G.R. No.
145804 February 6, 2003 The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners,
vs.
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT
SECURITY AGENCY, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals, promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, respectively, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled "Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor Navidad
vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al.," which has modified the decision of 11 August 1998 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating Prudent Security
Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and
Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on account of the death of Nicanor Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening, Nicanor
Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token"
(representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform
near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area
approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to
indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or
how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an
LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck
by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad,
along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin,
Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and
Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against
Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer,
denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its security guards.
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove
that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court
rendered its decision; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly
and severally the plaintiffs the following:
"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;
2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;
"b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
"c) Attorney’s fees of P20,000;
"d) Costs of suit.
"The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack
of merit.
"The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed."1
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court
promulgated its now assailed decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the
death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and
severally liable thusly:
"WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the
appellants from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees
Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his
death and are hereby directed to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees,
the following amounts:
 a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and
e) P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees."2
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet
boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the
victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the
fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from
liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the
death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows
upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by
reason of his having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and
operated at the time by Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their
failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of
emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.
The appellate court denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its resolution of
10 October 2000.
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate
court; viz:
"I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT
"II.
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
"III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA."3
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the
factual findings of the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping
conclusion that the presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier was
not overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartin’s assault upon Navidad, which
caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have
been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate court’s
conclusion on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between Roman
and LRTA lacked basis because Roman himself had testified being an employee of
Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a
contract of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at
the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the
rights and protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate court had
correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise
extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its
business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising
utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers. 4 The Civil Code, governing the
liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the
orders of the common carriers.
"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of
a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission."
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. 5 Such duty
of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only
during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises
and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. 6 The statutory
provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a)
through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts
or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees
through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or
omission.7 In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault
or been negligent, and8 by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the
duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the
burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event
or to force majeure.9 In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how
the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed
to show, the presumption would be that it has been at fault,10 an exception from the
general rule that negligence must be proved.11
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to
exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its
commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own
employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort
under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions, in conjunction with
Article 2180,13 of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is
negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the
employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that
the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and
supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by
showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual
matter that has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how
then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent
contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual
obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the
injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article
219414 of the Civil Code can well apply.15 In fine, a liability for tort may arise even
under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. 16 Stated differently,
when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the
source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on
tort to apply.17
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late
Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of
Appeals that "there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for
the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x
x x." This finding of the appellate court is not without substantial justification in our
own review of the records of the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of
any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to
say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation
between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own
fault or negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal
damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for
the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. 18 It is an
established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
damages.19
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and
(b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO
DIONISIO, respondents.
FELICIANO, J:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975 — at about 1:30 a.m. — private
respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home — he lived in 1214-B Zamora
Street, Bangkal, Makati — from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the
general manager of a marketing corporation. During the cocktails phase of the
evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his
Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General
Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down
General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He
switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck
looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and
registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was
parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side
of a person facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding),
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the
street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way
of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector
devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier
that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver,
with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried
out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by
swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump
truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including
some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge
dentures.
Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was
the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him
by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that
the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at
the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights
on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised
due rare in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and
Carbonel and ordered the latter:
(1) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 15,000.00 for
hospital bills and the replacement of the lost dentures of plaintiff;
(2) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 1,50,000.-00 as
loss of expected income for plaintiff brought about the accident in
controversy and which is the result of the negligence of the
defendants;
(3) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000. as
moral damages for the unexpected and sudden withdrawal of
plaintiff from his lifetime career as a marketing man; mental
anguish, wounded feeling, serious anxiety, social humiliation,
besmirched reputation, feeling of economic insecurity, and the
 untold sorrows and frustration in life experienced by plaintiff and his
family since the accident in controversy up to the present time;
(4) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000.00 as
damages for the wanton disregard of defendants to settle amicably
this case with the plaintiff before the filing of this case in court for a
smaller amount.
(5) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 4,500.00
due as and for attorney's fees; and
(6) The cost of suit. (Emphasis supplied)
Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. That court in
CA-G.R. No. 65476 affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of
damages to the following extent:
1. The award of P15,000.00 as compensatory damages was reduced
to P6,460.71, the latter being the only amount that the appellate court found the
plaintiff to have proved as actually sustained by him;
2. The award of P150,000.00 as loss of expected income was reduced
to P100,000.00, basically because Dionisio had voluntarily resigned his job such that,
in the opinion of the appellate court, his loss of income "was not solely attributable
to the accident in question;" and
3. The award of P100,000.00 as moral damages was held by the appellate court as
excessive and unconscionable and hence reduced to P50,000.00.
The award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees
and costs remained untouched.
This decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is now before us on a petition for
review.
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
Both the trial court and the appellate court had made fairly explicit findings of fact
relating to the manner in which the dump truck was parked along General Lacuna
Street on the basis of which both courts drew the inference that there was
negligence on the part of Carbonel, the dump truck driver, and that this negligence
was the proximate cause of the accident and Dionisio's injuries. We note, however,
that both courts failed to pass upon the defense raised by Carbonel and Phoenix that
the true legal and proximate cause of the accident was not the way in which the
dump truck had been parked but rather the reckless way in which Dionisio had
driven his car that night when he smashed into the dump truck. The Intermediate
Appellate Court in its questioned decision casually conceded that Dionisio was "in
some way, negligent" but apparently failed to see the relevance of Dionisio's
negligence and made no further mention of it. We have examined the record both
before the trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court and we find that both
parties had placed into the record sufficient evidence on the basis of which the trial
court and the appellate court could have and should have made findings of fact
relating to the alleged reckless manner in which Dionisio drove his car that night. The
petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if there was negligence in the manner
in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and
static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an
intervening, efficient cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he
sustained. The need to administer substantial justice as between the parties in this
case, without having to remand it back to the trial court after eleven years, compels
us to address directly the contention put forward by the petitioners and to examine
for ourselves the record pertaining to Dionisio's alleged negligence which must bear
upon the liability, or extent of liability, of Phoenix and Carbonel.
