Habitat International 27 (2003) 271–292

Peru 1957–1977: How time and place influenced John Turner’s ideas on housing policy
Ray Bromley*
Department of Geography and Planning, State University of New York at Albany, Arts & Sciences 224, Albany, NY 12222, USA Received 27 August 2002; accepted 3 September 2002

Abstract John F.C. Turner worked in Peru for several periods between 1957 and 1965, and he developed many of his ideas on aided self-help housing on the basis of his Peruvian experiences. His most famous publications on housing policy, several of them co-authored with the American anthropologist William Mangin who also worked in Peru in the 1950s and 1960s, make extensive use of Peruvian examples. This paper describes Peru in the periods when Turner was there, and in the succeeding decade, pointing out distinctive characteristics of the country and its housing, and outlining the major housing policy debates which raged among Peruvians. Publishing in English in major international journals, Turner was able to draw on abundant Peruvian research, ideas and expertise, and to graphically present Peru’s urban squatter ! ! settlements (barriadas) to a global audience. The contrasting ideas of Fernando Belaunde, Pedro Beltran and Carlos Delgado were particularly influential, leading to innovative government programs. Turner drew on all three of them to some degree, but found his own distinctive middle ground. r 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
! Keywords: Aided self-help housing; John F.C. Turner; Fernando Belaunde; Pedro Beltr! n; Carlos Delgado; Peru a

1. Introduction In a characteristically brief and modest self-description, John Turner presents himself as follows: Born in London in 1927, I was schooled in England and trained as an architect. I have worked mainly in the field of housing. Reoriented by working with self-managing home and
*Tel.: +1-518-442-4766; fax: +1-518-442-4742. E-mail address: r.bromley@albany.edu (R. Bromley). 0197-3975/03/$ - see front matter r 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. PII: S 0 1 9 7 - 3 9 7 5 ( 0 2 ) 0 0 0 4 9 - 8

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neighbourhood builders in Peru (1957–65), I have learnt that what matters in housing are the relationships between people, activity and place. Before leaving South America, I prepared a publication and the script of a documentary film showing how much more people can do than can be done for them, with so much less when free to decide and act for themselves. Opportunities followed to observe and interpret the same facts in other contexts.1 Turner’s work in Peru, some of it in association with his first wife Catherine S. Turner, the British architect Patrick Crooke and the American anthropologist William Mangin, provided the basis for a series of highly influential publications (e.g. Turner, 1963, 1965, 1967, 1968a, b; Turner, Turner, & Crooke, 1963; Mangin, 1963, 1971; Mangin & Turner, 1968, 1969). These publications, and textbook readers edited by Mangin (1970) and Turner and Fichter (1972) drew so heavily on Peruvian cases that the ‘‘Turnerian vision’’ of urbanization, housing and community development in developing countries was in many senses derived from Peru. This article describes Peru over two decades, starting with the years when John Turner was visiting the country for extended periods (1957–1965) and continuing through to 1977, the year when the most ambitious national community development program, known as Sinamos, was dismantled.2 Turner worked in Peru during a period of vigorous national debate about housing policy, community development and aided self-help, and this debate intensified after he left the country, and particularly during the military government of General Juan Velasco (1968–1975). Peru was not just a site for design and field observation by a visiting British architect. It was an exceptionally interesting centre of housing policy debate, with two contrasting schools of thought ! ! led by Fernando Belaunde (1912–2002) and Pedro Beltran (1894–1979), and a third emerging school, which was particularly identified with Carlos Delgado (1926–1980).3 Contrasting views on housing policy were linked to much broader debates on city planning, political ideology, and the nature of democracy. During numerous assignments in Peru between 1957 and 1965, Turner was able to observe and participate in those debates, and to study and advise several reconstruction and upgrading projects in Peruvian shanty towns, usually known locally as barriadas. He had originally been invited to work in the southern city of Arequipa by Eduardo Neira, a young Peruvian architect whom he had met at the International Congress of Modern Architects (CIAM) in Venice in 1950, who shared his interest in the ideas of Patrick Geddes, and who had studied planning at the University of Liverpool. From 1953 till 1959, Neira served as Director of the Department of Urbanism in the Peruvian Ministry of Public Works, and he had been instrumental in establishing OATA, a pilot program to improve the physical condition of Arequipa’s barriadas.4 Soon after Turner joined the program, Arequipa was hit by a major earthquake in January 1958. In the
http://www.wtp.org/Talks/TurnerBio.html. August 8, 2002. Ideas for this paper were developed during numerous visits and extended periods of work in Peru between 1970 and ! 1998, including a period in 1981–1985 working as a USAID-sponsored advisor to the second Belaunde Government. I am especially grateful to the Fulbright Commission for a Senior Fellowship in Lima in 1997, and to the UNI and DESCO for hosting that stay. 3 In Peru most people use both their paternal and maternal surnames, but names can always be shortened to use only ! the paternal surname. The fuller names used in library catalogs (paternal surname underlined) are: Pedro G. Beltran ! Espantoso, Fernando Belaunde Terry, and Carlos Delgado Olivera. 4 OATA’s full title was Oficina de Asistencia T! cnica a las Urbanizaciones Populares de Arequipa. Eduardo Neira’s e role and Turner’s experience in Arequipa are documented in Chavez, Viloria, and Zipperer (2002) and Turner (1972).
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aftermath of the earthquake, and with some support from national and international aid efforts, the Ministry of Public Works expanded its efforts in the city, and Turner advised and promoted self-help rebuilding efforts. In this effort, he was able to draw on the one major source of Spanishlanguage aided self-help manuals, the materials prepared in Puerto Rico from 1939 onwards as local housing and community development specialists developed innovative pilot projects and linked up with US federal agencies to widen their application (Turner, 1972, p. 128; Spohn, 1972, pp. 22–23). The Puerto Rican experience had been closely observed and supported by Jacob L. Crane, who coined the term ‘‘aided self-help housing’’ around 1945 and who, as Head of the International Office of the US National Housing Administration (subsequently Housing and Home Finance Agency) from 1945 to 1954, promoted the concept to US officials and international development agencies (Harris, 1997). Building on his Arequipa experience and his growing network of contacts among Peruvian architects and planners, in the early 1960s, Turner worked in various technical assistance and research projects in Lima, the capital city. Some of the architects who worked with him in Lima have described him to the author as quite fluent in Spanish, creative, genuinely interested in discussion and debate, and especially concerned with low-income housing and the barriadas.5 Turner worked in Peru at a formative period in his career, and during an eventful period of world and national history. Even though he was no longer a participant observer, events and debates intensified in Peru after 1965, and analysis through to 1977 is vital to understanding the potentials and limitations of different housing policies, and particularly the ‘‘aided self-help’’ approach which Turner and his co-authors so strongly recommended in their mid-1960s publications.

