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pathways to

deep decarbonization

2014 report

Published by Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN)
and Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI),
september 2014
The full report is available at
Copyright © SDSN & IDDRI 2014

The Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI) is a
non-profit policy research institute based in Paris. Its objective is to determine and
share the keys for analyzing and understanding strategic issues linked to sustainable
development from a global perspective. IDDRI helps stakeholders in deliberating
on global governance of the major issues of common interest: action to attenuate
climate change, to protect biodiversity, to enhance food security and to manage
urbanization, and also takes part in efforts to reframe development pathways.

Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) mobilizes scientific and tech-
nical expertise from academia, civil society, and the private sector in support of
sustainable development problem solving at local, national, and global scales. SDSN
aims to accelerate joint learning and help to overcome the compartmentalization of
technical and policy work by promoting integrated approaches to the interconnected
economic, social, and environmental challenges confronting the world.

The 2014 DDPP report was written by a group of independent experts
acting in their personal capacities and who have not been nominated
by their respective governments. Any views expressed in this report
do not necessarily reflect the views of any government or organization,
agency or programme of the United Nations.

Publishers : Jeffrey Sachs, Laurence Tubiana
Managing editors : Emmanuel Guérin, Carl Mas, Henri Waisman
Editing & copy editing : Claire Bulger, Elana Sulakshana, Kathy Zhang
Editorial support : Pierre Barthélemy, Léna Spinazzé
Layout and figures : Ivan Pharabod

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 2

The Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project (DDPP) is convened under the auspices
of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN)
and the Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI).

The project is led by:
Jeffrey Sachs, Director, SDSN
Laurence Tubiana, Founder, IDDRI; Co-chair of the Leadership Council, SDSN
Emmanuel Guerin, Associate Director, SDSN; Senior DDPP Manager
Henri Waisman, DDPP Manager, IDDRI
Carl Mas, DDPP Manager, SDSN
Michel Colombier, Scientific Director, IDDRI
Guido Schmidt-Traub, Executive Director, SDSN

This report was jointly prepared by the members of the 15 DDPP Country Research Partners:
Australia. Anna Skarbek (ClimateWorks Australia); Frank Jotzo (Crawford School of Public Policy, Australian
National University); Andy Jones (ClimateWorks Australia); Amandine Denis (ClimateWorks Australia); Rob Kelly
(ClimateWorks Australia); Scott Ferraro (ClimateWorks Australia); Niina Kautto (ClimateWorks Australia); Paul
Graham (technical advisor, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, CSIRO, Australia);
Steve Hatfield-Dodds (technical advisor, CSIRO, Australia); Philip Adams (Centre of Policy Studies, Victoria Uni-
versity). Brazil. Emilio La Rovere (COPPE, Federal University, Rio de Janeiro, UJRJ); Claudio Gesteira (COPPE,
UFRJ). Canada. Chris Bataille (Navius Research, Simon Fraser University); Jacqueline Chan (Navius Research);
Dave Sawyer (Carbon Management Canada); Richard Adamson (Carbon Management Canada). China. Teng Fei
(Institute of Energy, Environment, Economy, Tsinghua University); Liu Qiang (National Center for Climate Change
Strategy and International Cooperation, NCSC); Gu Alun (Institute of Energy, Environment, Economy, Tsinghua
University); Yang Xi ((Institute of Energy, Environment, Economy, Tsinghua University); Chen Yi (NCSC); Tian
Chuan (NCSC); Zheng Xiaoqi (NCSC). France. Sandrine Mathy (Université Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, EDDEN, PACTE);
Patrick Criqui (Université Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, EDDEN, PACTE); Jean Charles Hourcade (Centre International
de Recherche sur l’Environnement et le Développement, CIRED). Germany. Piet Selke (Dialogik); Ortwin Renn
(Dialogik). India. Ritu Matur (TERI University); Leena Srivastava (TERI University); Atul Kumar (TERI); Aayushi
Awasthy (TERI ); Ilika Mohan (TERI). Indonesia. Ucok W.R. Siagian (Center for Research on Energy Policy-Band-
ung Institute of Technology, CRE-ITB); Retno Gumilang Dewi (CRE-ITB); Iwan Hendrawan (CRE-ITB); Rizaldi Boer
(Centre for Climate Risk and Opportunity Management-Bogor Agriculture University, CCROM-IPB); Gito Eman-
nuel Gintings (CCROM-IPB). Japan. Mikiko Kainuma (National Institute for Environmental Studies, NIES); Ken
Oshiro (Mizuho Information and Research Institute, MIRI); Go Hibino (MIRI); Toshihiko Masui (NIES). Mexico.
Daniel Buira, Instituto Nacional de Ecología y Cambio Climático; Jordi Tovilla. Russia. Oleg Lugovoy (Russian
Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, RANEPA); Georges Safonov (High School
of Economics, Moscow); Vladimir Potashnikov (RANEPA); Dmitrij Gordeev (RANEPA). South Africa. Hilton Trol-
lip (The Energy Research Centre, ERC, University of Cape Town, UCT); Harald Winkler (ERC, UCT) Bruno Merven
(ERC, UCT). South Korea. Soogil Young (School of Public Policy and Management, Korea Development Institute,
KDI); Dong-Woon Noh (Korea Energy Economics Institute, KEEI); Ji-Woon Ahn (KEEI); Sang-Yong Park (Korea
Institute of Energy Research, KIER); Nyun-Bae Park (KIER); Chang-Hoon Lee (Korea Environment Institute, KEI);
Sung-Won Kang (KEI). United Kingdom. Steve Pye (University College London, UCL, Energy Institute); Gabrial
Anandarajah (UCL, Energy Institute). United States of America. Jim Williams (Energy + Environmental Economics,
E3); Sam Borgeson (E3); Jamil Farbes (E3); Ben Haley (E3); Elaine Hart (E3); Gabe Kwok (E3); Ryan Jones (E3);
Fredrich Kahrl (E3); Amber Mahone (E3); Jack Moore (E3); Katie Pickrell (E3); Rich Plevin (E3); Snuller Price (E3).
The following Partner Organizations contribute to the DDPP:
German Development Institute (GDI) ; International Energy Agency (IEA) ; International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA) ; World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD).

I Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

The 2014 DDPP report has benefited from advice from a large number of experts and many discussions
around the world on the key concepts of decarbonization. In particular, the authors would like to
thank the Leadership Council of the SDSN, the members of the SDSN, as well as the National and
Regional SDSNs that have discussed the implications of deep decarbonization for their countries
and regions. The report has also benefited from the advice of the Thematic Groups of the SDSN.
We are very grateful for the technical advice and encouragement received from the outstanding team
at the International Energy Agency, led by its Chief Economist Fatih Birol. Under the leadership of
Peter Bakker many members of the World Business Council on Sustainable Development and its
national chapters have provided valuable advice to the DDPP partners, particularly on technologies
for deep decarbonization. The report has also greatly benefited from discussions with the New
Climate Economy Commission, which will publish its report in September 2014.
The DDPP is grateful for generous financial support received from many supporters, including the
Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusamme-
narbeit (GIZ), the German Environment Ministry, the Gross Family Foundation, The European Climate
Foundation (ECF), Agence de l’Environnement et de la Maîtrise de l’Énergie (ADEME), IDDRI, and
the SDSN. Many others have provided direct assistance to individual Country Research Partners.
Critical support in the preparation of this report was provided by Pierre Barthélemy, Claire Bulger,
Jessica Moreira, Ivan Pharabod, Rebecca Sopchik, Léna Spinazzé, Elana Sulakshana, Erin Trowbridge,
and Kathy Zhang.
The authors of the DDPP are pleased to present this 2014 report to UN Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon in support of the UN Climate Leaders’ Summit that he will convene in New York on Sep-
tember 23, 2014. We thank the Secretary-General for his unwavering support for the SDSN and the
DDPP as well as his global leadership on the decisive issue of preventing dangerous climate change.

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report II

III Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . beyond technical feasibility. Achieving the 2°C limit will require that global net emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) approach zero by the second half of the century. The 2015 DDPP report will address these issues and take a broader perspective. The DDPP proceeds in two phases. The 2015 DDPP report will refine the analysis of the technical decarbonization potential. a transition we call “deep decarbonization. In the first half of 2015. and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC). which will be the topic for the next report. including a global cooperative effort to accelerate the development and diffusion of some key low carbon technologies. Preface The Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project (DDPP) is a collaborative initiative to understand and show how individual countries can transition to a low-carbon econ- omy and how the world can meet the internationally agreed target of limiting the increase in global mean surface temperature to less than 2 degrees Celsius (°C). to analyze in further detail how the twin objectives of development and deep decarbonization can be met through integrated approaches. such as equity and the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities. exploring options for even deeper decarbonization. identify national and international financial requirements. the DDPP will issue a more comprehensive report to the French Government. At this stage. including the question of who should pay for these costs. host of the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP-21) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). utilizing technology assumptions and timelines provided by the DDPP Secretariat. we have not looked at important issues in the context of the UNFCCC negotiations. and suggest policy frameworks for implementation.” Successfully transitioning to a low-carbon economy will require unprecedented global cooperation. This 2014 report describes the DDPP’s approach to deep decarbonization at the country level and pre- sents preliminary findings on technically feasible pathways to deep decarbonization. 2014. As underscored throughout this report. The DDPP is issuing this 2014 report to the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in support of the Climate Leaders’ Summit at the United Nations on September 23. the results of the DDPP analyses remain preliminary and incomplete. This will require a profound transformation of energy systems by mid-century through steep declines in carbon intensity in all sectors of the economy. At this stage we have not yet considered the economic and social costs and benefits of deep decarbonization.

