You are on page 1of 22

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.

BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA,
respondents.

Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf.

Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION TO


INVESTIGATE OFFENSE COMMITTED BY JUDGE WHETHER OR NOT OFFENSE RELATES
TO OFFICIAL DUTIES; REASON. — Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over said cases despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the
offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the
control and supervision of the Supreme Court . . . The Court disagrees with the first part of
petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to
offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate
of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency
under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the
Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO OFFICIAL DUTIES


SUBJECT TO PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST JUDGE BY SUPREME
COURT; REASON. — However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any
administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN REGARDING


COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE OR OTHER COURT EMPLOYEE; PURPOSE. — Thus, the
Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as
the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination . . . In fine, where a criminal
complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBPOENA SUPREME COURT AND ITS
PERSONNEL; REASON. — The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three
branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter,
as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. The rationale for the
foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively, the question before Us is this:
should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before
him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised with,
much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal
complaint that requires the resolution of said question?

DECISION

NOCON, J p:

The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint for
the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming
that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.

Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order
dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by
petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting
evidences.

In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had falsified
his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases
which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days have been
determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew
that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been
submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his
certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989;
and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17)
months.

On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of
ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.

Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this
Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense charged arose from the judge's
performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme
Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the
Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the
decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his
official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the
Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken against
him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by
the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts
and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws,
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.

The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the
Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their
personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.

Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this
Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case
load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman
cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or to
allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his
affidavit-complaint. 4

The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively. the
question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time
to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had
not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court. how could the Ombudsman resolve
the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question?

In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to
this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope of
their administrative duties.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to
dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same
to this Court for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1. New Judicial Form No. 86, Revised 1986.

2. L-50508-11, 139 SCRA 252 (1985).

3. The Order of September 18, 1991, in denying petitioner's ex-parte motion to refer the case to
the Supreme Court, cited Article XI, section 13 (1) and (2), which provides:

Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on compliant be any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at it own instance, any public official or employee of the government,
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or
controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by
law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.

4. Rollo, p. 19.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 167409 March 20, 2009

RODOLFO B. GARCIA, Retired Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge, Calatrava-Toboso,


Negros Occidental, Petitioner,
vs.
PRIMO C. MIRO, OMBUDSMAN-VISAYAS, Cebu City; DANIEL VILLAFLOR, PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR, Bacolod City; HON. FRANKLIN M. COBBOL, Acting Presiding Judge,
MCTC, Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental; and JULIETA F. ORTEGA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. The
petition seeks to impugn the Orders dated November 23, 20041 and January 26, 20052 issued by
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental.

The antecedents are as follows:

On January 31, 2003, Julieta F. Ortega (Julieta) filed a letter complaint3 before the Ombudsman-
Vizayas, Primo C. Miro (Miro), charging Judge Rodolfo B. Garcia, then Presiding Judge of the
MCTC, Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental, and Ricardo Liyage (Liyage), ambulance driver,
Municipality of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, with the crime of murder and the administrative
offenses of grave misconduct and abuse of authority.

The complaint arose from the death of Julieta’s husband, Francisco C. Ortega, Jr., on November
12, 2002, as a result of a vehicular mishap between a Toyota Land Cruiser driven by the
petitioner and the motorcycle driven by the deceased.4

The letter complaint was treated as two (2) separate criminal and administrative complaints
docketed as OMB-V-C-03-0076-B and OMB-V-A-03-0051-B, respectively.

On February 21, 2003, Deputy Ombudsman Miro approved a Joint Evaluation Report5 dated
February 12, 2003. In said evaluation report, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Antonio B. Yap
found the letter complaint to be sufficient in form and substance. He concluded that the offense
charged is not related to the functions of petitioner as a judge and can be the subject of
preliminary investigation.6 With regard to the administrative aspect of the case, GIO Yap
recommended that the case be indorsed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
appropriate action.7

GIO Yap also received information that it would be difficult on the part of the prosecutors to
conduct the investigation because they regularly appear before the sala of petitioner for their
cases. The Provincial Prosecutor of Negros Occidental also manifested that they would inhibit if
the case would be returned to them. Consequently, he deemed that it would be more appropriate
if the Office of the Ombudsman would conduct the necessary investigation.8

Corollarilly, on March 8, 2003, petitioner compulsory retired from the service.9

After the preliminary investigation, GIO Yap found the existence of probable cause for the crime
of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide in OMB-V-C-03-0076-B. In a Resolution10 dated
August 12, 2003, he recommended the filing of the corresponding charges against the petitioner
but dismissed the charges against Liyage.11

On January 27, 2004, an Information12 for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed
against the petitioner before the MCTC Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental, which was later
docketed as Criminal Case No. 5982-C.

On March 1, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information13 on the following grounds:
(1) that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (2) that the court trying the case
has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and over his person; and, (3) that the officer who
filed the information had no authority to do so.14 Ultimately, petitioner prayed that the information
be quashed and be referred to this Court for appropriate action.

On August 25, 2004, the MCTC issued an Order15 granting the motion and, consequently,
quashing the information.

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court granted in an Order16 dated
November 23, 2004. The court opined, among other things, that the case had nothing to do with
the performance of petitioner’s official functions and that an administrative complaint against him
had already been filed, as such, the purpose of referring cases against judges and court
personnel to the Supreme Court has already been served.17Accordingly, the MCTC set aside its
earlier order and denied petitioner’s motion to quash, the decretal portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the subject motion for reconsideration
filed by the prosecution is granted. Accordingly, the order of this court dated August 25, 2004,
granting the accused’s motion to quash the information is hereby reconsidered and set aside and,
therefore, the accused’s motion to quash the information is denied.

