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LABOR STANDARS - LABOR LAW REVIEW- TOPIC VII August 5, 2017

Art. 82. Coverage. The provisions of this Title shall apply to employees in all establishments and undertakings
whether for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial employees, field personnel, members
of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal
service of another, and workers who are paid by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate
regulations.

As used herein, "managerial employees" refer to those whose primary duty consists of the management of the
establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision thereof, and to other officers or
members of the managerial staff.

"Field personnel" shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the
principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot
be determined with reasonable certainty.

ARIEL L. DAVID vs. JOHN G. MACASIO G.R. No. 195466 JULY 2, 2014

For: overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay and payment for service incentive leave.

Facts:

In January 2009, Macasio filed before the LA a complaint against petitioner Ariel L. David, doing business under
the name and style “Yiels Hog Dealer,” for non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay and 13th month pay. He
also claimed payment for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Macasio also claimed payment for
service incentive leave (SIL) David claimed that he started his hog dealer business in 2005 and that he only has
ten employees. The LA concluded that as Macasio was engaged on “pakyaw” or task basis, he is not entitled to
overtime, holiday, SIL and 13th month pay. The NLRC affirmed the LA decision, thus this case reach the CA which
says that Macasio is entitled to his monetary claims following the doctrine laid down in Serrano v. Severino
Santos Transit.The CA explained that as a task basis employee, Macasio is excluded from the coverage of holiday,
SIL and 13th month pay only if he is likewise a “field personnel.”Thus this case reached the SC.

Issue: Whether or not Macasio is entitled of overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay and payment for service
incentive leave.

Ruling: Yes, in so far as the Holiday and SIL pay is concern. To determine whether workers engaged on “pakyaw”
ortask basis” is entitled to holiday and SIL pay, the presence (or absence) of employer supervision as regards the
worker’s time and performance is the key: if the worker is simply engaged on pakyaw or task basis, then the
general rule is that he is entitled to a holiday pay and SIL pay unless exempted from the exceptions specifically
provided under Article 94 (holiday pay) and Article 95 (SIL pay) of the Labor Code. However, if the worker
engaged on pakyaw or task basis also falls within the meaning of “field personnel” under the law, then he is not
entitled to these monetary benefits. CA that Macasio does not fall under the definition of “field personnel.” The
CA’s finding in this regard is supported by the established facts of this case: first, Macasio regularly performed his
duties at David’s principal place of business; second, his actual hours of work could be determined with
reasonable certainty; and, third, David supervised his time and performance of duties. Since Macasio cannot be
considered a “field personnel,” then he is not exempted from the grant of holiday, SIL pay even as he was
engaged on “pakyaw” or task basis.

However, the governing law on 13th month pay is PD No. 851. As with holiday and SIL pay, 13th month pay
benefits generally cover all employees; an employee must be one of those expressly enumerated to be
exempted. Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 851 enumerates the exemptions from
the coverage of 13th month pay benefits. Under Section 3(e), “employers of those who are paid on task basis,
and those who are paid a fixed amount for performing a specific work, irrespective of the time consumed in the
performance thereof are exempted. Note that unlike the IRR of the Labor Code on holiday and SIL pay, Section
3(e) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD No. 851exempts employees "paid on task basis" without any
reference to "field personnel." This could only mean that insofar as payment of the 13th month pay is
concerned, the law did not intend to qualify the exemption from its coverage with the requirement that the task
worker be a "field personnel" at the same time. Thus Macasio is not entitled to 13th month pay.

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Wherefore, the petition was partially granted the petition insofar as the payment of 13th month pay to
respondent is concerned. But all other aspect of the CA’s decision was affirmed.

SSS VS. UBAÑA GR 200114 AUGUST 24, 2015

FACTS

In her complaint for damages against the Social Security System (SSS), the DBP Service Corporation, and the SSS
Retirees Association, Debbie alleged that in July 1995 she applied for employment with the SSS. Despite
passing all the examinations and submitting the requirements, she was referred to the DBP Service Corporation,
passed the pre-employment examination and was referred to SSS Naga for training and immediate deployment
to SSS Daet. She was made to sign a six-month Service Contract in May, 1996; and when she reported to the
SSS Daet Branch, she was assigned to various sections and divisions as Processor and Data Encoder. Her salary
was only P229.00 daily compared to a regular SSS Processor who receives P846.45 daily. While her service
contract with the DBP Service Corporation was never renewed, she continued to be employed by the SSS; she
was continually assured of being absorbed into the SSS; in fact she was qualified for the position as she passed
the required training. Because of the oppressive and prejudicial treatment of the SSS, she was forced to resign
in August, 2002 as she could not stand anymore the exploitation, the agony of dissatisfactionn, anxiety,
demoralisation, and injustice. The defendants conspired to exploit her and violate civil service rules and
regulations and Civil Code provisions on Human relations, specificlly Articles 19. 20 and 21. She prayed for
actual damages by way of unrealised income, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, averring that the complaint was predicated on
the claims that arose out of employer-employee relations, thus cognizable by the NLRC. At first, the RTC
granted the motion to dismiss, but on motion for reconsideration by Debbie, the RTC reversed itself and denied
the motion to dismiss. It held that a perusal of the complaint filed by Debbie substantially alleges that the case
is for Damages. Having denied the existence of employer-employee relationship between it and Debbie, and
the case is for damages, the regular trial courts, not the CSC has jurisdiction over the case.

Equal Pay For Equal Work.DECEMBER 11, 2015 BY THE LAWYER'S POST

The Case:

2In her complaint for damages against the Social Security System (SSS), the DBP Service Corporation, and the SSS
Retirees Association, Debbie alleged that in July 1995 she applied for employment with the SSS. Despite
passing all the examinations and submitting the requirements, she was referred to the DBP Service Corporation,
passed the pre-employment examination and was referred to SSS Naga for training and immediate deployment
to SSS Daet. She was made to sign a six-month Service Contract in May, 1996; and when she reported to the
SSS Daet Branch, she was assigned to various sections and divisions as Processor and Data Encoder. Her salary
was only P229.00 daily compared to a regular SSS Processor who receives P846.45 daily. While her service
contract with the DBP Service Corporation was never renewed, she continued to be employed by the SSS; she
was continually assured of being absorbed into the SSS; in fact she was qualified for the position as she passed
the required training. Because of the oppressive and prejudicial treatment of the SSS, she was forced to resign
in August, 2002 as she could not stand anymore the exploitation, the agony of dissatisfactionn, anxiety,
demoralisation, and injustice. The defendants conspired to exploit her and violate civil service rules and
regulations and Civil Code provisions on Human relations, specificlly Articles 19. 20 and 21. She prayed for
actual damages by way of unrealised income, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, averring that the complaint was predicated on
the claims that arose out of employer-employee relations, thus cognizable by the NLRC. At first, the RTC
granted the motion to dismiss, but on motion for reconsideration by Debbie, the RTC reversed itself and denied
the motion to dismiss. It held that a perusal of the complaint filed by Debbie substantially alleges that the case
is for Damages. Having denied the existence of employer-employee relationship between it and Debbie, and
the case is for damages, the regular trial courts, not the CSC has jurisdiction over the case.

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SSS moved to reconsider, but the RTC denied, hence it filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The appellate
court dismissed the petition, stating:

“It is the character of the principal relief sought that appears essential in this connection. Where such principal
relief is to be granted under labor legislation or a collective bargaining agreement, the case should fall within the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, even though a claim for damages might be asserted as an incident
to such claim.

The pivotal question is whether the Labor Code has any relevance to the principal relief sought in the complaint.
As pointed out earlier, Ubana did not seek refuge from the Labor Code in asking for the award of damages. It was
the transgression of Article[s] 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code that she was insisting in wagering this case. The
primary relief sought herein is for moral and exemplary damages for the abuse of rights. The claims for actual
damages for unrealized income are the natural consequence for abuse of such rights.”

SSS is now before the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Debbie.

RULING:

The Court denies the Petition.

In Home Development Mutual Fund v. Commission on Audit,⁠1 it was held that while they performed the work
of regular government employees, DBP Service Corporation personnel are not government personnel, but
employees of DBP Service Corporation acting as an independent contractor. Applying the foregoing
pronouncement to the present case, it can be said that during respondent’s stint with petitioner, she never
became an SSS employee, as she remained an employee of DBP Service Corporation and SSS Retirees Association
– the two being independent contractors with legitimate service contracts with SSS.

Indeed, “[i]n legitimate job contracting, no employer-employee relation exists between the principal and the job
contractor’s employees. The principal is responsible to the job contractor’s employees only for the proper
payment of wages.”⁠2

In her Complaint, respondent acknowledges that she is not petitioner’s employee, but that precisely she was
promised that she would be absorbed into the SSS plantilla after all her years of service with SSS; and that as SSS
Processor, she was paid only P229.00 daily or P5,038.00 monthly, while a regular SSS Processor receives a
monthly salary of P18,622.00, or P846.45 daily wage. In its pleadings, petitioner denied the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between it and respondent; in fact, it insists on the validity of its service
agreements with DBP Service Corporation and SSS Retirees Association – meaning that the latter, and not SSS,
are respondent’s true employers. Since both parties admit that there is no employment relation between them,
then there is no dispute cognizable by the NLRC. Thus, respondent’s case is premised on the claim that in paying
her only P229.00 daily – or P5,038.00 monthly – as against a monthly salary of P18,622.00, or P846.45 daily wage,
paid to a regular SSS Processor at the time, petitioner exploited her, treated her unfairly, and unjustly enriched
itself at her expense.

For Article 217 of the Labor Code to apply, and in order for the Labor Arbiter to acquire jurisdiction over a
dispute, there must be an employer-employee relation between the parties thereto.

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x x x It is well settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employer-employee relationship exists between the
parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or
any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction, x x x The action is within
the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case belongs to the regular courts. While the resolution of the
issue involves the application of labor laws, reference to the labor code was only for the determination of the
solidary liability of the petitioner to the respondent where no employer-employee relation exists. Article 217 of
the Labor Code as amended vests upon the labor arbiters exclusive original jurisdiction only over the following:

Unfair labor practices;

Termination disputes;

If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay,
hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relations;

Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving legality of strikes and
lockouts; and

Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims,
arising from employer- employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service,
involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim
for reinstatement.

In all these cases, an employer-employee relationship is an indispensable jurisdictional requisite x x x.⁠3

Since there is no employer-employee relationship between the parties herein, then there is no labor dispute
cognizable by the Labor Arbiters or the NLRC.

There being no employer-employee relation or any other definite or direct contract between respondent and
petitioner, the latter being responsible to the former only for the proper payment of wages, respondent is thus
justified in filing a case against petitioner, based on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, to recover the proper
salary due her as SSS Processor. At first glance, it is indeed unfair and unjust that as, Processor who has worked
with petitioner for six long years, she was paid only P5,038.00 monthly, or P229.00 daily, while a regular SSS
employee with the same designation and who performs identical functions is paid a monthly salary of
P18,622.00, or P846.45 daily wage. Petitioner may not hide under its service contracts to deprive respondent of
what is justly due her. As a vital government entity charged with ensuring social security, it should lead in setting
the example by treating everyone with justice and fairness. If it cannot guarantee the security of those who work
for it, it is doubtful that it can even discharge its directive to promote the social security of its members in line
with the fundamental mandate to promote social justice and to insure the well-being and economic security of
the Filipino people.

In this jurisdiction, the “long honored legal truism of ‘equal pay for equal work'” has been “impregnably
institutionalized;” “[p]ersons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility,
under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.”⁠4 “That public policy abhors inequality and
discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The
Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to ‘give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities.’ The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, ‘in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith’.”⁠5

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed July 29, 2011 Decision and January 10, 2012 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110006 are AFFIRMED. The case is ordered remanded with dispatch to the
Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 39, for continuation of proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

paramedical technicians. Art. Overtime work. midwives. . Permission given to the employee to go on leave on some other day of the week shall not exempt the employer from paying the additional compensation required in this Chapter. for five (5) days a week.000. When there is urgent work to be performed on machines.000) or in hospitals and clinics with a bed capacity of at least one hundred (100) shall hold regular office hours for eight (8) hours a day. Art. Art. nurses. Meal periods. 85. Undertime work on any particular day shall not be offset by overtime work on any other day. epidemic. in order to avoid serious loss or damage to the employer or some other cause of similar nature. Work performed beyond eight hours on a holiday or rest day shall be paid an additional compensation equivalent to the rate of the first eight hours on a holiday or rest day plus at least thirty percent (30%) thereof. it shall be the duty of every employer to give his employees not less than sixty (60) minutes time-off for their regular meals. and Where the completion or continuation of the work started before the eighth hour is necessary to prevent serious obstruction or prejudice to the business or operations of the employer. Hours worked shall include (a) all time during which an employee is required to be on duty or to be at a prescribed workplace. earthquake. 5 HOURS OF WORK Art. typhoon. 88. For purposes of this Article. they shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least thirty percent (30%) of their regular wage for work on the sixth day. installations. Emergency overtime work. in which case. exclusive of time for meals. social workers. 86. psychologists. 83. flood. When the work is necessary to prevent loss or damage to perishable goods. Subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe. pharmacists. When it is necessary to prevent loss of life or property or in case of imminent danger to public safety due to an actual or impending emergency in the locality caused by serious accidents. Art. Night shift differential. dietitians. except where the exigencies of the service require that such personnel work for six (6) days or forty-eight (48) hours. Undertime not offset by overtime. Normal hours of work. "health personnel" shall include resident physicians. Work may be performed beyond eight (8) hours a day provided that the employee is paid for the overtime work. or equipment. fire. Health personnel in cities and municipalities with a population of at least one million (1. 87. laboratory technicians. Any employee may be required by the employer to perform overtime work in any of the following cases: When the country is at war or when any other national or local emergency has been declared by the National Assembly or the Chief Executive. an additional compensation equivalent to his regular wage plus at least twenty-five percent (25%) thereof. Rest periods of short duration during working hours shall be counted as hours worked. The normal hours of work of any employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a day. or other disaster or calamity. Art. 89. and (b) all time during which an employee is suffered or permitted to work. Hours worked. nutritionists. Art. 84. Every employee shall be paid a night shift differential of not less than ten percent (10%) of his regular wage for each hour of work performed between ten o’clock in the evening and six o’clock in the morning. attendants and all other hospital or clinic personnel.