2. The peculiarities of Peru There are many reasons why Peru has featured prominently in discussions on housing and urban development, and particularly in discussions on self-help housing in the developing world. John Turner and his co-authors made a major contribution to making the Peruvian case better known internationally, but even if they had not published their case studies and policy proposals, Peru would still be quite well known and frequently discussed. Academic and policy writing about Peru is widely read because the country is physically spectacular, has a rich history and natural resources, and is one of the major nations of Latin America. Its principal language is Spanish, a major world language, and it has deep-rooted intellectual and cultural traditions. The writings of Peruvian social scientists, architects, historians, novelists and political commentators are abundant and often excellent, providing a rich store of data and ideas which is readily available to visiting researchers and consultants. In the global league table of developing countries, Peru occupies an intermediate location: not high enough, like Argentina, Uruguay and Chile, to have had genuine aspirations to developed country status; not low enough like Haiti, Afghanistan or Chad, to acquire an aura of hopelessness. Numerous international flights are available to Lima,
I am especially grateful to Diego Robles and Nicholas Houghton for an interview in 1984, to Marcia Koth, Ernesto ! Paredes, Carlos Williams, Eduardo Gomez de la Torre, Carlos Franco, Francisco Guerra, Julio Cotler, Carlos Reyna and Gustavo Riofr!o, for information provided in 1997, and to William Mangin for information provided during an ı extended interview in December 2001.
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and Cuzco and other areas of the country offer world-class tourist attractions. Peru has several five-star hotels to cater to the tastes of the international development jet set, but mass poverty surrounds the enclaves of wealth. In short, it encapsulates the problems of the third world, and it is attractive to many first world visitors. Peru is usually divided into three major natural regions, the desert coastlands, the Andean highlands, and the vast and sparsely populated Amazonian lowlands. Most settlement is located in the coastlands and in the Andes, and settlement is usually highly visible because of the rugged terrain and relative lack of vegetation in these regions. Rain is rare on the desert coast, and visual contrasts between city, sea, desert, irrigated farmland and mountains are very striking. In the 1950s and 1960s, Peru still had fascinating indigenous traditions, with ancient modes of agriculture and handicrafts, vernacular architecture, folkloric dress, music and festivals, and many people speaking Quechua and Aymara. Nevertheless, the country was at its peak of population growth and urbanization, with massive migration from rural areas and small towns to the coastal cities, and with those cities growing by 5–10 percent each year. Between 1940 and 1972, the national population rose from 6.2 to 13.5 millions, and the percentage living in the primate city of Lima in the central coastlands rose from 9 to 25. In the coastal cities, most urban development is outward into the surrounding desert, and on the poorer and more mountainous sides of the city, it generally takes place through organized squatter invasion of the desert. A few small-scale urban land invasions occurred before 1945, when the Peruvian population was still predominantly rural, but the great majority of invasions have occurred since then (Collier, 1976, pp. 48–49). The invasion process is facilitated by the fact that unsettled desert land is officially virgin land held by the state, and the government has traditionally been too slow, bureaucratic and politically vulnerable to crack down on squatting. Especially in the 1950s and 1960s, while urban growth was accelerating, new squatter settlements frequently appeared on the urban fringe, and the national and local governments usually allowed them to remain. An elaborate charade emerged, whereby squatter organizers would select and research possible locations, ensuring that no major government or private-sector projects would be impeded, and that no wealthy or military interests would be affected. Subsequently, as they became more established and confident of their de facto rights to the land, the squatters organized to pirate electricity and water supply and to petition for roads, bus routes, public services, legal utilities and land titles. Squatting on virgin land is a particularly visible form of urban development, much easier for the outsider to comprehend than the illegal subdivision, which ! prevails in such cities as Bogota and Dhaka. Like most developing countries, Peru had striking inequalities between an impoverished and marginalized vast majority of the population, a small middle class, and a traditional oligarchic elite. Those inequalities are highly visible because of the country’s stark terrain, and because the spatial organization of cities has increasingly separated the rich from the poor, with the emergence of exclusive suburbs on the most attractive side of each city, and the spread of barriadas on the other side(s) of the city. The combination of stark terrain, rapid urbanization, organized squatting and sharp social differentiation between neighbourhoods makes Lima a shanty-town photographers’ paradise—a very easy city to take the dramatic images which Turner (1963, 1967, 1968b) used so effectively to illustrate his articles. This visual dimension had a special appeal to architects, planners and geographers, trained in disciplines which emphasize graphic illustration.

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Just as Turner and Crooke used the visual drama of Peruvian shanty towns to capture the imagination of architects, Mangin (1959, 1960), Patch (1967) and Doughty (1970) made major contributions to building urban anthropology as a field, using Peru as a case study. Anthropology had traditionally been the study of the traditional, rural, remote and indigenous heritage, and Peru had long been a major focus for anthropological research because of its pre-Columbian civilizations. In the late 1950s and 1960s, however, Peru was experiencing rapid urbanization, social science research in developing countries was steadily expanding, and anthropology was discovering new intellectual opportunities and audiences studying rural–urban migration and urban social organization. Mangin’s (1970) reader, Peasants in Cities, was global in coverage and at the crest of the wave, starting with five successive case study chapters on Peru and authored by Turner, Mangin and Doughty. The 1960s publications of Turner and Mangin on Peruvian urbanization and barriadas attracted considerable international intention because they were published in English in a variety of prominent places, because there was considerable international interest in Peru, and because the rapid population growth and urbanization of the developing countries was attracting increased worldwide attention. The worry of most observers, and the hope of some, was that the new settlers and shanty towns might be revolutionary. Turner and Mangin presented a picture of continuity, collaboration and progress—a reassuring view for all, who feared violent revolution against the current social order. While Turner and Mangin were still doing their background research for future publications on Peru, several Peruvian researchers were writing and publishing major books on the barriadas in ! ! Spanish, most notably the architect Adolfo Cordova (1958), the physician Carlos Paz-Soldan ! (1957) and the anthropologist Jose Matos Mar (1966), all reporting major surveys conducted in Lima in the mid-1950s. Their books include very thorough inventories and histories of major barriadas, they have many photographs, maps, plans and statistical tables, and they describe community self-help activities and some government support programs in considerable detail. Thus, the urban housing problems and solutions were not discovered by English or American visitors. They were well known to some Peruvian experts, but the expatriate researchers played the lead role in bringing Peru to a global audience. As global housing specialists and development financing institutions learnt more about the situation in Peru and other developing countries, they ! commissioned a new wave of country studies, notably Harris and Hosse’s Housing in Peru (1963) and Dietz, Koth and Silva’s Housing in Latin America (1965). Turner arrived in Peru quite early in the Presidency (1956–1962) of Javier Prado, an elected political conservative who enjoyed the pomp and circumstance of being Head of State, but who had little desire to bring about dramatic changes (Werlich, 1978, p. 266).6 Prado had won the 1956 elections with the support of the outlawed American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) ! Party, defeating Fernando Belaunde, a young architect who put up a remarkably strong showing for a first-time candidate. Prado’s government was heavily criticized for its failure to address major national problems, most notably the plight of peasants and labourers in rural areas where most of the land was controlled by large estates and plantations, and the poverty, ill health and lack of services in the rapidly expanding urban barriadas. Prado’s initial response to criticism was ! to establish a Commission on Agrarian Reform and Housing (CRAV) chaired by Pedro Beltran,
6

This was Prado’s second presidential term. He had previously served as President from 1939 to 1945.

