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The Strategy & Tactics of World War II

Number 10

Coral Sea, 1942
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by Kelly Bell 24 40 The Dodecanese Campaign: Germany’s Last Offensive in the Med Features The Germans launch (and win!) an airborne counteroffensive in the Mediterranean late in 1943. May 1942 History’s first carrier versus carrier battle. by Joseph Miranda 24 The Second Crimean War The Red Army resists the Germans where the Light Brigade once charged.indd 4 12/16/09 2:29:52 PM . by David March 52 4 #10 WaW10 Issue. The Strategy & Tactics of World War II Number 10 Feb/Mar 2010 Features 6 6 The Battle of the Coral Sea. by Carl Schuster 52 Eggheads at War: Operations Research in 40 World War II A new science wins the Battle of the Atlantic.

1649 The feature will be: Afrikakorps: Decision in the Desert. SUBSCRIPTION RATES are: Six issues per Strategic Backwaters: year—Game Edition: United States is $119. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Have a question or comment for our editorial staff? Visit our free bul.00/1 year.00/1 year. Bakersfield letin board at www. P. NON U. Elzworth St.StrategyAndTacticsPress.95/1 year. The Battle of Yelnia from the German Per. United States is $24. M-F) or use our 24-hour fax 661/587-5031 or e-mail us from our website Game edition columns www. SUBSCRIBERS PLEASE NOTE: Air mail Rules to foreign addres­ses may take six to ten weeks Coral Sea Solitaire for delivery. and The additional mailing offices. 33 Observation Post Design • Graphics • Layout: Special Ops: Callie Cummins & Chris Cummins Germany’s Spitzbergen Raid Map Graphics: Meridian Mapping Carl Schuster Advertising: Rates and specifications available on request. Box 21598. World at War (USPS ______) is pub- Next Issue lished bi-monthly by Decision Games.S. PO Box 21598.S. Battle of Savo Island and more. columns 22 Design Corner: Battle of the Coral Sea Joseph Miranda Publisher: Christopher Cummins 32 Game preview: Editor: Ty Bomba 1940 What if? Assistant Editor: Joseph Miranda Copy Editors: Jason Burnett. Analysis of German Airborne Operations.indd 5 12/16/09 2:29:53 PM . Write P. All orders should be sent to World at War. Non-U. CA 93390. Bakersfield CA 93390 or call 661/587-9633 (call 9am-4pm PST. Jon Cecil Eric Harvey and Dav Vandenbroucke. addresses are What If?: shipped via Airmail: Canada $40. addresses are shipped via Airmail: Canada add $20 per year. Box 21598. Box 21598.00. All correspondence should be sent to World at War c/o Decision Games. CA and spective. International rates are subject to change as postal rates change.O. Bakersfield CA 93390. World at War. Checks and money Lamont Wood orders or VISA/MasterCard Articles will include: The Battle of Yelnia from the Application to mail at Periodical Postage Soviet Perspective. to P. World at War (©2010) reserves all rights on the contents of this publication. Inquiries should be sent to World at War after that time.O. Overseas add $30 per Vernie Liebl year. Rates is pending at Bakersfield.O. Bakersfield CA 93312. #1. 1941-42. by Joseph Miranda Bakersfield CA 93390. Overseas $45. The ZRCV Flying Aircraft All payments must be in US funds drawn on a Carrier US bank and made payable to World at War (please no Canadian checks). World at War 5 WaW10 Issue. Djbouti in World War II Non-U. Six issues per year—Magazine edition.O.StrategyAndTacticsPress. Nothing may be reproduced from it in whole or in part without prior permission from the publisher. Bakersfield CA 93390. Box 21598.S. All rights reserved.

indd 6 12/16/09 2:29:56 PM . BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA. MAY 1942 By Joseph Miranda 6 #10 WaW10 Issue.

capturing the island of Midway by amphibious Japanese Army (IJA) quickly overran Malaya. The battle has been called a Japanese tactical high command was divided between Adm. USN would commit its carriers to battle. A Japanese carrier raid into would threaten Hawaii. Remarkably. on 18 April 1942. USN carriers attacked Japanese shipping on continued on page 11 World at War 7 WaW10 Issue. capabilities. It pitted the until-then victorious Impe- their victories. Once ensconced on Midway. The IJN committed most of its offensive strength to land base perimeter. Nagano’s plan initial projections for them. In order to understand Nagano’s Naval General Staff and Adm. and thus they could ac. southern New Guinea that was one focus of the pro- land-based airpower destroyed the British capital ships jected operation. While Nagano was technically the course of the larger war in the Pacific. they debated a new strategy. meant the Japanese couldn’t be secure inside their is. but Southeast Asia with their vital oil and rubber). ing American territory could the Japanese be sure the perior to those of their foes. within radius of US land-based aircraft. Japanese naval units are in the north coast of New Guinea. Allied naval units are in bold. emy waters. the debate came to something of a draw. however. Burma assault. For one. and do so within Tokyo found its operations succeeding far beyond the range of Japanese land-based airpower. were conducting an amphibious landing. His plan called for the seizure of New Guinea. He would take the Combined Fleet fleet was smashed in Javanese waters. it’s necessary to examine the place of the battle in Combined Fleet staff. Australian) accomplish more. One was the February USN carrier raid against gano also got his chance. They came to lieved the risk to be justified: only by directly threaten- believe both their strategy and tactics were vastly su. defensive perimeter to that of an offensive fight in en- The Japanese would wait for the Allied counter-offen. In his estima- complish anything. Yamamoto’s plan was called and caused the British to pull back troops and aircraft “MI” for Midway. Osami victory and strategic defeat. In IJN elements into the Coral Sea. the high command in force the USN to come out and fight. It would put the Combined Fleet beyond in all that fighting. Prince of Wales and Repulse in Malayan waters. the Japanese knew their empire was still vulnerable. Na- war. sive. the Allied base on crippled the American battleship fleet at Pearl Harbor. the Yamamoto’s plan risked much. the “southern resource area” (Dutch East Indies and It was still. the Japanese and the Dutch East Indies. Dutch. The US aircraft carriers weren’t present at Pearl would build a larger fleet than the Japanese could hope Harbor when the IJN struck. and the Battle of Midway would be played other events that took place in the early months of the out in June 1942. then. Their Navy. That would adjustment of that plan. wouldn’t be won at all. A month prior to that. the IJN lost no ship larger than a the protection of friendly airpower. while Adm. The continued existence to confront if the war were allowed to drag on. and both saw the objective destroy the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. with the movement of other the Japanese-held Gilbert and Marshall Islands. ate in waters patrolled by American submarines and That generated what’s been called a “victory dis. and have it oper- destroyer. American industrial strength ries.” and from them the sea and air lanes from the US west The events following 7 December 1941 caused a re. Then. March. tion. to engage and defeat the Allies in what the Japanese Forward bases would be established on those islands. of several American carriers in the Pacific therefore In the end. where the Japanese italics. Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet would be held in reserve the Solomon Islands. British. James “Jimmy” Doolittle’s carrier- launched B-25 bombers raided Japan itself. Yamamoto’s that. Yamamoto’s carriers had was called “MO” for Port Moresby. Yamamoto’s superior. and the Imperial east. but promised to Allied ABDA (American. and now switched from the original intent of conducting a establish a defensive perimeter among the Pacific’s defensive action against intruders within the Japanese many islands on which air bases could be established. Fiji. termed the “decisive battle. Isoruku cific. the latter’s prestige gave him le- verage in the game of imperial politics. Yamamoto be- ease” among Japanese commanders. IJN submarines and island-based airpower would Nagano wanted the fight to be in the South Pa- weaken those the intruding fleets. coast to Australia could be interdicted. in effect. the decisive battle doctrine. There was area Japanese Naval Strategy for agreement: both Nagano and Yamamoto wanted to Japan’s initial objectives in the Pacific were to go over to the offensive.indd 7 12/16/09 2:29:57 PM . rial Japanese Navy (IJN) against a still-recovering US Accordingly. Col. Despite The Battle of the Coral Sea has gone into histo- ry as the first aircraft carrier versus aircraft carrier battle. possibly even taking the island the Indian Ocean crippled Royal Navy power there chain in a later operation. seize as seeking out and destroying the American carriers. That was made ever more clear by Plan MI. New Caledonia and Samoa. the war had to be won by the end of 1942 or it There was only one flaw in the string of victo. from the Burma front to deal with concerns over an Critics charged Plan MI overstretched Japanese amphibious invasion of the subcontinent.

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World at War 9

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Naval Terminology

Standard USN terminology in the World War II era des- The IJN had two higher headquarters: Naval General
ignated each type of warship with two or three letters. A Staff (Chief of Staff Adm. Osami Nagano), which was re-
“dash” followed by the hull number would give the specific sponsible for all naval operations; and Combined Fleet
ship. Thus, “CV-5” was the Yorktown. That system, with (commander, Adm. Isoruku Yamamoto), which saw to the
some modification, is still in use today. actual conduct of operations. Naval forces were divided into
BB: Battleship fleets, some administrative and some operational, and fleets
would form task groups for specific missions. As the article
BC: Battlecruiser
indicates, the tendency was for the IJN to over-organize its
CA: Heavy Cruiser forces for operations. While the Naval General Staff was
CL: Light Cruiser technically the highest headquarters, the prestige of Adm.
CV: Fleet Carrier (sometimes CVA) Yamamoto, especially after Pearl Harbor, gave Combined
CVE: Escort Carrier Fleet a great say in determining strategy.
CVL: Light Aircraft Carrier Naval Aviation
DD: Destroyer. US Naval aircraft were generally prefaced with “V”:
PC or YP: Patrol Craft VB: Bomber
PT: Motor Torpedo Boat VF: Fighter
SS: Submarine VP: Patrol Aircraft
Logistical vessels were prefaced with the letter “A”: VS: Scout
AK: Cargo VT: Torpedo Bomber
AO: Oiler PBY: Patrol-Bomber Seaplane
AP: Transport The US Marine Corps added “M” to its designators, thus
VMF would be a USMC fighter unit.
APD: Destroyer Converted to a Transport
The smallest administrative and tactical air unit was
AVP: Seaplane Tender
the squadron of eight to 24 aircraft, depending on type. Air
Amphibious assault vessels were prefaced with “L”: squadrons might be broken down into smaller elements,
LCI: Landing Craft, Infantry called flights, each of two to four aircraft. For carrier aircraft
LCT: Landing Craft, Tank the highest tactical unit was the carrier air group, command-
LCVP: Landing Craft, Vehicle & Personnel ing all air elements on a single carrier. Higher-level aviation
command at sea was exercised by task group and task force
LSD: Landing Ship, Dock
commanders, at least at that time in the war.
LSM: Landing Ship, Medium
The IJN divided its aircraft into two major formations:
LST: Landing Ship, Tank the First Air Fleet, which was responsible for all carrier avi-
The smallest naval administrative unit was the individual ation; and Eleventh Air Fleet, responsible for all land-based
ship. Ships would in turn be organized into larger forma- naval airpower. As with the Americans, Japanese carrier air-
tions. Divisions were two or more warships. A squadron craft were based on the individual ship. Land-based naval
might be two or more divisions, though sometimes the indi- aircraft were under the operational command of individual
vidual divisions were dispensed with. Squadrons might have air flotillas.
up to 16 ships. The heavier units tended to have fewer ships The IJN’s Twenty-Fifth Air Flotilla was supposed to
per echelon. The usual USN operational unit was the task provide support to the operations in the Coral Sea, but its 7
force (TF), a grouping of different ship types to accomplish May attack on Adm. Crace’s cruiser group proved ineffec-
a specific mission. TF might be organized into subordinate tive. On the Allied side, both the Americans and Australians
task groups. Thus, for the Coral Sea, TF 17 was divided up had large numbers of land-based aircraft available. For the
into Task Groups 17.2, 17.5, etc. (see the order of battle most part, they had little impact on the battle owing to a lack
chart). Above the task force was the fleet, which was a major of training among those pilots for operations over water and
ocean-going force. against enemy warships. The battle would be decided by car-
The USN numbered its fleets in the Pacific with odd rier-based aviation.
numbers, and those in the Atlantix with even. The various
command echelons above fleet were administrative and not
operational. The highest level of command in the Pacific was
Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet, abbreviated as CIN-

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the Allies had. was to establish a base on Deboyne Island. tactics and spirit should be enough to win through again—or so 5) Support Group: this included a seaplane carrier that they expected. destroyers and smaller craft. the vaunt- carrying the land forces for the invasion of Tulagi ed Allied navies and armies had been swept aside in in the Solomon Islands. the others could still be maneuvered so as to accomplish the overall objective. the IJN had to make do 1) Carrier Strike Group: this included the fast carriers with the South Seas Detachment. establish sea- On the ground: Australian troops fight in New Guinea. One immediate problem came from having to gain support from the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) for the amphibious invasions. over- More. with a shift of avail- able fleet units toward the Japanese bases on Truk and Rabaul. That would. The situation transports carrying the land forces for the invasion was therefore all the more remarkable insofar as the of Port Moresby in New Guinea. It was to provide fighter cover for the land. The difficulty came from the fact such schemes can work well if the enemy is unaware of the plan but. In making their new plans. The Shoho was considered too slow to keep up The Japanese remained confident. vided his force into five separate task groups: For Operation MO. however. so MO would have to make do as an ‘economy of force’ operation. Relations between the IJA and IJN weren’t good. they could win at the Coral Sea with a minimum of 4) Tulagi Invasion Group: this included the transports force. to move into eastern Siberia. Their early vic- The Japanese intent in using five separate task tories had been won when they had the advantage of groups was to achieve strategic surprise by attacking surprise against an enemy unprepared for their attacks. Fourth Fleet to the Coral Sea Plan MO was initiated in March. to support them. underes- whelm the enemy’s ability to react. IJN was planning to seize and hold a vast stretch of 3) Covering Group: this included the light carrier territory in both New Guinea and the Solomons with a Shoho. at many points at once. ground force equal to less than a division (again. as well as its own Special Naval Landing 2) Port Moresby Invasion Group: this included the Force (SNLF) amphibious battalions. Operational command was under Adm. as will be seen. Plan MO’s forces were to accomplish several ob- jectives: land ground forces in southern New Guinea to seize Australian-held Port Moresby. and.indd 11 12/16/09 2:30:12 PM . After all. in the event the USSR collapsed in the wake of Germany’s attack. ity. World at War 11 WaW10 Issue. Its objective was to seek out ment the IJA had allocated to support operations in and destroy the American carriers. they hadn’t yet been beaten. the Pacific. a reinforced regi- Shokaku and Zuikaku. the previous months. plane bases on two small islands. “vic- ing groups and also had some offensive capabil. Shigeyoshi In- ouye of the IJN’s Fourth Fleet. The IJA wanted to concentrate on the war on the Asian mainland. some cruisers. that would not be not the case at the Coral Sea battle. tory disease”). though it didn’t actually kick off until 1 May 1942. at the start of the war. one light car- rier. in theory. of course. that with the Carrier Strike Group. south- east of New Guinea. though. Even if one task continues on page 16 group were to be defeated. nor did it have the supplies them. With accomplishing all that in mind. Most of the other fleet carriers and battleships had already been assigned to Yamamoto’s Plan MI. as well as in Manchuria to deter a possible Soviet invasion or. draw out the American carriers in order to engage and sink the 10 divisions required. The IJA had already turned down a proposal that it prepare for an invasion of the Australian mainland on the grounds it couldn’t divert Victory through airpower? USAAF B-17s. and superior strategy. then. the Japanese had overlooked an important factor. Inouye di. That included two fleet carriers.

. They were usually named after the naval bases in which they were or- ganized. . . They were instead equipped with even more heavy weapons (often guns dismounted from warships) and dug in on the islands of Japan’s far-flung defensive perimeter for last-ditch stands. the IJA wasn’t enthusiastic about supporting further offensives across Pacific waters. Shigeyoshi Inouye) CV CVL BB CA CL DD SS AYP Other AO AP Combat aircraft Carrier Strike Group 2 . The IJN organized its own amphibious units. gunboats and other small combat craft. 3 . 4 . . . . . were the size of reinforced battalions. 6 . . . . . . . . 12 #10 WaW10 Issue. Dividing forces between the navy and army in that way led to coordination issues when it came to amphibious operations. 7 2 11 - Invasion Group Tulagi Invasion Group . . 1 . called Special Naval Landing Forces (SNLF). SNLF. . Later in the war. Vice Adm. Japanese Amphibious Forces The Japanese armed forces were divided between the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and Imperial Japa- nese Army (IJA). For the opening campaign. 1 . SNLF units would be expanded to regimental size. but that was after the Japanese had lost the op- portunity to conduct offensive operations. to seize islands in the South Pacific. 2 . 2 . 6 . however. called the South Seas Detachment. . and one or two heavy weapons units. Order of Battle—Coral Sea Japanese Fourth Fleet (Commander. - Other = minesweepers. . . but that was after the decisive moment had passed. 1 . 9 . CVL Shoho: VF x 12 VT x 9 Port Moresby . They proved effective in the landings in South- east Asia and the Dutch East Indies. 2 . 1 . mortars and anti-tank weapons. 1 3 . - Land based aircraft VF x 63 (25th Air Flotilla. - Submarine Group . . . . 1 - Support Group . The South Seas Detachment would be involved in the first landings on New Guinea in March 1942. . SNLF organization varied.indd 12 12/16/09 2:30:12 PM . 7 . . . . . . VB x 86 Rabaul) VP x 12 Ships lost . . The latter might include infantry guns. Each service had its own air force. CV Shokaku VF x 21 VB x 20 VT x 21 CV Zuikaku VF x 21 VB x 21 VT x 21 Covering Group . and the naval air force included both carrier-based and land-based aviation. There were usually two overstrength infantry companies (with up to six platoons each). . the IJA provided a reinforced regiment from the 55th Infantry Division. . as the diagram shows. For the opening of- fensives of Japan’s first campaigns in the Pacific War. the IJA trained several divisions for amphibious opera- tions. . 1 . Later in the war the IJA was convinced to send several divisions to conduct operations on New Guinea and in the Solomons. . .

. . . . CV Lexington (Carrier) VF x 22 VB x 36 VT x 12 CV Yorktown VF x 20 VB x 38 VT x 13 Task Group 17. . . . . . . 4 . . - Notes: Based on task force organization of 6 May 1942. . . . . . Organization prior to that was Task Force 11 (CV Lexington). .1 . PBY x 12 (Search) Task Group 42. .6 . . 2 .5 2 . - (Support) Task Group 17. . . 2 . . 2 .indd 13 12/16/09 2:30:13 PM . . . . Allied Task Force 17 (Rear Adm. 5 .3 .9 . . . . Frank Fletcher)1 CV CVL BB CA CL DD SS AYP Other AO AP Combat aircraft3 Task Group 17. and Task Force 44 (became TF 17. .3). 11 . . 32 . . . . . . . . . - (Attack) Task Group 17.2 . 1 . - (Refueling) Task Group 17. . 1 . . . Task 1 Force 17 (CV Yorktown). . . 2Including two Australian CA. . - (Submarines) Ships lost 1 . 3Also available in Australia were several hundred Allied fighter and bomber aircraft. 5 . World at War 13 WaW10 Issue. which generally lacked the training to operate against enemy forces at sea. 1 . . .

