifyin, this ot that abject. We are equally unconscious of the nature of the sensations in themselves, and of the process we go through. Psychical result or significance is all in- telligence cares for. Starting-point and way to this resale are swallowed up in what they symbolise.” This explains “anconietons cenbration on it payebical nde, Processes, 5386 3. pawey: ‘whether of perception or of reasoning, aze of no account to Intelligence except as they lead to taeaning.Berception is well defined as unconscious reasoning. “And as such it illustrates the way in which the process loses itself in the result. The process is nothing as a process, or psychical existence; it is everything in what it means or symbolises. In reasoning proper, the processes are af some account to us, bocansy we know that upon varitions in the process depend variations im result. ‘The matter is more complex, and we go through it step by step ; but oven here we do nob pay attention to the pronase a8 an niotance,” We simply {ko one mamning ot @ time, and, then go on to the next meaning. Reasoning is the way in which we separate and unite meanings into one complex meaning, As our power to reason besomes developed, and the subject-matter be- comes familiar, we ease considering tho various subordinate amnings in ther zoltion tp each other. We gasp the meaning as a whole, as we do in perception, and reason Freeones, as we say, automatic. cr intuitive. Converselys ‘when. wé are in doubt in perception as to whether the result, is genuine or is an illusion, we do pay attention to the process. We repeat the process, analysing it into its steps, to 200 if we have drawn a comect inference. So, when we wish to decide whether that red colour fs really on the wall + or is dus to a purely organic affection, wo move the body or head, and observe results, end draw’ our inference aeoorde ingly, We often separate the various steps in perception, Just as we often consolidate them in reasoning; bub the Separation and the consolidation are always of meaning, and never of the psychical provess as an existence. ‘But let us consider snother example ar two of the fact that we neglect sensuous tasis and regard meaning alone. Everyone knows thai we have two retinal images of an ‘object in every case of binocular vision ; that is C0 say, we ‘have two complete sensuous outfits. In the vast majority of cases, these two sensuous bases are slightly difierent 5 in ‘one case in a thousand they mey be alike. Yet wo are ordinarily conscious of but one object ; in some cases, those where the retinal images are similar, we can be eonscious of ‘but one, do what we will. I know of no more striking illustration of the fact that sensations, as existences, are nothing for us, while sensations in their symbolic fanetion are for us everything. The sensations mann, but one object, and, do what we will, we sec but one object. ‘The duality of the sensation is nothing for us. But we neglect the greater part of the case, when we speak of the matter asRNOWLADGH AG TDEALISATION. 387 if it wore confined to a fow epecial cases of eyo and ear, and 1s if in these eases the sensations, as existonees, were only double, or tripte or quadruple. Th fact, as existences, they are indefinitely multiple in every case. As T touch the table, how many distinct sensations da I have? As the ray of light affects my retina, consider what a.chaos of sensations is stimulated, T may remark incidentally that a large num- ber of the psychologists who have occupied themeclves with the problem of space-pereeption do not seem to have realised the, elements of the problem. They first talk as if the problem were: How to get space-relations ont of sensations, 26 existences? and secondly, as if the problem were: Given isolated soxations as oquivalont co ieolatod points in epsoe to tell how these come to be connected with each other in complex space-forms? But the problem in the first place i: How do we teverpret sensations into spatial meanings? and secondly: How do wa interpret some sensations as isolated points and otlers as connected bodies? We do not start with separate points which ate to be combined through the medium of motion, or in any other way. The separate point is as much ‘an inference, an interpretation of the sensation, ag the comected line, enface, or golid. Our experience of one is built up along with thas of the other. Sensations, as existences, in spatial perceptions se in all perceptions, are naught; sensations, in their syrubolic quality, as inference is put into them and they become meaning, are all, ap it fndementl potion ia tht consation, a existence and ¢ process, as psychical occurrence, by which sensations axe connesied, never enter into knowledge. Knowledge 4g both the sensation and the process in their significant or sign-bearing quality. ‘But what i the sense in calling the sign-borne content inferential, and in separating it from the sensational hasis 08, immediate? ‘The general ground is the fact that the sensuous clustering 's