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the country’s leading free-market ideologue and editor of La Prensa, the most conservative and elitist of the country’s daily newspapers. Eduardo Neira served on the Commission and used the opportunity to press for the funding of OATA in Arequipa as an experimental aided self-help program. Prado showed little interest in initiating anything more than pilot programs on the basis of the Commission’s Report (CRAV, 1957), but in July 1959, facing an increasingly difficult ! political and economic situation, he appointed Beltran as Prime Minister. During his 2 years as ! Premier, Beltran made dramatic and unpopular budget cuts, stabilized the economy and currency, and won praise and support from the US government and international financial institutions. ! In the 1962 Presidential elections, V!ctor Raul Haya de la Torre, founder of the newly ı ! legitimized APRA Party, narrowly defeated Fernando Belaunde, who had founded the Popular Action (AP) Party after his 1956 election loss to Manuel Prado. Many senior military officers disliked and feared APRA because of the party’s role in riots, uprisings and attempted assassinations in the 1930s and 1940s, and also because APRA had considerable clandestine support among soldiers and junior officers in the military. The military leadership deposed Prado in a coup just 10 days before Haya was due to assume the Presidency. The ensuing centrist Military Junta ruled for a year and convened new elections in 1963. Allying AP with the Christian ! Democrat (DC) Party, Belaunde narrowly defeated Haya in the 1963 elections, and the military allowed him to take office as President. During the 1960s, however, the military radicalized and ! ! became increasingly frustrated with Belaunde’s government, and in 1968 Belaunde was overthrown in a new military coup. General Juan Velasco assumed the Presidency and ruled ! Peru till 1975, when he was deposed and succeeded by General Francisco Morales Bermudez. Velasco’s government was the most radical in Peru’s history, and particularly in its early years the sociologist Carlos Delgado was very influential on agrarian reform, housing and community ! development issues. Morales Bermudez’s government was more centrist, reversing some of Velasco’s most fundamental reforms. When the military finally decided to give up power and ! called elections in 1980, Belaunde was victorious again and served a full term as President from 1980 till 1985.

3. The Cold War backdrop to Peruvian politics Behind the democratic facade of Peru’s 1956, 1962 and 1963 elections lay a complex national and international history which proscribed some candidates and parties, and which stigmatized and blocked others. This history of political exclusion reflected both worldwide political issues and the idiosyncrasies of national political history (Astiz, 1969). The principal world issue at the time, the Cold War, was the dominant political issue in Peru. Since the publication of The Communist Manifesto (Mark & Engels, 1848), and more dramatically since the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917, world political circles were abuzz with the idea that an emerging proletariat might overthrow the bourgeoisie and install a workers’ state. The Soviet Union exemplified the idea that communism was politically and economically viable, a technological powerhouse which could support worldwide revolution. After the end of the Second World War, with the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and development of nuclear weapons, and with the Maoist Revolution in China and the partition of Korea and Vietnam, the world was split between capitalism and communism, and communism seemed to be on the ascendant.

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From 1945 onwards, world opposition to the rise of communism was led and dominated by the United States, still far richer and significantly more powerful than the Soviet Union, and the hub of the global economy and mass media. Since the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, successive US governments have viewed the Americas as their ‘‘back yard’’ and focused on maintaining ‘‘free trade’’ and protecting American investments, businesses and citizens in Latin American countries. Numerous overt and covert operations have been used to install and maintain ‘‘friendly governments’’ and to protect political allies, even when those allies are dictators. Nevertheless, a great shock came at the end of 1958 when Fidel Castro’s guerrilla army took Havana and installed a revolutionary government in Cuba. Though Cuba was small, the revolution was a massive political and military humiliation for the US government. After US victory in the Spanish American War of 1898, Cuba had been a US colony, and then a puppet state, closely tied to the US market and a playground for US investors, tourists and organized crime. Castro’s revolution was initially more populist than communist in character, but given the intensity and Manichean character of the Cold War, Castro was the enemy. After the US financed the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, Cuba moved into the Soviet Bloc, and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 turned Castro’s Cuba from a temporary irritation into an enduring symbol of communist revolution, an example and potential supporter for insurgencies all over the hemisphere. The Cuban Revolution encouraged many other insurgencies in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s, initially launched from rural mountain and peripheral areas comparable to Cuba’s Sierra Maestra, but from 1963 onwards also including urban guerrilla movements inspired by Uruguay’s Tupamaros. The United States and the other governments in the Hemisphere mobilized swiftly to diplomatically isolate Cuba, consolidating hemispheric support for capitalism through the Alliance for Progress, established in 1961. The Alliance was a curious mix of military aid, often given to repressive conservative dictators and reactionary generals, and ‘‘development aid’’—a package of loans, grants and technical assistance given to more progressive and reformist elements and governments. During the 1960s and early 1970s, military aid had a negative dimension, strengthening the power and prestige of the armed forces, and stimulating military coups in such countries as Peru (1962 and 1968), Brazil (1964), Argentina (1966), Bolivia (1971), Ecuador (1972), and Chile (1973). Whether they took power, or merely pulled strings behind the scenes, the military were in the ascendant because they were responsible for ‘‘fighting communism’’. Latin American countries were now battlegrounds in the Cold War, and the cost to be paid was often the installation of a national security state, with substantial powers of internal surveillance, arbitrary imprisonment, and even the use of torture and disappearance in a ‘‘dirty war’’. The US government covertly supported ‘‘dirty wars’’, but also promoted the ideas of capitalist progress. The words ‘‘reform’’, ‘‘development’’, ‘‘redistribution’’ and ‘‘planning’’ were co-opted to indicate that capitalism could benefit the masses, and that activist capitalist government could swiftly bring great economic benefits to the poor majority of Latin Americans. From the mid-1950s onwards, the US government and associated financial organizations such as the World Bank (IBRD) and Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) were seeking meaningful, politically feasible and relatively inexpensive policies to ensure political stability and the continuity of capitalism in developing countries. Latin America was considered particularly vulnerable because of the revolutionary movement in Cuba, the social tensions associated with population growth, the pressure for agrarian reform in rural areas, and the rapid rate of