Currently. Preface The Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) and the Institute for Sustain- able Development and International Relations (IDDRI) co-founded and lead the DDPP. Several Partner Organizations contribute to the analysis and outreach of the DDPP. Brazil. South Africa. Japan. The Country Research Partners are acting independently of governments and do not necessarily reflect the positions or views of their national governments. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report IV . South Korea. Indonesia. Mexico. France. Each DDPP Country Research Team is developing a “pathway” analysis for deep decarbonization. the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). We invite other organiza- tions to become DDPP partners and contribute to practical problem solving for deep decarbonization. while achieving their respective economic and social development objectives. Above all. and the USA. the International Energy Agency (IEA). Canada. the UK. China. and the World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD). We expect the number of Country Research Partners to grow over the coming months and years. Russia. including the German Development Institute (GDI). We hope that the Deep Decarbonization Pathways (DDPs) outlined in this report and the ongoing analytical work by the Country Research Partners will support dis- cussions in every country on how to achieve deep decarbonization. Germany. we hope that the findings will be helpful to the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as they craft a strong agreement on the global climate change regime at the COP-21 in Paris in December 2015. the DDPP comprises 15 Country Research Partners composed of leading researchers and research institutions from countries representing 70% of global GHG emissions and at very different stages of development: Australia. India.

and Diffusion of Low-Carbon Technologies   15 Part II. Aggregate Results and Cross-Country Comparisons from the 15 National Deep Decarbonization Pathways (DDPs)   29 Part III. The Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project Chapter 5. Taking the 2°C Limit Seriously    3 Chapter 2. CO2-energy budget to Stay Within the 2°C Limit   7 Chapter 3. Development. Demonstration. Research. National Deep Decarbonization Pathways Developed by Country Research Partners Australia   43 Brazil   59 Canada    71 China   83 France    93 Germany   105 India   115 Indonesia    129 Japan   139 Mexico    149 Russia   157 South Africa   167 South Korea   179 United Kingdom   189 United States   201 V Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . Developing Country-Level Deep Decarbonization Pathways (DDPs)   23 Chapter 6. Contents pathways to deep decarbonization Executive Summary Part I. The Global Challenges of Deep Decarbonization Chapter 1. Pathways to the Deep Decarbonization of Energy Systems   13 Chapter 4.

Acronyms  2DS 2°C scenario Mton metric ton 4DS 4°C scenario MWh megawatt 6DS 6°C Scenario NDP National Development Plan AR4 Fourth Assessment Report NGO non-government organization AR5 Fifth Assessment Report NGP New Growth Path BAU Business-As-Usual PE primary energy BECCS bioenergy with CCS PPM parts per million BIPV building-integrated photovoltaics PPP purchasing power parity CCS carbon capture and sequestration PV photovoltaic CHP combined heat and power RDD&D research. land-use change and forestry MtCO2 metric tons of carbon dioxide Mtoe metric ton of oil equivalent Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report VI . CLT coal-to-liquids and diffusion CNG compressed natural gas RPS renewable portfolio standards CO2 carbon dioxide SNG synthetic natural gas CO2e carbon dioxide equivalent T&D Transmission & Distribution COP-21 21st Conference of the Parties tce tons of coal equivalent CSP concentrated solar power tCO2 tons of CO2 DDPP Deep Decarbonization Pathways toe tons of oil equivalent Project TPES total primary energy supply DDPs Deep Decarbonization Pathways TWh terawatt-hours EDGAR Emissions Data base for Global UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention Atmospheric Research on Climate Change EJ exajoule WEO World Energy Outlook EOR enhanced oil recovery WG2 Working Group 2 ETP Energy Technology Perspectives ETS Emissions Trading Scheme EV electric vehicles FE final energy FEC final energy consumption GCAM global integrated assessment model GDP Gross Domestic Product GEA Global Energy Assessment GHG greenhouse gas Gt gigatons GW gigawatts HDV heavy duty vehicles IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change KPBY Kyoto Protocol kWh kilowatt-hour LNG liquefied natural gas LULUCF land use. development. demonstration.

economic growth. their large-scale dissemination on terms that are FCCC) to be held in Paris in December 2015. and jeop. This executive summary starts with a short out. social. There is no prospect of winning the fight The DDPP is a knowledge network comprising 15 against climate change if countries fail on poverty Country Research Partners. VII Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . consid- ing sustainable development are inextricably eration of economic and social costs and benefits. The DDPs devel- oped by the Country Research Partners assume that Climate change and sustainable a strong global cooperative push on technology Re- development search Development Demonstration and Diffusion The economic. without. what is new and special about the country-lev. tions consistent with limiting global warming Avoiding dangerous climate change and achiev- to less than 2°C. To be success- low-carbon economy. They form two sides of the from the Deep Decarbonization Pathways (DDPs) same coin and must be pursued together as part of developed by the Country Research Partners (in. infrastructure stocks. including the eradication of poverty and oped by the DDPP Country Research Partners continued economic growth. undermine prosperity. basic socio-economic development goals in the nary findings of the technical pathways devel. and several Partner Or- eradication or if countries do not succeed in rais- ganizations who develop and share methods. with the intent of taking into ful. show that deeply reducing GHG emissions and el approach of the DDPP (explained in chapter achieving socio-economic development are not V). and environmental risks (RDD&D) will support the timely deployment at of unabated climate change are immense. resource endowments. sustainable development. including the deep illustrative pathway analysis for the transition to a decarbonization of energy systems. times rapid. linked. devel- development needs are met within the constraints opment aspirations. in- line of key results from previous global studies cluding the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli- (discussed in chapter I to IV) and then turns to mate Change (IPCC) Assessment Reports (AR). Executive Summary This 2014 report by the Deep Decarbonization ardize countries’ ability to achieve even the most Pathway Project (DDPP) summarizes prelimi. at this stage. and findings related to deep decarboni- climate change requires deep emission reductions zation. and other relevant factors. economically and socially viable. of very low emissions. as- ing the living standards of their people. Addressing sumptions.. developed and developing countries alike. It summarizes the main preliminary findings mutually exclusive. this transition must ensure that socio-economic account national socio-economic conditions. The DDPs also assume continued. The results from previous global studies. They scale and affordable costs of key low-carbon tech- threaten to roll back the fruits of decades of growth nologies. These risks affect all with the objective of achieving emission reduc. some- and development. future. Each DDPP Country Research Team develops of all greenhouse gases (GHGs). Robust economic growth cluded in chapter VI) and draws some lessons and rising prosperity are consistent with the ob- for the international negotiations leading up to jective of deep decarbonization under the assump- the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP-21) of the tion of rapid technological evolution combined with UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN.

Executive Summary

The carbon budget and emissions project global CO2 emissions from the burning of
reduction trajectory to stay below 2°C fossil fuels and industrial processes (“CO2-ener-
In 2010, all governments operationalized the gy emissions”) close to 11 Gt in 2050 on average
objective of the UNFCCC to “prevent dangerous (down from 34 Gt in 2011). The IEA Energy Tech-
anthropogenic interference with the climate nology Perspective (ETP) 2°C scenario (2DS), which
system” by adopting the target of keeping the gives only a 50% chance of staying within the 2°C
global rise in mean surface temperature below limit, reaches 15 Gt CO2-energy globally in 2050.
2°C compared with the pre-industrial average. Assuming a world population of 9.5 billion people
They did this in recognition of the extreme risks to by 2050—in line with the medium fertility forecast
future human wellbeing resulting from a rise in tem- of the UN Population Division—this means that
perature above 2°C. The latest scientific research countries would individually need to reach close to
analyzed by the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) a global average of CO2-energy emissions per capita
Working Group 2 (WG2) concludes that even an in- of 1.6 tons4 in 2050, which is a sharp decrease com-
crease in global temperatures of 2°C constitutes a pared to today’s global average of 5.2 tons, especial-
serious threat to human wellbeing. Keeping below ly for developed countries with current emissions
2°C of global warming is indispensable to maintain per capita much higher than today’s global average. 
climate change within the boundaries of manageable
risks and to our ability to adapt to climate change. Why the 2°C limit should be taken
Limiting the increase in mean surface temper-
ature to less than 2°C imposes a tough con- The world is not on track to stay within the 2°C
straint on global cumulative GHG emissions, limit. While awareness of climate change is rising,
including CO2 emissions, which are the larg- and a large and growing number of countries, cities,
est single source (76%)1 of GHG emissions. and corporations have pledged to reduce their GHG
To have a likely chance—defined as a probability emissions, these pledges taken together are not suf-
higher than two-thirds—of staying within this limit, ficient to stay within the 2°C limit. The scenarios
the level of global cumulative CO2 emissions from reviewed by IPCC AR5 Working Group 3 (WG3) show
land use, fossil fuels, and industry must be in the that in the absence of additional commitments to
range of 550-1300 billion tons (Gigatons or Gt) reduce GHG emissions, the world is on a trajectory
by mid-century.2 If one excludes a significant con- to an increase in global mean temperature of 3.7°C
tribution from net negative emissions,3 the glob- to 4.8°C compared to pre-industrial levels. When ac-
al CO2 budget to 2050 is 825 Gt. Staying within counting for full climate uncertainty, this range ex-
this CO2 budget requires very near-term peaking tends from 2.5°C to 7.8°C by the end of the century.
globally, and a sharp reduction in global CO2 emis- The consequences of such a temperature rise
sions thereafter, especially in energy-related CO2 would be catastrophic. A recent report prepared
emissions. The scenarios reviewed by the IPCC that by the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Re-
give a likely chance of staying within the 2°C limit search (PIK) for the World Bank6 describes a dra-

2 Idem
3 The sustainability of the large-scale deployment of some net negative emissions technologies, such as bioenergy
with carbon capture and sequestratation (BECCS), raises issues still under debate, in part due to the competition in
land uses for energy and food purposes.
4 For a 50% probability. 1.1 tons for a 66% probability.
5 The India country research partner (TERI) is unable to endorse the findings of any studies on climate science referred
to in this report that have not been included in the IPCC AR 5 findings.
6 Schellnhuber, HJ, et al. Turn down the heat: climate extremes, regional impacts, and the case for resilience - full report.
Washington DC; World Bank. June 2013.