There are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a) whether or not private
respondent Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night; (b)
whether Dionisio was driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump
truck; (c) whether Dionisio had purposely turned off his car's headlights before
contact with the dump truck or whether those headlights accidentally malfunctioned
moments before the collision; and (d) whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of
the accident.
As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that no curfew pass was
found on the person of Dionisio immediately after the accident nor was any found in
his car. Phoenix's evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who
had taken Dionisio, unconscious, to the Makati Medical Center for emergency
treatment immediately after the accident. At the Makati Medical Center, a nurse took
off Dionisio's clothes and examined them along with the contents of pockets together
with Patrolman Cuyno. 1 Private respondent Dionisio was not able to produce any
curfew pass during the trial. Instead, he offered the explanation that his family may
have misplaced his curfew pass. He also offered a certification (dated two years after
the accident) issued by one Major Benjamin N. Libarnes of the Zone Integrated
Police Intelligence Unit of Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, which was said to
have authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila. This
certification was to the effect that private respondent Dionisio had a valid curfew
pass. This certification did not, however, specify any pass serial number or date or
period of effectivity of the supposed curfew pass. We find that private respondent
Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of
the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have
such a pass during that night. The relevance of possession or non-possession of a
curfew pass that night lies in the light it tends to shed on the other related issues:
whether Dionisio was speeding home and whether he had indeed purposely put out
his headlights before the accident, in order to avoid detection and possibly arrest by
the police in the nearby police station for travelling after the onset of curfew without
a valid curfew pass.
On the second issue — whether or not Dionisio was speeding home that night —
both the trial court and the appellate court were completely silent.
The defendants in the trial court introduced the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who
was at the scene of the accident almost immediately after it occurred, the police
station where he was based being barely 200 meters away. Patrolman Cuyno
testified that people who had gathered at the scene of the accident told him that
Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did not have its headlights on. 2 Dionisio, on the
other hand, claimed that he was travelling at a moderate speed at 30 kilometers per
hour and had just crossed the intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna
Streets and had started to accelerate when his headlights failed just before the
collision took place. 3
Private respondent Dionisio asserts that Patrolman Cuyno's testimony was hearsay
and did not fag within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the
facts he testified to were not acquired by him through official information and had
not been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so. Private respondent's
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
objection fails to take account of the fact that the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno is
admissible not under the official records exception to the hearsay rule 4 but rather as
part of the res gestae. 5 Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay
rule consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of an occurrence or event
sufficiently startling in nature so as to render inoperative the normal reflective
thought processes of the observer and hence made as a spontaneous reaction to the
occurrence or event, and not the result of reflective thought. 6
We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a
stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke
spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions from observers who happened to be
around at that time. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as
part of the res gestae and should have been considered by the trial court. Clearly,
substantial weight should have been ascribed to such testimony, even though it did
not, as it could not, have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at
winch Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck.
A third related issue is whether Dionisio purposely turned off his headlights, or
whether his headlights accidentally malfunctioned, just moments before the accident.
The Intermediate Appellate Court expressly found that the headlights of Dionisio's
car went off as he crossed the intersection but was non-committal as to why they did
so. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights
even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the
police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from
the intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible
explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio — i.e., that he had his
headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if
convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his
lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck.
A fourth and final issue relates to whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the
accident. The evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the
effect that private respondent Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken
from his smashed car and brought to the Makati Medical Center in an unconscious
condition. 7This testimony has to be taken in conjunction with the admission of
Dionisio that he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor before dinner with his boss that
night. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so
heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per
se an act of reckless imprudence. 8 There simply is not enough evidence to show
how much liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical
faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. We are also aware that "one shot
or two" of hard liquor may affect different people differently.
The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private
respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home
that night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his
headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets
and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto
the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate
Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's
injuries was the wrongful — or negligent manner in which the dump truck was
parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a
reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand
and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a
slightly different manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a
natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.
The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was merely a
"passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was
an "efficient intervening cause and that consequently Dionisio's negligence must be
regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier
negligence of Carbonel. We note that the petitioners' arguments are drawn from a
reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States but we
are unable to persuade ourselves that these arguments have any validity for our
jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that even in the United States, the distinctions between
"cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already
been "almost entirely discredited." Professors and Keeton make this quite clear:
Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish
between the active "cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions"
upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created only a
passive static condition which made the damage possible, the
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation
is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have
played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible
to distinguish between active forces and passive situations,
particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of
other active forces which have gone before. The defendant who
spills gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act
may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites
the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about
the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the
defendant has created, the defendant will not escape
responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the
"condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one who
digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who fans
into it a month afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find
occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost
entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer
to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the
defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and
some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the
distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but
the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. 9
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and
static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision
between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an probability not
have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning
lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for
having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view,
Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's
negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or
independent cause. What the Petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no
more than a foreseeable consequent manner which the truck driver had parked the
dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private
respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very
risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent
and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between
the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris
vinculum of liability. It is helpful to quote once more from Professor and Keeton:
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one
which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated
or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the
particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligence among
other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the
defendant may be negligent only for that reason. Thus one who sets
a fire may be required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and
customary wind arising later wig spread it beyond the defendant's
own property, and therefore to take precautions to prevent that
event. The person who leaves the combustible or explosive material
exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire from some
independent source. ... In all of these cases there is an intervening
cause combining with the defendant's conduct to produce the result
and in each case the defendant's negligence consists in failure to
protect the plaintiff against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact
that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which
the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass.
Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and
hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally
agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will
not supersede the defendant's responsibility.
Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate
the usual weather of the vicinity, including all ordinary forces of
nature such as usual wind or rain, or snow or frost or fog or even
lightning; that one who leaves an obstruction on the road or a
railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into
it; ...
The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of
the foreseeable negligence of others. ... [The standard of reasonable
conduct may require the defendant to protect the plaintiff against
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
'that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of
human life, and therefore to be anticipated.' Thus, a defendant who
blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where
the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes
liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is
negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the
highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when
another negligently drives into it. --- 10
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that
the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack
of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages
though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code
of the Philippines).
Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine.
The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent,
private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and
hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance"
must bear his own injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine of the common law
was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith 11 but it is a matter for debate
whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the
harshness of another common law doctrine or rule that of contributory
negligence. 12 The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any
recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence
was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant. 13 The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant
recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had
the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. 14 Accordingly, it is
difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to
play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an
absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in
Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 15
Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from
its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law
jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a court,
in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence — the plaintiff's or the
defendant's — was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply
or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to
imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative
location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts
or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of
more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of
each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission
for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and
therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior
negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased
diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the
truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too
close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the
forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-
delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them
among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to
weaken the very bonds of society.
Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the
part of his employer Phoenix 16in supervising its employees properly and
adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly in our opinion,
that Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence. The
circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his
home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning, when
coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the
manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an
affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative
negligence of private respondent Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and
Phoenix upon the other hand, 17 we believe that the demands of substantial justice
are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the
damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall
be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid
by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the
former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be
borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement
from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of
damages made by the respondent appellate court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing
the aggregate amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected income and moral
damages private respondent Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. Costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 102316. June 30, 1997]
VALENZUELA HARDWOOD AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY,
INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND SEVEN BROTHERS
SHIPPING CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Is a stipulation in a charter party that the (o)wners shall not be responsible for
loss, split, short-landing, breakages and any kind of damages to the
cargo[1] valid? This is the main question raised in this petition for review assailing the
Decision of Respondent Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. No. CV-20156 promulgated on
October 15, 1991. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 171, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered ordering South Sea Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc. to pay plaintiff the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00)
representing the value of the policy of the lost logs with legal interest thereon from

TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch

the date of demand on February 2, 1984 until the amount is fully paid or in the
alternative, defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation to pay plaintiff the
amount of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) representing the value of lost logs
plus legal interest from the date of demand on April 24, 1984 until full payment
thereof; the reasonable attorneys fees in the amount equivalent to five (5) percent of
the amount of the claim and the costs of the suit.
Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay defendant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation the
sum of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P230,000.00) representing the
balance of the stipulated freight charges.
Defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Companys counterclaim is hereby
dismissed.
In its assailed Decision, Respondent Court of Appeals held:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED except in so far (sic) as
the liability of the Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation to the plaintiff is concerned
which is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.[3]
The Facts
The factual antecedents of this case as narrated in the Court of Appeals
Decision are as follows:
It appears that on 16 January 1984, plaintiff (Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial
Supply, Inc.) entered into an agreement with the defendant Seven Brothers
(Shipping Corporation) whereby the latter undertook to load on board its vessel M/V
Seven Ambassador the formers lauan round logs numbering 940 at the port of
Maconacon, Isabela for shipment to Manila.
On 20 January 1984, plaintiff insured the logs against loss and/or damage with
defendant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. for P2,000,000.00 and the latter
issued its Marine Cargo Insurance Policy No. 84/24229 for P2,000,000.00 on said
date.
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
On 24 January 1984, the plaintiff gave the check in payment of the premium on the
insurance policy to Mr. Victorio Chua.
In the meantime, the said vessel M/V Seven Ambassador sank on 25 January 1984
resulting in the loss of the plaintiffs insured logs.
On 30 January 1984, a check for P5,625.00 (Exh. E) to cover payment of the
premium and documentary stamps due on the policy was tendered due to the insurer
but was not accepted. Instead, the South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.
cancelled the insurance policy it issued as of the date of the inception for non-
payment of the premium due in accordance with Section 77 of the Insurance Code.
On 2 February 1984, plaintiff demanded from defendant South Sea Surety and
Insurance Co., Inc. the payment of the proceeds of the policy but the latter denied
liability under the policy. Plaintiff likewise filed a formal claim with defendant Seven
Brothers Shipping Corporation for the value of the lost logs but the latter denied the
claim.
After due hearing and trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff
and against defendants. Both defendants shipping corporation and the surety
company appealed.
Defendant-appellant Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation impute (sic) to the court a
quo the following assignment of errors, to wit:
A. The lower court erred in holding that the proximate cause of the sinking of the
vessel Seven Ambassadors, was not due to fortuitous event but to the negligence of
the captain in stowing and securing the logs on board, causing the iron chains to
snap and the logs to roll to the portside.
B. The lower court erred in declaring that the non-liability clause of the Seven
Brothers Shipping Corporation from logs (sic) of the cargo stipulated in the charter
party is void for being contrary to public policy invoking article 1745 of the New Civil
Code.
C. The lower court erred in holding defendant-appellant Seven Brothers Shipping
Corporation liable in the alternative and ordering/directing it to pay plaintiff-appellee
the amount of two million (P2,000,000.00) pesos representing the value of the logs
plus legal interest from date of demand until fully paid.
D. The lower court erred in ordering defendant-appellant Seven Brothers Shipping
Corporation to pay appellee reasonable attorneys fees in the amount equivalent to
5% of the amount of the claim and the costs of the suit.
E. The lower court erred in not awarding defendant-appellant Seven Brothers
Corporation its counter-claim for attorneys fees.
F. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint against Seven Brothers
Shipping Corporation.
Defendant-appellant South Sea Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. assigns the following
errors:
A. The trial court erred in holding that Victorio Chua was an agent of defendant-
appellant South Sea Surety and Insurance Company, Inc. and likewise erred in not
holding that he was the representative of the insurance broker Columbia Insurance
Brokers, Ltd.
B. The trial court erred in holding that Victorio Chua received
compensation/commission on the premiums paid on the policies issued by the
defendant-appellant South Sea Surety and Insurance Company, Inc.
C. The trial court erred in not applying Section 77 of the Insurance Code.
D. The trial court erred in disregarding the receipt of payment clause attached to and
forming part of the Marine Cargo Insurance Policy No. 84/24229.