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urbanization. Supporting private property was an obvious policy objective because it helped defend the rights of the privileged, and simultaneously expanded the population with a vested interest in social stability and economic growth. Peru’s Prado Administration was an early recipient of aid to strengthen housing finance, providing technical assistance and loans to support new Building Societies and Savings and Loans Associations (Zoumaras, 1986, pp. 176–178). President Eisenhower’s brother Milton records how early in 1960 the President ‘‘had been particularly inspired by a visit to a low-cost housing project in Santiago (Chile). The government has provided land, utilities and foundations for nearly five thousand homes. The people themselves were building their houses, mostly of large wooden blocks which fascinated the President. He walked among thousands of low-income families, talked with them, and visited in their homes. They showered him with flowers. Some hugged him’’ (Eisenhower, 1963, p. 248). The ideas of ‘‘aided self-help’’ and ‘‘sites and services projects’’ were alive and well, and influencing US Latin American policy. In September 1960, through Public Law 86-735, funding and technical assistance for ‘‘aided self-help housing’’ became the official US policy towards Latin America. It was assumed that ‘‘the Latin American governments would assist in acquiring land, the prospective owner would provide the labour, and (the US) would give technical assistance and help finance the cost of materials’’ (Eisenhower, 1963, p. 250). During the Kennedy (1961–1963) and Johnson (1963–1969) Administrations in the US, a broad consensus emerged that the military could not win a war on communism unless development programs could be launched to win the hearts and minds of the impoverished and marginalized masses in Latin America. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address of January 20, 1961 challenged a new generation of Americans to join ‘‘a grand and global allianceyto fight tyranny, poverty, disease, and war’’. He continued ‘‘To those people in the huts and villages across the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves’’. By the end of 1963, 7300 Peace Corps volunteers were in the field, serving in 44 countries, and by June 1966 more than 15,000 volunteers were in the field.7 Peru was substantially involved in the early Peace Corps efforts, and William Mangin served as Deputy Director and then Director of the Peru Program. Thus, self-help and community development were enshrined at the centre of development discourse, emphasizing that the Cold War and the development effort were primarily struggles for the hearts and minds of ordinary people throughout the world, and that development efforts had to reach every household and home in the poor nations. Responding to the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations’ new emphasis on development programs for poor nations, including self-help housing, the US Congress (1962, 1963) held hearings on international housing policy. The sixties was also a period of rapid expansion of higher education in the US and Western Europe, and universities substantially increased the volume of coursework and research on international development, population growth and urbanization.

4. Peru in the cold war world Peru was one of the first countries after Cuba to develop substantial insurgent and guerrilla movements in the mountainous interior. A wave of peasant uprisings led by the Trotskyist Hugo
7

http://www.peacecorps.gov/about/history/decades/60s.cfm. August 11, 2002.

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! Blanco occurred in the La Convencion area east of Cuzco between 1958 and 1962 (Blanco 1972). In 1965 two guerrilla groups known as the MIR and ELN, inspired by the Cuban Revolution, began operations in four different areas of the highlands and were suppressed within a few months by the determined action of the armed forces (Bejar, 1969; Werlich, 1978, pp. 285–286). The pressure of the insurgencies and the rising wave of development aid associated with the Alliance for Progress stimulated centrist political parties promising accelerated development. For politicians, the mandate was to bring about dramatic socio-economic progress while supporting the military campaign against internal subversion. For military officers, the old code of professionalism, which viewed the military as an arm of the state, was being replaced by a national security doctrine which enshrined the military as the heart of the state and the ultimate guardians against both internal dissent and external invasion. Military officers became increasingly convinced that the war on communism had both civil and military dimensions and could be facilitated by establishing a military government. Since national independence in 1820, Peruvian political radicalism has taken many curious turns. Anarchism, communism and socialism were all widely discussed in radical circles in the 1910s, 1920s and 1930s, and the example of the US New Deal inspired many Peruvian intellectuals to envision a strong and more active state, building infrastructure, promoting industrialization, and providing a much broader range of services. Trotskyism, and later Maoism, emerged as ultraradical communist alternatives to Marxism–Leninism. The most Peruvian of all radical movements was the APRA Party, founded by Haya in 1924 and bathed in ideological confusion. Many of its early leaders were middle class and from the northern coastal cities; yet Haya founded the movement from Mexico announcing it as a Pan-American Party, and later describing it as ‘‘Indo-American’’ and anti-imperialist. As Aprismo gathered momentum in Peru, it presented itself as a socialist revolutionary movement of workers and peasants, sponsoring strikes and demonstrations, and then a failed 1932 uprising in Trujillo. The result was great bitterness between APRA’s rank-and-file membership and Peruvian military leaders, and the approval of a clause in the Constitution of 1933 which outlawed ‘‘political parties of international organization’’ a clause which was intended to exclude communism, socialism and Aprismo from formal participation in electoral politics. The APRA leadership gradually moved to the political centre, and the ban on APRA was eliminated after they supported Manuel Prado’s successful election campaign in 1956. In contrast, the ban on communist candidates continued till the approval of a new Constitution in 1979. Three important new parties were founded in 1956 to compete with APRA for the political ! centre: Belaunde’s AP, DC, and Social Progressivism (MSP). APRA, AP, DC and MSP shared many common ideas, but in different ways they reflected the national heritage of personalism and factionalism in politics, accentuated by the weakness of democratic institutions resulting from the country’s long history of military coups and suspensions of constitutional rights. Trying to avoid accusations that they were ‘‘political parties of international organization’’ APRA, AP, DC and MSP all sought ‘‘a third way’’ based on Peru’s national heritage—neither capitalism, not communism, but a middle road which facilitates peaceful progress. Peru’s Catholic traditions provided a vital starting point, explicit for the DC, and implicit for the other three parties. From the promulgation of the encyclical Rerum Novarum in 1891 till Vatican II (1962–1965) and the promulgation of the encyclical Populorum Progressio in 1967, the Catholic Church gradually developed a Social Doctrine calling for reforms and economic redistribution designed to maintain

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the allegiance of the masses, and thus to frustrate communist revolution. The central ideas are cooperatives, corporatism (the organization and representation of functional interest groups), and collective bargaining, whereby a strong state brings the representatives of capital and labour to the negotiating table, persuading both to be reasonable and compromise in the national interest (Mich, 1998). In the late 1950s and early 1960s, APRA and AP were the dominant centrist parties with strong charismatic leaders and a membership mixing centre-left and centre-right tendencies. The DC was smaller, lacking strong leadership but also mixing centre-left and centre-right tendencies. The MSP was smaller still and consisted mainly of centre-left Lima intellectuals. It never attracted much voter support because it had no charismatic leader and because its members seemed much more interested in research and planning than in electoral populism and the rough and tumble of parliamentary politics. Nevertheless, the MSP and the more radical sections of the DC had a major influence on Peru’s future because several of their leaders taught in the Centre for Higher Military Studies (CAEM), the national academy for outstanding young military officers. As a result, planning, cooperatives and worker management emerged as major priorities among the radical military officers who gained some governmental experience under the 1962–1963 Military Junta, and who formed the majority in General Velasco’s 1968–1975 military government (Villanueva, 1972). The radicalism of the Peruvian military in the late 1960s was deeply committed to finding a distinctive Peruvian third way; nationalist, Catholic, anti-capitalist, anti-communist, and tercermondiste (Einaudi, 1976). Among the nations of Latin America, Peru has one of the strongest and oldest senses of nationalism. The dominant element is a deep sense of pride that Lima was the administrative centre of Spanish colonial rule in South America, and thus embodies Spanish administrative, religious, military and cultural traditions. As a primate city about ten times the size of Arequipa and Trujillo, the next-largest cities, Lima still maintains a striking degree of intellectual, financial and administrative preeminence over Peru, a country which is now much smaller than the preceding Colonial Viceroyalty. Just as Peru, focusing on Lima, was a centre for authoritarian Spanish rule, it was also part of the vast Inca Empire, one of the three great civilizations conquered by the Spanish when they incorporated the Americas into their colonial empire. Highland Peru, centred on Cuzco, the old Inca capital, represents a vital secondary dimension to Peruvian nationalism—the depth of pride in indigenous civilization, and the heritage of South ! America’s greatest indigenous rebellion against colonialism, the movement led by Tupac Amaru II in 1780–1782. Along with Mexico, Peru’s nationalism is heavily tinged with pride in a great indigenous and colonial past, and resentment that much of the grandeur and territories of the past have been lost to other nations. A vital theme in Peruvian nationalism, shared across the political spectrum, is the belief that Peru has a heritage of communal activity and organization. The Inca Empire and many of the indigenous civilizations that preceded and sometimes co-existed with it, was in no sense ‘‘capitalist’’. In comparison with their contemporaries in most other parts of the world, the civilizations of ancient Peru had extraordinary engineering and agricultural technologies, excellent communications, and an impressive system of warehousing and inter-regional trade. Lands were held and used in common by the indigenous communities (ayllus). They also had traditions, known in Quechua as the minga and the faena, whereby teams of community members built public works, and neighbours helped one another in such tasks as planting and harvesting crops,

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repairing roads and canals, and roofing houses. Individualism and competitive behaviour were suppressed in many fields of social and economic activity, and communal organization and ownership were emphasized. To the Peruvian socialist Hildebrando Castro Pozo (1924), to the ! ! leading early Peruvian Marxist Jose Carlos Mariategui (1928), and to the renowned French scholar Louis Baudin (1940), the Incas had a sophisticated form of socialism. This led them to argue that the Spanish Conquest had been totally negative, destroying indigenous civilization and values, and replacing them with individualism, exploitation and mass poverty. In contrast, the ! ! ! famous conservative philosopher V!ctor Andres Belaunde (1943), uncle of Fernando Belaunde, ı argued that ancient Peru was notable for communal organization and cooperation, but it lacked Christianity, writing, the wheel, a global view, and the great philosophical traditions of the Renaissance. Peru’s great merit, therefore, is in its unique blend of indigenous and Spanish cultural traditions, rather than in its indigenous heritage or its Spanish heritage. Just as Europeans and Native Americans have mixed ethnically in Peru for almost five centuries, their cultures have blended to create a unique Peruvian culture. In this vision, the communal traditions of the ayllu, minga and faena are positive attributes which persist in indigenous communities, and which represent a distinctive Native American contribution to Peru’s national character. Just as the Spanish brought new forms of individualism, competition, entrepreneurship and economic organization, leading gradually to the development of capitalist corporations in Peru, Peruvians are also seen as having a natural propensity to organize communally, work together, and volunteer. Both from left and right, therefore, there is extensive Peruvian scholarship that links the nation’s indigenous traditions and rural communities with communal organization and land ownership. Whether or not Peru has more communal organization than other Latin American nations is uncertain, but Peru certainly has a twentieth century history of discussion, assertion and policy-making about communal organization. Communal organization embodies Peruvian nationalist and democratic values, and it represents a resource of labour vital to a poor country where investment capital is always scarce. In the 1950s and 1960s, significant areas of the country were still owned and operated by ‘‘indigenous communities’’, communal forms of land tenure by Native American groups.

5. Bela! nde, Beltr! n, Delgado, and housing policy u a ! Fernando Belaunde has a credible claim to being the most important architect to hold high political office anywhere in the world. Architects who serve as Heads of State are few and far between. Some, like Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States from 1801 to 1809, had no formal training, while others like Sixto Duran Ballen, President of Ecuador from 1992 to 1996, ! were remarkably unsuccessful. Opinions about Belaunde’s successes and failures as President of Peru are quite mixed, but taking into account both his Presidential terms, 1963–1968 and 1980–1985, he was one of the nation’s longest-serving Presidents, and when he died in June 2002 he was acclaimed as a true democrat and a great Peruvian. In 1968 he was deposed and exiled, but he was vindicated by the Peruvian people when the military finally relinquished office and he was ! re-elected President in 1980. Though corruption was far from absent in Belaunde’s party and

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governments, he maintained an impeccable personal reputation as someone who never enriched himself from political office. ! Belaunde came from a prosperous Arequipa family, which included several notable lawyers, intellectuals, politicians and diplomats. In 1919 his father was exiled from Peru, and Fernando continued his education in Europe and the United States, graduating as an Architect in 1935 from the University of Texas at Austin. He returned to Peru in 1936 and joined other foreign-educated architects in a successful campaign to establish architecture as a profession in Peru. In 1937 he established and edited a journal El Arquitecto Peruano (Zapata, 1995). In 1943 he began teaching in the newly established Architecture Department at the National Engineering School, which later became the Architecture School in the National Engineering University (UNI). In 1944 he helped found the Institute of Urbanism of Peru, and the Institute later became a Graduate Training and Research Centre at UNI. In 1945 he was elected to Congress as one of the leaders of the National ! Democratic Front, which supported the presidential candidacy of Jose Luis Bustamante y Rivero. ! For a time, after Bustamante y Rivero’s election in 1945, Rafael Belaunde, Fernando’s father, served as Prime Minister, and Fernando played the leading role in promoting three new housing laws: a condominium law to facilitate ownership of apartments in apartment blocks,8 the establishment of the National Urban Planning Office (ONPU), and the creation of a National Housing Corporation (CNV) as an autonomous public authority. The CNV developed a National Affordable Housing Plan, which prioritized the construction of unidades vecinales, apartment complexes targeted at middle income groups and consisting mainly of four-storey walk-up apartments. Only a few apartment complexes were initiated before Bustamante y Rivero was deposed by General Manuel Odr!a in 1948, but the CNV continued its projects under Odr!a. ı ı ! During Odr!a’s corrupt and despotic rule from 1948 till 1956, Belaunde returned to full-time ı teaching at the UNI, and for most of the time he served as Dean of the School of Architecture. Through his journal, his leading role in professional associations, his teaching and his deanship, he worked to promote the idea of urban apartment complexes as the dominant element of national housing policy. The designs he displayed were always modern in style, sometimes 3–4 storey walk-ups, sometimes taller buildings with elevators. The aim was to involve government directly in designing and financing apartment complexes, in commissioning their construction by private sector contractors, and in selecting tenants for rental apartments and buyers for condominiums. He recommended that apartment complexes be located near transport nodes so as to promote denser, more compact urban development with efficient transportation and utility networks. ! In his energetic first presidential election bid in 1956, Belaunde developed a distinctive political philosophy, blending a passion for public works construction, including roads, bridges, dams and apartment complexes, a fascination for visiting remote communities, and a fervent and highly ! ! idiosyncratic nationalism (Belaunde, 1959, 1960). Following his uncle’s lead (Belaunde, 1942), he emphasized Peru’s unique cultural identity blending indigenous and Spanish institutions and traditions, the agricultural and engineering sophistication and the social organization of the Inca Empire, the importance of public works to break down the isolation of the country’s remote
In Peru the underlying concept is known as ‘‘propiedad horizontal del suelo’’. It allows each apartment owner to register his/her property individually, even though all apartments in the building occupy the same piece of land. Registering apartments individually made it possible for each owner to take out a mortgage on his/her property.
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towns, villages and rural communities, the nation’s rich natural and human resources, and the potential of communal labour as a means to build infrastructure and increase production (Bourricaud, 1970, pp. 229–258). His doctrine was nationalist, populist, and anti-communist. He chose the spade as a symbol for his party, indicating Peru’s enormous potential for agriculture and public works, and the extent to which the whole population could become involved. His early * followers, mainly young Limeno professionals including many architects, also traveled widely, extolling Peru’s heritage and natural wonders, and advocating public works, communal labour and CNV apartment complexes as the prime solutions to the nation’s problems. ! Belaunde particularly emphasized the role that municipalities and government community ! development workers could play in support of communal labour, promising to make Cooperacion Popular (Coopop), ‘‘popular cooperation’’, a major program of any AP government. He explained his program as follows: Local problems can and should be solved locallyysupplicatory requests to the government in Lima should be eliminated andythere is an enormous and infinitely expandable source of capital in the towns to be released through community action. This immense fountain of capital can be implemented by means of an organic law decentralizing authority and by which the government not only provides aid and technical assistance, but also a positive economic support to function automatically. Such support should be free of bureaucratic routine, y and not require the intervention of any political bosses. To help he who helps himself; this should be the motto of this campaign to organize community action. yProperly organized, stimulated ! and generalized, cooperacion popular in local affairs is truly classical democracyyI have always proclaimed that this law is fundamentally based in our deep historical traditions, and a vigorous Peru can, and will, be built upon it.9 ! Belaunde’s apartment complexes and Coopop contrasted sharply with the visions of his neo! Liberal contemporary Pedro Beltran. Educated at the London School of Economics and an ! admirer of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, Beltran campaigned for a small and efficient state apparatus emphasizing law, order, and fiscal discipline, and for public policies to support and promote private sector housing projects. In the 1950s’ articles and editorials in La Prensa, he argued that conditions in the barriadas caused high rates of sickness and mortality, promiscuity, ! alienation and delinquency (Beltran, 1994, pp. 170–174). He advocated government support for private sector developers to create many new residential subdivisions on vacant land suitable for urban development. In a January 1955 editorial, he wrote: If they are to be an attractive business for the investor, residential subdivisions targeted at the mass market must receive incentives to assist in their finance. Thus, for example, they must allow the sale of lots as soon as the plans for the subdivision have been approved, instead of waiting for all the infrastructure to be completed. The developer will rapidly recover his money and will depend less on the banks and offer them better guarantees, saving on interest, reducing the cost of the land, and attracting new buyersyIf new residential subdivision is profitable business, there is no doubt that private sector capital will become available to urbanize the unused lands which the state has reserved for this purpose. yOnce each poor family in Peru
! ! Originally published in Spanish (Belaunde, 1960). The quote is taken from the English version (Belaunde, 1965, pp. 102–104).
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can thus acquire a cheap lot, what has so far been the greatest problem in housing will have been solved. What remains to be arranged is the individual financing of the house which each family wishes to build on their land. Mortgage credit is the obvious solution. yDealing with long-term loans such as mortgages, the only way to obtain the necessary capital is to sell savings bonds whose interest rates are attractive to investors. To ensure that construction is an attractive field of investment for private sector capital, the fees and taxes on corporate profits should be abolished. Other modes of stimulus would be to eliminate taxes on utilities and rent payments, to make the reinvestment of corporate profits and personal incomes in subdivisions and affordable housing tax exempt; to exempt the owners of affordable housing from real ! property taxes; and evenyexemptions from inheritance tax. (Beltran, 1994, p. 173)10 ! Without using the name ‘‘sites and services scheme’’, Beltran was envisaging private sector real estate developments which would function as sites and services schemes. Government would be responsible for law, order, property titles and general oversight of location, subdivision and utilities, real estate developers would play the central role in creating housing opportunities, and individual plot owners with utilities and property titles would take out mortgages to fund construction of their houses. Each house would have a design and pace of construction to match the tastes, circumstances and funding capacity of its owner. ! Beltran’s housing policy was based on private sector provision of sites and services schemes and tracts of mass-produced housing on the urban periphery, combined with government support of private property, corporate investment, Building Societies and Savings and Loans Associations for housing finance, and the eradication of any new barriadas as illegal squatter settlements.11 In 1960, as Prime Minister, he established a National Housing Institute (INVI), where Turner worked for a time, and he launched a satellite city project at Ventanilla, 25 kms north-west of downtown Lima. Ventanilla was designed to be a complete city with industry, services, and 20,000 housing units for 80,000 people in ten neighbourhoods. The housing was low-rise, single-family development of lots with basic core structures, giving purchasers the option to extend sideways or build upward sometime after acquiring title. Though USAID and the IDB offered financial ! support in 1961, Beltran’s departure from the Premiership was a severe blow to the project. Up till 1969, progress on locating industry in the area was very slow and only 2451 lots were developed in accordance with the original plan (Municipalidad de Ventanilla, 1992, p. 13; Austin & Lewis, 1970, p. 145). ! When it took office in 1963, Belaunde’s newly elected AP–DC coalition government embarked on an energetic program of public works, popular cooperation, import substitution and agrarian reform, but on all fronts its achievements were much less than its enthusiastic publicity tended to ! suggest. Belaunde’s lack of a Congressional majority, a difficult national economic situation, his lack of understanding of economic policy issues, and the emergence of revolutionary movements in the interior all weakened his first government. Nevertheless, the National Housing Board (JNV), a successor to the CNV and INVI, developed several apartment complexes in Lima, the
My translation from the article reprinted in Beltr! n (1994). a ! Ironically, in December 1954 Beltran had strongly supported Ciudad de Dios, a large squatter invasion which took place in Lima. He acted as a leader of political opposition to President Odr!a, as editor of La Prensa, and as a columnist ı on housing policy who argued that only greatly increased private sector involvement in providing sites, services and housing could solve the emerging urban housing crisis (Collier, 1976, p. 70).
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largest being San Felipe with 1600 apartments for upper middle income families (Austin & Lewis, 1970, p. 138). The AP–DC government held municipal elections in 1963, ending a period of over 40 years in which mayors and councils had been appointed by central government (Austin & Lewis, 1970, p. 55), but they did not embark on the sweeping political and fiscal decentralization ! which Belaunde had called for before he was elected. Coopop was launched enthusiastically in 1963 as Peru’s internal equivalent of President ! Kennedy’s Peace Corps. Belaunde pushed Coopop towards ambitious public works projects, especially roads, but some of the most successful efforts were smaller-scale efforts upgrading villages and shanty towns. Digging and cleaning drainage ditches, leveling streets, creating small sports grounds, and building schoolrooms and community centres were among the most popular projects. The indigenous traditions of the minga and faena were often invoked as a precedent, and many communal efforts were now branded as Coopop, even if the program was not formally involved. Nevertheless, results were very mixed, and government support for Coopop was reduced within 2 years of its ambitious beginnings. Logistic and financial support for the volunteers was inadequate, many of the public works projects initiated were badly designed or overly ambitious, and APRA and left-wing politicians and trade unionists often persuaded local groups not to volunteer to work as a gesture of political opposition to the government. Meanwhile, rumors spread that some of the most energetic and effective Coopop promoters were political agitators, and that the organization of community labour would lead the impoverished masses to consider political mobilization. The enthusiasm and idealism of young AP and DC volunteers in Coopop, promoting community development and a new democratic vision of Peru, was viewed by many conservatives as dangerous meddling in the established social order inspiring grass-root demands which could never be satisfied. The guerrilla insurgencies in Peru’s interior in 1965 were crippling blows to Coopop, forcing some workers to abandon their posts, and further strengthening the conservative and Aprista voices that denounced the program as AP demagoguery, exploitation of labour, and a cover for leftist students hoping to stir up the masses. If Coopop had focused on the cities and been implemented on a large scale as ‘‘aided self-help’’ barriada upgrading, it could have been the basis for an affordable housing strategy for the nation’s poor majority. In reality, however, the program was much too small, weak and rurally focused to have substantial impact in Peru’s major cities. The peripheral barriadas around Lima ! and other major cities continued to grow rapidly throughout the 1960s, and the Belaunde administration had little to offer in support of these new settlements. ! ! Belaunde and Beltran’s preferred housing projects differed on questions of urban design, with ! ! Belaunde favouring higher densities and apartment living while Beltran favoured lower densities ! and single-family houses. Belaunde sought strategic locations with higher land values, seeking to ! raise population density and support transit systems, while Beltran advocated new housing and ! sites and services schemes on the urban periphery where land was abundant and cheap. Belaunde ! preferred urban renewal, infilling, superblocks and smart growth, while Beltran followed an ! ! American model of suburbanization and residential subdivision. Both Belaunde and Beltran favoured targeting housing construction at the middle class, under the logic that the wealthy could deal with their own housing needs, and that government should not support the construction of housing that does not fulfill basic minimum standards comparable to those of Western Europe ! ! and North America. Belaunde and Beltran both recognized that many poor people had inadequate housing, and that only a minority could benefit from ‘‘trickling down’’ of former

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middle-class housing. Both of them rejected highly subsidized low-income public housing as a solution. Instead, they advocated policies which could have formed the basis for large-scale ! affordable housing programs; Belaunde through Coopop aiding community self-help in settlement ! upgrading, and Beltran through real estate developers creating sites and services schemes on the urban periphery and in new satellite towns, and through greatly expanded property titling and housing finance programs. For some of the young AP and DC volunteers who worked in Coopop in the first 2 years, the experience was both exciting and frustrating; a great learning opportunity on the potential of community development, and also a realization that effective development programs need more funding and technical support than was available. Many of these volunteers envisioned new and expanded forms of Coopop for a future government more committed to grass-root development. Similarly, many of the young military officers who participated in the successful campaign against the various 1965 guerilla movements, and especially those who had also taken social science courses from MSP and DC professors at CAEM, saw Coopop as the basis for something much bigger and greater, a government program which would simultaneously bring government to the grass roots, and mobilize grass-root support for government. This line of thinking culminated in the establishment of Sinamos in 1971, the high point of military radicalism. Velasco’s early speeches, written by Carlos Delgado, a former Aprista who served as advisor to the President, promised to liberate ordinary Peruvians from poverty, servitude and imperialism (Velasco, 1972), seeking a ‘‘third way’’ between capitalism and communism, a peaceful revolution based on cooperatives, corporatism and the civic ideals of the military. The flagship program was agrarian reform, which rapidly transferred the large estates and plantations to peasant and worker cooperatives. Major plantations belonging to transnational corporations were expropriated and converted to worker cooperatives, and major mines were expropriated and transformed into state corporations. Power production, irrigation and industrialization schemes were launched in the hope of accelerating economic development, and programs were announced to gradually convert government and private corporations to ‘‘social property companies’’ with worker participation in ownership and management. Peru’s shanty towns were officially renamed from barriadas, a negative term implying peripheral slums, to pueblos jovenes, ‘‘young towns’’, a positive expression of hope and progress. Two months after taking power Velasco established ONDEPJOV, the National Office for Young Towns, to promote aided self-help. Peru’s conservative elites were outraged at the military government’s rhetoric and policies, and ! ! Beltran (1976) and Belaunde (Chirinos 1987, p. 97) both denounced Velasco’s revolution as antidemocratic, statist, corrupt, abusive of human rights, and hopelessly inefficient. Nevertheless, in its early years, Velasco’s government enjoyed considerable popular support, and up to 1973 the national economy performed well while world prices for Peru’s major commodity exports were rising (Thorp & Bertram, 1978, p. 305). Sinamos was advised and largely designed by Carlos Delgado, but it was headed by military officers. It was created by fusing a variety of urban, rural and regional development and public works agencies, including ONDEPJOV and what remained of Coopop, and it had an elaborate system of regional and local offices. A civilian staff worked under the military leadership, drawing mainly on the staff of the agencies absorbed by Sinamos, and on radical advisors, researchers, trainers and writers, many of them previously identified with centre-left political groups. The name Sinamos was both an acronym for National System of Support for Social Mobilization, and

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a play on the words ‘‘sin amos’’, which translate as ‘‘without masters’’, symbolizing the liberation of the poor majority of Peruvians from oligarchic rule and feudal exploitation. The trigger for the establishment of Sinamos came in 1971 when a major land invasion in Lima was relocated from Pamplona to create Villa el Salvador, a massive sites and services scheme on the southern periphery of the city (Dietz, 1980, p. 27). Building on that experience, Sinamos assumed prime responsibility for government policy towards shanty towns. Delgado’s (1973, 1974, 1976) vision for Sinamos was an integral part of his broader vision for Velasco’s revolutionary government. He believed that strong central power, suppressing traditional democratic mechanisms, was essential to expropriate property from local elites and transnational corporations, and to transfer that property to the people. He argued that such property should not be assigned to individuals, but should be owned and used by the community. In the case of agriculture and industry, it should be ‘‘social property’’ organized into cooperative groups, which could share, manage and increase production. In the case of housing, it might be cooperative or leasehold, with restrictions on sale to prevent speculation and gentrification. He placed great emphasis on group decision-making for management and planning of enterprises and settlements, and on the availability of technical assistance from Sinamos experts. His ambitious vision for Sinamos needed much more budget than the agency actually received, and at least a decade of largely top-down management so as to organize and educate the grass-root participants. His hope in the long-term was that the socially mobilized settlements and enterprises would eventually form a bottom-up system of political participation, canalizing the people’s views to the highest levels of government and ensuring democracy through corporatist representation in functional organizations. Delgado’s vision for Sinamos as a means to gradually shift Peru from a top-down authoritarian system to a bottom-up participatory democracy was bold but na.ve. It is almost inconceivable that ı a military government, based on the tradition of strict command and control, could gradually evolve into a people’s democracy. Within Peru, Velasco’s government was strongly criticized from both left and right. The traditional political parties resented being displaced, the electoral democratic system had been overthrown, and local elites and transnational corporations were bitter about the loss of their property. Leftist unions, parties and revolutionary groups resented the military’s cooptation of radical rhetoric. The US government and transnational corporations were fearful that similar regimes could take power in other countries, nationalizing foreign investments, threatening private property, and propagating a dangerous tercermondiste rhetoric which could lead many countries to stop paying interest on their international debts. Most of Peru’s military leaders were more conservative than Velasco, and even Velasco probably did not share Delgado’s idealism. What was important in the early years was to use radical and redistributive rhetoric to win popular support, expressed through cheering crowds at public rallies, and Sinamos was given the main role of enlisting the general public and providing free transport, food and other benefits to win their favour. Nevertheless, by 1975 Velasco’s government had lost much of its early support. The press and some television channels and radio stations were under government control, often appearing as a crude propaganda machine (Booth, 1983). The President’s health was failing, the economy was stagnating as demand for Peru’s exports diminished and key commodity prices fell, and some of the cooperative institutions established in the agrarian reform and social property programs were proving to be remarkably inefficient. Advisors to cooperative enterprises were often corrupt or incompetent, and the reality

