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THE ROLE OF ARMY RAILROADING

AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

A Monograph

by

Major Bradley E. Smith

Transportation Corps

1
S C W L OF
y W E 0 MlUTARY SiVopS

School of Advanced Military Studies

United States Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Second Term 88-89, No. 1

Approved l o r Public Release: DlsCribulian is Unlimiled


T h e Role of Army Railroadinq at t h e

O ~ e r a t i o n a l Level of War

Major Bradley E. Smith

Transportation Corps

School of Advanced Military Studies

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

May 15, 1989

Approved for public release: distribution

is unlimited.

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Name of Student: Bradley E. Smith, MAJ, Transportation Corps

Title of Monograph: The Role of Army Railroading at the


O~erationalLevel of War

Approved by:

Monograph Director
LTC Charles D. Daves, MS

-
COL L. D. Holder, MA
Director, School of
Advanced Military
Studies

& /&
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.
Director. Graduate-
Degree' program

Accepted this day of &1989


ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF ARMY RAILROADING AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR


by Major Bradley E. Smith, USA, 64 pages.

Little emphas1s is being placed upon military railroad1ng


today by Defense Department planners. Rail is overshadowed by
motor transport and theater air when it comes to supporting
large unit operations. In doing that, logisticians may be
shortchanging themselves and, worse still, the units they are
obligated to support. A new look at Army railroading at the
operational level of war is warranted because little has been
written about it over the last several decades. Current
terminology, doctrine and capabilities are summarized before
further analysis is undertaken.

The Army's present railroad doctrine is based upon the


assumption that the present day equivalent of the Military
Railway Service, which is the Transportation Railway Service,
will be small in comparison to our efforts in World War II and
the Korean conflict. In fact, our reliance upon host nation
rail support is at an all time high. Foreign nationals will
have to be assigned missions that soldiers have traditionally
done in past wars.

A reevaluation of Army railroading at the operational


level of war is warranted before any realignment of doctrine
and force structure is initiated. Th1S paper is an attempt to
make a contribution toward that end. The first step 1n that
approach 1S to e"plore inherent advantages of rail from the
standpoint of a theater commander. The second step 1S to
examine railroad challenges confronting the operational
commander and his staff.

It is concluded that this mode of transportation warrants


much more attention and consideration than it is currently
receiving. Operational commanders have a great deal to gain
from increasing the number of U.S. Army rail units. The
advantages of ra1l outweigh any llkely difficulties which
might result from 1tS use.

To gain a true apprec1ation of rail. however, further


analysis is required. Strengths and weaknesses of d1fferent
transport modes need to be examined and quantified. Svstemic
comparisons need to be drawn so our logistical efforts can be
better focused and directed. The appropriate place for
military rail must be 1dentified and the necessary personnel
and equipment obtained. This 1S an important step which we
can take now which will help to meet the press1ng demands that
are llkely to be placed upon our logistical support structure
in the future.

iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

F'age

S e c t i o n I: Introduction................................ 1

S e c t i o n 11: Advantages o f R a i l a t t h e O p e r a t i o n a l
L e v e l o f War................................ 6

Capacity 7

Economy 11

S e c t i o n Summary 14

S e c t i o n 111: Challenges o f R a i l a t t h e Operational


L e v e l of War.............................:<. 14

A l l o c a t i o n o f Resources t o
S u b o r d i n a t e Commands

Command and C o n t r o l 19

D i f f e r e n c e s i n R a i l Gauges -.-.
7.7

Use o f R a i l c a r s as S t o r a g e
Containers

Misuse o f R a i l F ' r o d u c t i a n and


Maintenance F a c i l i t i e s

Host N a t i o n Support 29

S e c t i o n Summary
7
-, 1

Section IV: Conclusion .................................. --.1

Endnotes... ............................................... 36

Appendix A: Tonnage C a p a c i t i e s o f I n t r a t h e a t e r
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Assets........................ 45
Appendis P: Countries With Standard Gauge Track .......... 47

Bibliography .............................................. 48

Initial Distribution List ................................. 54

I. I n t r o d u c t i o n

L i t t l e emphasis i s b e i n g p l a c e d upon m i l i t a r y r a i l r o a d i n g

t o d a y b y Defense Department p l a n n e r s . H a i l i s overshadowed by

motor t r a n s p o r t and t h e a t e r a i r when i t comes t o s u p p o r t i n g

l a r g e u n i t operations. I n permitting that, l o g i s t i c i a n s may

b e s h o r t c h a n g i n g themselves and, worse s t i l l , t h e u n i t s they

a r e o b l i g a t e d t o support. A new l o o k a t Army r a i l r o a d i n g a t

t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l of war i s w a r r a n t e d because l i t t l e

t h o u g h t has been g i v e n t o i t over t h e l a s t s e v e r a l decades.

A t t e n t i o n t o o p e r a t i o n a l a r t has i n c r e a s e d s i n c e t h e 1982

v e r s i o n of F i e l d Manual 100-5: O ~ e r a t i a n sr e i n t r o d u c e d t h e

concept i n t o our m i l i t a r y l i t e r a t u r e . The concept i s n o t new

-- i t was employed p a r t i c u l a r l y w e l l i n t h e War Retween t h e

S t a t e s and World War 11. O p e r a t i o n a l a r t concerns t h e

employment o f m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n a t h e a t e r o f war t o

accomplish s t r a t e g i c ' goals. Theater o p e r a t i o n s and

campaign p l a n n i n g a r e c e n t r a l t o t h e concept. The mechanics

of o p e r a t i o n a l a r t d e a l w i t h sequencing t a c t i c a l "

engagements and b a t t l e s t o f o r m c o h e r e n t , long-range plans t o

d e f e a t t h e enemy. L o g i s t i c s p l a y s an i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t because i t a f f e c t s when and where f o r c e s can

flght, and t h e r e f o r e , whether t h e a t e r f o r c e s can a c c e p t o r

must d e c l i n e b a t t l e .

The f i v e war f i g h t i n g commanders i n c h i e f (CINCs) a r e

t h e a t e r commanders. They i n c l u d e t h e commanding o f f i c e r s o f

A t l a n t i c Command, C e n t r a l Command, European Command, Paclfic

Command and Southern Command. These CINCs o p e r a t e a t t h e

s t r a t e g i c and o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l s o f war* t o a c c o m p l i s h

s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s as s p e c i f i e d i n t h e J o i n t S t r a t e g i c

C a ~ a b iilt i e s P l a n , U n i f i e d Command P l a n and J o i n t C h i e f s o f

Staff P u b l i c a t i o n 2: U n i f i e d A c t i o n Armed Forces. These CINCs

employ o p e r a t i o n a l a r t i n t h e i r war p l a n n i n g process."

Many o f t h e U.S. Army's p a s t o p e r a t i o n a l achievements a r e

logistical i n nature, because our s t y l e o f w a r f a r e emphasizes

mass. For t h e same reason, l o g i s t i c s w i l l c o n t i n u e t o be

e s p e c i a l l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n f u t u r e wars.. As much e f f o r t i s

needed t o develop ways t o s u p p l y combat f o r c e s as i s needed t o

develop t h e new f i g h t i n g d o c t r i n e i t s e l f . ' The i m p o r t a n c e

o f t r a n s p o r t i n l a r g e u n i t o p e r a t i o n s cannot be o v e r s t a t e d .

The t y p e and amount of c a r g o which can be d i s t r i b u t e d w i t h i n a

t h e a t e r has a d i r e c t impact on t h e tempo o f b a t t l e , l i n e s of

o p e r a t i o n and s u p p o r t o f t h e main e f f ~ r t . ~

T r a n s p o r t a t i o n c a p a b i l i t i e s a r e o f fundamental concern t o

o p e r a t i o n a l commanders. General George S. Patton, Jr.,

p o i n t e d o u t t h a t r o a d and r a i l n e t w o r k s a r e of paramount

importance i n o p e r a t i o n a l planning.- The a b i l i t y t o

maneuver i s fundamental f o r any army, and t h e l a t e r a l s h i f t i n g

of forces i n a theater i n a timely fashion (which r a i l can do

so w e l l ) i s o f t e n c r i t i c a l t o t h e success o f a campaign. Wise

d e c i s i o n s must be made now, t a k i n g a long-term and s y s t e m i c


approach t o p e r m i t t h e maximum use of a l l a v a i l a b l e s o u r c e s of

transport, t o i n c l u d e r a i 1.

The c u r r e n t s t a t u s o f U.S. Army r a i l r o a d i n g i s t r i v i a l .

A t t h e h e i g h t of i t s g l o r y days i n World War 11, t h e M i l i t a r y

R a i l w a y S e r v i c e (MRS) was a c t i v e on e v e r y c o n t i n e n t except

Antarctica. I t had 43,500 s o l d i e r s assigned t o r a i l w a y

operating, maintenance of way and shop u n i t s . These men were

r e s p o n s i b l e f o r more t h a n 22,000 m i l e s o f main l i n e t r a c k in

North A f r i c a , Sicily, Italy, Northwest Europe, t h e United

Kingdom, Iran, India, Burma, New C a l e d o n i a , Alaska and Western

Canada.'O D u r i n g t h e Korean War, t h e MRS c o n t r o l l e d i n

excess o f 10,000 p i e c e s o f r o l l i n g s t o c k , 460 e n g i n e s and

1,243 m i l e s o f t r a c k . Between J u l y 1951 and November 1952,

Army r a i l r o a d e r s more t h a n doubled t h e s h o r t t o n s (STONs)"

c l e a r e d f r o m South Korean p o r t s . ' " The M i l i t a r y R a i l w a y

S e r v i c e t r u l y d i d l i v e up t o i t s m o t t o , "Ready For My

Co~ntry".'~

A t present, our d e p l o y a b l e r a i l a s s e t s a r e l i m i t e d t o one

railway battalion, which i s assigned t o t h e Army Reserve.

Under o p t i m a l c o n d i t i o n s , t h i s b a t t a l i o n can b a r e l y keep one

heavy d i v i s i o n and one s e p a r a t e mechanized b r i g a d e r e s u p p l i e d

over 90 t o 150 m i l e s o f track.14 The Army l o s t i t s o n l y

r a i l o p e r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g c a p a b i l i t y when t h e 6 7 t h R a i l w a y

Group was i n a c t i v a t e d i n 1986.'" But even b e f o r e t h a t

happened, t h a t g r o u p ' s d o c t r i n a l span of c o n t r o l was


a p p r o x i m a t e l y 600 m i l e s of main l i n e t r a c k , ' & which i s n o t

much t o o f f e r a t h e a t e r commander.

The U.S. Army's r a i l c a p a b i l i t y has been s c a l e d back more

t h a n s e v e r e l y s i n c e t h e end o f t h e Korean c o n f l i c t . The N i x o n

D o c t r i n e i s t h e reason f o r the acceleration i n the

i n a c t i v a t i o n o f r a i l w a y u n i t s i n t h e 1970s. President Nixon's

policy, simply stated, was t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s would

w i t h h o l d commitment o f i t s combat t r o o p s u n t i l t h e h o s t

nation(,) c o u l d a s s u r e t h a t adequate l o g i s t i c a l s u p p o r t , such

as r a i l , would be p r o v i d e d t o our f o r c e s . T h i s opened t h e door

t o tremendous s l a s h e s i n t h e Army f o r c e s t r u c t u r e . "

Because o f A m e r i c a ' s s t r a t e g i c f o c u s upon C e n t r a l Europe

a t t h a t time, a s o l i d case c o u l d be made f o r President Nixon's

decision. Rut t o d a y , t h e Defense Department has been d i r e c t e d

t o l o o k a t o t h e r c o n t i n g e n c i e s around t h e w o r l d , particularly

i n T h i r d World areas. The Army may have t o d e p l o y t r o o p s i n t o

t h e a t e r s t h a t have an i n a d e q u a t e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e t o s u p p o r t our

l o g i s t i c a l needs. Or, i t may be i n our n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t t o

i n t e r v e n e i n a p l a c e where t h e n a t i v e government i s hostile

and w i l l p r o v i d e no h o s t n a t i o n s u p p o r t . I n e i t h e r case, the

t h e a t e r commander and h i s l o g i s t i c a l s t a f f w i l l face

c h a l l e n g e s w i t h no easy s o l u t i o n s .