SO ORDERED.18

Petitioner then filed his Motion for Reconsideration,19 which was denied in the Order20 dated
January 26, 2005.

Hence, the petition.

At the outset, it is apparent that the present petition was directly filed before this Court, in utter
disregard of the rule on the hierarchy of courts which, thus warrants its outright dismissal. In
Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,21 this Court stressed that "[w]here the issuance of an extraordinary writ is
also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of
these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented," thus:

The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should
not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to
issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or
where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be
exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional
or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable
by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that
the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented. This is, and should continue, to
be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.22

Later, we reaffirmed such policy in People v. Cuaresma23 after noting that there is "a growing
tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called
extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and
immediately by the highest tribunal of the land." We stressed that -

[t]his Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. x x x It is also shared by this Court, and
by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals x x x. This concurrence of jurisdiction is
not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is
after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should
also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level x x x courts should be filed with the Regional
Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is
established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s
time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and
to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket. x x x.1avvphi1

Notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant petition for failure to observe the doctrine on the
hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure
question of law.

Petitioner argues that respondents violated this Court’s pronouncements in Caoibes, Jr. v.
Ombudsman,24directing the Ombudsman to refer all cases against judges and court personnel
filed before his office to the Supreme Court;25 and, in Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao,26 restricting not only the Ombudsman and the prosecution arm of the government, but
also other official and functionary thereof in initiating or investigating judges and court
personnel.27

Petitioner’s contentions are misplaced.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the two cases cited by the petitioner involve the
performance of administrative and professional duties of the judges that were involved. Caoibes
concerns the judge’s dealings with his fellow member of the Bench, while Fuentes touches on the
acts of a judge in the exercise of his official functions, particularly the issuance of a writ of
execution.
In Caoibes, two members of the judiciary got entangled in a fight within court premises over a
piece of office furniture. One of the judges filed a criminal complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman and an administrative complaint before this Court over the same incident. When the
Ombudsman denied the motion of Judge Caoibes to refer the case to the Supreme Court, he filed
a petition for certiorari before this Court seeking the reversal of the order. In granting the petition,
the Court held that:

Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with
exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this
premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint
against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty
bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the
Supreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein.

xxxx

Maceda28 is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over
all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the
lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and
court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them
if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power,
without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.29

In Fuentes, the issue was whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation over the acts of
a judge in the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before the
Supreme Court.30 According to this Court:

Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint
before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The
Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action.

Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.

Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take
the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land.
No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.

Petitioner’s questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing a writ
of execution were done in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order may be
erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of
execution was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the
judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts. "No other entity
or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not
any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision--whether final and
executory or not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or
administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to
the courts alone."31

Indeed, supervision over all inferior courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals to the lowest ranked court employee, is vested by the Constitution in the
Supreme Court. However, that prerogative only extends to administrative supervision. As such,
the Ombudsman cannot encroach upon this Court’s task to oversee judges and court personnel
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of
the land.

In the case at bar, the criminal case filed against petitioner was in no way related to the
performance of his duties as a judge. The Information reveals:

The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses
JUDGE RODOLFO B. GARCIA, of the crime of RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO
HOMICIDE, defined and penalized under ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of November, 2002, at about 5:15 o'clock in the afternoon, at Sitio
Tunga, Barangay Bantayanon, Municipality of Calatrava, Province of Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused JUDGE
RODOLFO B. GARCIA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Judge of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental, with Salary Grade 26, then driving a Land
Cruiser Toyota bearing Plate No. FDB-193, along the road at Sitio Tunga, Barangay Bantayanon,
Calatrava, Negros Occidental, a public highway, did then and there drive or operate said vehicle
in a reckless, negligent and imprudent manner without taking the necessary precaution
considering the grade, visibility and other conditions of the highway, nor due regard to the traffic
rules and ordinances in order to prevent accident to persons or damage to property, thereby
causing by such recklessness, negligence and imprudence the said vehicle to hit and bump the
motorcycle driven by Francisco C. Ortega, Jr., bearing Plate No. FH-2324, with Josemarie
Paghubasan as his backrider, thereby causing upon Francisco C. Ortega, Jr. the following
physical injuries, to with [sic]:

xxxx

which injuries resulted to the death of Francisco C. Ortega, Jr.

CONTRARY TO LAW.32

From the foregoing, the filing of the criminal charges against the petitioner before the MCTC was
warranted by the above circumstances. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of Republic Act No.
7691,33 provides as follows:

SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances
committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such
offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

As such, the jurisdiction of the MCTC over the case is beyond contestation.

Moreover, contrary to petitioner’s allegation, the administrative aspect of the case against him
was endorsed by the Ombudsman-Visayas to the OCA for appropriate action.34 In addition, an
administrative complaint against petitioner involving the same facts was filed by Julieta Ortega
with the OCA. The case was docketed as Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 03-1403-MTJ, and is
still pending to date. Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact considering that he filed a
Comment and Answer to the Complaint-Affidavit of Mrs. Julieta Ortega,35 dated March 21, 2003.
Thus, the Court’s mandate, as laid down in Caoibes, was more than satisfactorily complied with.

