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What does nitya mean in Mīmāṃsā?

This article examines the commonplace use of the word “eternal” to translate nitya in Mīmāṃsā
contexts, whereby it shows that this translation is not acceptable. This is based on the word’s ety-
mology, the parallel use of siddha in comparable Vyākaraṇa contexts (a school that shared a com-
mon history with Mīmāṃsā) and, most importantly, the Mīmāṃsā use of nitya in ritual contexts.
This latter use was so frequent that for a Mīmāṃsā audience, such a context was certainly immedi-
ately called to mind whenever the term nitya was used to define language.
To conclude, the article discusses some broader methodological points regarding the need to avoid
translations that evoke an altogether different cultural milieu. This is possible if, on one hand, one is
aware of one’s starting point, that is, one’s own cultural background. At the end of the hermeneutic
circle, this is the target language of a translation, or the language that is being used to analyse a text.
On the other hand, one must be aware of the point of departure, that is, the cultural background of
the text that is being translated or analysed.

1. Introduction to the problem: nitya in Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā
The concept of nitya has been long the object of debate between Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā scholars,
who have often misunderstood and attacked one another, often because they were talking about
different things. Nyāya scholars spoke of śabda ‘sound’ as being a-nitya ‘impermanent’, since
sound is an acoustic phenomenon that is necessarily produced and thus has a limited temporal ex-
tension. Mīmāṃsā scholars, in contrast, used the same terms in different contexts, speaking of
śabda ‘linguistic expression’ as being nitya ‘fixed’ in its relation to its meaning.1 To disentangle
this knot of mutual misunderstandings, I will focus on the Mīmāṃsā interpretation of language as
nitya. The locus classicus for the Mīmāṃsā discussion about language is Mīmāṃsāsūtra (hence-
forth PMS) 1.1.5:

But the relationship between word and meaning is originary. Its (dharma’s) knowledge
is the Instruction, which is non-erroneous with regard to a meant entity2 that cannot be
seized through direct perception, and it is an instrument of knowledge according to
Bādarāyaṇa because it is independent.3

Śabara, the author of the first extant commentary on the PMS, glosses the strange word autpattika
(here rendered with ‘originary’) with nitya. But what did he mean exactly?

2. Etymological and inner-Mīmāṃsā arguments against nitya as ‘eternal’

I will use ‘linguistic expression’ to translate śabda, since in Mīmāṃsā the term denotes language in general (ranging
from a single phoneme to a complex sentence) insofar as it communicates a meaning, as opposed to the phones mani-
festing it. artha will be translated with ‘meaning’ since it does not necessarily denote an external object. For a more
detailed discussion on artha in Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā, see Freschi, Keidan, forthcoming. In both cases, the Nyāya usage
of these expressions is different; śabda primarily indicates a sound (which is called nāda in Mīmāṃsā) and artha tends
to be interpreted according to direct realism as an object of the outer world.
On this translation of arha see fn. 23.
autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ. tasya jñānam upadeśo ’vyatirekaś cā rthe ’nupalabdhe tat pramā ṇaṃ
bā darā yaṇasyā napekṣatvā t.