ali that is present by way of im- Taedinte existence, ‘and it is convenient io have a term to express that which is prosent, by way of being signified or pinbolised, “Phe sensuous ‘basis stands for, conveys. fo intelligence, the content of the experience, and’the meaning 4s present only as thus represented. ‘The sensations, as immediate existences, have ne more meaning than letters of the alphabet or than vocal noises. The meaning is read Jnto thous or out of thom, we ong anay prefer, to slate i, But more specifically, this' clement may be called mediate cor indeseniil because it present a8 the resale of a process388 3. DEWEY: of reasoning. There is no need at this time, I suppose, to do more than state the fect that every perception is a jadg- ment based on an inference. It is indifferent to the sensi tion whether it is interpreted as a cloud or as a mountain ; & danger-signsl, or a signal of open passage. The anditory sensation remains unchanged whether itis interpreted as an evil spirit arging one to murder, or as intea-otgimic, due to Glsordered blood-pressure. ‘The result is arcived at by process of inference. It is not the eensation in and of itself that means this or that abject; it is the sensation as asso- ciated, composed, identified, or discriminated with other ex- perlenas ; the sensstion, in short, as mediated. ‘The whale ‘worth af the sensation for intelligence is the meaning it kas by virtue of its relation to the rost of experience. Since the rest of experience is not and cannot be. present as 60 much immediate existence, we may well call the element which gives any psychical fact its valne mediate. ‘We ‘have just been introduced to some terms which, indeed, it has long been difficult to keep in, the background ; torms like ‘identification,’ ' discrimination,’ ‘relation’, Por thie mediate clement in hecively what we mean by relation, and the processes by which it is got at, and read into the sensation, are those of association and comparison. Tt has long seemed to me a remarkable fact thet the later writers of the specifically British school of psychology, ted by ‘Mz. Spencer, recognise this trath and yet do not think it necessary to revise their fundamental notions of intelligence. T can aceotnt for it only on the supposition thet they do not aitend ta the double sense of the term ‘idea’. ‘Their general theory of intelligence, as at bottom sensational, Foquires that it be the sensations a9 existences which axe compared and velated. ‘Their theory, as it actually works, is that the sensations ‘in their intellectual quality, a8 signifi- cances, are compared and identified, ‘Their theory as they employ it for purposes of explanation is in direct contra diction to"theiz theory in, its fundamental presuppositions, Tall intelligence is. a produet of psychical existences, called sensations, plus their association and comparison, no amount of association and comparison will ever give a result which has meaning for consciousness, Strictly speak- ing, it is iropossible for such processes to ocenr. But it the comparison of sensations does resalt in significant ox- perience, there must be a certain jntellectual quality in the Sensations not die to their properties as bere existences. A relation of identity is not a sensuous ekeleton whieh runs through psychical occurrences and ribs them together. Te is identity of meaning; permanence, in short, of inteliigence.BNOWLEDGE AS IDEATISATION, 389 And discrimination is not the, introduetion of wnlikenese hetween ideas as occurrences in the psychical life. They are already se unlike as they can be, cach Being already a unique distinct exietence : as Huma says, every distinct idea is rate existence Nor cen it mean recognition of this, ‘unlikeness of oxistonce, except, in the sense that it is re~ cognised that the two peychical occurrences do not mean the same. ‘They may @ anlike, but we should never know they were did we not discover thet they did not point to ot symbolise the same intellectual content. ‘They must mean difference of times et least, and conscious experience of dierouee of times is just as inuch e matter of interpretation of sensations as recognitian of spatial differences is. ‘Wundt has shown clearly enough, as it seems to me, that association is finally a function of attention; but, not to confuse ourselves with terms, let us take a simple exarople. Ofall the sensations which, as oxistenees, are presente; Us at any one time, how many come into consciousness to- gether? ‘To patiit in the old-fashioned way, haw many ideas ‘can we be eouscious of at once? To answer the question in this form: Of idea in the sense of meaning, we ean be conscious of but one of idea in the sense of existence, or psychical occurrence due to separate stinulstion, we may he conscious of an indefinite, fimitiess number. Just as many as can be iuade to convey one meaning, just so meny may be eompre- ended in one idea. If we msko, for the aske of example, the asseraption that the universe 39 unity, itis theoretically