R. 80737 September 29. Grievance machinery.Implementation of Compressed Workweek Schemes PHILIPPINE GRAPHIC ARTS INC VS NLRC G. Ordering the Philippine Graphic arts. admitted its existence. grievance machinery. Whenever a grievance arises from the interpretation or implementation of a collective agreement. inc to restore and grant to all its employees the company policy regarding groceries previously enjoyed by them. in fact. 90. 1988 FACTS: petitioner corporation was forced by economic circumstances to require its workers to go on mandatory vacation leave. ISSUE: whether or not the forced vacation leave without pay is unfair labor practice and if not an unfair labor practice. As the law stands. under the circumstances. it is only logical. And though the law does not provide who. DEPARMENT ORDER NO. a management prerogative. RULING: The Court is convinced from the records now before it. Computation of additional compensation. NLRC affirmed the arbiter's decision with modification ordering the employers to refund the amount equivalent to the earned leave of the employees. just and equitable that whoever is aggrieved should initiate settlement of the grievance through the grievance machinery. including disciplinary actions imposed on members of the bargaining unit. notwithstanding the fact that in most cases the grievance is of the employees . The private respondents filed a "partial appeal" with (NLRC) questioning the Labor Arbiter's dismissal of their complaint for ULP and the resultant forced vacation leaves which were actually without pay. the private respondents themselves never questioned the existence of an economic crisis but. There is also no showing that the imposition of forced leave was exercised for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of employees under special laws or under valid agreements. No. the employer and the bargaining representative shall meet to adjust the grievance. Art. Private respondents contend that the petitioners should discuss said management's plan in the grievance procedure so that the Union members thereof may well be apprised of the reason therefor. as between labor and capital. that there was no unfair labor practice. As a result. both employers and bargaining representative of the employees are required to go through the grievance machinery in case a grievance arises. The statutory law on grievance procedure provides that: ART. the private respondents filed complaints for unfair labor practice and discrimination. For purposes of computing overtime and other additional remuneration as required by this Chapter. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for ULP. Thus the Court finds that the decision to resort to forced leaves was. The Court however do not agree. 02 SERIES OF 2004 . 6 Any employee required to render overtime work under this Article shall be paid the additional compensation required in this Chapter. should initiate that said grievance be brought first to the. To impose the compulsory procedure on employers alone would be oppressive of capital. Petitioner contends that before the implementation of the forced leave a consensus on how to deal with deteriorating economic conditions was reached between the employer and employees. The workers were paid while on leave but the pay was charged against their respective earned leaves. conciliation or arbitration as provided elsewhere in this Code. grievances shall be subject to negotiation. whether or not it was tainted with arbitrariness. without deduction on account of facilities provided by the employer. and such in consonance with their collective bargaining agreement. As found by the NLRC. 261. Where the grievance procedure as provided herein does not apply. the "regular wage" of an employee shall include the cash wage only.

7 In the case at bar private respondents instituted a case before the Labor Arbiter for unfair labor practices and discrimination. for retrenchment to be justified. Issue: Was there an illegal reduction of work hours? Ruling: In Philippine Graphic Arts. the Court upheld for the validity of the reduction of working hours. The validity of the reduction of working hours upheld in Philippine Graphic Arts. (2) the losses are actual or reasonably imminent. al [G. which was more than 6 months. prior to any referral to the grievance machinery. Oct. a consensus were reached on how to deal with deteriorating economic conditions and it was sufficiently proven that the company was suffering from losses. Inc. Inc. The SC ordered the decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED Linton Commercial vs. Arco would fail to meet the standards.. October 10. Hellera et. Linton implemented a compressed workweek by reducing from six to three the number of working days with the employees working on a rotation basis.. If the standards set in determining the justifiability of financial losses in retrenchment (Art 283) or suspension of work (Art 286) were to be considered. Linton failed to comply with these standards. However. there was notice and consultations with the workers and supervisors. to date. it has one main consideration. Linton Commercial Co. are proven by sufficient and convincing evidence.—In Philippine Graphic Arts. Hellera. 2007] Facts: Claiming financial losses. taking into consideration the following: the arrangement was temporary. taking into consideration the following: the arrangement was temporary. 10. On the other hand. NLRC. the Court upheld for the validity of the reduction of working hours. v. Financial losses must be shown before a company can validly opt to reduce the work hours of its employees. if already incurred. 2007 Labor Law. vs. Article 286 applies only when there is a bona fide suspension of the employer’s operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months. and (4) the alleged losses. in determining the validity of reduction of working hours —that the company was suffering from losses. but in this case. On the one hand. a consensus were reached on how to deal with deteriorating economic conditions . The Bureau of Working Conditions of the DOLE released a bulletin which states that a reduction of the number of regular working days is valid where the arrangement is resorted to by the employer to prevent serious losses due to causes beyond his control. NLRC. Inc.R. no definite guidelines have yet been set to determine whether the alleged losses are sufficient to justify the reduction of work hours. it was a more humane solution instead of a retrenchment of personnel. 163147. there was notice and consultations with the workers and supervisors. Although the bulletin stands more as a set of directory guidelines than a binding set of implementing rules. any claim of actual or potential business losses must satisfy the following standards: (1) the losses incurred are substantial and not de minimis. No. 535 SCRA 434 . Reduction of Working Hours. or the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled. Linton continued its business operations during the effectivity of the compressed workweek. there remained enough earnings to sufficiently sustain its operations. such as when there is a substantial slump in the demand for his goods or services or when there is lack of raw materials. consistent with the ruling in Philippine Graphic Arts Inc. which they are equally mandated to go through and under the circumstances they were better situated to initiate. (3) retrenchment is reasonably necessary and is likely tobe effective in preventing expected losses. v. 166 SCRA 118 (1988). Inc. it was a more humane solution instead of a retrenchment of personnel. 166 SCRA 118 (1988). NLRC. A close examination of petitioners’ financial reports showed that while Linton suffered from losses for that year. vs. The Bureau of Working Conditions of the DOLE released a bulletin providing for in determining when an employer can validly reduce the regular number of working days.

Moreover. On August 14. Management prerogative must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor. Guidelines on the Implementation of Compressed Workweek. Private respondent is an association of the monthly salaried employees of the Sime Darby factory workers in Marikina. released a bulletin providing for in determining when an employer can validly reduce the regular number of working days. The Bureau of Working Conditions of the DOLE. to 6:12 p.R. However. sustained operations in the black is the ideal but being in the red is a cruel reality. generally not constitutive of constructive dismissal. SIME DARBY VS NLRC GR 119205 APRIL 15.No. As provided in the MOA.645.m. Tryco informed the BWC of the DOLE of the implementation of a compressed workweek in the company. moreover. There was no showing or any indication that the transfer orders were motivated by an intention to interfere with the petitioners’ right to organize. 7:45am-4:45pm and Sat 7:45am-11:45am) with cofee break of 10 minutes between 9:30am-10:30am and 2:30pm-3:30pm and lunch break between 12nn-1pm(M-F).Oct. Notably. such privilege is not absolute. However. there remained enough earnings to sufficiently sustain its operations. 21. Personal inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the employee by reason of the transfer is not a valid reason to disobey an order of transfer. Clearly then. Mere incidental inconvenience is not sufficient to warrant a claim of constructive dismissal. the company issued a memorandum to all factory employees advising all its monthly salaried employees in Marikina Tire plant except those in the warehouse and Quality Assurance Dept. Same. Prior to the controversy. 8:00 a. mere transfer of its members will not paralyze and render the union ineffective. The MOA was entered into pursuant to DO No. the MOA complied with the following conditions set by the DOLE. while the company suffered a loss of P3. benefits and other privileges of the petitioners. Meantime.. No. In protest.m. which in this case was done through a reduced workweek that resulted in an unsettling diminution of the periodic pay for a protracted period. it retained a considerable amount of earnings and operating income. NLRC [G. from Monday to Friday. Management prerogative must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor. is a manufacturer of veterinary medicines. in the instant case. Bulacan. Bulacan. Bulacan. The concerned employees were directed to report at the company’s plant site. such as when there is a substantial slump in the demand for his goods or services or when there is lack of raw materials. tubes and other rubber products. 21. BMT opposed the transfer of its members to San Rafael. The union was not deprived of the membership of the petitioners whose work assignments were only transferred to another location. not in its main office in Caloocan City. 15. claiming that the transfer was inconvenient and amounts to ULP. regardless of whether it was made pursuant to the letter of the Bureau of Animal Industry. and no overtime pay shall be due and payable to the employee for work rendered during those hours. The said bulletin states that a reduction of the number of regular working days is valid where the arrangement is resorted to by the employer to prevent serious losses due to causes beyond his control. The transfer of its production activities to San Rafael. therefore. contending that it constitutes unfair labor practice. The transfer orders do not amount to ULP. BMT declared a strike. waiver of overtime). Same.00 in 1997. Permitting reduction of work and pay at the slightest indication of losses would be contrary to the State’s policy to afford protection to labor and provide full employment. the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. 1998 Facts: Sime Darby is engaged in the manufacture of automotive tires. under D. all employees of Sime Darby worked from 7:45am to 3:45pm with a 30-minute paid "on call" lunch break. Bisig Manggagawa sa Tryco vs. Series of 1990. of a change in work schedules. was within the scope of its inherent right to control and manage its enterprise effectively. providing for a compressed workweek. Where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily.. 8 and it was sufficiently proven that the company was suffering from losses. 151309. 2008] Facts: Tryco Pharma Corp. while Linton suffered from losses for that year. Indisputably.m. Permitting reduction of work and pay at the slightest indication of losses would be contrary to the State’s policy to afford protection to labor and provide full employment. . Issue: Is Tryco guilty of unfair labor practice? Held: Absent any evidence that the Bureau of Animal Industry conspired with Tryco. the adoption of a compressed workweek scheme in the company will help temper any inconvenience that will be caused the petitioners by their transfer to a farther workplace.—A close examination of petitioners’ financial reports for 1997-1998 shows that. a year of financial losses would not warrant the immolation of the welfare of the employees.O. Same. the transfer orders do not entail a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries.422. Tryco and BMT (rank-in-file union) signed separate MOA. Contrary to BMT’s claim. Tryco received a Letter from the Bureau of Animal Industry of the Department of Agriculture reminding it that its production should be conducted in San Rafael. with full understanding of what he was doing. (M-F.—Management has the prerogative to come up with measures to ensure profitability or loss minimization. 1992. such employee shall be entitled to overtime pay. should an employee be permitted or required to work beyond 6:12 p. and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable. The MOA is enforceable and binding against the petitioners (esp. the allegation is not only highly irresponsible but is grossly unfair to the government agency concerned. shall be considered as the regular working hours. However. Management’s prerogative of transferring and reassigning employees from one area of operation to another in order to meet the requirements of the business is. In business..

cites as reason for the adjustment the efficient conduct of its business operations and its improved production. So long as such prerogative is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements. alleging that the 14 August 1992 memorandum which contained the new work schedule was not discriminatory of the union members nor did it constitute unfair labor practice on the part of petitioner. as the employer. Issue: Is the act of management in revising the work schedule of its employees and discarding their paid lunch break constitutive of unfair labor practice? Ruling: The Office of the Solicitor General filed in a lieu of comment a manifestation and motion recommending that the petitioner be granted. Labor arbiter added that it would be unjust if they continue to be paid during their lunch break even if they are no longer on call or required to work during the break. However. all aspects of employment. dismissal and recall of workers. work supervision. in the motion for reconsideration. Hence. this Court will uphold such exercise. to change the working hours of its employees. place and manner of work. The workers alleged that this is necessarily and primarily for STANFILCO’s benefit. processes to be followed. working regulations. Further.the public respondent declared that the new work schedule deprived the employees of the benefits of a time-honored company practice of providing its employees a 30-minute paid lunch break resulting in an unjust diminution of company privileges prohibited by Art. it cannot be said that the new scheme adopted by management prejudices the right of private respondent to self-organization. 100 of the Labor Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the worker’s assembly time should be paid. discrimination and evasion of liability. management retains the prerogative. 1989 FACTS: Teofilo Arica et al and 561 others sued Standard Fruits Corporation (STANFILCO) Philippines for allegedly not paying the workers for their assembly time which takes place every work day from 5:30am to 6am. As shown by the records. whenever exigencies of the service so require. the labor arbiter dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the elimination of the 30 minute paid lunch break constituted a valid exercise of management prerogative and that the new work schedule did not have the effect of dimishing the benefits for the work did not exceed 8 hours. lay off of workers and discipline. Stating that. transfer of employees. supervision of workers. their getting of tools and equipments from the stockroom. time. including hiring. 9 Because of this memorandum. work assignments. In the instant case petitioner. their filling out of the Laborer’s Daily Accomplishment Report. We agree. working methods. and their going to the field to work. the change effected by management with regard to working time is made to apply to all factory employees engaged in the same line of work whether or not they are members of private respondent union. according to its own discretion and judgment. The assembly time consists of the roll call of the workers. Management is free to regulate. ARICA VS NLRC GR 78210 FEBRUARY 28. we sustain petitioner. HELD: . hence. NLRC having two new commissioners has reversed the earlier decision. The case before us does not pertain to any controversy involving discrimination of employees but only the issue of whether the change of work schedule. which management deems necessary to increase production. their getting of assignments from the foreman. the association filed a complaint in behalf of its members a complaint with labor Arbiter for unfair labor practice. as amended. constitutes unfair labor practice. Petition granted. However. The right to fix the work schedules of the employees rests principally on their employer. The association appealed to the NLRC but NLRC has affirmed the labor arbiter's decision and dismissed the appeal.

