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MOTION TO QUASH

1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
AQUILINO ANDRADE, ROMAN LACAP, YONG FUNG YUEN, RICKY YU, VICENTE
SY, ALVIN SO, ROMUALDO MIRANDA, SINDAO MELIBAS, SATURNINO
LIWANAG, ROBERTO MEDINA and RAMON NAVARRO,Respondents.

FACTS: Pursuant to the instructions of then Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Dionisio R.
Santiago, on June 30, 2003, a random drug test was conducted in the National Bilibid Prison
(NBP) wherein the urine samples of thirty-eight (38) inmates were collected and subjected to
drug testing by the Chief Medical Technologist and Assistant Medical Technologist of the Alpha
Polytechnic Laboratory in Quezon City, and out of that number, twenty-one (21) urine samples
tested positive. Necessarily, the twenty-one (21) inmates were charged with violation of Section
15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165).

All respondents pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged during their arraignment on June 29,
2006. Thereafter, the case was set for pre-trial and trial on August 11, 2006.

On August 29, 2006 (after arraignment), respondents filed a Consolidated Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a violation of Section 15,
RA 9165.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa, before the scheduled hearing date for pre-trial
and trial, issued an Order9 granting respondents' Consolidated Motion to Dismiss.

The CA, in its Decision dated May 29, 2008, affirmed the trial court's Order.

ISSUE: WON the filing of Motion to Quash is barred after arraignment.

HELD: No. The ground relied upon by respondents in their "Motion to Dismiss," which is, that
the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute an offense, is actually one of the grounds
provided under a Motion to Quash in Section 3 (a),14 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

It must be emphasized that respondents herein filed their Motion after they have been
arraigned. Under ordinary circumstances, such motion may no longer be allowed after
arraignment because their failure to raise any ground of a motion to quash before they plead is
deemed a waiver of any of their objections. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 9. Failure to Move to Quash or to Allege Any Ground Therefor. - The failure of the accused
to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information,
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall
be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in
paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.

However, since the ground asserted by respondents is one of the exceptions provided under the
above-provision, the timeliness of the filing is inconsequential.
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___________________
2. GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS (AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MALOLOS BULACAN, BR. VII), HON. ERANIO G.
CEDILLO, SR., (AS PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF
MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, BR.1) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

FACTS: The mauling incident involving neighbors end up with filing of criminal case in the
MTC for frustrated homicide and less serious physical injuries. Petitioners moved for the
reconsideration of the joint resolution, arguing that the complainants had not presented proof of
their having been given medical attention lasting 10 days or longer, thereby rendering their
charges of less serious physical injuries dismissible; and that the two cases for less serious
physical injuries, being necessarily related to the case of frustrated homicide still pending in the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, should not be governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure. The MTC denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration because the grounds of
the motion had already been discussed and passed upon in the resolution sought to be
reconsidered; and because the cases were governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, which
prohibited the motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the petitioners presented a manifestation
with motion to quash and a motion for the deferment of the arraignment. The MTC denied the
motion to quash, and ruled that the cases for less serious physical injuries were covered by the
rules on ordinary procedure; and reiterated the arraignment previously scheduled.

Unsatisfied, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari assailing the order of
the MTC in the RTC. RTC Judge Manalastas dismissed the petition for certiorari. The
petitioners moved for the reconsideration, but the RTC denied their motion.

The petitioners next went to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the
orders issued by the RTC, averring grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. They urged the dismissal of the criminal cases on the same grounds they advanced
in the RTC. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition for being the wrong
remedy.

ISSUE 1: Is it proper to invoke a motion to quash the information filed in the MTC in this case?

HELD 1: NO.

[T]he motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his plea, challenges the
complaint or information for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects apparent on
its face. Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the quashal of the
complaint or information, as follows: (a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) the
court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the court trying the case
has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) the officer who filed the information had
no authority to do so; (e) the complaint or information does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form; (f) more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law; (g) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) the complaint or information contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification; and (i) the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.
In the context of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the complaints sufficiently charged
the petitioners with less serious physical injuries. Indeed, the complaints only needed to aver the
ultimate facts constituting the offense, not the details of why and how the illegal acts allegedly
amounted to undue injury or damage, for such matters, being evidentiary, were appropriate for
the trial. Hence, the complaints were not quashable.

ISSUE 2: WON the order denying a motion to quash is assailable by certiorari.

HELD: No. Because the denial was interlocutory, they must show that there was no plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The fact that the denial was interlocutory, not a final order, signified that the MTC did not yet
completely terminate its proceedings in the criminal cases. The proper recourse of the
petitioners was to enter their pleas as the accused, go to trial in the MTC, and should the
decision of the MTC be adverse to them in the end, reiterate the issue on their appeal from the
judgment and assign as error the unwarranted denial of their motion to quash.33Certiorari was
not available to them in the RTC because they had an appeal, or another plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

3. PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.

FACTS: On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).3 On October 28, 1993,
respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon (Alagon).4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition
for annulment of his marriage with Modina.5 On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City,
Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio
for lack of a valid marriage license.6 On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in
June 2003, private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent’s previous
marriage with Modina.7She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit8 charging respondent with Bigamy.
Respondent was indicted in an Information for Bigamy committed as follows:
That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being
then legally married to JASMIN MODINA and without such marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or
subsequent marriage with ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which second/subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity.
Contrary to law.
Respondent moved for the quashal of the information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts
do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished.
On September 4, 2008, the RTC issued an Order denying respondent’s Omnibus Motion.
However, the CA granted the same.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it granted
respondent’s petition for certiorari and the resolution dated March 4, 2010 denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, considering that:
I. THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY
ALLEGES ALL THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING SAID OFFENSE.
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails
the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face
in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information." It is a
hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in
determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not the
facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements
of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic of the information are not to
be considered.27 To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect in the information
which is evident on its fact.28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the
court the opportunity to correct the defect by amendment.29 If the motion to quash is sustained,
the court may order that another complaint or information be filed30 except when the
information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.31
An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of
the allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of the
crime as provided for in Article 34932 of the Revised Penal Code. The information contained
the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally married to Modina; (2) that without such
marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
contracted a second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.

4. RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG, Petitioner,


vs.
TERESITA D. RIVERA, Respondent.

FACTS: Syhunliong and Rivera are respectively the private complainant and defendant in
Criminal Case No. Q-07-147802. Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development
Corporation (BANFF) and likewise owns interests in construction, restaurant and hospital
businesses. On the other hand, Rivera used to be the Accounting Manager of BANFF. She was
hired in September of 2002 with a monthly salary of Php 30,000.00.

About three years after, Rivera, citing personal and family matters, tendered her resignation to
be effective on February 3, 2006. However, Rivera actually continued working for BANFF until
March of the same year to complete the turn over of papers under her custody to Jennifer
Lumapas (Lumapas), who succeeded her.

Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the payment of her remaining
salaries, benefits and incentives. Lumapas informed Rivera that her benefits would be paid, but
the check representing her salaries was still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by
Syhunliong.7

On April 6, 2006, at around 11:55 a.m., Rivera sent the following text message to one of
BANFF’s official cellular phones held by Lumapas:

I am expecting that[.] [G]rabe talagasufferings ko dyan hanggang pagkuha nglast pay ko. I don’t
deserve this [because] I did my job when I [was] still there. God bless ras[.]8 [S]ana yung
pagsimba niya, alam niya real meaning.

Minutes later, Rivera once again texted another message, which reads:

Kailangan release niya lahat [nang] makukuha ko diyanincluding incentive up to the last datena
nandyan ako para di na kami abot sa labor.

Subsequently, on December of 2006, Rivera filed before the National Labor Relations
Commission a complaint against Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, 13th to 16th month and
incentive pay, gratuities and tax refund in the total sum of Php 698,150.48.11

On April 16, 2007,12 pending the resolution of the aforecited labor case, Syhunliong instituted
against Rivera a complaint for libel, the origin of the instant petition.

ISSUE: Does the failure of the accused to move to quash before pleading constitute a waiver to
raise the question of prescription at a later stage of the case?

HELD: A case in point is People vs. Moran, 44 Phil., 387. The court ruled that the crime had
already prescribed holding that this defense cannot [b]e deemed waived even if the case had
been decided by the lower court and was pending appeal in the Supreme Court. The philosophy
behind this ruling was aptly stated as follows:

"Although the general rule is that the defense of prescription is not available unless expressly
set up in the lower court, as in that case it is presumed to have been waived and cannot be taken
advantage of thereafter, yet this rule is not always of absolute application in criminal cases, such
as that in which prescription of the crime is expressly provided by law, for the State not having
then the right to prosecute, or continue prosecuting, nor to punish, or continue punishing, the
offense, or to continue holding the defendant subject to its action through the imposition of the
penalty, the court must so declare."

While Castro is an old jurisprudence, it still finds application in the case at bench in view of
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which in essence partially provides that the defense of
extinction of criminal action or liability, e.g., prescription, is not deemed waived even if the
accused had not raised the same in a motion to quash. In Rivera’s case, the issue of prescription
is raised in her comment to the instant petition before this Court. Syhunliong does not
specifically refute Rivera’s averment, thus, it is deemed admitted.
__________________________________________________________________
_____________________

5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,


vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION & THIRD DIVISION,
HERNANDO BENITO PEREZ, ROSARIO PEREZ, RAMON ARCEO and
ERNEST ESCALER, Respondents.

FACTS: The information alleging the violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 entitled People v. Hernando Benito Perez,
et. al., and was raffled to the First Division of the Sandiganbayan,52 averred:
That during the month of February, 2001 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto in the City
of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Hernando
B. Perez, a high ranking public officer, being then the Secretary of the Department of Justice,
while in the performance of his official function, committing the offense in relation to his office
and taking advantage thereof, conspiring, confabulating and confederating with accused Ernest
L. Escaler, Rosario S. Perez and Ramon C. Arceo, all private individuals, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally request and demand the amount of US TWO MILLION
DOLLARS ($2,000,000.00) for himself and/or other persons from Mark Jimenez a.k.a. Mario
B. Crespo, and thereafter succeeded in receiving from the latter the sum of US$1,999,965.00 in
consideration of accused Hernando S. Perez’s desisting from pressuring Mark Jimenez to
execute affidavits implicating target personalities involved in the plunder case against former
President Joseph ‘Erap’ Estrada and in connection with the pending application of Mark
Jimenez for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the government, over which
transaction accused Hernando S. Perez had to intervene in his official capacity under the law, to
the damage and prejudice of Mark Jimenez.
CONTRARY TO LAW.53
On May 8, 2008, the Perezes moved to quash the information.54 Escaler presented a similar
motion to quash ex abundanti ad cautelam on May 12, 2008,55 while Arceo adopted the
motions of the Perezes and Escaler on May 13, 2008.56 On June 4, 2008, the Office of the
Ombudsman countered with a consolidated opposition.57
On July 17, 2008, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan promulgated its resolution denying
the motions to quash.58
Respondents separately sought the reconsideration of the resolution of denial of their motions
to quash.
On November 13, 2008, the Sandiganbayan First Division granted the motions for
reconsideration,59 rendering the following ratiocination, to wit:

“It is clear that the ambit of Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 is specific. It is limited only to contracts or
transaction involving monetary consideration where the public officer has authority to intervene
under the law. Thus, the requesting or demanding of any gift, present, share, percentage, or
benefit covered by said Section 3(b) must be in connection with a "contract or transaction"
involving "monetary consideration" with the government wherein the public officer in his
official capacity has to intervene under the law. In this regard, the Supreme Court in Soriano, Jr.
vs. Sandiganbayan construed the term "contract" or "transaction" covered by Section 3(b) of RA
3019, as follows –
"It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was
it a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the terms which precedes
it. A transaction like a contract, is one which involves some consideration as in credit
transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the
petitioner." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, applying the above construction of the Supreme Court in the case at bench, the Court
believes and so holds that the alleged desistance of accused Hernando B. Perez "from pressuring
Mark Jimenez to execute affidavits implicating target personalities involved in the plunder case
against former President Joseph ‘Erap’ Estrada and in connection with the pending application
of Mark Jimenez for admission into the WPP of the government", cannot, by any stretch of the
imagination, be considered as"contract" or "transaction" as defined within the ambit of the
fourth element of the offense under Section 3(b) of RA 3019 because no "monetary
consideration" as in credit transaction is involved.”
The State moved for the reconsideration of the resolution quashing the information in Criminal
Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265.
During the pendency of the State’s motion for reconsideration, Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-
0265 was re-raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan.
On April 21, 2009, the Third Division denied the Ombudsman’s (State) motion for
reconsideration,
On June 22, 2009, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) assailed in this Court via petition
for certiorari the resolution of the Sandiganbayan promulgated on July 17, 2008 quashing the
information in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265 and the resolution promulgated on April
21, 2009 denying the State’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction in quashing the information by applying the definition of
transaction in Soriano, Jr. v Sandiganbayan, 131 SCRA 188.
HELD: The Sandiganbayan correctly applied the restrictive meaning of the term transaction as
used in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019 adopted in Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan
In its questioned resolution dismissing Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0265, the
Sandiganbayan relied on the ruling in Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,81 in which the principal
issue was whether or not the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by
petitioner Soriano, Jr., then a Fiscal, was a "contract or transaction" as to bring the complaint
within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, which punished any public officer for
"[d]irectly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit,
for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the
Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law." The Soriano, Jr. Court ruled in the negative, and pronounced:
It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it
a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A
transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions
and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.
In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the
Sandiganbayan to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019. (Emphasis
supplied)
The State now argues, however, that the Sandiganbayan thereby committed grave abuse of
discretion resulting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction for applying the interpretation of the term
transaction in Soriano, Jr. considering that the term transaction should be construed more
liberally, and positing that Soriano, Jr. was already abandoned by the Court, citing for that
purpose the rulings in Mejia v. Pamaran,82 Peligrino v. People,83 and Chang v. People.84
We disagree with the petitioner, and find for the respondents.
First of all, the interpretation in Soriano, Jr. of the term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019 has not been overturned by the Court.
And, secondly, it does not help the State any that the term transaction as used in Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019 is susceptible of being interpreted both restrictively and liberally,
considering that laws creating, defining or punishing crimes and laws imposing penalties and
forfeitures are to be construed strictly against the State or against the party seeking to enforce
them, and liberally against the party sought to be charged.86
Clearly, the Sandiganbayan did not arbitrarily, or whimsically, or capriciously quash the
information for failing to properly state the fourth element of the violation of Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019.

6. DAVID v AGBAY

DOCTRINE:

The MTC further cited lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner accused as ground for
denying petitioner’s motion for re-determination of probable cause, as the motion was filed
prior to his arrest. However, custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs
other than an application for bail.27 In Miranda v. Tuliao,28 which involved a motion to quash
warrant of arrest, this Court discussed the distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person, and held that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed
waived when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes
the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person.

Thus:
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their
filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez:

The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash
or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction thereover, appearing for
arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to
obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody
of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction
over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for
bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the
mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance. One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant
files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to
the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as
when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced. Being in the custody of the law
signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding
him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the
body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.

7. GALZOTE v BRIONES

FACTS:

Jose Galzote was charged of robbery. He moved to quash the information by alleging that it was
flawed in form and in substance. The MTC denied the quashal. Galzote then filed a certiorari.
Respondent moved to dismiss the certiorari. One of the reasons was that it was not the proper
remedy.

The RTC and the CA also denied the petition. The CA held that petitioner failed to appeal within
the 15-day reglementary period under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner should
have filed an appeal, instead of a special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the certiorari was correct.

RULING:

The SC denied the petition.

As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable and it is
not a proper subject of a certiorari. A certiorari is appropriate if the petitioner can establish that
the lower court issued the judgment or order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.

The SC found that the lower courts did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. The facial
examination of the information shows that the document is valid.
The SC also concurred with the CA that the remedy for petitioner was to file an appeal.