E. The trial court in disregarding the statement of account or bill stating the amount
of premium and documentary stamps to be paid on the policy by the plaintiff-
appellee.
F. The trial court erred in disregarding the indorsement of cancellation of the policy
due to non-payment of premium and documentary stamps.
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
G. The trial court erred in ordering defendant-appellant South Sea Surety and
Insurance Company, Inc. to pay plaintiff-appellee P2,000,000.00 representing value
of the policy with legal interest from 2 February 1984 until the amount is fully paid,
H. The trial court erred in not awarding to the defendant-appellant the attorneys fees
alleged and proven in its counterclaim.
The primary issue to be resolved before us is whether defendants shipping
corporation and the surety company are liable to the plaintiff for the latters lost
logs.[4]
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the RTC judgment by sustaining the
liability of South Sea Surety and Insurance Company (South Sea), but modified it by
holding that Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation (Seven Brothers) was not liable for
the lost cargo.[5] In modifying the RTC judgment, the respondent appellate court
ratiocinated thus:
It appears that there is a stipulation in the charter party that the ship owner would
be exempted from liability in case of loss.
The court a quo erred in applying the provisions of the Civil Code on common
carriers to establish the liability of the shipping corporation. The provisions on
common carriers should not be applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as
a private carrier.
Under American jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry a special
cargo or chartered to a special person only, becomes a private carrier.
As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability even for the
negligence of its agent is valid (Home Insurance Company, Inc. vs. American
Steamship Agencies, Inc., 23 SCRA 24).
The shipping corporation should not therefore be held liable for the loss of the
logs.[6]
South Sea and herein Petitioner Valenzuela Hardwood and Industrial Supply,
Inc. (Valenzuela) filed separate petitions for review before this Court. In a Resolution
dated June 2, 1995,this Court denied the petition of South Sea.[7] There the Court
found no reason to reverse the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that Chua was indeed an authorized agent of South Sea when he received
Valenzuelas premium payment for the marine cargo insurance policy which was thus
binding on the insurer.[8]
The Court is now called upon to resolve the petition for review filed by
Valenzuela assailing the CA Decision which exempted Seven Brothers from any
liability for the lost cargo.
The Issue
Petitioner Valenzuelas arguments revolve around a single issue: whether or not
respondent Court (of Appeals) committed a reversible error in upholding the validity
of the stipulation in the charter party executed between the petitioner and the
private respondent exempting the latter from liability for the loss of petitioners logs
arising from the negligence of its (Seven Brothers) captain.[9]
The Courts Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
Validity of Stipulation is Lis Mota
The charter party between the petitioner and private respondent stipulated that
the (o)wners shall not be responsible for loss, split, short-landing, breakages and any
kind of damages to the cargo.[10] The validity of this stipulation is the lis mota of this
case.
It should be noted at the outset that there is no dispute between the parties
that the proximate cause of the sinking of M/V Seven Ambassadors resulting in the
loss of its cargo was the snapping of the iron chains and the subsequent rolling of
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
the logs to the portside due to the negligence of the captain in stowing and securing
the logs on board the vessel and not due to fortuitous event. [11] Likewise undisputed
is the status of Private Respondent Seven Brothers as a private carrier when it
contracted to transport the cargo of Petitioner Valenzuela. Even the latter admits this
in its petition.[12]
The trial court deemed the charter party stipulation void for being contrary to
public policy,[13] citing Article 1745 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered
unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy:
(1) That the goods are transported at the risk of the owner or shipper;
(2) That the common carrier will not be liable for any loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods;
(3) That the common carrier need not observe any diligence in the custody of the
goods;
(4) That the common carrier shall exercise a degree of diligence less than that of a
good father of a family, or of a man of ordinary prudence in the vigilance over the
movables transported;
(5) That the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts or omissions of his
or its employees;
(6) That the common carriers liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers
who do not act with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force, is dispensed with
or diminished;
(7) That the common carrier is not responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of goods on account of the defective condition of the car, vehicle, ship,
airplane or other equipment used in the contract of carriage.
Petitioner Valenzuela adds that the stipulation is void for being contrary to
Articles 586 and 587 of the Code of Commerce [14] and Articles 1170 and 1173 of the
Civil Code. Citing Article 1306 and paragraph 1, Article 1409 of the Civil
Code,[15] petitioner further contends that said stipulation gives no duty or obligation
to the private respondent to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the
custody and transportation of the cargo."
The Court is not persuaded. As adverted to earlier, it is undisputed that private
respondent had acted as a private carrier in transporting petitioners lauan logs. Thus,
Article 1745 and other Civil Code provisions on common carriers which were cited by
petitioner may not be applied unless expressly stipulated by the parties in their
charter party.[16]
In a contract of private carriage, the parties may validly stipulate that
responsibility for the cargo rests solely on the charterer, exempting the shipowner
from liability for loss of or damage to the cargo caused even by the negligence of the
ship captain. Pursuant to Article 1306[17] of the Civil Code, such stipulation is valid
because it is freely entered into by the parties and the same is not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Indeed, their contract of private
carriage is not even a contract of adhesion. We stress that in a contract of private
carriage, the parties may freely stipulate their duties and obligations which perforce
would be binding on them. Unlike in a contract involving a common carrier, private
carriage does not involve the general public. Hence, the stringent provisions of the
Civil Code on common carriers protecting the general public cannot justifiably be
applied to a ship transporting commercial goods as a private carrier. Consequently,
the public policy embodied therein is not contravened by stipulations in a charter
party that lessen or remove the protection given by law in contracts involving
common carriers.
The issue posed in this case and the arguments raised by petitioner are not
novel; they were resolved long ago by this Court in Home Insurance Co. vs.