postble to grasp every detail of the universe in ond idea. in fact, it must be co grasped, for the unity of the world can only mean shat it ultimately possesses oneness of meaning. Te any given complex of presentations, therefore, jest as much will be selected and united into a conscious experience as hemonises in meaning. ‘The astronomer cannot attend to the ticking of the clack and to the passage of a star at the fame time, hecause they are indorpraad in two diferent ways. ‘Were they interpreted in the came content of significance, they would be, ipso festa, members of th same experience. ‘To herraw Wandt's illustration, if the eye sees a falling rod at one place, and there is a noise made at a slight distance, and if tho noise occurs regularly after the rod falls, although there is no connesion’between thers, the sight of the rod ‘and the ound will be united in the stime idea. So inevadi- eeble is the mind’s bent after meaning, shat if will force it if it be possible. In case, however, the noise is not harmo nijously related to the fall of the rod, the mind will have to aliernate between the two facts. They cannat both be pre390 a. DEWEY: sent in the same consciousness. ‘Their unlike significance makes them, by necessity, two distinat consciousness. Unity and difference, relation. im short, is elways a matter of significance, af content for intelligence, and nat of psych- eal existence.” When we say then, as Me. Speneer and all the later English writers do say, that a sensation is nothing until itis identified and disoriminated—that is, brought into relations of unity and difference—itis necessary} to remember that the identification and the discrimination aro elements cof meaning, of relation to intelligence. ‘The sensations, or existences, never unite themselves, end never differentiate themselves. But sensations, es they exist in conscious ex- erience, are always united and differentiated. | What is this tte say that intelligenes ie necessarily involved in ovory sensation as known, and, therefove, fhad it is impossible to derive intelligence from any combination of sensations? Let us remember two things : fire, a sensation is not knowledge tantil united and differentiated ; socondly, these processes have ebsalutely no reference ta ‘the existence of the sensn Mia, batonly to thei: eens, 6 the meaning conveyed them. " Cain we avoid drawing the conclusions: negatively, that relations —that is, connexions of unity and difference of meaning—ean never he produced by sensations as psychical existences ; and, positively, that the factor of relation—or ideal significanca—is necessarily required to make eensstions elements of eanscious experienes ? ‘This brings us to the fact that relations axe thoroughly, ‘ideal. Lewes frequently nated that scienee ie a process of idealisation, but be seems never to have realised either the true import’ of idealisation, or the fact that all inowledge, peroopiton included, requires the ideal element, Idealisation. ie not a process of deparinre from the material presented in perception, for this maicrial is itseif ideal. ‘The idealisation of acience’ is simply a further development of this ideal element, It is, in short, only rendering explicit and definite the meaning, the idea, already contained in perception. In the act of perception’ we do not realise anything like the whole meaning of what the sensations convey ; our interpee- tation is ragmiontiy and inadeqasto,, ‘Tho other prooeses of knowiedge, the so-called faculties of memory, conception, fudge ee-gonsciournons, den, are only rogessively ler interpretations, as each introduces same ideal factor— that is, telation—neglected by the previous. Memory, for example, simply maties explicit that ideal relation ot’ oar present experience to past experiences, which is involved in every perception, and which indeed inakes it what it is,XNOWLEDGE AS IDEALISATION. 301 alttiough in the stage of perception we are not couscious of this relation. Self-consciousnses, again, is simply the: con- scious recognition that the ideal element ts involved in all Knowledge togetner with what is ‘inplied in this statement Self-conscionsness is the idealising process of all knowledge continued till it becomes conscions of itself. But these are aspects of the question tbat must now be deferred. re have to ack what is the especial ground for calling the clement which makes Imowledge significant an weal element? The answer in general is that this factor is ideal, because it iS not present by way of immediate paychibal cetirence, bitt 28 meaning. Tt i signifieance; and this is sigmifieance, presence as symbolised.” Tk ix convenient. to havea term to derote what is present in the way of mesning rather than in the way of existence, and the term ‘ideal just meets the demand. Ib meets it negatively in suggesting that this factor is not one of Speco and time-existence and ecumence;itmeats te postvely ia suggesting thet ie due te intelligence. ‘This is the point which jhes now to be shown, and shown not through an examination of the logical sanditians of egpesienes but Cogh a psyebolgieal ingly oto is fs ‘Whence came the ideal clemente which five to experience its meaning? By what process do we interpret sensations eo that they become significant to us of objects and events jn space and time? ‘These questions are simply the finda mental questions of psychology, and can he answered only by a complete treatise on paychology.. Nothing but very general considerations tay be expected of me here. The Shawor hich. i ordinardy given to. the question, the one we have just seen given’ is undoubtedly the correct answer. Sensations get’ meaning by being interpreted through their relations to the vest of experience; through the processes of identification and discrimination. But the sensation is not identified with nor discriminated from Suother sopsation, ‘This would add. no whit to is signif cance, besides being a process peychologically impossible. Previous sensations, as existences, are gone for ever; gone as mnch a4 the time to which they ooeurred, Tt is true, doubtless, that they have le oxganie traces of their occa” rence in the brain; it may be true that these organie traces inay, by indirect stimulation, re-awaken sensations like 40 the pravicns ones. But in this process there fs, a= seh, no aid.! There is so mauch sensuous material indivectly stinan- Iated added to the sensuous raatoriel directly stimulated, and that is all, If sensations befoce were mialliple, chacti,a2, 2 Dewey: needing interpretation, there has been sdded more multiple chaotic material, equally in need of interpretation. Multi plication af sensations is not interpretation of sensations previously existent, ‘Tho identification is of the meaning of the present sensi- tion with some meaning previously experienced, but which, although previously experienced, still exists because it ‘meaning, and not occurrence. ‘This identification gives the present sensetion all the meaning possessed by those ex- Periences with which itis identified. Te renders it symbolic ‘of whatever these other experiences signified. If T sitriimte any mesning to the idea gold, all that meaning is transferred into the present sensation as soon as this sensation is seen to have the eaine symbolism. "And it is seen to have the same gymbolism just because the mind beings this meaning to bear upon the given sensation. There is undoubtedly a ‘mechanisin, convenicntly termed the association of ideas, which insures that the mind brings a certain set, as it were, of its interpreting activities to bear rather than another, but the final result of meaning is wholly dependent upon the group of ideal significances which is brought to bea. The interpreting activity may ining iteelf to bear in such a way that it shall regard the sensations as iron pyrites or as the talisman of lige; but npon this way depends the meaning of the experience, In short, the sole way of accounting for “the fact that we bave significant experience, or that sensa- fone, n addition fo being payehical occurzencen, are alao psychical meanings, is that the mind conserves permanently out of every experience the meaning of that experience, and, ‘when it sees fit, reads this conserved meaning into a given Fensation, tbocby eowipleting the transfer of significance. ‘The experience, as an existence at » given time, has for ever vanished. Tts meaning, as an ideal quality, remains as lon; as the mind does. Indeed, its remaining 4s the remaining the mind; the conservation of the ideal quality of experience is what makes the mind a permanence, If it be asked, then, how psychical experience can begin, the answer is, indifferently, either that it does not begia, or that it begins as the beginning of the development—the ‘manifestation—of intemal content of intelligence. Tt does not begin in the sensa that meaning arises out of taat which has no meaning. It does not begin in the sense that sen- fallons as mere accurrences over group themselves co that they have in sddition meaning. For meaning is mediate, heing through relation ; it is ideal, being what is symbolised to intelligence, If intelligence were not present with aXNOWLEDGH AS IDEALISATION. 393 roinimum of intelligent or ideal quality to read into #ensa- tions, these sensations would never get significance, or presence in conscious experience, ‘The mind must possess ‘at tho very outset: the idea that thete is meaning there. Tt roust, project into sensations tbe conception Hat they are significant, even if it does not develop the measure. oF this significance. A raind which does not come to sensations with an inéradicable pre-judement that the sensttions are interpretable, that is, possible bearers of an ideal quality, does not have the starting-point for any interpretation, and its sensation coald not ever get e beginning on the raad of meaning. ‘The sensations might conceivably revive each ‘other and fuse with each other indefinitely, but meaning is absent uniil they symbolise each other; and they fail