To reiterate, the case filed against petitioner before the MCTC is a criminal case under its own
jurisdiction as prescribed by law and not an administrative case. To be sure, trial courts retain
jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses committed by judges of the lower courts.36

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental, is ordered to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No.
5982-C with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ DANTE O. TINGA*


Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO**


Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[A.M. No. 00-8-05-SC. January 29, 2002]


RE: PROBLEM OF DELAYS IN CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JAN 29 2002.
A.M. No. 00-8-05-SC (Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the Sandiganbayan-
Letter, dated 04 January 2002 of Associate Justice Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. praying for clarification
of the resolution of 28 November 2001.)
“In this letter, associate Justice Badoy poses the following questions: First, whether or
not during the indefinite period of his leave of absence, he may fill up the positions for additional
staff approved by the Chief Justice; and Second, whether or not the Resolution promulgated on
28 November 2001 in A. M. No. 00-8-05-SC (Re: Problem Delays in Cases Before the
Sandiganbayan) apply to him during the indefinite period of his leave of absence.”
We resolve thus:
(1) Associate Justice Badoy, Jr. need not fill up the positions for additional
staff as he has been relieved of his duties with respect to the plunder case
against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Thus, additional staff members
are no longer necessary.
(2) The resolution promulgated on 28 November 2001 on A.M. No. 00-8-05-
SC which requires that cases be decided within three (3) months from
submissions for decision apply to Justice Badoy, Jr. despite the fact that he is on
an indefinite leave of absence will not suspend the running of the period within
which to decide the cases.
The Court further Resolved to NOTE the:
(a) Compliance dated 3 December 2001 submitted by Francis E.
Garchitorena;
(b) Letter dated 11 October 2001 of Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena, re request of Justice Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr. for additional
personnel, charging the latter with incompetence, etc.;

(c) Comment dated 3 January 2002 of Justice Badoy on the aforesaid letter
of Presiding Justice Garchitorena;
(d) Urgent Motion for Extension of ten (10) days from 14 December 2001
within to file Clarification and Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution of 28
November 2001, dated 14 December 2001 filed by Presiding Justice Francis E.
Garchitorena;
(e) Compliance with the resolution of 28 November 2001 with specific
reference to the adoption and submission of internal rules of the Sandiganbayan,
dated 23 November 2002 filed by Acting Presiding Justice Minita Chico-Nazario;
and
(f) aforesaid Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 168654 March 25, 2009

ZAYBER JOHN B. PROTACIO, Petitioner,


vs.
LAYA MANANGHAYA & CO. and/or MARIO T. MANANGHAYA, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailing the decision2 and resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85038. The Court of
Appeals’ decision reduced the monetary award granted to petitioner by the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) while the resolution denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

The following factual antecedents are matters of record.

Respondent KPMG Laya Mananghaya & Co. (respondent firm) is a general professional partnership duly
organized under the laws of the Philippines. Respondent firm hired petitioner Zayber John B. Protacio as
Tax Manager on 01 April 1996. He was subsequently promoted to the position of Senior Tax Manager. On
01 October 1997, petitioner was again promoted to the position of Tax Principal.4

However, on 30 August 1999, petitioner tendered his resignation effective 30 September 1999. Then, on 01
December 1999, petitioner sent a letter to respondent firm demanding the immediate payment of his 13th
month pay, the cash commutation of his leave credits and the issuance of his 1999 Certificate of Income
Tax Withheld on Compensation. Petitioner sent to respondent firm two more demand letters for the
payment of his reimbursement claims under pain of the legal action.5

Respondent firm failed to act upon the demand letters. Thus, on 15 December 1999, petitioner filed before
the NLRC a complaint for the non-issuance of petitioner’s W-2 tax form for 1999 and the non-payment of
the following benefits: (1) cash equivalent of petitioner’s leave credits in the amount of P55,467.60; (2)
proportionate 13th month pay for the year 1999; (3) reimbursement claims in the amount of P19,012.00;
and (4) lump sum pay for the fiscal year 1999 in the amount of P674,756.70. Petitioner also sought moral
and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Respondent Mario T. Managhaya was also impleaded in his
official capacity as respondent firm’s managing partner.6

In his complaint,7 petitioner averred, inter alia, that when he was promoted to the position of Tax Principal
in October 1997, his compensation package had consisted of a monthly gross compensation of P60,000.00,
a 13th month pay and a lump sum payment for the year 1997 in the amount of P240,000.00 that was paid to
him on 08 February 1998.

According to petitioner, beginning 01 October 1998, his compensation package was revised as follows: (a)
monthly gross compensation of P95,000.00, inclusive of nontaxable allowance; (b) 13th month pay; and (c)
a lump sum amount in addition to the aggregate monthly gross compensation. On 12 April 1999, petitioner
received the lump sum amount of P573,000.00 for the fiscal year ending 1998.8
Respondent firm denied it had intentionally delayed the processing of petitioner’s claims but alleged that
the abrupt departure of petitioner and three other members of the firm’s Tax Division had created problems
in the determination of petitioner’s various accountabilities, which could be finished only by going over
voluminous documents. Respondents further averred that they had been taken aback upon learning about
the labor case filed by petitioner when all along they had done their best to facilitate the processing of his
claims.9