In any event. Naval intelligence op- erations were generally understaffed.indd 14 12/16/09 2:30:20 PM . and their names are sometimes used interchangeably. At Coral Sea. but not enough to win a campaign. but mainly by the IJA in the China-Burma-Indian Theater of Operations. While in theory that ought to have led to an intensification of intelligence operations to find the enemy. IJN intelligence identified only one US carrier in Australian waters when in reality there were two. regardless of “soft” factors such as intelligence. They paid for that mistaken assumption at Coral Sea and Midway. There actually were several different Allied intelligence pro- grams. ULTRA mislabeled CVL Shoho as the Ryukaku. Added to those shortfalls was the IJN emphasis on the doctrine of decisive battle. The Japanese put considerable effort into conducting their own intelligence. The Japanese used a different code machine. the US could move its forces to counter those Japanese offensives while the Japanese had little idea about the strength and location of the Americans. Consequently. in practice it tended to cause intelligence to be ig- nored when it didn’t support preconceived concepts. ENIGMA was the name of the German code machine that encrypted messages using a typewriter-style keyboard and a series of rotors. Japanese leaders believed they could sweep the seas. Allied intelligence wasn’t omniscient. after the British security classification given to the codebreakers. undermining the sharing of intelligence product. subversion and various “black” operations. The term MAGIC is sometimes used for American codebreaking operations against the Japanese. all the intelligence in the world would make no difference if the admirals and generals didn’t use it properly. causing the cryptanalysts to have to start over. but most of those efforts were in the realms of espio- nage. designated OP-20-G. cryptanaly- sis (radio interception and decoding) had a significant influence on the Pacific War. American cryptanalysts provided intelligence information on Japanese intentions and order of battle prior to both the Coral Sea and Midway operations. They’re often known as ULTRA. 14 #10 WaW10 Issue. at least until the 1970s when the information was declassified. Allied leaders did appreciate the importance of intelligence and planned accordingly. Making things worse was the rivalry between the IJA and IJN. For- tunately. termed PURPLE. A persistent shortfall in Japanese reconnaissance operations (and one often shared by the Allies) came from the fact they frequently overes- timated the size of enemy ships spotted from the air. the Japanese believed they’d sunk the Yorktown when they’d only damaged her. On the tactical level the Japanese made considerable use of sea- planes and long-range aircraft to search for enemy forces at sea. but MAGIC was actually the US program for intercepting and decrypt- ing Japanese diplomatic messages. In general. Prior to the Coral Sea. The USN’s cryptanalytic unit. There was some effort to conduct signals intelligence. leading to strikes being launched against smaller warships or cargo vessels in the belief they were capital ships or carriers. for example. That kind of thing caused surprise when “sunk” ships reappeared in later battles. After their 8 May air strike in the Coral Sea. The war was to be won by seeking out the enemy’s fleet and destroying it in one climactic fight. After their vic- tories in the opening months of the Pacific War. That was good for individual actions. More specifically. The Japanese frequently changed their codes. and its results were often ig- nored. which had a system similar to a series of telephone dial switchers for encryption. was responsible for decrypting Japanese mili- tary traffic. was how Allied intel- ligence operations cracked the Axis codes. Exacerbating that was the Japa- nese tendency to overestimate damage to enemy targets. The Intelligence War One of the great untold stories of World War II.

World at War 15 WaW10 Issue.indd 15 12/16/09 2:30:26 PM .

shipping and aircraft. the Allies transports would make it through to the New Guinea had indeed gained a healthy respect for Japanese capa. Further. despite the fact the loss of the Lexington far task force into the Coral Sea. Inouye be- The details of the battle are in the Coral Sea Op. In the days curing New Guinea. Both side’s command. Fearing the Port Moresby fighters. lieved he’d sunk both American carriers. In retrospect.indd 16 12/16/09 2:30:28 PM . Fletcher’s orders were to “de. attempting Several things mitigated against that. Frank Fletcher. craft found the opposing carriers and launched strikes. As early as March 1942. mation revealed specific Japanese objectives as well It was due to the turning back of those Japanese as their order of battle. Fletcher dispatched Adm. Forewarned. timated both the IJA and IJN. following. Crace with a force bilities. nine dive bombers and six torpedo planes. Operational carrier air strength was reduced to 24 the enemy fleet carriers. and Zuikaku’s air group had been depleted in the fight- ers then decided to reserve their air strength to attack ing. while surviving the battle. transports that the Americans could claim a strategic Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet. continues on page 19 16 #10 WaW10 Issue. US aircraft damaged the By early April the Allies knew a Rabaul-based fleet Shokaku. Adm. ect cracked the Axis codes. nage and aircraft capacity. Moresby group to turn back to Rabaul. ordered a carrier victory. One was the to find each other. both sides’ carriers maneuvered. Shokaku was damaged ing the IJN light carrier Shoho. The of cruisers to intercept them. landing the troops at Port Moresby. Some air strikes were launched that two Japanese fleet carriers. Additional infor. though it was units from the Indian Ocean toward the South Pacific. beaches. On 8 May both sides’ air- Anglo-American ULTRA/MAGIC intelligence proj. Chester Nimitz. were effectively out of action. under the command of outweighed the sinking of the Shoho in terms of ton- Adm. quickly put back into action. Inouye immediately ordered the Port would be moving into the Coral Sea. sink- Allied intelligence became aware of the shift of IJN ing the latter and damaging the former. The Japanese hit the Yorktown and Lexington. including sink. The question then becomes: stroy enemy ships. To sum up. they were no longer in the dark. Since then. erations module. the Japanese successfully there seemed to be nothing to stop him from complet- landed their Tulagi force on that island while the Port ing MO. and se- Moresby group headed for its objective.” why did the Japanese turn back at that time? Battle Owing to faulty post-strike evaluations. did damage against minor enemy units.

who would co. in the first year of the war. as it allowed for the early detection of verability at the expense of airframe niceties such as armor and intruders. American aircraft tended to be more rugged and could take more Torpedo bombers often used “hammer and anvil” tactics. World at War 17 WaW10 Issue. The Japanese tended to make their naval aircraft longer-ranged ment continually while other fighters refueled and refitted than did other powers. One VT element would attack a ship from the front while Another type of aircraft that proved important was the humble another would come in from the flank. with the latter. As World War II approached. what was the correct mix? Coral When torpedo and dive bombers acted together. but carriers could move swiftly to attack enemy tar- gets and then withdraw into the expanse of the Pacific. early stage of the war. The Americans had a technological available to attack targets. Of course. naval doctrine changed.indd 17 12/16/09 2:30:29 PM . Dive bombers would come in from floatplanes based on seaplane tenders or other warships. When it came to the defense. they could Sea revealed carriers didn’t have enough fighters assigned to create a real dilemma for CAP. making their aircraft vulnerable when hit. That proved to be more accurate than level to wait for him to attack and then follow his aircraft back to their bombing. Fighters were needed for both combat air patrol (CAP) the VB would attack from high. dive bomber (VB) and torpedo bomber (VT). at least in theory. several carriers were built from converted battleship hulls. lack of precision-guided munitions. or on the high altitude to deliver bombs against enemy ship decks and Pacific’s many island bases. tended to view carriers as being the ultimate in naval raiders. The effectiveness of the CAP was often dependent craft that could stay in the air longer would have a greater chance on the skills of the fighter direction officer. That often used a system of relays to put up a fighter ele. there were three types of carrier aircraft: fighter (VF). The USN. At Midway the American dive bombers were able CAP was flown by carrier-based fighters over the fleet. seeking out and destroying the enemy fleet in one decisive action at sea. since air- on deck. The experience of the British carrier raid on the Italian fleet anchor- age at Taranto in November 1940 was studied by the Japanese as an example of the power of air- craft against ships. and to escort the former wouldn’t be able to climb to altitude in time to deal dive and torpedo bombers when attacking the enemy. owing to the primitive state of bombsites and the carriers—assuming your own carriers survived the strike. That was to enhance searches. The IJN saw the carrier as the means to execute their doctrine of the decisive naval battle. One was that the limits on fleet tonnage engendered by the Washington Naval Treaties of the 1920s cut back on the number of battleships the major powers could deploy. Carrier Tactics Originally carriers had been seen as useful mainly for scouting. punishment. it would be hit in the side by the launched against him. of spotting the enemy. USN carrier-based raids within the Japa- nese defensive perimeter (February-March 1942). Generally. Many of the searches were carried out by other. Several things changed that point of view. Air- craft carriers thereby became a viable alternative for fleet striking power. The Japanese gained range and maneu- edge in their radar. and against the Japanese homeland (April 1942) proved that point. the carriers could be quickly deployed to meet enemy threats and could cause damage sufficient to frustrate those offensives. The VT would come in low while them. It also ensured there would be more time ordinate interceptions. That meant CAP that dealt with to protect the carrier from enemy intruders. though the technology wasn’t fully reliable in the self-sealing fuel tanks. At that time the USN lacked the strength to win the war at sea in one decisive blow. It was needed to find the enemy so strikes could be avoid one set of torpedoes. as would be demon- strated at Coral Sea and Midway. to exploit that situation to sink four Japanese carriers. Another way to find the enemy was superstructures. As the target turned to search plane. Indeed. the attack on Pearl Harbor (7 December 1941) and the Indian Ocean Raid (March-April 1942) also demonstrated car- riers were the paramount naval offensive arm. The question was.

Fletcher’s orders are to engage the Japanese and cause as much damage as possible while counter- ing enemy invasions of New Guinea and the Solomons. 4 May: US carrier Yorktown launches an air raid against Tulagi. combin- ing the Yorktown and Lexington task groups. Shigeyoshi Inouye. based at Rabaul. the USN has the edge in in- telligence: its cryptanalysis has discovered IJN intentions and forces. but fail to do damage. the USN forms Task Force (TF) 17. Nonetheless. with carrier air support pro- vided by the Covering Group. Adm. un- der Adm. 18 #10 WaW10 Issue. Inouye realizes the Port Moresby Group has been spotted and is vulnerable to further Allied air strikes. reaches its objec- tive and seizes the island. Fletcher decides to halt all air strikes oth- er than against enemy carriers in order to con- serve aircraft strength and avoid giving away his position. commander of Fourth Fleet. Frank Jack Fletcher. On 6 May. but they come to nothing. built around the carriers Yorktown and Lexington. 3 May: The Tulagi Group. Isoruku Yamamoto gives the order initiating the Coral Sea Operation. Coral Sea Operations 1 May 1942: IJN Combined Fleet commander Adm. Adm.indd 18 12/16/09 2:30:33 PM . US Army Air Force B-17 bombers hit the Covering Group. Allied intelligence is unable to track the course of the Carrier Strik- ing Group. Both sides conduct extensive search operations. is in operational command. Mean- while. While the IJN has the advantage of numbers of carriers. beaching the destroyer Kiku- zuki and inflicting damage on other minor naval units. The USN reorganizes at sea. 5-6 May: The Covering Group joins the Port Moresby Group. Five task groupings head south (see the order of battle chart).

indd 19 12/16/09 2:30:37 PM . IJN land-based aircraft attack Crace’s squadron but inflict no damage. with 50 or so aircraft operational at the end 10 May: Yamamoto orders the Carrier Strike Group to return to base. thus dividing his strength at a critical moment. sending back reports they were actually a car- rier and a cruiser. though they report to In- ouye they’ve sunk a battleship and a cruiser. 7 May: Aircraft from the Carrier Strike Group find and sink the destroyer Sims and oiler Neosho. as would be later demonstrated in the opening surface naval actions of the Solomons campaign. thinking them to be IJN ships. (Again. Neither carrier groups. Inouye’s war- ships probably had the advantage in training and lead- ership. The former is quickly restored to duty. American carriers weren’t much better off than the but nothing is accomplished. The IJN airstrike damages both the Yorktown and the Lexington. their organization and plan- ning actually lacked the prerequisite of concentration for that intent. It accomplishes nothing other than losing several aircraft to USN combat air patrols and botched night landings. Mean- while USN carrier aircraft from TF 17 find the Shoho and sink her. it was due to factors in place prior to its beginning. the Allied land-based pilots lacked the 9 May: Yamamoto orders the Carrier Strike Group training to be of much threat to surface shipping. then. the battle turned. Conclusions Why. Nagano and his Naval General Staff wanted to make the objective Australia. The USN airstrike damages the Shokaku. 8 May: Aircraft from both sides’ carrier groups find each other. Crace (RN) toward New Guinea to counter the expected Japanese landing at Port Moresby. On that hesitation. canceled. The back to the Coral Sea to engage the Americans. caused them to hesitate at the critical moment. orders an evening air strike against Fletcher’s carriers. USAAF aircraft mistakenly attack Crace’s squadron. as the USN and Aus- tralian fleets had an advantage in numbers of surface warships. in retrospect. Japanese. Fletcher detaches a squadron of his cruisers under the command of Adm. The real danger to the Port Moresby amphibious force was from Allied cruisers. Takagi. along with the damage to the fleet carriers. Inouye pushes back the Port Moresby could provide air cover for the transports in the face landing until 3 July—it is later permanently of US and Australian land-based airpower.) Another explanation for Inouye’s about-face was the Japanese. did the Japanese plan ultimately fail? As with many other battles. sud- denly had to face the shock of the loss of a light car- rier. continued from page 16 The Shokaku and Zuikaku begin to withdraw to repair damage and replace their depleted air about 30 percent of initial strength. sinks. though. Yamato and World at War 19 WaW10 Issue. having been undefeated in the past. command- ing the IJN Carrier Strike Group. in retrospect. While the IJN had a doc- trine of decisive battle. That. though. Inouye orders the Port Moresby Force to turn back until he can be assured of air supremacy. but the latter. Adm. of 8 May. after some heroic damage control efforts.

eds. That led to their being continually surprised about the strength of USN forces in the Coral Sea. Once and self-delusions. ground to many of the US Navy’s victories. all those factors were seen again. History of United States Naval Operations In contrast. Nagano failed to provide sufficient force to accomplish the mission. though he did Prados. in World War II. Coral Sea. part semi- tive. Handbook on Japanese Military Forces. NY: Penguin. how they provided the back- the Japanese proved unable to concentrate their re. That also gets back to the intelligence situation. if nothing else. The Oxford Companion to World War II. intelligence operations in the Pacific. Morison. Fletcher had only one major objec. doctrine. Combined Fleet Decoded. US War Department. Empire had been stopped. I. The As for Plan MO itself. it has some excellent background more remarkable given the Japanese then had superi. Mitsuo. It includes some things simple for him. The Japanese were largely in the dark about both those things in regard to the Ameri- cans.R. ority in battleships over the Americans. and Foot. As the order of battle chart shows. and that was to destroy enemy forces. the IJN had no edge over the USN. at the Combined Fleet staff wanted Midway and Hawaii. Louisiana State University. Baton Rouge.B. Lewin. Thanks to their superior cryptanalysis. Instead. This is one of the great standard works on World War II naval operations.D. part great tale of the war at sea. M. fought a month later. American the Covering Group. one of the reasons Sources for the Port Moresby group turning back was the fear Dear. Boston: Little Brown. The American Magic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. view of one of the IJN’s great military aviators. 20 #10 WaW10 Issue. He pitted one light and two fleet carriers against two US fleet carriers. operations in which each group could be defeated in detail. The book provides That led to a further dispersion of force and a situation an extensive analysis of Japanese leadership. As for the Coral Sea. while the Americans again exploited their superior intelligence organization and stayed concentrated. at about 1500 hrs. sions. which gave him a bare margin of superiority. maining forces for a move on Port Moresby. Ronald. tensive work on the intelligence operations behind the Pacific War. with its light carrier had been hit. That’s all the clopedic work on World War II. John. but the IJN’s including the underlying doctrinal factors that led to the big deci- battleships weren’t deployed to the Coral Sea. detach Adm. Army study of Japanese armed forces. with interesting commentary on Japanese naval decision making. with five first year of naval-air operations in the Pacific from the point of task groups supposedly coordinating their operations. 1957. the Americans knew both the Japanese intentions and their order of battle from the start. Midway. as he didn’t have to disperse his extensive order of battle information. information on the armed forces of the major powers of the War.. Crace’s cruisers to deal with the threat to Veteran wargamers will recognize Prados’s name from the days of Simulations Publications. Fuchida. 1951. Japan didn’t have the resources to go for both objec- tives simultaneously with sufficient strength to be de- cisive. It includes lots of organizational and technical data. That kept official history. A reprint of the World War II U. Volume 4 deals with the force all over the Coral Sea to accomplish it. Inc. when it came to surface ships. The Japanese again divided their fleet into several task groups. Samuel Eliot. Combined Fleet Decoded is an ex- Port Moresby. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. At Midway. The result would be Yamamoto’s defeat and the turning point in the Pacific War. during the Battle of the Coral Sea. it was too complex. it proved to be a tremen- dous morale booster on the Allied home fronts as it was the first time in the war the forces of the Japanese View on the flight deck of USS Lexington (CV-2). 1991. on 8 May 1942. Once having decided to initiate the Coral Sea operation. he mostly kept his ships concentrated. Indeed. 1983. NY: Random House. The presence of two carriers and several cruisers was a situation for which Inouye wasn’t prepared. 1995.C. 1995.indd 20 12/16/09 2:30:37 PM . An ency- American cruisers would intercept it.S. leading to hesitation at the critical moments of the battle and cancellation of the Port Moresby invasion..

amphibious landings. and two or three ships for other units. bat- of war. air six to 24 aircraft.98 sales tax. US strategic intelligence was good in terms of identifying Japanese forces and their intentions. the player will have a certain edge over the IJN insofar as he will have a general knowledge of the location and objectives of major IJN task groups. Each aircraft strength point represents from transporting ground units. The map shows the Coral Sea and adjoining wa- ters. shore bombardment. islands and bases as they were in 1942. while Japanese forces are moved and fought by the system. Each Rules cover such things as: leadership. Each game turn represents 12 rier operations. alternative deployments. Historically. The player may use his forces as he pleases within the structures of the rules. Launching Planes NOW! Coral Sea Solitaire (CSS) is a purpose-designed one-player wargame covering the aero-naval battle that took place between the US and Imperial Japa- nese Navies in May 1942. task force organization. how- ever. $38 Overseas Customers CA residents add $1. and panic. depending on type and pilot qual- bases. car- to opposite side. the game system controls Japanese forces. tleships and heavy cruisers. Consequently. anti-aircraft fire. scouting. surface combat. reinforcements. night operations. hours. fog ity. It was the first of the Pacific War CSS is based on the game system used in World at War number two’s Solomons Campaign. Naval units represent one ship for carriers.indd 21 12/16/09 2:30:38 PM . random hexagon on the map represents 75 miles from side events. Send to: Decision Games ATTN: S&T Game Offer PO Box 21598 Bakersfield CA 93390 World at War 21 WaW10 Issue. there are significant differences owing to the smaller scale of this operation and the systemic ne- cessitates inherent in a solitaire design. To purchase the game that covers the battles featured in this issue send your name and address along with: $30 US Customers $36 Canadian Customers All prices include postage for first class or airmail shipping. fatigue. The player controls various US and Allied forces.

so the American player has to be careful. and also to conduct combat air patrol types instead of grouping them together into generic naval (CAP) at higher altitudes in order to better intercept intrud- and land categories. That. but an As regular readers of World at War will see. In the game. in turn. The Japanese at Coral Sea had would’ve been anachronistic. CSS puts you on the until coming in range of a target. Adm. operations and logistics. you know at least when operating together. and they retained them if—and that’s a big “if”—you get your own forces that superiority throughout 1942. especially when ships form of more die rolling. Coral Sea Solitaire By Joseph Miranda The Battle of the Coral Sea was the first carrier-ver- sus-carrier action in naval history. each with its own mission. IJN forces will head all over the map been readily available at the time. One was that pure naval actions would’ve really only added more procedural minutia. ers. to determine how high Japanese can be organized into task forces. then. One was to account panic threshold by inflicting losses. The judgment on Coral Sea has been that it was a Japa- intelligence. 22 #10 WaW10 Issue. Also. On the other side. this stage of the war. As was the case histori. I based Allied strategic victory (the Japanese turned back without Coral Sea Solitaire on the Solomons Campaign system invading Port Moresby). mand control situation. the panic rule. since it CSS as a solitaire game. timing air and naval strikes. There was also a rigidity in Japa- nese operational doctrine. Coral Sea’s more tactical scale also al. show that aspect of history in the design. though. the Japanese were where each Japanese task force is going. I dropped it. involved: Coral Sea was a much smaller campaign in Both sides learned a lot from Coral Sea. in which the Allies had an immense advantage from ULTRA. the Japanese are capable of launching devastating attacks if favorable circumstances come together for them. was how to (from issue number two). since it does a good job of simu. That means organizing the fleet. the Japanese are forced for the difference in scale between the two designs. since historically they had a bi-weekly turns of the multi-month Solomons Campaign. One was the intelligence situation. as opposed to the even when they win a battle. If the player can push the Japanese to their Some modifications had to be made. the and plans in order. The question. in the have relatively fewer units in play. your historic counterpart. It lends itself well to a solitaire game design for a couple reasons. you command the Allied units. I originally considered a rule allowing for CAP at low. that represents a breakdown in coordination. Another was the com. allowing players to imple- several different task forces conducting divergent mis. the Japanese still had the tactical edge at deliver a decisive blow or riposte. the Japanese were fighting with a minimum of information on Allied forces and intentions. air units would be flying in each mission. and can intercept better at night operations than the USN. The Japanese also move toward panicking covers a week or so of operations. There were several things facilitating the design of medium and high altitudes. then. either an enemy task bridge of an American carrier in May 1942. They divided their fleet into five separate task forces. per. though cally. high command realized they needed to increase carrier lowed me to show distinctions between different aircraft fighter coverage. That meant they didn’t have a concentrated force available to Historically.indd 22 12/16/09 2:30:43 PM . to fight the battle with what your counterpart knew histori- cally. Like bombers are more effective than comparative US types. Japanese get an edge in determining tactical initiative and forming tactical intelligence. nese tactical success (they sank more US tonnage). and you have force or an objective to assault. night combat. That’s all strategic intelligence and command control. Frank Fletcher. tendency to cut off operations prematurely after sinking There was also a large difference in the sizes of the forces some enemy ships. simulated through four command missions: organization. That’s counterbalanced by the US edge in and making sure your ships are sustained at sea. CSS to fall back. In the game. The US Navy terms of units. My answer was Design Corner lating operational-level conflict in the Pacific Theater. So their dive-bombers and torpedo- In the game. ment decisions based on information that wouldn’t have sions.