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report VIII

Executive Summary

matic picture of a 4°C warmer world, where climate Operationalizing the global 2°C limit
and weather extremes would cause devastation and Very few countries have looked seriously at
intense human suffering. It would have severe re- the operational implications of staying within
percussions on human and physical systems and the 2°C limit. Since COP16 in Cancun in 2010,
potentially unleash positive feedback mechanisms a large number of countries, both developed
that further amplify the human drivers. The IPCC and developing, have quantified targets to re-
AR5 and a large number of other international and duce their GHG emissions or the carbon inten-
national assessments validate this finding. It is sity of their GDP by the year 2020. But these
therefore vital that the world become much more targets—which sometimes are yet to be backed
serious about the implications of staying within the by detailed policy actions and implementation
2°C limit. Governments, businesses, and civil soci- plans—are collectively insufficient to put coun-
ety must understand and operationalize the pro- tries on a trajectory consistent with the long-term
found transformations required to reach this target. global objective of deep decarbonization. In fact
We do not subscribe to the view held by some most 2020 emissions reductions targets were
that the 2°C limit is impossible to achieve and framed as a deviation from Business-As-Usual
that it should be weakened or dropped alto- (BAU) trends, reductions in the carbon intensity
gether. The science is clear that global warming of GDP, or relatively modest decrease in absolute
beyond 2°C carries the risk of grave and irrevers- GHG emissions compared to a base year. By and
ible harm to human wellbeing and development large national targets are not derived from an
prospects in all countries. The political risks of assessment of what will be needed to stay within
jettisoning the 2°C limit are also significant. If the the 2°C limit.
world fails to mobilize in support of the 2°C limit Only an internationally coordinated, goal-ori-
or if countries try to weaken it there will be no ented approach to operationalizing the 2°C
realistic prospect for the international community limit will allow humanity to avoid dangerous
to agree to another quantitative target. Countries climate change. As this 2014 DDPP report and
would find themselves on a slippery downward many other analyses make clear, staying within
slope with no quantitative foothold to organize an 2°C will require deep transformations of energy
international and coordinated response to climate and production systems, industry, agriculture,
change. The 2°C limit is an invaluable tool for land use, and other dimensions of human devel-
international mobilization that must be preserved. opment. It will require profound changes in the
The latest scientific research indicates that prevailing socio-economic development frame-
keeping below the 2°C limit is challenging but works. Many of the technologies that will need to
feasible. Global studies—including the scenarios underpin these transformations are available, but
reviewed by the IPCCC AR5 WG3, the IEA World many others are not ready for large-scale deploy-
Energy Outlook (WEO) and Energy Technology ment. Making critical low-carbon technologies
Perspectives (ETP) reports, and the Global Energy commercially available and affordable, enabling
Assessment (GEA) led by the Institute of Applied countries to pursue long-term transformations,
Systems Analysis (IIASA)—show that reducing will require long-term international cooperation
global GHG emissions to a level consistent with and trust. One important purpose of the DDPP
the 2°C limit is still within reach. Clearly, though, is to lay out an analytical approach to operation-
the window of opportunity is closing fast. Countries alizing the 2°C limit, and to identify the areas
therefore need to act quickly and in a determined that will require global cooperation to successfully
and coordinated manner to keep the 2°C limit with- transition to a low carbon economy, including the
in reach. technologies that require a strong global RDD&D.

IX Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

Executive Summary

The need for country-level Deep The DDPP follows a two-stage approach to
Decarbonization Pathways (DDPs) problem solving. The first, which is the focus of
to 2050 this report, is to identify technically feasible DDPs
The DDPP aims to illustrate how countries for achieving the objective of limiting the rise in
could pursue their national development prior- global temperatures below 2°C. At this stage, we
ities while achieving the deep decarbonization have not looked systematically at the issue of eco-
of energy systems by mid-century consistent nomic and social costs and benefits, nor consid-
with the 2°C limit. Following the launch of the ered the question of who should pay for them. The
DDPP in October 2013, the DDPP Country Research technology pathways produced in this report are
Partners have collaborated to identify key principles based on technology assumptions provided by the
and requirements for DDPs that collectively may DDPP Secretariat to support the individual country
enable the world to stay within the 20C limit. A DDPs. In a second—later—stage we will refine the
broad consensus has emerged that DDPs would help analysis of the technical potential, exploring the op-
in identifying pathways towards the 2°C limit. tions for even deeper decarbonization pathways.
We will also take a broader perspective, beyond
Staying within the 2°C limit requires that coun-
tries develop long-term pathways to deep de- technical feasibility, by quantifying costs and ben-
carbonization to explore options and develop a efits, estimating national and international finance
long-term strategy. The nature and magnitude of requirements, mapping out domestic and global
the decarbonization challenge are such that there policy frameworks, and considering in more detail
is no quick and easy fix. Deep decarbonization will how the twin objectives of development and deep
not happen overnight, and there is no silver bullet. decarbonization can be met. These issues will be
Deep decarbonization is not about modest and in- described in the 2015 DDPP report. But technically
cremental change or small deviations from BAU. In feasible DDPs are a vital first step towards achieving
particular, it requires major changes to countries’ the 2°C limit, by illuminating the scale and nature
energy and production systems that need to be of technological and structural changes required.
pursued over the long-term. Decisions made today The technical DDPs developed by the Country
with regards to, say, power generation and transport Research Partners rest on a number of nation-
infrastructure, will have a long-term impact on fu- al and global policy assumptions that will be
ture GHG emissions, which must be mapped out investigated in more detail in the 2015 DDPP
carefully and understood quantitatively. report. These policy assumptions include:
The DDPs developed by the Country Research y yAll countries take strong, early, and coordinated
Partners “backcast” from the global goal of actions to achieve deep decarbonization.
limiting the rise in temperature below 2°C y yAll countries adopt adequate nationally appro-
to explore the transformations for deep de- priate policies, regulations, and incentives.
carbonization required to reach the goal. We y yFinancial flows are re-directed from high-carbon
use the term “backcasting,” to describe a process to low-carbon portfolios and projects.
where the future GHG emission target is set, and y yFinancial support is provided to developing
then the changes needed to achieve that target countries as they appropriately require financial
are determined. Backcasting is not to be confused support to implement mitigation policies and
with rigid, central planning. A process of deep finance low-carbon investments.
decarbonization must be adaptive, as strategies y yLow-carbon technologies become available and
and pathways will have to be continually revised affordable to all countries, for example through
and updated based on new results from climate a technology cooperation mechanism and fund,
science, technological innovation, and lessons which shares equitably the costs and benefits
learnt from implementation. across countries.

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report X

Executive Summary

The DDPs developed by the Country Re- DDPs that may be developed by national gov-
search Partners presented in this report are ernments would also be helpful in building trust
intended to provide a complementary anal- across countries, shaping their expectations,
ysis to existing global-level studies of deep and identifying where international coopera-
emissions reductions. To make a strong and tion and support is required, including support
convincing case for action at the national level, to developing countries. DDPs show how each
DDPs must be country-specific and developed by country aims to achieve deep decarbonization
local experts. They need to fit within countries’ and demonstrate the seriousness of national com-
development strategies and align with their other mitments to reduce GHG emissions. Transparent
socio-economic and environmental goals. They DDPs can enhance trust among countries, which
need to demonstrate that the short- and long- is critical for a concerted international response to
term challenges countries face, such as economic climate change. They will also help highlight areas
development, poverty eradication, job creation, that require international support, and increased
inequality reduction, energy and food security, international cooperation, particularly on RDD&D
and biodiversity protection, can be addressed of low-carbon technologies.
in parallel to deep decarbonization. DDPs must
take into account country-specific infrastruc- Interim results from the 15 Deep
ture stocks and natural resource endowments. Decarbonization Pathways (DDPs)
They must also take into account the systemic developed by the Country Research
implications and the inherent gradual pace of Partners
changing technology, infrastructure, and capi- In aggregate, the illustrative initial DDPs devel-
tal stocks within countries. None of this can be oped by the Country Research Partners outlined
accomplished through aggregate global models in this report achieve deep absolute emissions
and studies, which are not granular enough to reductions by 2050. Total CO2-energy emissions
present a detailed technical roadmap for policy from the 15 preliminary DDPs already reach a level
implementation at the country level. of 12.3 Gt by 2050, down from 22.3 Gt in 2010.
DDPs that may be developed by national This represents a 45% decrease of total CO2-ener-
governments would be helpful in promoting gy emissions over the period, and a 56% and 88%
a national dialogue on decarbonization and reduction in emissions per capita and the carbon
launching a process of intense and complex intensity of GDP, respectively. The interim DDPs do
problem solving. Transparent DDPs can enable not yet achieve the full decarbonization needed to
a public discussion in every country on how best make staying below the 2°C limit “likely,” defined
to achieve emission reduction objectives, under- as a higher than two-thirds probability of success.
stand costs and benefits and possible trade-offs, The Country Research Partners have identified ad-
and identify synergies or “win-wins.” Such tech- ditional opportunities for deep decarbonization
nical, economic, social, and political analysis and that will be incorporated in the next version of the
national dialogue on deep decarbonization will DDPs, along with assessments of economic and so-
involve business, civil society, and various expert cial costs, (see Chapter VI) to be published in 2015.
communities (e.g. engineers, geologists, clima- Nonetheless, the aggregate decarbonization path-
tologists, economists, social scientists) to debate way is already very substantial and well on its way
the best options for decarbonization, identify bot- to becoming consistent with the 2°C target.
tlenecks, and propose new approaches. DDPs can The illustrative initial DDPs already provide key
become a framework for organizing a dynamic insights and identify unique elements of deep
process of discussion and problem solving in every decarbonization in each country. These include
country. the key components of nationally appropriate