American Steamship Agencies, Inc.[18] In that case, the trial court similarly nullified a
stipulation identical to that involved in the present case for being contrary to public
policy based on Article 1744 of the Civil Code and Article 587 of the Code of
Commerce. Consequently, the trial court held the shipowner liable for damages
resulting from the partial loss of the cargo. This Court reversed the trial court and
laid down, through Mr. Justice Jose P. Bengzon, the following well-settled
observation and doctrine:
The provisions of our Civil Code on common carriers were taken from Anglo-
American law. Under American jurisprudence, a common carrier undertaking to carry
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
a special cargo or chartered to a special person only, becomes a private carrier. As a
private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability for the negligence of
its agent is not against public policy, and is deemed valid.
Such doctrine We find reasonable. The Civil Code provisions on common carriers
should not be applied where the carrier is not acting as such but as a private
carrier. The stipulation in the charter party absolving the owner from liability for loss
due to the negligence of its agent would be void only if the strict public policy
governing common carriers is applied. Such policy has no force where the public at
large is not involved, as in this case of a ship totally chartered for the use of a single
party.[19] (Underscoring supplied.)
Indeed, where the reason for the rule ceases, the rule itself does not apply. The
general public enters into a contract of transportation with common carriers without
a hand or a voice in the preparation thereof. The riding public merely adheres to the
contract; even if the public wants to, it cannot submit its own stipulations for the
approval of the common carrier. Thus, the law on common carriers extends its
protective mantle against one-sided stipulations inserted in tickets, invoices or other
documents over which the riding public has no understanding or, worse, no
choice. Compared to the general public, a charterer in a contract of private carriage
is not similarly situated. It can -- and in fact it usually does -- enter into a free and
voluntary agreement. In practice, the parties in a contract of private carriage can
stipulate the carriers obligations and liabilities over the shipment which, in turn,
determine the price or consideration of the charter. Thus, a charterer, in exchange
for convenience and economy, may opt to set aside the protection of the law on
common carriers. When the charterer decides to exercise this option, he takes a
normal business risk.
Petitioner contends that the rule in Home Insurance is not applicable to the
present case because it covers only a stipulation exempting a private carrier from
liability for the negligence of his agent, but it does not apply to a stipulation
exempting a private carrier like private respondent from the negligence of his
employee or servant which is the situation in this case. [20] This contention of
petitioner is bereft of merit, for it raises a distinction without any substantive
difference. The case of Home Insurance specifically dealt with the liability of the
shipowner for acts or negligence of its captain and crew [21] and a charter party
stipulation which exempts the owner of the vessel from any loss or damage or delay
arising from any other source, even from the neglect or fault of the captain or crew
or some other person employed by the owner on board, for whose acts the owner
would ordinarily be liable except for said paragraph.[22] Undoubtedly, Home
Insurance is applicable to the case at bar.
The naked assertion of petitioner that the American rule enunciated in Home
Insurance is not the rule in the Philippines[23] deserves scant consideration. The
Court there categorically held that said rule was reasonable and proceeded to apply
it in the resolution of that case. Petitioner miserably failed to show such
circumstances or arguments which would necessitate a departure from a well-settled
rule. Consequently, our ruling in said case remains a binding judicial precedent based
on the doctrine of stare decisis and Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that
(j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
In fine, the respondent appellate court aptly stated that [in the case of] a
private carrier, a stipulation exempting the owner from liability even for the
negligence of its agent is valid.[24]
Other Arguments
On the basis of the foregoing alone, the present petition may already be
denied; the Court, however, will discuss the other arguments of petitioner for the
benefit and satisfaction of all concerned.
Articles 586 and 587, Code of Commerce
Petitioner Valenzuela insists that the charter party stipulation is contrary to
Articles 586 and 587 of the Code of Commerce which confer on petitioner the right to
recover damages from the shipowner and ship agent for the acts or conduct of the
captain.[25] We are not persuaded. Whatever rights petitioner may have under the
aforementioned statutory provisions were waived when it entered into the charter
party.
Article 6 of the Civil Code provides that (r)ights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
prejudicial to a person with a right recognized by law. As a general rule patrimonial
rights may be waived as opposed to rights to personality and family rights which may
not be made the subject of waiver.[26] Being patently and undoubtedly patrimonial,
petitioners right conferred under said articles may be waived. This, the petitioner did
by acceding to the contractual stipulation that it is solely responsible for any damage
to the cargo, thereby exempting the private carrier from any responsibility for loss or
damage thereto. Furthermore, as discussed above, the contract of private carriage
binds petitioner and private respondent alone; it is not imbued with public policy
considerations for the general public or third persons are not affected thereby.
Articles 1170 and 1173, Civil Code
Petitioner likewise argues that the stipulation subject of this controversy is void
for being contrary to Articles 1170 and 1173 of the Civil Code[27] which read:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are
liable for damages
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, shall apply.
If the law does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance,
that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.
The Court notes that the foregoing articles are applicable only to the obligor or
the one with an obligation to perform. In the instant case, Private Respondent Seven
Brothers is not an obligor in respect of the cargo, for this obligation to bear the loss
was shifted to petitioner by virtue of the charter party. This shifting of responsibility,
as earlier observed, is not void. The provisions cited by petitioner are, therefore,
inapplicable to the present case.
Moreover, the factual milieu of this case does not justify the application of the
second paragraph of Article 1173 of the Civil Code which prescribes the standard of
diligence to be observed in the event the law or the contract is silent. In the instant
case, Article 362 of the Code of Commerce[28] provides the standard of ordinary
diligence for the carriage of goods by a carrier. The standard of diligence under this
statutory provision may, however, be modified in a contract of private carriage as the
petitioner and private respondent had done in their charter party.
Cases Cited by Petitioner Inapplicable
Petitioner cites Shewaram vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc.[29] which, in turn,
quoted Juan Ysmael & Co. vs. Gabino Barreto & Co.[30] and argues that the public
policy considerations stated there vis--vis contractual stipulations limiting the carriers
liability be applied with equal force to this case.[31] It also cites Manila Railroad Co.
vs. Compaia Transatlantica[32] and contends that stipulations exempting a party from
liability for damages due to negligence should not be countenanced and should be
strictly construed against the party claiming its benefit.[33] We disagree.
The cases of Shewaram and Ysmael both involve a common carrier; thus, they
necessarily justify the application of such policy considerations and concomitantly
stricter rules. As already discussed above, the public policy considerations behind the
rigorous treatment of common carriers are absent in the case of private
carriers. Hence, the stringent laws applicable to common carriers are not applied to
private carriers. The case of Manila Railroad is also inapplicable because the action
for damages there does not involve a contract for transportation.Furthermore, the
defendant therein made a promise to use due care in the lifting operations
and, consequently, it was bound by its undertaking; besides, the exemption was
intended to cover accidents due to hidden defects in the apparatus or other
unforseeable occurrences not caused by its personal negligence. This promise was
thus construed to make sense together with the stipulation against liability for
damages.[34] In the present case, we stress that the private respondent made no
such promise. The agreement of the parties to exempt the shipowner from
responsibility for any damage to the cargo and place responsibility over the same to
petitioner is the lone stipulation considered now by this Court.
Finally, petitioner points to Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Lopez
Costelo, Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., N. T.
[35] [36]
Hashim and Co. vs. Rocha and Co.,[37] Ohta Development Co. vs.
SteamshipPompey[38] and Limpangco Sons vs. Yangco Steamship Co.[39] in support of
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
its contention that the shipowner be held liable for damages. [40] These however are
not on all fours with the present case because they do not involve a similar factual
milieu or an identical stipulation in the charter party expressly exempting the
shipowner from responsibility for any damage to the cargo.
Effect of the South Sea Resolution
In its memorandum, Seven Brothers argues that petitioner has no cause of
action against it because this Court has earlier affirmed the liability of South Sea for
the loss suffered by petitioner. Private respondent submits that petitioner is not
legally entitled to collect twice for a single loss.[41] In view of the above disquisition
upholding the validity of the questioned charter party stipulation and holding that
petitioner may not recover from private respondent, the present issue is moot and
academic. It suffices to state that the Resolution of this Court dated June 2,
1995[42] affirming the liability of South Sea does not, by itself, necessarily preclude
the petitioner from proceeding against private respondent. An aggrieved party may
still recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss in the event the amount
paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the loss. Article 2207 of the Civil
Code provides:
ART. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received indemnity
from the insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach
of contract complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights
of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If
the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss,
the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person
causing the loss or injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for its utter
failure to show any reversible error on the part of Respondent Court. The assailed
Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 98695 January 27, 1993
JUAN J. SYQUIA, CORAZON C. SYQUIA, CARLOTA C. SYQUIA, CARLOS C.
SYQUIA and ANTHONY C. SYQUIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK
CEMETERY, INC., respondents.
Pacis & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Augusto S. San Pedro & Ari-Ben C. Sebastian for private respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Herein petitioners, Juan J. Syquia and Corazon C. Syquia, Carlota C. Syquia, Carlos C.
Syquia, and Anthony Syquia, were the parents and siblings, respectively, of the
deceased Vicente Juan Syquia. On March 5, 1979, they filed a complaint 1 in the then
Court of First Instance against herein private respondent, Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc. for recovery of damages arising from breach of contract and/or quasi-
delict. The trial court dismissed the complaint.
The antecedent facts, as gathered by the respondent Court, are as follows:
On March 5, 1979, Juan, Corazon, Carlota and Anthony all surnamed
Syquia, plaintiff-appellants herein, filed a complaint for damages
against defendant-appellee, Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.
The complaint alleged among others, that pursuant to a Deed of
Sale (Contract No. 6885) dated August 27, 1969 and Interment
Order No. 7106 dated July 21, 1978 executed between plaintiff-
appellant Juan J. Syquia and defendant-appellee, the former, father
of deceased Vicente Juan J. Syquia authorized and instructed
defendant-appellee to inter the remains of deceased in the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery in the morning of July 25, 1978
conformably and in accordance with defendant-appellant's (sic)
interment procedures; that on September 4, 1978, preparatory to
transferring the said remains to a newly purchased family plot also
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
at the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, the concrete vault encasing
the coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche underground
with the assistance of certain employees of defendant-appellant
(sic); that as the concrete vault was being raised to the surface,
plaintiffs-appellants discovered that the concrete vault had a hole
approximately three (3) inches in diameter near the bottom of one
of the walls closing out the width of the vault on one end and that
for a certain length of time (one hour, more or less), water drained
out of the hole; that because of the aforesaid discovery, plaintiffs-
appellants became agitated and upset with concern that the water
which had collected inside the vault might have risen as it in fact did
rise, to the level of the coffin and flooded the same as well as the
remains of the deceased with ill effects thereto; that pursuant to an
authority granted by the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila
on September 14, 1978, plaintiffs-appellants with the assistance of
licensed morticians and certain personnel of defendant-appellant
(sic) caused the opening of the concrete vault on September 15,
1978; that upon opening the vault, the following became apparent
to the plaintiffs-appellants: (a) the interior walls of the concrete vault
showed evidence of total flooding; (b) the coffin was entirely
damaged by water, filth and silt causing the wooden parts to warp
and separate and to crack the viewing glass panel located directly
above the head and torso of the deceased; (c) the entire lining of
the coffin, the clothing of the deceased, and the exposed parts of
the deceased's remains were damaged and soiled by the action of
the water and silt and were also coated with filth.
Due to the alleged unlawful and malicious breach by the defendant-
appellee of its obligation to deliver a defect-free concrete vault
designed to protect the remains of the deceased and the coffin
against the elements which resulted in the desecration of deceased's
grave and in the alternative, because of defendant-appellee's gross
negligence conformably to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code in
failing to seal the concrete vault, the complaint prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering defendant-appellee to pay plaintiffs-
appellants P30,000.00 for actual damages, P500,000.00 for moral
damages, exemplary damages in the amount determined by the
 court, 20% of defendant-appellee's total liability as attorney's fees,
and expenses of litigation and costs of suit.2
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the contract between the parties
did not guarantee that the cement vault would be waterproof; that there could be no
quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence, and
because there was a pre-existing contractual relation between the Syquias and
defendant Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.. The trial court also noted that the
father himself, Juan Syquia, chose the gravesite despite knowing that said area had
to be constantly sprinkled with water to keep the grass green and that water would
eventually seep through the vault. The trial court also accepted the explanation given
by defendant for boring a hole at the bottom side of the vault: "The hole had to be
bored through the concrete vault because if it has no hole the vault will (sic) float
and the grave would be filled with water and the digging would caved (sic) in the
earth, the earth would caved (sic) in the (sic) fill up the grave."3
From this judgment, the Syquias appealed. They alleged that the trial court erred in
holding that the contract allowed the flooding of the vault; that there was no
desecration; that the boring of the hole was justifiable; and in not awarding
damages.
