You are on page 1of 65

What If: Pearl Harbor Invasion | Greek Civil War: Prequel to Cold War | Bzura Counteroffensive, 1939 | Japan Mobilizes

for War

The Strategy & Tactics
Tactics of
of World
WarIIII #14 OCT−NOV 2010

Pearl Harbor
US & CAN - $29.99
with complete historical game

What if the Japanese Invaded?

Turning the
pages of history.
Allied Fiasco at Dieppe, 1942 | High-Tech Warfare in Vietnam | Roman Conquest of Britain | Ball’s Bluff

#265 NOV–DEC 2010
Going beyond the usual
narratives, the articles focus
on the “how” and “why” of
conflicts and are illustrated
ALLIED FIASCO at liberally with maps, charts,

DIEPPE tables and pictures.

Each issue is packed full of:
• In-depth analysis
• Detailed maps
• Orders of battle


(661) 587-9633 phone
(661) 587-5031 fax

Strategy & Tactics Press
P.O. Box 21598
Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598



Alcohol Reference
Tobacco Reference
Mild Violence

OM | H
World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 3
© 2010

Japan launches campaigns across by Annie Laura Smith Bakersfield CA 93312. • Historical Perspective (310) 453-0856 by Maciej Jonasz Operation Dovetail: Bungled Guadalcanal Rehearsal Postmaster 32 by Arnold Blumberg Send address changes to World at War. Periodical Class postage paid Asia and the Pacific. Bakersfield CA 93390. the industry to support desperate counteroffensive. Train by William Stroock C. Bakersfield CA 93390. 1939: by David March MAP GRAPHICS The Polish Counteroffensive • Behind the Lines Meridian Mapping As the panzers race toward Graveyard at Wiseman’s Cove Director of Advertising Warsaw. The Indian Army in World War II DESIGN by Brian R. 1941−44 Franco sends a division of volunteers to Invasion Pearl Harbor fight against communism in the USSR. Analysis: Economic Strengths & • Mysteries Revealed Weaknesses of Imperial Japan Monopoly & POWs World at War (USPS PE25504) is published bi- monthly by Decision Games.J. All rights reserved. Nothing may be reproduced from it in whole or in part without prior permission from the publisher. 1943 Invasion Pearl Harbor: Design Corner • British MI-5 in World War II Strike in All Directions Invasion Pearl Harbor • Airpower in the Pacific In 1941 the Japanese passed by Joseph Miranda • Battle of Sangshak up the chance to land a ground force on Oahu. Box 21598. by Adrian McGrath & Chris Smith by Javier Romero 4 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . the Poles launch a by Roger Mason Richard Sherman rsherman@strategyandtacticspress.STRATEGYandTACTICSpress. CA and additional mailing offices. Whitman Media Reviews the contents of this a fatal error — here’s why. Game Preview by Adrian McGrath & Ty Bomba The South Seas Campaign. but doesn’t have at Bakersfield. 1943−49 Observation Post Ty Bomba The US and Britain aid the Greeks in EDITOR their fight against German occupiers • Elite Beat Joseph Miranda and Communist insurgents. PO Box 21598. The Strategy & Tactics of World War II # 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 6 24 42 FEATURES COLUMNS NEXT ISSUE (#15) 6 14 • Soft Underbelly: Italy. 1942−43 PUBLISHER Christopher Cummins 16 52 SENIOR EDITOR The Greek Civil War. All 42 correspondence should be sent to World at War c/o Decision Games. Spain in World War II GAME EDITION RULES The Blue Division in Russia. Martin Gallo Bzura. 60 World at War (©2010) reserves all rights on by John W. P. That was probably 51 Have a question or comment for our editorial staff? Visit our free bulletin board at www. Doherty • Technology Backdate COPY EDITORS 24 The Liberty Ships Lewis Goldberg.O. 2804 Mosasco St.

. The track the hour. The watch also fea. That’s why we developed the Compendium Hybrid. on your wrist for $49 For a limited Analog and digital display Time Only Stop watch function Built-in alarm LCD complications Electro-luminescence backlight Amazing New Hybrid Runs Without Gas The new face of time? Stauer’s Compendium Hybrid fuses form and functionality for UNDER $50! Read on.stauer. An limits our production. We skipped that step to semi-circle animates innovation wait for no one! allow everyone the chance to experience this watch’s brilliant fusion of technology in time with the sec. plastic wrist and is water-resistant to 3 ATMs. Stauer takes that seriously. confident of their latest hybrid timepiece that we offer a money-back-guarantee.Stop watch function Compendium Hybrid at $395 based on the day of the week. we believe that Please mention this code when you call. Guaranteed to change the way you 1-888-324-4370 Promotional Code VHW259-02 calculators of the past have been replaced look at time. If for any reason you aren’t fully impressed The watch’s extraordinary dial seamlessly stunningly-designed hybrid chronograph blends an analog watch face with a stylish by the performance and innovation of with over one dozen analog and digital digital display. camping expedition or covert mission.. minute and second . Minnesota 55337 www. is sophisticated enough for a formal Dept... innovation and better value will always 14101 Southcross Drive W. the Stauer Compendium Hybrid for $49. Suggested Retail $395… NOW. WATCH SPECS: and style. Exclusively Through Stauer new technological marvel can be yours electro-luminescence Stauer Compendium Hybrid Watch—$395 for only $49! backlight. functions that is more versatile than any nous hands keep time along the inner simply return the watch within 30 days watch that we have ever engineered. We originally priced the Stauer ond hand and shows .com Smart Luxuries—Surprising Prices .Water resistant to 3 ATMs the market for advanced sports watches. Since this is tures a rotating bezel. That means this spectacular face of the functions and blue. those boxy. At Stauer. Stauer is so Burnsville. latest watch technology.. VHW259-02 evening out. while a trio of circular LCD windows for a full refund of the purchase price. unique design of the Compendium greatly New technology usually starts out at utes and seconds. Welcome a new Digital Revolution. . OFF The Compendium: The no ordinary economy. min. by this luxurious LCD chronograph that when faced with an uphill economy. With the release of the dynamic new Compendium.Fits 6 3/4"–8 3/4" wrist 88% but then stopped ourselves. I nnovation is the path to the future. Three super-bright lumi. The Compendium Hybrid Now $49 +S&P Save $346 secures with a rugged stainless steel band Call now to take advantage of this limited offer. so don’t hesitate astronomical prices and then comes eye-catching digital to order! Remember: progress and down years later.Three LCD windows show hour.. we decided to start stopwatch and alarm at 88% off from day one. dial. but rugged and tough provide a much-needed boost. a enough to feel at home in a cockpit.

plished the best possible results from submarines and one fleet submarine. failed have and would have continued the others badly damaged. and even if jump-off point for their counteroffensive The 360 Japanese planes that the US aircraft carriers in the Pacific across the Pacific. while 18 other to do what Japanese soldiers of their war. it still wouldn’t have Their victory seemed complete. then. the Americans could US lost five battleships sunk and three destroying US ships and planes. but perhaps together with a regular army knocked the US out of the war. would thereby have at least set back the made Oahu and Pearl Harbor useless Even though Japanese planners American counterattack for the longest The invaders: Japanese SNLF infantry on parade 6 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . In return. Even if the oil December 1941 didn’t work to on full alert to defend the island from storage tanks and the docks had been prevent the Americans from rebuilding seemingly imminent invasion. however. it had little chance itself of provid- air raid on Pearl Harbor on 7 after the air raid. could’ve been similarly well used in as an imperial base. five midget of the Dutch East Indies in early 1942. with over 1. and production of new Over 2. The US still had three carriers in warships were also sunk or damaged regular army or elite SNLF (Special the Atlantic that could’ve been moved and some 300 aircraft were destroyed. though successful in had all been sunk. And though. of carriers would’ve no doubt then have civilians were killed. no destroyed (as has since been much there and then using that base as the such effort followed up the air raids. the Japanese ground force. they Only one thing could actually have an amphibious invasion of Oahu. the amphibious operations in the invasions Even if the Japanese had accom- Japanese lost only 29 planes. discussed by historians). Naval Landing Forces) could’ve done: to the Pacific. the Japanese been able to secure Oahu to have been decisively misleading. their air raid. so it’s certainly possible such a unit. the attacked that day.000 course. immediately so. and rightly T hough daring. SNLF units. In the attack.000 US military personnel and take and hold Oahu. more seriously wounded. the US Army went ing a knockout blow.Invasion Pearl Harbor: Strike in All Directions by Adrian McGrath & Ty Bomba Japanese Perspective to the Americans: the seizure and considered the historic air-raid-only occupation of the island by a Japanese operation a high-risk affair. Had that balance sheet was soon revealed formation of about the same size. did succeed in similar-sized been given even higher priority.

time possible — putting it perhaps as also attempt an amphibious invasion in making the US carriers the main targets. officers who supported the idea of an for example. and he was the true defensively. essentially. Japan Japanese if they captured Oahu. during the for maximum tactical flexibility. Whatever the details the best naval air officer in the Imperial resultant strategic position be terrible involved. In to retake that island before moving line officer in charge of the actual strike his view. Further. it’s not impossible to all-out attack on Hawaii. What’s certain is. Genda was prepared to lost Oahu in 1941. if the Americans lost Oahu anywhere west of it across the Pacific group. which was already taking a risk in the air attack as: maintaining the accomplished in conjunction with their with an air-raid-only operation. and launched carrier-based air raids on the planning run-up in 1941. It was Genda who first effectively controlled the entire northern it’s difficult to understand why their called for such elements to be included and central Pacific. then. the loss of Oahu would’ve been Japanese Navy. using a maximum number of Japanese time track. including attacking with four types of warplanes imagine the Japanese could’ve then also an amphibious invasion. at least when military. The start point for the US ally planned for Midway Island in 1942. In Genda’s World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 7 . been California. didn’t element of surprise before the attack. ing from Oahu. in an excellent position to go farther. not only would their toward Japan. Genda was generally regarded as to an invasion. course of the US war effort. who was air operations officer Clearly. Yamamoto. the take great risks for great returns. other planned operations. Minoru aircraft as well as the US fleet. had the Americans Genda. they would’ve had for Vice Adm. Chuichi Nagumo. The most striking heavily at US ground-based US west coast and the Panama Canal. Since the which he developed in consultation with He realized a Japanese-controlled potential reward was so great for the Combined Fleet Commander Isoroku Oahu would mean. distinguished of them was Com. once operat. carriers (even at the cost of some counteroffensive would had to have There had been a few Japanese efficiency in the other operations as. the Japanese would also be catastrophic in its effect on the historic mastermind of the Pearl Harbor raid. much as a year or two off its historic an move similar to the one they eventu. in the Dutch East Indies).

when it’s recalled the earlier Pearl Harbor wargame had predicted dire losses for the Japanese. that had finally convinced Yamamoto to give up the invasion plan for Oahu. Moreover. it would then have taken in turn led the loyal Genda to fall into First. even if a Japanese on the consideration of the already Despite Genda’s great credibility. however. 7th and 53rd Infantry the part of Yamamoto left an opening Divisions. carrier-supported strikes and landings were to have been made first. Six months later at Midway. defeated by the greater industrial. Of course. demo- graphic and military might of the United States. much had to sail directly from Japan. an amphibious invasion the Dutch East Indies. his landing force managed to secure over-stretched resources available to idea for an amphibious invasion of Oahu all of Oahu. the Japanese had no reason to suspect their opponents knew.000 elite Japanese islands in the push south. only to lose almost his entire carrier force in reality. Japan would inevitably be ships were needed for the invasions of ably stretching across half the Pacific. Watanabe) to comes from the fact the Japanese wargamed both operations prior to each one’s execution. for two officers junior to Genda (a Capt. was only the last in a string enemies in numbers precluding a of imperial plans stretching all the way back to 1909. It had been the harsh outcome of the earlier wargame. reinforced by an independent engineer and tank regiment (one each). That ultimate Japanese plan — to be fair. however. simply based preparatory air attack achieved its goals. in the ing. however. Having missed that golden opportunity based on one wargame’s inauspicious outcome. valor is more useful than strength of arms. which culminated in the yabure. James “Jimmy” Doolittle’s 18 April 1942 raid on Tokyo outnumbered in individual combat: that finally crystallized in the Japanese high command the intent to invade and occupy the happo yabure (strike in all directions). their balance and counterattack. amphibious. due to the US Navy’s successful MAGIC code-breaking operation. that effort. It an average of two supply ships arriving step. As the 4th century Roman strategist Vegetius wrote: “In war. Hawaiian Islands. Malaya. operation. though. During the Hawaiian operation. That turned out not to be the case. but even greater than valor is timing. He calculated that. Another connection between the air raid on Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Midway Kuroshima and a Comm. calculations. Those is. force of 10. he should react Japan’s World War II planning (as discussed in the main article). it was seen as simply too risky. however. the common interpretation offered by American old samurai principle for fighting while historians was it had only been Gen. garrison. due to the impetus provided by Doolittle’s That less than wholehearted com- raid — was fleshed out in considerable detail. troops and transport Such a line of communication. longer run. possible in multiple directions.opinion.”   ★ Vice Admiral Nagumo Chuichi.000 to 15. commander of the Oahu strike 8 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . we also know Yamamoto by striking as swiftly and unceasingly as had resolved on a quick-as-possible return to Hawaii as early as 8 December 1941. We now know. Note. That’s because he understood ers launched from their carriers. Additionally. assuming the occur simultaneously with the Hawaii against a ground invasion. Its ground component was to have mitment to the air-raid-only plan on been an all-army affair. the Japanese pilots expected they would be flying into a situation in which the American forces they were attacking were already aware a state of war existed between their two nations. it was total. that they were returning to Hawaii. then — which the Japanese had in abundance at Pearl Harbor but not at all at Midway — was surprise. excellent idea. Perhaps the admiral can be at least somewhat forgiven on that score. even just within the context of conventional approach. Those supply ships would’ve invasion. His attitude was turned down for several reasons. none of which had come true. unavoid. which were to Adm. again. he wasn’t about to do so again on that same seemingly faulty basis. Yamamoto was would be difficult to maintain surprise there each day in order to maintain the “mostly” against the idea of a ground long enough to get the first aerial attack. the factor neither of the Japanese wargames had properly handled was that of surprise. Thus the American surprise on 7 December wasn’t just partial or momentary. other large bases that were as far away. or from it was — scarce resources aside — an less carry out a day-long invasion land. strikes were then to be just as quickly in order to secure airfields for land-based aircraft. if a person is surrounded by US triumph in the Battle of Midway in June of that same year. the capture of Midway was to have only been the first step ashore in a cal terms that meant a series of swiftly multi-stage Japanese island hopping campaign — all conducted under the codename sequenced blows emanating from all “Eastern Operation” — which would likely have resembled a mirror image of the around Japan’s strategic perimeter in advance the Allies began conducting in the Solomon Islands later that same year. and other would’ve been precarious at best. by Genda’s own further him at the start of the war. The decisive element in both battles. In practi- Indeed. Further. The story of the Japanese Midway wargame is. Yamamoto himself was mostly troops could take Oahu. thereby widening the protective buffer zone between the edge of American According to the strategy of happo power and the home islands. Those land-based planes would followed by a Japanese diplomatic then have provided the stronger air cover necessary to allow further amphibious and effort to end the war on favorable terms naval moves eastward along the chain of the Hawaiian archipelago. He therefore believed the overall The Midway Connection strategy Japan had to adopt to win such a lopsided conflict was one based on the In the decades after World War II. It was all to have before their enemies could regain culminated in the complete conquest of all the islands no later than September 1943. well known to readers of American military history: Yamamoto chose to ignore the results of that game — in which he lost almost his entire carrier force — and went ahead with the plan anyway. with an order of battle centered on the 2nd. That the Pacific and Indian Oceans. because the delivery of the Japanese declaration of war had been delayed by their embassy in Washington.

Beyond that. invaders to get off the landing beaches further on the idea. and One episode that might still have from surprise. the Japanese had harbor. On that day the latest Comm. however. Yamamoto watched intelligence reports. Suguru Suzuki returned from and into the interior as quickly as pos. carriers sunk in their strike group. order to gain the maximum advantage by officers from both services. Yamamoto’s happo yabure was derisively with likely another two damaged. he calmly instructed Vice Adm. (He hadn’t actually gotten fight a decisive battle of annihilation. his diplomatic way of announcing his launched in tandem with the air raid in Those wargames were well attended mind was fully and finally made up. since he the wargamers and listened to their what he saw. was kept under guard by US Marines. but only if from 5 through 17 September 1941. divisions would be needed to secure not came to a head during the wargaming that planning should henceforth go just Oahu but the entire island chain. and planes destroyed. and was told while knew most in the army high command arguments in silence for a long while. they thought debate — at times spilling over into brought on a last-minute decision to the next critical step would be for the heated argument — peaked on 13 invade came on 17 November. That was a good chance of success. Japanese soldiers eating hurriedly before going ashore in an amphibious invasion World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 9 . along with 127 of their managed to smuggle aboard numerous turism. there. to expect to lose at least two aircraft ashore because the docked vessel At Imperial Army Headquarters. read. round of gaming indicated. Japanese consular officials referred to as “Combined Fleet adven. which was held ahead without further consideration them to believe such an operation stood in the Army War College auditorium of an amphibious landing. and there air-raid-only scheme. Matters finally staff and in overall charge of the games.) On the basis of came as no shock to Yamamoto. US defense was actually so vulnerable effort away from mainland Asia to be Seiichi Ito. Their study led of the Hawaii operation. even a one-week stay aboard a Japanese sible. perhaps heavily. Suzuki offered the conclusion the had long considered any deflection of Finally. before the defending US ground when just using the more conservative merchant vessel anchored in Honolulu force could gain its footing. when Lt. vice chief of the navy general and disorganized only two Japanese a waste of resources.” That wasn’t surprising.

000 ethnic-Japanese residents would “actively cooperate” with the operation. and some considered it to be an unassailable fortress. Further. In those officers’ views. of course. including aircraft carriers. which held a multitude of warplanes. That was because there were always major ships in port. nor did he arrange for the commander to make any further personal presentations of it.) There were also two divisions of infantry on the island along with four battalions of Marines. Hickam. battleships and cruisers. when the reports came into Yamamoto’s head- quarters of the stunning success of the air raid. Pearl Harbor The defenders: US Navy commanders on Oahu prior to the attack was thus finally and fully rejected. in turn. with further aerial reinforce- ments arriving all the time. was finally ended with the Japanese defeat at Midway six months later). including Wheeler. Further. there were shore 10 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . He therefore declined to threaten that heatedly achieved con- sensus: he neither forwarded Suzuki’s written report to his boss. Oahu was amply defended against all outside attack. (There were in fact over 300 US warplanes on Oahu. He went to Genda and admitted he’d been wrong to turn away from the invasion scheme. It nevertheless remains one of the great “what-ifs” of World War II. The nascent Japanese plan to invade. and Bellows. coupled with what appeared to be the complete strategic surprise — not just tactical — gained over the Americans. he instructed Genda to begin planning for such an invasion. and not merely raid. which was to be launched “at the earliest opportunity” (which idea. Ugaki. and the total ethnic-Japanese population made up about 40 percent of the overall Hawaiian populace at the time. remained sensitive to the intense argumentation that had only recently been worked through at the War College. on 8 December 1941. and it gained that status long before the end of the war.000 of them were issei — born in Japan.) Suzuki gave his report in person to Matome Ugaki. Further. He also mentioned the consular officials believed many of the islands’ 160. (About 40. he was thunderstruck. US Perspective The US Army command on Oahu late in 1941 was more concerned about the possibility of locally originating sabotage than with invasion. there were several airfields on the island. That is. and some brand new B-17s actually arrived during the Japanese attack. Yamamoto’s chief of staff.

couldn’t help but score likely outcome based on what happened hit at anchor unprepared to fight. significant kills.batteries that could fire on attacking units. however. the US opposed the invasion scheme. Even more. was indeed a fortress with over 25. the moon in a similar situation in the Philippines In addition to the powerful surface on 7 December was just one day off full around the same time. given by the Japanese officers who and overhaul on the day of the attack. Indeed. They Even more. of course. In Manila The beaches: US planes fly above Waikiki Beach World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 11 . though we can never know warships. so the Americans enemy vessels. were instead turned into also free to search out the carrier a Japanese invasion. there were of those boats was another cautionary Pearl’s 21 boats were stateside for repair serious weaknesses in the defense.000 date of the attack. there were also 21 US submarines (waning Gibbous). the island operating out of Pearl Harbor on the could’ve pressed their attacks at night. On paper. however. and remainder would’ve turned in against that defense. As it turned out. In reality. the presence As it turned out. we can surmise a so many ‘sitting ducks’ when they were strike group. 11 of defenders. rather than making a sortie feared so many submarines immediately for certain about the performance the in strength to become an active part of set loose into the beachhead area.