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of popular participation was falling far behind the rhetoric. The people were mobilized in support of government programs, but their real voices and concerns often went unheard. From its beginnings, Sinamos was a controversial and underfunded agency. It lost influence as the economic situation and Velasco’s hold on power weakened after 1973, it was further weakened ! when Velasco was overthrown by General Morales Bermudez in 1975, and it was finally abolished in 1977. There are many different interpretations of what Sinamos was, and what it was intended to become (Collier, 1975, pp. 152–160). To the radicals in Velasco’s government, Sinamos was a corporatist means to mobilize support for the President and to guarantee the support base of the revolution, and it would eventually develop into new form of peoples’ democracy. To more conservative elements in the military, however, it demonstrated how Velasco’s revolution was getting out of control, and could lead to popular uprisings against authoritarian rule. Many representatives of the old political parties saw Sinamos as an attempt by the military to found their own political movement, and eventually to create a party apparatus or even a one-party state. Some observers saw it as a weak government agency intended to coordinate public works and communal projects in rural areas and urban shanty towns, but unable to respond to more than a small proportion of the needs for such projects throughout the country. Others saw it as a crude attempt to extend the governmental apparatus into every community, and to inventory, authorize and control all organizations, meetings and political activities.

6. Conclusion: John Turner on the middle ground John Turner’s philosophy of aided self-help and dweller control of housing has abundant parallels in the writings and projects of such earlier figures as Patrick Geddes (Tyrwhitt, 1947), Ernst May (Henderson, 1990) and Jacob Crane (Harris, 1997, 1998). In Peru, Turner’s work paralleled and interacted with the perceptions and concerns of local observers, and it ! ! occupied a middle ground. He argued that Belaunde’s apartment complexes and Beltran’s residential subdivisions were too expensive to satisfy popular demand, and that much more could be achieved for those in greatest need by a nationwide program of government support for communal projects and initiatives, including small public works, infrastructure and land-titling. ! ! Belaunde’s Coopop and Beltran’s developer sites and services schemes were significant steps towards this middle ground. In contrast, Delgado’s Sinamos tried to go far beyond what Turner envisaged, creating a complex, hierarchical structure which seemed oriented to social control, but which was supposed to lead to an unprecedented system of people’s democracy. The Peruvian shanty-town upgrading process under Velasco is wonderfully summarized by Rodr!guez, Riofr!o, and Welsh (1971) in their book De Invasores a Invadidos, ‘‘From Invaders to ı ı Invaded’’ and in the follow-up volume (Riofr!o & Rodr!guez, 1980). These books explain how ı ı during the 1960s and 1970s Lima squatter settlements became more and more documented, advised, regulated and controlled by government agencies. The barriadas were gradually co-opted with ‘‘aid’’ to their self-help activities, so that successive governments could monitor and control local leadership, implement low-cost local development programs, and build political support for their regime. Meanwhile, opposition parties encouraged non-participation in government programs for existing barriadas, and they sometimes supported or organized new squatter

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invasions to create barriadas in direct opposition to the current regime (Collier, 1975, p. 136). The barriadas were, and still are, highly politicized environments. The worldwide diffusion of Turner’s ideas and writings in the 1960s, and the subsequent mushrooming of his reputation in the 1970s as the pre-eminent authority on low-income housing in developing countries, is more related to the origins and timing of his ideas than to their radicalism or originality. Studies of Peruvian barriadas by Turner and Mangin helped to build and widen knowledge of rapid urbanization, the social and physical conditions in shanty towns, and the ways in which self-help and community development might be harnessed in neighbourhood upgrading. Turner and Mangin’s works hit mainstream architecture and anthropology in the United States and other Anglophone countries just as interest in Third World shanty towns was mushrooming. Theirs were not the first studies, or the experiences which formed United Nations, World Bank or Alliance for Progress policy, but they were timely, brief and highly graphic. They supported what seemed a new academic discovery at the time, that the rapidly expanding shanty towns of third world cities were mainly neighbourhoods of optimism and progress, rather than festering slums of despair. The barriada development process in Lima and other coastal Peruvian cities was a striking example of how poor and middle-income people could obtain private property without apparently harming the rights of more privileged groups. Though squatting was illegal, it seemed like a victimless crime, which increased stability and satisfied basic needs. At the height of the Cold War, when books like Latin America: Reform or Revolution? (Petras & Zeitlin, 1968), The Rape of the Peasantry (Feder, 1971) and Open Veins of Latin America (Galeano, 1973) were required reading, the barriada story that Turner and Mangin told so vividly provided a new sense of optimism based on the power of the human spirit and the value of hard work, self-help and community collaboration. Closer study of the Peruvian case in the late 1960s and early 1970s, focusing on the weakness of Coopop and the demise of Sinamos, might have revealed a different picture. Since the early 1950s, barriada development had provided abundant opportunities for political patronage and clientelism to a variety of regimes (Collier, 1976), enabling governments to favour their supporters and squatters to trade their support for land rights. Coopop and Sinamos provide vibrant examples of the serious problems which aided selfhelp housing policies must confront: the struggle of political parties and the military to control and co-opt popular participation; the fears of military and economic elites that grass-root community development may lead to revolution; the inefficiency and self-interest of central government bureaucracy when dealing with thousands of small, local problems across a large national territory; and, the problems of coordination and implementation which result when major national public works programs require local participation in planning and implementation. In many senses, a ‘‘national aided self-help housing policy’’ is a contradiction in terms, emphasizing top-down decision-making instead of grass-root empowerment, creating great potential for bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption, and turning community development into a party political or civil–military battle for the hearts, minds, votes and applause of the masses. Around the mid-point of Velasco’s government, the most ambitiously statist regime in Peru’s history, Turner and Fichter published Freedom to Build, a collection of essays intended to span the world, rather than to focus on Peru. On the very first page, they wrote: ‘‘The urgency of a basic shelter problem cannot be ignored; but neither the shelter problem nor the manifold social

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problems of which it is a part can be solved by bureaucratically administered, politically imposed programs’’ (Turner & Fichter, 1972, p. 8). The complex history of housing policy in Peru between 1957 and 1977 demonstrates the wisdom of this statement. Peru’s principal problem was, and still is, political centralism seeking to co-opt and control local initiatives. Successive national governments of different ideological tendencies have done little to change this fundamental characteristic of the nation. Peru has been a fount of ideas and innovation in housing policy, but visitors are still struck by the harsh living conditions and poor housing of most of the Peruvian population.

References
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