XI Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

through improved vehicle technologies. 3. public consul. Differentiat. wind. Some Country Research ing national circumstances include socio-economic Partners will include additional decarbonization Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report XII . Understanding energy and nuclear power. Low-carbon electricity: Decarbonization of challenge for global RDD&D efforts. other low-carbon energy carriers synthesized electrification of boilers. hydro. Energy efficiency and conservation: Greatly in which deep emissions reductions are most improved energy efficiency in all energy end-use challenging. smart and industry. Mexican. sustainable biomass (both energy crops and mass. options for industry include improved efficiency. and CCS. individual illustrative initial DDPs Some of the identified decarbonization op- show a wide variety of different approaches tions for industry and freight have yet to be based on national circumstances. Relative to the state of knowledge urban design. and sustainable biofuels and synthesized fu- transportation. of the spectrum. for freight include improved propulsion technol- thermal). the solu- Within the three pillars that are common to tions are contingent on their affordability. including low-carbon electricity. The 15 illustrative initial DDPs developed by the Country Research Partners share three The main decarbonization challenges at common pillars of deep decarbonization of the sectoral level national energy systems: The preliminary DDPs also reveal the sectors 1. area for future analysis by the DDPP and a future 2. and industry are less well developed and under- through improved equipment. because and meeting these conditions will require further the scale of the potential for geological carbon se- refinement through careful analysis. through improved as power generation. or lower-carbon fossil fuels. hybrid. Fuel Switching: Switching end-use energy sup. stood. Chinese. and construction materials. Decarbonization carbon fuels. In each case. solar. compressed or liq- gas) with carbon capture and storage (CCS). decarbonization strategies for freight practices. questration in India is uncertain. the availability of renewable energy re- technology options for deep decarbonization. and UK The three pillars of the deep teams project a significant share of coal and gas- decarbonization of energy systems fired power generation with CCS by 2050. and passenger end-use equipment. electricity generation through the replacement Some potential solutions have been identified of existing fossil-fuel-based generation with re. modal shifts (e. and optimized value chains. residen. uefied (natural or synthetized) gas. and industry. and other technologies. These two sectors constitute a key focus es. for freight and industry. the DDPs provide initial indications the DDP developed by the Indian team decarbon- of the enabling conditions for the successful imple. production process. particularly freight tion. economic and social costs. the DDPs developed by the Cana- dian. The sources.g. and geo. izes power generation using primarily renewable mentation of deep decarbonization. heat. Finally. Russian. buildings. nuclear power. CCS. re-use of process waste from electricity generation or sustainable bio. Decarbonization options newable energy (e. from road transport to trains and plies from highly carbon-intensive fossil fuels in ships). and industry to lower els for air and maritime transport. about low-carbon strategies in other areas such tial and commercial buildings. and national political imperatives regard- illustrative initial DDPs also identify the principal ing the development of renewable energy. architectural design. DDPP.g. and re-use of waste heat. Executive Summary strategies and the most promising country-specific conditions. nuclear challenges that still need to be addressed by the power. For example. material efficiency. and learning by doing. and/or fossil fuels (coal. even without consideration of sectors including passenger and goods transporta. ogies (battery electric. but not CCS. Indonesian. included in all DDPs. building transport. and hydrogen). At the other end tation. waste material). buildings. all countries.

technologies. complementary y y Advanced energy storage. and materials for buildings. production. The analysis by the 15 Country Research Part. collaborative effort in technology development. are not yet ment by 2050. wind and solar) goals and strategies. They will also ensure which shares equitably the costs and benefits consistency of national projections for industrial across countries. that successful implementation of national All Country Research Partners have adopt. timing. low-carbon technologies: and funded effort engaging government. They include: the freight and industry sectors. which. effort to develop low-carbon technologies and y y Carbon-capture and sequestration (on fossil-fue- ensure their widespread availability and their led power plants and industries). deep decarbonization in all DDPs. cost-competitiveness with high-carbon alter. regarding the change”—that is technological change that development and deployment of critical is propelled through an organized. vehicles. and business with targeted techno- ternational cooperation to make all the relevant logical outcomes in mind. The Country Research Partners underscore however. at the right scale. controls. y y Very high performance appliances. Likewise. ac- y y There will be sufficient global RDD&D and in. ademia. devel. (e. need not be uniform across countries. for example through nological success will therefore require a globally a technology cooperation mechanism and fund. sustained. in particular for energy and mining y y Technology diffusion will be actively supported. y y Advanced nuclear power technology that sus- natives. technically mature or economically afforda- es associated with deep emission reductions in ble. into account by means of carbon pricing. deep offshore wind. demonstration. ancing power systems with high penetrations of taking into account countries’ socio-economic variable renewable energy (e. try alone could develop the requisite low-carbon y y Critical low-carbon technologies will become technologies. For this reason.g. products. taking into account the so. advanced geothermal. and diffusion (RDD&D) and tidal energy). and coordination across cial cost of carbon imposed by means of carbon economies and sectors—even when these market pricing. flexible load manage- measures to reduce or limit the growth of demand ment. when the social cost of carbon is taken tains public confidence and support. These include: countries and the international community as a y y New types of renewable energy technologies whole must undertake a major research. forces are guided by potential large profits from y y Low-carbon technologies become available and the generation of new intellectual property. notably battery electric or fuel cell light-duty ners also confirms that the technical feasi. XIII Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . bility of deep decarbonization rests on the y y Sustainable biofuels or synthesized fuels for air large-scale deployment of several low-carbon and marine transport. with the forecasted global demand and Some key technologies.g. Team was comfortable assuming that their coun- mercially available in a timely and scaled manner. Given the technological challeng. and integrated portfolio design for bal- for their products and services will be explored. key in a subset of the 15 DDPs. Tech- affordable to all countries.Executive Summary options in their revised DDPs. which may differ across countries. market forces alone will affordable and cost-competitive with their high not be sufficient to promote the required RDD&D carbon alternatives. The need for a global technology push y y Zero emissions vehicles with adequate range. DDPs depends on “directed technological ed project-wide assumptions. which are critical for the domestic needs for infrastructure develop. No Country Research pre-commercial low-carbon technologies com. opment. some of which are not yet fully Some emerging low-carbon technologies are commercialized or affordable.

developed by critical importance of preparing country-level researchers) would. including the global approach will fail to consider the deep systemic RDD&D cooperative effort to ensure the timely changes and the key technologies that are still deployment at scale and affordable costs of key pre-commercial but necessary to reach the target. But carbonization. Official country DDPs The approach of the DDPP itself reveal the (as distinct from illustrative DDPs. and diffuse various opportunity for teams to work together across low-carbon technologies that are not yet tech- countries to map out how the global 2°C limit can nically mature or economically competitive with be operationalized and achieved at the country fossil fuel based technologies. but as making These do not cover the full scope of the agree- sure the market has enough winners to pick ment. In particular we hope that the DDPP can help they are likely to adopt strategies that fall far spur the design and international comparison of short of what is needed to stay below the 2°C national DDPs and promote the necessary global limit. These pathways. least two new elements will need to be part Directed technological change should not be of the global deal in 2015 at COP21 in Paris. a shared commitment to the global target and sion of their results and input assumptions. necessary mitigation and adaptation actions. and capacity building. horizon and backcast from this long-term target. bearing in mind that deep decarbonization policy coordination should always leave room for would lower the needs and costs of unavoidable new developments. businesses. low-carbon technologies. and capacity outcomes. While directed-technological change building) to developing countries to undertake the is essential to meeting the challenge of deep de. and inves. demonstrate. success of deep decarbonization. and the discus. Efforts aimed at building pub. there are many alternative tech. the current incremental cooperation to achieve them. that each country will develop and make pub- licly available a (non-binding) DDP to 2050 Early lessons for the global deal to stay that is consistent with the 2°C limit and their within 2°C national circumstances. technological. The current focus accessible and affordable for all countries. are to all aspects of global cooperation needed to essential tools for learning and problem solving. achieve it. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report XIV . conceived as picking winners. Executive Summary built on technology roadmaps for each of the key. they are nonetheless an essential component of nologies under development now and that may a successful global deal to operationalize the 2°C emerge in the future. A global tech- nology cooperation and fund mechanism will also It highlights the need to introduce long-term backcasting into the scope of the climate ne. hopefully. large-scale RDD&D of low-carbon expectations of countries. be predicated on DDPs to 2050. technologies: A massive and sustained global tors about future development opportunities. What the DDPP process illustrates is that at pre-commercial low-carbon technologies. This process is crucial to developing a long-term financial support. be necessary to make sure these technologies are gotiations preparing COP21. in particular the need to provide adequate from to achieve cost-effective low-carbon support (financial. and are key to the level. adaptation: lic support and acceptance for key technologies y yCountry DDPs: A shared global commitment will also play an important role. including technology cooperation. By its structure. Technology roadmaps and target. of the international negotiations on mitigation is It is our hope that this 2014 report and up- on emission reduction targets to 2025 or 2030. international collaborative public-private effort The DDPP and similar processes afford a unique to develop. vision for deep decarbonization and shaping the y y Global. coming DDPP reports will make a useful con- Yet if countries do not work with a longer time tribution to operationalizing the 2°C target.

CO2-energy budget to Stay Within the 2°C Limit   7 2.2. Business as usual means catastrophic climate change is likely     4 1. and Diffusion of Low-Carbon Technologies   15 4. Part I The Global Challenges of Deep Decarbonization Chapter 1. Even a 2°C increase in global temperatures entails major risks    5 1. Why the world needs to stick to the 2°C limit    5 1.2. Global CO2-energy emissions reduction trajectories to 2050     10 2. CO2-energy budget from the burning of fossil fuels and industrial processes    9 2. Taking the 2°C Limit Seriously    3 1.3.1. Research.5. How to pursue the 2°C limit seriously    6 Chapter 2. Pathways to the Deep Decarbonization of Energy Systems   13 3.5. The 3 pillars of the deep decarbonization    14 Chapter 4. Key technology areas for RDD&D     16 4.1.1. Fossil fuel proven reserves and resources    10 Chapter 3.1. Demonstration. The need for accelerated development of low-carbon technologies    15 4.4. Staying within the 2°C limit: the solemn responsibility of the global community     3 1.2.4. Development. Total CO2 budget for the period 2011-2100    8 2. The drivers of CO2 emissions    13 3.2. Total CO2 budget for the period 2011-2050    8 2.3.3. The role of technology roadmaps and roundtables    20 1 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .

Part I  pathways to deep decarbonization The Global Challenges of Deep Decarbonization Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 2 .

http://www. There is. no prospect of stabilizing GHG concentrations at a level that would 1 The India country research partner (TERI) is unable to endorse any references to climate science included in this report that are not part of the IPCC AR5. By 2013. CO2 emissions from the burning of fossil fuels and direct CO2 emissions from industrial processes were 23 billion tons (gigatons or Gt). Why the world needs to stick prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate to the 2°C limit    5 system. 1. Taking the 2°C Limit Seriously1 Our moment of truth has arrived.5 ppm.esrl. Twenty-two years ago at the Rio Earth Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 3 .2. Even a 2°C increase in global the planet and promote sustainable development by stabilizing temperatures entails major risks    5 “GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would Every country has signed on to fight against human-induced cli- mate change. Business as usual means catastrophic They adopted the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli- climate change is likely     4 mate Change (UNFCCC) two years later. 2 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Earth Sys- tem Research Laboratory (ESRL) data.8 parts per million (ppm). Chapter 1 Taking the 2°C Limit 1 Seriously1 Contents Staying within the 2°C limit: the solemn 1. at COP19. How to pursue the 2°C limit seriously    6 differentiated responsibility and respective capability. at the first Conference of the Parties (COP1) of the UNFCCC. the world’s governments recognized that hu- 1. GHG emissions are still far from stabilizing. and the CO2 concentration stood at 358. In 1994. global CO2 emissions had soared to 36 billion tons.noaa. but the world remains dangerously off course from the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC.” Yet. posing risks responsibility of the global community     3 for human wellbeing and sustainable development prospects. and resolved to protect 1. as of yet. Staying within the 2°C limit: the solemn manity was changing the climate system profoundly.5. more than two decades later.1  responsibility of the global community 1.1.” and in accordance with the principle of “common but 1. and CO2 concentrations stood at 396.

2  such as Bangladesh and small island states.5°C to 7. but will do so conflict. and many climate scien. Humanity faces catastrophic risks on Parties have struggled to create a framework of our current path. soaring food dramatically. climate mitigation that is up to the task. Business as usual means 1. For sev. Disasters such as Hurricanes Ka- Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 4 . this range extends from 2. Rising sea levels would overtake many of the world’s larg- est urban agglomerations and low-lying countries. Crises in any part of the world can by mid-century and to net zero emissions during quickly become global. last-ditch effort to operationalize (EIA). in the sense that a suc. for all on this planet. the second half of the century—the world will or violence resulting from food shortages result in not only overshoot the 2°C limit. The 2°C limit is energy trends—by the International Energy Agen- the world’s most explicit. drylands. the US Energy Information Association tists would say. the date that the sustainable development and humanity’s fervent world’s governments assigned themselves to reach hopes to end poverty and achieve a decent life an agreement to implement the 2°C limit. and alpine COP since Cancun. The climate science is mass migration and suffering3. A clear goal is set. When accounting for full climate un- world’s governments committed to a new and certainty. clear and unequivocal: without a dramatic rever. A failure in Paris would almost health and productivity. it is potentially catastrophic.5°C in light of available science. The COP added a provison assumes that the world will overshoot the 2°C that the 2°C limit may be revised downward to limit. just risky. human within the 2°C limit.Chapter 1 Taking the 2°C Limit Seriously prevent dangerous human-induced climate change. and more. all eyes have been on the road to mous. The risks of unabated climate change are enor- eral years now. They threaten every prospect of achieving Paris. increase of 3. The business-as-usual (BAU) course is so deeply face temperature below 2°C compared with the entrenched that one study after another blithely pre-industrial average. Decem. floods. world’s hopes and disappointments in our collective the world is on a path to an average temperature inability to date to head off a growing catastrophe. clear target: to keep the global rise in mean sur. mass migration movements. they leads to a significant decline in GHG emissions are mistaken. The current trajectory is not ber 2015 is our last chance. may become uninhabitable. Clearly. storms and other climate disruptions. global GHG emissions have regions. Yet. These COPs have borne the GHG emissions beyond those already committed. Some in the developed world might be skepti- sal of the GHG emissions trajectory—one that cal that such dangers will reach them. Runaway cess at Paris would enable the world to just barely climate change would threaten the life-support maintain the chance to keep the temperature rise systems of the planet: food production.8°C. cy (IEA). The Intergovernmental Panel on prices. the out of line. par- Despite the 2°C commitment reiterated at every ticularly the tropics. Many catastrophic climate change is likely threatened regions in today’s poor world. One can review any authoritative report on 1. COP21 in December 2015. leading to continued to rise sharply. Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report The Parties to the UNFCCC have now had 19 annual (AR5) shows that without major efforts to reduce meetings since 1994. or industry groups such as BP or Shell—and the goal of avoiding dangerous anthropogenic in. and safety from extreme certainly put the 2°C limit out of reach. but the means to achieve it our global politics and our energy practices are have not yet been established.7°C to 4. line” or BAU trajectory of roughly 4°C. forests. the trial levels. the result is the same: all reports present a “base- terference with the climate system. as when droughts.8°C compared to pre-indus- At the 16 th COP held in Cancun in 2010. Since 2010.

The argument of “economic development world risks inducing conditions that are inhospita- first. profound GHG emissions reductions. “slow amplifying feedbacks. floods. Yet jettison- very severe. methane uncontrollable threats when nature is disrupted. sense. society. Hansen et al : Assessing “Dangerous Climate Change”: Required Reduction of Carbon Emissions to Protect Young People. as just described. changes are slim. and CO2 buried in the permafrost in the tundra The prospects for successfully adapting to such could be released into the air as the tundra melts.3  ened. But keeping below 2°C of glob- tricably linked. 4 J. 5 Such findings are not reported in the IPCC. in summary. Uncontrolled climate change would gravely especially when humanity now comprises more threaten economic development. releasing massive amounts highly developed countries face dire and often of CO2 into the atmosphere. 5 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . but a rise in tem- rise of six meters (20 feet). Not only could a increase generations4. droughts. inex. climate change later” therefore makes no ble for the human species and millions of others.” For example. formerly the top in temperatures by 2°C bring untold suffering climate scientist at NASA. Similarly.5 He and others also perature of 2°C or more threatens many positive 3 IPCC. of the human era of the past 100.000 years. Managing the transition to deep al warming is indispensable to maintain climate decarbonization is critical to ensure that devel. and irreversible risks. suggesting that the temperatures entails major risks world should abandon a global emissions target Recent scientific evidence suggests that even a altogether and instead follow a pure bottom-up ap- temperature increase of only 2°C may generate proach to global emissions reduction. the environmental shocks would By pushing the climate beyond the experience likely overcome human and technological sys. the tems. Professor Hansen. points out that Earth’s in many parts of the world from severe climate paleoclimate history projects that a 2°C global disruptions such as heat waves. all clearly demonstrate that even the of repeated drought. But avoiding dangerous climate change is equally essential to safeguard development opportunities in both rich Why the world needs to stick to 1. which limits forecasts to 2100. the and massive forest fires and droughts in parts of Amazon rainforest could eventually die as a result Australia. SPM. They point First. Future Generations and Nature. limit global warming to 1°C instead. far from risk-free. and future upper limit of safety. Avoiding dangerous climate change and achieving A 2°C increase in global temperatures is therefore sustainable development are. Some ing or weakening the 2°C limit would be profoundly leading climate scientists are in fact advising to dangerous for several important and clear reasons. intense heat emphasize that warming of 2°C could induce waves in Europe. recent mega-floods in Serbia.4  and poor countries. Others go even further. change within the boundaries of manageable risks opment needs are met within the constraints of and to our ability to adapt to climate change. the 2°C limit Some observers argue that the 2°C limit has be- come too difficult to achieve and should be weak- Even a 2°C increase in global 1. complied by the IPCC suggests that 2°C is the crease could have on the earth. WG2. than 7 billion inhabitants on a crowded planet. warming is likely to result in eventual sea-level and intense tropical cyclones. pervasive. AR5. the scientific evidence to grave long-term consequences that a 2°C in.Taking the 2°C Limit Seriously trina and Sandy in the United States.

loosening or dropping the internation. a stabilization of GHG concentrations between There are already many influential voices that 430 and 480 ppm. and capacity building support. predicated on a shared commitment Fifth. for example. 2°C limit seriously: ization for almost any nation unless there is a y yRecognize the global carbon budget and global global cooperative framework. for example. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 6 . There is. techno- cooperative framework is put in place. They suggest that the ally agreed goal of limiting the global tempera. and more) required will also not and do what is necessary to keep global warming be put in place. including at relatively modest costs globally if the right technology cooperation and financial. nologically feasible and that it is also likely to be Second. in short. no capacity for countries to achieve the necessary y yDevelop country-level Deep Decarbonization deep transformations required to decarbonize Pathways (DDPs) to 2050 consistent with the their economy alone. many stud. Loosening the 2°C limit would very likely lead to a world without a 1. there is a 0. organized and thoughtful way—to understand capacity building. laborative public-private effort to develop. the package The truth is that governments have not yet tried of accompanying cooperative global actions (on hard enough—or. 2010–2100 in the scenarios reviewed that achieve ades of failed efforts to implement the UNFCCC. ways that keep the global increase in temperature demonstrate.06 (0. This report describes some of the impor- implementation of climate mitigation actions. 2°C limit. y yOrganize a massive global.5 How to pursue the 2°C limit quantified climate goal. success of deep decarbonization.14) percentage point reduction in the annu- UN and the multilateral system would become alized consumption growth rates over the period profound. especially after more than two dec. scenarios reviewed by the IPCC AR5. The global logical. In multilateral attempts to control anthropogenic the IPCC AR5. tant steps countries should follow to take the Yet. point beyond 2°C. there is no logical foothold or stopping global temperature increase below 2°C. Global goals imply the means below the 2°C limit. no reason for implementing them. to be frank. Taking the 2°C Limit Seriously feedback loops that could push the global climate Available studies show that the 2°C limit is tech- system into runaway and irreversible disruptions. say at 2. Similar or economically competitive and are key to the scenarios by the IEA underscore the same point. and perhaps most importantly. there is little prospect of deep decarbon. utilizing technologies that are already technologies that are not yet technically mature or close to being commercially available. which give a likely chance – have written off the multilateral processes defined as higher than two-thirds – of keeping the Third. Dropping these goals will to jettison the 2°C limit before we have really gravely undermine the will to cooperate on the tried. technology development and transfer. simply tried in an financing. The global doubts about the to 0. without a shared climate goal. international col- illustrate that there are technically feasible path.04 climate change. global costs of reducing GHG emissions to keep ture increase to 2°C without ever having tried the temperature increase below 2°C are modest seriously to achieve it could spell the death of compared to the size of the world economy. There is simply consistent with the 2°C limit. seriously Fourth. economically affordable. The world will not find a safe resting point. to the global goal and to all aspects of glob- ies indicate that the 2°C limit remains achievable al cooperation needed to achieve it. in particular on GHG emissions reduction trajectories to 2050 technology RDD&D and scale up. and diffuse various low-carbon below 2°C.5 or 3°C.