to symbolise each other until the meaning of one is repesented by another. But, after ali, the conception of the recalling and fusing of sensations is not one to he allowed, excepé ‘upon the supposition of the interpreting activity of intelli- nce, The very fact that. sensations are no connected that the peripheral stirsulation of one kind will set up the central stimulation of another is due to the unification of meaning ‘which kas some time made them fractional members of one whole, so that, one eaonot recat, even a3 existence, without the other. Attention has at some time Iaid its delaying hand spon them and conjoined them; it has sclected them for ‘aud oxeluded others from its connecting grasp ; and this ix to say that they have been given a wnity in that which thoy symbolise, Sensations cannot revive each other except as members of one whole of meaning; and even if they could, we should have uo beginning of significant experionce. Significance, mesning, mustbe already there. Intelligence, in short, is the one indispensable condition of intelligent ex- ‘This seen and stated, it becomes a question of simple fact how far developed in any case the necessary intelligence may be. For our general considerations, it is enough that the minimam requivement of an intelligence which recognises that its sensations have meaning de met ; whether any defi- rite meanings, and, if so, what, are peojected Into sensations, in at present’ a miatier of indifference. We do not care whether they are interpreted as in space and time; aa poe sessing necessauly quantity, quelity, relation and modality ornot. Tt is enough to know that they became experience ‘only as interpreting intelligence projects into them some- thing of its own being ; they are what they are through this relation to intelligence. There is therefore uo boginning of intelligent experience, except such as involves intelligance.304 3. paway: ‘This loads us to recognise that intelligence hes anecessary internal permanent content; and that itis only beeanee it has, and becanse it supplies it to its sense.stimnli, that. thers ever arises significant experience, and that this occurs just in the which intelligence possesses a xynthiotio content which it can project into its stimuli. In other words, whether we inguive after the origin of growth of mental experience we dnd invalved « synehetie intelligence, that is to say, an intelligence which possesses a content as opposed to one which is purely formal. Recent Empirical Peychology sbows that it bas ran the civeuit and returned to the position af Locke. Locke fitted the mind out. with sensations on tho one side, end associating comparing activities on the other. These latter were purely formal. ‘They merely operated from without pon the material of sense, dividing and combining. ‘Then Psychology altetopted to got slong with the sensations only. But it was driven to re-introduce the associating activity, and now we see it riven to bring beck tho comparing felating aciiviy. | We have complaints thst the Empirical School has neglected the native reading capacity of the min@, and thet we must ecognigo thet it ia endowed with the ebility to identify end discriminate. But this relating capacity is still conceived as, formal, although the conception involves a contradiction. ‘Phe reistions axe conceived a8 suporinduced, as it wero, ‘upon the materiat of sensation, introducing ab «xtra order into them; instead of as necessary to constitute theix entire dbeing as members of capscious experience. When Psy- chology recognises thet the relaing activity of mind is one nol exervised pan sensations, but one which supplies rex lations and therehy males meaning (makes experience, as Kant said}, Psychology will be in a position to explain, and thus to become Philosophy. ‘The mention of Kants mame saggesta that both bis strength and his wealmess lie in the line just mentioned. IL ie ie strength that he rooognises that ‘un uppercepsive unity interpreting sensations through categories which constitute the synthetic content of self-consciousness is indispensable to experience. {t is his weakness that be ‘conceives thie content as parely logical and hence gs formal. Self-consciousness hos a material, a psychologicel content. Kant was never able to bridge the dualism between bis ‘priori form and his « posteriori content, becanse he conceived of sensations as furnishing meaning provided only they were, unified by the forms of intuition and the categories of understanding. Tn truth, the sensations supply no Meaning.KNOWDBNGE AS IDBADISATION. 395 It is the sensations, however, with the ideal content given them by the self, which are meaning, ‘The self does nob work with a gris’ forms upon an « poderiaré material, but intelligence es ideal (ar a priori) constitutes experience (or the a posteriord) as having meaning. But [must rettim fom this digression, Experience begins when intelligence projects something of itself into sensations. We have now to recognise thet experience grows, or gets more meaning, just in the degree in which intelligence reads moze ideal coutent into it. "Phe adulé bas inore experience than the child-—the Englishman tian the Bushmnau—beeause he has more ideas in his intellect to bring to beur upan his sensations and thns make them significant Were the theory of our recent writers of the Hmpizical School correct, the difference must he (1) that the English adult hes his formal capacity of relating: more, sharpened, and (2) thet he hes a grester number of revived sensations which he combines with his present. But i ought co he evident by this time that (to take the latter point fret) the addition of revived sensations would in itself make the experience move confused, make it less significant. It is the addition of sensations selected because they possess the same meaning, it is their anifcation with the present as same content. ta intelligence, it is their discrimination as suggesting here and there a new and different shade of meaning,—it is, in short, the supplying of mezning through sensations, and nob of sensations, that males the experience mors significant, And this is to say that experience grows fs intelligence adds out of its own idea! content. ideal quali; we may see (t0 take up the other point) that say ammount of sharpening af the mere pawer of identification and discrimination, of comparison aa a formal power, world add no whit to the experienee. ‘The experience’ as an oxistence, as a clustering of sensations, is already there. ‘The sole thing ie ta find out what it means, and this can be done only as there is supplied the mediate relational ideal factor. ‘The growth of the power of comparison impliss not a formal growth, but a synthetic internal growth. Tt-implies that when the mind is stimulated to an act of comparison, it has a more varied, complex, better organised system of ideas or mesnings to bring to bear upon iis sensations, and thus to transfer to these its own content of significance. ‘This transference evidently ieorporstes the given ex- perience into the system of meanings or of intelligence, and thereby the better prepares the latter for future appereeptive, sets; its incorporation adds to the synthetic content of906 «J. DEWEY: RNOWLEDGE AS IDEALISATION. fntelligence, and thereby to the meaning of possible future cexperiencas, ‘The process of the growth of experience is accordingly e reciprocal one. Any experience has meaning as the self projects this meaning into it from its own ideal store ; this projection appropriates the given experience, a to its meaning, into the ideal store of the self, thereby farther developing it.” Knowledge might bc indifferentiy desoribed, therefore, as 4 process of idealisation of experience, or of ‘realisation, of intelligence. It is each through the’ other. Ultimately the growth of experience must consist in the development oat of itself hy intelligence of its awn implicit idleal content upon occasion of the tolicitation of sensation. But this is again a thought ta be elaborated at, another time. ‘We may sum up our results as follows: meaning cons ‘tates the worth of every paychical experience ; meaning is, not bare existence, but is an inferential mediate factor ; itis relation and is ideal ; as ideal it is supplied by intelligence ‘out of its own content ; this content constitutes, indeed, the reality of intelligence. ' T think we may hiave reason now to congratulate ourselves thet we did not, et the beginning, make any inguiry ito the connexion between this ideal quali o& the’ meaning of experience and objoctive reality, ‘or, it seers to me, that would have been to hegin at the wroug end, and imply that there was somehow, somewhere. present to consciousness, a conception of what reality is by ‘which we cotld measure the significance of our experience. And L have become convinced by the inquity set forth in the preceding pages thatif reality is itself an element in conscious experiance, if must as such come under the seope of the sig- nifleanee, the meaning of experfence, and hence carmat be used as ab external standaed lo measure this meaning. ‘The reality of experience is, in short, an element of its interpre- tation, ofits ideal quality or relation to intelligence. We da not have externally given to us some fixed conception of xeality which we can compare with our ideas, and thereby see how anfich agresment with reality the ‘latter have. Reality, like everything else thet hae meaning, is a fanction of our ideas, To Sng out what it is we must look within Shere ideas” Tt fe the gtent merit of English, Paychology that in attempt, at least, it has recognised this, It is its defect that it has tied to find thie reality in the ideas, as existences, where naught can be found. We have now to'see whether hetier fortune may mest an aitempt to discover the nature of reality, where all is ultimately contained and rust be found in the ideas as significances, as meanings. I hope, accordingly, at some futare time, to éek after this relation of ‘idea to reality.