The Court of Appeals in the Decision4 dated December 7, 1990 however, affirmed the
judgment of dismissal. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated April 25, 1991.5
Unsatisfied with the respondent Court's decision, the Syquias filed the instant
petition. They allege herein that the Court of Appeals committed the following errors
when it:
1. held that the contract and the Rules and Resolutions of private
respondent allowed the flooding of the vault and the entrance
thereto of filth and silt;
2. held that the act of boring a hole was justifiable and corollarily,
when it held that no act of desecration was committed;
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
3. overlooked and refused to consider relevant, undisputed facts,
such as those which have been stipulated upon by the parties,
testified to by private respondent's witnesses, and admitted in the
answer, which could have justified a different conclusion;
4. held that there was no tort because of a pre-existing contract and
the absence of fault/negligence; and
5. did not award the P25,000.00 actual damages which was agreed
upon by the parties, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees.
At the bottom of the entire proceedings is the act of boring a hole by private
respondent on the vault of the deceased kin of the bereaved petitioners. The latter
allege that such act was either a breach of private respondent's contractual
obligation to provide a sealed vault, or, in the alternative, a negligent act which
constituted a quasi-delict. Nonetheless, petitioners claim that whatever kind of
negligence private respondent has committed, the latter is liable for desecrating the
grave of petitioners' dead.
In the instant case, We are called upon to determine whether the Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc., breached its contract with petitioners; or, alternatively, whether
private respondent was guilty of a tort.
We understand the feelings of petitioners and empathize with them. Unfortunately,
however, We are more inclined to answer the foregoing questions in the negative.
There is not enough ground, both in fact and in law, to justify a reversal of the
decision of the respondent Court and to uphold the pleas of the petitioners.
With respect to herein petitioners' averment that private respondent has
committed culpa aquiliana, the Court of Appeals found no negligent act on the part
of private respondent to justify an award of damages against it. Although a pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of
a culpa aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondent's Court finding that
there was no negligence.
 Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . . (Emphasis
supplied).
In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale
and Certificate of Perpetual Care"6 on August 27, 1969. That agreement
governed the relations of the parties and defined their respective rights and
obligations. Hence, had there been actual negligence on the part of the
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170
of the Civil Code, to wit:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. bound itself to provide the concrete box to
be send in the interment. Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of private respondent
provides that:
Rule 17. Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete
box, or in an outer wall of stone, brick or concrete, the actual
installment of which shall be made by the employees of the
Association.7
Pursuant to this above-mentioned Rule, a concrete vault was provided on July 27,
1978, the day before the interment, and was, on the same day, installed by private
respondent's employees in the grave which was dug earlier. After the burial, the
vault was covered by a cement lid.
Petitioners however claim that private respondent breached its contract with them as
the latter held out in the brochure it distributed that the . . . lot may hold single or
double internment (sic) underground in sealed concrete vault."8 Petitioners claim that
the vault provided by private respondent was not sealed, that is, not waterproof.
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
Consequently, water seeped through the cement enclosure and damaged everything
inside it.
We do not agree. There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of
Perpetual Care and in the Rules and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be waterproof. Private respondent's witness, Mr.
Dexter Heuschkel, explained that the term "sealed" meant "closed."9 On the other
hand, the word "seal" is defined as . . . any of various closures or fastenings . . . that
cannot be opened without rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or
unauthorized opening." 10 The meaning that has been given by private respondent to
the word conforms with the cited dictionary definition. Moreover, it is also quite clear
that "sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". Well settled is the rule that when
the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the
contracting parties, then the literal meaning of the stipulation shall
control. 11 Contracts should be interpreted according to their literal meaning and
should not be interpreted beyond their obvious intendment. 12 As ruled by the
respondent Court:
When plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia affixed his signature to the
Deed of Sale (Exhibit "A") and the attached Rules and Regulations
(Exhibit "1"), it can be assumed that he has accepted defendant-
appellee's undertaking to merely provide a concrete vault. He can
not now claim that said concrete vault must in addition, also be
waterproofed (sic). It is basic that the parties are bound by the
terms of their contract, which is the law between them (Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 178
SCRA 739). Where there is nothing in the contract which is contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy, the
validity of the contract must be sustained (Phil. American Insurance
Co. vs. Judge Pineda, 175 SCRA 416). Consonant with this ruling, a
contracting party cannot incur a liability more than what is expressly
specified in his undertaking. It cannot be extended by implication,
beyond the terms of the contract (Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, supra). And as a rule of evidence,
where the terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the
document itself, being constituted by the parties as the expositor of
their intentions, is the only instrument of evidence in respect of that
agreement which the law will recognize, so long as its (sic) exists for
 the purpose of evidence (Starkie, Ev., pp. 648, 655, Kasheenath vs.
Chundy, 5 W.R. 68 cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court in the
Phil. p. 153, 1973 Ed.). And if the terms of the contract are clear and
leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the
literal meaning of its stipulations shall control (Santos vs. CA, et al.,
G. R. No. 83664, Nov. 13, 1989; Prudential Bank & Trust Co. vs.
Community Builders Co., Inc., 165 SCRA 285; Balatero vs. IAC, 154
SCRA 530). 13
We hold, therefore, that private respondent did not breach the tenor of its obligation
to the Syquias. While this may be so, can private respondent be liable for culpa
aquiliana for boring the hole on the vault? It cannot be denied that the hole made
possible the entry of more water and soil than was natural had there been no hole.