In its most ancient grammatical and Mīmāṃsaka uses it means “fixed”.5. 6 To assume that nitya belongs to a more recent layer than Jaimini’s and the Vṛttikāra’s. Clooney maintains that “Jaimini’s system requires not a demonstration of the ‘eternity of the word’. namely the PMS and the Śābarabhāṣya (henceforth ŚBh). who. as referring to linguistic expressions insofar as they are connected with a mean- ing. 9 nityas tu syā d darś anasya parā rthatvā t (PMS 1. I think.1.9 In other words.5.6-23 and in ŚBh ad 1. Frauwallner’s argumentation is based on the inner coherence of the “pre- nitya” layer. quoted in part in the ŚBh). See Frauwallner 1962. the use of nitya in a linguistic context is found in PMS 1. The term nitya has thus been read as evidence of the conviction in the physical eternity of sound by the author of PMS 1. for instance. This is why several scholars5 have assigned the word to a more recent layer of Mīmāṃsā linguistic reflection.1. we do not think that a new linguistic expression is being uttered every time we hear a word repeated: People say: “The word ‘cow’ has been uttered eight times” and not “Eight words ‘cow’ have been uttered” […] And. since [their] appearance8 is for the purpose of [communicating with] someone else. Frauwallner and Zangenberg. but simply the certainty that the word-meaning relation- ship exists prior to the action of any speaker. 10 aṣṭakṛtvo goś abda uccaritaḥ iti vadanti. and then to postulate a separate author (later or more “modern” than the Vṛttikāra) for those sūtras that speak of the word (śabda) as being nitya might seem to be begging the question. “bearing no exception” and refers to rules or rituals whose performance is obligatory. nā ṣṭau goś abdā ḥ iti. it means “personal” and is a synonym of sva. .1.18: On the contrary [linguistic expressions] must be permanent (nitya) [in their relation to their meaning].6-24 belong to a more recent layer within the PMS and who. linguistic expressions (śabda) are said to be nitya in the PMS because otherwise there could be no communication. 7 Clooney 1990:78. “eternal”. from this usage (among other evidences). as commonly thought. other people recognise [this] too. […] pratyabhijā nā nā vayam ivā nye ’pi nā nyaḥ iti vaktum arhanti (Ś Bh ad PMS 1.1.1. In its first instances. however.6-23 can be better explained. the basic meaning of nitya is not. Consequently. 70. found in PMS 1. 5 See.1.1. based on how nitya is used. It is not. distinguish the Vṛttikā ra’s passage from that of Ś abara in PMS 1. Śabara elaborates further: we rec- ognise (pratyabhijñā) linguistic expressions.18 glosses: “appearance means utterance” (darś anam uccā raṇam). According to the same scholars.”7 In fact. 8 Ś Bh ad 1. An example of this can be found in PMS 1. argue that PMS 1. like us. Francis X.5 or in the Vṛttikāra’s gloss thereon (an earlier commentary. On the other hand. the two elements of this relationship – word and mean- ing – have been considered physically eternal. with regard to common language.1. 4 Renou 1956.As Louis Renou and Minoru Hara4 proved. and therefore do not say that it (the newly uttered word “cow”) is another [word]10. the word-meaning relation was ini- tially conceived as “originary” (autpattika). Within the fundamental Mīmāṃsā texts.1. the word nitya in PMS 1. tome X.6–23 (who has therefore been distinguished from Jaimini6) and by Śabara.1. Hara 1959. p.18).1. but soon after Jaimini’s time it was reinterpreted as “temporally eternal” (nitya). However.20).