Section 3. It also contends that since there is a meeting of the minds between the respondent and the petitioner. 92. otherwise. . When employer may require work on a rest day. it is already commensurate of the 4 hours excess of work rendered by the respondent. To consider the overtime pay of the respondent included in his monthly salary would be in contravention of the rule against non-diminution of benefits and a violation of the Labor Code since it prescribes a certain manner on how overtime pay is included. whether operating for profit or not. Hence. Therefore. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.R. The thirty minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by mutual consent of the parties under Article IV. He was then dismissed by the petitioner company. 91. hence the terms and conditions imposed therein binds the parties to the contract. It argues that the salary of the petitioner already includes the payment for the excess of 4 hours of work rendered by the respondent. routinary practice of the employees. Because of this. However. . 10 No. 105963 Facts: The respondent used to be a security guard under the employ of the petitioner company. The employer shall determine and schedule the weekly rest day of his employees subject to collective bargaining agreement and to such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may provide. The general right to contract is subject to a limitation that such terms and conditions must not be contrary to law. not binding to the parties of the case. as shown in the computation of the petitioner itself. 1996 G. they are not subject to the absolute control of the company during this period. the monthly salary of the respondent is only a basic salary which is exclusive of all the other benefits that the respondent is to receive. the employer shall respect the preference of employees as to their weekly rest day when such preference is based on religious grounds. to provide each of his employees a rest period of not less than twenty-four (24) consecutive hours after every six (6) consecutive normal work days. their failure to report in the assembly time would justify the company to impose disciplinary measures. Issue: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to an overtime pay. With regard to the petitioner’s second contention that there is already a perfected contract. and the proceedings attendant thereto are not infected with complexities as to deprive the workers the time to attend to other personal pursuits. there is already a perfected contract which means that the parties are bound by their agreements. The Supreme Court held that the fact that one’s salary is higher than the minimum wage does not in any way offset the other benefits that are due to the employees. public order. The contention of the petitioner that since the respondent’s monthly salary is higher than the minimum wage. of the Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be considered as ‘waiting time’ within the purview of Section 5. The subject contract in the case at bar is contrary to labor laws. the Supreme Court found that contrary to what the petitioner aver. REST DAY/WEEKLY REST PERIODS Art. No. the respondent filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for the payment of his overtime pay. The petitioner contends that the fact that the monthly salary of the petitioner is higher than the minimum wage provided by law is already compensatory of the excess of 4 hours of work rendered by the said employee. the thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeply-rooted. the Supreme Court held that while such contention has the weight and force of law. morals and good customs. vs. Pal Employees Savings and Loan Association. Art. NLRCAugust 22. It shall be the duty of every employer. it is still subject to certain exception. Furthermore. Rule I. The employer may require his employees to work on any day: . Moreover. Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent is entitled to an overtime pay. public policy. Right to weekly rest day. Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code . Inc. He works for 12 hours a day and is receiving a monthly salary. in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the respondent is entitled to an overtime pay. In short. Employment contracts are imbued with public interest and are therefore subject to the police power of the state. the current petition.

Art. Every employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay. the ninth of April. fire. he shall be paid an additional compensation of at least thirty percent (30%) of his regular wage. Good Friday. he shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least fifty per cent (50%) of his regular wage. Where such holiday work falls on the employee’s scheduled rest day. Sunday or holiday work. Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays. Where the nature of the work requires continuous operations and the stoppage of work may result in irreparable injury or loss to the employer. 95. or installation. An employee shall be entitled to such additional compensation for work performed on Sunday only when it is his established rest day. the thirtieth of November. the fourth of July. and Under other circumstances analogous or similar to the foregoing as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. . Art. The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate. and As used in this Article. to avoid serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer. 93. Where the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract stipulates the payment of a higher premium pay than that prescribed under this Article. the employer shall pay such higher rate. This provision shall not apply to those who are already enjoying the benefit herein provided. except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers. SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVES AND SERVICE CHARGES Art. To prevent loss or damage to perishable goods. In cases of urgent work to be performed on the machinery. where the employer cannot ordinarily be expected to resort to other measures. Compensation for rest day. Right to holiday pay. epidemic or other disaster or calamity to prevent loss of life and property. the twelfth of June. flood. In the event of abnormal pressure of work due to special circumstances. typhoon. 94. the first of May. earthquake. Where an employee is made or permitted to work on his scheduled rest day. or imminent danger to public safety. he shall be paid an additional compensation of at least thirty percent (30%) of his regular wage for work performed on Sundays and holidays. equipment. HOLIDAYS. Work performed on any special holiday shall be paid an additional compensation of at least thirty percent (30%) of the regular wage of the employee. "holiday" includes: New Year’s Day. 11 In case of actual or impending emergencies caused by serious accident. the twenty-fifth and thirtieth of December and the day designated by law for holding a general election. Right to service incentive leave. Maundy Thursday. When the nature of the work of the employee is such that he has no regular workdays and no regular rest days can be scheduled. those enjoying vacation leave with pay of at least five days and those employed in establishments regularly employing less than ten employees or in establishments exempted from granting this benefit by the Secretary of Labor and Employment after considering the viability or financial condition of such establishment.

3. 12 The grant of benefit in excess of that provided herein shall not be made a subject of arbitration or any court or administrative action. consisting of basic pay and mandatory allowances. the solo parent employee must present to the employer his or her Solo Parent Identification Card. disappearance. unless company rules allow prior usage. the employee should notify his or her employer that he or she will avail of the leave within a reasonable period of time. . 6. to solo parents. or prolonged absence lasts for at least one (1) year.RA 8972 Republic Act No. 8. Finally. Legal separation or de facto separation from spouse for at least one (1) year: Provided that he/she is entrusted with the custody of the children. it can only be used AFTER the delivery of the child. 5. Unmarried father/mother who has preferred to keep and rear his/her child/children. that he/she is entrusted with the custody of the children. 4. Rules on Paternity Leave (RA 8187) Male employees in the private sector are entitled to a paternity leave under the following conditions: The new father must be legally married to the mother of the newborn child He is an employee at the time of birth or miscarriage He is cohabiting with his wife at the time she gives birth or suffers a miscarriage He has applied for paternity leave within a reasonable time from the expected date of delivery of his pregnant wife or within such period as provided by company rules or by collective bargaining agreement His wife has given birth or suffered a miscarriage Non conversion to cash: If the employee does not avail of the paternity leave. Such card which may be obtained from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) located in the city where the employee resides. that he/she is duly licensed as a foster parent by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or duly appointed legal guardian by the court. disappearance. 8972 grants parental leave of seven (7) work days with full pay every year. Physical and/or mental incapacity of spouse as certified by a public medical practitioner. abandonment. Duration of paternity leave: 7 Calendar days with full pay. Death of spouse. Any family member who assumes the responsibility of head of family as a result of the death. 9. SOLOR PARENTAL LEAVE . instead of having others care for them or give them up to a welfare institution. other crimes against chastity. whether continuous or broken. Giving birth as a result of rape or. 7. a solo parent employee should have rendered at least one (1) year of service. 2. that such abandonment. In order to be entitled to the leave. and 10. Declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage as decreed by a court or by a church: Provided. in addition to leave privileges under existing laws. this benefit is not convertible to cash nor is it cumulative. Abandonment of spouse for at least one (1) year. or prolonged absence of the parents or solo parent: Provided. Usage AFTER delivery: While application of paternity leave must be made before the delivery. In addition. Limits: This benefit is applicable to the first four (4) deliveries of the spouse of the employee with whom he is cohabiting. Parental leave for solo parents is granted to any solo parent or individual who is left alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to: 1. Spouse is detained or is serving sentence for a criminal conviction for at least one (1) year. as used by the law. Any other person who solely provides parental care and support to a child or children: Provided.

112-11 which lays down the guidelines for availing the special leave benefit provided for under Republic Act 9710 (Section 18). known as the Magna Carta of Women (MCW). What is special leave benefit for women Special leave benefits for women refers to a female employee’s leave entitlement of two months with full pay based on her gross monthly compensation following surgery caused by gynecological disorders. and after the surgery or recuperating period. 112-11. and mastectomy. 112-11 This special leave privilege is contained in Department Order No. CSC Resolution No. a woman employee shall be entitled to a special leave benefit of two (2) months with full pay based on her gross monthly compensation following surgery caused by gynecological disorders. the Department of Labor and Employment issued Department Order No. Likewise. Conditions All women employees in the private sector. 13 In the event that the parental leave is not availed of. As guidelines for the implementation of special leave benefits for women in the private sectors. are entitled to special leave benefits. Department Order No. This is how to avail of parental leave for solo parent in the Philippines. an employer who shall prejudice any person for assisting a co-employee who is a victim under this Act shall likewise be liable for discrimination. Gynecological surgeries shall also include hysterectomy. PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE. For female employees in the government service. What is gynecological disorders Gynecologial disorders refer to disorders that would require surgical procedures such as dilatation and curettage and those involving female reproductive organs such as vagina. This benefit is in addition to leave privileges under existing law. uterus.  She has filed an application for special leave. 1000432. 9262 AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN. How to apply for special leave The employee shall file her application for leave with her employer within a reasonable period of time from the expected date of surgery. regardless of age and civil status. Series of 2011. fallopian tubes. REPUBLIC ACT NO. – Victims under this Act shall be entitled to take a paid leave of absence up to ten (10) days in addition to other paid leaves under the Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and Regulations. extendible when the necessity arises as specified in the protection order. adnexa and pelvic floor. Entitled to Leave. AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. she must immediately file her application using the prescribed form. ovariectomy. ovaries. Women working in the private sector who are scheduled to undergo surgery for gynecological disorders can now file for special leave. 43. Female employees who have taken a leave of absence following surgery for gynecological disorder or or after 15 September 2009 are entitled to avail of the benefit. PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS. When application for special leave is not necessary Prior application is not necessary in cases requiring emergency surgical procedure. Who are qualified to avail of this benefit. When special leave benefits shall be granted . Any employer who shall prejudice the right of the person under this Sec. However. the employee must notify the employer verbally or in writing within reasonable period of time. it shall not be convertible to cash. Under the Republic Act 9710. you may refer to Civil Service Commission Guidelines on the Availment of the Special Leave Benefits for Women under RA 9710. breast. provided she has complied with the following conditions:  She has rendered continuous aggregate employment service of at least 6 months for the last 12 months. or within such period as may be provided by company rules and regulations or by collective bargaining agreement (CBA). otherwise known as “The Magna Carta of Women“. shall be penalized in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and Regulations. cervix.  She has undergone surgery due to gynecological disorders as certified by competent physician. Sec.

it was submitted for voluntary arbitration. As per the company’s new formula. Sec. of not less than 100% of basic pay. The COMPANY agrees to continue the practice of granting. however. In the latter part of 1998. . with a commitment however that in the event that the strike is declared legal. Gross monthly compensation refers to the monthly basic pay plus mandatory allowances. has the option to pay the employee before or during the surgery. in its discretion. Motion for Partial Reconsideration by Honda denied. Hence. BWC agreed with the pro-rata payment of the 13th month pay as proposed by Honda. 14 Special leave benefits shall be granted after the employee has undergone surgery. ISSUE: WON the pro-rated computation of the 13th month pay and the other bonuses in question is valid and lawful.SAMAHAN NG MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA SA HONDA G. Benefit is non-convertible to cash Special leave benefit is non-cumulative and non-convertible to cash unless otherwise provided by a CBA. the parties started re-negotiations for the fourth and fifth years of their CBA. 145561 June 15. The employer. 13th Month Pay The COMPANY shall maintain the present practice in the implementation [of] the 13th month pay. Section 6. HELD: The petition lacks merit. vs. 2005 FACTS: the case stems from the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) forged between petitioner Honda and respondent union Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Honda (respondent union) which contained the following provisions: Section 3.. When the talks between the parties bogged down. computed on the same basis as computation of 13th Month Pay. 14th Month Pay The COMPANY shall grant a 14th Month Pay. Secretary assumed jurisdiction. again assumed jurisdiction] The management of Honda subsequently issued a memorandum announcing its new computation of the 13th and 14th month pay to be granted to all its employees whereby the thirty-one (31)-day long strike shall be considered unworked days for purposes of computing said benefits. the amount equivalent to 1/12 of the employees’ basic salary shall be deducted from these bonuses. Thereafter. second notice of strike. WAGES ( ARTICLE 97 TO 127 OF THE LABOR CODE AS AMENDED) HONDA PHILS. Section 7. Honda sought the opinion of the Bureau of Working Conditions (BWC) on the issue. respondent union filed a Notice of Strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock. This CBA is effective until year 2000. this petition for review. financial assistance to covered employees in December of each year. The matter was brought before the Grievance Machinery in accordance with the parties’ existing CBA but when the issue remained unresolved. Respondent union opposed the pro-rated computation of the bonuses in a letter. Honda shall pay the amount deducted. Honda filed a Notice of Lockout. No. [To cut the story short. Benefit The employee is entitled to full pay for two months based on her gross monthly compensation. CA dismissed for lack of merit. the latter invalidated Honda’s computation.R.

The revised guidelines also provided for a pro-ration of this benefit only in cases of resignation or separation from work. The guidelines pertinently provides: The “basic salary” of an employee for the purpose of computing the 13th month pay shall include all remunerations or earnings paid by his employer for services rendered but does not include allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the regular or basic salary.. where the CBA is clear and unambiguous. and cost-of-living allowances.00 under P. 15 A collective bargaining agreement refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages. the computation of the 13th month pay should be based on the length of service and not on the actual wage earned by the worker. under these circumstances. 851 was removed. such as the cash equivalent of unused vacation and sick leave credits. For employees receiving regular wage. No. Both attested that when they were absent from work due to motorcycle accidents. clauses. however. public order or public policy. or pro-rated based on the compensation actually received.9 Thus. it becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law. overtime premium.11 The Court of Appeals affirmed the arbitrator’s finding and added that the computation of the 13th month pay should be based on the length of service and not on the actual wage earned by the worker.D. We agree with the findings of the arbitrator that the assailed CBA provisions are far from being unequivocal.000. The memorandum dated November 22. terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided these are not contrary to law. the provisions of a CBA may become contentious. 14th month and financial assistance pay. Under the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th month pay issued on November 16. 1989 FILIPINAS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB INC. Considering the foregoing. good customs. In the present case. A cursory reading of the provisions will show that they did not state categorically whether the computation of the 13th month pay. reckoned from the time he started working during the calendar year. As the rules state. morals. there being no gap in the service of the workers during the calendar year in question. we rule likewise constitutes voluntary employer practice which cannot be unilaterally withdrawn by the employer without violating Art. night differential and holiday pay. It further provided that the minimum 13th month pay required by law shall not be less than one-twelfth (1/12) of the total basic salary earned by an employee within a calendar year. the salary ceiling of P1. but 1/12 of their standard monthly wage multiplied by their length of service within a given calendar year. they still received the full amount of their 13th month. 14th month pay and the financial assistance would be based on one full month’s basic salary of the employees. No. and after they have exhausted all their leave credits and were no longer receiving their monthly salary from Honda.8 As in all contracts. NLRC PTGWO and LOCAL CHAPTER NO. L-62918 August 23. That a full month payment of the 13th month pay is the established practice at Honda is further bolstered by the affidavits executed by Feliteo Bautista and Edgardo Cruzada. 1987. as in this case. 100 of the Labor Code. G. 1999 which Honda issued shows that it was the first time a pro-rating scheme was to be implemented in the company. Petition Denied. This. vs. the parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations. hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit.R. 424 1989 FACTS: . The arbitrator thus properly resolved the ambiguity in favor of labor as mandated by Article 1702 of the Civil Code. the computation of the 13th month pay should not be pro-rated but should be given in full. we have interpreted “basic salary” to mean.10 In some instances. an employee is entitled to a pay in proportion to the length of time he worked during the year. not the amount actually received by an employee.