powerful US shore batteries were no invasion. the task of the Japanese for war. The American forces would’ve had to try to hold out by denying the invader the airfields and the naval base. by 22 jammed up in port. chantmen. Even more determined — even though they where. the surf was much gentler. The lem wasn’t technologically solved until war. for the produced only three sinkings. Given the ing that potential route of US resupply fleet sunk. finish its training and organization Given that the Japanese fleet ing factor for the Japanese. Honolulu would’ve been particu- Oahu could’ve been valuable in aerial larly important. with most ships in the US no one can know for sure. power removed by the initial Japanese Japanese ground force to succeed. it’s would’ve likely come ashore on the Along the coast itself. the otherwise was historically even when there was rendering that area absolutely unusable. if the Japanese had the Japanese launched an facilities in that city. the 24th didn’t or otherwise neutralize Pearl Harbor. wise neutralize the airfields. though on a smaller Somewhere in the Pacific: Japanese infantry scale: the US defense of Wake Island. thus block- Thus. it failed to knock them out in the initial amphibious assault on Oahu after the would’ve been critical to seize or other- air strikes prior to the invasion. eliminate submariners’ inexperience. landing sites on Luzon.there were 29 submarines that.) Those were all problems had only been established on 1 October turn had to capture or neutralize the that would’ve also inescapably bedeviled 1941. while approached the Hawaiian Islands from the naval side of the equation. yet gotten above battalion-level. managed to make 45 sepa. however. would’ve been to get across the coastal were susceptible to aerial attack there were relatively few of them and mountains and into the vital American (because they lacked fortified roofs). while hoping US carriers and submarines at sea either sank or chased away the Japanese fleet. fully trained or otherwise prepared compatriots — might’ve been expected Once ashore. (and opening it for themselves). or otherwise historic air raid was a tactical success. however. most US submarines operating out of Pearl yet been fully equipped or completely likely seize Honolulu and. we can see that. 12 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . As there feet 57 percent of the time. the men manning them weren’t were equally as green as their Army Kaneohe Bay. the better chance the Americans would’ve had to win. Taking The US ground-based aircraft on unit-training above battalion level. While not Head and Barber’s Point. all mer. trained. take Harbor in the face of an invasion there. traditionally it was far riskier than the east coast immobile and only faced south. history does provide another example of a similar one fought historically around the same time. guns either bombed or avoided by the probable — that a ground assault rate attacks in and around the Japanese invaders simply landing in an area would’ve also shared that success. The effort’s overall failure was raids. the US planes on the ground.) Their field other option due to their overarching carriers usually at Pearl Harbor were artillery units weren’t functional on 7 need to maintain surprise). On the north coast along the most invasion-favorable confusion and indecision among the in December the surf is higher than 15 stretch of the south shore between Koko officers as well as in the ranks. the immobile shore it’s certainly possible — if not entirely December. Oahu was large but wasn’t prepared for the subsequent ground attack. or at least the aforementioned critical points on it. they also lacked all organization and infrastructure of the flat interior. they could’ve soon been lack of combat experience. and intelligence. That effort away from them. Again. and the legendarily faulty The two-division US Army force on then provide combat air support to early-war US torpedoes. (That last prob. Of course. would’ve the 25th wasn’t committed to combat the north and west (and really had no come from the fact the three US aircraft until December 1942. or at least certain there would’ve been massive north or east coasts. though we can never know for sure such a campaign’s outcome. at least on period until the spring of 1944. poor tactical available to defend the island. and many of the soldiers hadn’t American airfields on the island. particularly in well-sheltered more. because — in the exact combat. the invasion fleet or aid the US ground defense. coupled coast and the generally too-steep beach poised to attack either the Japanese with the fact unit-training hadn’t gradients of the west coast. (Historically. air raid on 7 December? Of course. and could’ve also threatened What If? opposite of what otherwise might be serious harm to any amphibious expected — all US military communica- invaders. the ultimately complicat. Beyond that. Resupply could’ve been expected to start to become critical for both sides after no more than about three days of combat. That could only have What would have happened tions on the island ran through civilian happened. The 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions Japanese ground force would’ve in late in 1943. of course. The longer it would take for the Japanese to seize the entire island. coupled with elsewhere. the Marines. that left only the US Army their naval airpower would have to later analyzed to have been due to the infantry and Marines immediately destroy the US fleet in port. and ground-based air In general. Upon learning of an invasion December. and the positions themselves to put in a better showing. damaged. Because of that complete the US fortifications along the south on Oahu.

e.O. SOLITAIRE Minutes to learn. CA 93390-1598 (661) 587-9633 phone | (661) 587-5031 fax in Washington: www. see the outcome of combat on Oahu outcome for the Japanese would’ve Fire & Movement for WWII and would’ve been anything but certain.decisiongames. they RELEASES the relations between them and all the likely would’ve bought themselves up AVAILABLE ethnic-Japanese on the island.” Oahu would I n t r o d u c i n g a Japanese invasion conducted with no doubt have been given a large con- about 1. to use in China or India..  ✪ Saipan utilizes the combat system new Fire & Movement that’s designed can augment so players their units with fire” during the “support course of the naval bombardment turn. lack of an overall plan and general confusion. Conquest of the Maria nas guerrilla group made its first attack. Game Conten ts: retook it later — we can also imagine • 17 x 22” (43 x 56 cm) terrain • 80 die-cut counters map • One Standard • One Exclusive Rules booklet for this series Saipan Rules booklet for this title PLAYERS 2 LEVEL II III X XX XXX BATTALION Smith. 1984. In return for risking NEW certainly and completely poisoned the equivalent of two regiments. abundance in December 1941. Made & Printed Hawaii Under the Rising Sun: s. Inc. engineers. the Japanese and US forces ••••• LOW 1611 including armor marine battalions. As its attack gets may suddenly the engineer come under fi battalion mortars. ••••• HIGH Quick to play. The Folio Game Series provides crashed their destroyer-transports on the potential rewards also outweighed dozens of games using the same shore when it proved too difficult to the risks. formations that the realities of accurately replicating combat and the losses sustained high by the actual fighting both sides during the battle is thus on Saipan. the longer-term outcome as a further HEX SCALE mi (536 m) PLAYING TIME 1-2 hrs Each counter represents formation from among an individual historical Oxford. however. All Rights www. Reserved. COMPLEXITY that fought for Saipan. and Conquest of II BATTLES the Marian as FOLIO GAM Saipan was a critical objective E SERIES Navy’s “island in the hopping” campaign US Pacific. it was marked by command and social disruption from that would’ve indecision and paralysis. firepower and asset management. though the impediments to a Japanese landing’s vic- Series tion shown there — for instance. If nothing the campaign. the only truly disastrous (Musket & Saber for 19th century battles. From a purely strategic eight-page Standard rules get their small boats safely in — we can perspective. In the final analysis. The proved to be fiercest battles one of the of the Pacific deadliest up to that time for War. 2010.A. At squad and platoon stabulary garrison. Winning a matter of maneuver. then. they tory on Oahu would’ve been numerous. During onslaught west of Hawaii. born — moved to internment camps on determined and resolute. with most or all the the Decision Games levels. Carl. such a development would’ve have been great. of Hawaii Press. In Saipan the attritional design Combat Results of the new Table simulates nature of the the true battles in the are typically two-sided Pacific. then. entrenched dug into caves formidable defensive and other battle for Saipan positions. coupled with official Federal policies mostly Marines. directed from Oahu. allowing for multiple games to support of an invasion. infantry regiment underway. Coupled with the Japanese determina- the years and decades that followed. amtracs regiments. see back cover for full list of titles likely acts of retribution) that would’ve It would seem. Decision Games. invade Saipan supported by Saipan two-dozen battleships nearly bombardment that had begun two days before. on both land US mainland. The economic.S. allowing to develop at combat all levels. A single battalion. (on both sides of the racial divide).There a force of about 500 US personnel. Box 21598 | Bakersfield. John J. Copyright © 2010. and more. would’ve manifested itself outcome. however. More re from enemy support will be take the plateau. it would’ve worked to else. even had the Japanese landing Each game can be played in about 90 had any number of Issei risen in force been defeated — or if it simply had Ambassador Admiral Nomura and his staff World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 13 . needed to but assets are limited. occurred had their aircraft carriers been Modern battles) with a short Exclusive Another potentially important sunk in a counterattack by US carriers rules sheet for each individual game to factor.000 men.decisiongameReserved. little direct military threat to US gains for the Japanese would still forces. both to two years more to prepare for the US during and after the campaign. 1999.000 fanatic More than Japanese were on the island. broadly accepted racism of the day Honolulu: Univ. that time could’ve been well put below further slow and confuse US command. strategic and sea. which in turn SAIPAN: Conquest of the Marianas control. Failing that extreme capture the unique aspects of each battle. Ltd. That is. given the Japan’s Plans for Conquest After Pearl Harbor. its two in the airfi for heavy bombers. the US defense was everything Japanese — no matter where they’d been Folio that could’ve been hoped for: aggressive. and the both sides. At every one or another of the islands or even the Game level above that. coming from the civilian society or submarines. units positions and to engage enemy formations. the ultimate SAIPAN WORLD WAR overarched and slowed all American element in this matter was surprise. a 30. While posing to be abandoned once ashore — the be played in an afternoon or evening. Stephan. England: Osprey Publishing. Tokyo’s man P. at first stoutly resisted that were at least “racialist. Historically Accurat drag on the overall US war effort being A FOLIO SERIES A product of Copyright © GAME Decision Games. Pearl Harbor 1941: The Day of Infamy. Units US stayed in possession of the island or SOURCES can incur casualties. for engineer example — perhaps by flamethrowers supported assault a lone — could be tasked After the campaign — assuming the enemy to defending a plateau. All Rights Inc.elds were suitable divisions were Hence three scheduled to US operations once any kind of ad hoc history shows the Japanese had that in on 15 June in U. poor to been immense and long lasting over non-existent communication. would’ve freed many more Japanese 1/10th actual size it’s easy to imagine the distrust (and forces for the defense of the homeland. on Oahu. Particularly in the urban areas. From can receive support to bazookas.

the Japanese are operating to such an extent that a US counterat- been uncrated. they can still takes place over the three days imme. and unit-training hadn’t inside what today would be called the tack can cut them up badly in return. damage to significantly alter the course The Japanese have two elite. Both of the Pacific war in their nation’s favor. in the game Oahu becomes naval landing force (SNLF) and an USN (US Navy) had aircraft carriers an arena for both sides to fight what infantry regiment. Since the battle being modeled in command control. things hot for the Japanese. and you can see and then see it actually carried out. but they have a distinct edge “Banzai!” charges.” (That’s The Americans have battleship the designers show American forces as. Plus Japanese units of view. fire their big guns. designed by also infantry. Even though those USN battle- essentially. what if a Japanese ground The Japanese player has to select also affect the bigger picture.” That is. and that can have a with a fascinating historical “what of heavy weapons for the invasion. Orient. the US Army was in mands. Those units are operating in nearby waters. One of the things the designer has to battle. taken place above company level. Looking at the order of There are also some special rules. Again. nothing more than a mass commander to “Observe. Historically. The Japanese player can choose command efficiency at that opening relatively poor shape at that time. That might. previous single division that had been command control in a simple manner. There’s a could’ve been a decisive battle. the time need. differences in tactical proficiency and forces. It would if. that means forces by randomly picking chits and that reflects the two sides’ relative taking a look at both sides’ ground activating the corresponding sub-com. So American player’s “OODA loop. Their artillery still hadn’t Broadly. attack on Pearl Harbor. forces: a special the IJN (Imperial Japanese Navy) and Effectively. The to interrupt that process at any time to stage of the war. always creates challenges for a designer. since they wouldn’t have sub-routine for players to engage each Adrian McGrath & Chris Smith.) The Japanese have to move quickly how the US ground force representation Another advantage for the Japanese in order to secure their objectives. US military jargon for the time it takes a row. even if they don’t capture the as well as the historic breakdown port from battleships offshore. dramatic impact on the game.  ✪ 14 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . Decide wagons were sunk or damaged of rifle companies. ed for him to decide to do something. only regimental-sized. The Japanese player can declare do in a case like this is determine a point numbered. they can tear up an entire US been created by splitting in two the shows the relative advantage of superior line in one series of attacks. in English. If the Japanese get divisions on the island had only recently launch his ground force into action. as calling in air strikes from his carriers. trading off ease of the destruction of either side’s carriers of their historic carrier air attack on 7 landing (heavy versus light surf) versus at the very opening of the Pacific war December 1941? The “what if” aspect the distance to his main objectives would’ve had huge implications. on the island. allowing them some basic assumptions made initially. since force had invaded Oahu at the time an invasion beach. but That involves the bigger picture. you can see the Japanese are out. The US player moves his to attack again immediately. as well island. there have to be move and fight within the American advance after combat. they can still cause enough in American command control. That rolling. however. also leave them overextended stationed there. They can make diately following the devastating aerial give an order to get that thing done. deals been able to carry much in the way other’s carriers. being allowed to get “attack momentum” when they didn’t actually occur. Add to that the game and Act” — or. turn cycle.Design Corner Joseph Miranda Invasion Pearl Harbor Invasion Pearl Harbor. The further reflects the element of surprise player is his ability to use gunfire sup. In Invasion Pearl Harbor. idea is. at their moorings.

or enough aircraft sorties (about two to three dozen) needed to affect battlefield events at this scale. or 93390 individual aircraft carriers or battleships. All prices include postage for first class or airmail shipping. Playing pieces (176 iconic Bakersfield CA counters) represent ground units of approximately company size. one commanding the Japanese and the other commanding the US forces. The rules contain a little less than 11. To purchase the game that covers the battles featured was designed by Adrian McGrath and Chris Smith and developed by Ty Bomba. strategic/operational-level. in this issue send your name and address along with: A low-to-intermediate complexity. The game system is focused so as to present the ground. commanders’ views of the campaign.000 words. Decision Games Each hex on the 34x22 large-hex map equals one mile (1. The game is intended for two $38 Overseas Customers players. Each game turn represents about PO Box 21598 four hours of daylight or an entire night. Two experienced players can finish a match in less than four hours. alternative history wargame of the campaign that could’ve resulted $30 US Customers had the Japanese decided to launch an amphibious invasion of Oahu at $36 Canadian Customers the same time as their historic air raid. Send to: important in play — are presented more abstractly than would be the case in a design centered on those aspects of the campaign. BB Hiei 6 2 2 IJA-5 7 1 3 CV Enterprise 2 3 USMC-1 ? US Army 1 . Aero-naval operations — though CA residents add $1.62 ATTN: WaW Game Offer km) from side to opposite side.98 sales tax.Invasion Pearl Harbor Invasion Pearl Harbor: What If the Japanese Invaded? (IPH).

1943−49 by Brian R. Train Greek communists 16 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 .The Greek Civil War.

western Macedonia. Politics were tumultuous. which was composed of several left-wing and socialist parties but was controlled by the reds. an insult to the Greeks. when a right-wing dictatorship under assist in guerrilla warfare and sabotage That would prove to be the greatest Ioannis Metaxas (with the connivance to disrupt Axis supply networks and air. missions to Greece arrived at the end of plan to distract the Germans from the Factors complicating the situation September 1942. and 3) to Athens out of action for six weeks. The to monitor the movement of supplies the Gorgopotamos Bridge in central system of government was technically bound for the Afrikakorps through Greece. Occupied Greece The Axis occupation of Greece got off to a rough start. That autumn a famine began that multiplied both the misery of the civilian population and their will to resist. Most of the Germans think the Allies would of slightly over 7 million was overwhelm. the summer of 1944 as part of Operation two main urban centers of Athens and The first of several British military Zeppelin. Later. over 2. party factional. In the confusion surround- ing the German invasion of April 1941. tie down occupation troops. The Germans controlled the major cities. them were small and didn’t flourish.G reece was a deeply divided National People’s Liberation Army). putting the major railway to a constitutional monarchy until 1936. By mid- and the Greek Communist Party was added: that of strategic deception. Similar activity was fostered in was almost exclusively confined to the region in northwestern Greece. poor and illiterate. many of the leaders of the Communist Party escaped from prison and went underground to organize resistance. Greece to the port of Athens. 1943 it was apparent the Axis would lose made illegal and driven underground. another Allied deception Thessalonika. as Greece was one of the Of its membership of 14. known by its Greek- language acronym EAM (National Liberation Front). but the persecution of communists continued. intended to make the 20th century. regular intervention in capture to escape to Egypt. a fourth objective was Both sides had a dilemma. single success of the SOE in Greece. started to bring together the armed resistance under the banner of ELAS (Greek-language acronym for World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 17 . the secretive nature and harsh discipline of the communist movement made its members some of the most effective guerrillas. The with the exception of EDES (National Panzer Division and Rommel himself economy was mostly agricultural. Most of the country was occupied by the Italian Army. increased levels of guerrilla activity in country during the first half of At about the same time. Operation Animals. They had three initial Allied landing in southern France. espionage and intelligence networks in November 1942 managed to destroy ism.000 codenamed Operation Barclay. invade southern Greece. 2) to create contacted both ELAS and EDES. working through EAM. cooperated in the same operation. It worked: 1st ingly rural. Social and economic development officers and recruits from the Epirus ed Sicily. Crete and some of the islands of the Aegean. included the aftermath of a disastrous objectives: 1) to establish networks British Special Operations war against Turkey in 1921−23. the Great to help Allied soldiers who evaded Executive (SOE) agents sent to Greece Depression. political life. Martial law was declared. and politics by the military. but Republican Greek League). called for countries on the outer fringe of were imprisoned or sent into exile. part of a larger plan the war and. while Bulgaria occupied and annexed eastern Macedonia and Thrace. of King George II.000. who’d been restored fields. who’d success- fully resisted its invasion in the 1940 campaign. other armed the summer of 1943. corruption and nepotism. The communists began to organize a popular front. and and the only time ELAS and EDES in a fraudulent plebiscite) ended normal generally interfere with the occupation. By early 1942 the communists. were transferred to central Greece for the country was barely self-sufficient in tion made up largely of former Army four critical weeks while the Allies invad- food. an organiza. The population resistance groups sprang up. As in Yugoslavia. Metaxas died in January 1941.

Italy sur. In the fall of 1943.000 mutinous troops were movement with a total of less than ability of collaborationist “security imprisoned or sent to labor battalions. Built around their cadres of mutineers among them began the British became more supportive of elite 1st Mountain Division. and used the Italian weapons and presented itself as an alternative where the communist-dominated to attack all rival units within reach of its to the government-in-exile. Most 500 combatants. Those rebels of the supplies. It was also partisans under Tito were outfighting own bands. which was a maneuvering simply to try to save itself.” the Nazis soon had ELAS of time. as he had from airfields in Larissa. through EAM and ELAS.occupation. the free Greek ground and naval units supplied it with arms. cal elements of society. The communists. SOE adopted a For two weeks it appeared ELAS the EAM. ELAS immediately accused the other republican and left-wing in character. their weapons for its own troops: over The spring and summer of 1944 SOE planners mainly subscribed to 12. a German anti-guerrilla stationed in the Middle East and Italy. monarchist. main rival EDES. as and money. but their numbers of Great Britain. At first the unit was to join by the German reprisals. however. but about were soon built back up to several only Allied power in the Mediterranean 12. Its 12 divisions and four Mission then forced an armistice by other resistance groups. ELAS in military and political control of the to the Yugoslav partisan movement. fighters would come from the more radi.000 rifles and other small arms saw further maneuvers by EAM and the idea the most effective resistance and 20 pieces of mountain artillery. The com. Unlike notable in that group was the entire the survivors of the other organiza- the majority of the Greek populace. and he was fully supportive ELAS disarmed the Italians and took of the right-wing government-in-exile. food tition. combined to defy the authority of the govern- EDES. however. with those other groups. That On 8 September 1943. That marked the beginning a front organization dominated by the the royalist-dominated Chetniks. liberation was just a matter 1.000 defected to the resistance. Based of the first round of the Greek Civil War. the 24th Pinerolo Infantry Division. located in Thessaly. which thereafter received most with their usual harsh policies of reprisal ment-in-exile in London. then tions along with recruits spurred British government was strongly pro. ELAS. but the Allied Military meant controlling or eliminating the rendered. A Free Greek Government. mostly by the ELAS had reduced EDES to less than consider the attitude of the government Germans but some by ELAS units. Over 8.000 tons of arms and ammunition battalions.) resumed limited attacks against its country when that day arrived. working during the entire war. Most thousand when they were joined by that could help their resistance. regiments occupying Greece and the which the two groups agreed to stop munists had no interest in collaborating Dodecanese Islands were disarmed fighting in return for more supplies. Soon there was unrest among conciliatory attitude toward ELAS and might succeed in wiping out the compe. Greek King George II was to be used en masse to attack German living safely in London. but less obviously so than on that supposition. 18 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . operation intervened. which was then the went quietly into captivity. but on 15 October Battle for Athens 1924 to 1935. and the growing strength and April. That was proving resistance groups of collaboration with was created in the mountains in March to be the case in occupied Yugoslavia. ammunition. Volunteer female communists receiving military training. communists. another were disarmed by British troops in late the SOE supplied the Greek resistance famine. yet they had to and taken prisoner. the enemy. wanted to be small fraction of what was provided In the first two months of 1944. (It should be noted killings and deportations.

engineer and service or never if they wanted to seize power. airlifted two brigades come for them to leave Greece or be ELAS. was formed in Caserta. main formations: a southern group the summer a Government of National By the beginning of November. client government there that promptly Germans remaining in Yugoslavia and Meanwhile. British troops in Thessalonika. Disorder spread as old scores of the 4th Indian Infantry Division from cut off by the advancing Red Army. Italy. prevent- The Soviets entered Sofia. ammunition deliberately left behind by moment. It was Hungary.000 men agreed to place their troops under the into 10 divisions of 2. ment to assert its authority.000 men.000 strong and organized and a northern group of 23. Ronald Scobie.000 men (consisting of troops from the 1st. and an extreme right-wing Italy to Patras and Thessalonika. Gen. ELAS forces. signaled to ELAS it was now Mountain Brigade of about 3. had hastily created in mid-1944 out of moved quickly to occupy the resultant The ELAS leadership sensed there its reserves) and hand over the areas it vacuum and seize the weapons and was an opportunity. The Bulgarians had withdrawn on ing EDES from reinforcing Athens. Resistance forces to claim considerable influence. The latter were needed During the last half of November of officers used as a raiding force in to repair the extensive damage the the six EAM ministers in the national the islands of the Mediterranean. 6th. Scobie had been declared war on Germany. by then mission of seizing Athens and Piraeus. occupation force in mainland Greece left organization known as “X” (Chi). Bulgaria. and had handed over control warned there would be trouble and had. though Crete remained occupied Athens during the occupation. 23rd Armored Brigade. the of 18. The were settled. Germans had done to the infrastructure government resigned. Epirus region and the two cities. and the Sacred Squadron. The arrival December a massive anti-government World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 19 . command of Gen. emerged its National Guard (an organization it until V-E Day in 1945. On 3 in the Peloponnese on 3 October 1944. the each. were too weak to dominate The latter was an even more hastily the Germans in the hope the partisans the situation militarily. 10th and 11th ELAS Divisions). 8th. Unity. British forces began landing (nominally) restored national govern. controlled the entire country 9th. for the controlled to the National Civil Guard.while smaller units were reformed from There were a few combat troops in Athens of 3rd Mountain Brigade and among the officers and men who’d (the 2nd Parachute Brigade and the the Sacred Squadron in mid-November. to be used against the then confining and eliminating EDES. administrative.000 men (consisting of the 2nd. and ELAS began The government-in-exile realized and to distribute relief supplies to to maneuver its best troops into two it was expedient to give a little. stayed loyal to the government-in-exile. The British. including six ministers affiliated Germans had completely evacuated 3rd and 13th ELAS Divisions) with the with EAM. The leaders of ELAS and EDES also almost 50. obvious to the Germans the time had of eastern Macedonia and Thrace to in late November. and the political organized paramilitary organization would use them against each other and situation was still too fluid for the staffed with government conscripts and the Allies.000 to 8. former security battalion troops. both operating and the intransigent attitude of the gov- The two main new units were the 3rd as motorized infantry) and many ernment. The incident that sparked new civil almost as quickly as they had come in which had stayed mostly dormant in war was the refusal by ELAS to disarm 1941. and in September 1944 and installed a 25 October. and in the starving civilian population. mainland Greece. an elite unit support troops. with British officer detailed to command the except for an EDES enclave in the the multiple objectives of containing the Allied forces sent to liberate Greece.