During the pendency of the case before the Labor Arbiter, respondent firm on three occasions sent check
payments to petitioner in the following amounts: (1) P71,250.00, representing petitioner’s 13th month pay;
(2) P54,824.18, as payments for the cash equivalent of petitioner’s leave credits and reimbursement claims;
and (3) P10,762.57, for the refund of petitioner’s taxes withheld on his vacation leave credits. Petitioner’s
copies of his withholding tax certificates were sent to him along with the check payments.10 Petitioner
acknowledged the receipt of the 13th month pay but disputed the computation of the cash value of his
vacation leave credits and reimbursement claims.11

On 07 June 2002, Labor Arbiter Eduardo J. Carpio rendered a decision,12 the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents to jointly and solidarily pay
complainant the following:

P12,681.00 - representing the reimbursement claims of complainant;

P28,407.08 - representing the underpayment of the cash equivalent of the unused leave credits of
complainant;

P573,000.00 - representing complainant’s 1999 year-end lump sum payment; and

10% of the total judgment awards way of attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.13

The Labor Arbiter awarded petitioner’s reimbursement claims on the ground that respondent firm’s refusal
to grant the same was not so much because the claim was baseless but because petitioner had failed to file
the requisite reimbursement forms. He held that the formal defect was cured when petitioner filed several
demand letters as well as the case before him.14

The Labor Arbiter held that petitioner was not fully paid of the cash equivalent of the leave credits due him
because respondent firm had erroneously based the computation on a basic pay of P61,000.00. He held that
the evidence showed that petitioner’s monthly basic salary was P95,000.00 inclusive of the other benefits
that were deemed included and integrated in the basic salary and that respondent firm had computed
petitioner’s 13th month pay based on a monthly basic pay of P95,000.00; thus, the cash commutation of the
leave credits should also be based on this figure.15

The Labor Arbiter also ruled that petitioner was entitled to a year-end payment of P573,000.00 on the basis
of the company policy of granting yearly lump sum payments to petitioner during all the years of service
and that respondent firm had failed to give petitioner the same benefit for the year 1999 without any
explanation.16

Aggrieved, respondent firm appealed to the NLRC. On 21 August 2003, the NLRC rendered a modified
judgment,17 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 7, 2002 is hereby Affirmed with the modification that the
complainant is only entitled to receive P2,301.00 as reimbursement claims. The award of P12,681.00
representing the reimbursement claims of complainant is set aside for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED.18

From the amount of P12,681.00 awarded by the Labor Arbiter as payment for the reimbursement claims,
the NLRC lowered the same to P2,301.00 representing the amount which remained unpaid.19 As regards the
issues on the lump sum payments and cash equivalent of the leave credits, the NLRC affirmed the findings
of the Labor Arbiter.

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration20 but the NLRC denied the motion for lack of merit.21
Hence, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari.22

In the assailed Decision dated 19 April 2005, the Court of Appeals further reduced the total money award
to petitioner, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed resolution of public respondent NLRC dated
August 21, 2003 in NLRC NCR Case No. 30-12-00927-99 (CA No. 032304-02) is hereby MODIFIED,
ordering petitioner firm to pay private respondent the following:

(1) P2,301.00 representing private respondent’s reimbursement claims;

(2) P9,802.83 representing the underpayment of the cash equivalent of private respondent’s
unused leave credits;

(3) P10,000.00 attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.23

Petitioner sought reconsideration. In the assailed Resolution dated 27 June 2005, the Court of Appeals
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition, raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS’ SUMMARY DENIAL OF


PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT THAT COURT DECISIONS MUST STATE THE LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS
[THEREOF].

II

WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF


DISCRETION AND ACTED IN WANTON EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN TAKING COGNIZANCE
OF [RESPONDENTS] PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WHEN THE RESOLUTION THEREOF HINGES
ON MERE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE.

III.
WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS WANTONLY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN EMPLOYING A LARGER DIVISOR TO COMPUTE PETITIONER’S DAILY
SALARY RATE THEREBY DIMINISHING HIS BENEFITS, IN [VIOLATION] OF THE LABOR
CODE.

IV.

WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS CAPRICIOUSLY ABUSED ITS


DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE [CONCURRING] FINDINGS OF BOTH LABOR ARBITER AND
NLRC ON THE COMPENSABLE NATURE OF PETITIONER’S YEAR END [LUMP] SUM PLAY [sic]
CLAIM.24

Before delving into the merits of the petition, the issues raised by petitioner adverting to the Constitution
must be addressed. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals’ resolution which denied his motion for
reconsideration violated Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution, which states:

Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course
or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

Obviously, the assailed resolution is not a "decision" within the meaning of the Constitutional requirement.
This mandate is applicable only in cases "submitted for decision," i.e., given due course and after filing of
briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, as the case may be.25 The requirement is not applicable to a
resolution denying a motion for reconsideration of the decision. What is applicable is the second paragraph
of the above-quoted Constitutional provision referring to "motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court." The assailed resolution complied with the requirement therein that a resolution denying a motion for
reconsideration should state the legal basis of the denial. It sufficiently explained that after reading the
pleadings filed by the parties, the appellate court did not find any cogent reason to reverse itself.

Next, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari
when the resolution thereof hinged on mere evaluation of evidence. Petitioner opines that respondents
failed to make its case in showing that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had exercised their discretion in an
arbitrary and despotic manner.