2010 Columbus. Tournaments. & More! Home of the 36th Annual Origins Awards TM © 2009 Brian Dalrymple Recognizing Excellence in Game Design TM ORIGINS Where GaminG BeGins Play Games! Have Fun! TM presented by TM ORIGINS is the GAME MANUFACTURERS Players’ Convention ASSOCIATION OriginsGameFair. Oh © 2008 Ron Grecina Photography © 2009 Brian Dalrymple 4. © 2008 Ron Grecina Photography The Origins World at War 23 WaW10 Issue. CeLeBraTinG 35 Years! 5 Full Days of Gaming GAME FAIR Wednesday to Sunday 2010 TM June 23-27.indd 23 12/16/09 2:30:44 PM .000 + Events Games. Art Show.

Even so. And. pol. In October the Perekop bottleneck prevented von 15 and Il-16 fighters to the Crimean front. The Coastal Army arrived by sea at Sevasto- tive umbrella over them during their drive into the east. 1941. of Odessa. The Crimea was an important area. for just about the into the flanks of German Army Group South. the British Royal Air Force was stepping up and pack animals. Soviets also deployed more than 200 cannon-armed Il. The Red Army would also be denied had been besieged by British. French and Turkish armies a convenient staging area for amphibious counterattack in the Crimean War of 1854-56. That missing equipment would’ve its bombing raids against targets in occupied Europe.indd 24 12/16/09 2:30:45 PM . first time since the invasion of the USSR began on 22 In September the SS Liebstandarte Adolf Hitler Di- June 1941. locale of Sevastopol. effectively neutral- peninsula. been valuable in opposing Gen. Y. weapons and horses. German air units were being stretched thin. eastern front to deal with that threat. artillery the west. vehicles. adding 80. Erich von Manstein’s prompting Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering to with. but the Soviets blocked the narrow passage to swarms of ground attack aircraft and bombers. For four heady months they’d taken air Petrov’s Coastal Army to escape from the besieged port superiority for granted as the Luftwaffe spread a protec. the with a few riflemen and an armored train.E. causing havoc Manstein from deploying as large a force as he would among Axis troops. In addition Perekop. have liked. as the Crimea. The four-mile-wide corridor had room 24 #10 WaW10 Issue. German soldiers found themselves digging vision had attempted an audacious solo crossing of the foxholes for cover against hostile warplanes. Its loss would cost It was the eve of the German push into the Crimean the Soviets control of the Black Sea. Gen. The Second Crimean War by Kelly Bell It was a new sensation for the men of the German The absence of the Luftwaffe further aided the LIV Army Corps on the night of 17-18 October Crimea’s defenders in that it facilitated Maj.000 troops to the Soviet presence in the So far that drive had gone fairly smoothly but. In cranes had forced it to leave behind its armor. the Coastal Army arrived in its new front kept rolling across the seemingly endless Russian area of operations poorly equipped: a lack of loading steppe. the great naval base that izing their fleet. coming German-Romanian thrust through the Perekop draw an increasing number of Luftwaffe planes from the isthmus and into the Crimea.

indd 25 12/16/09 2:30:47 PM . doggedly crawled forward. Though caught in an inferno of explosions. As the barrage lifted to in- divisions—the 46th. enough for the simultaneous passage of just three full meticulous preparations. bolstered by Petrov’s ill-equipped units. With Army Group North grinding to a halt in front of Leningrad. German infantry emerged from their ments of the 170th. Into the Peninsula At 5:00 a. Still yards in front of them. which tillery and machinegun fire met them from a warren Hitler had provided on the condition that. white-hot shrapnel and scalding mud. the rainy darkness was banished by a massive German artillery barrage. Hitler had hoped a successful attack by Army Group South in the Crimea would help regain the ini- tiative along the front. The attack was fully expected. on comple. Infantry Regiment penetrated and secured the high Opposing von Manstein’s forces was Soviet 51st Army. it would immediately ing forced to drop flat to the ground. 73rd and 22nd Infantry—and ele. a hail of ar- en route to southern Russia was the XLII Corps. and Army Group Center tem- porarily stopped well in front of Moscow by mud and rains. Despite be- tion of the Crimean operation. of well-prepared and concealed positions. To their surprise. Following close behind would be soggy holes and charged the Soviet defenses just 100 the 50th Infantry Division and the rest of the 170th. the So- viets weathered the pitiless blitz remarkably well. on 18 October.m. The hapless defenders were hammered by 150mm and 210mm guns and by unnerving Nebelwerfer rockets that trailed flames as they shrieked down from the gloom. flames. and the defenders had made Another round of combat: German artillerists prepare shells. crease its range. the assault troops be dispatched for use in a planned drive beyond Ros. The 22nd Division’s 65th tov. World at War 25 WaW10 Issue. four cavalry divisions and the garrison from Sevastopol’s naval base.

tough nut to crack. Advancing elements of the 46th Division were cut devised a plan of attack intended to compensate for to pieces while entangled in barbed wire. 50th and 132nd Infantry Divisions went south on a di- After a final day of grisly fighting on 26 October. tled with heavily armed and well-prepared defenders. it went. the de- fense suddenly stiffened. the 46th. along The surviving defenders had abandoned their posi. when it and 46th Division took the stronghold of Kerch on the tip of the peninsula. Hans von Sponeck. Manstein and his adjutants. von Manstein sent six of his sev- ets who’d decimated the 46th. Realizing Sevastopol would be a attack by the 22nd Division then wiped out the Sovi. they were surprised to find the way clear. ground. Sev- astopol’s defenders had no hope for immediate relief. reconnaissance battalions. Alushta and Balaclava (the latter the site of the infamous 1854 Charge of the Light Brigade) fell in quick succession but.” the Germans inched through the to Sevastopol. 73rd and 170th Infantry which systematically eliminated pillboxes and ripped Divisions from the XLII Army Corps moved against apart wire obstacles. but was then forced to take cover from more With the way into the Crimea suddenly clear. the 46th Infantry Division penetrated to the Parpach isthmus and sealed it off from approach- ing Soviet reinforcements. 26 #10 WaW10 Issue. ing assault group called the Mobile Combat Group and tors. were organized into a fast-mov- cased explosives that went unnoticed by metal detec.000 die-hard defenders of the “Heroes’ Tumulus of Assis” men. on the direct route “Devil’s Plantation. On the third the 170th Di- vision captured the port of Feodosiya and continued east until 15 November. Meanwhile. sage of another detachment of the Coastal Army that had been en route overland to Sevastopol. anti-tank and remote-controlled flamethrowers. and electrically commanded by a Col. from enemy units. This Soviet bastion bris- fires at a target. rect course for Sevastopol in an attempt to surprise its Soviet resistance on the Perekop land bridge began defenders by appearing there suddenly. Gen. but a flank their lack of armor. Naval infantry. thereby seemingly securing the whole eastern region. and other cohesive formations bolstered by fortress ar- tillery. the Germans again surged ahead. the Mobile Combat Group took Simferopol and. to collapse. withdrawing their depleted forces to strengthen rior. pressed on tions and retreated south to the defenses of the Kerch all the way to Yalta on the southern coast. as the 72nd. on the Crimea’s east against possible counterattack They charged into the main Soviet defense net. To the east. with elements of the 22nd Infantry Division. barring pas- and Sevastopol ports. and von Manstein set the 28th as the date The Soviets were behaving exactly as Manstein had for the final breakthrough into the peninsula’s inte. The LIV Corps’s days to penetrate the mile of defenses. hoped. Dubbing the hellish fortifications the sent toward the town of Simferopol. were ready for action and well equipped. 50th and 132nd Infantry Regi- ments all bore down on Sevastopol. With 16 Russian divisions already destroyed. minefields of wood. When the Germans cautiously moved ahead that the defenses of Sevastopol and Kerch. halted the German advance on the 16th. On 1 November morning. all available motorized work: barbed wire entanglements interspersed with formations. The Reds had thrown in their last reserves. anti-aircraft batteries. Busse and Wohler. and those units. commanded by Lt. as the invaders loomed out of the north. Meanwhile. and stronghold (a gargantuan earthen mound in the middle a few Romanian units. mopping up resistance as firepower of the 190th Self-Propelled Gun Battalion. Cols. tanks buried up to their turrets.indd 26 12/16/09 2:30:48 PM . That battlegroup was detonated mines. leaving only the 46th’s 10. Ziegler. to cover the Kerch peninsula of a flat space). von shelling and another storm of small arms fire. All seemed to be going according to plan in the west as well. After killing the last en divisions against it. cadets of the 79th Officer Aspirant Brigade. Yalta. mile-deep zone in the face of fanatic resistance that The XXX Army Corps advanced behind the Mobile would’ve stopped the advance had it not been for the Combat Group vanguard. but the German ranks had also become weary and The Gustav 80mm Big Gun: German siege artillery thinned out by the bloodbath. unlike those encountered since the Perekop breakthrough over the preceding 10 days. It still took the attackers eight Feodosiya and the Parpach isthmus.

fighting a land battle in the middle of an again been halted by bombardment from coastal bat- inland sea. and at great cost. lodge the Soviets.indd 27 12/16/09 2:30:50 PM . as the German commandant of Paris. Finally. There was also word the distant Japanese had Hitler’s orders to destroy that city as the Allies ap- launched a new war in the Pacific. Infantry Regiment reached and secured the fortress’s ports of massive counteroffensives far to the north. north-south road. those monumental events may as well have teries and warships. fortress towering in front of them. The icy elements further cut vision breached the defensive perimeter on 21 De- ranks on both sides as men began to fall to frostbite. elements of the 22nd Di- 1942 closed in miserably. but by Christmas the Germans had Sevastopol. and all the while the winter of 1941.) Rommel had launched a new offensive into Egypt. who refused cow. hungry soldiers in front of overwhelmed. The besiegers got re. On the 23rd Col. (Von Cholitz would later gain fame as Red Army reserves struck back in front of Mos. bedraggled. cember. and in North Africa proached it in August 1944. The underground armored artil- World at War 27 WaW10 Issue. To The outer ring of Sevastopol’s defenses had been the freezing. Their universe consisted of the against Sevastopol’s defenses in a grisly effort to dis. Dietrich von Cholitz’s 16th hypothermia and pneumonia. Siege For five weeks the Germans hurled themselves been on another planet.

protected by armor 16 On 17 December the Germans launched an attack spe- inches thick. Able to rotate 360 de- grees. they could hit targets up to 26 miles (42 km) away. infantry swarming into its interior. 30th Battery hammered columns of German motorized infantry resting along a road. Only the battery’s massive turret. and machinery service rooms were ensconced within a two. reaching the final defensive deal more underground. The explosions. The 30th Battery (which was closer four yards thick. was visible at the surface. Despite the excellent gunnery. however. inch) railroad piece. perimeter of the guns. Still. but in case of a power failure it could also be rotated manually—a testa- ment to the precision of their design. pushed back that thrust. topol for more than six months.indd 28 12/16/09 2:30:51 PM . however. encircled and out of ammunition. the Kampf. including one 800mm (31. On 2 November. By 17 June. Seventeen electric motors powered the turret. crew quarters 29th. a power station. 142 by 55 yard complex shielded by concrete walls burning themselves out. 30th Battery fired its guns in anger for huge assortment of newly arrived and gigantic siege guns to the first time. shrapnel and shock waves destroyed 40 trucks and several tanks. but there was a great cifically targeting 30th Battery. were doomed. Maxim Gorki was heavily ploying to assault the Soviet 8th Marine Brigade. it was clear the big guns gruppe was depleted. Manstein deployed a On 1 November. By that time the rueful invaders had dubbed the big guns “Maxim Gorki. guns in opposing 11th Army’s attack in the autumn of 1941. After being damaged. The shells fell on the German 132nd Infantry renew the attack on Sevastopol. and hence more directly involved The communists seized power in Russia in 1918.5 Division’s Kampfgruppe Ziegler.” af- ter the radical Russian playwright who later became a Soviet hero. than 35th Battery in opposing them) fired 1. It was designated 30th Battery. which was just then de. The workers from Repair Plant #1127 of the Black of 305mm naval guns. the gargantuan rifles were level. to the main enemy force.360 tons. inherit. By the start of World War II barrels designed to fire just 300 a piece before being re- the defense network had been upgraded by another battery placed. With German pounded by 68 of the battery’s huge projectiles. A subterranean warren of compart. Designated 35th Battery. it would join its brother rels in just 16 days instead of the predicted 60. A spirited Soviet counterattack on the ments. they had helped delay the fall of Sevas- ing. As spring broke over the Crimea. 28 #10 WaW10 Issue. ammunition cellars. replacing the bar- to the city.238 rounds from ing Sevastopol and its defenses. which covered the southern approach Sea Fleet rose to the challenge. considering they each weighed 1. Between 1912 and 1917 they constructed a steel turret armed with two 305mm rifled guns to guard the northern side of the city. the last tsar set his best military engineers to work constructing a powerful artillery position to defend the vital Black Sea port and naval base of Sevastopol. dispersed and prevented from attack. Maxim Gorki: Defender of Sevastopol During the waning years of the Russian Empire.

the Germans counterattacked. Then. sealed off the beach. un- him to withdraw a crucial percentage of his troops der Gen. though. Its timing was a major problem because the bulk of the Axis force was tied down at Sevastopol. under Gen. freezing. On the morning of the 29th. The only way to disrupt the Red two or three more days until Sevastopol fell. Manstein He and his troops then slipped away from the So- was unaware. which buildup at Feodosiya was to throw it into turmoil via would then free the main body of troops to come to a surprise assault. The Soviets’ obvious Soviet forces and isolated from re-supply and rein. and 44th Army. he saw no Kerch to the rest of the Crimea. of the massive size of the force viets at Kerch and set out through a blizzard to move World at War 29 WaW10 Issue. other Soviet forces to the west the Kerch peninsula to the rest of the Crimea. were both ordered to move swiftly from the fortress perimeter and transfer them to meet to occupy the traffic junctions behind the Sevastopol the new flank threat. in temperatures that hovered around -22º cable disobedience. Though the Germans weren’t to- tally surprised the Reds had launched such a seaborne assault. the good reason to sacrifice his remaining men in a sui- 46th would be trapped between numerically superior cidal stand against that colossus. the 46th Division alone couldn’t It was a useless effort. they turned back some of the landings. Neutralization of that stronghold would clear the way to Severnaya Bay.” von Sponeck to stand firm until help arrived. Without prompt assistance it would be un. The Von Manstein figured the Soviet intent was to force Soviet 51st Army. von Manstein and his officers were busily plotting their next moves when word came of massive Soviet amphibious landings at Kerch and Feodosiya. at 10:00 a. Instantly grasping the implications of the situation. though. facing the 46th.m. while pillboxes and machinegun nests in that same sector also helped bring on another standstill. on the 29th. since the division accomplish everything necessary to get the emergency commander had already dismantled his wireless. the field marshal was stunned to receive a radio mes. The Master Planner: von Manstein examines a map.m. in hand. sealing off the peninsula by establishing themselves With his depleted. von Sponeck moving from its exposed position and retreating west. leaving only smaller units to face the new threat from the flank. those heavily outnumbered troops (mainly von Sponeck’s) reacted well. Closure of the harbor would isolate the city from naval re-supply. aim was to cut the slender Parpach isthmus connecting forcement. von Cholitz’s regiment had reached Fort Stalin. They would then launch a mas- divisions investing Sevastopol. Even so. front and thus cut the Manstein’s supply line. the city’s harbor.indd 29 12/16/09 2:30:56 PM . The Germans had to knock out the pillboxes and mortar pits individually in a series of gruesome actions that decimated the German 24th Infantry Divi- sion. If that occurred. Pervushin. At 8:00 a. which controlled the north- ern approaches to Sevastopol. he the 46th’s assistance. ate response: “Withdrawal must be stopped at once!” That success aside. Von Sponeck Marches sage from von Sponeck informing him the 46th was Quickly deducing Soviet intentions. von Manstein fired off an immedi- Fahrenheit. on 29 December. hungry and exhausted di- athwart the 12-mile-long Parpach isthmus connecting vision facing two onrushing Soviet armies. sive westward drive against von Manstein himself. Lvov. so von Manstein had ordered emy at Feodosiya and throw him into the sea. they’d hoped it wouldn’t come at that crucial stage of the fight for the city. Shocked at his subordinates’s inexpli- heads and. then trap of the 46th would be free to strike into the rear of the and wipe out the 46th. resolved not to merely march west. By dusk on 28 December. Meanwhile. doubtless because he anticipated his commander’s re- able to prevent the Feodosiya counterattack force from action and was unwilling to accept the likely response. but to attack in an Von Manstein had counted on the division to hold for unexpected sector. lery battery named “Maxim Gorky” showered them with 305mm shells. This division’s performance therefore had his radio re-assembled long enough to against the initial landings had made that seem to be inform higher command of his plan “to attack the en- a plausible stratagem. which meant Sevastopol could be starved into surrender.

who managed to hold off the preparations. so he suspended further assaults on Fort Stalin. though. knocking out 16 enemy tanks That stand-down turned into something longer and stopping the Reds’ counter-thrust into the Crimea. for he exhibited rare clemency and commuted the penalty to seven years imprisonment. sault guns. as the Soviet tanks closed with the German as- couldn’t wait for the entire installation to be secured. the Soviets launched a massed over the fort. von Manstein’s entire command likely would’ve ing of 31 December. He knew assistance from him would be assault. invaluable to the success of von Sponeck’s venture. reversing what had been growing Soviet mo- path. sleep-deprived on the Kerch peninsula. then established a successful block of at Sevastopol stormed the ramparts of that position. the Ger. which had just been shifted move. but The newly arrived German 213th Infantry Regi- first he would have to neutralize Fort Stalin. von Sponeck was executed by an SS firing squad on orders of the ever more paranoid Hitler. That extension of mercy proved only temporary. Under cover of the long winter night. as the fight for Fort Stalin was been cut off. sion. the Soviet 157th Rifle Division. It was noon collapsed. and von into that sector. The blistering combat made the men Manstein’s battalions were again decimated. evidently realized the value of von Sponeck’s actions in the Crimea. 30 #10 WaW10 Issue. advance elements of the 46th reached the throughout south Russia. there was still no relief for neck had averted having his own command annihilated von Sponeck’s famished. It would be five months before Without von Sponeck’s good use of the 46th Divi- the siege was resumed and completed. mans outflanked and bypassed those Soviets. hungry and tired they attack dragging on longer than expected. for the Soviet 63rd Rifle Division blocked their effect. The Germans held. with their lackadaisical conduct on New Year’s Eve that permitted von Sponeck to bypass their forces and set up behind them. The target: Sevastopol under siege. taking The Reds hadn’t done themselves any favors either. than he anticipated. mentum.indd 30 12/16/09 2:30:56 PM . after the 20 July 1944 bomb plot against the Fuehrer’s life. They could still pull triggers. By quick thinking. on New Year’s Day 1942 when the Soviets charged Von Manstein was meanwhile making his own the bedraggled Germans. with dire consequences for the Germans called off. A number of artillery pieces had to be up positions on open ground to the west in anticipa- abandoned en route because the horses pulling them tion of being attacked the next morning. A chagrined von Manstein—hop- ing to deflect his Fuehrer’s cold scrutiny onto some- one else—relieved von Sponeck of command to send him before a court-martial presided over by Goering himself. encountering a garrison of exhausted. That was really possible only due to the resourcefulness and quick. and instead used it to brilliant men. to Feodosiya. He was stripped of his rank and decorations and sentenced to death. however. Attempting to force a Under cover of smoke shells the Germans swarmed penetration to the west. With the on both sides forget how cold. Yet his foresight brought him no good re- ward. or by then continuing to delay un- til the Germans were able to bring up reinforcements and artillery support. independent thinking of von Sponeck and the resiliency of his 46th Infantry Division. shivering. Hitler. von Spo- Parpach isthmus. tank attack. The Crimean campaign had taken longer than Hitler thought necessary. but didn’t figure on the Germans’ last half-starved Russians who scarcely had the strength to three self-propelled guns. however. the 16th Infantry Regiment tain Corps. bolstered by elements of the Romanian Moun- 46th was beginning its trek. he decided he were. On the morn. So. as the ment. The Reward The Crimea was finally entirely taken by the Ger- mans on 4 July 1942.