The Army's c u r r e n t r a i l r o a d d o c t r i n e i s based upon t h e

assumption t h a t t h e p r e s e n t day e q u i v a l e n t o f t h e MRS, which

i s t h e T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Railway S e r v i c e (TRS) ,'- w i l l be s m a l l

i n comparison t o our e f f o r t s i n World War I 1 and t h e Korean


4
conflict.*- F o r t h a t reason, o u r r e l i a n c e upon h o s t n a t i o n

r a i l s u p p o r t i s a t an a l l t i m e h i g h . Foreign n a t i o n a l s w i l l

have t o be asked t o p e r f o r m m i s s i o n s t h a t s o l d i e r s have

t r a d i t i o n a l l y done i n p a s t wars. Two s t a f f organizations w i l l

a s s i s t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l commander w i t h t h e i n t e n s i v e management

o f c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a r y r a i l a s s e t s -- the Joint

T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Board (JTB) and t h e Theater Army Movement

C o n t r o l Agency' (TAMCA) .
JTFs a r e e s t a b l i s h e d by u n i f i e d , j o i n t o r combined

commanders as a means of massing t r a n s p o r t c a p a b i l i t y of two

o r more m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e s o r a l l i e d n a t i o n s . The board

recommends a l l o c a t i o n of t r a n s p o r t a s s e t s t o t h e commander,

based on h i s t a c t i c a l / o p e r a t i o n a l plans. JTRs p e r m i t t h e use

o f s c a r c e r e s o u r c e s i n t h e most e f f i c i e n t way p ~ s s i b l e . ' ~

TAMCAs p r o v i d e t h e means f o r a t h e a t e r commander t o

implement movement management and t r a f f i c control functions

w i t h i n h i s area o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . Rut t h e agency's most

i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n i n a j o i n t and combined s i t u a t i o n i s t o

i n t e g r a t e U.S. Army a s s e t s and needs w i t h t h o s e of our a l l i e s

and s i s t e r s e r v i c e s . = ' I n t h e case o f r a i l r o a d s , t h e United

S t a t e s w i l l be a "have n o t " p a r t i c i p a n t i n t h e war, trying t o

compete w i t h t h e "haves" i n using t h e i r resources.


. -.
. ~. . - .
.

D o c t r i n a l d i s c r e p a n c i e s e s i s t between what i s expected of

t h e TRS and what i t can r e a l i s t i c a l l y p r o v i d e . z z For

example, t h e combat arms a r e c o u n t i n g on h a v i n g a r a i l o p t i o n

for i n t e r t h e a t e r and i n t r a t h e a t e r moves.== They w i l l be

r e l y i n g on t h e Army T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Corps t o make i t happen,

r e g a r d l e s s ' o f t h e i n t e n t i o n s o r c a p a b i l i t i e s o f any f o r e i g n

nation.

And some of t h e Army's l o g i s t i c a l manuals a r e based upon

t h e assumption t h a t t h e Army has a comprehensive r a i l

capability. One f i e l d manual e x p l a i n s t h a t i t i s a " r e a l

p r o b a b i l i t y " t h a t m i l i t a r y r a i l w a y u n i t s w i l l have t o be

c a l l e d i n t o Thi'rd World areas f o r " n a t i o n b u i l d i n g " programs,

because t h e h o s t n a t i o n cannot p r o v i d e t h e necessary l e v e l s o f

upp port."^ I t would have t o be a p r e t t y s m a l l n a t i o n f o r


.,
o u r meager p r e s e n t r e s o u r c e s t o make a d i f f e r e n c e .

A r e e v a l u a t i o n o f Army r a i l r o a d i n g a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l

l e v e l o f war i s warranted b e f o r e any r e a l i g n m e n t o f d o c t r i n e

and f o r c e s t r u c t u r e i s i n i t i a t e d . T h i s paper i s an a t t e m p t t o

make a c o n t r i b u t i o n toward t h a t end. The f i r s t s t e p i n t h a t

approach i s t o e x p l o r e t h e i n h e r e n t advantages of r a i l from

t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f a t h e a t e r commander. Second, railroad

c h a l l e n g e s c o n f r o n t i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n a l commander and h i s s t a f f

are outlined. F i n a l a n a l y s e s w i l l conclude t h e paper.

11. Advantases of R a i l a t t h e O p e r a t i o n a l L e v e l of War

R a i l r o a d s have i n h e r e n t q u a l i t i e s t h a t a r e u s e f u l t o an

o p e r a t i o n a l commander. T r a i n s can h a u l l a r g e amounts of cargo

i n an economical manner. This r e s u l t s i n a cost e f f i c i e n t

means o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o n where c o s t s a r e measured i n terms of

6
personnel and fuel consumption. Conservation efforts are

necessary in war because resources are expected to be in short

supply. Logisticians will have t o manage supplies and

transport on hand t o support the execution of campaign plans.

Shortages are going t o occur. It is a matter of keeping them

t o a minimum.aa

Another complicating consideration is combined

operations. The United States may find itself in a position

of having t o supply allies who, in many cases, may be woefully

unprepared t o sustain a large scale war effort. Logistics is

supposed t o be a national responsibility, but there are no

guarantees that allied nations, t o include our own, will be

sufficiently prepared. We ourselves need t o ' g i v e serious

consideration t o getting the most productive use of our

money. Railroads, because of their great capacity and

economy, do exactly that. The Army Transportation Corps, as

the "Spearhead of Logistics", can only hold up its end in

these efforts by maximizing the use of railroads.

Capacity

~ - -
Raj.1 offers the greatest tonnage capacity for theater

~ - - =. . - ~ - -. - . .... - -... -

transportation. Simple comparisons can be made to illustrate

this point (Appendix A). More complex comparisons were made

by the Rand Corporation in 1970. In a detailed study, they

applied "redeployment/resuppl y" ratios t o road and rail

7
movements. A mechanized i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n was t h e f o c a l

point, b u t t h e c o n c l u s i o n s can b e a p p l i e d t o l a r g e r s i z e

f o r c e s and d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f o r g a n i ~ a t i o n s . " ~ I n t h i s

respect, t h e f i n d i n g s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y noteworthy f o r t h e a t e r

commanders who a r e concerned w i t h moving d i v i s i o n s and c o r p s

t h r o u g h o u t t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e areas.

An e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e " r e d e p l o y m e n t / r e s u p p l y " ratios i s

necessary b e f o r e t h e f i n a l r e s u l t s can make sense. Numerators

w i l l vary, based upon t h e mode o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o n s e l e c t e d f o r

a n a l y s i s and comparison purposes. The numerator w i l l r e f l e c t

t h e maximum d a i l y c a p a c i t y , i n short tons (STONs), o f a g i v e n

t y p e of conveyance used o v e r a p a r t i c u l a r way o f

transportation (i.e., gravel r o a d w a , paved highways o r

railw-). One example m i g h t be t h e t o t a l STONs t h a t a s t e a d y

stream of f i v e t o n t r u c k s c o u l d h a u l w i t h i n a 24 hour p e r i o d

o v e r a g i v e n s t r e t c h o f g r a v e l road. ( T h i s assumes an

u n l i m i t e d supply o f vehicles, drivers, f u e l and l o a d / o f f l o a d

capabilities. No t r a f f i c c o n g e s t i o n o r o t h e r d e l a y s a r e t a k e n

i n t o account.)

The more amenable t h e w x i s t o movement and t h e g r e a t e r

t h e c a r r y i n g c a p a c i t y o f t h e conveyance s e l e c t e d , t h e more

- STONs. w i l l b e d e l i v e r e d a t t h e d e s t i n a t i o n . The denomi-nator -1~T:; ..I1 1

on t h e o t h e r hand, r e p r e s e n t s t h e amount of supp 1i e s i n STONs,

t h a t t h e mechanized i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n needs f o r one day. The

l a r g e r t h e c a r r i a g e c a p a c i t y of the particular transportation

mode, t h e s m a l l e r w i l l b e p r o p o r t i o n a t e amount o f r o a d o r r a i l

space needed to accomplish the daily resupply for that one

division. It is a simple and straightforward means of

measuring capacity and efficiency based on the carrying

capacity of the conveyance selected and the wav of transport.

The larger the ratio, the greater is its potential a s a source

of mass transportation for the theater commander."'


The conclusions of the Hand study are not surprising.

"Redeployment/resupply" ratios for five ton trucks on gravel

roads and paved highways are 6: 1 and 7.6: 1 , respectively.

Eight ton trucks on gravel and hardstand produce ratios of

12:l and 15:1, respectively. Hut these results are puny

compared t o railway efficiency of 145:l.ze Logisticians

need to remind themselves of the basics when planning for ways

t o exploit all available means of moving large units and

supplying them in overseas theaters.

Rail is the ideal mode of transportation for large

tonnages. Men with railroad experience in peace and war are

firm proponents of this point of view. One such man was

Colonel J. Monroe Johnson, Chief of the Office of Defense

Transportation in World War 1 1 and later, commissioner of the

Interstate Commerce Commission. He wrote,

There is only one mass transportation -- the


railroads. You cannot go to war without them, for

war is mass t r a n s p ~ r t a t i o n . " ~

Another a s p e c t of capacity, o t h e r than c a r r i a g e

capability, i s p o t e n t i a l f o r expansion. Provided e i t h e r a

c o u n t r y has o r we can s u p p l y a s u f f i c i e n t base o f r a i l r o a d

r o l l i n g s t o c k and maintenance o f way a s s e t s , r a i l networks i n

t h e a t e r s of o p e r a t i o n can be expanded r a p i d l y t o meet m i l i t a r y

requirements. One i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h i s i s t h e g r o w t h of our

n a t i o n ' s i n f r a s t r u c t u r e d u r i n g World War 11. American

r a i l r o a d companies h a n d l e d 87 p e r c e n t of t h e increase i n

tan-miles g e n e r a t e d by t h e War Department, o r s i x and o n e - h a l f

t i m e s t h e amount of t h e o t h e r modes combined. They more t h a n

doubled t h e i r t o n - m i l e s h a u l e d i n 1943 compared t o 1933.=O

Even though t h i s i s an a p p l i c a t i o n of r a i l a t the strategic

level, t h e p o i n t about i t s p o t e n t i a l f o r expansion i s s t i l l

v a l i d a t the operational level.='

R a i l c a p a c i t i e s f o r l i n e s a l l o v e r t h e w o r l d can be

c a l c u l a t e d i n advance o f any U.S. commitment o f combat

forces. The Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency has p u b l i s h e d

u n c l a s s i f i e d m e t h o d o l o g i e s and some s t a t i s t i c a l r e s u l t s t h a t

a r e a v a i l a b l e t o t h e general public.'= Theater commanders

know what needs t o be moved f o r any g i v e n s c e n a r i o and t h e y

can f i n d o u t , if t h e y have n o t a l r e a d y done so, what r a i l r o a d

f a c i l i t i e s a r e a v a i l a b l e overseas t o s u p p o r t them. The

c h a l l e n g e t h a t remains i s t o m i n i m i z e any t r a n s p o r t a t i o n

shortfalls.
Economy

I n comparison t o o t h e r modes of transportation, t h e use o f

r a i l w i l l r e s u l t i n l a r g e s c a l e s a v i n g s i n p e r s o n n e l and

fuel.== T h i s i s r e f l e c t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t o n l y a t h r e e man

crew (conductor, e n g i n e e r and brakeman-switchman) a r e needed

for a t r a i n which can h a u l thousands o f s h o r t t o n s o f

cargo.=- Such manpower s a v i n g s a r e s i g n i f i ~ a n t . ~ ~

Motor t r a n s p o r t uses 20 t i m e s t h e men and f o u r times the

fuel as does r a i l t o move t h e same amount o f tonnage a g i v e n

distance.=L T r u c k s a r e p e r s o n n e l i n t e n s i v e per s h o r t t o n

delivered. I n t h e commercial t r u c k i n g i n d u s t r y , manpower

c o s t s a r e a p p r o x i m a t e l y 80 p e r c e n t o f t h e t o t a l o p e r a t i n g

budget.J7 Even though s a l a r i e s a r e o f l i t t l e concern t o

t h e a t e r commanders from t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f war f i g h t i n g , they

a r e s i g n i f i c a n t i n peacetime i n o r d e r t o g e t t h e most

p r o d u c t i v e use f r o m e v e r y d o l l a r . A i r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n i s even

less efficient. P l a n e s use 30 t i m e s t h e f u e l and 12 t i m e s t h e

manpower t h a n does r a i l . = = Only i n l a n d waterways and

p i p e l i n e s a r e more f u e l e f f i c i e n t than r a i l r ~ a d s . ~ ~

Shortages of f o s s i l f u e l s i n a t h e a t e r a r e l i k e l y today

because of t h e g r e a t consumption r a t e s o f modern

eq~ipment.~
R~a i l r o a d s can h e l p t h e a t e r commanders conserve

t h e i r fuel resources. I n World War 1 1 , s u r p r i s i n g l y enough.

t h e r e was l e s s use o f i n t e r n a l combustion, diesel railroad

e n g i n e s c v e r s e a s t h a n i n World War I. Because o f petroleum

11

shortages in the European theater in World War 11, both sides

turned t o coal-burning, steam engines. Russia, for instance,

relied almost entirely upon steam. This preserved diesel fuel

for tactical combat operations.*' Influenced by available

host nation support assets and the depressed state of

worldwide maritime shipping,42 the same could happen today.