As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court does not
assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their
conclusion. The query in this proceeding is limited to the determination of whether or not the NLRC acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. However,
as an exception, the appellate court may examine and measure the factual findings of the NLRC if the same
are not supported by substantial evidence.26 The Court has not hesitated to affirm the appellate court’s
reversals of the decisions of labor tribunals if they are not supported by substantial evidence.27

The Court is not unaware that the appellate court had reexamined and weighed the evidence on record in
modifying the monetary award of the NLRC. The Court of Appeals held that the amount of the year-end
lump sum compensation was not fully justified and supported by the evidence on record. The Court fully
agrees that the lump sum award of P573,000.00 to petitioner seemed to have been plucked out of thin air.
Noteworthy is the fact that in his position paper, petitioner claimed that he was entitled to the amount of
P674,756.70.28 The variance between the claim and the amount awarded, with the record bereft of any
proof to support either amount only shows that the appellate court was correct in holding that the award
was a mere speculation devoid of any factual basis. In the exceptional circumstance as in the instant case,
the Court finds no error in the appellate court’s review of the evidence on record.
After an assessment of the evidence on record, the Court of Appeals reversed the findings of the NLRC and
the Labor Arbiter with respect to the award of the year-end lump sum pay and the cash value of petitioner’s
leave credits. The appellate court held that while the lump sum payment was in the nature of a
proportionate share in the firm’s annual income to which petitioner was entitled, the payment thereof was
contingent upon the financial position of the firm. According to the Court of Appeals, since no evidence
was adduced showing the net income of the firm for fiscal year ending 1999 as well as petitioner’s
corresponding share therein, the amount awarded by the labor tribunals was a baseless speculation and as
such must be deleted.29

On the other hand, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s award of the lump sum payment in the amount
of P573,000.00 on the basis that the payment thereof had become a company policy which could not be
withdrawn arbitrarily. Furthermore, the NLRC held that respondent firm had failed to controvert
petitioner’s claim that he was responsible for generating some P7,365,044.47 in cash revenue during the
fiscal year ending 1999.

The evidence on record establishes that aside from the basic monthly compensation,30 petitioner received a
yearly lump sum amount during the first two years31 of his employment, with the payments made to him
after the annual net incomes of the firm had been determined. Thus, the amounts thereof varied and were
dependent on the firm’s cash position and financial performance.32 In one of the letters of respondent
Mananghaya to petitioner, the amount was referred to as petitioner’s "share in the incentive compensation
program."33

While the amount was drawn from the annual net income of the firm, the distribution thereof to non-
partners or employees of the firm was not, strictly speaking, a profit-sharing arrangement between
petitioner and respondent firm contrary to the Court of Appeals’ finding. The payment thereof to non-
partners of the firm like herein petitioner was discretionary on the part of the chairman and managing
partner coming from their authority to fix the compensation of any employee based on a share in the
partnership’s net income.34 The distribution being merely discretionary, the year-end lump sum payment
may properly be considered as a year-end bonus or incentive. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the granting of
the year-end lump sum amount was precisely dependent on the firm’s net income; hence, the same was
payable only after the firm’s annual net income and cash position were determined.

By definition, a "bonus" is a gratuity or act of liberality of the giver. It is something given in addition to
what is ordinarily received by or strictly due the recipient.35 A bonus is granted and paid to an employee for
his industry and loyalty which contributed to the success of the employer’s business and made possible the
realization of profits.36 Generally, a bonus is not a demandable and enforceable obligation. It is so only
when it is made part of the wage or salary or compensation. When considered as part of the compensation
and therefore demandable and enforceable, the amount is usually fixed. If the amount would be a
contingent one dependent upon the realization of the profits, the bonus is also not demandable and
enforceable.37

In the instant case, petitioner’s claim that the year-end lump sum represented the balance of his total
compensation package is incorrect. The fact remains that the amounts paid to petitioner on the two
occasions varied and were always dependent upon the firm’s financial position.

Moreover, in Philippine Duplicators, Inc. v. NLRC,38 the Court held that if the bonus is paid only if profits
are realized or a certain amount of productivity achieved, it cannot be considered part of wages. If the
desired goal of production is not obtained, of the amount of actual work accomplished, the bonus does not
accrue.39 Only when the employer promises and agrees to give without any conditions imposed for its
payment, such as success of business or greater production or output, does the bonus become part of the
wage.40
Petitioner’s assertion that he was responsible for generating revenues amounting to more than P7 million
remains a mere allegation in his pleadings. The records are absolutely bereft of any supporting evidence to
substantiate the allegation.

The granting of a bonus is basically a management prerogative which cannot be forced upon the employer
who may not be obliged to assume the onerous burden of granting bonuses or other benefits aside from the
employees’ basic salaries or wages.41 Respondents had consistently maintained from the start that petitioner
was not entitled to the bonus as a matter of right. The payment of the year-end lump sum bonus based upon
the firm’s productivity or the individual performance of its employees was well within respondent firm’s
prerogative. Thus, respondent firm was also justified in declining to give the bonus to petitioner on account
of the latter’s unsatisfactory performance.