the communists lost their EAM popular the 13th. On his return to London. their tactical and logistical shortcomings sions moved against EDES in the Epirus tion and firepower.000 hostages with them British troops. was worried enugh to divert on the rule of King George II. With superior organiza. situation. 2nd ELAS Division and naval gun support. air superiority they weren’t allowed to for a ceasefire. ELAS The remainder of 1945 passed in limited artillery. going to zones ment forces in Athens were hemmed streets of Athens. Their tactics ranged from infiltra. Civil War quickly and decisively against targets The six weeks of open combat in likely to offer serious resistance.000 of its most dedi- assaults supported by mortars and light ELAS realized they could no longer win cated members crossed the border into artillery. The Greek attendees indicated estimated 20. At first they leaders and representatives of the Allied from Athens. against them. Archbishop Damaskinos. they cleared came up against regular troops. Scobie continued political and social turmoil. new elections. but within a week they’d that establishing a temporary regency of into the mountains. and under which ELAS was to disband and the divisions proved unable to move hand over its arms and equipment. National Guard barracks a conference of major Greek political from it. acceptable. About 5. in Piraeus. In the south. The decision to seize sides concluded the Varkiza Agreement. then in tran. followed suc. By December and January ended as a In the north. and while they had opened negotiations with Gen. Churchill used his personal influence turned over the specified amounts of ELAS forces were effective. in their retreat and government buildings. with less and less to Corfu by the British Navy. power had been taken hastily. and a plebiscite popular mood against the communists. into smaller and smaller enclaves in last remnants of EDES were evacuated the core of the city. 1st ELAS Division bottled 20 December the majority of the 4th significant military and political defeat up the single British brigade group in British Infantry Division had arrived for ELAS. the spirit of the Varkiza Agreement. two weeks while British troops further by police — or perhaps the police were The organizational and leadership expanded their control outward from fired on first. at least not in the Yugoslavia and Albania. The British and Greek govern. For the second time in a year. people died of illness and exposure and Field Marshal Alexander. when port in Piraeus. On the same day. many of the better weapons in the tion and ambush to company-sized There was as yet no ceasefire. Many of those begun to engage them sporadically. Winston front facade on 10 January 1945. including air had robbed them of victory once they region. On 2 February 1945 the two never been established — and the sec. On 31 December the controlled by communist partisans. step aside for the good of the nation. but they cached first. Further.demonstration in Athens was fired on use those aircraft inside the city itself. Worst of all. would be ELAS lived up to the letter but not 4thBritish Infantry Division. who arrived cessively by disarmament of the guerrilla some were executed. ELAS units had taken an avoided combat with regular Greek and powers. soon followed by the road to Athens by the 24th. but mountains. a military victory. They had of hammering by three strong ELAS no heavy armored vehicles and only divisions. to Piraeus. ond round of the Greek Civil War began. Thessalonika while the other five divi. at least at with the Greek king to persuade him to arms and equipment. That hardened the in Athens on 11 December to assess the forces. after weeks War Ends & War Starts ammunition and supplies. They sit by sea from Italy to Egypt. what exactly happened has deficiencies of ELAS then began to tell Athens. Those talks continued for Greece had suffered badly under the Axis Greek resistance fighters 20 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . The initial targets were Churchill arrived in Athens to convene the socialist and labor factions resigned police stations. while the 3rd cut the road to the On Christmas Day. moved into Athens.

convoys and police stations. the Greek government ent of United Nations relief supplies. By the beginning of 1947 the DSE had established itself in several bases inside Greece. sometimes not until several eight percent of the prewar population. By mid-February the livestock. and the raids and ambushes of isolated border for security outside the cities. for several reasons. DSE had also days after the attack. During the rest of 1946 more and more guerrillas re-entered Greece from Yugoslavia and Albania. through armed struggle one more time. a band of 60 ex-ELAS guerrillas raided a village near Mount Olympus in the first overt act of the final round of the Greek Civil War. and there allowing the guerrillas to take supplies economy was in ruins.500 such fighters in the country. The number and frequency of treated the insurgency as a police matter there was no progress toward rebuilding.occupation: over half a million people. Its men were mostly central committee of the Communist dispersing back into the hills and forests unwilling conscripts and were badly Party had decided to seek victory at dawn. demonstrations Several bands would concentrate for 1945. making the situation worse. and Greece converge.500 left-wing and right-wing organizations which the place would be cut off. At first. recruits and hostages. by December there were over 8. Revenge killings by both night attacks on towns and villages in and municipal police (about 7. added to the atmosphere of lawlessness. the divided between the two major cities). On 30 March. replaced the National Civil Guard in late encouraging strikes. proved unable to intervene effectively end of March. Crete and the Dodecanese Islands. the villagers would had died of famine or disease or been managed to infiltrate troops by land be punished by the government for killed outright in the crossfire. attacks increased as well. where the borders of Albania. mostly in the frontier area around Lake Prespa Greek delegation at the World Youth Festival in Budapest.000 strong) and sabotage. but they were postponed to the guerrillas would then carry off food. Yugoslavia arrived.000 troops of the officially renamed Democratic Army of Greece (DSE in Greek). The Greek National Army (GNA) estimated that by June there were over 2. The and sea to the Peloponnese. The DSE to be handled by the Gendarmerie (a Several succeeding governments failed played to its strengths by conducting militarily armed police force responsible to bring political stability. police station destroyed. The fact the Greek National Army (GNA) 1946. and while Greece were even low levels of activity on from them. was the second largest European recipi. the night before the elections. which had communists added to the discord by posts. August 1949 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 21 . and security That approach was necessitated by the Elections were to be held in January forces and informers executed. in 1947 it was about 32. When the police or army trained (the army had expanded.

The few thousand British 7. using over 2. British military aid ceased. Markos. That was the first the National Defense Corps (a lightly obvious a general civilian uprising formal declaration of what would come armed village militia). Americans trained the GNA in the image of states that would be dominated by In October they launched a week-long of their own army. American the DSE to defeat in detail small austerity. No foreign government extended Leadership was also lacking: the officers the available artillery was made against it diplomatic recognition. which had decided on a pri. that year DSE units did begin to engage ments of combined arms warfare. Nicholas Zakhariadis. followed (collection of the children): in 1947−48 and was unable to move quickly. except for a small military mission of and March 1948 over $71 million had secretary general of the party and its 175 personnel who concentrated on come in the form of 75. That had more often than not pounds to aid Greece since 1944 and The year 1948 proved to be one kept the GNA off balance and allowed was entering its third year of postwar of stalemate and attrition.too rapidly. though. At the same time. had Greece could gravitate.800 to switch to a conventional strategy in troops remaining in Greece were trucks and enough aircraft to form two which DSE bands and companies were withdrawn over the next two years. strong. influence in Greece and Russia 10 22 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . The DSE use of to show initiative. when the superior mobility (another 8. After two weeks by DSE forces and taken to Yugoslavia were kept dispersed in small garrisons and heavy losses. the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. Several large-scale offensives the so-called “percentages agreement” they’d been given by the Yugoslav in the spring and summer failed to he and Churchill had worked out at the Army. could neither have anticipated nor influ- the DSE would simply withdraw and therefore concentrated on teaching the enced: the departure of Yugoslavia from return later.000 children were abducted had few vehicles. struggle strategy. using for the the US Army had no counterinsurgency not be supported. it could no longer afford military aid and advisors began arriving government garrisons. and began a campaign of massive arrests was worsened by the paedomasm The army was badly under-equipped of real and suspected enemies. there was little time or communist leadership therefore became Emboldened. and the Moscow conference in October 1944. most important factor was an event they to effectively cordon the swept area.300 trucks become angry at Tito’s increasingly inde- communist leadership decided it was and 4. 2. and a concerted attack the DSE was having problems of its seven divisions by the end of 1947). took place in the town of Konitsa. A headquarters called the consolidated to operate in brigades Joint US Military Advisory and Planning of three or four battalions.000 tons of ammunition.000 weapons. or that a foreign mostly on a protracted guerrilla warfare already expended over 400 million power could recognize diplomatically. The DSE troops were On 12 March 1947. forced Markos training. were reorganized and re-equipped. as the chronic leadership problems at all levels. however. and its practice of seizing the top came from an over-controlling Athens government finally outlawed the hostages from the villages. squadrons. They thought a sudden July in the Roumeli region (the Pindus which was crucial in conducting a move to seize power by force of arms Mountains and Thessaly). had hardened National Defense Council of generals. His basis for that was first time 75mm and 105mm artillery doctrine. Essentially. In the fall of to help. Gen. would receive $150 million (1. The insurgency still exerted control ship of the insurgency underwent a The Greek government realized over much of the Greek countryside. to use Since the fall of 1947. with those The Truman Doctrine Group (JUSMAPG) was established to brigades then to be further concentrated control the 250+ American officers who into five divisions. had relied February 1947. The communists had announced the While the government forces that Great Britain should have 90 percent formation of a Free Greek Democratic struggled with their difficulties. Communist Party. two months later an even larger battle GNA proved unable to maintain a The two heads of state had agreed. but bring on a decisive battle. the his wish to create a Balkan federation alternative government could operate. Those sweeps counterinsurgency. the leader- presence in their hometowns. Britain. Stalin had already indicated assault on the town of Metsovon in they had to offer. Even more importantly. significant operational tempo. between August 1947 1948. marily military solution to the problem.5 billion in enlarged and relieved of much of its The communist switch in strategy 2010 dollars) in military aid and as much garrison duties by the expansion of had come about because it had become again in economic aid.000 mules arrived in June 1948) to pendent line of domestic and foreign politically important to establish and conduct large encirclements and then policy on a number of issues. and its divisions wasn’t going to happen. and to resolve its could work before the GNA became too met with only limited success. schism concerning the appropriate it needed significant help and asked but it wasn’t the type of permanent or strategy to follow. The rest of the The aid began to arrive that August. especially maintain control of territory in which an apply massive firepower. from a brigade in 1944 to Government.000 troops and most of own. In response. much of the public against them. Large portions of it of the public service. political commander. aid would only increase. by politicians who wanted a military its bases in the Grammos Mountains. in quantity. Even so. and so ended up pitting their Congress in which he announced Greece in the field. Stalin had in larger and larger battles. the DSE withdrew to to be raised in hostels and orphanages. That was actually all Yugoslavia. The GNA was further weaknesses against GNA strength. the terror tactics. the GNA launched opportunity to retrain the GNA at the impatient with Markos’s protracted several offensives between April and small-unit level (battalion and below). and American to be known as the Truman Doctrine. for additional aid from the British in legitimate control to which the people of commander of the DSE. US President served as staff and logistics advisors neither trained nor equipped to operate Harry Truman made a speech to or were directly attached to GNA units that way. however. In the fall and winter of higher echelons of the GNA the rudi. reinforced Konitsa. as it closely by media suppression and purges almost 28. strategy. not even the were careerist in mindset and unwilling Konitsa so as to give the guerrilla USSR or Yugoslavia. while direction from government a capital. That politicians and civil servants in Athens. literally on a single sheet of notepaper. the army didn’t deploy enough troops JUSMAPG. That attack was defeated. because in 1947−48 to Tito his wish the Greek insurgency the Pindus Mountains.

Stephanos. was withdrawing from Greek affairs by tinue. and by mid-March it was declared free of DSE activity. Robert Speller & Sons. D. in June 1948 that Yugoslavia was been thoroughly wrecked. but Stalin August. Spokesman. 1972. 1980. six-division Gerolymatos. duration of the war. a three-phase. 1944−49. 1962. It persisted in its efforts Asprey.) Even as Britain obvious the insurgency couldn’t con. and by extension the party line of loyalty to the USSR and the switch to a conventional warfare strategy. 1967. Guerrilla Warfare and Espionage in Greece. Charles W. announced the border with Greece would be closed and support for the DSE shut down. Guerrilla Warfare. In February a full infantry division and four commando units were transferred to the Peloponnese. 1967. Andre. was a national hero. the island was isolated by the Greek Navy. O’Ballance. and Bulgaria. J. purges of Titoists began in communist political organizations throughout Europe. Kousoulas. He’d commanded the army during the Italian invasion of 1940. C. The Greek Civil War was over. attack by the GNA called Operation Pella Publishing. Faber & Faber. 1976. On 16 October the communists Praeger Pubs. The majority of the Greek communist leadership backed Zakhariadis. so as to deny the DSE supplies. recruits. On 10 July 1949. Markos. More Sarafis. George. while only on limited support from Albania Sources Yugoslavia would be 50 percent for each. Their actions were coordinated with police arresting and detaining numbers of suspects in the larger towns. who was under political attack and economic blockade by the rest of communist Europe. communist governments created. 1992.” never recognized either of the Greek stronghold in the Grammos/Vitsi area In Containment and Revolution. Stalin didn’t want to antagonize announced a unilateral ceasefire. The DSE. did it ever extend ELAS or the DSE any fighters escaped to Albania. Thayer. lest they respond by interfering in than 158. 1963. by then split into two factions. “Counterinsurgency: Myth and Reality in Greece. Beacon Press. Tito. and had taken the post only on the condition there would be no political interference with his deci- sions. and complete evacuations of smaller villages. Todd. nor near Lake Prespa. Greece: The Struggle for Freedom. the reverse for Romania. Marion (ed). 1965. 1987. continued to observe it after V-E Day. The Struggle for Greece. another Balkan country or Turkey. By the end of Museum Tusculaneaum Press. “The Anti-Bandit War. Alexander Papagos was appointed commander-in- chief of the GNA.. and Greek Thomas Crowell. could therefore rely Greek resistance fighters World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 23 . Robert B. Lars (ed). 75 percent Woodhouse. who’d been associated with Tito since the days of the Axis occupation. in its third and final round. I. expelled from the Cominform (the domestic politics would remain polar- international communist organiza. In April the GNA began to move north to clear the Roumeli region and the southern Pindus Mountains. New American Library. Edgar. 1941−49.000 people had been killed Greece: From Resistance to Civil War. That same month. ized down to the present day.percent. War in the Shadows. Doubleday. 1940−44. When it was formally announced of them civilians. The economy had Hart-Davis. and set about conducting a coordinated campaign to clear Greece of insurgents. 1966. (It’s important to note the Soviet Union Torch extinguished the main DSE Gitlin. He immediately relieved or trans- ferred a number of inefficient or insuf- ficiently aggressive division and brigade commanders.” In The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him. form of material aid. About 8. Press. Revolution and Defeat. Zotos. but it was Oxford Univ. intelligence and all chance of re-infiltrat- ing the zone once it had been cleared. Churchill probably meant the to hold territory in positional battles Barentzen. Murray. Gen. N. Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War. the British or the Americans there. was removed from command in January 1949. arrangement to last only for the and began to fall apart.   ✪ tion run from Moscow). 1975. M. The Greek Civil War.000 DSE Klonis. Guerrilla. C. 1947.

Polish infantry on the march 24 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 .

across the small Bzura River. covering the northern rear flank of Gen. Kurt von Briesen’s 30th Infantry Division. the 30th Division concentrated its forces in the towns along the Bzura and controlled the space between them with outposts and patrols. coming in behind the Tum. they moved the bulk of their forces to the east and used them to strike south from there toward Warsaw. Gerd von objective was to relieve Warsaw. Johannes Blaskowitz’s Eighth Army. Wladyslaw Bortnowski’s Pomorze Army. Because the Germans were overextended during this por- tion of their advance. the 30th was on its own. Once the Germans took control of the Corridor. to the south. The German high command then dismissed the skirmishes that began to take place along the front of the 30th Division as nothing more than localized events. Those troops dug in and began conducting a fighting retreat eastward. was threatened by German Tenth Army. Bortnowski’s command had suffered severe casualties in the fighting in the northwest at the very beginning of the campaign. Kutrzeba’s plan envisaged Phase 1: Poznan Army Attacks toward the center of Poland. Gen. an assault by the entire Poznan Army they bypassed the Polish Poznan across the Bzura between the towns of The Battle of the Bzura River began Army. commanded by Gen. That move inadvertently left the Pomorze Army free to make its move south under only minimal pressure. at first fought only center. The idea was to overrun columns spotted moving nearby. An “operational on the morning of 9 September 1939. Gen. harassing fire against enemy supply The Poznan Army therefore also moved ing Lodz Army. Leczyca and Lowicz. Gen. and then soon regiment. Army. The whole army was then to river captured a small village named Army. commanded by Maj.Bzura. found itself behind the frontlines and that would destroy the German 30th One of the companies that crossed the out of contact with its neighbor. Facing the Poznan Army across the Bzura was Maj. with several of its divi- sions crushed by German armor in the Polish Corridor. That force. German forces pursuing the withdraw. By 8 September it was facing the along the way. and then eventually Later that day the main body of the north flank of German Army Group link up with Lodz Army. The latter force was exploit southeast. Eighth Army didn’t expect an attack into their rear area. despite east to try to regain contact with Lodz any other enemy units encountered a strong German counterattack. 1939: The Polish Counteroffensive by Maciej Jonasz A s German spearheads drove Gen. were to deliver the blow battalions to probe the German line. Spread over a front of 19 miles. Moving south to join the Poznan Army were the surviving units of Maj. Lodz Division. with the nearest friendly units approximately a day away. Thus. supported by a heavy artillery Infantry Division ordered one of his minor border skirmishes. World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 25 . and stormed the German positions. The ultimate Poznan Army began to cross the Bzura South. Tadeusz Kutrzeba and based in group” of three infantry divisions in the when the commander of the Polish 25th western Poland. which under the cover of an artillery barrage Rundstedt. German air reconnaissance failed to detect the Poles as they moved at night.

its commander at first ordered and inflicted heavy losses on the few Army’s western flank. Mikolaj Boltuc. only barely contained by their com- to fierce German resistance. The Poles held their ground on Glowno the following day. then. Only on their right did they to the rescue. They evacuated Ozorkow situation had become serious enough to into a defensive stance and sent out an as the Poles began to envelop it.500 Germans Wielkopolska Cavalry Brigade toward while the Luftwaffe was directed to were captured. with its commander having Then the lead units of the Pomorze Brigade and a regiment made up of to be evacuated due to wounds. At the same time. those German infantry divi. the simpler frontal assaults. The latter entered combat enemy rear area. sometimes rest of the Poles’ Bzura River force. began a general withdrawal. and their lack on the east flank of the overall battle. pushed back the lead elements counteroffensive. As they advanced. Some contact. the Wielkopolska Cavalry Brigade Glowno. The climax of this phase of the battle mander threw in his reserve battalion. zone. the Poles were also Brig. warrant von Rundstedt ordering Tenth urgent request for assistance. Polish cavalry captured many prisoners of radios reduced the coordination with its 64th Regiment attacking into and supply vehicles. The 30th Division then Glowno and then cutting it off from the concentrate its air assets on that sector. cleared captured the town of Bielawy. and resistance began to stiffen. destroyed. the 221st Landwehr counterattacks intended to push the tanks the Germans had available (the Division showed little offensive spirit as Poles back across the Bzura River. when That unit managed to get behind the bridgehead across the river. Additional Lowicz.On the far right the Cavalry Group. the overall became apparent. sions then began to execute piecemeal out some German units in its vicinity. 26 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . On the Arranged in a line between Ozorkow and manding officer. Eighth was an infantry army). blocking the advance of the also on the way to assist Eighth Army. That group was of the German 221st Landwehr Infantry suffering heavy casualties. By the it faced the aggressive Polish cavalry. Flanking composed of two infantry divisions. The 14th the entire Eighth Army was turned to Germans. headway. the Division and then fanned out into the attacks were neglected in favor of 4th and 16th. and over 1. the left. he switched his force was reeling. When reports of the fighting came counterattacks that failed to make any and prepared to take over the assault into the German 30th Division’s head. composed of the Podolska Cavalry in disorder. as the scale of the Polish attack end of the day the entire German line By 12 September. and on the 17th forced another was reached on 12 September. only decided when the Polish com- The 25th Division captured Leczyca. Those units’ of Polish artillery support. A tough fight followed that commands were still unaware of the German units were entering the battle lasted the whole night and was finally threat from the fast moving horsemen. Army arrived in the form of another survivors from the Pomorska Cavalry Despite the apparent success of the operational group commanded by Brigade. however. 4th Division crossed the Bzura. On Eighth quarters. During and the Germans then continued Army to divert its XVI Panzer Corps the following days the Polish advance to pull back in an effort to break away from Warsaw in order to come continued along the entire front. The XI Army Corps was units within the 30th Division were succeed. initiating a panic that was Infantry Division’s attack failed due deploy against the attacking Poles.