no distinction is made under those two decrees between unarbitrated agreements and those brought about through and only after compulsory arbitration. effective February 25. Wage Order No. 1 upon which the petition is anchored are clear and unambiguous.00. 1980. as follows: P2. An order of garnishment was issued against petitioner. granting an additional two-peso (P2. customs. It is axiomatic that no distinctions may be read into the law which are not provided for therein. A survey of relevant decisions of this Court also fails to support the proposition implicit in the Labor Arbiter's decision that benefits granted by law may be claimed separately from and in addition to those granted by collective bargaining agreements under any and all circumstances.00. they create an equivalence between those legal and contractual obligations to grant increases. effective February 25. 1. PD 1678 provided that employers who have given increases in wages/allowances of at least P2.00 a day on or after February 8. and that those who have given less than P2. 1 was promulgated. In prescribing that increases granted during the periods therein specified. 1981. public order or public policy in a stipulation subordinating. Presidential Decree No. 1980 shall be deemed to have complied with the said decree. granting non-agricultural workers receiving less than Pl. Meanwhile. eff ective February 25.00 shall pay the difference. ISSUE: W/n petitioner must grant separate increases pursuant to PD 1678 and Wage Order No. 1678 was issued. A year later. and that recent SC decisions had set the rule that benefits under a CBA are entirely separate and distinct from that which the law grants. 1980. rendering both susceptible of performance by compliance with either. contractual wage increases to those imposed or prescribed by law. on the . subject only to the condition that where the increases given under agreement fall short in amount of those fixed by law. on February 20. 16 Pursuant to the decision of the executive labor arbiter resolving a CBA deadlock between petitioner and its employees union. The Labor Arbiter found no merit in the motion. crediting increases granted between 1 January and 22 March 1981. What seems. Under the CBA subsequently executed. whether unilaterally or by collective agreement.500. Wage Order No. (Only the difference must be paid) HELD: The cited provisions of PD 1678 and Wage Order No.00 a month a two-peso (P 2. There is nothing contrary to law. as does the aforesaid provision in the collective bargaining agreement. 1981. not from a unilateral act of the employer. The CBA between petitioner and the union of its employees also further provide that its provisions shall be subject to decrees and/or legislations promulgated during the CBA’s effectivity. and having thus agreed. are creditable to the increases mandated thereby. Filipinas Golf and the respondents were therefore perfectly free to agree thereon. which petitioner moved to have reconsidered since such order of garnishment did not take into account the increases it had given pursuant to PD 1678 and Wage Order No. Further.1982 Petitioner and the employees union were also ordered by the executive labor arbiter to execute a CBA stipulating such increase.00) per day increase in emergency living allowance to non-agricultural workers. are bound by such stipulation as constituting the law between them.1980 law library P2.00) per day increase in living allowance effective February 21. the increases granted by petitioner shall be subject to provisions of decrees and/or legislation promulgated/approved during the effectivity of the CBA. stating that the increase prescribed under the CBA should be given in addition to the legislated increases since the increases under the CBA were granted pursuant to the government’s compulsory arbitration powers. petitioner Filipinas Golf was ordered to grant a three-stage wage increase to its employees.1981 law library Pl. effective March 22. 1 or must it simply pay the difference between the increases under the CBA and under the said decrees. the difference must be made up by the employer. on March 25. or clearly implicit in its terms. 1 contains a similar provision.00.

to repeat. The government. good customs.” In the case at bar. private respondent was made to understand that her severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her married status but. 17 contrary. afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.
NLRC G. was her violation of the company’s policy against marriage (“and even told you that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our company. or to actually dismiss. while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements.It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married.” Petitioner’s policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment. The manifest will and intent of the parties to treat the legislated increases as equivalent pro tanto to those stipulated in their collective bargaining agreement must be respected and given effect. 1994 . and the right against. Hence. such a proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor Code. as it was verbally instructed to you. Stipulation against marriage. She thus claims that she was discriminated against in gross violation of law. which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies.R. the same should not be contrary to law. The Labor Code states. Issue: WON the policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is valid? Held: Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of. or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married. 74965 November 9. with the reminder. Thus. tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status. contrarily argues that what really motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her having contracted marriage during her employment. it can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by the branch supervisor of the company. petitioner Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (hereafter. The Constitution. Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Co vs NLRC (1997) G. or public policy. to be the common thrust of applicable rulings is that the intention of the parties whether or not to equate benefits under a collective bargaining agreement with those granted by law must prevail and be given effect. that “you’re fully aware that the company is not accepting married women employee (sic). cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and political life. and conditions that they may deem convenient. but it likewise assaults good morals and public policy. a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee of protection to labor and security of tenure. That employee. to convincingly establish. the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such employee. . it may even be said that petitioner’s policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage. public order. abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by petitioner PT&T. Carried to its logical consequences. 118978 Facts: Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari. discrimination. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
vs. 136. a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated. as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under his employ. provides a gamut of protective provisions. as follows: “ART. discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage. herein private respondent Grace de Guzman.R. terms. in no uncertain terms. No. morals. one’s labor being regarded as constitutionally protected property. discharge. through substantial evidence. in the termination notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor.” Again. over and on top of that. an employer is required. PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of an employee.

1. . 17 individual complaints against Republic Hardwood Inc. this petition for certiorari. Camarines Norte. 1981.R. NLRC affirmed LA’s judgment. private respondents filed with DOLE. in respect of any and all properties of the insolvent. 110 of the Labor Code applies only in case of bankruptcy or judicial liquidation of the employer. NLRC affirmed LA’s decision averring that taxes are absolutely preferred claims only with respect to movable or immovable properties on which they are due and that since the taxes sought to be collected in this case are not due on the barges in question the government’s claim cannot prevail over the claims of employees of the Maritime Company of the Philippines which.1985. “enjoy first preference. RHI alleged that it had ceased to operate in 1983 due to the government ban against tree-cutting and that in May 24. but it was dismissed. 1986. pursuant to Art. Under Articles 2241 No.Daet. Thus. Labor Arbiter favored private respondents and held RHI and DBP jointly and severally liable to private respondents. RHI contended that since DBP foreclosed its mortgaged assets on September 24. Article 110 of the Labor Code does not purport to create a lien in favor of workers or employees for unpaid wages either upon all of the properties or upon any particular property owned by their employer. DBP appealed to the NLRC. DBP filed M. No.” ISSUE: WON the claims of the employees are given first preference over the claim for unpaid internal revenue taxes. Art. Petitioner asked the Labor Arbiter to annul the sale but the same was denied. Private respondent impleaded DBP. 1. However. This case does not involve the liquidation of the employer’s business. DBP VS. HELD: No.R. These complaints were thereafter endorsed to Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC since the petitioners had already been terminated from employment. then any adjudication of monetary claims in favor of its former employees must be satisfied against DBP. 2242 No. this tax claim must be given preference over any other claim of any other creditor. 110 of the Labor Code. Jan 29. 18 FACTS: Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued warrants of distraint of personal property and levy of real property of private respondent Maritime Company of the Philippines for failure to pay its tax liabilities. it appears that four of the barges placed under constructive distraint were levied upon execution by respondent deputy sheriff of Manila to satisfy a judgment for unpaid wages and other benefits of employees of respondent Maritime Company of the Philippines. RHI failed to pay its loan with the DBP. and 2246-2249 of the Civil Code. 1993 FACTS: November 14. its sawmill was totally burned resulting in enormous losses and that due to its financial setbacks. (RHI) for unpaid wages and separation pay. 100264-81. NLRC G.

in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses. preferred or non-preferred. NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the LA’s ruling. Claims for unpaid wages do not therefore fall at all within the category of specially preferred claims established under Articles 2241 and 2242 of the Civil Code. on the goods manufactured or the work done). upon said buildings.(claims of laborers and other workers engaged in the construction. the uncontroverted claims for separation pay show that most of the private respondents still worked up to the end of 1985. The Supreme Court applied Article 283 which provides: “. Before the workers’ preference provided by Article 110 may be invoked. A preference applies only to claims which do not attach to specific properties. canals and other works. canals and other works. Because of the petitioner’s assertion that LA and NLRC incorrectly applied the provisions of Article 110 of the Labor Code. being a mortgage credit. may be adjudicated in a binding manner. . the separation pay shall be equivalent to 1 month pay or at least 1/2 month pay for every year of service. is a special preferred credit under Article 2242 of the Civil Code while the workers’ preference is an ordinary preferred credit under Article 2244. the closure of RHI’s business was not primarily brought about by serious business losses. whichever is higher. 1985.(claims for laborers’ wages. a preference in application.” (2) No. Despite the enormous losses incurred by RHI due to the fire that gutted the sawmill in 1981 and despite the logging ban in 1953. . A distinction should be made between a preference of credit and a lien. It is a right to a first preference in the discharge of the funds of the judgment debtor. RHI would still have continued its business had not the petitioner foreclosed all of its assets and properties on September 24. the Supreme Court was constrained to grant the petition for certiorari. The right of first preference as regards unpaid wages recognized by Article 110 does not constitute a lien on the property of the insolvent debtor in favor of workers. 19 ISSUE: (1) Whether the private respondents are entitled to separation pay. It is but a preference of credit in their favor. Article 110 of the Labor Code does not create a lien in favor of workers or employees for unpaid wages either upon all of the properties or upon any particular property owned by their employer. (2) Whether the private respondents’ separation pay should be preferred than the DBP’s lien over the RHI’s mortgaged assets. .(3). reconstruction or repair of buildings. which is application in insolvency proceedings where the claims of all creditors. DBP’s lien on RHI’s mortgaged assets. or by Article 2242. . Article 110 must be read in relation to the Civil Code concerning the classification. there must first be a declaration of bankruptcy or a judicial liquidation of the employer’s business. Such closure was a consequence of DBP’s foreclosure of RHI’s assets. A lien creates a charge on a particular property. . except to the extent that such claims for unpaid wages are already covered by Article 2241. It is a method adopted to determine and specify the order in which credits should be paid in the final distribution of the proceeds of the insolvent’s assets. . (6). concurrence and preference of credits. RULING: Yes. Thus.

A. and monetary claims shall be paid in full before the claims of the Government and other creditors may be paid. should be interpreted to mean `absolute preference. R. Decision of NLRC SET ASIDE. they would come within the category of ordinary preferred credits under Article 2244. his workers shall enjoy first preference as regards their unpaid wages and other monetary claims. where the financial claim of the Philippine National Bank against BISUDECO in the form of a loan secured by a chattel. and not attached to any specific property. provisionally manage and dispose of non-performing assets of the Philippine government identified for privatization or disposition. because of BISUDECO’s continued failure of to pay its outstanding loan with PNB. Worker preference in case of bankruptcy. 6715 to the case at bar. 2005 FACTS: Petitioner Bisudeco-Philsucor Corfarm Workers Union is composed of workers of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO). Respondent Asset Privatization Trust (APT). 1st priority na talaga ang laborer’s unpaid wages regardless kung may mortgage or wala ang ibang creditors ng employer) Article 110 of the Labor Code has been amended by R. committed grave abuse of discretion when it retroactively applied the amendment introduced by R. Even if Article 110 and its Implementing Rule. The amendment cannot therefore be retroactively applied to. 50. even mortgage credits are subordinate to workers’ claims. BARAYOGA VS ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST GR 160073 OCTOBER 24. No. No. (Note: SC favored DBP kasi yung mortgage nila against RHI was executed prior to the amendment of Article 110. any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding. a sugar plantation mill located in Camarines Sur. 14. as the sole bidder. was transferred to APT as a trustee of the government. then President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 50. To give Article 110 retroactive effect would be to wipe out the mortgage in DBP’s favor and expose it to a risk which it sought to protect itself against by requiring a collateral in the form of real property.” Hence.A. Philippine Sugar Corporation (Philsucor) took over the management of the sugar plantation and milling operations. Thus. 1989. The public respondent.A. 6715. Petition GRANTED. the mortgage credit which was secured by the petitioner several years prior to its effectivity. 6715 and now reads: “Article 110. as amended. nor can it affect. took effect only on March 21. Meanwhile. – In the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of an employers business. Pero sa present. 20 Since claims for unpaid wages fall outside the scope of Article 2241 (6) and 2242 (3). The amendment can’t be given retroactive effect daw.” The amendment “expands worker preference to cover not only unpaid wages but also other monetary claims to which even claims of the Government must be deemed subordinate. Sometime later. however. therefore. under the new law. . a public trust was created under Proclamation No. pursuant to Proclamation No. Such unpaid wages. No. unless the contrary is provided.’ the same should be given only prospective effect in line with the cardinal rule that laws shall have no retroactive effect. its mortgaged properties were foreclosed and subsequently sold in a public auction to APT. mandated to conserve.

conditioned their re-hiring upon their resignation from the union but. petitioners impleaded respondents APT and Pensumil in the labor case. Article 110. It is settled that the application of Article 110 of the Labor Code[ Article 110. held that the APT liable for petitioners' claims for unfair labor practice because the petitioners' claims could not be enforced against APT as mortgagee of the foreclosed properties of BISUDECO. Inc. petitioner-union's members who were not recalled to work by Philsucor. passed another resolution authorizing the payment of separation benefits to BISUDECO's employees in the event of the company's privatization. seek to hold APT liable for their monetary claims and allegedly illegal dismissal. He claimed that the labourers have voluntarily agreed to give him . Atty. Leonardo C. Appeals were made against this decision. during which all creditors are convened. the management. his workers shall enjoy first preference as regards their unpaid wages and other monetary claims shall be paid in full before the claims of the Government and other creditors may be paid. 21 The union filed a labor case against BISUDECO-Phisucor for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal when. at the time of the employees' illegal dismissal. the APT's Board of Trustees sold the plantation to Peñafrancia Sugar Mill (Pensumil). CIR sent the Chief Examiner to go to Biscom and compute the backwages. all respondents interposed the defense of lack of employer-employee relationship. Total net backwages amounted to P79. CIR GR No. Clearly. Thus. his workers shall enjoy first preference as regards their unpaid wages and other monetary claims shall be paid in full before the claims of the Government and other creditors may be paid AMALGAMATED LABORERS ASSOCIATION VS. under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. because it is a specially preferred credit to which the worker’s monetary claims is deemed subordinate. Workers' claims for unpaid wages and monetary benefits cannot be paid outside of a bankruptcy or judicial liquidation proceedings against the employer. the appellate court. In the interim. Hence. Now. were petitioner-union's members who had not been recalled to work. Worker’s preference in case of bankruptcy. ISSUE: Whether APT is liable for the claims of petitioners against their former employer. Responsibility for the liabilities of a mortgagor towards its employees cannot be transferred via an auction sale to a purchaser who is also the mortgagee-creditor of the foreclosed assets and chattels. Fernandez (herein respondent). The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC thereafter.22. and preserved in harmony is the legal scheme of classification. and the Labor Code. Upon motion of the complainants. though. It was ruled that while no employer-employee relationship existed between members of the petitioner union and APT. Worker’s preference in case of bankruptcy. L-23467 March 27. The board. however. as chief counsel. He alleged therein that he had been the attorney of record for the said case since the inception of the preliminary hearings of said case up to the Supreme Court in Appeal. the mortgagee-creditor has no employer-employee relations with the mortgagor’s workers. the Insolvency Law. under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. filed a “Notice of Attorney’s Lien” over the amount to be awarded. (Biscom). Not included in the Resolution. ordered APT to pay herein complainants. Assured thereby is an orderly determination of the preference given to creditors' claims. the assets of BISUDECO had been transferred to the national government through APT. concurrence and preference of credits in the Civil Code.755. their claims ascertained and inventoried. and their preferences determined. HELD: NO. On appeal. 1968 FACTS: Amalgamated Laborers’ Association won a case of unfair labor practice against Binalbagan Sugar Central Company. The mortgage constitutes a lien on the determinate properties of the employer-debtor. – In the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of the employer’s business. in the same case. nonetheless employed the services of outsiders under the pakyaw system. – In the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of the employer’s business.] is contingent upon the institution of those proceedings.