8. QUISAY v PEOPLE

On December 28, 2012, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City (OCP-Makati) issued a
Pasiya4 or Resolution finding probable cause against petitioner for violation of Section 10 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7610,5 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse Exploitation and Discrimination Act." Consequently, a Pabatid Sakdal6 or Information
was filed before the RTC on January 11, 2013 charging petitioner of such crime.

On April 12, 2013, petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the
ground of lack of authority of the person who filed the same before the RTC. In support of her
motion, petitioner pointed out that the Pasiya issued by the OCP-Makati was penned by
Assistant City Prosecutor Estefano H. De La Cruz (ACP De La Cruz) and approved by Senior
Assistant City Prosecutor Edgardo G. Hirang (SACP Hirang), while the Pabatid Sakdal was
penned by ACP De La Cruz, without any approval from any higher authority, albeit with a
Certification claiming that ACP De La Cruz has prior written authority or approval from the City
Prosecutor in filing the said Information. In this regard, petitioner claimed that nothing in the
aforesaid Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal would show that ACP De La Cruz and/or SACP Hirang had
prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor to file or approve the filing of the
Information against her. As such, the Information must be quashed for being tainted with a
jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured.

In its Comment and Opposition, the OCP-Makati countered that the review prosecutor, SACP
Hirang, was authorized to approve the Pasiya pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32.9
Further, it maintained that the Pabatid Sakdal was filed with the prior approval of the City
Prosecutor as shown in the Certification in the Information itself.

In an Order11 dated May 8, 2013, the RTC denied petitioner's motion to quash for lack of merit.
It found the Certification attached to the Pabatid Sakdal to have sufficiently complied with
Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which requires the prior written authority or approval
by, among others, the City Prosecutor, in the filing of Informations. Aggrieved, petitioner
elevated the matter to the CA that consequently affirmed thr ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the CA was correct in affirming the RTC’s ruling which denied the motion to
quash of the petitioner.

HELD: No. the CA was not correct in affirming the ruling of the RTC.
Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a
complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers
therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts, to wit:

No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without


the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.

Here, aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De La Cruz
was authorized to file the Pabatid Sakdal or Information before the RTC by himself. Records are
bereft of any showing that the City Prosecutor of Makati had authorized ACP De La Cruz to do so
by giving him prior written authority or by designating him as a division chief or review
prosecutor of OCP-Makati. There is likewise nothing that would indicate that ACP De La Cruz
sought the approval of either the City Prosecutor or any of those authorized pursuant to OCP-
Makati Office Order No. 32 in filing the Pabatid Sakdal. Quite frankly, it is simply baffling how
ACP De La Cruz was able to have the Pasiya approved by designated review prosecutor SACP
Hirang but failed to have the Pabatid Sakdal approved by the same person or any other
authorized officer in the OCP-Makati.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the CA erred in according the Pabatid Sakdal the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions solely on the basis of the
Certification made by ACP De La Cruz considering the absence of any evidence on record clearly
showing that ACP De La Cruz: (a) had any authority to file the same on his own; or (b) did seek
the prior written approval from those authorized to do so before filing the Information before
the RTC.

In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to quash as
the Pabatid Sakdal or Information suffers from an incurable infirmity - that the officer who filed
the same before the RTC had no authority to do so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed,
resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.
9. NAVAJA v DE CASTRO

FACTS: The instant case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit3 filed by private respondent DKT
Philippines, Inc., represented by Atty. Edgar Borje, against petitioner Ana Lou B. Navaja,
alleging that while she was still its Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by making it
appear that she incurred meal expenses in the amount of ₱1,810.00, instead of the actual
amount of ₱810.00, at Garden Cafe, Jagna, Bohol, and claimed reimbursement for it.

Navaja is charged with the crime of falsification of private document before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Jagna-Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, docketed as Criminal Case No.
2904. On August 1, 2005, Navaja filed a Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment5 on the
ground that none of the essential elements of the crime of falsification of private document
occurred in Jagna, Bohol, hence, the MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case
due to improper venue.

In the Order dated November 2, 2005, the MCTC denied the motion to quash and set the case
for arraignment.

Navaja filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, assailing the November 2, 2005 Order and
January 24, 2006 Resolution of the MCTC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
On September 21, 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the petition for certiorari for lack of
legal basis or merit.