StrategyAndTacticsPress. CA 93390-1598. Bakersfield. yet it happened only rarely. making possible the 1965. Erich von. front’s flanks were secured and German control was Carell. liberally illustrated with maps and diagrams (320 pages). New York: Ballantine Books. from raising and training armies to planning the campaign to fighting the battle. Paul. Reach for the Sky.PO Box 21598. immense drive to Stalingrad and the Caucasus in the Editors. 1954.indd 31 12/16/09 2:30:58 PM . CA: Presidio Press. Manstein. Now Available from Strategy & Tactics Press The Holy Grail sought by American Civil War generals was the decisive Napoleonic battle. vol. Each chapter looks at one part of the process with a detailed account of a particular battle or campaign. Hitler Moves East: 1941-1943. Paul. Key to the Black Sea: Sevastopol harbor. By Christopher Perello. York:Time-Life Books. New York: Bantam Books. Sources sponsible for achieving it. 1982 reprint of 1958 original edition. World at War 31 WaW10 Call: (661) 587-9633 • Fax: (661) 587-5031 Post: Strategy & Tactics Press. established over the Black Sea. This book analyzes the mechanics of battle. Novato. Time/Life Books Series. New summer of 1942. 1990. Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler’s Most at Brilliant General. The Third Reich. Despite the heinous treatment of the soldier re. the southern Russian Brickhill. Barbarossa. Next book Spring 2010 order online: www.

We will West Front map. will also month. which means experienced players can by telephone. Lithuania. alternative history wargame. and the third commands the his generals: “The time will never be better to destroy Soviets. The rules contain Once we’ve taken Moscow. The West from the historic timeline has taken place in mid-Septem. the second commands the Germans on continue to have nothing to fear in the west. he concludes it would be a waste of time by three. The Greater East Asia War. airpower. he also tells his foreign minister to drop on 34x22” large-hex mapsheet and 176 large-size counters all negotiations aimed at revising the original territorial (NATO and iconic). If four play.000 words. He tells commands the Anglo-French. Issue number 12 will contain an alternative history design two.indd 32 12/16/09 2:30:59 PM . strategic-level. one commands the Germans on the the Bolshevik power then in the coming year. and more. Issue # Month Game Topic & Lead Article 11 Apr 10 Afrikakorps: Decision in the Desert 12 Jun 10 1940: What If? 13 Aug 10 East Front Battles: Guards Tank 14 Oct 09 Invasion Pearl Harbor 15 Dec 09 Soft Underbelly 32 #10 WaW10 Issue. three or four players can investigate the possibilities by Ty Bomba. Most importantly. fortifications. we’ll take Paris and London some 17. and and French simply do not want war. the third commands the Soviets. The British the East Front map. he can’t help but notice the strategic paralysis of turn on both maps equals half a month. If played that realization. all other forces in the game are corps. the fourth commands the Anglo-French. titled 1940: What If? In it. the Anglo-French. 7th Flieger Corps.” finish a match in about four hours. armies. who are doing nothing to try to prevent If two play. Each game That is. Japan. they are afraid of it. Components include Accordingly. All Soviet units are conquest of Poland. originally in the Ger. World at War No. Romanian oil. Front map is scaled at 16 miles per hex. be included. 12: 1940: What if? All of which results in this low-to-intermediate com- plexity. Rules cover such things as: neutrals. Hitler receives a flash of intuition. one player commands the Germans. Add-on counters and rules for issue split set out in the accord with the USSR the previous number six’s game. From Game Preview commands both the Anglo-French and Soviets. At that time.” isn’t traded for a further slice of war. Soviet 1st Shock Army. the departure inherent in a changed German strategy for 1940. The East Front ber 1939. Polish territory as was done historically. as his forces are completing the map is scaled at 25 miles per hex. one commands the Germans while the other the downfall of their fast-disappearing ally Poland. one player to redeploy the Wehrmacht to the west in 1940. In it. fog of man “sphere of interest.

indd 33 12/16/09 2:31:00 PM . the coal handling their main and anti-aircraft guns at garrison and its facilities had to be de. but had returned a few months later to deploy a small Free Norwe- gian garrison and weather station. assault engineer sections and three destroyers appeared on the horizon ship captains who’d served the island naval radiomen. The whelm the defenders. The engineers and a naval radioman. Hitler had battleship Tirpitz. The ships would town to capture prisoners. and the landing force would be The landings were to be con- 349th Grenadier Regiment landed at made large enough to quickly over. Two hours visits to the islands. Goe- The Spitzbergen raid was the Adm. 5th and 6th 3:50 a. All agreed anti-aircraft artillery (two 40mm guns time. but were organized into three elements: destroy the radio station and seize any Kriegsmarine commander Adm. then. The destroyers light (20mm) anti-aircraft gun battery. and the 4th. ships in the group opened fire. itself the precursor to naval forces under him included the was to go ashore from the Z-30 on northern Europe’s weather. The garrison was estimated at couldn’t leap directly onto the pier. before the war. sweeping away the back into the Luftwaffe’s Norway. lead by 1st Lt. Z-27 and Z-15. those going ashore into Spitzbergen. It weather. Special Ops Germany’s Spitzbergen Raid On 8 September 1943. It was over 100 men supported by a small but that proved unnecessary. Once they had the main pier. brought assault boats in case they power. and the German force moved and the radio station.m. They were to take out the mine and strategic position astride Destroyer Flotillas. they were to destroy the her main guns in anger for the first anti-aircraft batteries. was an infantry platoon largest component of a campaign mander of the Kriegsmarine’s Group reinforced by a section of assault to dominate the reporting on Arctic North. garrison from engaging the assault Kriegsmarine’s “Operation Sicily. achieved those objectives. facility.” or pened. The island and a 20mm gun). Extensive aerial reconnaissance had while the 4th (Landing Group Green) gian garrison on Spitzbergen Island provided details about the garrison’s and 5th (Landing Group Red) took received a radio message indicating layout and strength. Minutes the operation’s start. North Sea Raider: the Scharnhorst. as well as from reinforced assault platoon.” had begun. and documents they found. Those troops were to and closed on the main harbor. Doenitz had to repeat the same argument when Hitler raised the issue of Spitzbergen again in February 1943. the coal mine’s entrance the buildings and positions behind stroyed. Erich Landing Groups Green and Red. sections. World at War 33 WaW10 Issue. Group Red’s Raeder had convinced him the island the Screening & Support Force. and the largest of the war. the ground operation would be groups in sequence. a British Royal Navy task force of tional charts were built from informa. Once the German battleship Tirpitz. The two other destroyers. Sud. ducted simultaneously to prevent the three points and moved inland. Allied shipping lanes to Russia. the mander of the 230th Infantry Division. hlinghorst. Whatever hap. The destroyers rushed in. By 28 July the basic be landed in three separate elements denly the destroyers emitted black operational plan and estimate were from the Z-29. Oskar Kummetz. German 230th Infantry Division’s speed. The British had evacuated the island’s predomi- nantly Russian population in April 1941. Accurate naviga. was impossible to hold in the face of Allied naval superiority. firing speed was of the essence. 6th Flotilla was to provide security combined 140-man Free Norwe. Planning for Operation Sicily began. a reinforced battalion from the therefore approach the island at high and materiel. completed and the force withdrawn Red landed in two widely separate “Operation Citrus. three later. the three defenders who might otherwise have based air umbrella within 28 hours of elements were to converge on the opposed the landing troops. indicating a rush to full complete. Z-31 and Z-33. Group as the German Army codenamed it. in late April 1943 when that task was assigned to the com. They smoke. com. documents later. was in tactical command. within eight hours of landing. firing coastal defense battery and several ashore. however. along with a en route to the island. The 4th was to land a reinforced two cruisers and six destroyers was tion gathered by previous German infantry company. The first. the battlecruiser the western shore of Cape Linn at earlier wanted the island for its coal Scharnhorst. two large warships and several interviews with Norwegian steam.

but other than a few safety. a small town in ish mini-subs just four weeks later. The ships were biyen. The Tirpitz’s opening accomplish that task.m. who’d rushed to the buildings destroyed. She was crippled by Brit- Goehlinghorst’s troops found their fled to Sverdup. The majority of the Norwegians in combat. Commanded by 1st Lt. Tacti- craft gunners protecting Barentsburg group pressed hard in the hope of cally. escape into the hills. he collapsed from wounds. Haenkemeyer. Ullring.m. taking the Allied weather station off-line for only a few weeks. Hempel’s and several British cruisers. the troops leaped four wounded soldiers who couldn’t anti-aircraft guns there. three withdrawal toward the mountains several Germans and causing Hempel radiomen and a reinforced platoon of behind the town. The Norwegian light anti-air. signal. fered light damage as it steamed into be assured of his remaining men’s Commanded by 1st Lt. ~Carl Otis Schuster The battleship Tirpitz conducting trials in the Baltic Sea during the fall of 1941. objectives vacant. Surprise was so complete. Advent valley. The landing detachments quickly assault engineer detachments.. It was to debark task group. Though insig- nificant in size and damage inflicted. Hempel’s men quickly secured all their assigned objectives. were to land a reinforced infantry scored some hits on the incoming taking more prisoners. a series of long blasts on their Hempel. He therefore had to settle for they were to destroy the barracks and slightly wounded. while the Scharnhorst the garrison headquarters where they stores burning and most of the town’s supported the assault on Longyear. killing half assault engineer sections. captured Ullring. Operation Sicily was a success in that all the mission’s tactical objec- tives were achieved.indd 34 12/16/09 2:31:00 PM . shortly after 11:00 a. seized Tirpitz supported the landing at the harbor and the town. nine hours ashore. coastal mountains. The Norwegian garrison commander. The underway for home shortly after noon The operation’s early moments Germans took him before he could and returned to Altafjord by early went well. Z-27 suf. Operationally. 34 #10 WaW10 Issue. Longyearbyen. left the coal Barentsburg. Wetter- truppe Knospel. however. with documents. and Landing Group Red’s within minutes of landing. however. had time to who pinned down the Germans until ning battle with HMS Duke of York react. onto the pier without difficulty. building to destroy documents. time she would fire her main battery 5:00 a. They had achieved directly onto Barentsburg pier. but two of the company supported by one-and-a. Their retreat was last successful mission. to halt the advance until he could “special troops” at Longyearbiyen. which remained in northeast Spitzbergen until the fol- lowing spring. behind the island’s The raid was also the Scharnhorst’s desks and equipment undisturbed. the raid did have strategic impact in that it distracted the Allies from learning of the presence of a German metrological team. destroyers before making a fighting Tirpitz’s salvoes landed short. as it hadn’t been active since 1941. The destroyers sounded the recall of the three. infantry company supported by three retreat after signaling for help.m. She was sunk The defenders in Barentsburg and covered by a lone machinegunner on Christmas Day 1943 after a run- Longyearbyen. including dozens of documents. The special evening on 9 September. a ing the Germans wouldn’t stay around began an orderly withdrawal back reinforced “special assault platoon” to take on the coming Allied naval to the ships. Group Green was the largest The fighting was short and sharp. Similarly. while the the battleship Tirpitz’s only participa- troops were all ashore by 3:50 a. Those men enabled the Germans to receive the vital weather data so critical both to planning their own military operations and anticipat- ing the timing for those of the Allies. troops reached the wireless station The raid on Spitzbergen marked craft guns. ordering his troops to fog horns. its impact was minimal. it consisted of a reinforced Capt. salvoes silenced the island’s anti-air. know. and the coal mine’s destruc- tion was merely a waste. assault engineers seized the mining tion in naval combat and the only and had achieved their objectives by facility. having spent less than and three radiomen.

A small So- African empire. It was was completed in June 1917. World at War 35 WaW10 Issue. that Ethiopia consid. established by treaty in 1897 between for its overall imperial presence. a small commercial harbor (maximum throughput was only 2. located in what was begun to make a profit. The The railroad was owned and Its initial strength was 1. Men Djibouti.700 miles away. Mogadishu was even more primitive. as it used it as its commercial outlet to the rest of the world.” Initially completely lese and Ethiopians. 200 Yemeni Arabs. who’d treaty stipulated France considered Africa. believing Addis Ababa. and all loading and unloading was done by hand. and the even smaller port of Mogadishu. Ethiopia also considered Djibouti critical to its national survival. in Ital- ian Somaliland fronting the Indian Ocean. where it was renamed free hand to establish a “protector. ate” over independent Ethiopia. and had mali unit of two companies (2nd and Djibouti. went to of former German colonies and a transfer all materials of war required France in July. inadequate access to fresh water. That British and Italian imperial moves in also desired by the Italians. after the last Italians had finally ceased resistance in Ethiopia. Wolchefit Pass. by the Ethiopian Empire. it had no facilities at all. by 1924 it had paid off all its they were initially put to work as crippled gave them a moral claim to loans.000 tons per month) on the Red Sea. Djibouti was a valued line trenches in October as part of the first-rate harbor on the African coast port of strategic importance for its Moroccan Colonial Infantry Regi- in the 3. investing the place with further their country into World War I on the ered Djibouti to be their only official emotional significance. 4th) were finally placed in the front then French Somaliland. The Italians had the port of Massawa. Massawa was 2. War I. those requests. Strategic Backwaters Djibouti in World War II In 1935 the colonial port of the right of way for which had been Indian Ocean and Pacific colonies. in Eritrea. and the the 6th Bataillon de Marche Somali list had included significant chunks railway was specifically authorized to was formed in Madagascar.400 Somalis final treaty ended up frustrating all operated by the “Franco-Ethiopian (from Djibouti). as a the seventh largest French port Menelik II and France. Neither port was useful: Massawa had no modern facilities. while Mogadishu was 3. Djiboutian manpower had also earlier made a bid for it at Versailles the port to be the only outlet for proved of value to France in World as part of the price for having brought Ethiopian trade. In May 1916 Allied side. laborers repairing roads. built the Addis Ababa station.600 miles from the nearest Italian port. load and unload cargo into small boats that beached in the surf. The few ships that called there had to anchor in the roadstead offshore. Other items on that wish outlet for international trade. another half-million permanently France. From the harbor of (Imperial War Museum photo number: E 6064 28 September 1941. and many Italians Railway Company of Djibouti & 75 Comoro islanders and 25 Senega- were therefore outraged.indd 35 12/16/09 2:31:01 PM . The railroad control over Ethiopia and a brake on outside metropolitan France. their loss of half-a-million dead and underwritten by the government of Deployed to the Verdun sector. 1st Bataillon de Tirailluers Somalis. and that was via the Brit- ish-controlled Suez Canal. was the only For France. Djibouti was a highly valued harbor. expanded its rolling stock.000-mile stretch between the Suez and the Kenyan port of Mombassa (both British). a railroad stretched to Addis of the (British) King’s African Rifles (KAR) collecting surrendered arms at Ababa via Dire Dawa and Harrar.

with French troops remain- large but virtually uninhabited chunk French Somaliland to them. In two Djiboutian infantry companies in Djibouti to approximately 10. Italy asked for a “solution erate the headquarters of an Ethiopian Following the French armistice to the Ethiopian problem” (in other resistance movement against the Ital. tions that resulted in the Laval-Mus. Joined later by the rest of the France responded to the Italian allow French troops to utilize British Somali infantry companies. and replaced commit to oppose Germany over the made rolling stock tossed in to the Legentilhomme in late July with Gen. Throughout the officially designated a combat unit egalese and Malagaches (Madagas. Italy and France vowed to carry on the fight at the side Central Africa and the whole of Dji. 300 artillery pieces and 150 commander-in-chief of French gui-Chari and Cameroon did so in tanks. and 37mm artillery. and anti-tank ditches and field Aden. all Italy got in return for its declara. He ordered the August. Gen. lowers. French colonial territories in Africa 300. Italy decided to fled from Djibouti to British Somalil- Italian Libya (the Aouzou Strip) from make Djibouti redundant by expand. Ali Sabieh and Dikhil. The Ethiopians had Dorale. and being able to hold out against any Horn of Africa. and in early August with a few fol- Chad. and the Second Battle of the Battery of the French Somali Coast. The French also prolonged siege. the destruction of Ethiopia). port.500 network in the advent of an Italian Bataillon de Tirailluers Somalis was French (European) troops.000 local Djiboutians. along with the coastal village port of Free French movement in England in sive and arduous build-up of forces Asseb. but the 8. 13 anti-aircraft guns. In 300.434 Somali and two squadrons camel dragoons. The Vichy administration in Djibouti tion of support to France and Austria ing. driving Italian forces eight reconnaissance aircraft. in Somaliland and Eritrea. but they out of British Somaliland. to op. Of the 2. In return. With Italian attack from Ethiopia. allowed Antonin Besse. In February Italians in an earlier failed invasion all expressed their confidence in 1941 the British re-engaged in the in 1896). citizen and employee of Royal Dutch Lebanon and Indochina strained the solini Agreement of January 1935. Ouban- aircraft.000 or so rifles (most of them fortifications at the key villages of in Aden worked to bring the French obsolescent). as well as two Gen. a private families evacuated from Madagascar. In January 1938 an Italian Germain. Approximately via Asmara. Italy attacked des Dames (1917). In Shell in Ethiopia before 1935. 6. small warships. and building a new asphalt October. Ap. armed and blockhouses at Ambouli and the British forces there evacuated to only with spears. lonial administration declared for the itself. Farah Had. on 17 June. The French garrison Djiboutians who served. man French garrison in Djibouti Marne in 1918. supported by 400 modern Paul Legentilhomme was named French movement. attacked the approximately forces in Djibouti. after an exten. The British therefore agreed to 36 #10 WaW10 Issue. and the liberal use of poison gas. the Italians worried an Italian attack through Free French Brigade of the Orient successfully concluded the conquest British Somaliland might take the occupied Keren. ultimately joining de Gaulle’s In October 1935. order condemning that surrender and the grant of extensive tracts in French In August 1936. fuel tanks were constructed. That garrison included 1. ized. to France and 517 died in action or stationed at Djibouti. Italy engaged in negotia. Because of that. Legentilhomme of worthless desert transferred to at that. agreed to the continued operation of of the British. French Somaliland before withdraw. Legentilhomme prepared for a from service-related causes. was left alone.500 Sen. at an Allied meeting in Aden. fewer than 50 artil. bargain. In forces in Djibouti over to the Allied lery pieces (some captured from the May. construction of anti-tank defenses in August the Italians invaded Brit- proximately two-thirds of the Ethio. 1st 1935. ing the port facilities of Massawa. That proved to be the precursor then agreed to accept the armistice as was a tiny slice of French Somaliland to a year of intense Italian diplomatic long as the Italians didn’t occupy the transferred to adjacent Eritrea.indd 36 12/16/09 2:31:01 PM . camel patrol penetrated 25 miles into France via Italian-occupied Ethiopia. Unfortunately. and around the city.088 went A squadron of Potez bombers were likewise adopted a defensive stance. Mussolini felt cheated. ment. the Italians road to link them with Addis Ababa Throughout the rest of 1940. in March. in December. declared for de Gaulle and the Free troops. Further distinguished Units included the 1st Foot Battalion extensive warehousing built. service was performed at the Chemin of Senegalese Tirailleurs.000 warriors of Ethiopia. 2. cause. Legentilhomme issued an words. invaded Ethiopia.500- (1917). the co- bouti with the exception of the port the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railroad. who arrived by plane from When the negotiations ended. year the port facilities were modern- and reinforced with machineguns and carene). of Ethiopia by April 1936. but to no avail. and a activity aimed at forcing Paris to cede city itself. the Colonial Artillery France in Europe. question of Austria’s independence. Italy was willing to with a French purchase of Italian. occupying it after pian forces were tribal levies. and Gabon in November. those first actions by reinforcing its garrison Somaliland territory if necessary. those talks. though. the Somali In June 1940.000 June the French began to stockpile spearheaded the assault that retook troops. attack on Djibouti. all in place by the end of arms and explosives for a resistance Fort Douaumont. Failing ing in garrison there. new Vichy government. with casemates ish Somaliland. resources of the colony. in Eritrea. but the presence of In 1934.000 Italian and native colonial At the beginning of 1939. Chad. and 2. ians. Free French representatives only 50. Malmasion Coast Militia.