Petitioner failed to present evidence refuting respondents’ allegation and proof that they received a number
of complaints from clients about petitioner’s "poor services." For purposes of determining whether or not
petitioner was entitled to the year-end lump sum bonus, respondents were not legally obliged to raise the
issue of substandard performance with petitioner, unlike what the Labor Arbiter had suggested. Of course,
if what was in question was petitioner’s continued employment vis-à-vis the allegations of unsatisfactory
performance, then respondent firm was required under the law to give petitioner due process to explain his
side before instituting any disciplinary measure. However, in the instant case, the granting of the year-end
lump sum bonus was discretionary and conditional, thus, petitioner may not question the basis for the
granting of a mere privilege.1avvph!1

With regard to the computation of the cash equivalent of petitioner’s leave credits, the Court of Appeals
used a base figure of P71,250.00 representing petitioner’s monthly salary as opposed to P95,000.00 used by
the Labor Arbiter and NLRC. Meanwhile, respondents insist on a base figure of only P61,000.00, which
excludes the advance incentive pay of P15,000.00, transportation allowance of P15,000.00 and
representation allowance of P4,000.00, which petitioner regularly received every month. Because of a
lower base figure (representing the monthly salary) used by the appellate court, the cash equivalent of
petitioner’s leave credits was lowered from P28,407.08 to P9,802.83.lawphil.net

The monthly compensation of P71,250.00 used as base figure by the Court of Appeals is totally without
basis. As correctly held by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the evidence on record reveals that petitioner
was receiving a monthly compensation of P95,000.00 consisting of a basic salary of P61,000.00, advance
incentive pay of P15,000.00, transportation allowance of P15,000.00 and representation allowance of
P4,000.00. These amounts totaling P95,000.00 are all deemed part of petitioner’s monthly compensation
package and, therefore, should be the basis in the cash commutation of the petitioner’s leave credits. These
allowances were customarily furnished by respondent firm and regularly received by petitioner on top of
the basic monthly pay of P61,000.00. Moreover, the Labor Arbiter noted that respondent firm’s act of
paying petitioner a 13th month-pay at the rate of P95,000.00 was an admission on its part that petitioner’s
basic monthly salary was P95,000.00

The Court of Appeals, Labor Arbiter and NLRC used a 30-working day divisor instead of 26 days which
petitioner insists. The Court of Appeals relied on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III42 of the implementing rules
of the Labor Code in using the 30-working day divisor. The provision essentially states that monthly-paid
employees are presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.

The provision has long been nullified in Insular Bank of Asia and American Employees’ Union (IBAAEU)
v. Hon. Inciong, etc., et al.,43 where the Court ruled that the provision amended the Labor Code’s provisions
on holiday pay by enlarging the scope of their exclusion.44 In any case, the provision is inapplicable to the
instant case because it referred to the computation of holiday pay for monthly-paid employees.

Petitioner’s claim that respondent firm used a 26-working day divisor is supported by the evidence on
record. In a letter addressed to
petitioner,45 respondents’ counsel expressly admitted that respondent used a 26-working day divisor. The
Court is perplexed why the tribunals below used a 30-day divisor when there was an express admission on
respondents’ part that they used a 26-day divisor in the cash commutation of leave credits. Thus, with a
monthly compensation of P95,000.00 and using a 26-working day divisor, petitioner’s daily rate is
P3,653.85.46 Based on this rate, petitioner’s cash equivalent of his leave credits of 23.5 is P85,865.48.47
Since petitioner has already received the amount P46,009.67, a balance of P39,855.80 remains payable to
petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85038 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondents
are liable for the underpayment of the cash equivalent of petitioner’s leave credits in the amount of
P39,855.80.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 104874 December 14, 1993

DANILO HERNANDEZ, petitioner,


vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Marcelo Y. Hernandez for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for People of the Philippines.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to
set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 05877, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, FINDING the decision appealed from to be in accordance with


law and evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED except as to Criminal Case
No. 21-87 where, for reasons above discussed, the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED (Rollo, p. 33).

CA-G.R. CR No. 05877 was an appeal by petitioner from the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 17, Cavite City in Criminal Cases Nos. 21-87 to 29-87, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds Danilo Hernandez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt in the following cases: Crim. Case No. 21-87, for
Estafa and he is hereby ordered sentenced to an indeterminate prison term from
Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to Twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party
Remedios de Leon in the amount of P150,000.00 corresponding to the value of
jewelries embezzled and unreturned and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 22-87,
for Estafa, he is hereby ordered sentenced for an indeterminate prison term of
Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to Twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal. as maximum and to pay the offended party
Remedios de Leon in the amount of P100,000.00 for the value of the jewelries
embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 23-87, Violation of BP 22, he is
hereby sentenced to eight (8) months of prision correccional and to pay the
costs; Crim. Case No. 25-87, for Estafa, he is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of from Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum
and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of P250,000.00
for the value of the jewelries embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 26-
87, for Viol. of BP 22, he is hereby sentenced to eight (8) months of prision
correccional and to pay the costs; Crim. Case No. 27-87, for Estafa, he is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from Twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the
amount of P280,000.00 for the value of jewelries embezzled and to pay the
costs; Crim. Case No. 28-87, for Estafa, he is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of from twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum
and to pay the offended party Remedios de Leon in the amount of P100,000.00
value of the jewelries embezzled and to pay the costs; Crim. case No. 29-87, for
Viol. of BP 22, he is hereby sentenced to eight (8) months of prision correccional,
and to pay the costs (Rollo, pp. 49-50).

It appears that sometime in August 1986, petitioner was introduced to Remedios de Leon by his
aunt, as one engaged in the business of buying and selling jewelry (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 18,
20).

In their first transaction, petitioner paid in cash the several pieces of jewelry which he bought from
de Leon. In their subsequent dealings, petitioner either paid in cash or by way of postdated
checks (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 22-23). On one occasion, petitioner issued post-dated checks
with the aggregate amount of P275,000.00. These checks bounced. However, upon notice of
dishonor by the drawee banks concerned, petitioner paid de Leon cash in exchange for the
dishonored checks. Some checks were likewise exchanged with cash even prior to their due date
(TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 33, 37).