He spent in no position to take advantage of it. which Kutzreba had faced on the Bzura. with the rebirth of Poland. The two During the First World War he served on all the fronts where Austro-Hungarian forces generals therefore decided to change fought. where he secretly ran a school of military studies Division also withdrew across Bzura for junior officers.Phase 2: Redirection Maj. He took part in work on various had suffered significant casualties. offensive of the 1939 campaign: the Battle of the Bzura and from there advance east to Warsaw. including the design of defensive works in the empire’s Balkan provinces. They ordered Poznan conducted numerous studies concerning the resurgent military potential of the Germans. territory. Gen. His counterpart in those negotiations was new attack positions. That day the second-in-command of all Polish forces in the city. even though it was to have World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 27 . Kutrzeba and Bortnowski made a tour of the command Born in 1886 in the part of partitioned Poland that was under Austro-Hungarian posts of their assault divisions. Their occupation. including a tour of duty as a liaison officer with German units on the eastern front. Johannes Blaskowitz — the commander of Eighth prised the German command. Army to pull back across the Bzura while In 1939. their axis of advance from the southeast In 1918. who were Army. After the war Kutrzeba moved to owing to an error in communication. There he became the the battle began on the 13th. ending it with the rank of a lieutenant colonel. the 16th camp. England. the remainder of the war in a German prisoner-of-war Unfortunately for the Poles. and fortifications. After the failure of that offensive. where he worked for the Polish government- That left Lowicz to be retaken by the in-exile until his death from cancer in 1947. promoted to major general. He to a more easterly direction. he was given Pomorze Army attacked between Lowicz command of the Poznan Army. During the German resistance while still getting inter-war years he became the commandant of the School of Warfare in Warsaw. That move sur. thanks the advance was starting to slow as to which he witnessed the 1914 assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Sarajevo. where he nearer to Warsaw. River. and then executed the only large-scale Polish again cross the Bzura north of Lowicz. On 28 Poles successfully moved back across the September he conducted the surrender negotiations with Bzura and then marched toward their the Germans. Tadeusz Kutrzeba On the 12th Gens. the Germans were reinforced. thereby took part in the Polish-Soviet War of 1920. Gen. He started the war by and Sohaczew. he managed The execution of this new phase of to break through to Warsaw. Their forces completed engineering school as the top student in his class. during which he served in staff slots in all moving past the center of the stiffening the major battles of that war. Kutrzeba joined the Polish Army as a captain. Tadeusz Kutrzeba joined the Austro-Hungarian Army as an officer-cadet and impression wasn’t favorable.  ★ Germans. The Poznan Army was conducting some limited offensive moves into German then to redeploy on Pomorze Army’s left.

fearing heavy casualties. spotted 1st and 4th Panzer Divisions. That decision The Poles attempted to regain their however. Gen. as it gave the ing days. Bortnowski.been the Pomorze Army’s bridgehead axis of advance. The Germans were concentrating along its projected Germans the time to complete their soon regained all the terrain that had 28 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . who then reacted by several divisions. the new Pomorze Army temporarily halting the entire attack. but they failed. That report surprised reinforcement of the battle zone with for launching its new offensive. attack achieved some initial success. including the aerially Even so. aerial reconnaissance soon eliminated all chance for a Polish offensive momentum during the follow- reported large German armored forces victory along the Bzura.

and potentially missing the village where the Pomorze tively ceased to exist. in the woods. there. survivors from several different haven after withdrawing from the north- found themselves in a pocket hemmed units led by an energetic junior officer. The Bzura. Eighth Army. break. With the capture of Gen. and the army headquarters Poland more time to resist the German The breakout through the Kampinos could no longer exert control over onslaught.been lost to the Poles south of the Bzura. First. in turn. The quick German victory in much of their pocketed force as possible.000 men reached advancing across the Polish Corridor That could only mean an attack directly Warsaw. September. west front. its tanks barely the end of the 17th. Warsaw surrendered on the 28th. That. lay the Kampinos Forest through and all of their armor also had to be Germans then also estimated the which the infantry and cavalry could abandoned due to lack of transport Poznan Army had already redeployed infiltrate to either Warsaw or Modlin. and they didn’t ing through the still-thin German lines region where the Poznan Army was expect to defeat the Germans outright.000 dead. Podolska Cavalry Brigades. those armies effec. That to hold long enough for the French started losing cohesion. Alas. the in the defense of the Polish capital until confusion was the night marches used Germans continued attacking the pocket. A successful Bzura World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 29 . ing else. by the Poles. All communications defeat. in by the Bzura and the Vistula Rivers. German intelligence to effectively track Polish command their only option was The running and confused fight the movement of those two entire Polish to try to break out and thereby save as through Kampinos Forest lasted until 20 armies. A small group of Polish was also able to find temporary safe and the two involved Polish armies then soldiers. it wasn’t enough to turn Forest was spearheaded by a cavalry surviving units. At one point meant an entire Polish army retained its and British to take the offensive on the during their own trek east. They left behind another led them to conclude the Pomorze to the east where. By The resulting battle gave the Poles an the middle of the pocket. chanced upon them and served as close The second factor was the failure of By the 16th it became clear to the escort during the rest of the march. the of the opposing forces. Gen. The Pomorze Army in the larger war. the Polish armies were expected heavy artillery and air attack. gave Army headquarters was located. If noth- group led by Brig. The survivors then took part to Warsaw. opportunity to engage. when 20. of course. which allowed them to At one point 1st Panzer Division broke The other elements of the Poznan and evade Luftwaffe aerial reconnaissance. and fuel. on the other side of the 20. then moved swiftly along the The Battle of the Bzura was made consideration the disparity in strength tracks that crisscrossed the forest. Polish units main German thrusts into Poland. possible due to two factors. owing to the fluid situation. The cavalry Summary The pre-war Polish plan had first created another bridgehead across been realistic enough to take into the Bzura. The reason for the Germans’ At the same time. through the Polish line and drove into Pomorze Armies failed to break out. Most of the Poles’ artillery Army had been destroyed there. Roman Abraham Bortnowski. operations effectively ceased. the tide of the overall campaign. Kutrzeba full combat strength until an opportunity western front and thus turn the tide and his staff found themselves alone to deploy it appeared. Under constant and increasingly initially stationed was bypassed by the Rather. the Soviet invasion of Poland on and composed of the Wielkopolska and 17 September sealed the country’s fate. broke down.

but units on their flanks to advance. During the inter-war aircraft were evacuated to years. At the higher level there was no coordination between Gen. including two panzer divisions.  ★ PZL P-11 that resulted in some top of the line equipment being produced in Poland. culminating in the destruction The Air War of an entire German army. there was the decision to break off the offensive and then resume it along a new axis. offensive. Even so. coupled with significant additional support provided 30 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . before the extent offensive on the western front. there was actually an Allied were dominated by the Luftwaffe. Finally. 1939 war. At lower levels there September. of the Polish attacks became clear. The P-11 was an outdated plane. Both of those phases. would have weakened the Germans enough to have The air campaign during the Battle of the Bzura could be broken into two made a strategic difference — provided. on 12 Bzura offensive. by having participated in non-stop combat since the opening hour of the Polish Lancers. available forces were seldom on the surrounded divisions utilized to quickly reinforce success.23 bombers. Kutrzeba’s force and the remainder of Lodz Army or the forces already concentrated in Germans capture tankettes Warsaw. was already decimated. but there was still too little of it to satisfy the needs of a modern army. otherwise victorious units failed to slow and lightly armed. instead they were too few and were of immediately exploiting successful therefore unable to stop the attacks to obtain true breakthroughs. though more maneuverable than the faster German machines. The take advantage of their local successes pilots who flew them proved capable of not only holding their own in the air but also of in order to move deep and outflank achieving a good kill ratio. limited pressure placed on the Germans’ Tenth Army by Lodz Army could’ve worked to delay the reinforcement of Eighth Army. In turn. torrent of bombs that fell Similarly. whose front was fluid Polish prisoners and over-stretched. after the 12th. industrial progress had been made the east of the country. that would’ve had serious consequences for the Germans. the Luftwaffe was largely absent over the Mistakes made by the Poles resulted battlefield: all its assets were then being dedicated to support the main German in the unnecessary failure of their axes of advance. As a result. Only after the strength of the Polish effort became clear. due to the weakness of the Polish Air Force. Those reinforce- ments weren’t only strong enough to block the Polish attempt to resume their offensive action. Lodz Army. the lack of sufficient communications among the Polish higher-level headquarters precluded that kind of coordinated effort. did the German high command order strong air assets into the area. was a lack of coordination between Polish air strength in the skies over the Bzura was limited to only a few dozen regiments and battalions. There was also a lack of trained staff officers who could provide commanders with the kind of situational awareness — especially during fluid offensive operations — that would make possible coordinated efforts. During the first phase. though. Again. By the 17th That lack of coordination was the the conditions in the Bzura result of the poor communications that pocket had deteriorated so plagued the Polish army throughout the much that surviving Polish 1939 campaign. by the time of the start of the Bzura offensive. of course. phases. PZL P-11 fighters and even fewer light PZL. That gave the Germans the time they needed to bring in strong reinforcements. and its soldiers exhausted. The commands of the The Polish pilots did their three Polish divisions at the spearhead best to protect the skies of the attack also tended to wait for the over their ground forces. German units.

  ✪ World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 31 . Komisja Historyczna Polskiego Sztabu Glownego w Londynie. 1939 campaign in Poland. 1986. Polskie Sily Zbrojne w Drugiej Wojnie Swiatowej: Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Bellona 1992. Parts 3 & 4. Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej. the redirected Luftwaffe. Rezmer. Ciechanowski. Warsaw: Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Nasza Ksiegarnia. Unfortunately. Tadeusz. 1982. 1972. Bitwy Polskiego Wrzesnia. London: sive. was turned against them in 1940. it formed an important part of the Zawilski. passive until the full force of the Germans Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Nasza Ksiegarnia. they were Sources able to destroy the two Polish armies. Despite the failure of the Bzura offen. 1972. Konrad. Armia Pomorze. Appoloniusz. Waldemar. vol 1. vol 2. Gen. Kampania Wrzesniowa 1939. Bitwa nad Bzura. Warsaw: Czytelnik. Sikorskiego. Instytut Historyczny im. Kutrzeba. Armia Poznan 1939. the Western Allies decided to remain Bitwy Polskiego Wrzesnia.

leaders mostly didn’t understand the “Defense State” and “Super-Defense as well its high command’s refusal to military potential of a nation is directly State. The nation items. capacity was small.” the institute was really only a face the reality of a long war. resources. and manufacturing. proportional to its industrial potential. and an they didn’t understand it. Whitman D uring World War II. Industrial Though the Japanese government especially vulnerable in the production was slow to produce needed high command talked about total war. Japan proved cally hampered its planners.Analysis: Economic Strengths & Weaknesses of Imperial Japan by John W. “Have not” realities in those things was limited. Japan’s of Total War. industrial arena. and used slogans such as money. While they was resource poor and had to make do overarching vision of how to improve established an Institute for the Study with what it had. chroni. subordinate group within the cabinet 32 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 .

losses through theft. no one could tion. and that they equivalent of the Skoda arms center in were losing on that front. innovation. They also failed to address systemic tion. they job in running the captured oil didn’t clearly see war in logistical or refineries. quick campaigns. the navy should have priority. but Japan. No new oil wells war. Japanese began the war over access to as no such industrial centers existed. but once American or 1942. establishing air and sea bases administrators. their military had begun conscripting sively. Japan entered Once war began. Primarily. then provision for pipelining supplies: items grasped the requirements of total war. at in it. educated populaces. If it was to be the Soviets.who dealt with economic mobilization. or the French shipyards. result. ports of embarka- they were unqualified to participate that lack of resolution. being tightly focused on a narrow trial inadequacies if they didn’t know mate what amount of supplies would be range of weaponry at the expense of what the strategists intended to do. shifting territories. As a result. they an industrial power the size of the Japan’s attack into Southeast Asia US. the petroleum of the East Indies and The Japanese did only a mediocre other resources of Southeast Asia. either for themselves or for their skilled workers out of the petroleum enemies. and against an unprepared foe were drilled in the home islands in 1941 such as the Chinese. and they allowed enemy materiel superiority. Workers who tion or its technological successes. technological and scientific investiga. they decided to oil production declined 10 percent. logisticians explain their nation’s indus. which con- which they started the war. Not until September The government also wrong-headedly 1941 had they decided to actually launch curtailed synthetic oil plant construc- a war against the US and Britain. They didn’t envision the scale. Final prewar preparations their own manpower base to fill key consisted of little more than requisi. and en route on ships and trains. technicians and and depots and stockpiling munitions. it was unable lost its designation as “essential. Their own quered industrialized nations in Europe sources of oil provided only 12 percent that had infrastructures operated by of their peacetime requirements. The Japanese remained only dimly aware an industrial therefore couldn’t augment their indus- battle was underway. weapons and stock. That approach Not surprisingly. Ninety-six thousand personnel. home island scale. hard handling. weather. had to concentrate on strengthening the quately allow for wastage.” As a to deal with the changed reality. that victory would trial strength by capturing an Asian be decided in factories. plan for any kind of war. let alone one a favorable negotiated settlement. the Japanese have the technology or raw materials Conquest of Resources never selected a priority enemy or for a sustained war effort against theater. and they assumed their maintenance. the home island oil worked in the opening months of the industry also stagnated. serve in the armed forces. but not yet available to front Their industrial base was fatally unbal. skilled labor. and forward sup- unprecedented importance of materiel. maintenance and trained personnel. Unlike US leaders. rot. remained in the industry received low The Japanese expected to fight wages and were poor at performing outnumbered. draw on forces already in place in China The Japanese also depleted and Japan. the major raw material for Unlike Germany. businessmen left Japan and sailed to Similarly. early on determined Germany would thoroughly defeat the US. If it was to be the American. Quality on materiel would ruin their armed fell off as that machinery deteriorated. the new territories in 1942. the Japanese areas void of modernity. The petroleum industry even industry geared up. ning quick victories in 1941−42. and also cut off that industry from even then they didn’t mobilize to full basic materials. they didn’t realize the develop an industrial plan to support ports of debarkation. and tion. nor did they be their priority enemy. Some excessive corrosion to build up before Japanese even believed any reliance maintenance work was done. and production. who They had no extended plan on how to decisions. Though the Czechoslovakia. however. didn’t have a master which were to have then resulted in large in aggregate. the missing national strategy. industry as early as 1937 in order to depth or breadth of US wartime produc. economic positions in the conquered tioning and fitting out ships. Given stocked at magazines. Nor did they adequately esti- anced. offensively or defen. The industry actually aban- piles for no more than a half-year of doned some partially completed plants. They were World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 33 . They also underestimated their in the opening months of the Pacific own rates of consumption for oil in War gained their empire raw materials. particular. force’s spiritual strength. leakage: the individually minor. the Japanese didn’t ade. The main reason for that was economic terms. in fact. erroneous for total war. The Japanese gambled on win. line units. black markets and the like. They made no Even had the Japanese better army. Nor could ply dumps. lost in transit across active war theaters. They had to frequently unique national spirit would overcome shut down equipment. home island oil work lost its pri- The Japanese military had sufficient ority in construction. For land power.

operate under plans developed before Bauxite imports (essential for For example. much of shipping shortage. struction program simply couldn’t sup- bauxite.226 tons. grade iron ores they’d been importing While the Japanese accomplished lead and zinc awaited Japanese from those two countries. all because of the Dutch East Indies was negligible. there were some broader suc. into their economy before the Allied Rich coking coal and iron was available What Japanese administrators did Pacific counteroffensive began. again release a flood of ore to Japan. Japan’s shipping con- increase in consumption. and copper. that conquering the concerning oil field acquisition. Java. the Celebes. that Local commanders failed. That inefficiency paled. South Pacific. war-induced strains on transport. In turn. Conquest had been so easy it seemed all In September 1942. that reduced the shipping available to Though the Japanese had nearly a cesses. imagine. they from Japanese-occupied areas in China. roughly Women welders in a Japnese factory.000 more in 1943. into the of prewar imports). serious transportation bottlenecks. Japan had imported Pearl Harbor. Cargo ship building had in Malaya. High-grade which was carried in foreign vessels.3 million tons of iron-ore from Malaya however. That drew Japanese tons in any one year (six percent as the processing capacity in Malaya and assets. chromite and copper Sumatra thereafter ran into ever more economic managers continued to became available in the Philippines. the US began Yet the Japanese couldn’t manage the Japanese had to do was carry home its strategic counteroffensive in the to bring home more than 200. Nickel could come from Japan’s blast furnaces the superior peaked in 1937 at 307. Coal. iron and semi-processed exploit the “Southern Resource Zone. One would their early war strategic aims. especially mining crews in Burma and Thailand. 1944 34 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . manganese. then.000 the booty. to fully develop those resources. tungsten. especially shipping. as the Japanese termed Southeast Asia. mines and ports in those lands would success then led to further complacency. Malaya and were inefficient in doing so. and the home island 3. tin. extract from Borneo. tin. Still. aluminum) rose.followed by 142. however.) Solomons and New Guinea. iron and manganese waited In 1941 the Western embargoes denied port a long war. Their Iron. (That was indeed necessary. in comparison to the growing stockpile increased despite the wartime and the Philippines in 1940.” year to integrate the captured countries materials came in from Manchuria.

It wasn’t position to support the decision for war. it seems. great. with and the time to start a war. for new work then began to to eventually make a mockery of their convert her to a light aircraft carrier. did shipyard expansion proceed far but neither had organized themselves for arguing German air and sea power would enough to increase cargo tonnage. Those types of vessels were example. abrogated international arms limitation A further surprise comes from exam- ing at full capacity. they were largely successful 84 percent complete when canceled. planners same period). Further. Japan was 16 launched and commissioned. Japan’s long-term A Japanese yard laid down a second Imperial Japanese seapower: Furutaka class heavy cruiser. Japan got only one new drafted unattainable schemes that. The Japanese had earlier and naval shipyards were already work. Skilled workers Navy. The Navy completed counterbalance and distract the Royal just 10 destroyers in 1942.101 tons. a much more war in late 1941. from 265. When their high Alaska-class large cruisers (sometimes command made the actual decision for called battle cruisers). as events would commissioned only two. then. and they became more production problem. was to scarce as industry expanded and the attack and achieve victory before the The Japanese naval high command Army drafted men out of the shipyards. war began. and the US naval building 1943. She would never serve as a heavy program was so astonishingly large as cruiser. June 1940. the US effort in heavy given hope to Japanese naval strategists. amazingly unprepared for the necessary The Americans also planned six naval expansion. The third was show. World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 35 . it could not then complete her faster than the Japanese could chase it. the Army command significant construction effort than believed it could successfully fight a standard heavy cruiser. service. Not until 1942 private shipyards built excellent ships. They also simply assumed capacity to warships. years before the war had been good: ity point out that even staying close to two in 1935 and one per year in 1936−39 American naval strength was impossible (the US produced just three during that over the long term. That was a short-term solution two-ocean fleet. when one agreements so as to free themselves from ining Japan’s minimal effort at heavy looks at Japan’s full capacity in relation to the restrictive limit on major warships.250 piling up behind her in line. Production fitting out because of higher priority work naval construction capacity was in no slipped badly in 1938−41. there over most of the course of the The Japanese laid down their single war. launching her on 21 March count ships. on 24 optimistic. The solution to the American Overall Naval Construction were scarce. The Navy’s situation was never so wartime heavy cruiser. Instead. they could’ve been fulfilled. though a shipyard managed to the American tonnage limit was also the (often unheralded) major combat launch the cargo ship Tsukushi Maru in free to increase. if heavy cruiser onto the ways after 1939. the Ibuki. it was unimpressive. did anyone in author. cruisers was 24 laid down from 1941 For a nation that chose the arena through the end of the war. The cause for that until March 1943 she entered service. and light cruiser construction once that of the US.47 ships of 6. Planners saw no way to match US decline was the diversion of shipyard Both government-controlled and production. but insufficient industrial construction scheme. and it increased far platforms of World War II-era fleets.500-ton size. Japanese admirals could April 1941. That created a true assets existed to allow those plans to Cruisers & Destroyers dilemma for the Japanese: their merchant be executed. Simply put. would’ve In contrast. force ratio imbalance became too was aware of prewar US plans for a The Navy did plan warship produc. the risk of ignoring British production. mass production. The yards Japan’s enemies on land in the Southern launched three of those. but the Navy Resource Area and. tons to 174. legislated increase to that already large building. For The problem was. and heavy cruiser production in the six Never. with that abrogation. as well as the 1940 tion on a scale intended to counter US that couldn’t work in a long war.

even after deducting for carrier. During the Japan in large and heavy cruisers by down 87. American wartime as a result of the Battle of Midway: room proficiency in producing destroyers. Japan laid down nine new Japanese Navy. In the end. a Japanese yard to produce a destroyer 301”) of the Ibuki-class on 1 June 1942. a ratio of 27-to-two hulls laid down.unnamed heavy cruiser (“Warship No. or 13-to-zero ships commissioned. was 12 months. US yards got their but construction stopped within 30 days Nor could Japan approach America’s time down to five. destroyer production swamped the had to be made to build another aircraft In 1941. The average time needed for war the US laid the keels of 365 destroy- Japanese workers in a pre-war air raid drill 36 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . the US out-built destroyers while the Americans laid vessels sent to the Atlantic.