Likely is usually defined as “a probability of two-thirds or higher. we must speak in terms of probability. Total CO2 budget for the period 2011-2100    8 emissions of GHGs (measured in tons of CO2 equivalent). A given cumulative path of GHG emissions will offer a given probability of stay- ing below an increase of 2°C of mean surface temperature relative to preindustrial levels. 2.4. and the resulting global average temperature 2. Chapter 6: Assessing Transformation Pathways. For the pur- 1 See IPCC AR5 Working Group III . Total CO2 budget for the period 2011-2050    8 ured in ppm of CO2 equivalent and watts per square meter. CO2-energy budget to Stay Within the 2°C Limit There is a meaningful correlation between total cumulative 2. Global CO2-energy emissions reduction trajectories to 2050    10 sions and global temperature increase has been determined to be approximately linear.1 That in turn implies a limit on total cumulative GHG emissions over time. CO2-energy budget from the burning of fossil fuels and industrial processes    9 response (measured in increase of global average tempera- tures). https://www. In general. we are interested in global pathways that are “likely” to stay below 2°C.Mitigation of Climate Change. their long-term concentrations and radiative forcing (meas- 2.” The IPCC AR5 review of climate model scenarios has found that in order to have a likely chance of staying within the 2°C limit. December 2013. The overall relation between cumulative GHG emis- 2. Fossil fuel proven reserves and resources   10 However. the peak concentration of atmospheric GHGs would need to be in the range between 430 and 480 ppm of CO2 equivalent by 2100. since there is uncertainty surrounding the relation- ship of cumulative GHG emissions and global temperature.5. Table 6.3.3. respectively) Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 7 .ipcc. Chapter 2 CO2-energy budget 2 to Stay Within the 2°C Limit Contents 2.2.

the feasibility and sustainability of large-scale and the sensitivity of the climate to CO2 and the net negative emissions is still under debate. the sustainable large-scale use of biomass for energy purposes could be feasible.18 December 2013. including regarding several factors. other forcings. we call CO2-energy—since our Country Research Some scenarios reviewed by the IPCC AR5 WG3 Partners are developing pathways to the deep are based on the idea of “net negative emis- decarbonization of their energy systems to 2050. since Taking into account these factors.19 December 3 See IPCC AR5 Working Group III . Below. although in some countries keeping within the 2°C limit2. including: the non-CO2 direct air capture of CO 2. Annex II. the timing of century. sions” during the second half of the century.II. we are particularly interested and divide them into two time periods: 2011- in the level of cumulative CO2 emissions from 2050 and 2051-2100. for simplicity. and the power plants would 2011-2100 in turn capture and sequester the CO 2. the CO 2 budget for the first half of the CO2 emission reductions (and therefore the time century would be correspondingly 4 See IPCC AR5 Working Group III .Chapter 2 CO2-energy budget to Stay Within the 2°C Limit pose of the DDPP. N2O.II. if the use of biomass for energy pro- duction is deployed with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS). The bulk of emissions will the burning of fossil fuels and industrial processes occur in the first period.Mitigation of Climate Change.Mitigation of Climate Change. https://www. the large-scale use 2100 should be within the range of 630 to 1180 of biomass for energy production could cause Gt (billion tons) of CO2. Table Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 8 . as well as To the extent that negative emissions are avail- contributions from climate-changing factors such able on a large scale in the second half of the as aerosols and land-use albedo. At the global level. should decline to zero during the second period. Table 6. in order to achieve CO2 deforestation and compete with land-use for concentrations consistent with a likely chance of food production.ipcc.Mitigation of Climate Change. GHGs like methane. December 2013.1  Total CO2 budget for the period in power plants.ipcc. The scale of the geological potential for CO 2 sequestration 2. and indus tries. and F-gases. the IPCC AR5 it combines the dual challenge of large-scale Working Group 3 (WG3) found that the level of biomass production and large-scale storage of cumulative CO2 emissions for the period 2011– CO 2 . https://www. Chapter 6: Assessing Transformation Pathways. Table A. we describe the steps and assumptions to Net negative emissions could be achieved. Annex II. This is Defining a budget for CO2 only (the largest single called bioenergy plus carbon capture and se- source of total GHG emissions at 76%) for the questration (BECCS). since net emissions permissible by mid-century—which. We have there fore mad e an we need to take the century-long CO2 emissions assumption in the DDPP that large-scale net 2 See IPCC AR5 Working Group III .ipcc. for calculate this “CO2-energy budget. Biomass would be burned 2. BECCS in particular raises serious issues.2  Total CO2 budget for the period is also under debate.” example. https://www. But the carbon cycle has to absorb the CO2 emitted). There are other potential 2011–2100 period requires making assumptions net negative emissions technologies.3. and CCS would have to 2011-2050 be deployed first on fossil-fueled power plants To define a CO2 budget for the 2011-2050 period.

and improved support research programs that could make net agricultural practices. and that more The CO 2 budget of 950 Gt during 2011-2100 research is urgently needed. But we emphasize that there is great uncertain- CO2-energy budget from the 2. This means that the 950 Gt scale net negative emissions.4 budget for CO2-energy only for the 2011–2050 This implies 125 Gt of CO2 cumulative net emis. land-use sector.3  ty regarding the precise potential and timing for burning of fossil fuels and industrial CO2 emissions reduction and net biological se- processes questration of CO2 in land use.CO2-energy budget to Stay Within the 2°C Limit negative emissions are still too uncertain to and the potential for net biological sequestration build into our country-level Deep Decarboniza. not by mid-century. even though we strongly production. The 825 Gt3 and of 950 Gt for the period 2011–2100.6 scenarios. since land sions for the period 2051-2100. It might prove to be combines CO 2 emissions from land use. peat tion Pathways (DDPs). use is assumed to reach net zero emissions only over the century. CO2 emission reductions in the land-use sector We hope to be able to define a more precise Figure 2. As a preliminary standard. further reducing the size of the Defining a budget for CO2 from the burning of CO2-energy budget. we adopted the same assumption as the IPCC Based on the best estimates regarding non-CO2 AR5 WG3 of net zero emissions from land use forcings and excluding the availability of large. negative emissions a future reality. and industrial processes. be possible to achieve net negative emissions in cus of our country-level DDPs) requires that we the land-use sector. 2010 to 2050 40 000 MtCO2-energy 35 000 30 000 25 000 20 000 15 000 2DS 10 000 RCP -2. the IPCC AR5 WG3 total CO2 budget for the 2011–2100 period can be defines a CO2 budget for the 2011–2050 period of considered as a budget for CO2-energy only. of CO2 in particular through reforestation. period is somewhat lower than 825 Gt.6 5 000 0 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 9 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . Alternatively it may prove to fossil fuels and industrial processes only (the fo.1. CO2-energy emissions reduction trajectories for the IEA 2DS and RCP-2. in which case the permissible make assumptions regarding the potential for budget for CO 2-energy would rise accordingly. over this century. wetland restoration. the impossible to achieve net zero emissions in the burning of fossil fuels.

Unconventional oil deposits include shale in scenarios surveyed by the IPCC AR5 WG3 that oil.451 664 .1008 • Gas 275 . Conventional oil and gas are el of annual CO2-energy emissions in 2050 is of deposits that can be extracted by conventional particular interest.4 trillion barrels. serves represent approximately 3667-7119 GtCO2 Table 2. distinguish between conventional and unconven- For the purpose of the DDPP.895 • Gas 1127 .6837 3380 .2 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 10 . developed by PBL Netherlands Environ.57211 Source: IPCC AR5 WGIII Chapter 7 Table 7.411 829 .50092 35019 . and coal-bed methane. 11-12 Gt of CO2-energy. reduction trajectories to 2050 Resources are defined as amounts in addition to Given all these uncertainties. reserves of unconventional gas are estimated to gree scenario (2DS5)—which gives a 50% chance be 4-10 times higher than those of conventional of staying below 2°C of global warming—is 15 gas.43203 Total 3667 .396 404 . the projected lev.6 By the end of 2012. Unconventional gas deposits include shale gas. Taking all fossil fuels together. In particular. than 66% of staying within the 2°C limit— reach. is large.1. The range of 2050 emissions means.1989 27561 – 41214 29197 .7 Gt of CO2-energy in 2050.3 trillion barrels of conventional oil.1090 1104 .4  Global CO2-energy emissions current economic and technological conditions. For comparison.10602 • Coal 1636 . proven re- GtCO2-energy. the proven reserves amount- scenario. CO2-energy content of fossil fuel proven reserves and resources Fossil fuel Reserves Resources Total Conventional • Oil 359 . and 1010 Gt of coal (including 730 Gt of hard es 11. 220 mental Agency—which gives a probability higher trillion cubic meters of conventional natural gas.3765 2253 .499 683 .1501 Unconventional • Oil 279 . ed to 1. tional oil and gas.6 Proven reserves of the 2050 level of CO2-energy emissions projected unconventional oil were 0. CO2-energy budget to Stay Within the 2°C Limit Fossil fuel proven reserves and 2.7119 31352 . there are many proven reserves that are technologically accessi- possible global CO2-energy emissions reduction ble and potentially economically viable.5  CO2-energy budget for the 2011–2050 period in resources the next phases of the DDPP. and extra-heavy give a likely chance of staying within the 2°C limit oil. the RCP 2. and in the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) 2-de. We also trajectories that are consistent with a 2°C path.557 305 . coal and 280 Gt of lignite). It has a median value of approximately tight gas. bitumen oil sands. heavy oil. Proven reserves are defined as those fossil fuel amounts that are economically viable under 2.