The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by
the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons,
of the time and of the place." 14 In the absence of stipulation or legal provision
providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the performance of the
obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.
The circumstances surrounding the commission of the assailed act — boring of the
hole — negate the allegation of negligence. The reason for the act was explained by
Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, who said that:
Q It has been established in this particular case that
a certain Vicente Juan Syquia was interred on July
25, 1978 at the Parañaque Cemetery of the Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., will you please tell
the Hon. Court what or whether you have
participation in connection with said internment
(sic)?
A A day before Juan (sic) Syquia was buried our
personnel dug a grave. After digging the next
morning a vault was taken and placed in the grave
and when the vault was placed on the grave a hole
was placed on the vault so that water could come
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
into the vault because it was raining heavily then
because the vault has no hole the vault will float and
the grave would be filled with water and the digging
would caved (sic) in and the earth, the earth would
(sic) caved in and fill up the grave. 15 (Emphasis
ours)
Except for the foreman's opinion that the concrete vault may float should there be a
heavy rainfall, from the above-mentioned explanation, private respondent has
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of
water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the
grave filling the same with earth.
Thus, finding no evidence of negligence on the part of private respondent, We find
no reason to award damages in favor of petitioners.
In the light of the foregoing facts, and construed in the language of the applicable
laws and jurisprudence, We are constrained to AFFIRM in toto the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated December 7, 1990. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918
AMADO PICART, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant-appellee.
Alejo Mabanag for appellant.
G. E. Campbell for appellee.
STREET, J.:
In this action the plaintiff, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank
Smith, jr., the sum of P31,000, as damages alleged to have been caused by an
automobile driven by the defendant. From a judgment of the Court of First Instance
of the Province of La Union absolving the defendant from liability the plaintiff has
appealed.
The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place on
December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union. It appears
that upon the occasion in question the plaintiff was riding on his pony over said
bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, the defendant approached from the
opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles
per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his
horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had
taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the
man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the
approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the
bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he
thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. The bridge is
shown to have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters. As the
automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that being the
proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the
horseman would move to the other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright,
and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was
apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some
distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse
without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant quickly turned
his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing
where it as then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close
proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the
bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the
left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its
rider was thrown off with some violence. From the evidence adduced in the case we
believe that when the accident occurred the free space where the pony stood
between the automobile and the railing of the bridge was probably less than one and
one half meters. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention
for several days.
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in maneuvering
his car in the manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to
a civil obligation to repair the damage done; and we are of the opinion that he is so
liable. As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that
the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward
the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done;
and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross
with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of
situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this
moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down
by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed
entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate
stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other
side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision.
Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on until he was almost upon the
horse. He was, we think, deceived into doing this by the fact that the horse had not
yet exhibited fright. But in view of the known nature of horses, there was an
appreciable risk that, if the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles,
he might get exited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. When
the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion,
negligent in the eye of the law.
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may
be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence
in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor
in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy,
or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability
by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and
in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here
be of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their
conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are
not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be
expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn
of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a
result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by
ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be
negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen
that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing
conduct or guarding against its consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that
negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the
defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was
pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse
and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances
the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was
guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But
as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the
problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It
will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous,
since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an
appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with
the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
The decision in the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359)
should perhaps be mentioned in this connection. This Court there held that while
contributory negligence on the part of the person injured did not constitute a bar to
recovery, it could be received in evidence to reduce the damages which would
otherwise have been assessed wholly against the other party. The defendant
company had there employed the plaintiff, as a laborer, to assist in transporting iron
rails from a barge in Manila harbor to the company's yards located not far away. The
rails were conveyed upon cars which were hauled along a narrow track. At certain
spot near the water's edge the track gave way by reason of the combined effect of
TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch
the weight of the car and the insecurity of the road bed. The car was in consequence
upset; the rails slid off; and the plaintiff's leg was caught and broken. It appeared in
evidence that the accident was due to the effects of the typhoon which had
dislodged one of the supports of the track. The court found that the defendant
company was negligent in having failed to repair the bed of the track and also that
the plaintiff was, at the moment of the accident, guilty of contributory negligence in
walking at the side of the car instead of being in front or behind. It was held that
while the defendant was liable to the plaintiff by reason of its negligence in having
failed to keep the track in proper repair nevertheless the amount of the damages
should be reduced on account of the contributory negligence in the plaintiff. As will
be seen the defendant's negligence in that case consisted in an omission only. The
liability of the company arose from its responsibility for the dangerous condition of its
track. In a case like the one now before us, where the defendant was actually
present and operating the automobile which caused the damage, we do not feel
constrained to attempt to weigh the negligence of the respective parties in order to
apportion the damage according to the degree of their relative fault. It is enough to
say that the negligence of the defendant was in this case the immediate and
determining cause of the accident and that the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff
was a more remote factor in the case.
A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special defense pleaded in
the defendant's answer, to the effect that the subject matter of the action had been
previously adjudicated in the court of a justice of the peace. In this connection it
appears that soon after the accident in question occurred, the plaintiff caused
criminal proceedings to be instituted before a justice of the peace charging the
defendant with the infliction of serious injuries (lesiones graves). At the preliminary
investigation the defendant was discharged by the magistrate and the proceedings
were dismissed. Conceding that the acquittal of the defendant at the trial upon the
merits in a criminal prosecution for the offense mentioned would be res adjudicata
upon the question of his civil liability arising from negligence -- a point upon which it
is unnecessary to express an opinion -- the action of the justice of the peace in
dismissing the criminal proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no effect.
(See U. S. vs. Banzuela and Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.)
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court must be
reversed, and judgment is her rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant
the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of other instances. The sum here
awarded is estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the
plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest
on the whole to the date of this recovery. The other damages claimed by the plaintiff
are remote or otherwise of such character as not to be recoverable. So ordered.

TORTS AND DAMAGES/ 1st batch