Hence.6.1. 74.11 Further evidence of this is found in the ŚBh. Śabara asserts: The configuration is always (nitya) related to the concrete instance: once the first related element (i. . called kāmya (‘optional’ rituals).3. See. 12 ā kṛtir hi vyaktyā nityasambaddhā .5.5. The second and third options are treated in ŚBh ad 1.12 This does not mean that the relationship between a common configuration and each single (perisha- ble!) individual is chronologically without beginning and end.3.6.In this sense.. or those performed to fulfil a certain desire.1 nitya in ŚBh ad PMS 1. But as in ŚBh ad 1. used in Mīmāṃsā to designate the universal. Conversely. as recorded in the MK. PMS 3. as opposed to those performed for specific events (as. in a discussion on ākṛti (lit. 13 Although ś abda and artha are not exactly symmetrical. in my view the strictly temporal aspect of nitya is discarded by Śabara himself14: 11 The most frequent occurrences of nitya in Mī mā ṃsā .3). 2. nitya means here that no individual can possibly be considered independent of a configuration and vice versa. See also: nityaṃ viś iṣṭa evā rthe pratyayo yat pravartate (NS ad TV. for example. p. 708). esp. a son’s birth). the configuration is known.1. for instance. who never think of a linguistic expression independently of its meaning. tasmā t vaiś yanimittakaṃ sā ptadaś yaṃ nityasya pā ñcadaś yasya bā dhakam (JNM ad PMS 3. “compul- sory” or “unchanging”. where it means “necessary”. nitye na phalasā dhanatvena vidhiḥ. nitya is used above all to designate those kinds of rituals which must be performed in any case. understood as the common element among several individuals).5 In ŚBh ad 1.2.13 every time a person thinks of. where. kintu jī vanarū panimittasaṃy- ogena (JNM ad 6.2).33). naimittikaṃ tu viś eṣarū patvaniravakā ś atvā bhyā ṃ prabalam. within Mīmāṃsā. existing in time but without beginning or end. sambandhinyā ṃ ca tasyā m avagatā yā ṃ saṃbandhyantaram avagamyate (Ś Bh ad PMS 1. the external world is logically inde- pendent of the language that describes it. see Ollett 2016. p. the other one is also known.5 when it discusses the beginningless tradition of language users. called naimittika (‘occasional’ rituals). conceives or touches an object. 14 Paradoxically. the very fact that linguistic expressions can be recognised requires their being con- stant. and ‘fixed’. A ‘continual’ relation would refer to the diachronic continuity of linguistic expressions and entities of meaning from the point of view of speakers. its primary meaning in Mīmāṃsā is ‘fixed’. It is also found in the context of the word-meaning relationship: nityā ḥ ś abdā rthasambandhā yathā vasthitagā minaḥ ity anena nyā yena (TV ad PMS 2. A ‘fixed’ relation would mean that it cannot be changed by a speaker.43 and Ś Bh thereon: nityaṃ sā mā nyarū patayā sā vakā ś atvena ca durbalam. ‘shape’. that is. At least in Kumā rila. nitya. As for the first option. even Ollett’s defence of the use of “eternal” to translate nitya accurately points out the major differ- ences between the two terms. This interpretation is better suited than the one above (“eternal”) to make sense of the other (non-linguistic) occurrences of nitya within the PMS. Indeed.3. An ‘eternal’ relationship between linguistic expression and meaning would imply that linguis- tic expressions and entities of meaning are themselves metaphysically and ontologically eternal. ‘bearing no exception’.1. there is a linguistic expression for it. in principle this term could be interpreted in at least three ways: ‘eternal’.1.3). ‘configuration’. where Śabara glosses ‘originary’ (autpattika) with nitya.e. are found in contexts referring to sacrifice. creates. ‘continual’.

42. 17 utpattau nityasaṃyogā t. asti ced vyavahārasiddhiḥ. one of the latter’s arguments is based on the interpretation of autpattika as ‘fixed’: Indeed. Jaimini states that a person with congenital defects has no ad- hikāra. beyond any doubt.16 Within the PMS. tasya keneti naivāvatiṣṭhate. Why? Because ‘relation-making’ just does not make sense. tasmād avaśyam anena saṃbandhaṃ kurvatā akṛtasaṃbandhāḥ kecana śabdā vṛddhavyavahārasiddhā abhyupagantavyāḥ. Yet the meaning does not change. rather than to the temporal idea of eternity. since what is there at the origin (utpatti) is fixedly (nitya) connected [to the person].5.e. The re- lation does not take place afterwards. – katham? – saṃbandhakriyaiva hi nopapadyate. PMS 6. Whilst discussing the responsibility (adhikāra) to perform sacrifices.1. Arguments against nitya as ‘eternal’ coming from Vyākaraṇa In the Vyākaraṇa.4).17-47. then a relation-maker is not needed. grammar. hence. na niyogataḥ saṃbandhrā bhavitavyam (ŚBh ad 1. 16 na hi saṃbandhavyatiriktaḥ kaścit kālo ’sti. when some linguistic expres- sions were not connected with a meaning. in PMS 6. tasya kena kṛtaḥ? athānyena kenacit kṛtaḥ.42. tasya keneti. F 24. avaśyam anena saṃbandhaṃ kurvatā kenacic chabdena kartavyaḥ. Indeed. when they (linguistic expression and meaning) have [already] been originated. we must ad- mit some linguistic expressions whose relation was not made by a relation-maker and which are established through the usage of senior speakers. notpannayoḥ paś cā t sambandhaḥ (Ś Bh ad PMS 1. The relationship between linguistic expression and meaning is ‘originary’ in the sense of being ‘mutually inborn’.17 It is surprising that this sūtra has not been taken into account (as far as I know) to support the view that utpatti and nitya do not contradict one another and. . there was no time when a relation was not there. Surely whoever made the relation must have done it by means of lin- guistic expressions. 3. And who made [the former relation] of those [linguistic expres- sions].1. a sphere closely connected to the Veda (i.5. I would thus rather interpret Śabara’s gloss as closer to that of the Vṛttikāra.15 This means that it is impossible to conceive of linguistic expression and meaning existing separate- ly. Frauwallner prefers bhā vaḥ sambandhena and trans- lates it accordingly: Das Wesen von Wort und Gegenstand ist also von der Verknüpfung nicht getrennt. F 46. The relation is the non-separate existence of linguistic expression and meaning. yena kriyeta. Thus. through which [the latter relation] was made? Or was (the former relation) made through [linguistic expressions whose meanings were fixed through previous ones]? And that through what? There would be no end.2). that nitya refers to an intrinsic/innate character. nitya is again linked to utpatti.1. Although most editions and manuscripts agree on this reading. vyākaraṇa) and 15 aviyuktaḥ ś abdā rthayor bhā vaḥ sambandho. yasmin na kaścid api śabdaḥ kenacid arthena saṃbaddha āsīt. [But] if there are [linguistic expressions] established through senior speakers’ usage.. they can never exist independently.1.

On this last subject.15 (yaugapadyam ā dityavad). p. vol. Śabara’s nitya can be read in the same way.24 In this way. reflects primarily on its first words. 19 For the next section.19 Significantly.1. the meant entity. vol. Kā tyā yana’s is the most ancient gloss thereon. A further relation between the vā rttikas and Jaimini’s sū tras is offered by the vā rttika 56 (na caikam anekā dhikaraṇasthaṃ yugapad ity ā dityavad viṣayaḥ). siddhā dyauḥ siddhā pṛthivī siddham ā kā ś am iti (Mahā bhā ṣya. 25 nityaparyā yavā cī siddhaś abdaḥ. vol.25 With regard to other possible understandings of nitya-siddha. 21 siddhe ś abā rthasambandhe lokato ’rthaprayukte ś abdaprayoge ś ā streṇa dharmaniyamaḥ (Kā tyā yana.. 20 Pā ṇini’s collection of sū tras.23 and [their] relation are fixed. unchanging things. Hence the treatise (i. quoted in Mahā bhā ṣya Paspaś ā . p. p. kathaṃ jñā yate. it could be assumed that here the first part of the composed word has been 18 As shown in Freschi and Pontillo 2013. the earth is siddha”. Grammar) regulates [only] the dharmic [aspect of language].a. but it has been preserved only within a later commentary.2. 60). see Scharfe 1977:138. ‘established’). closely resembling PMS 1. and the use of the linguistic expression in relation to its meaning [is well known] from common experi- ence (loka). [Objector:] How do you know that? [Reply:] Because it is applied to eternal (kūṭastha).21 It is worth noting that Kātyāyana’s limitation of the use of grammar parallels Jaimini’s confining vedaprāmāṇya ‘the epistemological validity of the Veda’ to dharma alone. Patañjali then proceeds by stating that siddha means nitya and ex- amines the various meanings of this pair: The word siddha is a synonym of nitya. tad yathā . 23 I have rendered artha in this way because Patañjali’s interpretation seems to refer to the fixedness of the external referent. the Aṣṭā dhyā yī . giving an alterna- tive interpretation: The linguistic expression. Clooney 1990:53 and Goehler 2011. Patañjali says: Or else. I will elaborate on this. commenting on the vārttika. Paspaś ā . for example “the sky is siddha. has remained until today the most authoritative work on Sanskrit grammar and has never ceased to be studied and admired by both Indian and Western scholars. 59). Patañjali possibly departs from Kātyāyana’s statement – more similar to Jamini’s – that the relation alone is established. vā rttika I. 18 the relationship between linguistic expression and meaning is defined as siddha (‘fixed’.1. Patañjali’s Mahā bhā ṣya. 65). I. the first vārttika (comment) of Kātyāyana on Pāṇini’s sūtra20 reads: The relation of a linguistic expression and its meaning is established. I. In my opinion. section 3. it is possible that they were contemporar- ies. .22 Patañjali.59. This parallel gains force since Kātyāyana’s and Jaimini’s styles are quite similar. 24 siddhe ś abde ’rthe sambandhe ceti (Mahā bhā ṣya. I. See also Freschi and Pontillo 2013. Paspaś ā . see Madeleine Biardeau 1964:§ I. yat kū ṭastheṣv avicā liṣu bhā veṣu vartate.sharing a common history with Mīmāṃsā. Francis X.e. 22 This is the opinion of Paranjpe 1922.

. see Freschi 2012.. Il n’est donc pas sûr que dans la langue du MBh [Mahābhāṣya] le terme nitya veuille dire plus que «non-instantané». like “he laughs continuously (nitya). and [with regard to which] doubt cannot involve non-determination.. Madeleine Biardeau summarises Patañjali’s point and concludes that nitya for him does not imply an eternally lasting entity. where Patañjali speaks of nitya banyan trees.. p. [.. nous ver- rons que le Nyāyabhāṣya tient le son –śabda– pour anitya. with an auspicious word.. in reference to another passage in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya. [. non-permanent.68. tad yathā . . he speaks continuously (nitya)”. 61-2). Paspaś ā .. 28 Biardeau 1964:41.].. temporally it only denotes the opposite of “instantane- ous”: [L]e term nitya qui qualifie les manguiers et les banyans.] kim punar anena varṇyena kiṃ na mahatā kaṇṭhena nityaś abda evopā ttaḥ. why did he [Kātyāyana] use a term that needs a further ex- planation? Why did he not plainly (lit.28 An indirect confirmation of this use of nitya can be found in Uddyotakara’s criticism of the use of nitya in expressions such as “nitya rivers.] maṅgalā rthaṃ siddhaś abdam. yā vatā ā bhī kṣṇye ’pi vartate tatrā py anenaivā rthaḥ syā d vyā khyā nato viś eṣapratipattir na hi sandehā d alakṣaṇam iti (Mahā bhā ṣya. 30 For more details. nityaprahasito nityaprajalpita iti. atyantasiddhaḥ siddha iti.. Nitya exprime donc une permanence relative.] Inversement.... c’est-à-dire en fait instantané. [. le pluriel à lui seul suffirait à nous en assurer. “absolutely established” [. ā bhī kṣṇye ’pi vartate. et l’on peut par conséquent attribuer à ces arbres en aucun sens une éternité vraie.1. [Objector:] So to what then? [Reply:] It applies also to a case of continual repetition.].26 [. [Objector:] If this were so.”27 Finally. Nyā yavā rttika ad 2. CONCLUSIONS To conclude. the term nitya does not necessarily apply to eternal (kūṭastha) and unchanging things. yasminn upā dī yamā ne ’sandehaḥ syā t. quelque chose de très proche de ce qu’exprime le terme siddha quand il est opposé à sādhya. 29 Uddyotakara. I. 4. whose knowledge is determined by an ex- planation. “with a strong voice”) use nitya. nitya mountains”..] Moreover. at least (in case of sū tras to which no extra words can be added).29 which seems to refer to permanent (but not necessarily eternal) entities.] ayaṃ khalu nityaś abdo nā vaś yaṃ kū ṭastheṣv avicā liṣu bhā veṣu vartate. let me quote a summary of the Mīmāṃsā understanding of nitya by the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā Rāmānujācārya30: It has been said: 26 Indian texts usually begin with an auspicious verse or. kiṃ tarhi. 27 athavā pū rvapadalopo ’tra draṣṭavyaḥ.. omitted and siddha stands for atyantasiddha. so that the un- derstanding would have been doubtless? [. [.. peut difficilement s’appliquer à autre chose qu’aux arbres individuels concrets [. vol.. And when it applies to a case of continual repe- tition it can also bear the meaning of “that.] [Reply:] Because of the auspiciousness of siddha (as placed at the beginning of Kātyāyana’s work).

One ascertains the meaning of a group of phonemes because one notices that a certain meaning is missing in a certain sentence when a certain group of phonemes is omitted and vice versa. tac ca ś abdanityatve syā t iti tannityatvaprasā dhanaṃ vyutpattyarthatayā pi saprayojanaṃ syā t.1. 24) 33 “European” scholars includes here also scholars whose education has been deeply influenced by European models. vṛddhavyavahā re hi ś aktigrahaḥ. which is non-erroneous in regard to a meant entity that cannot be seized through direct perception. varṇā nā ṃ tattatpadasyā rthaparihā reṇa svasvā rthā vadhā raṇaś aktir ā vā podvā pā bhyā ṃ bhū yobhū yaḥ prayogadarś anā dinā . On the other hand. (TR III. “But the relationship of word and meaning is originary. Its (dharma’s) knowledge is the Instruction. sa ca bhū yobhū yaḥ prayoga- darś ane syā t.31 Rāmānuja then points out what is really at stake on the Mīmāṃsā side of the debate: nityatva is needed in order to ensure that linguistic expressions can be recognised and used in ordinary communication. the establishing of words’ fixedness would be useful also for the sake of explaining proficiency in the use of language32. iti. Hence. tasya jñā nam upadeś o ’vyatirekaś cā rthe ’nupalabdhe tat pramā ṇaṃ bā darā yaṇasyā napekṣatvā t. p. By contrast. the fixedness ensures that a repeated usage enables the listener to deepen her understanding of each linguistic expression. na hy uccā raṇamā trā pavargiṇaḥ ś abdasya punaḥ punaḥ prayogadarś anaṃ sambhavati.1 Methodological conclusions In contrast. It is possibly also dependent on the conflation European scholars33 end up performing with their 31 tad uktam – autpattikas tu ś abdasyā rthena sambandhaḥ. there would be no certainty about what each linguistic expression means. (TR III. Thus. phonemes must appear again and again in use. meanings are seized in the senior speakers’ usage and their employment must be experienced again and again. proficiency in the use of language would not occur either. this may well happen if linguistic expressions are perpetual. p.1. nitya highlights primarily the fixedness of rituals and. which is destroyed as soon as it is pronounced. nor could one learn its meaning through repetition. fixed (nitya). (PMS 1. The ontological aspect of “eternity” is not relevant (and altogether wrong. As a matter of fact. as . Nor is indeed possible that a linguistic expression. If the relationship between linguistic expressions and meanings were not fixed. when one comes to the meaning of human artefacts. such as “TV” or “computer”): Moreover. one might add.5) autpattikaḥ –svā bhā viko ’pauruṣeyo nitya ity arthaḥ. And in order to do that. by extension. non-human. 4. The non- humanity of the relation is caused by the fixedness of meanings in the form of an un- broken succession and by the fixedness of phonemes. that of language seen as an instrument of communication. if linguistic expressions were not fixed. for a Mīmāṃsā audience. interpreting nitya as “temporally eternal” is dependent on non-Mīmāṃsā developments.” [MS 1.5] ‘Originary’ means connected with its own nature. comes again and again in use. and it is an instrument of knowledge according to Bādarāyaṇa because it is independent. varṇā nā m nityatvā d arthā nā ṃ pravā harū peṇa nityatvā t sambandhasyā pauruṣeyatvam. 22) 32 kiṃ ca ś abdā nityatve vyutpattir eva na syā t.

Shāstrī. This proposition seems to be equivalent to that which Mr. In: Nyāyasudhā. 1952. In: Frauwallner 1962 and Kāśīnātha Vāsudeva Abhyaṅkara. A Primer of Prābhākara Mimāṃsā. NS Nyāyasudhā by Someśvara ad TV. Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series. see Frauwallner 1962. avoid translations that use terms evoking an entirely different scenario. are difficult to keep separate from the scenario being focussed on (for the same reason I recommend avoiding the use of “creation” to translate sṛṣṭi). ed. and Hume criticised him in the light of the fact that “innate” should rather be understood as autpattika. and Gaṇeśaśāstrī Aṃbādāsa Jośī. that he comprehends all our perceptions under the term of idea. by Pan ̣d ̣it Someśvara Bhatṭa. 14. Śrīmajjaiminipraṇn̄īte mīmāṃsādarśanam. 1970–9. it might be worth remembering that a comparable debate about the word “innate” occurred in English philosophical thought. and Gaṇeśaśāstrī Aṃbādāsa Jośī. In: Frauwallner 1962 and Kāśīnātha Vāsudeva Ab- hyaṅkara. Ramaswami Sastri. ŚBh Śābarabhāṣya ad PMS. it would be methodo- logically advisable to: 1. a Commentary on Tantravārtika. Puṇyākhyapaṭṭana: Ānandāśrama. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series. PMS Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra or Mīmāṃsāsūtra. in which sense it is false. Pan ̣d ̣it Mukunda.background assumptions regarding European speculation on eternality. For it is evident our stronger perceptions or impressions are innate. 3. 34 Hume 1740:9. love or virtue. . resentment.34 Locke referred to “innate” in the temporal sense. viz. Śrīmajjaiminipraṇn̄īte mīmāṃsādarśanam. critically ed. that we have no innate ideas. Only it may be observed as an inaccura- cy of that famous philosopher. 1970–9. In: Jaiminīyanyāyamālā. Abbreviations and primary sources F critical edition of PMS (1. Puṇyākhyapaṭṭana: Ānandāśrama. 1901–9. and increasingly often also in the rest of the world. Poona. Thus. TR Tantrarahasya: Rāmānujācārya (1956). once used. Wai: Prājña Pāṭhaśālā Maṇḍala. Ś ivadatta Ś arman. and all the other passions. whereby David Hume criticised the use of this word by John Locke: [W]e can never think of any thing which we have not seen without us. that no ideas are innate. Benares. JNM Jaiminīya Nyāyamālāvistara by Mādhava. and that natural affection.1. 1916 MBh Mahābhāṣya MK Mīmāṃsākośa: Sarasvati.S. Siromani. 2. Vol.1-5) and ŚBh thereon. since these.̣ ed. Tantrarahasya. with Introduction and Appendices by K. 24. Oriental In- it is regularly the case in North America. arise immediately from nature. since the beginning of one’s experience (be it of language or of the world). be aware of one’s own background in order to see the implicit assumptions one carries. in this connection. become aware of the complexity of debate in ancient India and avoid sweeping generalisations about “Indian thought”. Mīmāṃsākoṣa. or felt in our own minds. Australia and New Zealand. Locke has taken such pains to establish. Kevalānanda. with the commentary Vistara. namely as referring to something that was there necessarily ab origine. Indeed.

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