Several days before October 20, 1986, petitioner told de Leon that he was interested in buying
some more pieces of jewelry (TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 60). On that date, at around 10:00 A.M.,
petitioner, together with his common-law wife, Rosemarie Rodriguez, and two other companions,
went to the house of de Leon in Cavite City (TSN, March 17, 1987, p. 70). Petitioner selected a
pair of 2-carat diamond earrings worth P150,000.00 for which he issued BPI Check No. 798246
payable to "cash" in the said amount and post-dated it to October 26, 1986. The amount of the
check was filled in by Rosemarie Rodriguez and petitioner affixed his signature as drawer (TSN,
March 17, 1987, p. 69).

Petitioner and Rodriguez returned to de Leon's house at about 7:00 P.M. and bought one choker
with 20 diamond stones and one bracelet with 16 diamond stones, for which he issued BPI Check
No. 798247 payable to "cash" in the amount of P250,000.00 and postdated it to October 27,
1986. Petitioner specifically instructed de Leon to give him one week to confer with his buyer
before de Leon negotiates the check. The check was also prepared by Rodriguez and signed by
petitioner (TSN, March 17, 1987, pp. 73-79).

In the evening of October 22, 1986, petitioner again went to the house of de Leon and bought one
heart-shaped diamond set. In payment thereof, he issued BPI Check No. 798248 payable to
"cash" in the amount of P280,000.00 and post-dated it to November 9, 1986 (TSN, March 17,
1987, pp. 84-89).

On October 23, 1986, petitioner made a long-distance call to de Leon and inquired whether she
still had jewelry for sale. When she said that she did, petitioner made an appointment with her.
Petitioner arrived at de Leon's house at around 2:30 P.M. The two went to a restaurant, where
petitioner selected a set of earrings and a ring, each piece with a 1-carat diamond (TSN, March
31, 1987, pp. 15-16). In payment for the set, petitioner issued to de Leon BPI Check No. 798250
payable to "cash" in the amount of P100,000.00 and dated that same day (October 23, 1992).
Petitioner told de Leon that the check was funded and that she could even withdraw the amount
on that day. De Leon did not encash the check for the bank was closed (TSN, March 31, 1987,
pp. 16, 19).

In the evening of October 24, 1986, petitioner with Rodriguez went to de Leon's house and
bought a 5-carat diamond piece. In payment thereof, petitioner indorsed to de Leon ASB Check
No. 245964 in the amount of P150,000.00 post-dated to November 10, 1986 and issued by one
Enrique Araneta (TSN, March 31, 1987, pp. 21-26).

BPI Checks Nos. 798246, 798247 and 798250 were drawn against insufficient funds, while BPI
Check no. 798248 and ASB Check No. 245964 were drawn against a closed account.

Petitioner was charged in nine informations with estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges (Rollo, pp. 16-17).

After a joint trial, petitioner was convicted of the nine charges in a joint decision.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the conviction of petitioner was affirmed as to Criminal Cases
nos. 22-87, 23-87, 24-87, 25-87, 26-87, 27-87, 28-87 and 29-87, and reversed as to Criminal
Case No. 21-87.

In this petition, petitioner claims that his conviction of nine distinct offenses subject of nine
separate informations in a single judgment is reversible error, This contention is untenable.

The case of United States v. Tanjuatco, 1 Phil. 116, relied upon by petitioner, is distinguishable
from the instant case. In Tanjuatco, we held that the trial court improperly rendered a single
judgment for two offenses in one of the two criminal cases, in the absence of a consolidation of
the two cases. In the case at bench, the trial court rendered a judgment for each of the nine
separate informations, albeit in the same decision.

We further stated in Tanjuatco that the trial court violated "an essential right of the accused,
inasmuch as he is entitled, although accused of two offenses, to a trial in each of the two cases
upon the proofs adduced in each individual case, and upon the allegations set forth in each
information. It is not permissible to take into account or consider in one case the facts proved in
the other, and vice versa" (at pp. 117-118).

The trial of the nine criminal cases was conducted jointly without any objection from petitioner.
Even had he signified his opposition to the joint trail, such opposition would have been unavailing.
A consolidation of trails, at the court's discretion, is allowed in "charges for offenses founded on
the same facts, or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character" (1985 Rules on
Criminal procedure, Rule 119, Sec. 14).

Petitioner also complains that while he assigned eight errors, the Court of Appeals did not make a
complete findings of fact as to the last two assigned errors (Rollo, pp. 11-12).

In the last two assigned errors, petitioner claims that the trial court erred:

VII

IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN


CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 21-87 TO 29-87 NOTWITHSTANDING ABSENCE OF
INCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND PRESENCE OF NUMEROUS PROOFS
NEGATING THE SOUNDNESS OF SUCH VERDICT.

VIII

IN PRONOUNCING THE ACCUSED, THROUGH A SINGLE JUDGMENT,


GUILTY OF ALL THE NINE DISTINCT OFFENSES COVERED BY THE NINE
SEPARATE INFORMATIONS SUBJECT MATTER OF CRIMINAL CASES NOS.
21-87 TO 29-87, INCLUSIVE (Rollo, p. 56).

Obviously, the Court of Appeals did not deem it necessary to make a separate findings of fact for
said assigned errors, because they were just the necessary consequences of the previous,
assigned errors.