Hence. to direct that the present dispute be lodged in another court as petitioners advocate would only result in multiplicity of suits. before the aforesaid case was elevated to this Court. Entry of final judgment was issued by the Court on July 15. He further averred that this is already a discounted fee out of the plea of the union’s president to reduce it from 30% for them to also satisfy Atty. Fernandez. Jose Ur Carbonell. a labor organization affiliated with the Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR). 1882 and. This and a subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Fernandez.Yes. 22 as attorney’s fees on contingent basis 25% of the award. Furthermore. As such. No division of fees for legal services is proper. it is not denied that as early as March 13. a domestic corporation engaged in the telecommunications business. Carbonell and respondent Atty. Said letter-decision was affirmed by the Office of the President in O. Atty. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS VS. this Court in its resolution of July 15. 1. Afterall. but should always be subject to the supervision of a court. SECRETARY OF LABOR GR 77959 JAN 1989 FACTS: petitioner.P. Court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction. CIR decided the appeals still in favour of the petitioners and ordered Biscom to deposit the amount representing 25% of P79. 2) the award of 25% as attorney’s fees to Atty. He may seek compensation only as union president.00 daily effective March 22. as to its reasonableness. and in the absence of prohibitive legislation. An examination of the record of the case will readily show that an award of 25% attorney’s fees reasonably compensates the whole legal services rendered in the case. Case No. 1985 in G. 1985. except with another lawyer. filed with the National Wages Council an application for exemption from the coverage of Wage Order No.22 with the cashier of the court to be awarded and granted to Atty. Since the court of Industrial Relations obviously had the jurisdiction over the main cases. such as claims for attorney’s fees made by the members of the bar who appeared therein. 2 The application was opposed by respondent URCPICLA-FUR. Meanwhile. Though common effort is presumed. the rightful shares of both must be ascertained. it shall also be impliedly granted. 1981. a situation abhorred by the rule. In the absence of such express grant. unfair and illegal. based upon a division of service and responsibility. National Wages Council disapproving said application and ordering the petitioner to pay its covered employees the mandatory living allowance of P2.Is 25% of the award a reasonable attorney’s fee? RULING: 1. the case has been remanded to the CIR for the sole determination of shares. This must however be shared by petitioner Atty. 70148 dismissed RCPI's petition for certiorari for lack of merit.No. 2. subsequently. this petition. ISSUES: 1. asserting therein its claim to 15% of the total backpay due to all its members as "union service fee" for having successfully prosecuted the latter's claim for payment of wages and for .Is CIR bereft of jurisdiction over the claim for attorney’s fees? 2. 1985. Fernandez is excessive.755. In the case at bench. No. Carbonell and ALA appealed from the decision contending that 1) CIR is bereft of jurisdiction to adjudicate contractual disputes over attorney’s fees averring that a dispute arising from contracts for attorney’s fees is not a labor dispute and is not one among the cases ruled to be within CIR’s authority and to consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a case over which CIR may validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard the special and limited nature of said court’s jurisdiction. A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an attorney is to receive in a suit should be reasonable under all circumstances of the case.R. they are the counsel of record of the complainants. it likewise had jurisdiction to consider and decide all matters collateral thereto. The union president is not the attorney for the labourers. OTHER IMPORTANT POINTS: Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns the arrangement wherein union presidents should share in the attorney’s fees. respondent union filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution.

par c) Of and from the aforesaid total amount due every employee. 1985. 10% thereof shall be considered as attorney's fee due Atty. that "there is no legal basis for respondent Union to have the sum equivalent to 20% union service fee deducted from the amount due to every recipient member". According to their CBA. 10% thereof shall be considered as attorney's fee. SC find no cogent reason to disturb the order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment finding petitioner liable for the union service fee of private respondent. or Manila. petitioner filed its opposition to said motion. In this connection. On October 24. without the knowledge and consent of respondent union. meat traders. respectively.6 On September 24. 1985. He and the herein union assume sole responsibility for and shall hold RCPI free and harmless from any claim. to be remitted to the institution previously adverted to. Petitioner imports cattle by the boatload from Australia into the ports of General Santos City. RULING: NO. petitioner entered into a compromise agreements 9 with BMRCPI-NFL as the new bargaining agent of oppositors RCPI employees. meat processors. fattening and distribution of live cattle for sale to meat dealers.R. Rodolfo Capocyan. canned good manufacturers and other dealers in Mindanao and in Metro Manila. 2009 FACTS:  Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of importation. 23 reimbursement of expenses incurred by FUR and prayed for the segregation and remittance of said amount to FUR thru its National President. employees of herein petitioner. 14 although. Subic. that particular aspect or deficiency is deemed to have been supplied. however. or what it termed as "union service fee. 1994. 1993 and October 29. if not modified pro tanto. Batangas.' ISSUE: whether the public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding the petitioner solely liable for "union service fee' to respondent URCPICLA-FUR.  Respondents Albert Caban and Chiquito Bastida were hired by petitioner on June 25. Considering. asserting. DEALCO FARMS VS. NLRC G. Rodolfo Capocyan manifest (sic) that he is authorized by the covered employee (sic) to collect 10% of whatever is/are due them as attorney's fees and undertakes and binds himself to submit to RCPI the required individual check-off authorization with respect to the 30%. among others. as hereinafter discussed. the same to be deducted from the remaining 70% and distributed to Atty. production. suit or complaint arising from the deduction of this 10% attorney's fee. by the compromise agreement subsequently executed between the parties. 1985. it sought to withhold it from respondent union. A cursory perusal of said agreement shows an unqualified admission by petitioner that "from the aforesaid total amount due every employee. did not expressly provide for payment of attorney's fees. No." is indubitable. Capocyan at the time of the distribution of the remaining 70%. Atty. In a subsequent "Motion for Immediate Issuance of Writ of Execution". 153192 January 30. While it is true that the original decision of said Council. that respondent union was categorically found by the Labor Secretary to have been responsible for the successful prosecution of the case to its ultimate conclusion in behalf of its member. as escorts or comboys for the transit of live cattle . respondent union reiterated its claim for said union service fee but this time in an amount equivalent to 20% of the total backpay due its members. its right to fees for services rendered. dated September 9. R.

that respondents can only be considered as casual employees performing work not necessary and desirable to the usual business or trade of petitioner. . Noteworthy is the fact that respondents’ affidavit merely contain a statement that the offer of their services as comboys or escorts was not limited to petitioner alone. HELD: No. were engaged by Dealco on a per trip basis. Upon arrival in Manila. cattle fattening to market weight and production. service incentive leave pay. 280. thus. as comboys. 24 from General Santos City to Manila. an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. on a per trip or per contract basis. which denied due course and dismissed the petition for procedural flaws. which commenced upon embarkation on a ship for Manila and terminated upon their return to the port of origin. salary differentials. likewise. 280).e. Art. i. petitioner admits that respondents were engaged. respectively. the Fifth Division affirmed the Labor Arbiters ruling on the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties .  Respondents filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for separation pay with full backwages. Petitioner posits. this appeal ISSUE(S): Whether the employees are casual workers.. Petitioner failed to disprove respondents’ claim that they were hired by petitioner as comboys from 1993 and 1994. even assuming they were casual employees they may be considered regular employees with respect to the activity in which they were employed and their employment shall continue while such activity exists (last par. Transporting the cattle to its main market in Manila is an essential and component aspect of [petitioners] operation. Second. petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. This assertion petitioner failed anew to substantiate.  Hence. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties. Even assuming that respondents task is not part of petitioners regular course of business. including herein respondents. Respondents work entailed tending to the cattle during transportation. and attorneys fees against petitioner before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The affidavits simply aver that they.  Petitioner denies the existence of an employer-employee relationship with respondents. at one point. of Art. denied by the appellate court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was. among others. Regular and Casual Employment. RATIO: First. o More. damages. the cattle are turned over to and received by the duly acknowledged buyers or customers of petitioner. o All the four elements in the determination of an employer-employee relationship being present. at which point. therefore. Respondents did not state that their engagement by petitioner was on a one-time basis.  The Labor Arbiter found that respondents were employees of petitioner. this does not preclude their attainment of regular employee status. o Respondents also performed activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of petitioner. except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. respondents were.  Undaunted. it appears that respondents had rendered service for more than one year doing the same task repeatedly. petitioners claim remains an unsubstantiated and bare-faced allegation. In fact. respondents work ceases. employees of petitioner. 13th month pay. As a result.  On appeal to the NLRC.

Definition of certain terms As used in this issuance. 851 December 16. regardless of the nature of their employment. whether such service is continuous or broken.000 a month. Undoubtedly. 174. That. the Christmas season is an opportune time for society to show its concern for the plight of the working masses so they may properly celebrate Christmas and New Year. do hereby decree as follows: Section 1. hereinafter referred to as the "Decree". This Decree shall take effect immediately. 851. without regard to continuity or brokenness of the service. FERDINAND E. and all allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the regular or basic salary of the employee at the time of the promulgation of the Decree on December 16. Employers already paying their employees a 13th-month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree. any employee who has rendered at least one year of service. 1975. Section 2. 851 are hereby issued for the guidance of all concerned. THEREFORE. . a 13th-month pay not later than December 24 of every year. this 16th day of December 1975. Section 1. (a) "Thirteenth-moth pay" shall mean one twelfth (1/12) of the basic salary of an employee within a calendar year.000 a month a thirteenth-month pay not later than December 24 of every year. profit-sharing payments. 851 By virtue of the powers vested in me by law. respondents were regular employees of petitioner with respect to the escort or comboy activity for which they had been engaged since 1993 and 1994. respectively. RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. NOW. 25 An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided. (b) "Basic salary" shall include all remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an employee for services rendered but may not include cost-of-living allowances granted pursuant to Presidential Decree No. Section 2. there has been no increase in the legal minimum wage rates since 1970. WHEREAS. Done in the City of Manila. it is necessary to further protect the level of real wages from the ravage of worldwide inflation. 1976 REQUIRING ALL EMPLOYERS TO PAY THEIR EMPLOYEES A 13th-MONTH PAY WHEREAS. shall pay to all their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than P1. by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution. shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. Payment of 13-month Pay All employers covered by Presidential Decree No. WHEREAS. MARCOS. 525 or Letter of Instructions No. the following rules and regulations implementing Presidential Decree No. Section 3. I. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. All employers are hereby required to pay all their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than P1.

as well as premium contributions to the State Insurance Fund. Section 8. regardless of their position. cost of living allowances and all other allowances regularly enjoyed by the employee. without regard to the time spent in producing the same. (c) Employers already paying their employees 13-month pay or more in a calendar year of its equivalent at the time of this issuance. except those corporations operating essentially as private subsidiaries of the Government. has consistently declined by more than forty (40%) percent of their normal income for the last two (2) years. social security. contributions. including government-owned and controlled corporations. 26 Section 3. and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid. 1976. Option of covered employers A covered employer may pay one-half of the 13th-month pay required by the Decree before the opening of the regular school year and the other half on or before the 24th day of December of every year. workers paid on piece-rate basis shall refer to those who are paid a standard amount for every piece or unit of work produced that is more or less regularly replicated. Section 5. As used herein. provided that they have worked for at least one month during the calendar year.000 a month. Section 6. except where the workers are paid on piece-rate basis in which case the employer shall be covered by this issuance insofar as such workers are concerned. fringe benefits. and those who are paid a fixed amount for performing a specific work. (b) The Government and any of its political subdivisions. Exemption of Distressed employers Distressed employers shall qualify for exemption from the requirement of the Decree upon prior authorization by the Secretary of Labor. The term "its equivalent" as used in paragraph c) hereof shall include Christmas bonus. profit-sharing payments and other cash bonuses amounting to not less than 1/12th of the basic salary but shall not include cash and stock dividends. medicare and private welfare and retirement plans. Special feature of benefit The benefits granted under this issuance shall not be credited as part of the regular wage of the employees for purposes of determining overtime and premium pay. Where an employer pays less than 1/12th of the employees basic salary. boundary. as well as non-monetary benefits. such as (1) those which are currently incurring substantial losses or (2) in the case of non-profit institutions and organizations. the periodicity or frequency of payment of the 13th month pay may be the subject of agreement. In any establishment where a union has been recognized or certified as the collective bargaining agent of the employees therein. grants and other earnings from any source. Section 4. The regional offices shall transmit the petitions to the Secretary of Labor within 24 hours from receipt thereof. (d) Employers of household helpers and persons in the personal service of another in relation to such workers. where their income. Section 7. Employees covered Except as provided in Section 3 of this issuance. all employees of covered employers shall be entitled to benefit provided under the Decree who are receiving not more than P1. subject to the provision of Section 7 of this issuance. Employers covered The Decree shall apply to all employers except to: (a) Distressed employers. Petitions for exemptions may be filed within the nearest regional office having jurisdiction over the employer not later than January 15. mid-year bonus. Nothing herein shall prevent employers from giving the benefits provided in the Decree to their employees who are receiving more than One Thousand (P1. or task basis. . whether from donations. Report of compliance Every covered employer shall make a report of his compliance with the Decree to the nearest regional labor office not later than January 15 of each year. the employer shall pay the difference.000) Pesos a month or benefits higher than those provided by the Decree. designation or employment status. and (e) Employers of those who are paid on purely commission. irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof.

D. Prohibition against reduction or elimination of benefits Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize any employer to eliminate. 22 December 1975. Total amount of benefits granted 8. Total employment 5. Section 11. NO. Contractors and Subcontractors. no. the following clarifications are hereby made for the information and guidance of all concerned: 1. Name. Principal product or business 4. 851 and its implementing regulations. Total number of workers benefited 6. including Security and Watchman Agencies. Section 10. or diminish in any way. Transitory Provision These rules and regulations shall take effect immediately and for purposes of the 13-month pay for 1975. of person giving information Section 9. . Amount granted per employee 7. supplements. SUPPLEMENTARY RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING P. the same shall apply only to those who are employees as of December 16. Philippines. position and tel. Name of establishment 2. Manila. No. are exempt for the year 1975 subject to the following conditions: (a) that the contracts of such enterprises were entered into before December 16. application and enforcement of the provisions of P. 27 The report shall conform substantially with the following form: REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH PD NO. 1975. (b) that such enterprises have complied with all labor standards laws during the year. 1975. 851 1. 851 To insure uniformity in the interpretation. Adjudication of claims Non-payment of the thirteenth-month pay provided by the Decree and these rules shall be treated as money claims cases and shall be processed in accordance with the Rules Implementing the Labor Code of the Philippines and the Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission. Address 3. or other employee benefits or favorable practice being enjoyed by the employee at the time of promulgation of this issuance.D.

7730. Private school teachers. Nothing herein shall sanction the withdrawal or diminution of any compensation. In view of the lack of sufficient time for the dissemination of the provisions of P. An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under this Article may be appealed to the latter. Overtime pay. 6. (As amended by Republic Act No. the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. In case the violation is attributable to the fault of the employer. Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary. 3. 4.D. wage order or rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto. June 2. 1976 except in private schools where compliance for 1975 may be made not later than 30 June 1976. except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection. Visitorial and enforcement power. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives. condition or matter which may be necessary to determine violations or which may aid in the enforcement of this Code and of any labor law. 2. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders. LABOR CODE AS AMENDED) Chapter VI ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT Art. 851 and its Rules and the unavailability of adequate cash flow due to the long holiday season. 1994) The Secretary of Labor and Employment may likewise order stoppage of work or suspension of operations of any unit or department of an establishment when non-compliance with the law or implementing rules and regulations poses grave and imminent danger to the health and safety of workers in the workplace. No. an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from. . 5. are entitled to 1/12 of their annual basic pay regardless of the number of months they teach or are paid within a year. and the right to copy therefrom. (As amended by Republic Act No. earnings and other remunerations which are not part of the basic salary shall not be included in the computation of the 13-month pay. In case said order involves a monetary award. 28 (c) that the contract cannot really accomodate 13-month pay or its equivalent. 7730. and (d) that the contract does not provide for cost escalation clause. he shall pay the employees concerned their salaries or wages during the period of such stoppage of work or suspension of operation. benefits or any supplements being enjoyed by the employees on the effective date of this issuance. New establishments operating for less than one year are not covered except subsidiaries or branches of foreign and domestic corporations. to question any employee and investigate any fact. and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists. 128. including labor regulation officers. This exemption is without prejudice on the part of the workers to negotiate with their employers or to seek payment thereof by filing appropriate complaints with the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor. June 2. Within twenty-four hours. including faculty members of colleges and universities. ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR STANDARDS (ARTICLES 128 TO 129. 1994). compliance and reporting of compliance with this Decree are hereby extended up to March 31. a hearing shall be conducted to determine whether an order for the stoppage of work or suspension of operations shall be lifted or not. shall have access to employer’s records and premises at any time of the day or night whenever work is being undertaken therein.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representative may supervise the payment of unpaid wages and other monetary claims and benefits. or abuse of authority. 131. be subject to summary dismissal from the service. 3. 29 It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to obstruct. In case of urgent work to be performed on machineries. to hear and decide any matter involving the recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits. delay or otherwise render ineffective the orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives issued pursuant to the authority granted under this Article. The Regional Director or hearing officer shall decide or resolve the complaint within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the filing of the same. with or without compensation: 1. the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment or any of the duly authorized hearing officers of the Department is empowered. 1989) Title III WORKING CONDITIONS FOR SPECIAL GROUPS OF EMPLOYEES Chapter I EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN Art. Republic Act No. other than agricultural. shall be employed or permitted or suffered to work. Recovery of wages. 129. flood. to avoid serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer. or 3. (As amended by Section 2. after appropriate administrative investigation. epidemic or other disasters or calamity.00). Any decision or resolution of the Regional Director or hearing officer pursuant to this provision may be appealed on the same grounds provided in Article 223 of this Code. under this Article shall. March 21. simple money claims and other benefits. No woman.000. to the National Labor Relations Commission which shall resolve the appeal within ten (10) calendar days from the submission of the last pleading required or allowed under its rules. or 2. earthquake. . fire. shall be held as a special fund of the Department of Labor and Employment to be used exclusively for the amelioration and benefit of workers. typhoon. including legal interest. the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Regional Director directly to the employee or househelper concerned. 130. arising from employer-employee relations: Provided. Art. including legal interest. That such complaint does not include a claim for reinstatement: Provided further. Upon complaint of any interested party. The prohibitions prescribed by the preceding Article shall not apply in any of the following cases: 1. by appropriate regulations. Any sum thus recovered on behalf of any employee or househelper pursuant to this Article shall be held in a special deposit account by. Any government employee found guilty of violation of. owing to an employee or person employed in domestic or household service or househelper under this Code. equipment or installation. and shall be paid on order of. within five (5) calendar days from receipt of a copy of said decision or resolution. In any industrial undertaking or branch thereof between ten o’clock at night and six o’clock in the morning of the following day. In any agricultural undertaking at nighttime unless she is given a period of rest of not less than nine (9) consecutive hours. Where the work is necessary to prevent serious loss of perishable goods. between midnight and six o’clock in the morning of the following day. Nightwork prohibition. In cases of actual or impending emergencies caused by serious accident. Any such sum not paid to the employee or househelper because he cannot be located after diligent and reasonable effort to locate him within a period of three (3) years. 2. found owing to any employee or househelper under this Code. impede. to prevent loss of life or property. The Secretary of Labor and Employment may. or in cases of force majeure or imminent danger to public safety. through summary proceeding and after due notice. Exceptions. In any commercial or non-industrial undertaking or branch thereof. regardless of age. Art. 6715. and no inferior court or entity shall issue temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order or otherwise assume jurisdiction over any case involving the enforcement orders issued in accordance with this Article. require employers to keep and maintain such employment records as may be necessary in aid of his visitorial and enforcement powers under this Code. That the aggregate money claims of each employee or househelper does not exceed Five thousand pesos (P5.

6. Art. 5. require any employer to: 1. Where the women employees are immediate members of the family operating the establishment or undertaking. The maternity leave shall be extended without pay on account of illness medically certified to arise out of the pregnancy. or where the woman employee has been engaged to provide health and welfare services. salary or other form of remuneration and fringe benefits. which renders the woman unfit for work. and 2. he shall. May 12. To establish separate toilet rooms and lavatories for men and women and provide at least a dressing room for women. 1. including wage. provided they can perform their duties in this position without detriment to efficiency. delivery. 2. Every employer shall grant to any pregnant woman employee who has rendered an aggregate service of at least six (6) months for the last twelve (12) months. 135. (As amended by Republic Act No. 137. 134. for work of equal value. training opportunities.Payment of a lesser compensation. Prohibited acts. Maternity leave benefits. by regulations. Family planning services. abortion or miscarriage. and 7. Stipulation against marriage. The actions hereby authorized shall proceed independently of each other. unless she has earned unused leave credits from which such extended leave may be charged. 6725. the application or use of contraceptive pills and intrauterine devices. 1. 2. 133. It shall be unlawful for any employer to discriminate against any woman employee with respect to terms and conditions of employment solely on account of her sex. Facilities for women. but not be limited to. Where the woman employee holds a responsible position of managerial or technical nature. incentives for family planning. 1989) Art. To establish a nursery in a workplace for the benefit of the women employees therein. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married. The employer may require from any woman employee applying for maternity leave the production of a medical certificate stating that delivery will probably take place within two weeks. Art. 3. which may include claims for damages and other affirmative reliefs. Discrimination prohibited. and 4. discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage. the Department of Labor and Employment shall develop and prescribe incentive bonus schemes to encourage family planning among female workers in any establishment or enterprise. 3. discharge. 132. That the institution of any criminal action under this provision shall not bar the aggrieved employee from filing an entirely separate and distinct action for money claims. Under other analogous cases exempted by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in appropriate regulations. study and scholarship grants solely on account of their sexes. In appropriate cases. to a female employees as against a male employee. maternity leave of at least two (2) weeks prior to the expected date of delivery and another four (4) weeks after normal delivery or abortion with full pay based on her regular or average weekly wages. Where the nature of the work requires the manual skill and dexterity of women workers and the same cannot be performed with equal efficiency by male workers. 30 4. or to actually dismiss. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees. Art.  It shall be unlawful for any employer: . Art. The following are acts of discrimination: 1. 2. Provide seats proper for women and permit them to use such seats when they are free from work and during working hours. To determine appropriate minimum age and other standards for retirement or termination in special occupations such as those of flight attendants and the like. Favoring a male employee over a female employee with respect to promotion. a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated. Establishments which are required by law to maintain a clinic or infirmary shall provide free family planning services to their employees which shall include. Criminal liability for the willful commission of any unlawful act as provided in this Article or any violation of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to Section 2 hereof shall be penalized as provided in Articles 288 and 289 of this Code: Provided. or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married. Art. The maternity leave provided in this Article shall be paid by the employer only for the first four (4) deliveries by a woman employee after the effectivity of this Code. 136. In coordination with other agencies of the government engaged in the promotion of family planning.

to a similar job for which they are fit to work.— Night workers who are certified as unfit for night work. SEC. Art.  To discharge such woman on account of her pregnancy. OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled: SECTION 1. THEREBY REPEALING ARTICLES 130 AND 131 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NUMBER FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-TWO. This limit shall be fixed by the Secretary of Labor after consulting the workers’ representatives/labor organizations and employers. 10151 AN ACT ALLOWING THE EMPLOYMENT OF NIGHT WORKERS. 156. Transfer. 2. massage clinic. 155. Classification of certain women workers. workers shall have the right to undergo a health assessment without charge and to receive advice on how to reduce or avoid health problems associated with their work: “(a) Before taking up an assignment as a night worker. bar or similar establishments under the effective control or supervision of the employer for a substantial period of time as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.” “Art.— This chapter shall apply to all persons. maritime transport and inland navigation. with or without compensation. Any woman who is permitted or suffered to work. 3. shall be considered as an employee of such establishment for purposes of labor and social legislation.— Suitable first-aid facilities shall be made available for workers performing night work. due to health reasons. fishing. A new chapter is hereby inserted after Book Three. Coverage. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4. or while on leave or in confinement due to her pregnancy. to read as follows: “Chapter V “Employment of Night Workers “Art. Title III of Presidential Decree No. whenever practicable. after consulting the workers’ representatives/labor organizations and employers. to be determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. stock raising. 154. except those employed in agriculture. shall be transferred. during a period of not less than seven (7) consecutive hours. The employers are likewise required to provide safe and healthful working conditions and adequate or reasonable facilities such as sleeping or resting quarters in the establishment and transportation from the work premises to the nearest point of their residence subject to exceptions and guidelines to be provided by the DOLE. in any night club. can be taken immediately to a place for appropriate treatment. SEC. AS AMENDED. the findings of such assessments shall not be transmitted to others without the workers’ consent and shall not be used to their detriment.” “Art. “(b) At regular intervals during such an assignment. 31  To deny any woman employee the benefits provided for in this Chapter or to discharge any woman employed by him for the purpose of preventing her from enjoying any of the benefits provided under this Code. including arrangements where such workers. 442. cocktail lounge. Title III. 157. SEC.  To discharge or refuse the admission of such woman upon returning to her work for fear that she may again be pregnant. and “(c) If they experience health problems during such an assignment which are not caused by factors other than the performance of night work. Mandatory Facilities. The subsequent articles in Boot Three. who shall be employed or permitted or suffered to work at night. . Article 131 of the Labor Code is hereby repealed. 138. Health Assessment.” “Art. – At their request. ‘”Night worker’ means any employed person whose work requires performance of a substantial number of hours of night work which exceeds a specified limit. Article 130 of the Labor Code is hereby repealed. including the interval from midnight to five o’clock in the morning. where necessary. Chapter I to Chapter IV of Presidential Decree No. “With the exception of a finding of unfitness for night work. 442 are hereby renumbered accordingly.

SEC.— The compensation for night workers in the form of working time.” “Art. If the offense is committed by a corporation. and specify. at the discretion of the court. “The provisions of this article shall not have the effect of reducing the protection and benefits connected with maternity leave under existing laws. the length of which shall be determined by the DOLE after consulting the labor organizations and employers. 160. Compensation. 161. the penalty shall be imposed upon the guilty officer or officers of such corporation. partnership or association. or both. the employer shall consult the workers’ representatives/labor organizations concerned on the details of such schedules and the forms of organization of night work that are best adapted to the establishment and its personnel. 8. consultation shall take place regularly. in the ease of pregnant employees. partnership or association. “A night worker certified as temporarily unfit for night work shall be given the same protection against dismissal or notice of dismissal as other workers who are prevented from working for reasons of health.00) nor more than Fifty thousand pesos (P50.” “Art. 7. where necessary.— Any violation of this Act. Application. other than the company physician. Night Work Schedules. safety and welfare of night workers. firm. SEC. in respect of which a medical certificate is produced stating that said additional periods are necessary for the health of the mother or child: “(1) During pregnancy. 158. “During the periods referred to in this article: “(i) A woman worker shall not be dismissed or given notice of dismissal. ‘Pregnant women and nursing mothers may he allowed to work at night only if a competent physician.—Appropriate social services shall be provided for night workers and.— Measures shall be taken to ensure that an alternative to night work is available to women workers who would otherwise be called upon to perform such work: “(a) Before and after childbirth. firm. which shall be divided between the time before and after childbirth. “The measures referred to in this article may include transfer to day work where this is possible. the provision of social security benefits or an extension of maternity leave. 6. 9.000.— If any portion of this Act is declared unconstitutional. trust. “(b) For additional periods. the same shall not affect the validity and effectivity of the other provisions not affected thereby. Penalties. 32 “If such transfer to a similar job is not practicable. SEC. and access to promotion which may attach to her regular night work position. Guidelines. Title I. In establishments employing night workers. Social Services. for workers performing night work.000. except for just or authorised causes provided for in this Code that are not connected with pregnancy. and the rules and regulations issued pursuant hereof shall be punished with a fine of not less than Thirty thousand pesos (P30.00) or imprisonment of not less than six (6) months. SEC. as well as on the occupational health measures and social services which are required. shall certify their fitness to render night work.” “Art. for a period of at least sixteen (16) weeks. seniority. The subsequent articles starting from Book Four. trust.” SEC.— The measures referred to in this chapter shall be applied not later than six (G) months from the effectivity of this Act. Chapter I of Presidential Decree No. 442 are hereby renumbered accordingly.— Before introducing work schedules requiring the services of night workers. Separability Clause. the period of the pregnancy that they can safely work. “(2) During a specified time beyond the period. “(ii) A woman worker shall not lose the benefits regarding her status. Women Night Workers. 159. 5. . after childbirth is fixed pursuant to subparagraph (a) above. or to secure employment during such period.” “Art. childbirth and childcare responsibilities. or other entity. or entity. pay or similar benefits shall recognize the exceptional nature of night work.— The DOLE shah promulgate appropriate regulations in addition to existing ones to ensure protection. these workers shall be granted the same benefits as other workers who are unable to work.

her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. by regulations. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES.75 of her collections. or to actually dismiss. 118978.— All laws. when she signed the reliever agreements on June 10. discharge. Stipulation against marriage. Second." Article 136 provides. he shall. 1991. 1991 to July 1. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married. as she had represented herself. PAL sought refuge from Article 132. no regulation had yet been issued by the Secretary of Labor to implement Article 132. LABOR CODE AS AMENDED ZIALCITA V. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. 1991. during the time Zialcita was terminated. 1991 to August 8.F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods. 1991 as reliever for C. a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated. The Labor Arbiter handed down a decision declaring that private respondent. February 20. executive orders. the NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiter but . 1991. acts. "Article 132. was illegally dismissed by petitioner and ordered her reinstatement plus payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA. Grace volunteered the information that she had failed to remit the amount of P2. 1977) FACTS: Zialcita is a stewardess of PAL. require any employer to: To determine appropriate minimum age and other standards for retirement or termination in special occupations such as those of flight attendants and the like. are hereby modified and repealed. Article 132 provides. Repealing Clause. In appropriate cases. such would be in violation of Article 136 of the Labor Code. In the job application form furnished to Grace. On appeal. 11 Effectivity Clause. INC. On September 2. which are inconsistent with this Act. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees. 33 SEC. decrees. 1991 and July 8. "Article 136. NLRC.— This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. This meant she was not single. May 23. Under the Reliever Agreement signed by Grace. Zialcita anchored on Article 136 of the Labor Code. or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married. At the preliminary conference. The policy also states that subsequent marriage of a stewardess shall automatically terminate employment. Article 136's protection of women is broader and more powerful than the regulation provided under Article 132. discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage. and from July 19. Grace was asked to join petitioner company as a probationary employee. and executed a promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner. PAL argued and cited its policy that stewardesses must be single. Grace immediately filed a complaint for illegal dismissal coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA). Petitioner dismissed Grace from the company after learning about Grace’s real civil status and being unconvinced of Grace’s explanation for the discrepancy. 1990 until April 20. even assuming that the Secretary of Labor had already issued such a regulation and to the effect that stewardesses should remain single. (Case No. STIPULATION AGAINST MARRIAGE . who had already gained the status of a regular employee. From June 10. GR No. v. RO4-3-3398-76. rules and regulations or other issuances or parts thereof. SEC. Facilities for women. PT&T Co. PT&T again engaged the services of Grace as reliever for Erlinda F.380. she indicated in the civil status that she was single although she had in fact contracted marriage on May 26. 1991. She was fired from work because she had gotten married. before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Baguio City. 1997 FACTS: Grace de Guzman was hired by PT&T as a Supernumerary Project Worker for a fixed period from November 21. 1991. 10.ARTICLE 36. First of all." ISSUE: Was Zialcita's termination proper? HELD: The termination was improper.

corrective labor and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more frequency in the years. organized and unorganized. discharge . and training opportunities. . albeit disproportionate. a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated . then an employee of the Repacking Section. then a Sheeting Machine Operator. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol. Two of these are Republic Act No. The Constitution provides a gamut of protective provisions due to the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and political life. the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory. 2006 FACTS: Simbol was employed by the company and met a co-employee and they eventually had a relationship and got married. Simbol resigned. among others. discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage. 2) if the two employees got married. The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides “it shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married. the manager advise the couple that should they decide to get married. In the case at bar. to Alma Dayrit. local and overseas. and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all” and Article XIII Section 14 which states that “The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions. one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated first. The private respondent’s act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. RULING: No. effect. it is not a valid exercise of management prerogative and violates the rights of employees under the constitution. 164774. affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts. In the Labor Code.” Since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1. promotion. No. STAR PAPER VS SIMBOL G. 34 modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three months due to the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned. must clearly establish the requirement of reasonableness. there was no reasonable business necessity. Prior to the marriage. 1974. one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy: 1) new applicant will not be allowed to be hired if he/she has a relative.” The company policy of Star Paper. 7192 or the Women in Development and Nation Building Act which. taking into account their maternal functions. a valid exercise of management prerogative. 6727 which explicitly prohibits discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment. already employed by the company. could be detrimental to its business operations. to be upheld. or to actually dismiss.” Corollary to this is Article XIII Section 3 which states that “The State shall afford full protection to labor. April 12. Article II Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution states that “The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building. she was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from work.R. and Republic Act No. Lastly. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory. or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married. and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the service of the nation. ISSUE: Can the alleged concealment of civil status be a ground for terminating the services of an employee? HELD: No. ISSUE: Whether or not the policy of the employer banning spouse from working in the same company. In other words. up to 3rd degree of consanguinity. and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men. Article 136 explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee.

Glaxo's competition. GLAXO WELCOME GR NO. Unable to comply with condition. that he agrees to study and abide by the existing company rules. to resign from the company. Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy. an employee of Astra. The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy. insensibility. Corollarily. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied. 2004 FACTS: Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance Committee and while pending. Before getting married. an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes impossible. and other confidential programs and information from competitors.. On Constructive Dismissal Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting. 15. . Tecson's District Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but marriage took place in Sept. On Nov. to disclose to management any existing future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest. 1995. 35 DUNCAN VS. ISSUE: Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company is valid RULING: On Equal Protection Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets. 162994 SEPTEMBER 17. the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid. Company's Code of Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation that management may transfer the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for employment outside of the company after 6 months. 2000. Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. with due regard for the lot of the employee. Contract of employment signed by Tecson stipulates. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner. however. manufacturing formulas. 1998. among others. Tecson's superiors informed him of conflict of intrest. In Jan. marketing strategies. After his request against transfer was denied. None of these conditions are present in the instant case. he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. it has been held in a long array of US Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection clause erects to shield against merely privately conduct. The prohibition against pesonal or marital relationships with employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy resign from their respective positions).. 24. 1999. unreasonable or unlikely. discriminatory or wrongful. It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. or diminution in pay. when there is demotion in rank. or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. or when a clear discrimination.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner as illegally dismissed Rulings: Yes. Tropical alleged that Belga concealed her pregnancy from the company. In the case at bar. petitioner herein. be violating the Labor Code which prohibits an employer to discharge an employee on account of the latter’s pregnancy. Lakpue Drug Inc.R. brought her daughter to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) for treatment of broncho-pneumonia. Her absence for 16 days was justified considering that she had just delivered a child. Belga G. 36 HELD: The challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo impartially and disinterestedly for a long period of time. it must be stressed that respondent’s discharge by reason of absences caused by her pregnancy is covered by the prohibition under the Labor Code. petitioner will. 2001. 2005 Facts: Ma. No. The undeniable fact is that during her complained absences in 1994. Issue: Whether or not Belga is illegally dismissed. respondent herein was dismissed by the petitioner Del Monte Philippines due to excessive absences without permission. respondent was pregnant and suffered related illnesses. the record shows that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest brought about by his relationship with Betsy. While at the PGH. The respondent’s sickness was pregnancy-related and. The respondent alleged that her absences was due to urinary tract infection. Lourdes Belga (Belga). Belga was dismissed on the ground of serious misconduct. Tropical summoned Belga to report for work but the latter replied that she could not comply because of her situation. The alleged misconduct of Belga barely falls within the situation contemplated by the law. No. the petitioner cannot terminate respondent’s services because in doing so. . but he never availed of any of them. therefore. Belga. a subsidiary of Lakpue Drug Inc. 20. Belga who was pregnant experienced labor pains and gave birth on the same day. Rulings: Yes. On March 19. 153477March 6. Again. vs. respondent herein. 2007 Facts: Lolita Velasco. Two days after giving birth. She did not apply for leave and her absence disrupted Tropical’s financial transactions. a dereliction of duty. pregnancy-borne and that she filed an application for leave to her supervisor. DISPOSITIVE: "WHEREFORE. the petitioner had no legal basis in considering these absences together with her prior infractions as gross and habitual neglect. which can hardly be considered a forbidden act. worked at Tropical Biological Philippines. Since her last string of absences is justifiable and had been subsequently explained. in effect." Del Monte Phil vs Lolita Velasco GR. the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. 166379 Oct. She also went to see the company doctor for check-up and was advised to rest for four days..

He was then asked to comment regarding the charge of sexual harrassment filed against him by the VP's secretary Capiral. No. but the latter held that the company acted with due process and that his punishment was only mild. On 14 August 1993 petitioner submitted his written explanation denying the accusation against him and offering to submit himself for clarificatory interrogation. ANTI-SEXUAL HARASSMENT ACT (RA 7877) Libres v NLRC G. While there may be instances where the pregnancy may be inconspicuous. the NLRC had to agree with the Labor Arbiter. begs the question as to how one can conceal a full-term pregnancy." They suspended Libres for 30 days without pay. Ratio: On not strictly applying RA 7877. Hence.Republic Act No. He draws attention to victim Divina Gonzaga’s immediate filing of her letter of resignation in the Villarama case as opposed to the one year delay of Capiral in filing her complaint against him. 37 much less does it imply wrongful intent on the part of Belga. In so doing. Belga’s failure to formally inform Tropical of her pregnancy can not be considered as grave misconduct directly connected to her work as to constitute just cause for her separation. Faced with the same predicament.” or “created a hostile. the Labor Arbiter have to rely on the MEC report and the common connotation of sexual harassment as it is generally understood by the public. intimidating or offensive environment. We agree with respondent’s position that it can hardly escape notice how she grows bigger each day. This was included with a waiver of his right tobe heard once he didn't comment. an electrical engineer. As a rule.R. 7877 or the law against sexual harassment to the instant case. was holding a managerial position with National Steel Corporation (NSC) as Assistant Manager. hence. caressing her nape and telling other people that Capiral was the one who hugged and kissed or that she responded to the sexual advances are unauthorized acts that damaged her honor. The Management Evaluation Committee said that "touching a female subordinate's hand and shoulder. Moreover. This argument. Tropical harps on the alleged concealment by Belga of her pregnancy. This was due to his demand for personal confrontation not being recognized by the MEC. or except in a criminal case when their application will favor the accused. petitioner assailed the failure of the NLRC to strictly apply RA No. NLRC and Golden Donuts was misplaced.” “impaired her rights and privileges under the Labor Code. He now surmises that the filing of the case against him was merely an afterthought and not borne out of a valid complaint. It was still being deliberated upon in Congress when petitioner’s case was decided by the Labor Arbiter.” He claimed that he wasn't guaranteed due process because he wasn't given the right be heard. petitioner also contends that public respondent’s reliance on Villarama v. In the Supreme Court. Issue: Was Libres accorded due process when the MEC denied his request for personal confrontatiom? Held: Yes Petition denied. 123737. 1999 Facts: Petitioner Carlos G. it has not been sufficiently proven by Tropical that Belga’s case is such. Libres. He filed charges against the corporation in the Labor Arbiter. Moreover. the NLRC did not commit any abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter. he assailed the NLRC decision as without basis due to the massaging of her shoulders never “discriminated against her continued employment. . May 28. 7877 was not yet in effect at the time of the occurrence of the act complained of. laws shall have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided. however. the Villarama case should have no bearing on the instant case.

Petitioner Libres never questioned the veracity of Capiral’s allegations. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. an opportunity to explain one’s side. The VP further allowed him to air his grievance in a private session He was given more than adequate opportunity to explain his side and air his grievances. And when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate. or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. there must be a demand. Whereas petitioner Libres was only meted a 30-day suspension by the NLRC. Rayala 546 Scra 90 February 18. part of her neck then tickled her ears. the delay did not detract from the truth derived from the facts. having authority. or offensive environment for the employee. 2008 Facts: Ma. or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting.” But it is not necessary that the demand. in the other case was penalized with termination. it even invited the attention of the Court to focus on sexual harassment as a just and valid cause for termination. are all realities that Capiral had to contend with. terms. petitioner is bound by more exacting work ethics. conditions. As pointed out by the Solicitor General. Lourdes T. She alleged that Rayala called her in his office and touched her shoulder. instructor. It is undeniable that petitioner was given a Notice of Investigation informing him of the charge of sexual harassment as well as advising him to submit a written explanation regarding the matter. even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3. he would still be administratively liable. sexual harassment is committed when: (1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment. position papers. agent of the employer. he provides a justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. segregating or classifying the employee which in a way would discriminate. or privileges. (2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under existing labor laws. Issue: Whether or not Rayala commit sexual harassment. coach. The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC. not to forget the social humiliation and embarrassment that victims of this human frailty usually suffer. with equal certitude. Villarama. Domingo (Domingo). professor. hostile. filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala. manager. written explanations. memoranda or oral arguments.Requirements were sufficiently complied with. it could be expected since Libres was Capiral’s immediate superior. RA 7877. Domingo vs. He only raised issue on the complaint’s protracted filing. It may be discerned. – Work. or (3) The above acts would result in an intimidating. request or requirement of sexual favor. Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. or any other person who. deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee. Work. that he submitted his written explanation to his superior. supervisor. request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. re-employment or continued employment of said individual. Fear of retaliation and backlash. Rayala argued that his acts does not constitute sexual harassment because for it to exist. or as applied to administrative proceedings. As a managerial employee. On the contrary. In fact his narration even corroborated the latter’s assertion in several material points. influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment. The essence of due process is simply to be heard.litigants may be heard through pleadings. It is true that this provision calls for a “demand. Homeowners v NLRC. trainor. Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise: Sec. The disparity in the periods of filing the complaints in the two (2) cases did not in any way reduce this case into insignificance. the chairman of NLRC. 3. 38 On the Villarama afterthought-it was both fitting and appropriate since it singularly addressed the issue of a managerial employee committing sexual harassment on a subordinate. Personal confrontation was not necessary. regardless of whether the demand. from the acts of the . He failed to live up to his higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. “It is the the duty of every employer to protect his employees from oversexed superiors. education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer. Moreover. (a) In a work-related or employment environment. request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.” Public respondent therefore is correct in its observation that the Labor Arbiter was in fact lenient in his application of the law and jurisprudence for which petitioner must be grateful for. requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other. or in granting said individual favorable compensation. Due process as a constitutional precept doesnot always and in all situations require a trial type proceeding. promotions. teacher. demands. request or requirement of a sexual favor. On the question of due process. Rulings: Yes.

000. When asked at one point whether or not she already had a boyfriend. and she said she was so in a hurry that she did not find time for it. The following day. U. finding Dr. 2002 Facts: Juliet Q. she exclaimed “hala ka!” and instinctively pulled her pants up. People of the Philippines G. decided to leave. a white car driven by petitioner stopped. He then handed over to her P300. Petitioner told her to meet him at Borja Street so that people would not see them on board the same car together. petitioner urged her to reconsider her decision to quit. Rationale: Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides: . she could afford to be honest in her answers to the doctor. Petitioner then fondled her breast. 23799. 29 November 1995. Juliet’s father and petitioner were childhood friends. then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of sexual harassment as defined and punished under R. 7877. Petitioner later offered her the job where she would be the subject of a “research” program.A. Before proceeding to petitioner’s office that afternoon. at the designated place. she and her father went back to the office of petitioner. particularly Sections 3 and 7 thereof. Yee. giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges.” Petitioner told her to raise her foot and lower her pants so that he might confirm it.00 for her expenses. She felt assured that it was all part of the research. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders. Soon. if she were interested. raised it up to her navel. Before she alighted from the car.S.R. eventually. The latter informed her that there was a vacancy in a family planning project for the city and that. and she said “no. Petitioner still pushed her pants down to her knees and held her thigh. After dropping by at his house to put on his bowling attire. Juliet and her father returned to the City Health Office. March 6. petitioner got back to the car. He “hypothetically” asked whether she would tell her family or friends if a male friend happened to intimately touch her. He told her to raise her shirt to check whether she had nodes or lumps. petitioner made several telephone calls to some hospitals to inquire whether there was any available opening for her. No. Held: The questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 39 offender. with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 140604.A. Petitioner then inquired whether she was still a virgin. Shocked at what petitioner did. He put his hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic hair. where she might be considered. Cagayan de Oro. around nine o’clock in the morning.00) Pesos. The father. Petitioner then touched her abdomen with his right hand saying words of endearment and letting the back of his palm touch her forehead. and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones – all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor. Surprised. telling him angrily that she was through with the research. Petitioner then started putting up to her a number of questions. is AFFIRMED. While driving. petitioner again offered her a job in the family planning research undertaking. 7877.Jacutin vs. taking the cue. averred that on 28 November 1995 her father accompanied her to the office of petitioner at the City Health Office to seek employment. explaining to her his theory on the various aspects of virginity. Not finding any.. she said “no. Petitioner then invited her to go bowling. She expressed hesitation if a physical examination would include “hugging” her but petitioner assured her that he was only kidding about it. On 01 December 1995. she lowered her shirt and embraced her bag to cover herself. Juliet was informed by the doctor that the City Health Office had just then filled up the vacant positions for nurses but that he would still see if he might be able to help her. having inappropriate conversations with her. he could interview her for the job. He begged her not to tell anybody about what had just happened. Juliet dropped by at the nearby church to seek divine guidance as she felt so “confused. and penalizing him with imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20. Petitioner then inquired whether she had varicose veins. She hesitated for a while but.” Petitioner suggested that perhaps if her father were not around. was coming to town in December to look into putting up a clinic in Lapasan. running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear.” When she got to the office. Dr. Rico S. and they were informed by petitioner that a medical group from Texas. Rico Jacutin y Salcedo GUILTY of the crime of Sexual Harassment defined and punished under Republic Act No. Petitioner held her pulse and told her not to be scared. She was requested to be back after lunch. She got in. petitioner casually asked her if she already took her bath.

terms. Regulation of industrial homeworkers. 40 “SEC. 153. promotions. a city health nurse. agent contractor. regardless of whether the demand. nevertheless. requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other. an impression that he could facilitate Juliet’s employment. the "employer" of homeworkers includes any person. or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting. trainor. – Work. Chapter IV EMPLOYMENT OF HOMEWORKERS Art. re-employment or continued employment of said individual. deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee. that a recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the municipal health office could carry good weight. APPRENTICES AND LEARNERS . and of Farah Dongallo y Alkuino. “(a) In a work-related or employment environment. or any other person who. Work. coach. teacher. and his employment does not in any way interfere with his schooling. articles or materials to be processed or fabricated in or about a home and thereafter to be returned or to be disposed of or distributed in accordance with his directions. Art. petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed. or on behalf of any person residing outside the country. except when he works directly under the sole responsibility of his parents or guardian. sexual harassment is committed when: “(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment. 154. having authority. demands. No employer shall discriminate against any person in respect to terms and conditions of employment on account of his age. The findings of the Sandiganbayan were bolstered by the testimony of Vivian Yu. or Sells any goods. it should stand to reason. for his account or benefit. influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment. employee. natural or artificial who.” While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel. or in granting said individual favorable compensation. petitioner would not have been able to take undue liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high position in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. instructor. petitioner’s secretary between 1979 to 1994. professor. all of whom were said to have likewise been victims of perverse behavior by petitioner. Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. 139. request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act. No child below fifteen (15) years of age shall be employed. The foregoing provisions shall in no case allow the employment of a person below eighteen (18) years of age in an undertaking which is hazardous or deleterious in nature as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. by his words and actions. agent of the employer. Indeed. 140. Distribution of homework. Regulations of Secretary of Labor. Any person between fifteen (15) and eighteen (18) years of age may be employed for such number of hours and such periods of the day as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in appropriate regulations. of Iryn Lago Salcedo. manager. sub-contractor or any other person: Delivers. For purposes of this Chapter. directly or indirectly. Prohibition against child discrimination. Minimum employable age. education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer. EMPLOYMENT OF MINORS Art. any goods. conditions. Art. or through an employee. either by himself or through some other person. Public Health Nurse II. Indeed. segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would discriminate. articles or materials to be processed or fabricated in or about a home and then rebuys them after such processing or fabrication. 155. Art. supervisor. or causes to be delivered. 3. The regulations or orders to be issued pursuant to this Chapter shall be designed to assure the minimum terms and conditions of employment applicable to the industrial homeworkers or field personnel involved. The employment of industrial homeworkers and field personnel shall be regulated by the government through the appropriate regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment to ensure the general welfare and protection of homeworkers and field personnel and the industries employing them. or privileges.

may be entered into only in accordance with apprenticeship programs duly approved by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Executive Order No. 1986) Art. December 24. Apprenticeship agreements. group or association. 111. "Apprenticeship agreement" is an employment contract wherein the employer binds himself to train the apprentice and the apprentice in turn accepts the terms of training. associations or groups and by the apprentice. and a copy thereof shall be furnished both the employer and the apprentice. shall conform to the rules issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The Department shall develop standard model programs of apprenticeship. An "apprenticeable occupation" means any trade. Art. if the latter is not available. 41 APPRENTICES Art. Possess vocational aptitude and capacity for appropriate tests. . 63. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below the legal minimum wage. Employment of apprentices. which in no case shall start below 75 percent of the applicable minimum wage. The period of apprenticeship shall not exceed six months. including the wage rates of apprentices. Only employers in the highly technical industries may employ apprentices and only in apprenticeable occupations approved by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. To establish a national apprenticeship program through the participation of employers. and Possess the ability to comprehend and follow oral and written instructions. or Initial training in trade fundamentals in a training center or other institution with subsequent actual work participation within the sponsoring firm or entity during the final stage of training. and To establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices. 59. (As amended by Section 1. Trade and industry associations may recommend to the Secretary of Labor appropriate educational requirements for different occupations. 57. or by an authorized representative of any of the recognized organizations. Definition of Terms. Executive Order No. As used in this Title: "Apprenticeship" means practical training on the job supplemented by related theoretical instruction. To qualify as an apprentice. 58. 111. workers and government and non-government agencies. Statement of objectives. Any firm. Signing of apprenticeship agreement. Contents of apprenticeship agreements. 62. December 24. if any. 60. This Title aims: To help meet the demand of the economy for trained manpower. form of employment or occupation which requires more than three (3) months of practical training on the job supplemented by related theoretical instruction. Art. and the same shall be binding during its lifetime. establishment or entity. (As amended by Section 1. Art. An "apprentice" is a worker who is covered by a written apprenticeship agreement with an individual employer or any of the entities recognized under this Chapter. Art. a person shall: Be at least fourteen (14) years of age. Every apprenticeship agreement entered into under this Title shall be ratified by the appropriate apprenticeship committees. Venue of apprenticeship programs. 61. industry organization or civic group wishing to organize an apprenticeship program may choose from any of the following apprenticeship schemes as the training venue for apprentice: Apprenticeship conducted entirely by and within the sponsoring firm. employer. by an authorized representative of the Department of Labor. 1986) Art. Every apprenticeship agreement shall be signed by the employer or his agent. Apprenticeship entirely within a Department of Labor and Employment training center or other public training institution. An apprenticeship agreement with a minor shall be signed in his behalf by his parent or guardian. Qualifications of apprentice.

LEARNERS Art. Deductibility of training costs. Art. or In a Department of Labor and Employment training center or other public training institution. The organization of apprenticeship program shall be primarily a voluntary undertaking by employers. Apprentices without compensation. When learners may be hired. Learners defined. Supplementary theoretical instruction to apprentices in cases where the program is undertaken in the plant may be done by the employer. Actual training of apprentices may be undertaken: In the premises of the sponsoring employer in the case of individual apprenticeship programs. exemptions. Investigation of violation of apprenticeship agreement. That such deduction shall not exceed ten (10%) percent of direct labor wage: and Provided. the same may be delegated to an appropriate government agency. That the person or enterprise who wishes to avail himself or itself of this incentive should pay his apprentices the minimum wage. Consonant with the minimum qualifications of apprentice-applicants required under this Chapter. Art. further. 70. If the latter is not prepared to assume the responsibility. 64. and Where services of foreign technicians are utilized by private companies in apprenticeable trades. The duration of the learnership period. Upon complaint of any interested person or upon its own initiative. Voluntary organization of apprenticeship programs. The decision of the authorized agency of the Department of Labor and Employment may be appealed by any aggrieved person to the Secretary of Labor and Employment within five (5) days from receipt of the decision. and the employment does not create unfair competition in terms of labor costs or impair or lower working standards. If they do not have adequate facilities for the purpose. the appropriate agency of the Department of Labor and Employment or its authorized representative shall investigate any violation of an apprenticeship agreement pursuant to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. occupations. Art. 67. employers or entities with duly recognized apprenticeship programs shall have primary responsibility for providing appropriate aptitude tests in the selection of apprentices. Exhaustion of administrative remedies. . Responsibility for theoretical instruction. Art. said companies are required to set up appropriate apprenticeship programs. 68. Sponsoring of apprenticeship program. Learners may be employed when no experienced workers are available. the President of the Philippines may require compulsory training of apprentices in certain trades. Any employer desiring to employ learners shall enter into a learnership agreement with them. 42 Art. Art. Art. In the premises of one or several designated firms in the case of programs sponsored by a group or association of employers or by a civic organization. Any of the apprenticeship schemes recognized herein may be undertaken or sponsored by a single employer or firm or by a group or association thereof or by a civic organization. When national security or particular requirements of economic development so demand. 69. Art. 66. unless he has exhausted all available administrative remedies. 72. An additional deduction from taxable income of one-half (1/2) of the value of labor training expenses incurred for developing the productivity and efficiency of apprentices shall be granted to the person or enterprise organizing an apprenticeship program: Provided. The Secretary of Labor and Employment may authorize the hiring of apprentices without compensation whose training on the job is required by the school or training program curriculum or as requisite for graduation or board examination. the Department of Labor and Employment shall perform the service free of charge. Art. 74. Art. Learnership agreement. jobs or employment levels where shortage of trained manpower is deemed critical as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. No person shall institute any action for the enforcement of any apprenticeship agreement or damages for breach of any such agreement. which agreement shall include: The names and addresses of the learners. 71. the employment of learners is necessary to prevent curtailment of employment opportunities. finally. The decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment shall be final and executory. Aptitude testing of applicants. Appeal to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. 75. 73. Learners are persons hired as trainees in semi-skilled and other industrial occupations which are non-apprenticeable and which may be learned through practical training on the job in a relatively short period of time which shall not exceed three (3) months. 65. That such program is duly recognized by the Department of Labor and Employment: Provided. which shall not exceed three (3) months. Appropriate rules in this connection shall be promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employment as the need arises. Art.

43 The wages or salary rates of the learners which shall begin at not less than seventy-five percent (75%) of the applicable minimum wage. The learnership agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representative. Penalty clause. Art. Any violation of this Chapter or its implementing rules and regulations shall be subject to the general penalty clause provided for in this Code. 77. and A commitment to employ the learners if they so desire. Art. All learners who have been allowed or suffered to work during the first two (2) months shall be deemed regular employees if training is terminated by the employer before the end of the stipulated period through no fault of the learners. 76. Learners in piecework. Learners employed in piece or incentive-rate jobs during the training period shall be paid in full for the work done. as regular employees upon completion of the learnership. .