in Algeria in the wake of the Allied the Bataillon Somali de Souverains. Despite that to align himself with Darlan. Truffert resigned under duress. but the from a fixed trapeze. US consul in Aden. but at a 60-degree offset.” as with blimps. Dupont. which would carry nine dive Navy put that accumulated experience farther down the airship’s belly. What If? The ZRCV Flying Aircraft Carrier The adoption of a new technol. those planes direction compass. a trapeze that folded down from the removed and replaced by external US Navy planners were drawn to hangar deck. After Free French troops approached the ~Vernie Liebl outskirts of the city. The 8. had been resurrected. That same year. with a loss of 73 lives. hangar with its own trapeze.indd 37 12/16/09 2:31:02 PM . ceding authority to Gen. Once aboard. attempted to keep the colony in its inhabitants were accorded French neutral status. While the airship was gas tanks. The Macon in the US Navy in the inter-war years. after of Honor. With ZR Macon). patrol line 200 miles wide. its flanks. permanently on 25 June 1946. The bat- contact was maintained between Dji. they were unique in that they had its airplanes to save weight. The Vichy military command. It sortied without affected the course of World War II. In April. Darlan raised a native Somali detachment surrender or go over to the Allies. Dupont “overseas territory” of France and all Free French cause. Almost as big as the contempora. once again.000 French troops in The stalemate remained until The Free French immediately Djibouti continued to refuse to either November 1942. The plan was to eventually storm off New Jersey on 4 April 1933. we’ll never know how neous German Luftschiff Hindenburg. initiated publication of a ber. that was lacking build 10 of them. having been awarded two Legions Free French newspaper in Dire Dawa. or “perch. So they set out to skyhook added to the top of its own moving away and toward it. the Macon could advance a zeppelins. stood for “rigid. distinguished rigorous effort at blockade. On 4 Decem. who left for d’Afrique Equatoriale et Somali until planes flying via Lebanon. S standing for “scout”): the ZRS4 (the tober 1931) had used its planes only ogy requires that someone convince USS Akron) and the ZRS5 (the USS experimentally before it crashed in a or compel others to use it. Truffert. of French troops (accompanied by talion was grouped with the Regiment bouti and France by long-range sea. working through the citizenship. designating it steadfastly remaining in their posi.” as with zeppelins. formed an anti-German government for service in Ethiopia. with airplanes scouting for “lighter than air. but the it rendered. a plane could jink upward ship’s speed. but failed. Gen. and kite balloons. (Z stood fuselage. (Hav- World at War 37 WaW10 Issue. British Somaliland on 3 December in August 1945. and aimed radio a clear majority of Djibouti’s military 20 unit citations.) A fifth plane could also be operated Plans were then drawn up for a Two of the first three crashed. When scouting. bombers. Further. the planes accounts of how Imperial Germany’s moving at approximately the planes’ would patrol at double their mother- Zeppelin force had maintained aerial stall speed. (commissioned 23 June 1933) set out Consequently. how they would scout the vast Pacific could be recovered in midair using the planes’ landing gear would be Ocean if war with Japan broke out. tions around the port. seven Military Medals and titled Djibouti Libre. each in a separate belly into the design of the ZRS class (with The Akron (commissioned 27 Oc. as they pondered small biplanes. It would then be hauled in. carrier operations. to advance the art of flying aircraft “flying aircraft carriers” might have but filled with nonflammable helium. The British invasion of North Africa and the By March 1943 the Bataillion de placed Djibouti under blockade. and they Yes. flying aircraft carriers. airship technology. a belly hanger that could hold four would catch up later using a radio In the 1920s. Dupont surren- dered on 28 December. regular opening was taken by two battalions combat service for France. and R ter of dropping it from the trapeze. Launching a plane was a simple mat. then was disbanded British forces began leaflet drops into order to join the Allies. broadcasts into the town urging the and civil administration threatened to on 27 October. its men Djibouti. Djibouti became an populace and troops to rally to the leave for British Somaliland. where receiving some supplies. Moving acquire a force of ZR units.” ZRCV. numerous civilians). patrols over the North Sea during and latch itself to the trapeze using a so they always stayed abreast while the Great War. at 50 knots. when Adm. departing in from which the Vichy troops had been er in Djibouti. reactive German occupation of Vichy March Somali (of World War I fame) cutting the rail line to Addis Ababa France. refused August for service in Europe.

in 1921 with a loss of 16 Americans.000 feet. replaced with gas tanks or small 38 #10 WaW10 Issue. same kind of attack. the Navy would then also have commissioned monoplanes purpose-built for trapeze operation. plane pilot to master the trapeze was no leaders believed in the airships emy action was easy to overstate. with widely and bad weather. the ZRS had an operating surface vessels were immune to that In the face of Depression budget cuts. the even after the British invented the tions until late in 1944. about five minutes. which surface carrier took two years. (As well continued incursions into UK airspace didn’t regularly mount night opera- as the lost Akron and Macon. and the US Navy as the Aleutians. along It did not have to be that way. The with no fear of mines. with machineguns mounted around technology was there. the Germans had been funds could’ve been diverted to air. powerful segments of the Navy’s knots (speeding up briefly to recover did detonate—again. Sixth. structure (mostly cloth. (To conserve expensive he. when airplanes. ing one trapeze for four planes had That is. with a loss of two lives. In acquired five ZR units and lost four explosive hydrogen. a ZR would have 1960s.000 nautical miles. With enormous range. (It Marshalls and even Japanese home cells could be accessed and patched did operate patrol blimps. until the Third. their vulnerability to en. they feared funds would be diverted Based on Midway. which had waters. stay by 1942: the airships would’ve been ship had crashed in trials in England out of enemy gun range. while also making them larger than the Hindenburg. As for strafing. it wasn’t as if brass reacted negatively to airships. great radar platforms. severe—well. with rudimentary wheeled landing gear that would be removed after the plane was hauled aboard to be Lighter than airpower: USS Akron emerges from its hanger.) Fifth. then crashed off don those technologies. broke into patriotic songs. for example.) What was lacking was will: Fourth. which compared enough to champion them. the sure than a grocery sack. they could move several routinely. night trapeze operation First. and New Deal make-work altitude. they could’ve patrolled as far afield multiple cells under little more pres- They closed ranks. Those later models were to have been a ‘stretched’ design (rejected for the Macon for budgetary reasons) with an additional gas cell. and the Germans comparison. surface units emy aircraft. the Marianas. replacing the older Akron and Macon along the way. (The Akron rarely flew above 4. and Macon each cost less than a de. or even dry land of moderate the hull. Yes. in flight—the Germans had done that dramatically less capacity. which would expand and have able to build new Zeppelins from ship construction. a victim of metal fatigue accidents there was no outcry to aban. Those Zep. they scratch in two months. Building a some surface warships. and given them space for a second perch. Cruising at 55 would trigger the detonator. and a still-unnamed with rudimentary reconnaissance. was adequate for scouting. Further. there were several lit up the English countryside as they produce a pilot capable of dependably arguments they could’ve made in fell in flames while the crowds below landing on a surface carrier favor of more ZR units. Operating A final argument wasn’t available thunderstorm over Ohio in 1925 with over the ocean.) Had those arguments been made and accepted. planes).indd 38 12/16/09 2:31:02 PM . torpedoes. That would’ve extended their range 25 percent. large airships had without encountering anything that 1935. radius of nearly 3. Had any night-raiding German Zeppelins had favorably with the time it took to stepped forward. Most likely. Plus. and its own air cover for defense. however. in 1935. but would’ve been obvious a loss of 14 lives. the ZR units could. As for en.) or submarines were lost in operational bombs would go through a zeppelin’s The Macon. the fact the US Navy had pelins. there was a good chance proved an operational bottleneck. the time it took for an air- stroyer. the airships’ helium was stored in from building cruisers to airships. spaced light aluminum-alloy girders) Point Sur. If enemy attacks became available. as was done for to be vented if they rose higher. on 12 February Second. If a bomb that.) times faster than surface vessels. lium. the never operated such airships again. California. had been filled with was as easy as daylight operation. the Navy would’ve gone ahead and built all 10 planned ZRS units. US Navy surface carriers was not really an issue. the helium was reefs. Shenandoah had been torn apart in a incendiary bullet in 1916.

430. Examples Akron. overall head of the the ZRCV could’ve patrolled against lin (the R34) flew a UK/Long Island US Navy.000 7. magazine. At a time when the public’s attention more than any running wild off the east coast. 6. Contact Chris Perello at: every status-conscious city would cperello@calpoly.6 knots 74. We want For a number of years in the late it to be a critical analysis. little lighter-than-air infrastructure might have been the weather. The firm that built the Akron and at War. and media reviewers for Strategy & Tactics presumably the US Navy would’ve and World at War. contact Ty Bomba. cu. Absolute max is 500 words. technology ebbed Maximum Speed 75. at: 1927. not just a 1920s and early 1930s it was assumed description. when ZRCV planes would’ve had an advantage over those of surface carriers. Incursions above Cruising Speed contested waters would likely have Aircraft 4 or 5 scouts 5 or 6 scouts 9 dive bombers been at night. But beyond the fact that the top of the Empire State Building was designed with a Zeppelin mooring mast. website. belatedly inquired into the U-boats all across the Atlantic. FYI editor. land-based aircraft lacked the range. had to build a mammoth $2 million pithy articles for this column. In fact. Any media will do: rigged more tenders and set up more book.500 nm 8. Macon Never Built Never Built their airframes could’ve been made Helium. Charles Lindbergh’s “Spirit ally any aspect of WWII military his- of St.000 significantly lighter than those of conventional planes.000 words). the US craft would’ve had two Attention readers: We’re looking for oceans across which to retreat. US airships And there ended the story of the fly- arose. on-shore masts. it didn’t turn out that way. When none icing had proven deadly. Zeppelin flew the Pacific non-stop in dissuaded on logistical grounds. airship’s feat. at round trip in Tactics and Observation Post for World ity. Since such planes wouldn’t Class ZRS ZRS Extended ZRCV have had to routinely absorb the shock of ground or carrier landings.500. soon have its own Zeppelin mooring facility. The remained was entirely tied up making One of the rationales for the Na- German Zeppelin force had been blimps. enduring winds of up to 40 miles per hour.indd 39 12/16/09 2:31:04 PM .940 nm 11. World at War 39 WaW10 Issue. on virtu- hangar. industry of the same type. ing aircraft carriers. and the Graf construction of a ZRCV fleet. bombs. Adm.000 9. ~Lamont Wood pairs while on those masts.1 knots 75 knots A division of 10 ZRCV would Cruising Speed 55 knots 50 knots 50 knots thus have carried the punch of one Range at 5.550. Entrepreneurial activity came to focus on planes because of the lower entry costs. their biggest problem 1929. unlike the Ger- mans. and what he did with it caught WhiteRook@att. but building a ing for authors for FYI for Strategy & Zeppelin required an industrial facil. and begin construction of the first ZRCV. It would have taken a year vy’s early support of airships was to trapped in their hangars by cross. film. What Indeed. ft. He was least during the summer.000 in tory. You could start an airplane firm with a few technicians Attention readers: We’re always look- in a converted barn. Crews were able to effect major re. a British zeppe. If you’d like to try your hand Macon (at about $4 million each) first at writing short (under 2. Cit- ies built airports for airplanes instead.750 nm surface carrier. to get to the point where they could encourage a domestic civilian airline winds for significant periods. Louis” cost about $10. For stronger storms it was best to relocate ahead of the front but. etc. Earnest King. the admirals’ patience with the could be moored outside on masts. The result and the Navy had a seaplane tender was that in January 1942 with U-boats with a mooring mast on its stern.

indd 40 12/16/09 2:31:07 PM . The Dodecanese Campaign: Germany’s Last Offensive in the Med By Carl Otis Schuster 40 #10 WaW10 Issue.

beat the ligence knew Italy was wavering in its support for the Red Army to the rest of Balkans. He dispatched over World at War 41 WaW10 Issue. at little cost. vinced the Germans plans existed to invade Greece The Dodecanese Islands for a time seemed to be instead of the Italian mainland. There were also deeper reasons. Bringing Turkey into the the war. Greece’s communist guerrillas had begun to attack Hitler could also read a map and. Unfortunately. country. countries represented the “soft underbelly of Europe. through it. all without the losses that might be created in a direct as. but ensuring the entire chain would fall quickly and sault through France. shifted to the Allies’ favor. particularly Soviets could move in. and he therefore gave ever and then go on to seize all of the Balkans before the more thought to shaping postwar Europe. Origins The driving force behind the Dodecanese Cam. thereby frustrating Axis and that the Allis were trying to draw Turkey into Stalin’s long-range plans. and as bases to use and its other Asian colonies. the pro-British resistance groups in that still-occupied Germany’s forces were much closer to the islands. the Dodecanese Islands as forward defenses for pro- That would in turn threaten Britain’s links to India tecting the Romanian oil fields. The concept looked impressive in the Balkans. country’s coastal commerce. perhaps bring Turkey into the Allied camp. To Churchill the Mediterranean ful staging bases for operations into Greece or Turkey. Churchill feared a postwar communist Greece Hitler and his general staff saw the Aegean Sea and and. and could either protect or choke off much of that who saw an opportunity presented by Italy’s Septem. The Italians had formance in the Sicily campaign led Hitler to reinforce seized them from the Ottoman Empire in 1911: they the Aegean with German troops. The Italians’ poor per- the key to achieving those goals. Those concerns were reinforced by the Allies’ war on the Allies’ side was yet another possible ben. He therefore considered to prevent Allied supplies reaching the USSR via the it essential the Western Allies establish a presence in eastern Mediterranean and Black Seas.indd 41 12/16/09 2:31:08 PM . Soviet entry into the Mediterranean. were within artillery range of Turkey’s western coast. “Operation Mincemeat” deception plan. German intel- Greece as early as practical and. which con- efit. if possible. more importantly. when depicted on a map in London. paign was British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. From there the Allies could push into By late 1943. They could also be use- ber 1943 surrender.” Churchill correctly believed the islands’ Italian garri- through which the Allies could strike the Third Reich son wouldn’t resist Allied forces coming ashore. Churchill knew the war had irrevocably Greece.

He therefore ordered his Command- er-in-Chief Middle East.indd 42 12/16/09 2:31:10 PM . to active- ly join the Allies upon Italy’s expected surrender. Wilson had about 14.000 men to arrest the Germans and assist Britain’s 234th Brigade in landing on and hold- ing the island. Wilson. he covertly sent a small team to Rhodes on 6 September.000 men under an experienced armor officer to Rhodes. and the Ger- mans were alert. 6. Wilson loaded his troops on Royal Navy destroyers and used them to seize the 42 #10 WaW10 Issue. however. Planning nonetheless went forward. Scaroina and Adm. Pressed further by Churchill. Campioni. Henry M. They would then use their 10. detained the other Italian officers and attacked their troops’ barracks. the most important of the Italian-garrisoned islands in the Eastern Mediterranean (see Table 1). but only a few Spitfire and Beaufighter squadrons and no aerial or maritime transport. Campioni officially surrendered the is- land to his nation’s erstwhile ally the next day. Gen. to be prepared to seize the Dodecanese immediately on Italy’s surrender. Their mission was to convince the Italian garrison com- manders. Rhodes and its critical airfield were in German hands.000 infantry and some special forces units under his direct command. That move pre-empted Churchill’s original plan. The Italians proved hesitant. which was to take Rhodes by negotiating a surrender of the Italian garrison. Gen. They arrested Scaroina on 10 Septem- ber.

22 Long Range Bombers Bombers. **Available from 4-11 October to support the evacuation of British forces from the Aegean. #Available 3-5 October and 10-18 November. 141 Medium 166/128 Fighters. World at War 43 WaW10 Issue.000 men 17. 69 Dive Bombers. Table 1 Comparison of Ground & Air Forces in the Aegean Ground Forces German Allied Command: Oberbefehlshaber Sud Ost Middle East Command 440th Assault Brigade (Rhodes) 10th Indian Division 22nd Air Landing Division 9th Armored Brigade 11th Luftwaffe Field Division (Greece) 11 Parachute Battalion 3rd Brandenburger Regiment (Greece) Greek Brigade Group 15th Kustenjaeger Battalion (Crete) Royal Horse Artillery Regiment 2 Battalion. ##Available 4-11 October and 2 sorties per plane on 26 October.000 men) Total Forces: 32. 3 Fallschirmjaeger Regiment nd rd LRDG Group Naval Coastal Defense Garrisons (Aegean) Italian Garrisons (5. *The Beaufighters suffered 50% losses in the Dodecanese Campaign.indd 43 12/16/09 2:31:12 PM .400 men Air Forces German Allied 2 Jadgegruppen (52 aircraft in Greece) 2 Spitfire Squadrons – ( 20 ACFT Cyprus) 2 Stukagruppen (69 aircraft in Greece) 1 Beaufighter Wing (118 ACFT Cyprus)* 2 Ju-88 Kampfgruppen (62 Ju-88s in Greece) 2 P-38 Squadrons (28 ACFT Cyprus)** 1 He-111 Kampfgruppen (25 He-111 in Rhodes) 3 B-24 Squadrons (22 ACFT in North Africa)# 2 Transportgruppen (92 Ju-52s in Greece) 1 B-25 Squadron (12 ACFT)## 1 Marinefliegergruppen (16 seaplanes) 1 RAF C-47 Squadron (10 ACFT) 2 Mixed Kampgruppen (42 Ju-88s/12 He-111s in Greece)** Total: 52 Fighters. 92 Transports and 16 Seaplanes Notes: Six Spitfires were stationed on Kos from 19 September until their destruction on 29 September.

Wilson thus found himself trying to conduct an of- fensive with only one brigade from the incompletely equipped 10th Indian Division. Churchill’s re- sponded to Wilson’s request for additional forces by admonishing him to be “innovative. the British had no Over the Mediterranean: Luftwaffe Ju-88 bomber.000 tons of merchant shipping. In a campaign fighter and two C-47 transport squadrons. His first priority was to retake Kos. then on Crete. They struck Comparison of Naval Forces Luftwaffe bases in Greece. Luftwaffe and special forces troops. under German control. but their effort couldn’t be sustained. even though he had less Caiques 22*** 16 than 13. because its airfield made it the most important objective. altogether designated Kampfgruppe Mueller. supply and staging base. They of the Salerno landings then in progress in southern Italy moved their convoys in stages. given the demands Germans had learned well from that campaign. but the bombing and difficulties of shipping Submarines 0 10 supplies with limited transport delayed that move. navy. Table 2 The RAF retaliated as best it could. providing an almost continuous air umbrella vice (SBS) detachment of naval commandos on Kos. and a Special Boat Ser. He landed the Durham Light Infantry’s Muller requested and received air support. means of providing consistent air cover or projecting tactical airpower across the area. Kastellorizo and Samos lied airfield was in Cyprus. Anti-Aircraft Cruisers 0 1* By 21 September the Luftwaffe was striking Kos twice Light Cruisers 0 5** a day. shelling German garrisons and inter- support. over the Germans was limited to naval forces (see Ta- 44 #10 WaW10 Issue. Allied shipping was sunk in the harbor. a the Luftwaffe swiftly deployed over 300 aircraft into South African Spitfire squadron. daylight sky belonged to the Luftwaffe. Kos. Without it. His superiority ***Only 8 available before 1 October. the Germans weren’t idle. serviceable merchant ships and a total of 138 aircraft **Only two available before 1 October. troops and supplies. over 200 miles away. using destroyers and attack craft to deliver (LRDG) detachments occupied Samos. along convoy routes to prevent their ships from being attacked close-in by the Royal Navy. Its over the northern Aegean and bombing Kos daily start- airfield made it the most important of the islands not yet ing on 18 September. He sent the 2nd Royal Irish Fu. By Patrol Craft 4 0 28 September. an RAF anti-aircraft artillery regiment. but Eisenhower denied his request for four P-38 cepting their supply convoys at night. A lone infantry company seized The Royal Navy provided Wilson what support Kastellorizo. the did agree to release 10. Generaleutnant Mueller. Churchill was meanwhile still press- Landing Craft 8 6 ing Wilson to take Rhodes. All supplies to Kos had to be delivered by parachute drops. The Italian campaign had priority. a handful of landing craft.” and by directing him to “inspire the Italians to join in.000 men. the That in itself was a major concession. Short Range Destroyers 2 22 Wilson ordered the construction of satellite air- fields. which he intended to use as his central decisive advantage. and 1st Battalion. and laid minefields and the subsequent fighting in Italy. The next-nearest Al- smaller islands of Leros. four under-strength fighter squadrons and an odd assortment of merchant ships and locally acquired caiques. was ordered to retake the islands with an ad hoc joint task group of army. and Minesweepers 6 4 even nearby Leros could no longer be used to stage Minelayers 4 0 supplies. It also conducted sweeps through- Wilson also requested and received some Royal Navy out the Aegean.” Meanwhile. and German Allied it was proving more difficult than had been expected. commander of the 22nd Air Landing Division. From then on it became a race. on 14 September. with most of the bombing focused on its Anti- Fleet Destroyers 0 11*** macchia Airfield. Further. Greece. he reminiscent of the one fought on Crete in 1941. however. all the airfields and their Spitfires were Torpedo or Gun Boats 6 10 destroyed.indd 44 12/16/09 2:31:13 PM . only two Notes: *Not available until 1 October. while SBS and Long Range Desert Group it could. with victory going to the side that could first achieve a siliers to Leros. (20 Spitfires and 118 Beaufighters).

Total RN told the prime minister Leros couldn’t be held without forces included four cruisers and 10 destroyers. ble 2). an island just 15 nautical ployed the Twelfth Cruiser Squadron and a destroyer miles west of Leros. probably in the had hoped to conduct its operations under the long- hope of motivating Churchill to get him more rein. the island. even with Short-Range Destroyers 0 0 2 0 4 drop tanks.) island’s air defenses. but the cruiser HMS Sirius on 16 October. though. retook Levitia two days later. an armed trawler and six were joined by two Ju-88 gruppen redeployed to Ath. By 7 October they’d sunk a German ammuni- curate and deadly ground attack plane. The Rhodes-based He-111 to shift its targeting from Leros to the waters around gruppen and the Ju-88s attacked supply dumps. Their bombing campaign suffered withdrawn two days later.400 sor. albeit at the loss of 16 bombers. an armed sloop and an E-boat. but only so the island garrisons could be evac- Leros on 5 October. in the ab. That Allied defeat changed the stra. a minelayer. the Stuka remained an ac. flotilla into the Aegean and.” German British Wilson therefore had to continue planning Warships 30% 33% for “Operation October Accolade. The Admiralty island’s garrison on his own initiative. ings and logistical facilities. the RN enjoyed some suc- sence of fighter opposition. while the Stukas struck the anti-aircraft cruiser HMS Carlisle was disabled air defenses and prepared positions.Light Cruisers 0 0 0 0 4 tegic situation. He ordered Kos retaken and the plans for taking Rhodes finalized. That struggle between the Royal Navy channel patrols. Though long obsolete. even with Ultra intelligence Naval & Shipping Losses in the Campaign warning him of their plans and movements. Churchill would hear nothing of Merchant Ships 6 2 0 0 0 such a move. Caiques 8 3 2 0 4 Unfortunately. The RN de. The P-38s were ties against Leros. Wilson reinforced the the Aegean to attack German shipping. starting on 4 October. to take established a combined cruiser-destroyer patrol in the the island. had finally agreed to provide a P-38 group for two The Germans shifted their bombing campaign to weeks. He didn’t know Churchill had no inten- Rhodes. and German forces RN’s intervention thwarted their plan. Wilson was to use locally available ship. and then immediately approved Wilson’s Landing Craft 3 1 2 0 1 request for air cover to effect that withdrawal. to provide effective air cover. primarily because of the from that time on. Transports 40% 23% name given to the assault on Rhodes. German British Counterstrike The Germans assaulted and took Kos with a Ship Type Sunk Damaged Sunk Crippled Damaged combined airborne and amphibious assault on Anti-Aircraft Cruiser 0 0 0 1 0 3 October. shelling German-occupied Kalymnos Island from 12 The Germans had hoped to follow-up their Kos op.Torpedo or Gun Boats 1 1 4 0 0 man fighters stationed just 70 miles from Kos. By the end of and a destroyer and motor gunboat sunk on 10 Octo- October the Luftwaffe had conducted over 1. Luftwaffe bombers damaged the eration with an immediate assault on Leros. Despite those problems. sinking another three German mer- and the Luftwaffe would constitute the critical element chant ships. It called for the 10th Indian Division. however. The Beaufighters had the range but Patrol Craft 1 1 0 0 0 were outclassed by the 52 single-engine Ger. (Eisenhower forcements. continues on page 47 World at War 45 WaW10 Issue. RN losses rapidly mounted several interruptions. ber. Despite the additional P-38 fighter cover. supported by the 9th Ar- mored Brigade and 11th Parachute Battalion. cess.” the code. they tion supply ship. The substantially increased air and naval support. He ordered Percentage of Naval Forces Lost or Damaged Leros be held “at all costs. Wilson’s remaining 14 Cyprus. through 15 October. at least at night. moving two Stuka gruppen to uated safely. all that prompted the Luftwaffe ens from the Russian front. but British warships continued the Royal Navy. he from entering those waters.Fleet Destroyers 0 0 3 0 0 based Spitfires lacked the range. and it wasn’t sufficient to fully counter Table 3 the Germans. The Stukas concentrated their attacks on the tion of withdrawing. Further.Minelayers 1 0 0 0 0 lands. channel opposite Leros that prevented the Germans ping to conduct the amphibious landing. At best they could remain over the islands for only Submarines 0 0 3 0 4 10 minutes.indd 45 12/16/09 2:31:13 PM . Despite RN command also moved additional submarines into Churchill’s lack of a response. build. Minesweepers 1 1 0 0 0 British Middle East Command therefore rec- ommended the evacuation of the remaining is. as well as of the Dodecanese campaign’s second phase. range air cover of Cyprus-based P-38s. landing craft. Even so.

just as the British 1st Battalion of the Kings Own Rifle Regiment counterattacked. He therefore decided to land his troops only on the in the open with only sand bags for protection. as at Kos. The re- mainder of that company arrived a few minutes later. most daily. Even so. Mount Cazzuni was the most coast to cover the likely landing areas. Given their maritime supremacy. with the amphibious forces moving toward their assigned landing areas. Operation Taifun: Assault on Leros The original German plan called for Leros to be attacked within a week of the fall of Kos. The Italians’ fire proved so accurate. Though it lacked an airfield. The same most difficult and lightly defended beaches. each of four 120mm guns.m. Tirney commanded a seemingly Despite the shortfalls. as often hap- pens. The gunners on Mount Clidi then sank six landing craft before Stuka dive bombers silenced them. an unassailable position. so his troops would be already established ashore during ian naval facility was well trained but lightly equipped. to cut the defense in half. He then deployed the Italians along the each of the island’s main bays. they forced the Gurna Bay assault group to withdraw without landing. however. followed terrain and poor roads forced him to divide his force into by Mount Cidi’s four 152mm guns and Mount Scumbarda’s three almost independent sectors. The naval infantry company that protected the Ital- ing.W. Tirney integrated the Italian forces impressive garrison. but the Italians remained at their guns. with the Luftwaffe flying 206 sorties and delivering 180 tons of bombs with uncanny accu- racy. all the batteries were positioned assault.000 Italian troops were administrative and supply would be jeopardized. There were four batteries infantry battalion. The assault began at 5:10 a. but the RN’s shelling of the German garrisons and aggressive sweeps of the surrounding waters delayed the assembly of the assault force. and he understood the garrison was awaiting his Unfortunately. The land- ing craft. Most of the went ashore on the island’s rocky northeast corner. On the Al- lied side. placing his elite SBS and LRDG Italian coastal defense batteries and 43 anti-aircraft guns. their commanders felt they never would do so. and their entire position across the Aegean island’s 8. while a battalion re- inforced by a special forces platoon was to seize the south end of Gurna Bay. The island’s rocky powerful with one 120mm and four 152mm guns.G. capable of handling all manner of Allied merchant ships. on 12 November. gain the air superiority needed to build German paratroops on the ground. Air support was critical to the Germans. with it. The promontory changed hands several 46 #10 WaW10 Issue. the Allies could use the port as a base to deliver the troops and equipment to construct an airfield quickly and. troops and equipment therefore had to be staged slowly into position. The main assault of two infantry battalions and a special forces com- pany landed at Guido Bay and the headland at Pasta Sotta.A. and a battery of four captured 25 Mueller noticed the RN was reinforcing the island al- pounders equipped with German sights. British troops couldn’t move or mass effectively since the island’s almost vegetation-free terrain denied them cover from aerial observation. including four into his defensive scheme.m. for Germany.indd 46 12/16/09 2:31:15 PM . daylight hours when the Luftwaffe ruled the sky. each held by a reinforced three 152mm and one 102mm gun. contact with the enemy forced a change. Mueller planned a pre-dawn land. Another battalion landed at Palma Bay. The Germans established a battalion-sized beachhead at Cape Pasta di Sotto and Palma Bay and began to move in- land. personnel among the Italians to “stiffen them” and facilitate The Italians had sited their guns on the hills overlooking communications. A special forces platoon then scaled Mount Clidi and captured the battery there by 10:00 a. its narrowest point. The first wave held true for the Italian anti-aircraft batteries. Brigadier R. Leros had to be taken. Two echelons of paratroopers were to seize the center of the island. The one infantry battalion was a reserve unit of the lowest Generalleutnant F. It was a daring plan. Subsidiary landings were planned for Pandeli Bay. personnel who’d done little to develop the island’s defenses. He had 24 gun batteries. the island hosted the Aegean’s largest and deepest natural harbor. driving off the second wave. Mount Clidi and its coastal defense battery was the first objective. however. If the Germans didn’t take Leros before November’s end. category.

Tierny made an The German airborne finally arrived at 4:30 p.109 casualties. The Luftwaffe threat forced Hill and Mount Appetici. German landing forces simply shifted to held the ridge for the rest of the battle. Tierny ordered an immediate counterattack by the flowed throughout the 14th. land. Elsewhere the fighting centered on the three hills: Mounts they were moving across the coastal plain toward Castle Appedici. as both sides fed in reinforcements. but the Germans successfully re-supplied their men. and the Germans Meanwhile.m. Intense air the Germans finally held it by dusk. lacked the strength to hold the ground in the face of Luftwaffe Dropping from an altitude of only 300 feet.m. Many of those Italian captives died when his men couldn’t hold Appedici if the British withdrew. It British submarines inadvertently sank the merchant ships was a fateful decision.m. By 8:30 a.000 Germans coming in costing the Germans over 1. narrow beachhead after intense fighting. many were on attacks. while the Germans simply executed troop companies on the ridge at 7:00 a. when his Italian counterpart told him and 5. from where they could dominate the British to move only at night. Some 200 British officers and 3. but he simply hours after they were originally scheduled to have landed. Tierny wanted to pull units from Mount Ap. taking them to Greece. however. whatever undefended beaches they could find. on the 15th.000 troops. World at War 47 WaW10 Issue. inflicting The Germans began to move on Mount Meraviglia on broken bones that limited their tactical capabilities. however. reached his HQ at 4:00 p.indd 47 12/16/09 2:31:15 PM . about 40 percent the morning. and all British efforts to dislodge them failed. German troops moving on his headquarters. He formally surrendered the island shortly after the Germans With his reserve committed to the fighting in the north. The the morning of 16 November. The Germans captured Appedici and Germano late the ground before the defenders could react. cutting the the south.000 pedici to retake the ridge. It was a grim ending to one of the ber. strikes prevented any major counterattacks. and soon thereafter he initiated surrender proceedings. The RN rushed in three destroy- Royal Irish Fusiliers. They drove the Germans back into a ers to deliver supplies and provide naval gunfire support. and within min. last major German victories of World War II. on 13 Novem. Though only 20 survived the murderous defensive fire.m. they captured Rachi Ridge by nightfall.. He had put up a stout defense. ing on the rocky terrain injured 80 paratroopers. most of the Italian officers. The Germans landed two more para. Tierny tried to utes over 100 were killed or wounded. He had to call off that planned soldiers were taken prisoner along with 350 Italian officers night attack. With ammunition short and other 400 were quickly brought under fire. nine attempt to retake Rachi Ridge that morning. Quirico and Germano. and ultra warning him of another 2. so the fighting ebbed and the port. He lost contact with most of his units by late after- telephone lines connecting the island’s northern and south. times during the day. ern halves. of their assault force. but in turn suffered They also brought in two infantry companies from Samos heavy casualties from Luftwaffe attack. evacuate his staff from Mount Meraviglia and withdraw to though. Despite their losses. noon. during the predawn hours of 15 November.

losing nearly 80 killed or wounded in the initial a mine and went down almost immediately. minesweepers. The attacks were in. The logistical end: a Spitfire refuels. struck rain. It was all to no avail. tions and made it all but impossible for Allied forces ing of the force threshold at which the Germans would to move in daylight. attacked troop concentra- ued.000 aircraft. The Germans also sent reinforce- launch their assault.500 men. eve of the German assault the British garrison there and lacking both food and water. and the German transport late afternoon the battle for Leros was over. One of the destroyers. the Ger. was told the island couldn’t be ish troops were landed successfully on Leros. By 12 November it had fired over 2. The last Allied forces departed the Dodeca- nese on 28 November. week. of the 400 crewmen and soldiers aboard were saved. Tirney. HMS Eclipse. British resistance on the first day was so heavy the tended to reduce the potential Leros invasion force and German airborne landing was delayed until the after- divert German attention from three destroyers deliver. Two more destroy. rounds into those islands. equipment concentrations ashore. Brig. Nonetheless. night of 13-14 November. Destroyers shelled Kos nightly beginning on in the harbor area was heavy. dominating terrain north of the main bay and along- mans had laid over 400 mines in the Leros Channel side the port. and the Italians sank two 20 October. the Luftwaffe closed out October by dis. Unable to break out from his headquarters. The island’s Italian week. morning of 16 November. Unfortunately. The RN sent two more German merchant ships and a minesweeper. but not before they sank dominated the central part of the island. with Wilson employing Beaufighters to pro.700 combat troops. The battle remained in doubt for three days while Two more destroyers and a submarine were lost to the two sides desperately fought over the two hills that mines over the next two days. Within a force had been reduced by a third. losing another destroyer and The garrison headquarters was surrounded on the two motor gunboats in the process. On the evacuated.indd 48 12/16/09 2:31:16 PM . German airpower proved insurmountable. and delivered another 400 abling the cruiser HMS Aurora and sinking two British men shifted from Samos island. he surrendered. 48 #10 WaW10 Issue. but another 400 Brit. By numbered some 2. Only 136 landing. By then the amphibious force had captured the ing reinforcements to Leros. mander. opening with a three-pronged assault on the island’s vide air cover for the RN’s daylight transits through main port of Leros with the goal of gaining control of the southern Aegean so they could patrol the channels the town and the surrounding high ground. just minutes after the com- ers were also seriously damaged. as Ju-87s The German build-up on Kos and Kalymnos contin. the RN intensified its attacks on ments and deployed them almost unhindered by Allied those islands. in two destroyers to shell the German positions on the For its part. the RN evacuated the remaining British island garrison totaled another 2. the airborne dropped and on 17 October along with another 100 to the east of suffered heavy losses among the rocks and rough ter- Kalymnos. noon. destroying at least two landing craft and German landing craft before abandoning their guns. With ultra intelligence intercepts providing warn. Resistance at night. garrisons. silenced artillery positions. The fighting around Leros intensified over the next The German attack began shortly before dawn.

. Long Road to Leros. and Churchill refused to alter the plan man operations there. Jeffrey. Friedrich. was the more important theater of operations in 1943. In contrast to Crete. Holland. Ruge. the assault force Churchill’s vision. S. The Aegean Mission : Allied Operations in the Dodecanese. Information was ment of the garrison there and the reduced size of his own exchanged freely and quickly among the service head. 1997. where victory would’ve and Leros were similar to their 1941 invasion of Crete. were familiar only with their immediate billet areas. Manitoba: J. the Germans The Dodecanese campaign also shares many common were also able to execute amphibious assaults in the features with Churchill’s failed Dardanelles campaign of face of British maritime superiority. positions. advantage of its officers already being familiar with Hinckley. Generalleutnant the Allies had neither sufficient forces in the area nor the Mueller. quarters. The Royal Navy in World War II. within the reality of available resources and opposition. and the plans visualized on them must be executed Germany’s regional Command Headquarters South. logistics and transport capacity to achieve the core of Kampfgruppe Mueller. Co. The Brandenburgers’ Global Mission. with The planning for the actual assaults was combined the greatest potential strategic impact. He also prohibited commanders on services cooperate so well. Capt. troops had been on the islands only a few weeks and 1986. London: William Kimber & in the Dodecanese because the Aegean was more im. and ity was entrusted to one commander. them a significant advantage in both the planning and London: Greenwood Press. Kurowski. GN. Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press. which a strategic objective in a single blow. service components across the area. It was an amphibious operation sent to achieve the Germans’ effective employment of mines. That made a big difference on the battlefield when it Roskill. Federowicz Publishing. World at War 49 WaW10 Issue. War in the Aegean. London: Purnell & Sons. Volkmar. a diversion of resources.. been nice to achieve but certainly wasn’t critical. he continued to press for the actually consisted of army and Luftwaffe marine craft seizure of Rhodes despite the enemy’s significant reinforce- as well as those of the Kriegsmarine. 1945. The Dodecanese was (or “joint” to use the modern term). The German Navy in World War II. F.H. the Germans won Smith. Capt. even though they erational realities. garrisons. 1987. Reversal of Fortune portant to them than it was to the Allies. facilitating the Luftwaffe’s operations against Churchill’s strategic vision was in itself sound. are static. Shipping was in short supply.indd 49 12/16/09 2:31:17 PM . which then became restricted the RN’s freedom of movement. In many ways the German operations against Kos the island campaign was a sideshow. 1988. For the in that they were able to use air supremacy to limit Germans. Many of the British garrison Kuehn. execution of operations. The dismal end: Germans march British prisoners of war. however. London: Her Majesty’s came to things such as reconnaissance and preparing Stationery Office.W. British Intelligence in the Second World War. Schnellboote im Einsatz 1939-1945. Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag. eration was launched. RN. Additionally. Great reliance was placed on Sources at aerial reconnaissance. Another bogged down in protracted fighting. whose 22nd Airlanding Division constituted strategic reserve. London: Her Majes- the islands and the waters around them. Franz. based on a set of circumstances that changed before the op- lent inter-service cooperation that characterized Ger. which was just then opening at Salerno. 1957. For Eisenhower. That was due to World War I. that secured the islands. but maps both the island defenders and the RN. 1943. but the Germans had the added Gander. assault force. 1974.J.. 1957-60. The amphibious groups the ground from modifying their own plans in the face of op- were under unified naval command. but the responsibil. Most important of all. The east enjoyed outstanding relations with its subordinate Italian campaign. Peter & Edwin Walker. In no other theater did the three to reflect those changes. That gave ty’s Stationery Office. The objectives were key factor in the Dodecanese campaign was the excel. though. the islands were critical to the defense of their the RN’s ability to reinforce or support Britain’s island strategic oil resources and the rear areas of the eastern front. For example. Leonard M.

ships. Advanced PTO is the most realistic yet playable game on the subject. playable and realistic. 3 Dice and#10 50 Storage bags.” along with the units of every nationality that fielded a military in the war. Components: 7 full size strategic maps in full color. It also includes an additional set of the aircraft counter sheets for a total of five counter sheets. rule books and assorted displays and player aid charts. $120. Marines and army units began their program of island-hopping. There are a number of rules and concepts that will. the strategic maps let players move and engage in combat on all levels: air. no World War II strategic series has ever been so all-encompassing. was attacked by Japanese aircraft. But playing through smaller map sections and scenarios enables the player to become familiar with the mechanincs of the game. detailed. it includes admirals and generals. the US naval base at Pearl Harbor. 7 December 1941. WaW10 Issue. War in the Pacific is the most detailed board game of the Pacific Theater ever cre- ated. midget submarines. APTO represents the ultimate blend of playabil- ity and detail. though. and is even more detailed than the acclaimed Advanced ETO. Allied task forces engaged elements of the Imperial Japanese fleet throughout the ocean. this is actually a division-level game. Player Aid cards & display. War in the Pacific is a multi-level simulation of the Pacific theater of operations during World War II. coast-watchers. The kit includes a new counter sheet for planes. APTO and AETO can be linked to simulate the entire Second World War more ac- curately than any other game ever produced. $40 Advanced Pacific Theater of Operations Like Advanced ETO. Ships as 12 units. Strategic Map War in the Pacific Extension Kit This Extension kit extends WITP into late 1945 and 1946 making it possible to explore the possibilities of the war continuing without atomic intervention. every type of aircraft and every capital ship that existed in the Pacific Theater. wresting from the Japanese the empire that they had expanded in every direction. It even features all the Soviet and Japanese forces that engaged in the “Nomonhan Incident. 32 die-cut counter sheets. In conjunction with AETO and also Africa Orientale Italiana (the East African expansion for AETO and APTO). ground and naval. The game enables players to recreate the entire course of the war. plus two more tactical island maps. atomic bombs. For the next four years. This is more than an AETO supplement. There’s no guesswork. in that it features special rules for: elite pilots. tropical disease and more. new tactical maps with nearly 340 individual islands for new ground units to fight over. The rules and charts booklet covers the additional rules needed to continue the war. and even some refits.00 On Sunday.680 Die cut counters. Hawaii.000 counters showing all types of units from the Pacific Theater. every piece is based on the most thorough study ever devoted to a wargame. Representing some 30% of the globe. the forces in APTO are exactingly accurate and have been ex- haustively researched. 1941 to the climatic Allied assaults in the closing days of 1945.indd 50 12/16/09 2:31:22 PM . 2 34” x 22” Map. and other units scheduled to appear after August 1945. nearly 9. form the opening Japanese attack on 7 December. at first.00 Contents: 1. 2 Rule booklets & 1 Scenario booklet. Command your task force in the Pacific! War in the Pacific $420. be unfamiliar to a majority of players. Indeed.

divisions.decisiongames. Vol 1 $50 USN Deluxe $80 Shipping PO Box 21598 Bakersfield CA 93390 Name 661/587-9633 • fax 661/587-5031 • www. Soviet intervention. South America. exploit errors and win great victories. While maintaining the original game’s basic systems. volume 1: 15 X 11 SPA II I I B The Rising Sun 6 (3) 6 37 (4) 12 Pacific Battles is a wargame series covering the great land battles of the Pacific theater in WWII. There are also mini-games for Midway. The game system uses an interactive sequence of play in which both sides can launch strikes. strategic bombing. Scenarios include the first year of the Japanese offen- sive.S.) Country 1st unit Adt’l units Type of Service $12 $2 UPS Ground (USPS PM add $5) V/MC # Exp. 460 die cut counters. naval bombardment. 00 2 (6) 7 2 QTY Title Price Total War in the Pacific $420 5th Air Grp XX War in the Pacific. $80. with X companies and regiments. special operations forces. 21 21 and engineer operations. amphibious landings. $120 Pacific Battles. the new design includes rules for a compre- hensive simulation that includes the entire war. 1941-45. the atom bomb. task force markers. China. USN Deluxe Refight the greatest naval-air-land war of history. airpower. The system shows the evolution of tactical doctrine in both the Japanese and Allied armies with Banzai charges. Games in this volume include: The Fall 2 (5) 6 2 (3) 6 of Singapore. and yes. except aircraft carriers. rules book and assorted Player Aid Address City/State/Zip Shipping Charges (Rates are subject to change without notice. Contents: 2 22x34 inch maps. Components: 2 22 x 34 inch mapsheet. Included is a War Plan Orange scenario for a “what-if” naval war with the US and Japan squaring off in the 1930s. Air units are in groupings based on squadrons.00 Pacific Battles. 24 3 Canada Signature 34 3 Europe. storage bags and 1 die. 6 (2) 6 212 and employment of combined arms tactics becomes critical. $40 HQ 1 1 5 (4) 12 Adv Pacfic Theater Op. USN Deluxe is an update of the classic SPI game on the War in the Pacific. MAGIC.indd 51 12/16/09 2:31:26 PM . fire III III 4 4 coordination. Burma. Manchuria and others. superior U. as well as 1941-43. rules III USAAF booklet. player aid cards. Most games in the series have players 9I 9I commanding anywhere from a division to a corps worth of forces. 1943-45 and 1941-45. Struggle for Bataan and Guadalcanal. which are each represented by individual counters. Units are battalions. New rules include kamikazes. 22 18 $50. Asia Phone # 36 5 Australia World at War 51 WaW10 Issue. Land units are regiments. the China front. 840 die-cut counters. the Philippines. Naval forces are at the squadron level. brigades. corps and armies. the Solomons. Extn. extending the game from Hawaii to the Asian Mainland. armored divisions.

Patrick Blackett of Cambridge. not replace them. A team was formed by Dr.indd 52 12/16/09 2:31:30 PM . Its use later branched out into both the air war and the ground war. OR specialists assist in finding solutions. the British. and then later the US. B. Establish control over the solution through documentation and maintenance. OR doesn’t solve problems by itself. UK OR Prior to World War II. decision analysis and simulations to postulate and predict possible industrial problems and fix them as they occur. Construct a model and conduct data acquisition. He was given the job of studying convoys to see how to make them most effective. It uses statistics. F. gaming theory. and then works on setting proper goals for improvement by taking into account constraints on cost and time. Test the model to see if it responds to that solution. prob- ability theory. in the final analysis. Implementation. One goal of OR is to assist existing managers. in anti-submarine warfare in World War II. Derive an optimal solution. It recognizes that. The process an OR specialist takes when encountering a problem is as follows. An OR specialist first de- termines which techniques are most appropriate to a given process. A. queuing theory. a pioneer in anti-matter physics. Eggheads at War: Operations By David March Introduction Operations Research (OR) is an engineering process often is used by business to increase efficiency. OR was used to assist in planning for both logistics and training in the armed forces of the British Commonwealth. D. new urgency was given to the field and OR specialists got their first test with the trans-Atlantic con- voy system. E. 52 #10 WaW10 Issue. Identify the problem and find an appropriate objective. The importance of this branch of engineering came to the fore when it was used extensively by. C. Many engineers today still consider OR a key item in their toolbox. With the fall of France in June 1940. first. it’s men and machines that solve problems.

or that ter to send one large convoy or several small ones. Statistically. The terms “exchange rate” and “effectiveness ratios” One further criticism of large convoys was they pro. or at shallow attack depth—and forced to dive. Further. it was better for the enemy which centered on the question whether it would was bet. The Admiralty was against that approach. the Royal Navy in had accordingly been designed with that in mind. it was the presence of warships setting the depth charges to detonate at shallower depths. determined the ultimate goal was the inception there was debate among convoy commanders delivery of supplies to the United Kingdom. therefore. couldn’t get Blackett’s team determined the size of a convoy had little to that depth in time to meet up with the explosions. The charges were detonating at the depth best any given convoy was only as fast as the slowest ship in it. They were terms used to define the maxi- vided more targets for enemy U-boats. suited to transmit explosive power over the greatest under- smaller convoys could travel faster and thereby better elude water area. OR researchers took the number of flying hours all the ships. and depth charges had been slow to implement convoys. however. Blackett determined mum effective use of time in order to achieve a defined goal. Early in the war.s Research in World War II Unlike the situation in World War I. His group recommended larger anti-submarine success rates were doubled. however. Boat sightings in a given area. as op- convoys allowed for greater warship coverage per convoy. convoy escort doctrine had been World at War 53 WaW10 Issue. not destroying about the most effective method of organizing their ships. when the Admiralty aimed at destroying enemy submarines. The OR World War II was quick to implement that system. and to better be able to concentrate on areas tactics be centered on the goal of deterring submarines from of high U-Boat activity. convoys with more warships be made the standard. Large they be altogether prevented from making attacks. U-Boats. once spotted—on the surface U-Boats and surface raiders.indd 53 12/16/09 2:31:34 PM . since deterrents. By re- to do with its survivability. as they The OR scientists then determined depth charges weren’t wanted to avoid tying up ships on convoy escort in order that detonating at the optimum depth in order to serve as attack they could be freed for offensive operations. At its scientists. that reduced convoy losses. however. attacking. subs to be forced to waste torpedoes in hasty attacks. at least as long as enemy submarine numbers for Allied planes and compared them to the number of U- remained constant. U-Boats. posed to trying to kill the sub. came from OR. through statistical analysis that more ships would survive in One of the first uses of the principal was in aircraft coverage a large convoy because enemy submarines were unable to hit of convoys. By studying those numbers it was possible to redistribute aircraft to cover more territory Other research led to the recommendation that escort more efficiently.

case of convoys.indd 54 12/16/09 2:31:35 PM . ASWORG’s assignment was to determine the best way of destroying U-boats before they could attack convoys. They sent back the data to their colleagues in the UK. “H. that wouldn’t work because their study was too constrained by the nature of the information available. mand. were sent by In order to try to solve that problem. ships wouldn’t stay around a combat area ers should fly in order to best avoid both collisions among and had to continue to move as fast as possible. The Sunk A.” which was analyzed. during the Normandy invasion. returned from missions over Germany. Probably slightly damaged. C. themselves as well as interception by enemy night fighters. E which they recommended armor should be placed on parts Undamaged F. aerial bombing and anti-tank measures. The flaw in the original RAF study came Thus there were many factors that had to be added into from the fact it only included planes that had returned—not an analysis. J an aircraft going down over enemy territory (and thus not re- turning to Britain). in the determined the precise distance from each other that bomb. which was intended to overwhelm the That was a big problem given the fact many subs were no Kammhuber Line. A tale of combat: ground crew examine an damaged bomber. which led to almost all OR scientists also worked on developing the “bomb. I. Those them to dependably reconstruct the details of each attack. B. Insufficient evidence of damage. I. That is. H. US ASWORG American naval OR teams were early on given a differ- ent task from their British colleagues. G of the planes not damaged by enemy fire. Insufficient evidence to assess. Probably damaged. The ASWORG investigators attempted to solve that problem by making a detailed analysis. Philip Morse of Princeton University. All ships involved in an engagement were logged in as one “incident report.” “I” and “J” reports being removed from consideration. the German defensive system of radar doubt involved in those categories. F. No damage. special OR on enemy submarines was therefore insufficient to enable teams landed with the Canadian and British Armies. G. which had made a study of damaged bombers that J. E. Target attacked not a submarine. however. Army Operation Research Groups (AORG). to the uncertainty of sonar of that era. Blackett’s team also worked with RAF Bomber Com. but without confirmation and ground-controlled night fighters that had been taking they had to be dropped from the study. The OR team inflicted on U-Boats was also hard to determine since. who in turn studied them in order to best improve methods and training. That is. the researchers broke 54 #10 WaW10 Issue. Known sunk. the reports were graded as follows. They reasoned those parts were the critical ones that. D. Probably sunk. They soon found. the most notable being false spotting reports due ones actually lost. Presence of submarine uncertain. A. The extent of damage a heavy toll on Bomber Command’s planes. the US Navy’s high command was irrevocably in favor of concentrating on actively hunting down enemy submarines. and therefore commissioned the Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Re- search Group (ASWORG) within the already existing Of- fice of Scientific Research and Development. The AORG teams followed the advancing forces. resulted in Non-submarine H. Probably damaged. The team was formed by Dr. The RAF studied the For purposes of analysis the assessments were usually parts of those planes that suffered the most damage from grouped in the following categories. the primary source for their data came from the after ac- tion reports filed by each vessel involved in a U-Boat attack. the Ministry of Supply to gain and accumulate data directly from the front. analyzing and compiling information on the effec- tiveness of artillery. possibly sunk. when hit. The data available to the OR teams concerning attacks In 1944. enemy fire and had determined they should put more armor on those parts. B OR team then came up with a counter-intuitive solution in Damaged C. In making their as- sessment of the effectiveness of each incident’s anti-subma- rine warfare measures. That approach didn’t help the situation. er stream” tactic. D.

the roll and pitch of a ship. as the probable chanc- es of successfully engaging subs then approached zero. 41 13 7 20 13 III   Apr. factors the ASWORG dealt with were determining the best ness.June 43 79 49 128 144 VI   July 43 .Sept. taking into account the effects of Number assessed A or B 9 3 different methods of attack and comparing all that to the Percent successful 5 17 data in after-action reports. Aircraft vs. and recollections afterward were often U. Their further concern centered on the fact accurate data weren’t re. the ASWORG found further problems that needed to prisingly. an attacking surface vessel. as had been done for surface vessels. Number of incidents (A-G. minute after having been spotted and crash-diving. the OR teams noticed the more ships fir. approaching from cloud cover. Atlantic and Mediterranean. contact. A attacks as possible. when combined with the maxi. the total number of A and B assessments did actually correspond closely to total enemy submarine losses during World War II.May 45 105 54 159 179   Sept. and the use of counter-measures to block radar emis- its commander realized he’d been spotted by a plane. As shown in the chart below. which continues on page 56 World at War 55 WaW10 Issue.May 1945 their investigations on two general factors: attack errors and weapon lethality. The first conclusion ASWORG analysts offered. 41 26 1 27 27 IV   Jan. attacks. A U-boat would crash dive as soon as flage. not sur- trols. was that pilots should try to make as many Class be addressed. The German surrender provided a list of the U-boats lost with the name of the commander and date and position of the sinking. would combine to produce the greatest chance an en. a U-Boat had to submerge prior to a plane’s attack. much an enemy U-Boat there was a corresponding five percent in. In order to do that. Aircraft were well suited to attack U-Boats. Class B attacks ships. sonar training. they had to take into account many variables in Number assessed A or B 5 21 formulating attack error factors. down the various factors in the report to try to determine Coordinated vs. + JS1) 41 38 Next. All others were labeled Class C. 42 . A comparison of the A and B assessments and the losses shown in the German list follows: Allied Assessments Compared with the German List*   A B Total German list I   Sept. March 1944 . Number of incidents (A-G.   Independent Coordinated corded during battle.May 44 117 79 196 206 VII   June 44 . The factors involved were: optimal however. 42 .indd 55 12/16/09 2:31:36 PM .Dec. equipment and the proper training of personnel on it. 42 27 23 50 50 V   Oct. onds. the type of ship and its sounding gear. Independent Attacks the effects of different specific conditions and action. Some of the Weapon lethality was expressed as a range of effective. camou- next to impossible. They soon determined that. 39 .May 45 391 213 604 643 * These data are based on information available at V-E Day. could oc- Good attack accuracy could be achieved by better design of cupy any spot within 270. 41 . + JS1) 176 18 The OR teams therefore had to make their evaluations using macro-statistics. Class A attacks were those made on U-boats still mum volume of fire from the greatest possible number of visible or submerged less than 15 seconds. The experience of the crew of the enemy U-boat was a factor that had to be excluded because meant researchers had to maximize the effectiveness of those it couldn’t be dependably quantified. within one with which anti-submarine operators had to be concerned. Neither Allied nor German information is complete for the last periods. and how to limit the time ing on a given target the more likely it was it would be sunk. conditions such as state of Percent successful 12 55 the sea. U-Boats When considering ASW from the perspectives of air pa. could also shake off airplanes more quickly than they could Additional ships also meant a contact could be kept longer. Atlantic and Mediterranean.S. Submerged U-Boats crease in the likelihood that sub would be damaged or sunk. attacks.Feb 1944 faulty. That Classifications were determined for different types of increased weapon accuracy. In that regard. aerial tracking of subs once they’d submerged was speed and altitude. they based U. Jan 1943 .000 square feet of that place. A German U-Boat could travel at All that led to the OR teams identifying major factors speeds from three to seven knots submerged and.June 40 24 0 24 24 II   July 40 . for each ship that could fire on Attack errors had to be identified and eliminated. 39 . way for planes to achieve surprise. were those made on U-boats submerged from 15 to 30 sec- emy U-Boat would be sunk.Mar. vague and contradictory.S. planes while the subs were still on the surface.

D. well with scientists was prized. His ability to work 1985). Within 24 hours he and Kimball were advising Adm. They also lery. After the war he became involved with the La- bour Party. on the question of reli. He was born in Kensington. of the lead designers for tanks. and shortly thereafter he resigned He. in physics plan to intercept the Germans’ V-1 flying bombs. and as a deviser of simple time with the RTC he developed a reputation as a daring algorithms to solve tough problems quickly. Anti-Aircraft Command. In a very short space of time the A Royal Navy lieutenant during World group was working on tactical patterns for War I. study known as OR. both the Battle of the Falkland Islands and ability of aircraft sightings. earning himself the Military Cross and worked on developing effective defenses the DSO. He took the opportunity at the question of whether or not to send out a de.” commander who would ‘chance his arm’ to win in battle. Morse was professor of physics and an adminis. It was later renamed the Operation World War I. a post held for the duration. They also went on to brief the navy secretary defense. he went on to he was one of the first to receive a copy of the Smythe become one of the world’s first experts on Report. He also did studies for the There he began the work that would lead to the field of Rand Corporation and worked for the Institute for De. Gen. words describing his work at the time: “In Patrick Maynard Stuart Blackett (18 No- the ORG the initial work dealt with search vember 1897-13 July 1974). where he became one of Merit for his efforts. and the Joint Senate-House Naval Affairs Committee on which allowed bombardiers to release their ordnance that subject. He first saw action as a battery he was soon made deputy director of that commander of the Royal Horse Artillery in group. Morse served on the National without having to make a level bombing run. but it was rejected for fear of the shot falling on Operations Research Group. Research Society of America. After the war. where he took part in the Battle Research Group and sent to the Pacific. U-boats. He November 1976). on the study of mathematics and physics. After the war Kimball received the Presidential Citation He transferred to the War Office. pacities as a staff officer for the Royal Artil- rine offensive against Japan. He also from Princeton University in 1926. He worked to develop a ican OR. Philip McCord Corps (RTC) in 1923. In August Research Council and was founder of the Operational 1940 he joined the Anti-Aircraft Command under Pile. He transferred to the Royal Tank against Kamikaze attack. Pile was head of the Anti- studied quantum mechanics and received Aircraft Command. Methods of Operations Research. a group tasked with de- his Ph. and he joined the National Acad. end of the war to attend classes at Cam- stroyer force. and it led to many of trator who’s considered the father of Amer. co-authored the first OR from the service in order to concentrate textbook in the US. In 1942 developed a plan to intercept V-2s with radar tracking he organized the Anti-Submarine Warfare gunfire. he served as a gunnery officer at destroyer attacks. from which position he Merit for his work during the war. recruited in 1943 to assist the ASWORG He was born in Dublin. In his own London. the eldest of three to study the effects of the German U-boat sons of the 1st Baronet and Lord Mayor attacks on trans-Atlantic shipping. as a uni. Philip McCord Morse (06 August 1903—05 September There he became involved in OR. He was fending Britain from aerial bombardment. ally minded officers of the artillery branch. the successes of the OR team. He earned his Ph. Blackett was and with the optimum geometric patterns a major influence in the British develop- for the depth charge bombing of German ment of OR. because his innovative Morse said of him: “Kimball’s abilities ideas weren’t well received by the tradition- were in daily use as an educator. won the Nobel Prize for physics.” bridge. of Mons in 1914. the study of anti-matter. Key Personalities George Elbert Kimball (12 July 1906—05 December 1967). and helped to lobby for the installation of radar for air erations. and of Dublin.D. 56 #10 WaW10 Issue. After the Atomic Bomb was detonated over Hiroshima After graduating in 1921. During his versal scientific encyclopedia. He became Director of OR for the fense Analyses. In 1939 he took over the emy of Sciences.indd 56 12/16/09 2:31:38 PM . a report on the development of the atomic bomb. Blackett joined the Aeronautical Research Committee King of the implications of atomic weapons on naval op. criticized the RAF area bombardment campaign as inef- fective. and the related Jutland. Sir Frederick Alfred Pile (14 September 1884—14 Kimball was born in Chicago in 1906. and was an advisor to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. He received the Presidential Medal of Admiralty from 1942 to 1945. He served in different ca- where they did studies on the US subma. Later he developed the Mark XIV bombsight. in 1932 from Princeton. along with George Kimball.

By the means of Jan   1943 3.100 95 18 19 expected number of contacts. That was due May 5. In the spring of 1943 the Wellingtons were July 8.800 117 15 13 crossing the bay.2 71 14 10 10 1.0 30 30 50 10 4. and by June a full 100 percent Average 5.400 100 32 32 equipped with Leigh Lights (a powerful searchlight) and me- ter-wave radar. given a 300 Aug 3. however.5 7. Average 3.5 2. The bay was important because the French Results of Bay of Biscay Offensive ports of Brest. During the first month nearly 40 percent of all Mar 4. 10.200 115 52 45 months the results fell to less than 10 percent. The OR teams believed that.900 57 60 105 at night with safety. but also because the Germans in- troduced radars on their U-Boats that allowed them to operate June 5. June 1942 2. It  Month Flying Hours U-boat Sightings of Percent was hoped an air offensive using a balanced force could cause on Patrol Transits U-Boats Sighted significant loses to the raiders as they went in and out of those First Period bases. Third Period The first part of the offensive involved 10 Wellingtons Feb 1943 4.8 4.600 135 42 31 U-boat transits were detected. Nov 4. World at War 57 WaW10 Issue.350 120 98 81 partly to the winter weather. during the next few Apr 4.500 101 61 60 of transits were being detected.200 80 37 46 mile air umbrella.0 18 18 Bay of Biscay Air Offensive In 1942 the ASWORG proposed an offensive air patrol over the Bay of Biscay.600 140 19 14 In addition.100 90 39 43 spend submerged would still leave 13 hours of surface time to cross the bay. If nothing else. Lorient and St. the maximum amount of time a U-Boat could Sept 4. 17.750 65 20 31 equipment fatigue.600 50 26 52 thereby slowing their transits across the bay. it would force the subs to submerge.400 130 14 11 types of detection equipment were included.130 105 10 10 that formula.700 78 81 104 reequipped with centimeter radar.4 125 13 100 17 --. to track every U-Boat Average 3. each equipped with radar. That would provide the basis of how many flight hours were needed to effectively cover the bay.400 71 30 43 A formula was devised in which the total transits per month Second Period for U-boats in the area was determined and then divided by the Oct 1942 4.2 42 21 20 10 2. thereby reducing the time they had for operations as well as increasing crew and July 3. quantifications for the effectiveness of the various Dec 3. Nazaire were the main staging areas for German U-Boats attacking trans-Atlantic shipping.indd 57 12/16/09 2:31:41 PM . Surfaced Days per Transit Percent of Time Speed on Speed Average Speed Total Time Time on Surface Spent on Surface Surface (kt) Submerged (kt) (kt) (hours) (hours) 100 10 --. the OR teams determined the anti-sub force would need 40 planes.

MA: Harvard Univ. In Iraq. After the war. military OR was redesignated “operational analysis” (OA). Stern and/or 22 32 5 25 20 4 conning tower at Periscope 3 0 0 2 0 0 Down 0-15 sec 38 3 3 11 18 9 Down 15-30 sec 25 4 4 11 0 0 Down 30-45 sec 12 0 0 4 0 0 Down over 45 sec 22 0 0 5 0 0 Sources Blackett. Patrick. The bombs were redesigned so they would hit within the most desirable spread of dispersion.453 Sternhell. sions. which it did by diving. TOTAL 167 5 5 150 25 15 Milkman. IED were located. and thereby saved lives and man hours. Another factor identified early on was the need for effec- tive bombsights. 35.ibiblio. %A-C %A No.3. The placement of ordnance on a bomber. The chal- lenges of terrorism. <www. logistics and recruitment. OA continues to play an important role on the battlefields of today.” United States Naval Institute Proceedings. whether in a bomb bay or under its wings. Conclusion It’s hard to calculate exactly how much of an effect op- erational research had on the course of the war. Efforts were also made to determine times when the U-Boats were least alert. Submergence or B or B and costs in both materiel and lives were reduced. Charles M. War & Politics in the Twentieth Century. The importance of prompt attack using surprise was the key to success in using aircraft against U-Boats. When an aircraft bombed a U-Boat it had to leave its high search altitude and close with that target. %A-C %A were detected and counter-ambushed. May 1968. Thorndike. Press. ambushes Degree of No. By watching convoy July-Dec 1942 Jan-July 1943 routes and looking for day to day discrepancies. The pioneers of the field went on to careers in industry and business. Accuracy of bomb aiming was just one part of the ap- proach. and by surprising them in places where aircraft attack was unexpected. vol. 3.indd 58 12/16/09 2:31:41 PM . pp. was studied to make sure they would spread out in the most effective way to hit an enemy U-Boat.’ but the use of an angular sighting device reduced that error to a 16x16 foot range. The plan- ning and scientific study of operations did unquestionably Kite balloons in port. 453-470 DOI: 10. the bom- bardier would simply make his best estimate of the location of his target and then try to release his bombs so they would hit that point. 2004. In the early part of the war. May-June 1987. Report No. Other 9 8 8 33 30 21 Cambridge.1287/opre. have direct effect on the efficiency of munitions. & Alan M. OA also came to be taught at universities and expanded to cover strategic planning. the number of improvised explosive de- vices (IED) killing and wounding soldiers was dramatically reduced by the use of OR techniques combined with photo reconnaissance and drone monitoring. It was dis- covered the lighter the bomb the more likely it would be to hit the target.  Operations Research.35. “Operations Research in World War II. Level bombing had a 40x25 to 66x14 foot degree of spread when dropped ‘by eye. 51 of the Operations Evaluation USN/rep/ASW-51/index. no. Evaluations showed the inaccuracy of that method. Raymond H. Physics. asymmetric warfare and budgetary is- Fully surfaced 17 41 24 52 37 23 sues still provide plenty of opportunities for OA specialists Decks awash 7 29 0 5 40 20 to continue to serve with distinction.html> 58 #10 WaW10 Issue.

Naval power and air power are abstracted as points rather than on-map units. declare war on neutral nations.) 1st unit Adt’l units Type of Service $12 $2 UPS Ground (USPS PM add $5) 24 3 Canada System requirements : 34 3 Europe. territory ownership. F Multiple map overlays show the supply net. create new units. and zones of control. 1. F Battle on three fronts—War in the West (two-player. with autosend. U-Boat.95 Shipping Charges (Rates are subject to change without notice. players make all the critical decisions. and edit the data tables used in the game. new setups. Signature PO Box 21598 Bakersfield CA 93390 Phone # 661/587-9633 • fax 661/587-5031 • www. War in the East (two. Windows Edition War in Europe is a computer-moderated simulation of the European Theater of Operations in World War II. air. browse mode and multiple file load/save tracking. amphibious assault. sea and strategic forces of the Axis. or 16 campaigns (the whole war from a specified date through May ‘45 or the defeat of one side). including: surface fleet. tactical air and strategic bomber points. Asia OS : Windows 98/ME/NT/2000/XP/Vista (XP/Vista recommended) CPU : Pentium III 800Mhz (Pentium 4. F Select from 10 scenarios (shorter games focused on a single major offensive). Allied and Soviet powers in order to change or recreate the events of the war. F Fully featured game editor for creation of new scenarios and campaigns. transport.  There’s no computer/AI player in the game. 16 bit color Name HD : 50MB free space Windows Compatible Sound Card and Mouse Address City/State/Zip Country V/MC # Exp. F Fully integrated PBEM mode.decisiongames. South America. air range. Soviets versus Axis).player. while also allowing one-click switching between areas of interest. Axis versus Allies & Soviets). and control the ground. Allies versus Axis). with some brigade and corps-sized ground units. $59. inbox. multiple customizable map sets and customizable icons. F A unique “tabbed” map display allows each player to define his own set of map views.indd 59 12/16/09 2:31:48 PM . Play takes place on a 159x133 hex map of Europe and North Africa. and War in Europe (three-player. F Support for any screen resolution. The game is a division-level simulation. You decide on production World at War 59 WaW10 Issue.2Ghz recommended) 36 5 Australia RAM : 128 MB (256 MB recommended) Screen : Minimum resolution 1024x768.

In the game. as he fought his way back and forth across the deserts of North Africa. If the Allied troops seize the beaches. Germany is doomed. in which smaller forces were often able to defeat and rout larger ones by using better tactics and planning.decisiongames. But if the assault fails. and events of the campaign. The game features: the Afrika Korps. To win. 1939. the day that decided the fate of World War II in Europe. Now you command the Allied and Axis armies as each struggles to control the five key beaches along the Normandy coastline. Cards depict the combat forces. Navy. PO Box 21598. War on Terror is an ultra-low complexity card game for all ages. The focus is on fast card play. Special Forces and Propaganda Warfare. assault enemy positions. To accom- plish this. LNA uses cards to represent the military 60 #10 WaW10 Issue. The dynamic game system puts you in charge of one of the most famous theaters of WWII. Tobruk. Marines.indd 60 12/16/09 2:31:53 PM .00 All games include 110 full color playing cards and one sheet of rules. but also by out-thinking and bluffing him. The victorious Imperial Japanese Navy was poised to capture the airfield on the island of Midway and thus threaten Hawaii and the United States. $23. The only obstacle in their path was an outnumbered US fleet itching for payback for Pearl Harbor. You get to command elements of the Air Force. you have been given command of the latest weapons and best personnel America has to offer. a massive battle raged around the tiny Pacific island of Midway that changed the course of World War II. minefields and more. battles can be won not only by overwhelming the enemy with firepower. Bakersfield CA 93390-1598 • (661) 587-9633 •fax 661/587-5031 • www. the Germans strive to force the Polish surrender quickly by capturing Polish cities including the Polish capital. You get to command the US and Japanese fleets and their squadrons of fighter planes. Germany will have the time it needs to build its ultimate weapons. strategy. it was a stunning victory but the blitzkrieg strategy was untested and Poland expected to hold on long enough for other countries to intervene. In LNA. and fun interactive game play for 2-4 players.00 North Africa Covering the great battles of Erwin Rommel from 1941 to 1943. torpedo bombers and dive bombers in this epic battle! $20. The Polish fight to defend their cities and stop the German advance. Warsaw.00 War on Terror Fight the war on terror with America’s cutting edge weapon systems! You have been charged with hunting down terrorists aiding regions around the world and toppling their corrupt governments. objectives. Army. $20. $20.00 D-Day June 6. anti-tank guns. That approach is faithful to the historic events. 1944. you must consider your units’ combat power and maneuver options as well as their supply situation. supply convoys and objectives of the historic campaign. You get to make vital command decisions that send troops into battle. and create heroic sacrifices so others can advance to victory! $20. LNA is based around a new combat system that makes maneuver and planning as important as brute force. Historically. Malta.00 Midway From June 4th to June 6th of 1942. the Desert Rats. resupply from Europe. A Fast & Easy Playing Series of Card Games Poland This game depicts the German campaign against Poland in September.

Box 21598 Bakersfield. Back Issues Available Complete list of available issues on our website including Strategy & Tactics issues. P. CA 93390-1598 ph: (661) 587-9633 • Fax: (661) 587-5031 www.O.StrategyAndTacticsPress.indd 61 12/16/09 2:31:58 PM .com World at War 61 WaW10 Issue.

Each game turn equals 15 minutes in the basic game or 30minutes in the extended game. In this solitaire game from the designer of RAF and Ambush. close escort. Each game turn equals a “raid day” with six two-hour segments. tanks. one controlling Fighter Command and the other the Luftwaffe. 165 Cards. tension and play options with three complete games. ULTRA intercepts. RAF: 2-Player allows for two-players.indd 62 12/16/09 2:32:04 PM . The game controls the RAF response. Player Aid cards & display. The game is for two playing cooperatively. rockets. D-Day at Omaha Beach (seven hours) covers the entire day. 6 June 1944 D-Day at Omaha Beach recreates America’s most bloodiest day of World War II. Rule booklets. Scenarios: The First Wave (two to three hour playing time) introduces the basics in a recreation of the initial assault. 2 Dice and Storage bags. Contents: 352 5/8” Counters.” altitude advantage. Hitler orders his Luftwaffe to destroy the RAF in preparation for the invasion of England. day and night bombing. to the full cam- paign. The game’s system generates targets and forces. playable in 12 hours. the Observer Corps. ace squadrons. one inch equals 20 miles (32 kilometers). Improving on his award-winning solitaire classic. which remain hidden until you commit your squadrons. US forces that break through the beach defense must then contend with German mobile reinforcements in the hedgerows. each controlling a division. and flak. the Channel Patrol. Units are British squadrons and German groups. Units include assault infantry. taking an hour to complete. engineers and HQ. you control the US 1st and 29th Divisions landing under fire and struggling to establish a beachhead. One 34x22” Full-Color Map. “big wings. On the map. Contents: 176 Die cut counters. You command the RAF or Luftwaffe in history’s greatest air campaign—the Battle of Britain. The game takes into account intangibles such as leadership under fire and the initiative of American GIs. Event cards keep the action flowing while controlling German strategy. 3 34” x 22” Map. 1940 England stands alone against Germany. On the map. Beyond the Beach (four to five hours) picks up on the high ground and adds rules for German tactics. attempting to deliver the knockout blow. free hunt. Historical Study Booklet. responding to German raids. 55 Event Cards. The combat rules highlight unknown enemy deployments and the importance of the right tactics. Units are companies for both sides. RAF: Lion puts you in control of Fighter Command. weather. You schedule raids and assign missions to your bombers and fight- ers. radar. artillery. Features include: German priorities. The system controls the German defenders. designer John Butterfield ramps up the historical accuracy. Scenarios range from one day. Rules Booklet. RAF: Eagle puts you in control of the Luftwaffe raiding England. D-Day at Omaha Beach. 62 #10 WaW10 Issue. Histori- cal Study Booklet. defended only by the Royal Air Force. New Solitaire Games RAF: The Battle of Britain. each hex equals 275 yards. squadron patrols. and Player Aid Cards.

Rule booklet. Loyalties switch back and forth.indd 63 12/16/09 2:32:06 PM .) Country 1st unit Adt’l units Type of Service $12 $2 UPS Ground (USPS PM add $5) V/MC # Exp. Asia Phone # 36 5 Australia World at War 63 WaW10 Issue. and eventually a galactic empire is born. Contents: 176 Die cut counters. There are rebels. usurpers.decisiongames. Units have two combat values: weapons and morpho- genetic systems. growing and consolidating. alliances become federations. South America. social. as well as technological. Over the long millennia. usurpers. 1 34” x 22” Map. You make decisions to deal with threats. when mankind has gained the means to transit space. Despite its size and apparent success. and aliens of every imaginable form. those who want to create empires of their own. independent empires. bringing most of the inhabited worlds under its control. and still expand and bring new glory through discovery. 24 3 Canada Signature 34 3 Europe. The map shows the entire galaxy divided into sectors. economic. political and military events. including: rebels. Struggle for the Galactic Empire In the far future. colonization and conquest. invaders and alien forces. That empire exists for millennia. Threats are generated by chaos markers. Struggle for the Galactic Empire is a solitaire science fiction game. keep the empire stable. Player Aid cards. Communities of worlds form alliances. Production creates starships and other weapons. QTY Title Price Total RAF: Battle fo Britain $75 D-Day at Omaha Beach $55 Struggle Galactic Empire $50 Shipping Total PO Box 21598 Bakersfield CA 93390 Name 661/587-9633 • fax 661/587-5031 • www. though. 1 Die and Storage Bags. Weapons destroy the enemy. a human wave extends across the galaxy. You also launch expeditions to gain new knowledge and Address City/State/Zip Shipping Charges (Rates are subject to change without notice. You assume leadership of the empire as it strives to maintain and expand while fighting the forces of chaos. all is not well. while morphogenetic systems change them into friends. Other rules allow you to use psychosocial warfare and propaganda to repress rebellions. even the form of man is taking a new shape with genetic engineering.

Use the subscription card or order online. Box 21598 64 #10 WaW10 Issue.indd 64 12/16/09 2:32:10 PM . Turning the Pages of History Strategy & Tactics magazine covers all of military history and its future possibilities. Don’t miss a single issue! In-Depth Analysis Detailed Maps Orders of Battle P. and are richly illustrated with maps. CA 93390-1598 ph: (661) 587-9633 • Fax: (661) 587-5031 www. The articles focus on the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of war. diagrams and photos.StrategyAndTacticsPress.O.