Petitioner next questions: (i) as violative of the constitutional mandate that decisions shall contain
the facts and the law on which they are based (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, sec. 14, par. 1), the
decision of the Court of Appeals which merely adopted the statement of facts of the Solicitor
general in the appellee's brief, and (ii) as violative of the constitutional mandate requiring that any
denial of a motion for reconsideration must state the legal basis thereof (1987 Constitution, Art.
VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2), the denial of his motion of reconsideration on the basis of a comparison of
said motion with the "comment thereon" (Rollo, pp. 10-12).

In its decision the Court of Appeals merely stated: "The facts of the case as summarized in the
Appellee's Brief are as follows: " and the quoted in full the statement of facts of the Solicitor
General (Rollo, p. 20). According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals did not make its own
"independent judicial opinion" by such act of adopting the statement of facts made by the
advance party (Rollo, p. 11).

What the Court of Appeals, in effect, said was that it found the facts as presented by the Solicitor
General as supported by the evidence. The constitutional mandate only requires that the decision
should state the facts on which it is based. There is no proscription made in the briefs or
memoranda of the parties, instead of rewriting the same in its own words.

Precisely briefs or memoranda are required in order to aid the courts in the writing of decisions.

We note that aside from adopting the statement of facts of the Solicitor General, the Court of
Appeals also made findings of facts in the course of its discussion of the assignment of errors.

As to the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals stated in its Resolution
dated March 30, 1992:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused-appellant of the
decision dated December 13, 1991 and the comment thereon of the Solicitor
General, the Court finds no cogent reason that could justify a modification or
reversal of the decision sought to be reconsidered.

Accordingly, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit (Rollo, p. 35).

The denial, therefore, was based on the ground that the Court of Appeals did not find any "cogent
reason that could justify a modification or reversal of the decision sought to be reconsidered."

Petitioner claims that the decision of the trial court is not supported by the evidence, which is
contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals that said decision is "in accordance with law and
the evidence" (Rollo, p. 12). He points out that the appellate court should not have believed the
trial court's conclusion that "the sole testimony of the offended party would have sufficed to
sustain her assertions (Rollo, p. 47). He claims that self-serving declarations of a party favorable
to himself are not admissible and that none of the alleged witnesses to the transactions were
presented.

The common objection known as "self-serving" is not correct because almost all testimonies are
self-serving. The proper basis for objection is "hearsay" (Wenke, Making and Meeting Objections,
69).

Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between self-serving statements and
testimonies made in court. Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of court
advocating his own interest; they do not include a party's testimony as a witness in court (National
Development Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 19 SCRA 861 [1967]).

Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse party is not given the opportunity
for cross-examination, and their admission would encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot
be said of a party's testimony in court made under oath, with full opportunity on the part of the
opposing party for cross-examination.

It is not true that none of the alleged witnesses to the transactions was presented in court (Rollo,
p. 13). Yolanda Dela Rosa, an eye-witness to some of the transactions, testified for the
prosecution. Assuming that Dela Rosa was not presented as a witness, the testimony of de Leon
sufficed to sustain the conviction of petitioner. The conviction of an accused may be on the basis
of the testimony of a single witness (People v. Rumeral, 200 SCRA 194 [1991]). In determining
the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not counted (People v.
Villalobos, 209 SCRA 304 [1992] ).

Petitioner also contends that while he was condemned by the trial court to pay civil indemnity, no
evidence was actually presented in court to prove the existence, ownership and worth of the
pieces of jewelry other than the checks (Rollo, p. 14).

The existence of the jewelry was established by de Leon herself, who testified that petitioner even
selected the pieces of jewelry before buying them.

As to the ownership of the jewelry, we held in People v. Dy, 109 SCRA 400 [1981] that:

Ownership is not a necessary element of the crime of estafa, . . . In estafa, the


person prejudiced or then immediate victim of the fraud need not be the owner of
the goods. This, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "Any person
who shall defraud another (it does say 'owner') by any means mentioned herein
below shall be punished . . . ." All that is necessary is that the loss should have
fallen on someone other than the perpetrators of the crime. . . ." (at p. 408).

The trial court based the civil indemnity on the actual price of the jewelry as agreed upon by
petitioner and de Leon at the time of the transactions and this is reflected by the face value of the
checks.

Petitioner further contends that the trial court erred in admitting the checks in evidence without
the prosecution first proving that his signatures on the checks were authentic (Rollo, pp. 13-14). If
petitioner claims that his signatures on the checks were forged, the burden is on him to prove
such fact. He who alleges must prove his allegations.

In the trial court, petitioner presented a certification issued by the San Juan Police Station to the
effect that he reported as lost several blank checks, to wit: BPI Checks Nos. 798246, 798247,
798248, 798249, and 798250, and AB Check No. 245964. We agree with the trial court when it
gave little weight to the certification. Like the trial court, we wonder why petitioner never filed a
criminal case against de Leon, if said checks were really stolen.

Lastly, petitioner contends that because "the amounts covered by the checks were deposited by
the offended party in her savings account with the Prudential Bank, it becomes the liability of the
bank by its acceptance to pay for the amounts of the checks" (Rollo, pp. 14-15).

The case of Banco de Oro v. Equitable Banking Corporation, 157 SCRA 188 (1988) cited by
petitioner as authority, dealt with the negligence of a collecting bank which facilitated the payment
by the drawee bank of the value of a check with a forged endorsement and signature of the
payee. No such issue is involved in the case at bench.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED