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G.R. No.

L-5180 August 31, 1953

CONSEJO INFANTE, petitioner,


This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of appeals affirming the judgement of the court of origin which o

Consejo Infante, defendant herein, was the owner of two parcels of land, together with a house built thereon, situated
mentioned property for a price of P30,000 subject to the condition that the purchaser would assume the mortgage ex
Plaintiffs found one Pio S. Noche who was willing to buy the property under the terms agreed upon with defendant, b
authority she had given them was already can-celled. However, on December 20, 1948, defendant dealt directly with

Defendant admitted having contracted the services of the plaintiffs to sell her property as set forth in the complaint, b
that while plaintiffs took steps to sell her property as agreed upon, they sold the property at Taft Avenue to another pa

The lower court found that the preponderance of evidence was in favor of the plaintiffs and rendered judgement sente

There is no dispute that respondents were authorized by petitioner to sell her property for the sum of P30,000 with th
November 30, 1948 when, by the voluntary act of respondents, they executed a document stating that said authority
therefore, was not in duty bound to pay them any commission for the transaction..

If the facts were as claimed by petitioner, there is in-deed no doubt that she would have no obligation to pay respond
an agent at will. (Article 1733.) But this fact is disputed. Thus, respondents claim that while they agreed to cancel the
upon. True, this verbal assurance does not appear in the written cancellation, Exhibit 1, and, on the other hand, it is d

The plea that oral evidence should not have been allowed to prove the alleged verbal assurance is well taken it appe
considered as containing all those terms, and, therefore, there can be, between parties and their successors in intere
writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in i
that has been put in issue by respondents in their complaint. The terms of the document, Exhibit 1, seem to be clear

But even disregarding the oral evidence adduced by respondents in contravention of the parole evidence rule, we are
agreed upon. It is a fact found by the Court of Appeals that after petitioner had given the written authority to responde
brought to the knowledge of petitioner. But the latter, perhaps by way of strategem, advised respondents that she wa

That petitioner had changed her mind even if respondents had found a buyer who was willing to close the deal, is a m
the benevolence of the other and acts in a manner that would promote his own selfish interest. This act is unfair as w
took advantage of the services rendered by respondents, but believing that she could evade payment of their commis
commission agreed upon.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. L-28050 March 13, 1928

FEDERICO VALERA, plaintiff-appellant,

MIGUEL VELASCO, defendant-appellee.

This is an appeal taken by Federico Valera from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing his c

In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged as committed by the trial court in its judgment, to
and the execution of the judgment obtained by the agent against his principal is but renunciation of the powers confe
Miguel Velasco inasmuch as the right redemption was exercised by neither Eduardo Hernandez nor the plaintiff Fede
annulling the sale made by the sheriff at public auction to defendant Miguel Velasco, Exhibit K; (6) the lower court err
repurchase the land in question to Salvador Vallejo; (8) the lower court erred in not declaring Exhibit M null and void,
the lower court erred in not awarding plaintiff the P5,000 damages prayed for.

The pertinent facts necessary for the solution of the questions raised by the above quoted assignments of error are c

By virtue of the powers of attorney, Exhibits X and Z, executed by the plaintiff on April 11, 1919, and o
Street, City of Manila.

The defendant accepted both powers of attorney, managed plaintiff's property, reported his operation
P3,058.33 in favor of the plaintiff.

The liquidation of accounts revealed that the plaintiff owed the defendant P1,100, and as misundersta
the sheriff levied upon the plaintiff's right of usufruct, sold it at public auction and adjudicated it to the

Subsequently, on May 11, 1923, the plaintiff sold his right of redemption to one Eduardo Hernandez,

After the plaintiff had recovered his right of redemption, one Salvador Vallejo, who had an execution u
adjudicated to him. Later, he transferred said right of redemption to the defendant Velasco. This is ho

As the first two assignments of error are very closely related to each other, we will consider them jointly.

Article 1732 of the Civil Code reads as follows:

Art. 1732. Agency is terminated:

1. By revocation;

2. By the withdrawal of the agent;

3. By the death, interdiction, bankruptcy, or insolvency of the principal or of the agent.

And article 1736 of the same Code provides that:

Art. 1736. An agent may withdraw from the agency by giving notice to the principal. Should the latter s
to himself.