Navaja elevated the case on appeal with the CA. In the Decision dated August 28, 2007, the CA
dismissed Navaja's appeal and affirmed in toto the September 21, 2006 RTC Order.

ISSUE: WON a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to assail the order denying a motion to
quash.

HELD: No. In Zamoranos v. People, this Court emphasized that "a special civil action for
certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The
established rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not
to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an
unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law."

On a number of occasions, however, Court had sanctioned a writ of certiorari as an appropriate


remedy to assail an interlocutory order in the following circumstances:

(1) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion;
(2) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not
afford adequate and expeditious relief;
(3) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice;
(4) to promote public welfare and public policy; and
(5) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with
dispatch in the consideration thereof.43

As can be gleaned from the Court's discussion on the substantive issue of the case, Navaja failed
to prove that any of the said special circumstances obtains in this case, let alone the grave abuse
of discretion she imputed against the MCTC. Hence, the CA did not err in affirming the RTC
ruling that the MCTC correctly denied her motion to quash.

10. PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN

Jessie B. Castillo (Castillo) was elected mayor of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite in the May
1998 elections. On September 19, 2000, an Information was filed against Castillo charging him
with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019,3 in relation to the alleged illegal
operation of the Villa Esperanza dumpsite located in Molino, Bacoor, Cavite. According to the
Information, Castillo, while in the performance of his official functions as Mayor of Bacoor, gave
unwarranted benefits to his coaccused Melencio and Emerenciano Arciaga by allowing the latter
to operate the Villa Esperanza dumpsite without the requisite Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) and permit from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB).

An administrative complaint for Simple Misconduct had previously been filed against Castillo
also in relation to the illegal operation of the dumpsite. The Office of the Ombudsman found
Castillo guilty of the administrative charge and imposed the penalty of one (1) month and one (1)
day suspension. On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman and ordered the dismissal of the administrative complaint against Castillo. After
arraignment and pre-trial, Castillo, on August 21, 2001, filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion
to Dismiss or Terminate Proceedings.7 He argued that the case against him had been
decriminalized by Section 37 of Republic Act No. 90038 and invoked the decision of the Court of
Appeals absolving him of administrative liability.

On September 21, 2001, Castillo filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash the Information on the
ground that the same does not charge an offense. He claimed that a public officer may only be
held liable for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 if he caused undue injury to the
government or any private person. Thus, Castillo argued that the undue injury must not only be
mentioned in the Information, its extent must be specified. Castillo asserted that the claim of
undue injury must be "specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.

The Sandiganbayan Special Division, in its challenged Resolution dated January 9, 2002,
granted Castillo's Supplemental Motion. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON outright quashal was the proper course if the Information was defective on the
ground that the facts charged therein did not constitute an offense.
HELD: No. Outright quashal of the Information not proper Even assuming for the sake of
argument that the Information was defective on the ground that the facts charged therein do not
constitute an offense, outright quashal of the Information is not the proper course of action.

Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court gives clear guidance on this matter. It provides –

Sec. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on an alleged


defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order
that an amendment be made.

If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution
shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall
be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still
suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.

When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and
the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the
prosecution to file an amended Information. Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an
Information to charge facts constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an
amendment. In such instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash the
Information; rather, it should grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through
an amendment. This rule allows a case to proceed without undue delay. By allowing the defect
to be cured by simple amendment, unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which only
result to prolonging the proceedings, are avoided.

More than this practical consideration, however, is the due process underpinnings of this rule.
As explained by this Court in People v. Andrade, the State, just like any other litigant, is entitled
to its day in court.

Thus, a court's refusal to grant the prosecution the opportunity to amend an Information, where
such right is expressly granted under the Rules of Court and affirmed time and again in a string
of Supreme Court decisions, effectively curtails the State's right to due process.

Hence, even assuming that the Information was defective, the Sandiganbayan should have first
ordered its amendment and not its quashal. Doing so would have saved the parties from
resorting to an appeal to this Court and this case from remaining in the docket of the
Sandiganbayan for a long period.