7 plus resources will have to stay in the ground or The CO2-energy budget to 2100 for the 2°C limit be “stranded”—that is. 7 IPCC AR5 WG3 Table 7. Combining reserves But it is clear from the numbers reviewed above and resources. Nine more CCS projects are under construction. This raises the obvious are vastly more reserves and resources than the question whether such investments are well di- world can use safely. it Research Partners. given the substitutes for coal. coal deposits will likely be of around 125 Gt of CO2 until 2050. reference. expect the fossil fuel industries to be investing far tion of CO2. Even under optimistic assumptions.8 Third. One would instead cant share of biological and geological sequestra. The conclusion is stark: there resources and reserves. stranded in the highest proportion.092 GtCO2 of poten. Indeed. developing reserves This conclusion is true even allowing for a signifi. This is for four All elements of CCS are proven at the pilot scale. iosandprojections/ 6 See BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013. power plants. lution that causes severe disease burdens. term. the CO2-energy content reaches that a very large share of the fossil fuel reserves 35.211 GtCO2. it is CCS.019-57. rected. e. greater than that of oil and gas (22% and 68% tionary point sources operate around the world higher. Aggregate heavily of fossil fueled power generation—would fossil fuel resources are enormous. countries and businesses need may soon be feasible and necessary for many or to urgently increase the levels of RDD&D in CCS most countries to stop building new coal-fired to test if it can be technically and economical.352–50. left unused in the long- is a mere 950 GtCO2. or are simply wasteful. respectively). coal use often has (most of them on natural gas processing plants.CO2-energy budget to Stay Within the 2°C Limit of potential CO2-energy emissions. very serious adverse side effects. As a resources that will eventually be usable. 8 See IEA WEO 2012. Fourth. its reserve and resource levels are But the feasibility of large-scale CCS deployment much higher than those of oil and gas and vastly remains under debate.2. including in and zero-carbon substitutes are relatively easy to many of the DDPs developed by the Country identify. power plants except for those that deploy CCS. Twelve CCS projects at sta. ly deployed at a large scale.g. larger than the CO2-energy budget. 11 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .iea. greater than any plausible CO2-energy budget. most coal is used in relatively large stationary Since CCS is a critical abatement technology in sources. carbonization. the IEA ETP 2DS scenario assumes CCS Of the three fossil fuels. more heavily in the RDD&D of CCS in order to the deployment of CCS will not enable the use increase the proportion of existing reserves and of all fossil fuel resources or even reserves. tial CO2-energy emissions. cal storage sites where carbon can be sequestered Second. The already-proven reserves are many times tained in proven reserves is roughly 3-7 times beyond the safe level of cumulative fossil fuel use. many countries—in particular those relying clear that the available oil and gas reserves plus 5 See the following for a description of the portfolio of related IEA scenarios: http://www. such as air pol- some of them on fertilizer production plants). In the absence of In addition to the stranding of coal deposits. that can never be safely used. the CO2 per unit of energy of coal is much remains uncertain. First. where lower-carbon most global mitigation scenarios. Total reserves yet the energy sector invests hundreds of billions and resources exceed the CO2-energy budget by of dollars each year to discover and develop new some 35-60 times. representing find it much more difficult to achieve deep de- approximately 31. The amount of CO2 con. since the scale of geologi.

leaving the higher-cost oil and gas in the ground. We note that stranding assets will have high distributional consequences. through consumption or production permits. Yet which of those oil and gas reserves and resources will be stranded and which will be developed? The efficient answer is to deploy the lowest-cost oil and gas (taking into account their respective CO2 content per unit of energy in the cost calculations). A country with stranded fossil fuel reserves may lose considera- ble potential income. etc. it is the relative cost of the development and extraction of the alternatives. carbon taxation. Therefore.) will have large distributional implications for sharing the global effort of emissions reduction that will need to be considered in any successful interna- tional framework. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 12 .g. the decisions on how to strand assets (e. CO2-energy budget to Stay Within the 2°C Limit resources is also large relative to the CO2-energy budget. The issue is not conventional versus non-conventional resources per se.

Pathways to the emissions. energy use per unit of GDP.1. Since the CO2 contained in proven reserves and resources Systems of fossil fuels vastly exceeds the 2°C global CO2-energy budget. then CO2 emissions are driven mainly by two factors: Energy/GDP and CO2/Energy.1  The drivers of CO2 emissions Deep decarbonization requires a very significant transformation Contents of energy systems. residential and com- mercial buildings. that lead Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 13 . we use the term “energy conservation” to describe a broader set of measures. we simply refer to them as CO2 emissions.2. Only fossil fuels in conjunction with CCS would re- Deep Decarbonization of Energy main. including structural and behavioral changes. The second term is the carbon intensity of energy. CO2 emissions can be expressed as the product of four inputs: population. meaning the amount of energy per unit of final output. 3. The first term is the energy intensity. since the focus of this chapter is on energy systems. the transformation toward a low-carbon energy system cannot 3. The 3 pillars of the deep decarbonization   14 The simplest way to describe the deep decarbonization of en- ergy systems is by the principal drivers of energy-related CO2 emissions—for convenience. Chapter 3 Pathways to the 3 Deep Decarbonization of Energy Systems 3. The drivers of CO2 emissions   13 be driven by the scarcity of fossil fuels. We refer to “energy efficiency” measures as the technical improvements of products and processes. The ultimate objective of this transformation is to phase out fossil fuel combustion with uncontrolled CO2 3. GDP per capita. and industry). and CO2 emissions per unit of energy: CO2 emissions = Population x (GDP/Population) x (Energy/GDP) x (CO2/Energy) If we take as given the population trajectory and assume a rising trajectory of GDP per capita in line with a successful economic development program. The energy intensity of GDP (Energy/GDP) can be reduced through energy efficiency and conservation measures in energy end-use sectors (passenger and goods transportation.

This is the result of a combined transportation. Decadal and cumulative percent change in carbon intensity percent change in Energy/GDP in the carbon intensity. Decadal and cumulative Figure 3. wind. The 3 pillars of the deep 3. material efficiency. the decrease in the carbon intensity 0% 0% of energy plays a bigger role than the decrease in -20% the energy intensity of GDP in the overall decrease -20% of carbon intensity of GDP. First. including low-carbon electricity. GDP) decreases by approximately 90% compared ing) from highly carbon-intensive fossil fuels in to its 2010 level. compared with a fall in carbon intensity 2020 2030 2040 2050 2050 2020 2030 2040 2050 2050 of approximately 20% relative to 2010. Though as the electricity supply is decarbonized over the longer term. the carbon intensity of GDP (CO2/ switching end-use energy supplies (fuel switch. nuclear pow. The analysis of the scenarios also shows the tem- poral dynamics of the decarbonization of energy systems. Second. 2010 to 2050 2010. (Energy/GDP) and 70% reduction in the carbon er low-carbon energy carriers synthesized from intensity of energy (CO2/Energy) compared to electricity generation or sustainable biomass. -40% -40% These dynamics are driven. and optimized value chains In sum. smart urban design. Energy intensity is pro- of GDP for the IPCC 2°C scenarios.2  Examples of energy efficiency and conservation decarbonization measures include: improved vehicle technologies. electrifica- -100% -100% tion plays a big role in the decrease of the CO2 intensity of energy. and industry to lower 60% reduction in the energy intensity of GDP carbon fuels. improved tems rests on three pillars: end-use equipment. lower-carbon fossil fuels. in part. WG3 that give a likely chance of staying within er.Chapter 3 Pathways to the Deep Decarbonization of Energy Systems to lower levels of energy consumed per unit of GDP. the reductions in the energy intensity tend to be larger than the reductions Figure 3. improved equipment. fuel based generation with renewable energy (e. y yFuel-switching production processes. oth.g. by the effects of electrification. the 2°C limit. and CO2/Energy for the IPCC 2°C jected to fall by around 40% by 2030 relative to 2010 to 2050 scenarios. and/or fossil fuels (coal. buildings. But by 2010 2020 2030 2040 2010 2010 2020 2030 2040 2010 mid-century. electrification -60% -60% only has a small effect on the CO2 intensity of energy. solar. building y yEnergy efficiency and conservation practices. gas) with CCS. and construction materials (in residential y yLow-carbon electricity and commercial buildings). At first. the decarbonization manner.2. architectural design. since electricity generation is still rather -80% -80% carbon-intensive. in CO 2 emissions.1. the deep decarbonization of energy sys- (for passenger and goods transportation). or their 2010 levels. and geothermal). countries must implement all The carbon intensity of energy (CO2/energy) can three pillars of decarbonization in a coordinated be reduced in two ways. In the global scenarios reviewed by the IPCC AR5 hydro. and re-use In order to deliver the required deep reductions of waste heat (in industry). No single approach is sufficient given of electricity generation (low-carbon electricity) the magnit ud e of the d eep d ecarbonization through the replacement of uncontrolled fossil challenge. In the short-run. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 14 .

and solar photovoltaic and concentrat- ing solar power. Research. and switching to low-carbon fuels are already technologically mature and commercially available.3. and battery electric light-duty vehicles. The role of technology roadmaps ment. They are poised to achieve much higher penetrations in the presence of investment in RDD&D and policies that provide the right incentives. decarbonizing electricity generation. albeit sometimes at significantly higher costs than the fossil fuel alternatives. and process technologies in the building and industrial sectors. and widely available in every country. and diffusion (RDD&D) of these and roundtables   20 emission-reducing technologies to make them reliable. and Diffusion of Low-Carbon Technologies Contents 4. 4 Demonstration. Chapter 4 Research. heating. fuel-efficient. The need for accelerated development of low-carbon technologies   15 quires the deployment of new low-carbon technologies to transform energy production and consumption patterns. Development. cooling. Many of the technologies required for improving ener- gy efficiency. hybrid. and a wide range of energy-efficient lighting.1. Key technology areas for RDD&D    16 This in turn will require accelerated research. demonstration. and hydrogen fuel cell-powered buses and fleet vehicles. power and heating technologies based on hydro-geothermal resources.2. natural gas. cost-competitive. 4. and Diffusion The need for accelerated development of 4. Demonstration. wind.1  of Low-Carbon Technologies low-carbon technologies Deep decarbonization of the world’s energy systems re- 4. ethanol production from biomass-derived sugars and starch. Examples include renewable energy-based electricity generation technologies such as hydropower. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 15 . Development. develop- 4. electric hybrid.