In the case of De la Peña vs. Hidalgo (16 Phil., 450), this court said laid down the following rule:

and abandons the property, turns it over to a third party, renders accounts of its revenues up to the da
termination of his trust, and, without stating when he may return to take charge of the administration o
and just to conclude that the said agent had expressly and definitely renounced his agency and that s
words, were undoubtedly so understood and accepted by the principal, because of the lapse of nearly

The misunderstanding between the plaintiff and the defendant over the payment of the balance of P1,000 due the lat
said defendant brought suit against the said principal on March 28, 1928 for the payment of said balance, more than
representing a person who has adopted such an antagonistic attitude towards him. When the agent filed a complaint
Miguel Velasco renounced the agency; because his act was more expressive than words and could not have caused

Briefly, then, the fact that an agent institutes an action against his principal for the recovery of the balance in his favor
juridical relation between them.

If, as we have found, the defendant-appellee Miguel Velasco, in adopting a hostile attitude towards his principal, suin
principal's right of usufruct at public auction held by virtue of an execution issued upon the judgment rendered in favo

In regard to the third assignment of error, it is deemed unnecessary to discuss the validity of the sale made by Federi
Federico Valera; and the same thing is true as to the validity of the resale of the same right of redemption made by E
nor Eduardo Hernandez exercised his right of redemption within the legal period, the purchaser's title became absolu

Moreover, the defendant-appellee, Miguel Velasco, having acquired Federico Valera's right of redemption from Salva

And even supposing that Eduardo Hernandez had been tricked by Miguel Velasco into selling Federico Valera's right
third party claim when the right was levied upon for the execution of the judgment obtained by Vallejo against Federic
the reason that the one-year period of redemption has already elapsed.

Neither did the trial court err in not ordering Miguel Velasco to render a liquidation of accounts from March 31, 1923,
considering them as part of the redemption price; but not having exercised the right repurchase during the legal perio

Summarizing, the conclusion is reached that the disagreements between an agent and his principal with respect to th
relations, and the complaint is equivalent to an express renunciation of the agency, and is more expressive than if the

By virtue of the foregoing, and finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its p

G.R. No. L-11415 May 25, 1959

MANUEL BUASON and LOLITA M. REYES, plaintiffs-appellants,

MARIANO PANUYAS, defendant-appellee,

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dismissing an action brought by the sp
declaration that the sale in their favor is valid, recovery of possession of the parcel of land described in the complaint

In their lifetime the spouses Buenaventura Dayao and Eugenia Vega acquired by homestead patent a parcel of land
executed a power of attorney authorizing Eustaquio Bayuga to engage the services of an attorney to prosecute their
the sale to deduct whatever expenses he had incurred in the litigation (Exhibit B). On 14 March 1934 Buenaventura D
the parcel of land to the appellants, the spouses Manuel Buason and Lolita M. Reyes (Exhibit A). Their mother Eugen
of the same parcel of land to the spouses Mariano Panuyas (appellee herein) and Sotera B. Cruz (Exhibit D). Eustaq

The appellants and the appellee claim ownership to the same parcel of land. In their complaint the appellants prayed
favor and of his wife (Exhibit D) be declared null and void and that transfer certificate of title No. 8419 issued in their n
damages and attorney's fees in the sum of P9,600; and that he ordered to pay the costs of the suit. The appellees aff
action; that the claim on which their action is based is unenforceable under the statute of frauds; and that the appella
ordered to pay him the sums of P5,000 as actual damages and P10,000 as moral damages.

After trial on 20 August 1956 the Court rendered judgment holding that the appellants' action is barred by the statute

It appears that the appellants did not register the sale of 12.8413 hectares of the parcel of land in question executed
authorizing Eustaquio Bayuga to sell the parcel of land (Exhibit B) was annotated or inscribed on the back of the origi
power of attorney was annotated or inscribed on the back of the same original certificate of title (Exhibit C) as Entry N
registered owners and of the authority conferred by them upon the agent also recorded on the back of the certificate

As to the appellants' contention that, as the death of the principal on 14 March 1934 ended the authority of the agent,
principal's demise, and for that reason article 1738, old Civil code or 1931, new Civil Code, which provides:

Anything done by the agent, without knowledge of the death of the principal or of any other cause which extinguishes

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.