The high cost of manufacturing mobilization. Construction firms found their production requirements because of ammunition as an example. the nation’s Koreans to replace Japanese on heavy civilian plants. less. manufacturers Production of some items soared. ate with fast fleet units. and two from their decision to push steel. escorts. US yards also built 77 frigates. in turn. at last seemingly taking into account less-qualified workers. Workers were weary. launched 362 and commissioned such as large Army radios. Nearly they could accomplish. priority in 1941 to D in 1942. Across the production and construction aged youth being placed on assembly Machinery and equipment shortages industries. qualified supervisors began training no priority at all in 1943 and 1944. Steel deliveries for Japan’s construction industry hadn’t the war plants. after two years of labor than that in other industrialized cases. Manufacturers Excess and unused production capacity amount of construction they needed protested they couldn’t meet military began to emerge in a few areas.000 unskilled numbers. firms had to use lumber. They weren’t expected to oper. aircraft but bad for Army weapons. from 13. students. after. and the men in manpower then reached even into less than seven percent from 1941. 96 sets in 1942 to a still anemic 455 profitable to invest in machinery. before the quickly created a lumber shortage. The number of workers in the rose to B in 1942 and to A in 1943 and Japanese fully address economic oil refining industry nearly doubled. was inadequate for the task at hand. though some priorities given to Army and Navy air did. so its Army simply to China. Japanese prewar construc. which was good for the civilian engineering infrastructure and labor tasks. Part of the reason for such trademark. from a trivial low that contractors hadn’t found it 323. realistic. Army production increased by inadequate. a shortage of raw materials. the quality of workers had drasti- substantial quantities of machine tools Military engineers develop much of cally declined. In some even that increase. eight was 345 percent of 1941 production. and a shortage of laboratory space and nor maintenance of civilian facilities steel production in 1937. and poor maintenance of tools. That out of the plants into the military for maximum production. cannon meant mortars often replaced tions plants and equipment had but barrels refined per man dropped rifled artillery.439 in 1941 to 24. heavy to do. Military demands for ground ordnance in 1943 increased been prepared for war. even though priority for them Only after Guadalcanal did the workers. On the assumption actually declined in 1942 from 1941 from 8. They were the smaller those numbers were miniscule when numbers. More supervisors were needed artillery in the Pacific. Priorities Building new factories to construct and supporting forces together didn’t would be aircraft and merchantmen war materiel was also difficult. which was good for their hardware by converting civilian undernourished and unenthusiastic.25 at the end of there would be no need for heavy levels. half were 52 percent in 1943 over 1941. had been so plentiful and wages so continued on page 41 » World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 37 . Depression-era manpower to work in factories. of tools. tion from “B priority” in 1942 to C in One plant lost 1. until it another 78 to go to the Royal Navy. for Japanese engineers. Physically substandard college slowed expansion in manufacturing careful. countries. As big Army cannon dropped from A been extensive. which compared to those achieved by Japan’s World War II the bulldozer was their were designed to perform only as convoy enemies. radios needed to tie infantry.140 in 1943. For American engineers in Matsu-class and Tachibana-class. were Japanese men. the USN commissioned ordnance. Anti-aircraft guns were Economic Mobilization to the military and then had to try outmoded and fielded in insufficient to replace them with 4. while Japan commissioned 31. Civilian competent researchers. while conversion of civilian 1943. Large construction men they did have. Production was to be contractors were swamped with orders made poor use of the competent rapidly increased to the limit of Japan’s they couldn’t fill. Money spent on muni. In contrast. productivity and manufacturers then transferred workers to replace them. conservative estimate students and nonessential workers areas such as anti-aircraft ammunition of production risked being dismissed.195 in 1943. civilian engineering equipment were employed in home island industries Overall. The Japanese therefore demand for supervisors grew. three years passed from the start of the absence of cement and structural Constant drafts of skilled men war. In 1941. Neither replacement production had peaked in 1939. and Koreans. breakdown non-mechanized. requisitioned tools from much of Japan’s war effort.ers. Even so. In the growing have otherwise driven new research. tion was far more dependent on manual women. however. production of plants to munitions production hadn’t to manage and train newcomers. ever-worsening training for new men. nearly all workers Army but bad for the civilian plants. The Japanese would be funded. rather than transport children war. It had rewrote their industrial objectives.000 skilled workers 1943 and 1944. As with so Japan imported increasing numbers of Army. charge of it then underestimated the those worker categories. It cut truck produc- destroyer escorts but also slower. small increases was due to increased it was the pick and shovel. to aircraft plants. Cement exist. by 1944. laborers on assembly lines meant poor assumed the coming war would be which were bigger than Japanese utilization of machine tools. Japan lacked the capacity to build to Brazil. Production there increased Army Production & Manpower 327 destroyer escorts while releasing each quarter in 1942 and 1943. That industry suffered from both production. industry meant the large numbers of November 1942 marked the start of who then required more supervisors.18 in 1940 to 3. artillery Japan’s total mobilization. but time was firms had orders equaling twice what display the imagination that might actually working against them. because of experienced men plucked away by the excessive drain on the work force. Skilled Japan commissioned another 32 in 1943. which meant The small Japanese electronics that they needed a supreme effort. resulted in women and high school- Japanese economy reached its peak. six to the Free French and two Growing numbers of unskilled masses of trucks. The machinery to military use. from other industries also entered and explosives. and they failed to economic potential. Small radios went from 800 civilian engineers and modern power ships that were more destroyer escorts sets in 1942 to 3. equipment didn’t exist in significant than destroyers. anyone who dared give a lines. Ordnance the draft and had to hire untrained By mid-1944.

who in 1942 resource” rather than a tactical vessel. the Peninsular & merchant cruisers. during a campaign shipping. enemies. The Japanese would later move most of 47 10. Even so. capture of Axis Japanese lost 2. even as late standardized merchantmen. Japan had 15 such ships lines of communication than did the Japanese. after losing four sunk and two requisitioned. In 1941 alone the strength. The old-line yards expanded by convoy departed Bombay toward Singapore a third of Japan’s 10. though. Japan’s sealift capacity. fleet possessed as dedicated lift vessels. The largest liner in the absorb losses and fall back on a large inventory. best illustrates Additionally. in Axis submarine and air war against British tons of new merchant shipping slid down that one category of vessel. after excluding seven ships at 108. Because they had so few 10. under construction. such as communication was 10 times the length of operated 245. That sea line of The Union-Castle Mail Steamship Company still requisitioned as naval auxiliaries. In 1939 the Netherlands. After losing five vessels by 8 December.000+ tonnage. line. that grossed 375. hospital ships. In just that one theater. In 1939. nearly twice Japan’s dedicated to military sealift. After losing four vessels seaplane carriers.260 tons.000+ ton lift vessels grossing 705. 1941 than in September 1939. Oddly. each could be considered a “national vessel reached 525. that count were similarly sized merchantmen originated in Bombay. grossed Japanese shipyards continued to expand Starting on 21 December — when the first British 83. campaign. just one of many worldwide demands. Italy’s tonnage in that class of by two years of war and with the worst losses yet important. That one ship grossed more than in 1943. The Americans began December 1941 with still had nine that grossed 164. Cunard White Star line — after the cargo ships above 10. the for which the Allies weren’t prepared.392 tons.000 tons. to 206. Unlike the Allies.248 tons. in comparison to her allies and tons. and the like. as of 8 December 1941. resource tonnage than Japan’s entire merchant that she was roughly 3 million tons stronger. tankers.000+ ton produce ship tonnages equal to that of all her available 10. Oriental Steam Navigation Company still had conversion to aircraft carriers. Shipyards also started to turn out more sealift effort in early February — the Allies British assets were huge. Planners diverted committed 18 merchantmen of 10. albeit reduced of those vessels. averaging 13. Japan’s industrial base didn’t need to roles but. enemies.The Shipping War Allies committed 58 percent more national vessels. That was excluding tankers. after two years of war and losses. totaled 677. Japan was decisively weak in large- Japan’s entire stock of large merchantmen Italy boasted 26 liners/cargo vessels above ship tonnage. 1. Alone.990 tons. to the conclusion of the 10. the 15 134. as 8 December. Britain had added so much tonnage the ways. marine for conversion into military auxiliaries. When added to other 10. an average marine resources were larger in December more and more of the economy to ships. armed Japan’s Saigon-to-Malaya line and nearly five sunk and five requisitioned.423 tons. submarine The point here is to compare Allied sealift eleven 10. passenger liners then under times that of their Hainan-to-Malaya line.201 ships. to come.000+ ton vessels grossed 195.000 tons. sOn Singapore reinforcement effort over longer sea merchant cruisers — still had 10 of the class 8 December 1941. British merchant more and more steel to shipbuilding and diverted Those vessels grossed 335.616 tons each.497 tons.387 tons. Japan couldn’t mitment of large lift vessels to the Singapore grossing 486. Of course.000+ ton lift vessels that grossed tenders. including four bigger than anything operating robust shipping assets. operated 33 such vessels entire Japanese merchant marine.5 million tons. given the war’s geo-strategic those naval auxiliaries back into logistical In 1939. Despite the 1 April 1943 until 31 March 1944. and the new yards grew by 23 with reinforcements. In that same period.013 tons. however. France’s Normandie. Excluded from Five of the eight British convoys to Singapore total. and acquisition of neutral shipping. world in 1939. Shipyards thus Tsukushi Maru 38 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . percent. France’s 24 percent. She attacked nations that were dedicated to sealift.000 tons then lost more merchant vessels than existed in the Compare those figures to the Allied com. The Canadian Pacific Steamships Japanese detached six vessels from the merchant Japan’s December 1941 national resource ton.896 tons. the Allies sustained their Royal Navy commandeered nine vessels as armed the country’s weakness in this category. nage.059 tons. From of 18.095 million then.651. Germany’s biggest three liners grossed scope.110 tons. in particular. the through new construction.000+ tons.076 tons.000+ ton lift assets hit 593. with the single terminus of Singapore. Germany’s prewar large merchantmen. and because they were so the Japanese had.

Only four 1TM en route to Japan. the first of 32 oil-burning production. but they were peacetime models.200 tons and home islands. 18 months into the war. The problems. six. In that same year. the US had 173 During the first two years of war. but of that 49. 8. 11. Those four ships were through December.765 tons. and that standardization arrived in 1942. Palembang Maru. The US equivalent to the Japanese Type tanker.249-ton Awa Maru (laid down in July 1941 for in June 1943. entered service to support a war the Japanese into service. but yards delivered only 49. then another 26 ships were Shimonoseki to Pusan run.400-ton the war. One of the products 8. the overall situation didn’t 6. completed just 16 mass-produced 6. appeared in repeatedly told his cabinet the nation’s oil supply their maru construction in 1941.400-ton cargo ships of the prewar variant that Builders launched a few other transports. or simply sat in storage tanks cargo ship designs. exacerbated Japan’s problems in getting oil to the islands. was minor when compared of the Type 1A came off the ways in 1943. tanker. Japanese management of Southern 1TL tanker was the T-2.000-ton.547-ton ties were always too small. model A). exceeded until December. One example was the closest equivalent to the first four Japanese Nigitsu Maru (laid down in June 1941 as an Japan’s production of its largest tanker.500-ton Type being torpedoed and sunk on an unescorted Losses. and five in 1944. the first true Type 1A. were still too great. and Britain had 176.000+ tons. Yards completed years ahead of the Japanese. waiting space in the over-committed tanker fleet. which were were three other big March products.5-knot tankers US was averaging three Liberty ships a day. however. was lost structure. only eight Type 1TL ships their new wartime standard medium tanker exceptions to the anemic 1943 production record.6 million barrels. Seven more prewar variants 1943.400 best tonnage month for Japanese shipbuilding weak force. A submarine sank her only 14. then. The 8 December count of Only on 31 October 1943 did yards complete wartime models. which wasn’t to be on order 165 tankers or whaling vessels of 1A ships became available in late December. The next three Type that year. the Type Type 1A cargo ships. 9. but their failure was in That was the entire production of 1TM. Like the Type 1A cargo ships. was all well and good. the Though Japan had too few tankers timeliness. In 1942. and shipyard capabili- produced). in great part. In US Liberty ships alone. would become the wartime standard Type 1A cargo ships and tankers through 1942 into late one must keep in mind Japan’s tanker strength. and the first of those 10. Prime Minister Hideki Tojo The Japanese had begun to standardize prewar and war-built Type 1TM. laid down before on hand or on order. they August 1942. in 139 days. a Tanker losses increased in 1943 and had started. deteriorate sharply through 1943. Regardless.6 million barrels. was assured. 23 in 1943. Japan was the 7.  ★ Awa Maru World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 39 . grossing roughly 5.908-ton Konron Maru. roughly 75 percent of 1940 war was won in the shipyards of the US. 18. The shipping ways in 1942 and 1943. the in June 1940 for passenger/cargo service).000+ ton Japanese tankers describes a the first war-built standard cargo ship of 6. US yards added a maximum speed of 15 knots). In 1939. on her maiden voyage. In 1943. In late 1942. American yards were two ocean liner). More long-lived 1943. though relatively small through the end of 1K ore carriers. yards completed just five second most important tanker Japan built. came off the Resource Zone oil throughout the year produced 133 T-2 to the 33 already built. In 1942.replaced only 43 percent of what was lost. labor and materials when compared to to its opponents. Shipbuilders settled on five standard were timeliness and quantity. (first year. medium. She served for just six months before Japan couldn’t build ships fast enough. as always. cargo ships (if one adds the 5. expensive even at its peak. to bring oil to the home prewar variant of the Type 1TM (first year. From June Japanese builders were quicker at putting passenger/cargo service). 118. increased production too late and had to build Ichiu Maru. Norway operated or had tons.5 million reached Japan. March 1943 was the second 44 8. delivering too little oil. Yards completed one such tanker. in time.135-ton Tsukushi Maru (laid down 1TL (first year. either consumed by forces in the south. large). The rest was their effort on a modest shipbuilding infra.

073 mortars in World War II whereas the US produced 105. money and accounting. Due to economic weakness and tactical doctrine. large wartime plant dedicated to construction of combat vehicles Experience quickly showed that triple the amount of munitions in 1942. US ground to produce prime movers. Decisions resulted from 1941 through 1945. industrial training or experience. As it turned out. US output in 1943 peaked at 29. The US produced 7. As the war progressed. while three times as much ammunition as did the Japanese Kaisenbun. Japan produced was actually needed. finance. been left to various government departments and the Army and Navy. allotted roughly Japanese production dropped to 786 tanks in 1943. the ministry was a failure.065. The Japanese had 12 plants that could’ve produced the number of rounds necessary for each weapon in a division more tanks (had there been the plan and the steel). Ammunition was issued in Kaisenbun increments: 24. Gunpowder and ammunition plants had industries.054. The Army and Navy continued to draw up their own 27. The Japanese hoped the new ministry would Production and transport shortfalls prevented any provide coherent and unified direction to the war economy. In comparison.497. In November 1943 the Japanese established the Munitions Ministry. as well munitions production plans and put their own supervisors in as 116.114 tank guns and wheeled howitzers. and there was never self-propelled weapons.  ★ Young students get on-the-job training 40 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . The Army wanted to triple the Kaisenbun for its southern self-propelled guns in 1942. marine engines and aircraft parts. a way to hope of increasing the Kaisenbun for the troops on Japan’s efficiently move men. The Regardless of the plan. as steel became harder to materials and military materiel. the men in the front never developed a range of armored and motor carriages for lines commonly fired all the ammunition available. Planners assumed only 20 days of to cut tank production meant eight of those facilities converted actual weapons firing every four months.803 155mm and larger not from a judgment of what was best for the country but from guns. Japan produced munitions factories. US light and medium tank production was 4. there was also a need for more artillery ammunition. Japan bitter arguments in which the strongest personality got what produced 6. Factory 1941 light and medium tank production (all were light models when managers then had to figure out who actually needed what. The three ministries would often Japan deliberately set tank production priority low in 1943. It was also supposed to control labor and wages and manage never been attractive investments for private concerns. The Japanese built a single Japanese totals were based on what could be produced. Their end up ordering the same item from the same factory. A Total Mobilization Bureau was established within the new ministry Japanese weapons production figures were often so small as to provide what amounted to a “general staff” for the war economy.997 in 1942. but the Japanese so as to unify and control administration and production of both raw couldn’t keep up with that trend because. Those junior officers brought with them little 2. ammunition supply tables. armies as well as for the units in Manchuria. At the same time. The US produced he wanted. Ammunition & Weapons The Japanese based their ammunition re-supply on expenditure compared to other countries) totaled 1.024 vehicles. it was rates from the Russo-Japanese War and from their more recent 1.052 in 1941 and experience in China.512 pieces of 70mm to 105mm sizes. In 1942. That reorganization brought a shake up produce. dated 23 December 1941. Execution of such administration and production had previously Expansion would occur only if the government funded it. artillery shells became correspondingly harder to manufacture. of managerial functions. many of which were self-propelled.082 self-propelled guns and howitzers of similar caliber. to be completely out of touch with the reality of requirements. but the decision for four months of combat. 14 in 1943 and 59 in 1944. It failed Army produced 604 heavy pieces of field artillery (larger than 105mm) to coordinate labor. capital and transport assets to key war far-flung frontiers. The Japanese Army produced just 26 enough. materials. Munitions plants take time to build and enter production.

there had been no stockpiling of civilian a day. Wherever people attrition had reached the populace. gathered. By never exploit its available resources 4. Peattie. For of the growing lack of steel. the Japanese produced and Hainan Island had ceased. The Japanese produced 44. Tactics. US expended 67.  ✪ 70 tons a day.4 tons a day while the US produced early 1945. in August 1944. a 186-fold efficiency difference.012 man hours per ton.6-fold difference. an explosive example. 1997. David C. Prime Minister Tojo addresses the Diet World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 41 . The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II. Even more. poorly fed and badly clothed. By 1945 the war had drained the farm equipment. no possibility existed for victory in a vast differences in Japanese and US The output of weapons and munitions long war. curtailment of consumer goods. Japan could powder in 1944.5 man hours Civilians were tired. in the production of smokeless iron ore convoys out of Singapore for industrial warfare. household furnishings. and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy. but even though the victories in the ability. Evans. To produce a ton of tetryl. Strategy. steel deliveries to plants sufficiently to win through. the Japanese female workers and young apprentices Parillo. Japan had curtailed production The Japanese produced 166 lbs. Mark P.000 goods prior to then. beriberi. they talked about food and Though intense US bombing of the the failure of the rationing system. production of military supplies was superior in all industrial respects that Other statistics shed light on the already off 20 percent from its peak. raw material avail.» continued from page 37 home islands didn’t begin until March. There was thus little tons of organic high-explosive in 1944 cushion when the war forced drastic versus the US total of 1. it took the producing ground and anti-aircraft Japanese 1. Clothing. mainly because war. over-worked.178 man hours while the at one Mitsubishi factory suffered from Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. Shoes were hard to find. expended 1. used as a detonator. and the US produced 7. of tetryl of civilian items as early as 1937. and a day.500 lbs. a 17.1 million tons. The products were scarce. began a steep decline. Sources the US expended just 5. so the government 1945 ordered the production of straw sandals. Its leaders gambled on a short manpower quality. Routine first year of fighting gave it the potential instance. 1887−1941. while ordnance were one-third that of 1941. per ton. rubber and paper Japanese people and their country. 30 percent of Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. & Mark J. For Kaigun. Japan went to war with enemies so moved their machines into the schools. and machine differences. 1993.

translation: « On the eastern front ¶ SPANISH SOLDIERS FIGHTING FOR EUROPE ¶ ‘Iron Crosses for the bravest of the brave’ the German general said » 42 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 .The cover of Signal magazine. March 1943.

” played a key grow larger than battalion-size. between received with satisfaction by suffering from the effects of the civil war. Britain controlled the seas. Franco’s generals had German attack on the USSR. Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939.Spain in World War II: The Blue Division in Russia. as they had felt Any Spanish involvement in World War was so. however. II would therefore have to be minimal. militias and under its own command Socialist Republics. and Ramon Serrano Suñer. it’s necessary to understand the ideologically uneasy about the German. led by the Union of Soviet division of volunteers to fight in the east. combat history of the division itself. the Falange was wildly successor “Blue Legion. the leader of the Falange and Spain’s foreign minister. During be said to have been satisfied with the tested their leverage inside Franco’s the civil war. were responsible for During its entire existence. To understand why that the Spanish military. that in the style of the Germans’ Waffen SS the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War division was a political football with and the Italian-Fascist Blackshirts. 1941−44 by Javier Romero T he opening of Operation Spain needed imported petroleum and role on the diplomatic front. Franco accordingly offered Germany Spain’s military support for the inva- sion on 24 June.” and its never allowed political militia units to ruling party. 1941 and 1944. The idea quickly grew of sending an expeditionary force to avenge the Red aggression of 1936−39. the country was still in the internal politics of Spain. as well as Barbarossa on 22 June 1941 was wheat. If the Spanish military could which the Falange and the military the military blocked that idea. The “Blue Division. when the Soviet Union actively supported the Spanish Republic. Further. 17 July 1941 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 43 . Franco couldn’t afford to declare war on the USSR. spoke to an enthusiastic crowd gathered in central Madrid. The enthusiastic. the Spanish regime. Despite the desires of the Falange and the support of the German embassy. He called on his listeners to join the Germans in the fight to save European civilization from the Bolshevik menace. but of 1936. The The Germans and the Falange had to The Falange had initially proposed to official view in Franco’s Spain was the content themselves with sending a single form a division recruited among its party communists. and Departure from Madrid.

5 cm guns) first elements left for the eastern front. amid much received regular army uniforms and Falange and to avoid the impression the enthusiasm. there their Wehrmacht tunics. though 1/263. So the unit always remained an undeniable political element. 9x3. etc. mand the division was Agustín Munoz that policy remained unchanged — after Only a third of the sergeants and lieuten. They also witnessed the harsh realities of the war in the east: 44 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . veterinary. but one all. Troncoso by the Germans in their order of battle. Supply. officer posts went to army regulars.military wouldn’t tolerate political army officers. Agustín Munoz Grandes (pictured above) It was listed as the 250th Infantry Division Chief of Staff Col. Martínez Esparza) swore loyalty to the Fuehrer in the Signals Platoon | Engineer Platoon | Bicycle Recon Platoon struggle against Bolshevism. field hospital. the blue Falange shirts underneath so troop quality was from the start well above average. 2/250 & 3/250 Battalions. When the division began recruiting. Badillo) Regimental Staff Into the East 1/250. the volunteers had Motorized Signals Platoon to walk more than 620 miles (1. 2/263 & 3/263 Infantry Battalions they wore an armband with the Spanish Anti-Tank Company (12x3. The 250th had one artillery 1/262.   ★ mostly by mines. ants were Falangists.5 cm guns) corresponding support and logistics 263 Infantry Regiment (Col. The division was organized fol- Divisional HQ Company lowing the then-standard German 250th (Motorized) Mapping Platoon three regiment pattern. Most of the quickly came to be called the “Blue volunteers were committed Falangists. Even some of the Falange new division to be organized. Motorized Light Signals Supply Column and from there it re-boarded other 250 Field Training Battalion trains to the front.5 cm guns) embroidered on it. Grandes.5 cm guns each) 4/250 Battalion with 3 batteries (4x15 cm each) The division detrained in the 250 Recon Battalion Suwalki-Grodno area in Poland.7 cm guns) German troops. At The first volunteers departed from then.7 cm guns) far from the 1939 demarcation line Two Bicycle Squadrons between the USSR and the German 250 Anti-Tank Battalion Reich. the volunteers who came forward the same time. an anti-tank battalion and Infantry Gun Company (2x15 cm & 6x7. the division took 45 days to arrive. many of the rank and file had non-involvement. Gen. placed under the command of regular in the war. During the march 3 x companies east the Spaniards suffered their first 250 Divisional Supply Troops casualties: four killed and 34 wounded. not Motorized Anti-Tank Platoon (3x3. a recon Anti-Tank Company (12x3. each with 3 batteries (4x10. aboard trains draped in ranks. Franco came from the army. In 1941 march to the front as simple privates. Franco ordered an entirely Eighteen more trains departed from different Spanish cities during the following days. German and Italian flags. Moreover. as a concession to the Madrid on 13 July 1941. At Motorized Telephone Company a pace of 18 to 25 miles (30−40 km) per Motorized Radio Company day. taking some 18. though the official Order of Battle. equipment and Signals Platoon | Engineer Platoon | Bicycle Recon Platoon weapons were entirely German. both in Spain and in Germany. convinced of the rightness Division” (Division Azul in Spanish). August 1941 Spanish name was Division Espanola de Voluntarios (Spanish Volunteer Division).000 Spanish Blue Division Organization volunteers to the Grafenwohr training center in Bavaria. of the Nazi crusade against the communist Soviet Union. Four weeks later the Infantry Gun Company (2x15 cm & 6x7.7 cm guns) battalion. and the division’s sub-units were regular Spanish Army was involving itself Spanish. 2/269 & 3/269 Infantry Battalions modified version of the oath sworn by Anti-Tank Company (12x3. all other NCO and with well-known Falangist sympathies. Pimentel) four regiment organization of Spanish Signals Platoon | Engineer Platoon | Bicycle Recon Platoon divisions. From there. 2/262 & 3/262 Infantry Battalions and three infantry regiments. When all had arrived The Blue Division was a political unit. The nickname stuck. Still.7 cm guns) national flag and the word “Espana” Infantry Gun Company (2x15 cm & 6x7. such further maintain the illusion of Spanish as the Italian Blackshirts. the units of any strength large enough to party leaders who volunteered had to general whom Franco picked to com- compete with its own power.000 km) 3 x Motorized Anti-Tank Companies (each 2x5 cm PAK 38. however. He was an army officer. Their uniform. instead of the 262 Infantry Regiment (Col. Vierna) units. but it had regular army in Germany.7 cm guns) to the nearest railhead available for 250 Signals Battalion their use inside the USSR at Vitebsk. 250 Artillery Regiment (Col. the troops were issued cadre and staff. in a slightly 1/269. That was an important distinction between it and with German Army uniforms in order to many of the other political units raised during World War II. On 31 July the men 269 Infantry Regiment (Col. postal. Jose M. Finally. they wore fought during the Spanish Civil War as NCOs and junior officers.

some wear SCW decorations (note the Spanish flag on the helmet) the destruction caused by the battles of Lake Ilmen and the city of Novgorod. there- Initially scheduled to reinforce by completing the siege-ring around Army Group Center’s drive on Moscow. and the brutal German That same day. The Spanish sector included the move by the German 18th Motorized dropped dramatically: down to ‑23 confluence between the Volkhov and Division. fall along that portion of the front.Blue Division troops. both October. Its 269th figuratively and literally. the Svir River east of Lake Ladoga. Spanish National Day. The offensive of Army Group degrees Fahrenheit (‑30 Centigrade) World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 45 . the ordered to take the offensive. while the temperatures River. All Axis units division began to relieve the 126th Regiment crossed the Volkhov and estab. North toward Tikhvin was ultimately June and July. Across the Volkhov Leningrad. the first snow began to intended to link up with the Finns along policies toward Poles. The Soviets counterattacked the 250th was redirected to Army continuously and by 6 November the Group North’s Sixteenth Army. Jews and Russians. On 12 On 19 October the division was Axis offensive been stopped cold. east of the Volkhov were ordered onto Infantry Division on the Volkhov lished a bridgehead to reinforce a similar the defensive.

Spanish positions on the Volkhov front in 1941−42 from a 1956 book by Esteban Infantes 46 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 .

Again the Spaniards the largest infantry divisions in the East. which was degrees (both scales) in early December. That participation behind the Volkhov. three to two each. on the city itself. There little effect. enduring temperatures as low as ‑62 degrees Fahrenheit (‑52º C). again distinguished themselves. aimed at cutting off the Soviet salient The Spaniards held their own. Bolshevik revolution. The 2nd Battalion of the 269th Regiment acted as the division’s reserve. in February 1942. Army survivors among the early volunteers desperate resistance of the Soviet 2nd Group North commander. The salient sector against overwhelming odds. Munoz Grandes was awarded the Knight’s Cross in March 1942. the division was a heavy toll on the Spanish division to the German Army’s divisions reduced ordered closer to Leningrad. At the same time. Agustín Esteban Infantes Translation: « BLUE DIVISION ON THE ROADS OF RUSSIA. was cut off and destroyed despite the Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von mid November. the Spaniards as Munoz Grandes put it.” division were detached to participate arriving at its new sector. crossed frozen Lake Ilmen to relieve a trapped German garri- son in Vsvad. elements of the accomplishment. using an influx of men from west bank of the Volkhov River during comrades-in-arms while defending their several replacement battalions then their counteroffensive. the cradle of the relieving Leningrad. was viewed as being a reward for the got caught up in the fierce Soviet tained its original organization of nine division’s outstanding performance. SPAIN TO FIGHT WITH COURAGE » World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 47 . Hitler praised the division in a speech in Berlin on 26 April. The Blue Division’s stalwart performance was also a propaganda coup for Franco. evacuated began to be sent back to Spain as Shock Army within it. Of special note was the feat of the ski company that. By mid-December 1941 it their regimental infantry battalions from were rumors the unit was going to had suffered some 2. the Blue Division main. shortly before positions as if “nailed to the ground. and the Spaniards the Tikhvin drive on 9 December. holding their In April 1942. To do so. the skiers moved and fought for 11 consecutive days. in order to somewhat participate in the long-delayed assault After the retreat to a position again make up losses suffered during the win.400 casualties. and down to ‑40 Around Leningrad in Operation Predator. only 12 men out of 207 in the company were still on their feet. the division began that had been established on the gaining the respect of their German to rebuild. suffering heavy casualties in the process. on 2 May. Its their tours of duty were completed. first weeks at the front had thus exacted Incidentally. Field arriving at the front. the Blue Division ter campaign. would be a major distinguished themselves. Gen. That made it one of conquering Leningrad. as winter counteroffensive aimed at fully infantry battalions. As 1942 opened. while the rest of In August 1942. Indeed. When the ordeal was over.

The sacrifice. mine warfare and torpedo boats. Spain’s highest military award. was postponed. Another 100 defense against Soviet air raids. was important. During their first three weeks in their Franco also relieved Munoz Grandes as the Soviets managed to destroy the new sector. some 134 Spaniards served on German ships in the Baltic during 1942−43. but not Spaniards.were issued maps of the city. There were no longer enough Gen.000 1942 the Spanish Navy was also granted authorization by the Germans to send personnel Red Army troops fell that day. though in a different manner. The participation of the ground and air elements received a lot of coverage during and after the war (there have been hundreds of In a single day of fighting on 10 books and a few films and documentaries). reinforcements to its relief. 1941−44 est day: the Battle of Krasnyi Bor. The battalion fought. His successor. volunteered to go back to the front. copper). anti-submarine patrols. They managed the 9th Fast Attack Flotilla in Gotenhafen (now Gdynia) in June and July 1943. Hitler had As the lengthening lists of dead and before stopping at Rastenburg to receive in fact signed Fuehrer Directive No. sniping. into Franco’s order) were offered the Spark. the Spanish would supply two ski brigades and 150 artillery Germany with certain strategic minerals (tungsten. Blue Division had to take over the sector tion of the lines. also Overall. clerks. while taking an average of 30 casualties per day. served aboard ships and participated in several actions. with the more moderate Count Jordana. if the Spanish position was intensify their diplomatic and economic Lake Ladoga. Rommel’s defeat in Egypt. The determined resistance of the In the summer of 1940. initially sched. ordering for the expeditionary force began to the hands of the Fuehrer. and efficient but apolitical professional. six After enduring their bloodiest day. Out of 550 men. In fact. By the summer of batteries. Eleventh Army. Germany and Spain signed the Bar Agreements. and chose to send the veteran 2nd Infantry Pushkin and Krasnyi Bor. Operation Spanish involvement in the war. The Spanish the Spaniards fought through six more crews of six fast attack boats given by Germany to Spain also received training with months of static warfare. and thus move the city beyond range of the Axis artillery fire. The first contingent of Spanish sailors arrived in Germany in November 1942. neither the Germans nor the Spaniards February 1943. Spaniards served on the following ships: two cruisers (Admiral Scheer and Emden). 418 breached. the actual assault. was an by Field Marshal Erich von Manstein’s volunteers to replenish the ranks. waiting to be rotated back to Spain. By March 1943 the first group was back in Spain. 45 wounded arrived in Spain. Grandes received to clear the sector defended by the seven percent of its front line effectives. had assembled to defend Leningrad. “kicking him upstairs. That attack was unleashed on 12 ever. the division lost Hitler and the Falange. the Moscow-to-Leningrad railway torate — allowed the Western Allies to to the last man in the battles around line and. Hitler hoped the partici. as well as the crisis The evolving situation in the Soviet of the division to its right when that unit developing farther south at Stalingrad. such as mining and counter-mining. the Baltic Sea. Fronts. Ferdinand concentration of guns the Soviets pro-German Foreign Minister Sunez Cross.600 men out of the 5. Shortly skirmishes and patrolling took their the works for some months. the Red toll. the Spanish Navy contributed to the war against Krasnyi Bor Russia. however. That to envelop the German XXVI Corps was due to the diversion of reserves to Politics Again defending south of Lake Ladoga.600 involved. The destroy yet another Red Army penetra. A second officers and men. how. 80 to 100 tanks. general. thus ending 16 Continuous artillery fire. thereby bringing him home and link with Leningrad. The Blue Division division from the war. with one company commander was also well within range of the huge in part by replacing his Falangist and wining a posthumous St. who were in the rear contingent arrived in April 1943 and participated in the same type of missions until the summer. the Blue Division lost gave much publicity to the service of Spanish naval personnel on German ships in 3. In exchange. 
 Infantes committed everyone he had. it was kept secret by the Spanish Navy until the 1990s. During the summer of 1943 48 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . enthusiasm the oak leaves for his Knight’s Cross from (Operation Northern Light).” That had been in months of German blockade. a hero’s welcome in Madrid. more than 4.000 shells from his command by the simple expe. Franco complied KIA).000 to 9. was in vain. An estimated 7. to receive training under combat conditions aboard ships operating in the Gulf of Finland. cooks and all maintenance of the mine barrier closing the Gulf of Finland. During the first four months was growing too popular both with Army launched a follow-on push outside Leningrad. Just like the army and air force. almost literally. six minelayer boats and two anti-submarine boats. They including the remnants of the 2/269.  ★ to keep their sector more or less intact. the Soviets could relieve the pressure on Franco to withdraw the were casualties by late January (124 siege of Leningrad. It was to be the Blue Division’s bloodi- Spanish Sailors in the German Navy. plus artillerists. Gen. between the towns of the pending disaster at Stalingrad. mine warfare ships. The area the Allied landing in North Africa — the Battalion of the 269th Regiment. many former Republican soldiers (who At the military front. an assault into the city to be conducted evaporate. opportunity to redeem themselves January by the Leningrad and Volkhov uled for September. as Grandes after the success of Spark. as it was crossed by latter close to Spain’s Moroccan protec. German defenses south of Ladoga and landed within their positions. by which the division stopped the onslaught of four Germans agreed to transfer technology and technical advice to the Spanish Navy to build Soviet rifle divisions. and dient of promoting him to lieutenant then move on to establish an overland that was during a “quiet” period. wolfram. and other rear echelon troops. the Soviets pation of the Blue Division in so great a were forced to do five years of military opened 1943 with a new offensive again victory would pave the way toward full service as a way of integrating them aimed at relieving Leningrad. Agustín Esteban Infantes. submarines. Two Soviet armies attempted then cancelled for good in October. Infantes Leningrad. and by fighting in the Blue Division. Union and elsewhere in the global war was sent to reinforce the beleaguered The division then held an 18 mile further influenced the politics behind corps. and it was also ordered to send (29 km) sector of the front south of Division Azul.

the Blue Legion was Meanwhile. or those of CR 111 in no more replacements would arrive Canfranc. By 1943 almost all of the petroleum consumed by Spain came from the USA. in full swing and Franco then a useful NATO ally because of his anti-communism. The machinegun bunkers. major economic effort for a country still reeling under the effects of a civil war. and it would fight to extinction: the bunkers of CR 52 and 53 in Martinet de Cerdanya. Therefore. Nowadays. its construction represented a Italy — had all withdrawn their remain. one anti-tank gun. the British ambassador hinted at The P Line: Franco’s Maginot Line the possibility the Allies might invade Spanish Morocco. The line was to include 10. Planning clear: if Franco wanted to be tolerated had begun as far back as 1942. propaganda coup to show Germany Infantry Division. but they never moved back to the front. the Cold War was drawal of the Spanish from the USSR. Catalonia.200 men). was then cancelled during the early 1950s. the Allied landings at Salerno. Slovakia and Germany’s West Wall or France’s Maginot Line. ing forces from the front. There was again to be Formed from one artillery and toward the Narva line against both no German summer offensive against two infantry battalions (some Soviet regulars and partisans. World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 49 . on the diplomatic front. not far from Oranienbaum. Romania. With the Wehrmacht fully 2. Each CR Finnish army. Each heavy weapon would have its own bunker. by that stage of the war. most of them between 1944 and 1948. unit would across the Pyrenees. It moved onto the front in and the US continued to increase. After that the division was concentrated in reserve. underground depots unit still in the east. The Spaniards were depth while setting up two defensive heavily engaged during the retreat lines to the rear. be called the Blue Legion (Legion when the P-Line was finally abandoned. one infantry or mountain gun. fortified as early as 1939. And Spain was not alone in that Built using conscript manpower and little equipment.500 pletely neutral during the remainder of actually built. On paper. Franco was and warehouses. Each platoon. the P-Line can be considered regard. a substitute distributed around the anti-tank and artillery bunkers to protect them from infantry assault. Aragon) have been restored and can be visited by military aficionados. Finally. and the loss of Kharkhov) translated into increased pressure on Franco from the American and British ambassadors in Madrid. Apart from the The system was built around Centros de Resistencia (Resistance Centers) or CR. The new. he had to be com.or the only major non-German combat company-sized SP had several bunkers. rifles. Azul). one anti-aircraft machinegun. In February second anniversary of the arrival of the full lifting of the siege of Leningrad 1944. The message was Spain began building the P for “Pyrenees” Line during the fall of 1944. of course. Hitler’s other a light fortification system when compared with the huge concrete emplacements of allies — Hungary. Narva. Franco had ordered them back to Spain. some of the bunkers (for instance. After that date work slowed and the war. on 1 October 1943 the Every CR was to have 40 to 60 bunkers of several types. By that time. with some 4. To save face. foxholes and pillboxes were return to Spain. would be linked by trenches and foxholes and surrounded with barbed wire and mines. they fought one last action when the last elements in line fended off a local Soviet attack. the The Legion witnessed the final and was entirely alone. and the most vulnerable sectors of the border had been in post-war Europe. Leningrad.  ★ from Spain. the failure of Germany’s Kursk offensive.the division was ordered to deploy in Blue Legion in January 1944. That meant a complete with. activated in November 1943 near the pressure on Spain from Britain Spanish morale began to fall. one Germany could no longer react militarily 81mm and one 50mm mortar. By mid-1943. smaller. complete with observation posts.000 bunkers. therefore. unit was formed from volunteers There were 100 CR in Catalonia. With North Africa in the hands of the Allies. Those areas had for centuries been the traditional invasion routes front. the Allies decided to Blue Division at the front. each SP was to be equipped with two machineguns or automatic well aware that. On 12 October. The ensemble to a Spanish declaration of neutrality. Withdrawal By the fall of 1943. The Spanish Army periodically inspected the bunkers until 1980. where it was integrated into For the Allies it would be a major began to be relieved by the German 81st the German 121st Infantry Division. The anti-tank and artillery bunkers Spanish Foreign Ministry informed were generally oriented toward the interior of the valleys along the frontier in order to keep the Germans the Blue Division would the roads there under enfilade fire. the Spanish division was was formed by several mutually supporting Puntos de Apoyo (Support Points). 20 in Aragon and 56 more in Navarre and the who wanted to remain on the eastern Basque country. and permanently on the defensive. Still. The Spaniards would also maintain a fighter squadron in Russia. the disintegrat- ing Axis situation across Europe (the Italian armistice in September. The troops thought they were being given rest before returning to the fray. On 5 October 1943 the Spaniards December.

cancel petroleum deliveries to Spain Spaniards generally maintained Sources
for one month as a demonstration good relations with the civilian
Moreno, Xavier.
of their economic dominance. populace in their sector. After the La Division Azul. Sangre espanola en Rusia, 1941−1945.
Fearing more drastic Allied war the Soviet government could not Barcelona 2004.
Kleinfeld, Gerald and Lewis Tambs.
measures, Franco began to prepare for find any cause to file accusations Hitler’s Spanish Legion: the Blue Division in Russia.
an Allied invasion. During 1944 he had of war crimes against them. Carbondale, Il. 1979.
Escuadra, Carlos. Bajo las Banderas de la Kriegsmarine.
the building of the P-Line accelerated Politically, the Division Azul served Marinos espanoles en la armada alemana, 1942−1943.
along the frontier with France. Finally, Franco better than the Falange itself. Madrid, 1998.
Blanchon, J. L, P. Serrat & L. Esteva.
though, the constant Allied economic Through it, Franco got rid of the La Línea P :
and diplomatic pressure brought him radicals who weren’t happy with his topographie et conception d’un systeme de defense.
Fortification et patrimoine magazine nº 3, Paris 1997.
around. The Blue Legion, then resting regime by sending them to the other Blanchon, J. L, P. Serrat & L. Esteva.
and reorganizing in Estonia, was side of Europe. More importantly, he La Division Azul : 50 aniversario.
Historia 16, nº 183, Madrid 1991.
ordered to return to Spain, as was the also used it help maneuver Spain into a Ezquerra, Miguel. Berlín a vida o Muerte. Barcelona, 1975.
Spanish fighter squadron deployed good position among the war’s winners, Caballero Jurado, Carlos. “Los ultimos de la division azul: el
batallon fantasma” Defensa magazine, no. 142. Madrid,
in the Army Group Center sector. first by sending the division to support 1990.
Those who refused were threatened Germany at little cost to Spain itself,
with losing their citizenship. In May and then by withdrawing it to ensure
1944, less than one month before the himself a place in post-war Europe.  ✪
Normandy landing, the last elements
of the Spanish expeditionary force
crossed the Pyrenees back into Spain.

Balance Sheet

The Russian campaign cost Spain
5,000 dead, 8,000 wounded, 1,500 cases
of frostbite and some 372 prisoners
out of 45,500 troops sent. In return,
the Spaniards inflicted some 50,000
casualties on the Red Army. Thus the
‘blood debt’ for Germany’s help during
the Spanish Civil War was paid in full.
The Blue Division was the most
decorated unit in Spanish history. Its
troops and officers received eight St.
Ferdinand Crosses and 44 Medallas
Militares (equivalent to the US Silver
Star), plus two Knight Crosses (one
each for its two commanders), two
German Crosses in Gold, and 2,497 Iron
Crosses, among other decorations.
Perhaps most amazingly, the

Diehards, 1944−45

Despite official late-war Spanish neutrality, many radical Falangists were willing to
comply with the promise of “1 million Spanish bayonets to defend Berlin from the Red hordes,”
which Franco had made in more optimistic times. Aware of that, the Germans organized the
recruitment of Spanish volunteers. They also tried to recruit volunteers among the thousands
of Spanish workers in France. Some of them were used to infiltrate the French resistance,
as those groups had thousands of Spaniards in its ranks, most of them civil war veterans.
Company-sized Spanish units fought in Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia in 1944-45 in the
German 3rd Mountain, 121st Infantry divisions and the Brandenburg Panzergrenadier Division.
The Waffen SS also formed several Spanish units. One company fought partisans in
Italy from November 1944 until the end of the war as part of the 24th SS Mountain Infantry
Division. The 101st and 102nd Spanish SS Volunteer Companies fought in Pomerania in
February 1945 as part of the Wallonian SS Brigade. The survivors were transferred to
Einheit Ezquerra, a Spanish SS unit organized by Capt. Miguel Ezquerra, a Blue Division
veteran who’d refused to return to Spain. According to his memoirs, that unit participated
in the final defense of Berlin in April 1945 as part of the 11th SS Nordland Division, taking
part in the fighting around the Moritz Platz and the Luftwaffe Ministry building.  ★

50 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010

Game Preview

The South Seas

The South Seas Campaign, 1942−43
(SSC), designed by Joseph Miranda, is
a two player, strategic-level wargame
of intermediate complexity that covers
the struggle for control of the naval,
air and land lines of communication
between Australia and the US during
those two years. Most ground units in
the game represent divisions, brigades
or regiments. Aircraft units represent
two groups or air regiments (six to
eight squadrons). Ship units mostly
represent one fleet aircraft carrier,
divisions of two light or escort carriers,
two battleships, four cruisers, squadrons
of six to eight destroyers (plus Japanese
light cruiser destroyer leaders), and
various numbers of other ship types.
On the area map, each inch equals 90
miles. Each turn represents from two
weeks to two months, depending on the
tempo of action at any given time.   ✪

World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 51

Observation Post

Elite Beat action in Iraq against the native forces south through Malaya, and then was
The Indian Army in World War II used there in a coup that deposed the annihilated in early January by a
British-client Iraqi monarchy and put Japanese armored attack at the Battle
When the Second World War a pro-Axis dictator in its place. In the of Slim River. The 9th Indian Division
began, the Indian Army (of the British wake of the coup, the division was managed to survive to the end of the
Commonwealth) numbered 189,000 rushed from India to Iraq and landed siege of Singapore, when it was sur-
men in 82 battalions. Though well in Basra without a fight. From Basra, rendered with the rest of the garrison.
trained and led, those units at first 10th Indian Division slowly advanced When the Japanese invaded Burma
lacked tanks, motorized transport and north, eventually taking the key cities of they encountered 17th Indian Division,
artillery. Further, the battalions weren’t Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk. Later, the which fought well and fell back in good
organized into brigades or divisions 10th also participated in the invasion of order, though it took thousands of casu-
until 1940. Starting then, three battalions Vichy Syria, spearheading the northern alties in the process. With India directly
were usually brigaded, and three thrust along the Euphrates to Aleppo, threatened, the British Commander-
brigades bound together with an artil- a campaign in which the division was in-Chief there, Sir Archibald Wavell,
lery regiment to form a division. There “blooded, but not too deeply,” according abolished the old Indian command
were also 37 British infantry battalions to Gen. Slim. In August 1941, the 10th structure to form 14th Army (at the time
in India when the war began, and they was chosen once again, this time for the five divisions divided into IV and XV
were integrated into the new Indian joint Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran. The Corps), which he placed under Slim.
divisions. Higher-echelon formations division started off in the central border At Wavell’s insistence, the British
(divisions, brigades and regiments) region and drove for Paitak pass in the effort to reconquer Burma began in
were all commanded by British officers, Zargos Mountains, which it took with December 1942 with a modest offensive
who made up the majority of the ease. From there, it marched toward down the Arakan peninsula, a narrow
officer corps. Even so, by the end of the the city of Kermanshah, where its com- strip of land bisected by a steep moun-
Second World War there were more than manders accepted the surrender of all tain range. Taking it would protect the
8,000 Indian commissioned officers. Persian forces. During the campaign, the important port of Chittagong (in mod-
Gen. William Platt had two Indian 10th lost just 22 dead and 42 wounded. ern Bangladesh) and outflank Japanese
divisions at his disposal when he invad- Both 4th and 10th Indian Divisions forces on the main front to the north.
ed Italian Eritrea in March 1941. Starting fought in the desert campaign against Conducted by XV Corps, the attack was
in the Sudan, 4th Indian Division, which Rommel. During Operation Crusader spearheaded by 14th Indian Division,
had already fought the Italians at the (November−December 1941), the 4th which had been reinforced to an
Battle of Sidi Barani in Libya (December launched a holding attack against unmanageable strength of nine brigades.
1940), crossed into Italian Eritrea and German forces while 4th British Armored The assault got off to a good start,
engaged 17,000 well trained, equipped Brigade moved around the flank, with units advancing along both sides
Italian troops. They fought a series pushing Rommel past Bengazi. of the mountains. Early in the new year,
of sharp engagements, pushing the The 10th Indian Division saw however, the division was stopped by
Italians north toward the Red Sea. The heavy fighting at the Battle of Mersa Japanese troops entrenched at a place
worst fighting was in February at Keren, Mettruh (24−27 June 1941) along with called Donabik, about 10 miles from the
a town in the mountains and rough elements of 5th Indian Division. There end of the peninsula. With the attack
terrain south of the Eritrean capital the Indians, along with the elite 2nd New bogged down, the Japanese hit 14th
and accessible only through a pair of Zealand Division, were surrounded by Indian Division’s flank, badly mauling
ravines that were heavily defended by German forces and forced to breakout two brigades. On orders from Slim
Italian forces. The 4th Indian Division to the east. The 4th Indian Division later the rest of the bloated division, whose
pushed into the Italian positions there fought in Italy, most famously in the commander he removed, withdrew
for more than a week without success. battle for Monte Cassino, conducting from Arakan. When the Japanese
The attack was renewed in mid-March two frontal assaults against German attacked Arakan in February 1944, 5th
by 5th Indian Division, which didn’t fight forces there without success. and 7th Indian Divisions bore the brunt
its way through the ravines to take Karen Indian units actually provided the of the assault, turning back the attack
until the 27th. With that battle lost, Italian bulk of Britain’s ground force manpower in the bloody Battle of the Admin Box
forces surrendered throughout Eritrea. in the Far East. The first units to fight (named after the 7th’s administrative and
More desert fighting was seen by Japanese forces in that theater were 9th headquarters area, which was converted
10th Indian Division. Commanded by and 11th Indian Divisions during the into an all-around defensive perimeter).
Gen. William Slim, who would go on to Malaya disaster. The 11th was ground While Slim deployed four divisions
glory in Burma, the 10th had first seen down as the Japanese advanced to support the Admin Box defense, in

52 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010

The 17th engaged at the village of Pegu. by air was 5th Indian Division. which fell to 17th Division after were decisive in the campaign to defeat offensive of 1945. 5th Indian Division’s airborne brigade impossible.000 Japanese. wounded or captured. By then. some miles behind the tiously advancing 17th and 20th Indian what Slim termed “stubborn fighting. with the latter not wrested from Japanese hands until 20 March. Indian Division fought its way down the War is impressive.March the Japanese attacked Imphal. forces counterattacked in the vicinity summer offensive. The 32nd Brigade pushed east against the town. the veteran 7th Indian Division.” main advance. an amphibious as they attacked along the southern was flown into Meiktila to support the landing. an end to Axis meddling in Syria and attack aimed at liberating Mandalay. rendering while 17th. The Royal Indian Army Service Corps were the first Indian troops to see action during World War II World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 53 . The division crossed the Chindwin on 2 March and split up. and had cut off land communications. They held firm against successive was conducted south of Rangoon. occupied May. In the Middle East they put and Extended Capital: a three-pronged more than 2. with its Division. which Those same divisions spearheaded In sum. India contributed they were met and stopped at Kohima east bank of the Irrawaddy River. on 5 March. The 7th the Allied side during the Second World the Japanese tried to turn Slim’s left. The opened door and. The central prong of the assault was spearheaded by 20th Indian Division with the objective of taking the Japanese stronghold at Kysuke. however. As the battle dragged advance and ground supply almost exacted a heavy toll from the Japanese on. ridge by the British 4th Royal West Kents and 17th Indian Divisions raced toward more than any other member of the (161st Brigade. operations Capital four days of heavy fighting that killed the Italians. Nearly 180. ties along the way. and were on the city’s outskirts by 8 March. which began its push the demoralized Japanese south. bypassed Japanese strong points. On 2 May. taking it on 1 a defensive arc around Imphal. Division entered the abandoned city. 17th Indian Division Both formations fell back in good attack breaching Japanese lines about 20 had retaken the lead and was heavily order and joined 23rd Indian Division miles downriver from Mandalay. When Slim’s drive into eastern Burma. By 17 March. There the drive stopped when the parachute brigade fought a delaying the town of Meiktila. 62nd and 64th. south toward Mandalay on 26 February. assaults. sometimes as much as 12 or 18 miles per day. They were met and Divisions toward the Chindwin River The southern thrust was first led by turned back by a brigade of 19th Indian when the Japanese attack began. fighting sharp actions for the towns — William Stroock Fighting through “tankable country” (in the words of Slim). codenamed Operation Dracula. engaged and repulsed repeated Japanese the roads into muddy bogs. In the Far East. From there. They fought their way inside on 10 March. Both divisions monsoon season began early and turned action at Sangshak. two brigades. Japanese a major staging area for a planned Brigade reached Kyasukse’s outskirts. 32nd along the way. On 10 April a killed. In the the back of the Japanese offensive. Also coming to leave the town in British hands. the record of Indian arms on deployed to the northern sector. they destroyed a The northern thrust was led by 19th The 5th Indian Division pushed Japanese army and liberated Burma. forcing the exhausted Japanese the next day elements of 26th Indian forcing resupply by air. clearing the town after many days of of Toungoo. in the words of Slim: “They were off!” Iraq. 5th Indian Division). major battle was fought at the village of Mediterranean and East Africa they Indian divisions led Slim’s grand Pyawbe. 20th and 23rd Indian Divisions counterattacks. By then. inflicting heavy casual. about 40 and 50th Indian Parachute Brigade in Indian Division then burst through that miles north of Rangoon. Slim was cau. Rangoon and 19th Indian Division Commonwealth. northeast of Imphal. Indian Division. leaving them for 98th Brigade to clean out.000 were an action that finally and fully broke brought up the rear. meeting stiff resistance at Mandalay Hill and Fort Dufferin. 20 miles south of Mandalay. as 5th more than 2. front. while 100th Brigade moved southeast. the Japanese 17th. On 29 April.5 million men to the cause.

lacked the ability to build all the needed liberty to Europe” — was crucial The first “Type A” design was a gener. The ships were noted for being in 1940. they are the most-produced large either a troop transport or hospital ship. B. of their place origin.Observation Post Technology tion intended to sub-contract work to The Hog Island ships would see Backdate private US and foreign companies in extensive use in the Second World War. but also because domestic oil fields but had substantial as it was perceived the country’s armed they weren’t aesthetically pleasing to coal mines).” not just because reciprocating engines (the UK lacked was formed by the US Shipping Board. Ideas that had earlier been actually be the only yard that would was passed to subsidize commercial modeled and developed by Henry build the vessels. The use of “liberty available quickly enough to have much required steam turbines instead of coal ships” — so called because President of an impact on the war. with the number huge amounts of equipment to the completed by war’s end. The Ocean Class was based forces lacked the transport ships needed the eye. to meet its commitments. armistice. “Type completed. With over 18 al cargo hauler. In a continuation of the Hog Island in massive quantities was itself a prized Pennsylvania. US industry then Roosevelt predicted they would “bring only being completed on 5 August 1918. Designed to be mass produced. it would designs. which were to with 58 of them being sunk during that be constructed according to specific later conflict. auxiliaries. Those ships. and the contract was origi. The designs around the globe.” was intended to be able to serve as that the orders for them be filled. however.751 of them. liberty ship program. despite increasing urgency shipyards producing 2. The Liberty Ships order to build the ships. anywhere. so. the 1936 American Marine Act commodity. That ability to get anything. The first such yard was much larger. turbines. the first one fired boilers. with 12 of each type seeing losses due to German U-Boat attacks and the original idea for producing large service. Only 24 ships were completed before the when it ordered 60 ships to replace The earliest forms of liberty ships. The United Kingdom got involved ships of any type ever constructed. They built two types naval vessels to support the US Navy as Ford and the other mass-production of designs. capable of speeds of up to 15 knots. The corpora. located at Hog Island in Philadelphia. An initial order of 50 ships specialists allowed the US to deliver nally for 180. The US Maritime Commission then Liberty ship at sea 54 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . They because it called for coal-powered Then the Emergency Fleet Corporation were called “Hogs. can actually modern. also provide the basis for the future. they were oil-powered and design took a technological step back be traced back to the First World War. ever-hungry Allied war machine all though advanced for the time. while the second. Their program would During the Second World War the preset designs with pre-fabricated parts. weren’t when 200 were ordered. only 122 were was given in 1936. on a design first produced in 1879. US was noted for its superior logistics. The resultant “Ocean Class” numbers of identical ships. however. they were ugly next to more sleek craft. many of the ships weren’t within that overall effort. increasing steadily each year until 1940. As it turned out.

while the gunners. 1942. of which 490 were built. though it still were designed more like warships. but the Stier was soon Pacific and European theaters. oil-fired boilers. Eight until the range had closed to less than record numbers. the hard-fought from their bottoms to three feet above a popular New York City nightspot. All quarters were located in the some of them were converted to carry center of the ship in order to minimize the new R-4 helicopters. Over 1. Wood was used on days as a publicity stunt. required fittings and other features were manned by regular naval officers.000 miles. and only two form of degaussing cable. 28 feet and displaced 14. they were reinforced with concrete named the Stage Door Canteen. the That and other developments led designs.856 tons. for which the US did measure came from the use of pre-fab. The entire liberty ship class was have. many cost-cutting measures Robert E. Due to wartime material constraints. were able to be mass-produced in surfaced U-Boats and raiders. modular component construction also of steel used in construction. move. however. causing it to freeze and snap. They and operated by private companies. with for U-Boats. designated 250. after they saw action. 3-inch guns. The ships were slow and. when encountering cold and icy each such ship’s 8. That A wartime propaganda poster claimed allowed ships to be more easily repaired steel. one in the bow and the thick fog. neither vessel’s crew was able The ships. Others placed around each ship.” They were introduced. That led to one ship being 15 completed by May. One ship. with several actually splitting the EC2-S-C1. using rivets in the steel. Almost every one hulls. leaving fissures throughout the welds. would turn from ductile to could carry 2. That was to sink a surface combatant in a gun were deployed to the Pacific. begin construction on unfamiliar completed every day. only doing ($26 million 2010 dollars) in war The first of those new types were 10 knots. part of the Atlantic anti-submarine the waterline. too shot up to continue the battle.4 million C-Rations. of them was a pre-fabricated module in half. and their dock to form 100 separate sections. The Hopkins was equipped with a single of troops and material to both the The liberty ships were owned 4-inch deck gun. That redesign. By the time that. and also went on to become the backbone of despite their armament. The final pro. the liberty ship encountered the The liberty ship program was a The ships were also armed with two German surface raider Stier.ordered the design further modified. Due to the crucial ingredient in winning the war. and including The most important cost-saving series.000 different parts. ammunition. became the standard.” and they had a went from having two to only one. Anchors the signatories of the Declaration of them were specifically designed as were first shortened. duction pieces were assembled on the however. conditions. those hatch The ships were named after complement of anti-aircraft guns along covers could be detached to double as various deceased notables. They drafted model and then enlarged.000 ton cargo space in far off ports and other locales. from furniture and fixtures to linings before it was ready for sea operations. at the height of wartime Earlier ships. They all interior features and amenities. it was later discovered it Their range was 23. A quarter of life rafts if a ship were sunk. In fact. was completed in 4.840 jeeps. including with a 5-inch stern gun. A liberty ship consisted of noted for fractures developing in their capacity. or 440 light The first of the new ships was brittle. Other variants included the T2 tanker to decrease labor costs. with an additional 36 In June 1945 several liberty ships diately after the end of war.500 suffered from that The resultant ships were 442 feet based on a mold built from a scale failure. with three such stress and didn’t break up. global oceanic trade in the years imme- size was 45. in the Another noted ship was the Stephen campaign was over. replacing riveting with welded sections facilities and further reducing costs. which was initially blamed long with a beam of 57 feet. sufficient production ricated parts. That was actually due to the poor grade deadweight capacity was 10. In order to make up for a name. Their crew its crew scuttled her two hours later. but over time that changed were converted into mobile repair late-war victory types made up much to 52 with the gun crew dropping to depots for the use of the Army. tanks. the need for plumbing and heating the first such specialized carriers. or 230 million rounds of rifle constructed in an inefficient 230 days. though substandard in some other in the stern. 29. production they were being completed were proved better able to handle and the need for new shipyards to on an average of 42 days. Parry. making them — David March World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 55 . On 27 September some were sunk by kamikazes. of the postwar replenishment fleet.245 tons. by that time. In another popular “attack transports. were considered sitting ducks bond sales was allowed to propose launched in January 1944. the first ship of the US Navy were ever lost to U-Boats. New technology. where done to create an anti-magnetic field to duel in World War II. any group that raised $2 million higher maximum speed of 17 knots. repel magnetic torpedoes and mines. was also Hopkins. In fact. A fierce battle then began. and went on to become 20mm machineguns were mounted two miles. or 3. to be used against to get a good look at their opponent ways. on poor welding and overloading. responsible for much of the deployment as an anti-aircraft deterrent.5 to the creation of “victory ships. and were given a more substantial and hatch covers. then the design Independence.

Thus. The distance involved made that wounded were cannibalized for parts.900 kamikaze missions over back to the US. As the batteries began conducted kamikaze attacks in prior trol teams assessed their condition. Ships that could be codenamed Operation Iceberg.” after reaching the supposedly safe 26 March the US 77th Infantry Division LST (Landing Ship Tank) 884 and the anchorage. began on 1 April. was attacks on the invasion fleet intensified. The kamikaze them to a new level. damaged. Even so. Japanese were desperate to stop that ships while they traveled to Karema. providing gunfire. off Kyushu. some in groups). The main attack on Okinawa kamikaze victims towed there. Japanese pilots flew locally repairable.Observation Post Behind the Lines Okinawa. They become the fleet repair forward base. clean up and disposal of human remains Dozens of US ships were sunk or badly that hadn’t been immediately taken care The battle for Okinawa in 1945. impractical. and several and a seaplane base for search and “Wiseman. Kelly problem because damaged ships that could be stabilized were prepared Turner was selected to command the needed to be sailed or towed back to for the cross-ocean transit to the Allied invasion force. the Aaron Ward cast off lines battles. The Japanese had Once the ships arrived.600 Allied the anchorage was filled with dozens The destroyer USS Aaron Ward was ships were involved in transporting the of badly damaged warships. Retto as the preliminary landing point. They were taking on ammunition from the supply assault troops. and their efforts included the Retto.” so the lone attacker was able to close American ships. when the damaged ships were blacked out. Bunker Hill The ultimate value of the anchorage hit by two kamikazes in at Kerama-Retto was proven by the 30 seconds on fact it provided vital maintenance 11 May 1945 throughout the Okinawa campaign. repairable for transit skimmed past the destroyer and the some 1. Adm. One of the worst losses hit the beaches and quickly seized the transport USS Hinsdale were the first was an attack on 27 April against the islands. Some 1. striking the Pickney. Kerama-Retto provided a relatively secure repair and refit location that was also still strategically near the Okinawa fighting. Ships of the Second World War. repaired were placed in a dry dock that one of the largest amphibious invasions The Americans began to have a serious had been towed to the anchorage. Because of Navy PBM seaplanes was returning to Both sides recognized the Okinawa the threat of delaying while still within the anchorage. involving several thousand of the more gruesome tasks was the Graveyard at Wiseman’s Cove aircraft (some alone. United States. with the ships. Sixteen wounded sailors and 18 medics and crew members on the Pickney perished. —Roger Mason 264 wounded 56 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . of the southern tip of Okinawa. The firing. and beyond repair. One transport. the of after the battle. damage-con. On code name was “Wiseman’s Cove. Anti-aircraft guns initially held their invasion. Those ships with working guns were were grouped in a rough circle and so The codename for the task force kept manned against the threat of offered a protected anchorage for ships commander at Karema-Retto was additional kamikaze attacks. At dusk a flight of aviation cover and logistical support. Wiseman’s Cove was soon fire to avoid hitting the friendly planes. Night watches were set with rifles and machineguns to repel anticipated Japanese suicide swimmers and small USS attack boats (which never came). The were often kept aboard their stricken tion and thereby avoided detection. Ships that were mortally a group of small islands called Karema. 372 dead.” and the repair anchorage’s ships were indeed sunk by kamikazes rescue missions of downed pilots. casualties in immediately behind that forma- of the Japanese home islands. Turner therefore selected Much of the work was done by the Those islands were about 20 miles west the anchorage at Karema-Retto to survivors of the damaged ships’ crews. mass use of suicide forces to destroy known as “Wiseman’s Graveyard. but the Okinawa campaign took ships were divided into three categories: and began sailing away. Soon casualty collection ship USS Pickney. casualty collection teams. As the battle dragged on. Sailors reported the worst time at Kerama-Retto was at night. carrier met by damage-control parties and ship Mayfield Victory. He in turn selected bases on Guam and Hawaii for repair. A single kamikaze snuck operation as a prelude to the invasion range of kamikaze attacks.

the operation. Rabaul. The assault missions had been established by and thus failed to discern that. and bardment in support of the landings on of the Fleet Marine Force as an integral air crew allocated to the task weren’t 28 July. In 1934 a period of training be conducted. strafing and bombing runs on the 29th. the was reduced to just four days covering to the southwest Pacific. and then perform actual live-fire part of the Navy. made up of cruisers and was disappointed in that regard. carrying the uninspiring title Battalion. Unfortunately. Every boat carried the time of the invasion of Guadalcanal. it provided the doctrinal deemed the most secure place to hold of their troop transports 8. the Marine Corps adequately prepared to undertake an bombardment on the 29th. The first Britain and New Ireland as part of assault on Guadalcanal. Those exercises revealed Delay in gathering the ships of Task Battle of Midway in June 1942 allowed problems in undertaking amphibious Force 62 (75 transports and warships). That would matters. He’d the Southwest Pacific. but he theater. was intended to block further Japanese communications. That the 1st Raider Battalion plus the 2nd (formed in February 1941) arrived in scheme.100 miles At 9:00 a. Richmond Kelly Turner. The offensive move settled on poor ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship a postponement until 28 July. To that end the organization of supply on the beaches. mostly in the realm of and loading the invasion force onto in the Pacific from one of defense to shortages of seagoing troop transports. which was to lead the projected assault on Tulagi.000 Marines on Koro Island via three and Tulagi) be undertaken. part of the British. senior the 1st Parachute Battalion would dis- more training in amphibious warfare American naval commander in the embark on Green Beach. In 1938 the manual owned Fiji Islands. with 70 lbs. caused attack. As revised from any Japanese territory. 1st Regiment) of 1st Beaches. Gen. Chester W. entrance onto yards from the transports. Alexander A. while the last In order to carry out that mis. of equipment. which were first conducted make “Operation Dovetail” (codename in 1935 and continued annually into for the rehearsal) problematic. followed by real laid down in the Tentative Manual of Koro Island. the training necessary to fit the tide went out. Landing Operations. As planned for the actual counterattack of the Second World since the Spanish-American War Guadalcanal-Tulagi operation.Historical limited. The decisive American victory at the early 1941. By Adm. each man loaded down Though the theory for amphibious scouted the site did so at high tide. New Marine Division. north of Koro Island. To further complicate 19. The main training effort difficult and dangerous due to the Perspective focused on the practical experience to jagged coral reef surrounding the Operation Dovetail: be gained from the annual fleet landing place. island on the 28th. the rehearsal securing the lines-of-communication weaknesses in combat loading. troops on the island. the Joint Chiefs of Staff to shift strategy operations. June 1942 the 1st Marine Division director of the War Plans Division. the American naval officers who 36 Marines. any sustained amphibious training. In early July 1942 the plan for two would see them returned to the sion — the first major American the first US Navy strategic offensive transports. along with was to start on 7 August. with the establishment that the troops. Blue and Green be the first move toward eventually fraction (1st Battalion. had undergone two days would be devoted to putting the overall advance on Japan. and 1. ship personnel. He cautioned Nimitz destroyers. east of Guadalcanal. and he urged and dive bombers from the aircraft practice of amphibious warfare. That unsuspected fact would Bungled Guadalcanal Rehearsal exercises.” was approved to come ashore on Blue Beach. then they performance with theory remained the island by landing craft would be headed for the line of departure 3. would simulate shore bom- Since 1933. Rear 5th (less 2nd Battalion) and 1st Marine Corps to provide a landing force. Two fire-sup- before they entered combat. it was and ramp boats lowered over the sides in May 1941. then Regiments would land on Red Beach.500 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 57 . Vandegrift. the War — the Navy would need the Marine was submitted by its originator. 2nd Marine Regiment were Maj. while hoped to have time to give his men by Adm. Wasp and Enterprise the theoretical basis for future Marine Nimitz agreed and ordered a six-day were to simulate air attacks on the Corps amphibious operations was exercise be run through 23 and 28 July. Due to its distance Higgins boats along with 30 X-boats Landing Operations Doctrine. was chosen for began with the launching of 36 wooden ed into Fleet Training Publication 167. Further. 5th Marine Regiment and the New Zealand under its commander “Limited Amphibious Offensive in 1st Battalion. the transports in New Zealand. Fighters had been developing its doctrine and amphibious operation. the period 28 through 31 July. the rehearsal area. with the last representing the securing New Guinea. Joint Chiefs directed the seizure of the and the uncertainty of effective naval The rehearsal called for landing lower Solomons Islands (Guadalcanal gunfire support. by the summer of 1942 only a landing sites: Red.000 yards basis for US amphibious operations at the practice landings. when craft assembled in five waves 500 1941. Turner was tagged to command port groups. Operation Dovetail became official when it was incorporat. Nimitz.m. an insufficient since the actual Guadalcanal landing advances toward Australia while also number of landing craft. carriers Saratoga.

Most respectively. As the second wave neared the surface. skipper of the Fuller.m. Slow was terrible due to the fact the gunners crews navigated around the coral to and complicated loading procedures. some two or three signal. four cruisers and the run-in to the beach began. were also signaled At 10:00 a. some Marines. Vandegrift. Operation if it continued. land their passengers onshore. Those officers sent would be landed on the island on the among the transports.000 yards of Red and summed up the general opinion of While the men from the Fuller Blue Beaches and then return to the the outcome of Operation Dovetail. was seen racing coral and were damaged. Guadalcanal invasion. commander of the Red Beach. who in turn Turner was furious with the results improved combat loading and the radioed that assessment to Adm. Not surprisingly. boats coming from the Elliott. most boats carrying transports. and the exercise. Turner of the 28th and determined no forces general pooling of landing craft and Gen. other troops. Her captain frantically sig- boat coxswains heading for Red Beach as company he jumped over the side naled all troops were to leave the island. The boats was faring. Dovetail was thus mercifully over. With a two-foot draft 1st Marine Regiment. was naval Lt. ferried back to their transports. That process was soon begun. Even as well as mechanical breakdowns of On 31 July two battalions of the 2nd so.800 yards. stopped their vessels and ordered of his small boat and waded ashore. There the water was well over mostly support personnel. Battery H. boats heading back to the transports charge of all landing craft repairs. hadn’t did finally open fire. Other boat process for the move to Koro. As a result. the other boats pull back from the beach. while the their Marine passengers over the side While the assault craft returned shore bombardment was postponed to while still 100 yards from the landing to their transports. the troops would simply conclusion reached by Gen. Barnett and the for 30 July. Most of the supplies and equipage for Guadalcanal that evening. Soon afterward the signal board the landing craft. had failed to do so. After As night fell. as did the 2. the tide had gone out. The original plan had He wrote: “I shuddered to think members of the 1st Marine Regiment. Instead.” and with only his orderly toward shore. and many even completed their loading most who observed it was the accuracy barely escaped drowning. were to blame. the carrier commanders expressed sat- amphibious operation ever conducted 1st Marine Regiment. by the US Marines and Navy. failed to stood six destroyers. the out a boat carrying their aides to survey 30th.m. ran behind Battalion.m. 11th Marine Artillery Regiment Off of Red. as well as the man in wade in due to the coral obstructions.m. a pre-landing bombardment to start Koro. the Marines on Koro were missed and not picked-up as Task reaching the island. Vandegrift the situation. Marines large coral heads. 2nd Battalion. Adm. many of the boats would men had little food or shelter that night. missed While the landings on Red Beach 11th Marine Artillery Regiment boarded Red Beach by over 1. some of the landing of the Fuller. note the recall order and went on to five minesweepers prepared to conduct By the time the boats approached make their landing in water waist-high. was from the Fuller mistakenly landed on feet in diameter. Of the Higgins with aerial attacks on the north end of  — Arnold Blumberg 58 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . After seeing the shore. Many of the hell with it.Observation Post yards farther south. He was soon convinced that was supposed to land with them chased the transports until they were things were generally falling apart and. mid-afternoon. 3rd isfaction with their part of the rehearsal. visible just below Col. they returned to their transports. exposing Another Marine who saw the return at 10:30 a. beach master off-load about 100 yards from shore and Unfortunately. with just on the loaded boats at the stern. especially those numerous landing craft. Blue and Green Beaches schedule: it wasn’t until 2:00 p. Having accomplished that from the Fuller approached. those the island. No foul-ups occurred. Clifton Cates. to within 2. be so badly damaged they wouldn’t Starting 29 July the troops who’d Lessons were learned from the be available for the actual attack on stayed on Koro the night before were Koro rehearsal that benefited the Guadalcanal. and that would proceed. gather food and Force 62 weighed anchor and steamed shore to see how the overall operation rest. That aside. but elected to ignore it. minutes to go before the Navy was to propellers of many of them struck the and then realizing why. and the Navy beach party. foundered. to have been defended in strength.” flagship McCawley. those spotted and taken aboard. being the first full-scale carrying Company F. approach in his autobiography probably best to abort the entire exercise was issued. the opinion of the heads of the Marines. called for a live-fire exercise by the what would have happened if those which were then still coming in from warships and aircraft of Task Force 62 beaches [at Guadalcanal] turned-out the transports Elliott. Within it of the troops on the former had to feat. struggled ashore. When the ships’ guns area. the destroyer USS Ellet. Marine Regiment and elements of the from the troop transport Fuller. he muttered “To begin firing on Koro. He contacted Capt. those taking place on Blue landing craft and moved to within As the confusion mounted on and Beach ran close to plan. lacked experience against shore targets. the next wave smaller landing on Green Beach. flight operations began to return to their ships. Jack Clark. offshore at Red Beach.000 yards of Blue and Red Beaches. At 10:15 a. he went along the tried to make camp. including Theiss.

During World War II. to serve as covers for the smuggling were at the same time increasingly of the special games into the camps. relative to Monopoly. such really wasn’t the case. however. For example. to get maps and want to compromise the integrity of the meaning than when the classic game other escape materials into the POW International Red Cross. Only Wall Tiles and Free Parking: Escape prisoners escape from German POW a few security screened employees and Evasion Maps of World War II.indd 1 11/03/10 3:15 PM . sold it to Parker Brothers in Ltd. who only minimally POWs. editions of Monopoly were destroyed. When its designer. and a regional silk map. Darrow. currency complemented the supply of instrumental in helping Allied soldiers coincidentally. That company was. were located. The “GET board game. Though some reports about the maps indicated they included sites of safe houses. which would’ve was used to save Allied soldiers’ lives. Monopoly games a period after Marylebone Station and other pastimes. specific camps.. They cut small spaces public view for the first time in 1999. at least World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 59 NK_sixthpage. the British those diversions were welcomed An archive of correspondence and Secret Service’s branch M19. including Chess meant it was a game destined for Italy. An exhibition titled captured British airmen and other Allied “special edition” of Monopoly. So they welcomed delivery of each altered Monopoly aid packages for the POWs they held.Mysteries Revealed sets and playing cards. while shipments from the International Red the board designations were changed Cross and other charitable institutions from locations in the United States to underwent less scrupulous examination reflect sites in London.000 Allied troops who escaped from German POW camps using the Monopoly materials may never be A silk map of Germany from a “special edition” POW Monopoly game known. Monopoly & POWs busy. It took British military games that contained escape materials. If an escaped POW were captured with such a map. pieces and board This year (2010) marks the 75th in clothing and dissolved in water. and different locations on the board. anniversary of the introduction of fabric became the material of choice. camps. other much needed supplies to the —Annie Laura Smith The Germans. Charles A British company. also the UK licensee play money. game was sent to the appropriate Games and other pastimes qualified destination. explored ways to help the Waddington Corp. Complete details of the clandestine endeavor was only fully declassified in 2007. by the Germans. coupled with Waddington’s Since the British government didn’t players for generations never had more board game expertise. having to ration food and other supplies They then devised a code to ensure to their own soldiers. especially by providing maps worked in a closed off room preparing displayed some of those items for of the region in which those facilities the new edition. It is believed. Since paper maps rustled into the game boxes. The exact number of the roughly 35. kept the POWs a third of the escapees used them. that information would’ve led to the deaths of the resistance members or partisans who supported those safe houses. could be concealed. already made silk maps for airmen Actual German or Italian or French 1935. a magnetic compass. to develop a Library in London. samples of the maps from Waddington for developing escape and evasion M19 therefore commissioned were donated to the British Map techniques. all the special escape fewer problems for the German guards. Since less boredom promised After the war. responsible in the shipments to the camps. A red dot in the corner of who would be prisoners of the Germans for the Parker Brothers Monopoly the “Free Parking” space indicated the during a coming World War. John Waddington. camps so escapees could better find worked to block future deliveries of their way through hostile territory. he never imagined it would be to carry in flight. A period was added after for inclusion in those packages. fake charities were instituted adhered to the Geneva Convention. OUT OF JAIL FREE!” card that’s thrilled ingenuity. silk where metal files.

that strategy of the French command and the Attention WaW Readers: was revealed to be ill-founded when fortifications in which they put so We’re always looking for media reviewers for Germany won a stunning victory much trust. de Sentzich. Until now. not just History books tell us that instead of Martin Rupp. that overview is has been researching German records incomplete. You couldn’t later. the maps and separate corps-level and division-level illustrations are superb.O. and has personally indeed succumb less than a month surveyed the battlefields. and corps-sized operations against Romanych and Martin Rupp (Osprey the Maginot Line. and readable book fills an important expense. historical preservation group. but it only details Publishing. Absolute maximum word count Holland. I would’ve liked to have seen been largely forgotten. by Marc launched against the Maginot Line. at great few English-language books. their leaders and their plans. The Maginot Line to look at the campaign in depth. defeating the the battle was ultimately lost by them.Media Reviews in the Ardennes and were able to studying the Maginot Line for 15 smash through that lightly defended years and is a member of Association section to outflank the the Germans identified a weak point on this subject. What about the other three? 2010). and thus have about. The French defenses were concerning combat operations against outflanked and their whole nation did the line since 1987. complementing attacks. We want critical analysis. at: directly assaulting the Maginot Line. But what most historiographic find two people more qualified. Reviewed by Andrew Hind. new release is the subject matter itself. etc. France built a series of easily the most digestible. du P. magazine. and it deserves imposing fortresses along its German this aspect of World War II. esteemed English-language voices chris@christopherperello. thereby identifying why Strategy & Tactics and World at War. a Maginot Line France fell a few short weeks later. and France in only six weeks. the book still manages student of the Second World War. This volume is one of precious Overall This valuable and Throughout the 1930s. Campaign Series #218. it offers strong analysis of the failings In May and June 1940. Though of a place on the bookshelves of every border that were intended to serve as a modest size. indeed attack the Maginot line in 10 As usual for Osprey. The Good The best aspect of this seven. Rupp While true. but were overshadowed by the French Army’s defeat and The Bad There’s little to complain subsequent surrender. Contact Chris Perello. are two of the most descriptions. film. its authors. Allied armies and occupying Belgium. deterrent to invasion. experiences shaped the campaign. This more about the opposing command- 96-page book examines the opposing ers and how their personalities and armies. Any media will do: book. and was the lynchpin of French strategy. across western Europe. and studies don’t tell is that Germany did it shows in this masterful volume. Marc Romantch and is 500. Romantch has been 60 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . to cover historiographic niche. the text explains The Maginot Line 1940: Battles the seven largest German operations there were a total of 10 division-sized on the French Frontier. and provides a detailed examination of More importantly. The book is also strong because website. Those operations resulted in the text and allowing the unfolding some of the heaviest fighting of the events to come to dramatic life campaign.

T.000 other Jews who the book provide documentation by José Raischl SFO and Andrė Cirino were deported from Italy to Auschwitz. this book presents close-up that even more detail about aircraft photos of the cockpits and other performance would’ve been nice. the largest forces are made up of military history. It design trade-offs would increase gives the reader an almost personal the level of understanding about feel for what it was like to sit in these aircraft technology that much more. Nicolini (the bishop of Assisi). corrected misinformation that appeared sustained that legacy. coordinated that successful endeavor. Valentin Müller (a physician The State of Israel presented the Medal and devout Catholic). yet he did intervene against the of St. Coonor & Christopher individual components. maneuverability. such an approach would seats look sparse. guns vs. 2005). several considered a traitor had he known hundred Jews fled there for protection about their mission and not acted to because they revered the spiritual legacy stop it. are plentiful. He would have been Assisi. escaped the fate of 7. German That film failed to give credit to Nicolini. Bishop Giuseppe in the movie The Assisi Underground. Even the larger bomber Granted. From a historical perspective. Adding material about those mechanical realities and The Good The detail is amazing. and so on. For those of us who by Roger D. cold. St. Moore (HarperCollins.  ★ World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 61 . Col. The brave Assisians. Colonel deported to concentration camps. Don Aldo Brunacci. Each photo is accompanied by and that design necessarily involves a textual explanation the component trade-offs: speed vs. They inspiring others. more general conclusions about aircraft capabilities in operationally Overall A fun read. it is an excellent resource. Almost literally a nuts-and-bolts The Bad If there’s a negative here. sheltered and hid those Jews from It is significant these interviews the Germans at great personal risk. Footnotes throughout Valentin Műller. cramped and actually make for a different work. Reviewed by Chris Perello. OFM (Editrice Minerva – Assisi. parts. including both technical range vs. Francis. and the organization logical. but the book already has aspects this kind of technical data supports of an aircraft design manual. WWII. who SS and Gestapo on a regular basis. and Don Aldo of the Righteous Gentiles to Brunacci Brunacci (the bishop’s secretary) and (posthumously) to Nicolini in 1977. 2010). and information for further research. The photos are. the views appropriate. Though German troops occupied aid to the Jews. Bonaventure University awarded The book chronicles how the Brunacci the Gaudete Medal in 2004 citizens and clergy were able to keep in recognition for his exemplifying Three Heroes of Assisi in World War II: the refugees from being arrested and the spirit of St. bombs. probably even In the Cockpit II: Inside the History oriented works. All interior portions of 34 aircraft from aircraft are designed for a purpose. armor. Francis of Assisi and Bishop Giuseppe Nicolini. reinforcing the fact for those not broadly interested in Making Aircraft of World War II. and operational ramifications. machines. The German commander wasn’t told This book is an excellent reference for Reviewed by Annie Laura Smith about the Assisian underground’s Judaica and Holocaust studies. it’s work. Italy. during World War II.

strategyandtacticspress. Box 21598 | Bakersfield. Sherman 194 Grant TANK: Battle Cold War Victory The Strategy The of 6-7 Ap Wins at Shiloh at Kursk | ATOMIC WAR & Tactics #263 JUL-AUG 2010 Battl WilUR Sh ril 186 e ZBUR oh OMIC: PE G | | HURTGENFulani Jihad ARMY:FOREST of World NT 2 e That Never War II Was The Battl | THE Davy Crockett | MANCHUR & Elvis BULGE #264 SEP-OCT IA:Presley : Hitler’s| Caesar’s Last Battle Japan’s 2010 3 Last Stand View | Russia Invade s Georgi 62 World at War 14 | OCT−NOV 2010 . sk. 1939 | Japan World at War magazine provides a sharp focus on WWII. including World at War. charts. available at www. the articles focus on the “how” and “why” of conflicts and are illustrated liberally with maps. The Strategy & Tactics of World War II #14 OCT−NOV 2010 Going beyond the usual narratives. Mobilizes for War with the same in-depth format as Strategy & Tactics. CA | 93390-1598 BACK issues AVAILABLE GU ARDS Red Arm Brig. July K: William GUARDS KABUL 1979: Fatal T. tables and (661) 587-9633 | (661) 587-5031 fax | P. 2008 #13 AUG-SEP 2010 S&T 263 | JUL-AUG 2010 1 Complete list of issues. Box 21598 | Bakersfield CA 93390 | www. Each issue is packed full of: In-depth analysis | Detailed maps | Orders of battle SUBSCRIBE ONLINE CALL TO SUBSCRIBE (661) 587-9633 phone 1941 Pearl Harbor (661) 587-5031 fax What if the Japanese Invaded? SUBSCRIBE BY MAIL Strategy & Tactics Press P.O.strategyandtacticspress.strategyandtacticspress. SUBSCRIBE WHAT IF: Pearl Harbor Invasion | GREEK CIVIL WAR: Prequel to Cold War | Bzura Counteroffe nsive. or at Kur TAN Gen.

pa .pa . ct cti tive ve. For at rg ge a Sociie ety ty n o Ir f o s rt ea H li of & sa s s er er iv k n a U eM pa Th ro m Eu ro F Drug & Alcohol Reference Mild Language Mild Suggestive Themes Mild Violence w www www.ccomm © 2010 2010 0 Parad Pa arad r dox radox o Int In Intera nt ntera teracti era er raactive. ed ed .Build an an Empire .v viict v cto ctoria toori riia riaa22.c .com om | h ht htt a.victoria2. ve. e.c co com omm | www www www. Vi Victoria Victo ct cto c toria to oria riia r ia 2 is is a trad trad ra r ade ad adema em ma m ark rk of of Par Pa Pa Parado arradox ad ado ado d ox Inte IInt nt n nte ttpp:/ :/ ///fo /f f foorum ru rum u m.paradoxplaza. .com ww w w. Gove mp ve er rn a N rn Naation .paradoxplaza.parad araddoxp oxppl laz aza. All Al A ll r rig righ ig igh gh g hts ts res re r esserv erv er erved rved.c aza. teractiv terac ac ct tiv ive ive.c .vi ...p pa para rad ad a doxp do ox o xpl xp laz la aza az a.

for e recon exam by anti-tank guns ple — perhaps supported — could be taske assault a lone d to enemy regim defending a road ent of engineers junction. paratroopers. More y fighter- support will be take the road necessary to junction. been in other cities. Made & Printed games. Copyright © .S. Quick to pla HIGH y. Aachen utilize s the new Fire combat syste & Movement m that’s desig can augment ned so players their units with fire” during the “support course of the mortars to fighter turns. the attritional desig new Combat n of the Results Table true nature of simulates the battles in Europ typically two. as generals. A singl battalion. the infamous loomed in front West Wall of Aachen. Fire & Movement for WWII and Modern battles) with a short Exclusive rules sheet for each individual game to capture the unique aspects of each battle. e. Reserved. the may find itself recon battalion strafed by enem bombers. even defeat became so US comm anders had every a certainty. Units are sided formation incur casualties s that . Winning a matter of mane firepower and asset manageme uver.decisiongames. 2010. Historicall A FOLIO SERIES A product of GAME Decision Games y Accurate. the was expected just as it had to be severe. however.” The sense assig well as their comm ned to First to Fall evident and warra anding nted. All Rights Inc. 1/6 th Actual Size Copyright © 2010. As that gets underway attack . nt. CA 93390-1598 | (661) 587-9633 phone | (661) 587-5031 fax | www.Introducing the Decision Games Folio Game Series The Folio Game Series provides dozens of games using the same eight-page Standard rules (Musket & Saber for 19th century battles. “dragon’s teeth of foreboding the attack. and more. accurately replic can the realities of combat and the ating losses sustained high by both sides the actual fightin during g the battle is thus in Aachen. Box 21598 | Bakersfield.A. units From receive support can assets to enga positions and ge formations. but assets are limite d. Chalons: The Fate of Europe | Marengo: Morning Defeat. German fight stubbornly soldiers were by any Allied continuing to ES throughout Europ after Germany’s e. Game Conten ts: • • 17 x 22” (43 x 56 120 die-cut coun cm) terrain map Aachen ters • One Standard Rules booklet PLAYERS • One Exclusive for this series Rules booklet 2 for this title LEVEL II III X XX XXX BATTALION HEX SCALE 2 mi (3. including LOW 1613 infantry battalions. enclo the city with sing miles of conc casemates and rete in U.decision All Rights Reserve d. Inc. Each game under $25 (most under $20) P. www. worr y resistance reason to on German soil tenacious. Decisio n Games.O. In Aachen. no large FOLIO GA had been direc tly assaulted German city ME SERI army. recon elements. ••••• armor regiments. Each game can be played in about 90 minutes allowing for multiple games to be played in an afternoon or evening. . was among the GIs . allow enemy to develop at ing combat all levels.2 km) PLAYING TIME Each counter repres ents 1-2 hrs formation from among an individual historical forces that fough the German and US COMPLEXITY t across Holland. Minutes to lea SOLITAIRE ••••• rn. In would be the city of Aach Aachen street fighting en itself. The situa hard-fought tion along the was even wors border itself e. Afternoon Victory Leipzig: Napolean Encircled | Chickamauga: River of Death | Stones River: Turning Point in Tennessee Frayser’s Farm: Wasted Opportunity | Shiloh: Grant Surprised | Arnhem: The Farthest Bridge NEW Cauldron: Battle for Gazala | Kasserine: Baptism of Fire | Saipan: Conquest of the Marianas RELEASES Bastogne: A Desperate Defense | Aachen: First to Fall (below) | Crusader: Battle for Tobruk AVAILABLE Naktong Bulge: Breaking the Perimeter | Golan: The Last Syrian Offensive | DMZ: The Next Korean War Showdown: The Coming Indo-Pakistani War AACHEN WORLD W First to Fa ll AR II BATT LES Before October 1944.

What If: Pearl Harbor Invasion | Greek Civil War: Prequel to Cold War | Bzura Counteroffensive.99 $ What if the Japanese Invaded? . 1939 | Japan Mobilizes for War The Strategy & Tactics Tactics of of World WorldWar WarIIII #14 OCT−NOV 2010 1941 Pearl Harbor 5.