What's more, the economic aspect of rail could be an

advantage in securing more realistic minimum force levels for

theaters if included in CINC estimates. Congressional

committees are concerned about the Army's tooth t o tail

ratios. The Defense Department has been criticized in past

years because critics believe the logistical component is too

large. That is one reason why there is some merit to

increasing the size of the military's railroad force. Far

fewer people, and in the long run dollars, are needed to

produce the same result. Railroads are likely t o be given

favorable consideration by the national legislature. The

results of cost-benefit analyses of greater use of rail would

be a recognition of its capacity and economy. The war

fighting CINE= should initiate such analyses because they are

the ones who submit minimum risk force estimates to the Joint

Chiefs of Staff. Those estimates are intended to reflect the

smallest forces needed, to include combat service support

units,4a to meet current threats around the world.

The United States is not the first country t o have

internal disputes over purse strings. The interwar period

f2
p r o v i d e d an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r Germany t o expand h e r r a i l

system. Her p r i m a r y g o a l was t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e r a p i d movement

of m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n f u t u r e wars. H a i l was l e s s e x p e n s i v e

t h a n t r u c k s as measured i n t o n - m i l e s . The German m i l i t a r y

b e l i e v e d r a i l r o a d s c o u l d p l a y a r o l e i n even t h e B l i t z k r i e q

doctrine, which r e l i e d on f a s t paced b a t t l e and r a p i d l y

changing f r o n t s . B r e a k t h r o u g h s l e f t enemy r a i l i n t a c t which

was l a t e r e x p l o i t e d by Germans f o r t h e i r own l o g i s t i c a l

efforts.4- And i t worked. Similar r a t i o n a l e s are

a p p l i c a b l e t o d a y i n o u r s t r u g g l e t o spend w i s e l y . Money spent

on U.S. Army r a i l crews, e n g i n e s and r o l l i n g s t o c k i s money

w e l l spent i n t e r m s o f d o i n g t h e most l o g i s t i c a l l y -- at

minimal c o s t -- even f o r t a c t i c a l 4 " as w e l l as o p e r a t i o n a l

commanders.

One f i n a l b u d g e t a r y concern d e a l s w i t h l o w i n t e n s i t y

c o n f l i c t e c and a t h e a t e r commander's n a t i o n b u i l d i n g

r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s as s p e c i f i e d i n c u r r e n t Army d o ~ t r i n e . ~ '

When a t h e a t e r C I N C i s f a c e d w i t h p r o t r a c t e d war, nation

b u i l d i n g i s one way t o h e l p win t h e h e a r t s and minds o f the

indigenous p o p u l a t i o n , which, d e s p i t e i t s h a v i n g become a

hackneyed phrase, i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y i m p o r t a n t i f an i n s u r g e n c y

i s ever t o be managed. Money spent t o improve r a i l n e t w o r k s

overseas may b e n e f i t b o t h U.S. f o r c e s and t h e l o c a l economy.

Friedrich List, a German w r i t e r whose arguments f o r military

r a i l d a t e back t o t h e 1820s, focused on t h i s s y m b i o t i c

r e l a t ~ o n s h l p . He reasoned t h a t a r m i e s have always been a

1:
necessary d r a i n on n a t i o n a l t r e a s u r i e s , b u t t h e expansion o f

r a i l n e t w o r k s would n o t o n l y b e n e f i t m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s , but

would a l s o enhance c i v i l i a n b u s i n e s s as w e l l . T h i s l i n e of

reasoning a p p l i e s e q u a l l y w e l l today i n d e a l i n g w i t h

insurgency o p e r a t i o n s o r h e l p i n g a country r e e s t a b l i s h i t s

economic and m i l i t a r y power d u r i n g a c o n v e n t i o n a l war.*e

S e c t i o n Summary

Two s t r e n g t h s i n h e r e n t t o r a i l r o a d i n g -- c a p a c i t y and

economy -- have g r e a t impact a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l of war.

Theater commanders s h o u l d e x p l o i t t h e s e p o t e n t i a l advantages

t o t h e maximum e x t e n t p o s s i b l e i n f r a m i n g t h e i r minimum r i s k

f o r c e e s t i m a t e s and i n t h e p l a n n i n g and e x e c u t i o n o f

campaigns. B u t t h e y cannot c o u n t , exclusively, on i n d i g e n o u s

resources. The r e a l v a l u e l i e s i n o r g a n i c army r a i l u n i t s .

Because r a i l can p r o v i d e t h e s e advantages, t h e use o f trains

s h o u l d a t l e a s t be c o n s i d e r e d f o r any l a r g e u n i t move.

C a p a c i t y and economy can a l s o o f f s e t , and i n some cases, solve

some o f t h e c h a l l e n g e s t h a t a r i s e from r a i l o p e r a t i o n s . These

p o t e n t i a l s t u m b l i n g b l o c k s a r e d i s c u s s e d below.

111. Challenges o f R a i l a t t h e Ooerational Level of War

Theater commanders w i l l f a c e a m y r i a d o f c h a l l e n g e s i n any

f u t u r e war. One o f t h e l e s s e a s i l y s a l v e d problems w i l l be

14

t h e movement of men and m a t e r i e l . Even though r a i l o f f e r s a

p a r t i a l solution t o transportation shortfalls, i t s use can

i n t r o d u c e some new c h a l l e n g e s o f i t s own. A t the operational

level, t h e s e c h a l l e n g e s a r e of a systemic n a t u r e , therefore,

much o f t h e response w i l l have t o be i n i t i a t e d a t h i g h l e v e l s

w i t h i n t h e c h a i n o f command.

The f i r s t c h a l l e n g e any l o g i s t i c a l s t a f f w i l l confront i s

g e n e r a l s k e p t i c i s m i n t h e employment o f o p e r a t i o n a l r a i l .

(Some of the greatest c r i t i c s , s u r p r i s i n g l y enough, are

l o g i s t i c i a n s themselves.) These a t t i t u d e s d a t e back t o t h e

f i r s t use o f r a i l r o a d s i n t h e m i d - N i n e t e e n t h Century. Similar

viewpoints p e r s i s t today, and a r e n o t r e s t r i c t e d t o our own

army. The B r i t i s h h i s t o r i a n , Hew S t r a c h a n , w r o t e about t h l s

phenomenon and o f f e r e d t h e f o l l o w i n g e x p l a n a t i o n s .

First, there are the different ways i n which c i v i l i a n s and

s o l d i e r s c o n t r i b u t e t o wars. The g r e a t e s t d i s t i n c t i o n s among

t h e s e c o n t r i b u t i o n s a r e most r e a d i l y apparent a t t h e t a c t i c a l

l e v e l of war. F a i l u r e t o appreciate the c i v i l - m i l i t a r y team

effort, however, can e v e n t u a l l y l e a d t o breakdowns i n a

n a t i o n a l u n i t y of effort. Some members of t h e combat arms see

l o g i s t i c s as i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e i r b u s ~ n e s so f war and t e n d t o

get "annayed by i n t e n d a n t s and commissaries who do n o t

a p p r e c i a t e t h e e s i g e n c i e s of ~ a m p a i g n i n g " . ~Such
~

viewpoints a r e l i k e l y t o be exacerbated by t h e use o f h n s t

n a t i o n support. C i v i l i a n r a i l r o a d e r s appear t o have l i t t l e i n

common w l t h t h e m i l i t a r y and p r o b a b l y do n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h e
f i n e r p o i n t s o f c o n d u c t i n g war, b u t t h i s does n o t d l m i n i s h

t h e i r value. The U.S. firmy may be f o r c e d t o r e l y upon h o s t

n a t i o n support, if f o r no o t h e r r e a s o n t h a t i n s u f f i c i e n t

m i l i t a r y r a i l assets exist.O0

Second, S t r a c h a n w r o t e t h a t t h e expansion of railroads i n

Europe and t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was prompted o n l y i n p a r t by

m i l i t a r y needs. (These e f f o r t s were p r i v a t e b u s i n e s s v e n t u r e s

f o r t h e most p a r t . ) Track c o n s t r u c t i o n t h e r e f o r e d i d n o t

i n c l u d e many of t h e t r a n s v e r s e l i n k s t h a t would have m i l i t a r y

v a l u e f o r o p e r a t i o n a l s u s t a i n m e n t and maneuver purposes. Hail

l i n e s a l s o were s i n g l e - t r a c k e d for t h e most p a r t , except where

heavy commercial t r a f f i c w a r r a n t e d d o u b l e l i n e s . Simultaneous

f o r w a r d and back h a u l s , which would b e t t e r s u p p o r t m i l i t a r y

operations, were t h e r e f o r e n o t always p ~ s s i b l e . So,


~ ~

c r i t i c s of m i l i t a r y r a i l argue, w i t h some t r u t h , that track

n e t w o r k s a r e n o t designed f o r use i n a t h e a t e r o f war. What

they f a i l t o address, however, are modifications t o track,

such as by-passes and " s h o o - f l i e s " , n = t h a t h i s t o r i c a l l y have

been s u c c e s s f u l i n i m p r o v i n g t h e e f f i c i e n c y f a r m i l i t a r y use.

Third, t h e r e a r e c h a l l e n g e s i n h e r e n t t o r a i l r o a d i n g and

sources o f friction, other than j u s t a t t i t u d a l ones, that

develop between r a i l r o a d e r s and o t h e r branches of service.

They i n c l u d e d i f f e r e n c e s over t h e a l l o c a t i o n of resources,

breakdowns i n command and c o n t r o l , d i f f e r e n c e s i n r a i l gauge,

use of r a i l c a r s as s t o r a g e f a c i l i t i e s , and misuse o f r a i l


p r o d u c t i o n and maintenance f a c i l i t i e s . These a r e c h a l l e n g e s

t h a t must be r e s o l v e d a t t h e h i g h e s t e c h e l o n s o f command.

A l l o c a t i o n o f Resources t o S u b o r d i n a t e Commands

Major s u b o r d i n a t e commands w i l l compete f o r l i m i t e d

resources, e s p e c i a l l y i n war. Theater commanders and t h e i r

s t a f f s w i l l be deluged w i t h s u p p o r t r e q u e s t s and, no d o u b t ,

e x c e l l e n t reasons w i l l e x i s t t o j u s t i f y needs. I t w i l l be a

demanding t a s k t o s o r t t h r o u g h t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n . The

T r a n s p o r t a t i o n R a i l w a y S e r v i c e w i l l a l s o need i t s s h a r e o f men

and m a t e r i e l , b u t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n o f t h e TRS i s t h a t , once t h e

r a i l network i s o p e r a t i o n a l , t h e e n t i r e t h e a t e r w i l l reap

rewards i n t e r m s o f t h e massive amount o f men and m a t e r i e l

which can be moved i n a s c a l e i m p o s s i b l e by any o t h e r means.

A c c o r d i n g t o t h e D i r e c t o r General o f t h e M i l i t a r y R a i l w a y

S e r v i c e i n World War 1 1 , Major General C a r l H. Gray, J r . ,

r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of t h e r a i l r o a d s i s a c o n t i n u i n g challenge

t h r o u g h o u t any ~ o n f l i c t . " ~A s s i s t a n c e f r o m t h e Army Corps

o f Engineers i n f o r w a r d a r e a s and h o s t n a t i o n s u p p o r t i n t h e

r e a r w i l l be needed t o m a i n t a l n r o l l i n g s t o c k and roadbeds.

There a r e few r a i l r o a d a s s e t s p r e s e n t l y i n t h e Army's

i n v e n t o r y t o do t h e job.=*

Combat f o r c e s w i l l be competing f o r t h e s e same engzneer

resources t o perform c ou n t e r m o b i l i t y , m o b i l i t y and

s u r v i v a b i l i t y missions. There w i l l n o t be enough t o go

17
around, so d i f f i c u l t c h o i c e s w i l l have t o be made. Engineer

a s s e t s w i l l have t o be committed i n t h e a t e r t o r e p a i r

highways, roadways o r r a i l w a y s t h a t d e t e r i o r a t e from heavy use

o r a r e d e s t r o y e d by bombs. Our r e s o u r c e s s h o u l d a p p l i e d where

t h e r e t u r n s w i l l be g r e a t e s t , and t h a t means r a i l . No easy

solution exists, but the s h o r t f a l l s i n , and c o n f l i c t s o v e r ,

e n g i n e e r i n g r e s o u r c e s can be reduced, i n part, by b e e f i n g up

o u r m i l i t a r y r a i l r o a d c a p a b i l i t i e s now.

D e c i s i o n s w i l l have t o made about t h e assignment o f

personnel t o r a i l u n i t s . The s i t u a t i o n may d i c t a t e t h a t men


.
w i t h l i t t l e o r no r a i l r o a d background be thrown i n t o a r e l a t e d

s p e c i a l t y and l e a r n on t h e i r own. T r a i n o p e r a t i o n s w i 11 n o t

be e f f i c i e n t , b u t a t l e a s t t h e c a r s w i l l be moving. General

George S. P a t t o n , J r . u s i n g men w i t h m i n i m a l e x p e r i e n c e had


T h i r d Army r u n t r a i n s f r o m Normandy i n t o h i s r e a r near Nancy,

France when i t appeared t h a t h i s p e t r o l e u m s u p p l i e s were

d r y i n g up i n October 1944. The r o l e of host n a t i o n support

was t o a s s i s t i n t h e t r a i n i n g of h i s men and p r o v i d e t h e

necessary r o l l i n g s t o c k . P a t t o n ' s i d e a worked f o r a s h o r t

time.a- Because t h e U.S. Army has o n l y one t r a i n o p e r a t i n g

company, and t h a t i s on Reserve s t a t u s we may be f o r c e d

t o repeat h i s t o r y .

Defending t h e r a i l l i n e s o f communi c a t i o n may consume

c o n s i d e r a b l e resources. I n World War 11, Major General Gray

had 1 4 M i l i t a r y P o l i c e b a t t a l i o n s a t t a c h e d t o him i n Eurnpe,

s t r i c t 1y f o r r a i l r o a d s e c u r i t y purposes. Most o f these

18

s o l d i e r s were t h e r e t o s t o p f o r e i g n n a t i o n a l s f r o m

steal in^.^' I n addition, there w i l l be p h y s i c a l s e c u r i t y

r e q u i r e m e n t s t o p r o t e c t t r a i n s f r o m a i r s t r i k e s and ground

a s ~ a u l t . " ~These add up t o c o n s i d e r a b l e , b u t necessary,

investments i n personnel. Rut t h e y w i l l be more t h a n

compensated f o r by t h e a s s e t s saved by r e d u c i n g t h e need f o r

t r u c k t r a n s p o r t and by t h e f a c i l i t y w i t h which t h e combat

a s s e t s can be massed a t t h e c r i t i c a l p o i n t .

Command and C o n t r o l

S u c c e s s f u l r a i l o p e r a t i o n s depend upon c e n t r a l i z e d

p l a n n i n g and d e c e n t r a l i z e d e x e c u t i o n . Theater commanders need

t o delegate s u f f i c i e n t a u t h o r i t y t o t h e i r senior r a i l o f f i c e r s

if t h e y a r e t o c a r r y o u t t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . This

a u t h o r i t y w i l l have t o be g r e a t because, historically,

r a i l r o a d e r s have always f a c e d c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t e r f e r e n c e i n

running t h e i r l i n e s . Combat commanders have a h i s t o r y of

assuming c o n t r o l o f r a i l w a y s and r o l l i n g s t o c k i n t h e l r

r e s p e c t i v e areas o f o p e r a t i o n , without consideration f o r the

demands o f t h e o v e r a l l p l a n o f d i s t r i b u t i o n and s ~ p p l y . ' ~

Major s u b o r d i n a t e commanders, whose u n i t s a r e recipients

of supplies, want r e s p o n s i v e s u p p o r t -- and t h e j o b of

l o g i s t i c i a n s i s t o provide exactly that. These s e n i o r leaders

believe, and sometimes r i g h t l y so, t h a t t h e i r personal

involvement w i l l r e s u l t i n f a s t e r s e r v i c e f o r t h e i r particular

19
organizations. W h i l e t h i s sometimes produces i s o l a t e d cases

o f success, i t v i r t u a l l y guarantees f a i l u r e o f t h e o v e r a l l

plan. ( T r a i n schedules a r e i n t e r r e l a t e d , and d i s r u p t i o n s i n

one a r e a have r e p e r c u s s i o n s t h r o u g h o u t t h e e n t i r e system.)

The t h e a t e r commander's p r i o r i t i e s must have o v e r r i d i n g

c o n s i d e r a t i o n i f t h e campaign p l a n i s t o be s u c c e s s f u l .

Superintendents o f r a i l r o a d s need s u f f i c i e n t a u t h o r i t y t o

c a r r y o u t t h e a t e r m i s s i o n s as a s s i g n e d by t h e C I N C .

F a i l u r e t o d e l e g a t e a u t h o r i t y p r o p e r 1y' and h o l d

subordinates r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i r a c t i o n s w i l l guarantee

problems i n t h e e x e c u t i o n o f any o p e r a t i o n . There have been

instances of g r o s s mismanagement i n t h e p a s t , when s o l d i e r s

have been g i v e n t h e same t r e a t m e n t as b u l k cargo. I n December

1870, d u r i n g t h e Franco-Prussian War, t h e French a t t e m p t e d t o

use t h e r a i l r o a d s t o e x p l o i t F r u s s i a n weakness. Helmuth K.

von M o l t k e t h e E l d e r was o v e r e x t e n d e d and v u l n e r a b l e t o

counterattack, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n E a s t e r n France. Without

t h i n k i n g t h r o u g h a1 1 t h e l o g i s t i c a l d e t a i l s , French l e a d e r s ,

Gambetta and H o u r b a k i , h u r r i e d l y t h r e w a p l a n t o g e t h e r t o t a k e

advantage o f t h e s i t u a t i o n . Two o f H o u r b a k i ' s c o r p s were

supposed t o be s h i f t e d by r a i l f r o m t h e L o i r e t o t h e Saone

R i v e r over a two day p e r i o d . Trains arrived a t the

e m b a r k a t i o n s i t e s t h r e e days l a t e . I t t o o k days t o l o a d t h e

men and equipment. S o l d i e r s were packed i n t o c a t t l e c a r s f o r

over a week i n f r e e z i n g weather w i t h o u t f i r e s f o r warmth.

T r a i n s b r o k e dawn and f o o d r a n o u t . Some o f t h e men d i e d . It

20
was a bad s i t u a t i o n t h a t was a l l o w e d t o g e t p r o g r e s s i v e l y

worse because o f a nebulous c h a i n of command. No one s p e c i f i c

person o r o f f i c e was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e o p e r a t i ~ n . ~ ~

Nor were t h e French q u i c k t o l e a r n f r o m t h e i r e r r o r s . The

f o l l o w i n g month, i t t o o k n i n e days t o move a French b a t t a l i o n

230 m i l e s f r o m Bourges t o Baume. On t h e f i r s t day, the troops

had r e p e a t e d l y t o e n t r a i n and d e t r a i n and s u b s e q u e n t l y were

delayed f a r s e v e r a l more days e n r o u t e . They r a n o u t o f f o o d

because t h e y had b r o u g h t o n l y two days r a t i o n s w i t h

No s i n g l e a u t h o r i t y t o o k i t upon i t s e l f t o s t r a i g h t e n out the

mess -- i t was always someone e l s e ' s problem. S i m i l a r events

c o u l d happen t o d a y , extreme and absurd as t h e y m i g h t sound,

u n l e s s we develop a s t r o n g command and c o n t r o l s t r u c t u r e

o r i e n t e d t o t r a n s p o r t needs.

So, i n a d d i t i o n t o i l l u s t r a t i n g t h e need f o r s u f f i c i e n t

a u t h o r i t y t o c a r r y out r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , t h e French e x p e r i e n c e

a l s o p o i n t s o u t t h e need f o r a c l e a r and p r o p e r l y executed

c h a i n o f command f o r r a i l r o a d e f f o r t s . These r e q u i r e m e n t s a r e

c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o a p r i n c i p l e t h a t f i n a n c i a l l y sound p r i v a t e

r a i l r o a d s f a l l o w i n peacetime -- t h a t o f a "supreme

coordinating a u t h ~ r i t y " , ~d
' edicated t o c e n t r a l i z e d planning

and d e c e n t r a l i z e d e x e c u t i o n . D u r i n g t h e American War Between

the States, D a n i e l McCallum, who i n peacetime worked as t h e

General S u p e r i n t e n d e n t of t h e E r i e R a i l r o a d , was e s s e n t i a l l y

g i v e n c a r t e b l a n c h e by S e c r e t a r y of War S t a n t a n . McCallum was

commissioned as a c o l o n e l and was a p p o i n t e d M i l l t a r y D i r e c t o r

21

and S u p e r i n t e n d e n t of t h e R a i l r o a d s of t h e United States. He

was a l s o g i v e n t h e a u t h o r i t y t o t a k e p o s s e s s i o n of any and a l l

r a i l equipment w i t h i n t h e t h e a t e r o f o p e r a t i o n s . He c o u l d "do

and p e r f o r m a l l a c t s and t h i n g s t h a t may be necessary and

p r o p e r t o be done f o r t h e s a f e and speedy t r a n s p o r t

a f ~ r e m e n t i o n e d " . ~ " H i s powers were tremendous, b u t no more

t h a n needed t o g e t t h e j o b done.

C e n t u r v Nasazine i n March 1887 p r i n t e d an a r t i c l e

entitled, " R e c o l l e c t i o n s Of Secretary Stanton". An o r d e r

i s s u e d by S t a n t o n was p u b l i s h e d .

No o f f i c e r , whatever may be h i s r a n k , w i l l i n t e r f e r e
w i t h t h e r u n n i n g o f t h e c a r s , as d i r e c t e d by t h e
S u p e r i n t e n d e n t of t h e road. Anyone who so i n t e r f e r e s
w i l l b e . d i s m i s s e d from t h e s e r v i c e f o r d i s o b e d i e n c e
o f orders.&*

General Samuel D. Sturgis, a Union d i v i s i o n commander, was

one o f t h e f i r s t t o c h a l l e n g e t h i s o r d e r . I t was i m m e d i a t e l y

p r i o r t o t h e Second B a t t l e o f B u l l Run and S t u r g i s demanded

immediate t r a n s p o r t a t i o n t o t h e f r o n t f o r h i s t r o o p s . When

i n f o r m e d he would have t o w a l t h i s t u r n , t h e general seized

p o r t i o n s of t h e t r a c k near A l e x a n d r i a , V i r g i n i a f o r a day and

stopped f o u r t r o o p t r a i n s d e s t i n e d f o r Manassas. He backed

down when shown a t e l e g r a m f r o m General Henry W. Halleck,

General i n C h i e f o f t h e Armles, authorizing t h e r a i l r o a d

c o l o n e l t o p l a c e t h e d i v i s i o n commander under a r r e s t .
F r i c t i o n between v a r i o u s o p e r a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s has always

been p r e s e n t , and n o t j u s t i n o u r army. S i r Percy G i r o u a r d ,

D i r e c t o r o f B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y R a i l r o a d s d u r i n g t h e South

CIfrican War, complained t h a t f i e l d commanders would " s e i z e and

work t h e p o r t i o n o f t h e l i n e n e a r e s t t o themu,&& t h e r e b y

t h r o w i n g t h e e n t i r e l o g i s t i c s system i n t o c o n f u s i o n . Theater

commanders w i l l have t o do whatever i s necessary t o e n f o r c e

cohesion.

Major General Gray argues t h a t m i l i t a r y r a i l r o a d s s h o u l d

b e under a s e p a r a t e major s u b o r d i n a t e command t h a t r e p o r t s

d i r e c t l y t o t h e t h e a t e r commander. His ratidnale i s that

r a i l r o a d s a r e o f such c r i t i c a l i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e war e f f o r t ,

t h a t t h e r a i l w a y s e r v i c e commander needs d i r e c t access. His

communications s h o u l d n o t be slowed o r m o d i f i e d by

intermediate authorities. Railroading i s a h i g h l y technical

industry, and t h e D i r e c t o r General s h o u l d be a l l o w e d t o

operate without interference-7 ( f r o m commanders s u b o r d i n a t e

t o t h e t h e a t e r commander).

D i f f e r e n c e s i n R a i l Gauges

D i s r u p t i o n s t o r a i l o p e r a t i o n s can occur f r o m d i f f e r e n c e s

i n r a i l gauges. (Gauge i s t h e d i s t a n c e between t h e two

r a i 1s. ) Four s e p a r a t e gauges e x i s t e d t h r o u g h o u t Europe p r i o r

t o World War 11. T h i s posed c h a l l e n g e s f o r m l l i t a r y p l a n n e r s

who t r i e d t o i n t e g r a t e t h e v a r i o u s l i n e s i n t o one

'7
L. .4
Cargo had t o transloaded t o and from trucks, which then hauled

the cargo between the railroads of different gauges.

Today, standard gauge of four feet, eight and one-half

inches has been adapted by all European countries except

Finland, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Russia. The Warsaw Pact

countries, South Korea, North Korea and Communist China have

also built, using standard gauge track.Lv A complete list

of countries with standard gauge is provided at Appendix B.

The Soviet Union (except for Latvia and Lithuania) uses a

different gauge than the rest of Europe for military reasons.

They consider it an additional buffer against invasion.7o

But the Soviets have also taken steps t o facilitate logistical

support if they were t o attack across their borders. Warsaw

Pact rolling stock is unique in that decks, underframes and

couplers can be removed as complete units from their

supporting wheel and axle a s ~ e m b l i e s . ~Cranes


~
hoist the

laden railcars off their wheel and axle assemblies and

transfer them to new ones waiting on an adjacent track of

different gauge. This allows the Soviets to speedily modify

railcars, even as part of their normal peacetime rail

activity, to avoid transloading cargo to another mode of

t r a n ~ p o r t a t i o n . ~Western
~
Europe and the United States have

nothing similar.

Differences in rail gauge elsewhere around the world are

not as severe as they once were. Efforts to standardize have

been successful in North America. Mexico, Cuba, Canada and

24

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s have adopted one s t a n d a r d f o r t h e i r main

lines.73 Such a u n i f o r m system has i t s advantages,

e s p e c i a l l y i f we became i n v o l v e d i n combat on t h e American

continents.

Still, r a i l r o a d s i n some p a r t s o f t h e w o r l d have n o t

a c h i e v e d t h e same degree o f ~ ~ n i f o r m i tand


y lack:

i n t e r c h a n g e a b i l i t y i n r o l l i n g stock.74 That c o u l d be a

problem f o r us if we ever need t o o p e r a t e i n t h o s e a r e a s ,

u s i n g our equipment. One p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n would be t h e

purchase o f some r o l l i n g s t o c k and l o c o m o t i v e s w i t h removable

wheel and a x l e assemblies. More t h a n one can p l a y t h e Russian

game. T h i s a l t e r n a t i v e i s most e f f e c t i v e and l e a s t c o s t l y i n

t e r m s of l a b o r and t i m e d e l a y s .

A second a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o s e t up t r a n s f e r p o i n t s t o

manhandle c a r g o between t h e d ~ f f e r e n tl i n e s . The T u r k l s h Army

was p l a g u e d w i t h numerous t r a n s f e r p o i n t s d u r i n g t h e World War

I P a l e s t i n e Campaigns. These p o i n t s drew o f f v a l u a b l e motor

and animal t r a n s p o r t which was needed elsewhere i n t h e

theater. The B r i t i s h Navy c a p ~ t a l i z e dupon t h l s by d i s r u p t i n g

enemy o p e r a t i o n s on t h e one main l i n e t h a t d i d have a u n i f o r m

gauge. Naval gun f i r e f r o m H r i t i s h w a r s h i p s i n t h e

Mediterranean f o r c e d T u r k i s h r a i l o p e r a t i o n s f u r t h e r inland t o

l l n e s w i t h i n c o m p a t i b l e gauges, which r e s u l t e d i n d e l a y s f r o m

t r a n s l o a d i n g o p e r a t i o n s n e c e s s i t a t e d by d i f f e r e n t gauges.7m

The d i f f i c u l t l e s and i n e f f i c i e n c i e s o f o p e r a t i n g t r a n s f e r

p o i n t s a r e addressed i n a f t e r a c t i o n r e p o r t s o f Allied r a i l

25

o p e r a t i o n s i n French N o r t h A f r i c a d u r i n g World War 11. Most

o f t h e t r a n s f e r p o i n t s i n A l g e r i a and T u n i s i a were t h e r e s u l t

o f p o o r l y planned l i n e s , i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h s t a n d a r d and narrow

gauges t h a t had been b u i l t b e f o r e America e n t e r e d t h e war.

Major c h a l l e n g e s a t t h e s e l o c a t i o n s i n c l u d e d : o b t a i n i n g an

ample s u p p l y o f r a i l c a r s , v e h i c l e s t o s h u t t l e c a r g o between

t h e l i n e s and t h e manpower t o do t h e work. A c q u i r i n g t h e men

was perhaps t h e h a r d e s t t a s k because o f t h e numbers

required. '*
A t h i r d a l t e r n a t i v e i n s o l v i n g problems generated by gauge

d i f f e r e n c e s i s t o b u i l d new t r a c k . I n the long run, new

c o n s t r u c t i o n can be an e f f e c t i v e s o l u t i o n , but i t requires

significant capital outlays i n i t i a l l y . The French i n World

War I b u i l t new l i n e s t o r e l i e v e i n t r a m o d a l c o n g e s t i o n caused

by gauge d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h i n France. During t h e Spring of

1917, a main l i n e was estended 6 0 k i l o m e t e r s t o Dugny.

Another l i n e was completed t o S o u i l l y , which was d i r e c t l y

b e h i n d t h e t r e n c h e s near Verdun. The new t r a c k was s t a n d a r d

gauge and a v o i d e d i n t e r f a c e c o m p l i c a t i o n s t h e l i g h t r a i l

(three foot and t h r e e and t h r e e - e i g h t h s i n c h gauge) had caused

elsewhere. The new t r a c k a l s o t o o k b e t t e r advantage o f

t e r r a i n masking t o h i d e t r a i n s f r o m German f o r w a r d

observers. 77

When Germany i n v a d e d Russia i n 1941, H i t l e r ' s a r m i e s

r e p a i r e d and c o n v e r t e d hundreds of m i l e s of Russian f i v e f o o t

gauge t r a c k t o German ~ t a n d a r d s . ~
Re~f o r e O p e r a t i o n

26

Rarbarossa began, t h e German H i g h Command had p r e p a r e d p l a n s

t o u n d e r t a k e t h i s massive e n g i n e e r i n g t a s k , so t h e work was

c a r r i e d o u t smoothly and w i t h r e l a t i v e l y few unplanned

delays. R u t a t l e a s t two h i s t o r i a n s -- M a r t i n Van C r e v e l d and

Ron Z i e l -- argue t h a t even g r e a t e r p r e p a r a t i o n s i n t h i s a r e a

would have s o l v e d many o f Germany's l a t e r l o g i s t i c a l problems

and perhaps would have a l t e r e d t h e c o u r s e o f t h e war i n favor

o f t h e Nazis. 7v

Use o f R a i l c a r s as S t o r a g e C o n t a i n e r s

The use o f r a i l c a r s as m o b i l e s t o r a g e c o n t a i n e r s i s a

self-inflicted wound. I t does n o t t a k e much b l e e d i n g o f f of

r o l l i n g stock t o reduce a r a i l r o a d ' s c a r r y i n g c a p a c i t y

significantly. Prompt u n l o a d i n g o f c a r s by consignees i s o f

paramount i m p o r t a n c e i f t h e r a i l r o a d i s t o c o n t i n u e o p e r a t i n g

e f f e c t i v e 1 y. Sometimes, because o f poor l o g i s t i c a l planning,

t h a t does n o t g e t done. For example, personnel o r m a t e r i a l s

h a n d l i n g equipment (MHE) may n o t have been c o o r d i n a t e d i n

advance. T r a i n s may be scheduled i n such a way t h a t c a r g o i s

d e l i v e r e d t o r a i l h e a d s f a s t e r t h a n t h e goods can be

d i s t r i b u t e d t o t h e user. Since, many t i m e s , t h e r e i s so

l i t t l e space a t r a i l h e a d s t o s t o r e c a r g o , m a t e r i e l s i t s on

c a r s u n t i l t h e c o n g e s t i o n can be c l e a r e d . And t h e c a r s a r e .

effectively, l o s t t o t h e t r a n s p o r t system. Such was t h e case

i n September 1870, when t h e P r u s s i a n 2nd Army backlogged 2,322

27

railcars with 16,830 STONs of provisions on five spur lines.

Meanwhile, their troops were going hungry.=O

The misuse of railcars became acutely serious for the

Allies in France and Belgium in 1944. In one instance, 2,240

loaded cars were backlogged at one railhead.-i Ry the end

of April 1944, the allies had sent 12,000 more cars into

Germany than had been r e t ~ r n e d . The


~ ~ only

way to avoid

such misuses of railcars is the effective exercise of command

and control. Not only must senior leaders stress the

importance of returning railcars to the transportation system.

but they must also ensure sufficient MHE and/or stevedores

exist t o manhandle cargo.

Misuse of Hail Production and Maintenance Facilities

Using rail production and maintenance facilities for

purposes other than that for which they were originally

designed can have serious long-term consequences. England

used her rail plants to produce tanlcs during World War 1 1 , and

her engines and rolling stock: suffered accordingly. The

Germans, on the other hand, made proper use of their rallroad

assets. They reserved their rail production and maintenance

facilities for their intended purposes and were able to keep

their rolling stock operational until the end of the war.s3

To avoid the error of misusing rail and engine production

facilities requires setting proper logistical pr~oritiesand

28

recognizing the contributions railroads can make. We need %a

set those priorities now.

Host Nation Support

Even if we enhance our present military railroad

establishment, theater commanders will still have t o rely on

assistance from the host nation to run the railroads. Put it

is unlikely that our chain of command will rely entirely upon

local nationals for all management. TRS supervision wi 1 1 be

necessary t o ensure U.S. Army interesGs are protected.e4

Naturally, differences in priorities are going t o exist

between civilian and military agencies. Conflicting orders,

uncoordinated instructions and confusion will ultimately ensue

if there is no clearly dominant authority -- and that will

have to be the theater CINC, who is represented by the

TRS. Po
The Luzon military railroad in World War I 1 provides an

excellent example of how the military and civil authorities

interface and how the three phases of railroad operatlonc, as

specified in our doctrine, are put into practice.=' On

January 14, 1945, the 790th Railway Operating Company came

ashore and began Phase I level operations -- which is strictly

a military operation. Japanese destruction of track, engines

and rolling stock was severe, so the rehabilitation effort was

expected to be intense. In February and March, engines and


29

r o l l i n g s t o c k began a r r i v i n g from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . More

r a i l u n i t s were c a l l e d i n t o a s s i s t . Working c o n d i t i o n s were

n o t good. Steaming j u n g l e , disease, p o i s o n o u s snakes and

roaming bands of Japanese s o l d i e r s slowed p r o g r e s s . Military

s h o r t t o n s h a u l e d were 12,047 for F e b r u a r y and 43,645 for

March. Ton-miles c o n t i n u e d t o i n c r e a s e u n t i l J u l y 1945, when

r e p l e n i s h m e n t demands peaked due t o a s t a b i l i z i n g combat

s it ~ a t i o n . ~ ~

Because of increased s t a b i l i t y i n t h e area, limited

c i v i l i a n passenger and f r e i g h t t r a f f i c was accepted b e g i n n i n g

May 16, 1945. With c o m p l e t e ' c e s s a t i o n o f h o s t i l i t i e s on Luzan

i n August, a r a i l w a y o p e r a t i n g b a t t a l i o n and t h r e e companies

were o r d e r e d o f f the island i n preparation f o r t h e i n v a s i o n of

Japan. With t h e consequent r e d u c t i o n of Army r a i l r o a d i n g

capabilities, i t became i m m e d i a t e l y necessary t o s t a r t F'hase

I 1 operations -- j o i n t m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n r a i l r o a d

activity. The 6,674 F i l i p i n o s h i r e d by t h e end of August made

LIP far t h e l o s s of American r a i l p e r s o n n e l . I t was a s t e p .

t o w a r d a c c o m p l i s h i n g our l o n g - t e r m g o a l of turning the

r a i l r o a d s over t o i n d i g e n o u s b u s i n e s s companies w l t h minimal

m i l i t a r y supervision. That would c o n s t i t u t e Phase I 1 1

operations, which o c c u r r e d i n January 1946.-'

The phases o f r a i l r o a d o p e r a t i o n s a r e n o t always t h a t

c l e a r c u t and s i m p l e . For example, General Douglas MacArthur

had access t o ample m i l i t a r y r a i l u n i t s i n t h e Southwest

F ' a c i f l c t h e a t e r and, so, he d i d n o t have t o be concerned w i t h


--
-3l.I
Phases I 1 and 1 1 1 . That i s a l u x u r y which does n o t e x i s t a t

present. Depending on t h e t h e a t e r and tonnage requirements

involved, we may have t o go i m m e d i a t e l y t o Phase 1 1

operations. Army r a i l r o a d a s s e t s may be spread so t h i n t h a t

s u p e r v i s i o n of t h e c i v i l i a n s may be inadequate. These a r e b u t

a few o f t h e consequences o f our maintenance o f such a s m a l l

m i l i t a r y r a i l force.--

S e c t i o n Summary

The c h a l l e n g e s c o n f r o n t i n g a t h e a t e r commander a r e

numerous and comple:.:. R a i l r o a d r e l a t e d problems may n o t

c a p t u r e h i s immediate a t t e n t i o n , b u t even a competent s t a f f

cannot keep t h e t r a n s p o r t r e q u i r e m e n t s -- which a r e

p o t e n t i a l l y t h e most s e r i o u s o f t h e l o g i s t i c a l m a t t e r s --
under c o n t r o l u n l e s s p r o p e r r e s o u r c e s a r e p r o v i d e d i n

advance. S t a f f o f f i c e r s a r e g o i n g t o have t o worl: now a t

o b t a i n i n g t h e needed r a i l r o a d u n i t s so r a i l can be used t o i t =

fullest p o t e n t i a l when i t i s needed.

IV. Conclusion

The a p p l i c a t i o n s o f m i l i t a r y r a i l r o a d s a t t h e operational

l e v e l of war a r e numerous. T h l s mode of transportation

w a r r a n t s much more a t t e n t i o n and consideration t h a n i t IS

currently receiving. Operational commanders have a g r e a t d e a l

;1

t o g a i n f r o m i n c r e a s i n g t h e number o f U.S. Army r a i l u n i t s .

The advantages o f r a i l o u t w e i g h any l i k e l y c h a l l e n g e s which

m i g h t r e s u l t f r o m i t s use.

R a i l r o a d s a r e unequaled i n t h e i r a b i l i t y t o h a u l massive

numbers of men, p i e c e s of equipment and volume o f s u p p l i e s

w i t h i n a t h e a t e r o f operations. T h e i r g r e a t c a p a c i t y would be

p a r t i c u l a r l y v a l u a b l e i n h i g h i n t e n s i t y c o n f l i c t s which

consume l a r g e amounts of p e t r o l e u m and ammunition. A t t h e low

i n t e n s i t y end of t h e spectrum, r a i l can make s u b s t a n t i a l

c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o our f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n t h e f o r m of nation

building projects. Such p r o j e c t s can c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e

prevention or r e s o l u t i o n of i n s u r g e n c i e s and r e v o l u t i o n s .

The r a i l o p t i o n i s e f f i c i e n t i n i t s use o f f u e l and

manpower, compared t o o t h e r modes o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o n . During

wartime, g e t t i n g t h e most f r o m our l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s c o u l d

make t h e d i f f e r e n c e between v i c t o r y and d e f e a t . I n peacetime,

e f f o r t s t o i n c r e a s e t h e U.S. Army's wartime o p e r a t i n g

efficiencies a r e welcomed by our s e n i o r m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s and

elected o f f i c i a l s . I n c r e a s e d use o f r a i l r o a d s would e f f e c t

t h a t increased e f f i c i e n c y .

Any s k e p t i c i s m i n u s i n g r a i l w i l l have t o be overcome b v

demonstrated performance. Unbiased a n a l y s i s o f t h e p o t e n t i a l

c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f r a i l w i l l n o t be enough t o c o n v i n c e everyone

of i t s value. When m i l i t a r y r a i l r o a d e r s have t h e s u p p o r t o f

senior m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s , s u f f i c i e n t t o a l l o c a t e necessary
men, tools and equipment, rail's value in future conflicts

will be apparent enough.

Rut it will not be free. Engineer resources will need to

be allocated to keep the track, engines and rolling stock

working throughout the theater. Since, in any case, the

engineers will be required to maintain rights of way -- be

they rail, water or road -- efforts should be made where the

returns will be greatest. This means rail with its great

capacity.

Command and control challenges will have to be resolved.

Sufficient authority should be delegated to railroad

organizations to ensure the theater CINC's overall plan of

distribution and supply can be successfully executed. With

that authority should come a corresponding level of

responsibility. Poor performance and instances of gross

neglect, a s have occurred in the past, should not be

tolerated. CI clearly designated chain of command will help

prevent such incidents from happening again.

Differences in rail gauge exist in parts of the world

where the U.S. Army may be called upnn to flght. A long-term

solution to thls problem could be a construction program to

regauge track, but this 1s not feasible in a short war

scenario. Regaug~ng is not absolutely necessary. Steps can

be taken, such as rerouting trains or purchasing rolling stocl:

and locomotives wlth removable wheel and axle assemblies, to

minimize disruptions to rail operations. A5 a last resort,

33

t r a n s l o a d i n g o p e r a t i o n s between d i f f e r e n t t r a n s p o r t modes can

b e undertaken.

Self-inflicted wounds have o c c u r r e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e h i s t o r y

of modern w a r f a r e and m i l i t a r y r a i 1 has n o t been exempted.

The use o f r a i l c a r s as s t o r a g e c o n t a i n e r s i s one example and

t h i s can be stopped o n l y w i t h command emphasis. The misuse o f

r a i l p r o d u c t i o n and maintenance f a c i l i t i e s i n an overseas

theater i s a n o t h e r example. I t i s a c o m p l i c a t e d i s s u e due t o

t h e p r o b a b l e i n v o l v e m e n t by f o r e i g n p o l i t i c a l leaders. U.S.

m i l i t a r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s may n o t be g i v e n t o p p r i o r i t y i n

a l l o c a t i n g another n a t i o n ' s i n d u s t r i a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , and

t h i s c o u l d have n e g a t i v e e f f e c t s upon t h e conduct o f our

campaigns u n l e s s we have our own, organic, r a i l u n i t s and a l l

i t t a k e s t o s u p p o r t them.

C h a l l e n g e s can a r i s e w h i l e i m p l e m e n t i n g h o s t n a t i o n .

s u p p o r t agreements. Problems may o c c u r i n r e s o l v i n g conf 1i c t s

between our Army's d o c t r i n a l phases of r a i l o p e r a t i o n such as

a s s i g n i n g movement p r i o r i t i e s , when n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s a r e

competing, and even d e c i d i n g upon t h e maximum danger t o which

c i v i l i a n workers w i 11 b e exposed. S o l u t i o n s t o these issues

w i l l have t o be worked o u t on a case by case b a s i s a t t h e

time.

The e v o l u t i o n o f . t e c h n o l o g y c o n t i n u e s , b u t no new forms of

i n t r a t h e a t e r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n have been developed which compare

favorably with r a i l r o a d s a t the operational l e v e l of war.

S t r e n g t h s and weaknesses of d i f f e r e n t t r a n s p o r t modes need t o


:. 4
be examined and q u a n t i f i e d by t h e a t e r . Systemic comparisons

need t o be drawn so our l o g i s t i c a l e f f o r t s can be b e t t e r

f o c u s e d and d i r e c t e d . The a p p r o p r i a t e p l a c e f o r m i l i t a r y r a i l

must be i d e n t i f i e d and t h e necessary p e r s o n n e l and equipment

obtained. I t i s an i m p o r t a n t s t e p which we can t a k e now which

w i l l h e l p t o meet t h e p r e s s i n g demands t h a t a r e l i k e l y t o be

p l a c e d upon our l o g i s t i c a l s u p p o r t s t r u c t u r e in t h e f u t u r e .
ENDNOTES

ENDNOTES

' S t r a t e g y p r o v i d e s t h e ways, means and ends o f a c h i e v i n g


n a t i o n a l goals. War i s an e x t e n s i o n o f t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s
b y o t h e r means. Armed f o r c e i s o n l y one o f numerous o p t i o n s
a v a i l a b l e t o e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s i n p u r s u i t of n a t i o n a l g o a l s .
Economic and d i p l o m a t i c e f f o r t s a r e u s u a l l y exhausted b e f o r e
f o r c e i s resorted to. C a r l Von C l a u s e w i t z , On War (1984): pp. . .
87, 88; Department of t h e Army, F i e l d ~ a n u a l 100-5: O ~ e r a t i o n s
(1986): pp. 1, 9, 28, 29.

"The t a c t i c a l l e v e l o f war i s t h e one w i t h which


s o l d i e r s a r e most f a m i l i a r . T a c t i c s u s u a l l y concern
a c t i v i t i e s a t c o r p s l e v e l and below. That i s where
engagements and b a t t l e s a r e won and l o s t . ( F i e l d Manual 100-5
d e f i n e s engagements as " s m a l l c o n f l i c t s between opposing
maneuver f o r c e s " and b a t t l e s as " a s e r i e s of r e l a t e d
engagements".) T a c t i c s f o c u s on t h e immediate o r s h o r t - t e r m
d e f e a t of enemy f o r c e s . Department o f t h e Army, op. c i t . , p .
10.

=Ibid., pp. 10, 59, 60, 65.

"The t h r e e l e v e l s o f war -- s t r a t e g i c , o p e r a t i o n a l and


tactical -- a r e n o t d i s t i n c t and t e n d t o o v e r l a p . Situational
c r i t e r i a have a b e a r i n g o w w h a t l e v e l u n i t s and o r g a n i z a t i o n s
are operating. A t r a n s p o r t e r ' s j o b becomes more complex as he
focuses h i s e f f o r t s a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l as d i s t i n c t from
the tactical. I t i s i n h e r e n t l y d i f f i c u l t , from any
s t a n d p o i n t , l o g i s t i c a l l y , t o s u p p o r t s e q u e n t i a l o p e r a t i o n s and
l a r g e u n i t movements. L o g i s t i c i a n s must t h i n k b i g and be
p r e p a r e d t o move masslve amounts o f s u p p l i e s . Transport
o p t i o n s f o r each mode o f t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g r a i l ,
c o n t i n u e t o i n c r e a s e as one moves toward s t r a t e g i c p l a n n i n g ,
b u t so do t h e t r a n s p o r t r e q u i r e m e n t s . army r a i l r o a d i n g a s s e t s
a r e so l i m i t e d . However, i t i s l i k e l y t h e y w i l l be spread
t h i n a t any l e v e l t o which t h e y a r e a p p l i e d . B r a d l e y E.
Smith, "The H o l e o f Army R a l l r o a d l n g a t t h e T a c t i c a l L e v e l of
War" (1988) : pp. 2s - .7..-..
-

"Personal I n t e r v i e w w i t h Major Alexander J. Rase,

I n s t r u c t o r / A u t h o r , Department o f J o i n t and Combined

O p e r a t i o n s , Command and General S t a f f C o l l e g e , F o r t

Leavenworth, Kansas, January 12, 1989.

'Edward N. L ~ ~ t t w a l : :"The , O p e r a t i o n a l L e v e l of War",

I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c ~ u r i t y ( W i n t e r 198Cl - 1981): pp. 6 2 , 63.

7 0 p e r a t i o n a l a r t ought t o be o f g r e a t concern t o

p ' r o f e s s i o n a l o f f i c e r s , because t h i s i s where new ground i s

most l i k e l y t o be brohen. Senior m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s a r e

assigned strategic missions by their political masters, and --


rightly or wrongly -- d u e consideration is not always given t o
t h e soldier's point 04 view. Tactics a r e centered upon
specific techniques and often a r e chosen a s t h e result of an
opinion of t h e senior officer present. But operational art is
different. This level of war is wide open for creative
thinking and solutions on how t o link t h e strategic and
tactical spheres. New theory and approaches such a s
Blitzkrieq and AirLand Battle a r e examples of contributions t o
modern war fighting. Luttwak, op. cit., pp. 62, 63.

'Department of t h e Army, op. cit., p. 10.

"Peter S. Kindsvatter, "An Appreciation f o r Moving t h e

Heavy Corps: T h e First Step in Learning t h e Art of Operational

Maneuver" (1986): p. 26.

'ODepartment of t h e Army, The Transportation Corps


Railway Fleet (l96O): pp. 524, 525. Prior t o World War 1 1 ,
t h e condition of t h e Military Railway Service (MHS) was
significantly different than in 1945. Brigadier General J.J.
Kingman, Assistant Chief of Engineers, concluded in 1938 that
t h e "MRS had fallen t o less than nothing". This is t h e
position w e a r e finding ourselves in today. Carl R. Gray,
Jr., "The Military Railway Service -- Part I", Armv
Transuortation Journal (May - June 1948): p. 38.

"A short ton is a unit of weight equivalent t o 2,000

pounds. Random House Colleae Dictionary (1980):p. 1383.

%=Department of t h e Army, T h e Transuortation Corps

Railway Fleet (1960): p. 533.

'=Kevin C. Ruffner, "Yankee Boomers in Action", TRANSLOG

(March 1980): p . 5.

'-Smith, op. cit., p. 31.

'=United States Armv T r a n s ~ o r t a t i o n School.


Transuortation Master an -- coordination raft (1987): p.
9-7.

'&Lewis I. Jeffries, "The Importance of Military

Railways in Future Conflicts" (1975): p. 9.

17C.J. Schwendiger, "Is T h i s t h e End of the Line for


TRS? Can t h e Nation Afford It?", Defense Transportation
Journal (December 1976): p. 15.

'="The Transportation Railway Service (TRS) is t h e

overall organization of railway units assigned or attached t o

a major transportation organization in t h e theater army,

u s u a l l y a t r a n s p o r t a t i o n command. The t r a n s p o r t a t i o n commana


c o u l d i n c l u d e groups ( b r i g a d e s i f r e q u i r e d ),battalions,
companies and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n teams." Department of t h e Armv,
F i e l d Manual 55-20: Armv R a i l T r a n s p o r t U n i t s and O o e r a t i o n s
(1986): p. 1-6. ,. ,

=ODepartment o f t h e Army, F i e l d Manual 55-10: Movement


C o n t r o l i n a T h e a t e r o f O p e r a t i o n s (1986): pp. 2-1, 2-"L .

='Department of t h e Army, F i e l d Manual 100-10: Combat


S e r v i c e Support (1988): pp. 9-10, 9-11.

==United S t a t e s Army T r a n s p o r t a t i o n S c h o o l , loc. cit.

"SDepartment o f t h e Army, F i e l d Manual 71-100: Division


Ooerations --
F ' r e l i m i n a r v D r a f t (1987): p. 3-22.

34Department o f t h e Army, F i e l d Manual 100-10: Combat


S e r v i c e Support (1988): p. 9-13.

=-Smith, op. cit., pp. 19 - 22.

"'J.W. H i g g i n s , M i l i t a r y Movements and Supply L l n e s as


Comparative I n t e r d i c t i o n T a r g e t s ( 1 9 7 0 ) : p. V.

=-Ibid., pp. 11, 12.

'9Association o f American R a i l r o a d s , U n i t e d S t a t e s
Department of T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and U n i t e d S t a t e s I n t e r s t a t e
Commerce Commission, G u i d e l i n e s f o r t h e R a i l r o a d I n d u s t r y i n a
N a t i o n a l Emergency (1974) : p. 2.

=OLewis I. J e f f r i e s , "U.S. Railroads --


A Military
A s s e t " ( 1 9 8 5 ) : p. 8; James A. Van F l e e t , R a i l T r a n s ~ o r tanG
t h e Winning o f Wars ( 1 9 5 6 ) : p. 59.

='Since t h e end of World War 11, t h e g r o w t h of


containerization and i n f e r m o d a l i s m i n t h e c l v i l i a n
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n i n d u s t r y has made p o s s l b l e t h e more e f f i c i e n t
movement of l a r g e amounts o f cargo. Some of t h e s e techniques
have m i l i t a r y application. T r a i l e r s on f l a t c a r s (TOFCs) and
containers on f l a t c a r s (COFCs) facilitate t h e i n t e r f a c e
between hlghway and r a i l a s s e t s o f a t h e a t e r commander.
C o n t a i n e r s can be d o u b l e staci:ed on f l a t c a r s t o i n c r e a s e t h e
amount and t y p e of goods a f l a t c a r can h a u l . T h l s has an
added b e n e f l t of speeding t h e c l e a r a n c e of r a i l y a r d s i n a
h o s t i l e environment. Truci:. t r a l l e r s can a l s o be f i t t e d w l t h
" h i - r a i l e r " r o a d wheels which p e r m i t chassis and b o g i e s t o be
pulled over t h e t r a c k s by rail locomotives. Telephone

Interview with Mr. Anthony T. Newfell, Railroad Equipment

Specialist, Transportation Systems Center, United States

Department of Transportation, Cambridge, Massachusetts,

January 12, 1989.

s=Defense Intelligence Agency, Railroad Capacity


Methodoloav (Unclassified) (1983): pp. vii - 15.

3sJeffries, op. cit., p. 2.

=.Telephone Interview with Major Robert W. McGuire, Jr. ,


Executive Officer, 1205th Railway Services Unit, Middletown,
Connecticut, October 31, 1988.

=-Dennis E. Showal ter, Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers,


Technoloqv and t h e Unification of Germanv (1975): p. 21.

s4Van Fleet, op. cit., p. 60.

='P.M. Kalla-Bishop, Future Railways: An Adventure in

Enaineerinq (1972): p. 3.

sgVan Fleet, op. cit., p. 62.

a-Jeffries, op. cit., p. 3; United States Army

Transportation School, op. cit., p. 6-7.

40Smith, op. cit., pp. 19 - 22.


**Denis Bishop and W. J.K. Davies, Railways and War Since

1917 (1974): p. 107.

4=Bradley E. Smi t h , "The United States International


Maritime Industry: Challenges t o Sustaining t h e Force" (1988):
pp. 15 - 18, 46 - 50.

-T.Jnited States Army War College, Army Command and


Manaaement: Theorv and Practice (1988): pp. 10-14, 10-15.

44Bishop and Davies, op. cit., p. 2.

enBradley E. Smith, "The Role of Army Railroading at t h e


Tactical Level of War" (1988): pp. 8 - 22.

.&Low intensity conflict is defined a s "a limited


politico-mi 1 itary struggle t o achieve pal itical , social,
economic or psychological objectives. It is often protracted
and ranges from diplomatic, economic and psychosocial
pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low intensity
conflict is generally confined t o a geographic area and is
often characterized by constraints an t h e weaponry, tactics
and the 1.evel of violence. Also called LIC. " Department of
Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1: Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms (1987): pp. 214, 215.

*'Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-10: Combat


Service Support (1988):p. 9-13.

405howalter, op. cit., pp. 20 - 22.


-*Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War
(1985): p. 122.

'=Smith, op. cit., pp. 8 - 1 1 , 29 - 33, 35 - 40.

a"Strachan, loc. cit.


'"Smith, op. cit., pp. 8 - 19.
'JCarl R . Gray, Jr., "The Military Railway Service --
Part 11", Armv ~r&sportation ~ o u r n a l(July - A u g u s t 1948),: p .
44.

'*Smith, op. cit., pp. 29 - 33.

UPChristopher R . Gabel, "The Lorraine Campaign: An


Overview, September - December 1944" (1985): p. 22.

'&Smith, op. cit., p. 30.

-'Gray, loc. cit.


''Smith, op. cit., pp. 15, 16.

o*Strachan, loc. cit.

COMichael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: The German


Invasion of France. 1870 - 1871 (1981): pp. 412 - 416.

&%Strachan, loc. cit.

L W o w a r d , op. cit., pp. 26, 70, 414; Strachan, loc. cit.

LJCarl R . Gray, Jr., "The Military Railway Service --


Part I " , Armv Transportation Journal (May - June 1948): p . 19.

*-Ibid.
LaBruce Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army (1951): pp. 6 - 8.

&*Strachan, loc. cit.


.'Carl R. Gray, J r . , "The M i l i t a r y R a i l w a y S e r v i c e --
-
P a r t 11", Army T r a n s p o r t a t i o n J o u r n a l ( J u l y August 1948): p.
44.

&-Denis Bishop and W. J.K. Davies, R a i l w a y s and War S i n c e


1917 (1974): p. 89.

&'Department o f t h e Army, F i e l d Manual 55-15:


T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Reference Data (1963): pp. 136, 137; James A.
Van F l e e t , R a i l T r a n s p o r t and t h e Winnina of Wars (1956): p.
50.

'OStrachan, loc. cit.

'%"The f o u r main components o f a f r e i g h t c a r a r e t h e


deck, underframe, t r u c k and c o u p l e r . The deck i s t h e s u r f a c e
t h a t t h e l o a d r e s t s on. The deck o r f l o o r i s u s u a l l y s t e e l o r
wood. The underframe i s t h a t s t r u c t u r e under t h e deck t h a t
supports t h e weight o f t h e load. The t r u c k i s t h a t assembly
which c o n t a i n s a c a r ' s wheels, a x l e s , j o u r n a l s , sctspension
system and b r a k e system. The c o u p l e r i s a d e v i c e which
connects o r c o u p l e s a c a r w i t h another c a r . " Department of
t h e Army, F i e l d Manual 59-20: A r m y R a i l T r a n s p o r t U n i t s and
O p e r a t i o n s (1986): p. 8-14.

7=Personal I n t e r v i e w w i t h Colonel Lewis I. Jef f r i e s ,


D i r e c t o r of Academic Operations, Command and General S t a f f
C o l l e g e , F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas, J u l y 8 , 1988.

'=Van Fleet, loc. cit.

7'Archibald P. Wavell, The P a l e s t i n e Campaiqns ( 1 9 2 9 ) :


pp. 12, 16.

'.William P. Addison, " R a i l Movements: O f f i c e o f t h e


Chief of T r a n s p o r t a t i o n --
French N o r t h A f r i c a , November 1942
t o December 1945" (1946): pp. 64, 65.

"Bishop and Davies, op. c i t . , pp. 93, 94; Department o f


t h e Army, F i e l d Manual 55-15: T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Reference Data
(196.1): p. 136.

"Bishop and Davies, op. cit., p. -


L.

7'Ron Z i e l , S t e e l R a i l s t o V i c t o r y : A Photoqraphlc
H i s t o r y of Railway O p e r a t i o n s D u r i n q World War I 1 ( l W O ) : p.
49. M a r t i n Van C r e v e l d has w r i t t e n , "Among t h e f a c t o r s t h a t
p r e v e n t e d t h e Germans from e n t e r i n g Moscow, g e n e r a l mud (which
p r a c t i c a l l y stopped a l l wheeled v e h i c l e s ) i s u s u a l l y
....
c o n s i d e r e d t h e most i m p o r t a n t D u r i n g October, s u p p l i e s of
f u e l were almost nonexistent....Had politico-military-economic
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a l l o w e d Germany t o a t t e m p t t h e conquest of
Russia i n a s l o w and m e t h o d i c a l manner, more r e l i a n c e c o u l d
have been p l a c e d on t h e r a i l w a y s " . M a r t i n Van C r e v e l d ,
L o o i s t i c s From W a l l e n s t e i n t o P a t t o n ( 1 9 8 4 ) : pp. 176, 177.

O'Van Fleet, op. cit., pp. 17, 20, 28.

m=James A . Huston, Army H i s t o r i c a l S e r i e s : ' The Sinews o f


War -- Army L o q i s t i c s . 1775 - 1953 ( 1 9 6 6 ) : pp. 535, 536.
Another example o f m i s u s i n g r a i l c a r s o c c u r r e d i n I r a n d u r i n g
World War 11. " F a i l u r e o f t h e Russians t o u n l o a d c a r s of
Lend-Lease s u p p l i e s f o r w a r d e d t o them o v e r t h e I r a n i a n
r a i l r o a d system f r o m t h e P e r s i a n G u l f caused s u b s t a n t i a l
r e d u c t i o n i n t r a f f i c c a p a c i t y of t h e l i n e . Once t h e s i t u a t i o n
g o t so d e s p e r a t e t h a t a l l c a r s were on t h e n o r t h end of t h e
l i n e under l o a d . T h e r e f o r e , an embargo was e s t a b l i s h e d from 8
August t o 13 August 1943, d u r i n g which p e r i o d no f r e i g h t was
p u t aboard c a r s n o r moved o u t o f t h e s o u t h e r n p o r t s u n t i l t h e
s i t u a t i o n was improved. To i l l u s t r a t e t h e e f f e c t of t h e
c o n g e s t i o n , i t was t a k i n g t a n k c a r s 30 days t o move from t h e
P e r s i a n Gulf t o t h e Caspian Sea and r e t u r n , which was t w i c e
t h e necessary t i m e . W h i l e such c o n d i t i o n s l a s t e d , t h e
c a r r y i n g c a p a c i t y o f t h e t a n k - c a r f l e e t was h a l v e d , of c o u r s e
by t h e Russian f a i l u r e t o u n l o a d . " Van F l e e t , op. c i t . , p.
20.

-=Bishop and Davies, op. cit., p. 3.

m4Smith, op. cit., pp. 33, 34.

waDepartment o f t h e Army, The T r a n S ~ o r t a t i ~Corps


n
R a i l w a y F l e e t ( 1 9 6 0 ) : p. 510.

ecDepartment o f t h e Army, F i e l d Manual 55-20: Army R a i l


T r a n s p o r t U n i t s and O p e r a t i o n s ( 1 9 8 6 ) : p. 1-2: Smith, l o c .
cit.

m7S. K i p F a r r i n g t o n , Jr., R a i l r o a d i n q From t h e Hear End

( 1 9 4 6 ) : pp. 370 -
372.

O m F a r r i n g t o n , op. cit., pp. 372 - 375.

m9Smith, l a c . cit.
APF'ENDIXES

Appendix A

Tonnage C a p a c i t i e s o f I n t r a t h e a t e r
T r a n s p o r t i o n Assets

Payload c a p a c i t i e s f o r motor and a i r t r a n s p o r t were

S t a f f O f f i c e r s ' F i e l d Manual -- O r q a n i z a t i o n a l .
e x t r a c t e d f r o m Deoartment o f t h e Army F i e l d Manual 101-10-1/2:
T e c h n i c a l and
L o a i s t i c a l Data P l a n n i n g F a c t o r s (Volume 2 ) ( 1 9 8 7 ) : pp. 3-5,
3-6, 3-11, 3-12, 3-19, 3-21. Payload c a p a c i t i e s f o r r a i l
t r a n s p o r t were e x t r a c t e d from Department o f t h e Armv F i e l d
Manual 55-20: Army R a i l T r a n s p o r t O p e r a t i o n s f 1969) : pp. C-2,
C-3 and a Telephone I n t e r v i e w w i t h M r . Thomas M. Hatchard,
D i r e c t o r , S a f e t y and O p e r a t i n g R u l e s , A s s o c i a t i o n of American
R a i l r o a d s , Washington, D.C., A p r i l 14, 1989. Sample
capacities f o r d i f f e r e n t types of trucks, helicopters, A i r
F o r c e t r a n s p o r t s and r a i l c a r s a r e p r o v i d e d . L i s t i n g s are not
i n t e n d e d t o be comolete f o r a l l i t e m s i n t h e Army and A i r
Force i n v e n t o r i e s .

Motor T r a n s p o r t

Truck, u t i l i t y , t a c t i c a l , Z / 4 t o n (CUCV M1009)


Truck, u t i l , cgo, t r o o p c a r r , 5 / 4 t o n (HMMWV M998)
T r u c k , cargo, t a c t i c a l , 5 / 4 t o n (CUCV M1008)
Truck, cargo, LWH, t a c t i c a l , 5 t o n (M939)
Truck, t r a c t o r , t a c t i c a l , 5 t o n (M931)
Truck, t r a c t o r , l i n e h a u l (M'715)
Truck, t r a c t o r , l i n e h a u l , 20 t o n (M916)
S e m i t r a i l e r , low bed, 15 t o n (M172)

S e m i t r a i l e r , f l a t b e d , break b u l k c o n t a i n e r (M872)

S e m i t r a i l e r , t r u c k t r a n s p o r t e r , 50 t o n (M15A2)

S e m i t r a i l e r , low bed, 60 t o n (M747)

A i r Transport

He1 i c o p t e r, OH-6A
H e l i c o p t e r , OH-58C
He1 i c o p t e r , UH-60
He1ic o p t e r , AH-64
H e l i c o p t e r , CH-54A
H e l i c o p t e r , CH-54H
He1 ic o p t e r , CH-47C
He1 ic o p t e r , CH-47D
A i r Force Transport, C-130E/H
A i r Force Transport, C-141H
Appendix A, continued

Rai 1 T r a n s p o r t

Type o f Car

Rox, 40 ton,, f o r e i g n s e r v i c e
Gondola, 40 t o n , l o w s i d e , f o r e i g n s e r v i c e
Fox, 50 t o n , domestic s e r v i c e
Tank, 10000 g a l l o n , domestic s e r v i c e
Tank, 16000 g a l l o n , E ~ ~ r o p e asne r v i c e
F l a t , 70 t o n , depressed c e n t e r , f o r e i g n s e r v i c e
F l a t , 70 t o n , domestic s e r v i c e
F l a t , 80 t o n , f o r e i g n s e r v i c e
F l a t , SSym, European s e r v i c e
F l a t , FFlm, European s e r v i c e
F l a t , 100 t o n , domestic s e r v i c e
F l a t , 140 t o n , domestic s e r v i c e
F l a t , 150 t o n , domestic s e r v i c e
F l a t , 2 0 0 t o n , domestic s e r v i c e
F l a t , 250 t o n , depressed c e n t e r , domestic s e r v i c e
F l a t , 250 t o n , span b o l s t e r , domestic s e r v i c e
F l a t , 250 t o n , w e l l h o l e , domestic s e r v i c e
F l a t , 290 t o n , s t e e l l o a d i n g deck, domestic s e r v i c e
F l a t , 300 t o n , span b o l s t e r , domestic s e r v i c e
F l a t , 350 t o n , span b o l s t e r , domestic s e r v i c e
Appendix B

C o u n t r i e s W i t h S t a n d a r d Gauge T r a c k

The i n f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d b e l o w was p r o v i d e d i n Department


o f t h e Army F i e l d Manual 5-35: E n a i n e e r s ' R e f e r e n c e and
L o q i s t i c a l D a t a ( 1 9 6 0 ) : pp. 100 - 106 and Department of t h e
Army F i e l d Manual 55-15: T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Reference Data (1963):
pp. 133 - 138. The c o u n t r i e s l i s t e d b e l o w h a v e s t a n d a r d gauge
track. Some o f them have more t h a n one gauge and a r e
confronted w i t h t h e ensuing t r a n s l o a d challenges.

Africa: Algeria C e n t r a l America


Egypt and West I n d i e s : Cuba
Ma1i Jamaica
Mauritania Trinidad
Morocco
Niger
Senegal Europe: Albania
Tunisia Austria
Upper V o l t a Belgium
Bulgaria
Czechos1ovaL:ia
Asia: Afghanistan Denrnar k
China France
Indonesia Germany
Iran Greece
Iraq Hungary
Israel Italy
Japan Latvia
Korea Lithuania
Lebanon Luxembourg
Saudi A r a b i a N e t h e r 1 and=
Syria Norway
P o l and
Ruman ia
Sweden
N o r t h America: Canada Switzerland
C o n t i n e n t a l U. S. T u r ke./
MP:.:~ c o U n i t e d t:':ingdam
A1 aska Yugoslavia

S o u t h Ameri ca: Argentina F'aci f i c Ocean: Au-,tral i a


Chile Hawaii
Guyana
Paraguay
F'eru
Uruguay
Venezuela
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ATTN: Mrs. N i c e ( L i b r a r y )
C a r l i s l e B a r r a c k s , P e n n s y l v a n i a 17013

C i v i 1ian Personnel

M r . Thomas J. Edwards
U.S. Army L o g i s t i c s Center
ATTN: ATCL-E
F o r t Lee, V i r g i n i a 238ill-bC)~:10

M r . George R. H a r t
U.S. Army T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Center and F o r t E u s t i s
O f f i c e o f t h e School S e c r e t a r y
ATTN: ATSF'D-SE
F o r t E u s t l s , V i r g i n i a 23604-5?61
Mr. Thomas M. Hatchard
Director
S a f e t y and O p e r a t i n g Rules
A s s o c i a t i o n o f American R a i l r o a d s
50 F S t r e e t , N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20001

M r . James McGee
U.S. Army T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Center and F o r t E u s t i s
ATTN: TMD-DPD-DAC-T (Rail Section)
F o r t E u s t i s, V i r g i n i a 23604-5408

Dr. A l f r e d C. M i e r z e j e w s k i
Command H i s t o r i a n
TEXCOM
F o r t Hood, Tesaa 76544-5065

M r . Anthony T. N e w f e l l
Department o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n
T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Systems Center
ATTN: OPS-73
55 Broadway
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142

M r . James R o b e r t s

M i l i t a r y T r a f f i c Management Command

ATTN: I n t e r n a t i o n a l T r a f f i c

5611 Columbia P i k e

F a l l s Church, V i r g i n i a 22041-505CI

M r . Mike R u f f u s
U.S. Army Troop Support Command

ATTN: AMSTR-WC

4J00 Goad F e l l o w H l v d

S a i n t L o u i s . Missoclri 6.713:)-1798

M r . Elmer Voegel i

171st Movement C o n t r o l Detachment

Harstow Marine Corps L o g i s t i c s Base

Yermo, C a l i f o r n i a 9231 1

M i 1it a r v Personnel

Major General James T. C r a i g


Commander
143rd T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Command
2800 Dowden S t r e e t
Orlando, F l o r i d a 32827-5299

C o l o n e l Leonard D. H o l d e r Jr. ,
Director
School o f Advanced M i 1 it a r y S t u d i e s
F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

C o l o n e l L e w i s I. J e f f r i e s
D i r e c t o r o f Academic O p e r a t i o n s
U.S. Army Command and General S t a f f C o l l e g e
F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l C h a r l e s D. Daves
School o f Advanced M i 1it a r y S t u d i e s
F o r t Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l W i 11iam H. Janes
School o f Advanced M i l i t a r y S t u d i e s
F o r t Leavenworth. Kansas 66027

L i e u t e n a n t C o l o n e l M i c h a e l J. Swart
143rd T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Command
ATTN: AFKD-ACC-A-MVT
2800 Dowden S t r e e t
Orlando, F l o r i d a 32827-5299

Major Vaughn H a r n e t t
J o i n t S t r a t e g i c Deployment T r a i n i n g Center
U.S. Army T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Center and F o r t E u s t i s
Fort Eustis, V i r g i n i a 2 3 0 4

Major John W. H a r r i s
143rd T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Command
ATTN: F u l l - T i m e Manning S t a f f
2800 Dowden S t r e e t
Orlando. F l o r i d a 32827-5299
Major R o b e r t W. McGuire
1205th Rai lway S e r v i c e s U n i t
N i l e Lane
M i d d l etown , C o n n e c t i c u t 06457

Major James E. Myers


U.S. Army L o g i s t i c s Center
ATTN: QTCL-E
F o r t Lee, V i r g i n i a 23801-60(:)0

Major Anthony R. P e t r u z z i
U.S. Army L o g i s t i c s Center
ATTN: ATCL-E
F o r t Lee, V i r g i n i a 23801-bO00

Major J e f f r e y M. Schroeder
757th T r a n s p o r t a t i o n B a t t a l i o n
6610 West G r e e n f i e l d Avenue
West A l l i s , Wisconsin 55214

C a p t a i n Dianne D. N c I n t y r e
U.S. Army L o g i s t i c s Center
ATTN: ATCL-E
F o r t Lee, V i r g in ia 2380 1-6000

C a p t a i n John R. Murphy
416th Railway B a t t a l i o n
3 1 Pecan S t r e e t
J a c k s o n v i l l e . F l o r i d a 32211-8719

C a p t a i n Horam Simpkins
U.S. Army L o g i s t i c s Center
ATTN: ATCL-E
F o r t Lee, V i r g i n i a 23801-6000

F i r s t L i e u t e n a n t Mark A. Smith
171st Movement C o n t r o l Detachment
Barstow M a r i n e Corps L o g i s t i c s Base
Yermo, C a l i f o r n i a 97311