already done commercially in applications where 1 Air capture. although individual components of all achieve the objective of deep decarbonization of CCS (capture. RD. from the other exhaust gases.2  Key technology areas for RDD&D plants. Some of these technolo. Development. A number of ment of these technologies will require a broader key technology areas requiring focused attention mix of adequate financing.Chapter 4 Research. After the CO2 is captured The focus needs to be on reaching cost-effective at the point source. it is transported by pipeline emissions reductions. ance and support. and sequestration) are their national energy systems through technologies established technologies.1  Carbon capture and sequestration infrastructure needed for their deployment. This list of technologies is CO2 is removed from fuels through other chemi- not comprehensive and represents a snapshot of cal processes before combustion. Some have been direct technological support). is discussed below in the negative emissions technologies section. to an appropriate geological site for storage un- The 15 DDPs developed by the Country Research derground. or environmental impacts. cluding putting a price on carbon emissions and gies are still under development. and Diffusion of Low-Carbon Technologies But existing and commercially available technol. including IEA technology roadmaps. effective policies (in- are described below. A full treatment of RDD&D is mercial niches but not yet at large scale. We underscore that the commercial deploy- der to achieve widespread uptake. Some lack the complementary 4. resulting in a relatively be careful not to preclude any technologies from pure CO2 stream after the removal of water in playing a role in future decarbonization efforts. tries. are technically viable but at too high a cost for mass adoption. based on recent some cases. for decarbonization. Demonstration. In particular. the tion through a chemical process that separates it IPCC AR5 WG3 report. number of variants. CCS at small scale is that are not yet deployed at large scale. Some beyond the scope of this interim report. 2012). Many other new technologies are in devel. transport. combustion. cement 4. the exhaust stream.1 In areas for low-carbon RDD&D. Pre-combustion a continuously evolving energy technology land. New through public and private RDD&D in order to energy supply and end-use technologies will be make deep decarbonization possible in all coun- needed. typically in saline aquifers more than Partners do not all rely on the same technology mix 800 m below the surface. a non-point source form of carbon capture. some DDPs do not CCS has not yet been proven as a whole system use CCS. in which fuel is combusted in pure D&D efforts for decarbonization should therefore oxygen rather than air. requiring various levels of RDD&D in or. The remainder of this chapter focuses on key ogies alone will not be sufficient in many national technological hurdles that need to be overcome contexts to achieve deep decarbonization. refineries. and steel mills that emit exhaust gases Below is a high-level overview of key technology with a relatively high concentrations of CO2. the CO2 is captured after combus- literature. while others do not use nuclear power.2. and post-combustion CCS technologies have a scape. A special variant is “oxyfuel” opment today that may emerge in the future. and the Global Energy As. But at large scale. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 16 . and public accept- demonstrated in pilot projects or in small com. monly refers to the capture of CO 2 at large stationary point sources such as coal and nat- ural gas-fueled power plants. Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) com- reliability. In other cases the sessment (IIASA. and some face barriers of public concern about safety.

such as gas turbines. This is traditionally accomplished er generation in North America are expected to go with large generators. the relative and built-in energy storage by way of their fuel merits of pre-combustion. The sheer volume of CO2 under con. generation. Demonstration. that provide shock absorption tion and operating experience at scale. and Diffusion of Low-Carbon Technologies CO2 is pumped into partially depleted oil wells costs of electricity from time-varying renewable for enhanced oil recovery (EOR). the largest market for CCS systems ing demand at will. as well as hybrid remains out of the atmosphere. will be better understood. post-combustion. However. at stationary point sources—mostly at natural gas Power grids must be able to match energy de- processing plants and some on fertilizer production mand and energy supply on a moment-by-mo- plants. sideration is large: for every ton of coal entering Three principal approaches are available to bal- a CCS-equipped power plant. to coordinate and control and economical infrastructure to transport CO2.2. to make for a supply system capable of follow- In the long-term. systems that combine wind and solar energy with gas-powered electricity generation. the energy resources to levels comparable to that injection of high-pressure CO2 generates com. dination of diverse resources in space and time. second. gas hybrid systems are limited in how much natural 4. the electric grid must rely and most concentrated point source of CO2. energy storage. cost. and stability. tovoltaic modules and more gradual declines in Demand response and flexible load offer a large price of wind turbines have reduced the direct potential resource for adjusting the temporal pro- 17 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . is therefore no existing wells. The on other low-carbon methods of balancing supply main challenges of CCS reside in scale. With construc. load generators are complemented by flexible and emissions requirements. sources and therefore their inability to provide To date. the choice of geological “flexible load”). about three tons of ance an electric power system with a high pene- CO2 must be captured and stored. and that link uncorrelated or negatively correlated the mechanisms for assuring that stored CO2 in fact supplies of intermittent energy. per se. readily dispatchable units.2  Energy storage and grid management gas can be used while meeting the falling target Recent sharp declines in the cost of solar pho. These stable base- oxyfuel CCS technologies for specific applications. and economic conditions. Development. emissions intensity of the grid. include the optimal power plant design to facilitate to compensate for the intermittency with other carbon capture. The cost of mercial value by increasing oil production from solar and wind energy. such as coal-fired and nu- online within the next year or two. availability (known as “demand response” and and sequestration of CO2. electric demand so as to coincide with power economic and energy costs of capture. Two large pilot projects for CCS pow. 12 CCS projects operate around the globe reliable power on a desired schedule. the design of an effective. and reservoir and massive inertia. likely requiring a more refined coor- verification. clear power plants. Exam- sites for storage at the scale of tens or hundreds of ples of the first approach include grid networks billions of tons of CO2 over coming decades. At least nine more CCS projects are under ment basis in order to maintain grid functionality construction. The economics of CCS for EOR longer a substantial impediment. reliable. The main chal- therefore are not primarily driven by the carbon lenge remains the intermittency of these energy removal objective. Open questions tration of time-varying renewable resources: first. and and demand. As the penetration level of will most likely be found in the electric power sector intermittent and non-dispatchable renewable where coal-burning plants constitute the greatest resources increases. In this case. and third. from other fuels in many countries. transport.Research.

Also. reliability. pability in millions of individual devices is now issues of waste management. Design goals a bility. i. Yet high costs.g. the least costly. and still others are planning to expand their declined dramatically so that the potential for nuclear capacity dramatically. Where it is available—for example. Passive reactor safety is another key hydrocarbons). cooling based on water pumping that itself re- mercialize these technologies at a large scale. the emergence of electric vehicles ance especially following the Fukushima accident. fuel strated on a broad range of time scales. safety considerations. Technical advances. water avail. A variety of electric storage however. communica. However. Breakthroughs technologies are known and have been demon. with flexible charging capability suggests that an currently hinder a decisive scale-up of nuclear increasing capacity for demand response is be.2.3  Advanced nuclear power energy storage at the end use location. as to matching electric demand and supply since well as symbolic links between nuclear energy it fits readily into the traditional design philos. fuel security. molten salts. technology advances that involve the modularity ades. from recycling. others plan to scale of sensor and communication technologies have back. of production systems. smaller-scale units. using captured rials from any point in the fuel cycle for nuclear CO 2 plus renewa ble energy to create liquid weapons. alter- way’s mountain reservoirs that store Denmark’s native systems for fuel reprocessing. Many other storage technologies exist. and Diffusion of Low-Carbon Technologies file of loads. although it is not necessarily engineering improvements. and second-by-second needed in order for nuclear energy to remain a storage. automatic demand response ca. energy. quires electric power). Some of these are proposing to phase tion. Public support for nuclear technology may coming available. The costs out their nuclear power fleet. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 18 . runs. energy. load-following units. philosophical differences over appro- of lower supply is the most obvious approach priate strategies for nuclear waste disposal. have important non-technical dimensions—for Storing excess energy for delivery during periods example. including batteries. alternative wind power—the intermittency problem can (e. and cos t-e ffective applications and to com. in safety systems. hydrogen (through electrolysis). and public resist- available. and passive safety systems. thorium) fuels. proliferation concerns. The term fourth-generation nuclear power gen- Large-scale pumped hydroelectric storage has erally refers to a range of nuclear fission energy been cost-effective in many countries for dec. as well as improved. Development. and economic incentives. and weapons—that are not readily addressed by ophy of the grid. often taking advantage of thermal 4. matic. The main challenges of both of these approaches are in the There are presently 40 countries with nuclear realm of information management. safe operability of reactors as dispatchable. Substantial development and feature. and dependably low costs will likely be seasonal to daily. meaning that the reactor core is assured demonstration is required to determine the best by physical first principles to be safe from melt- matches between diverse storage technologies down even in the absence of active cooling (e. Short-term storage may also be used significant part of the decarbonization pathways for improving electric power quality and local of major emitting economies. reliability.g. Research. and environmental concerns greatly include greater simplicity so that reactors are less limit the feasible locations for pumped hydro vulnerable to construction delays and cost over- storage. compressed air. and proliferation resistance. making it much more difficult to divert mate- and synthetic hydrocarbons (e. hourly. auto- be solved. decentralized. control. topography. flywheels. Demonstration. also play a critical role.g.e. Nor.

Research, Development, Demonstration, and Diffusion of Low-Carbon Technologies

4.2.4  Vehicles and advanced biofuels 4.2.5  Industrial processes

The decarbonization of the transport fleet, be- Process heat in industry is one of the most
ginning with personal vehicles but also extending challenging sources of energy-CO2 emission to
to heavy-duty vehicles, aviation, and ocean ship- decarbonize. Many industrial processes, such as
ping is crucial to stay within 2°C. A range of cut- smelting, cement production, steelmaking, oil
ting-edge technologies, such as high-performance refining, and other distillation processes, require
batteries, hydrogen fuel cells, and advanced bi- vast inputs of heat, typically with very large CO2
ofuels, hold the potential to decarbonize much emissions. In principle, many of these heat pro-
or all the transport sector. Yet most low-carbon cesses could be electrified, or the heat could be
transport technologies are pre-commercial, at produced from hydrogen as a fuel. Electrical en-
least at a large scale. For electric vehicles, lithi- ergy can provide increased efficiency through the
um ion (Li-ion) batteries are expected to improve appropriate use of directed-heating technologies
incrementally, but new battery technologies will (e.g. electric arc, magnetic induction, microwave,
likely be required to achieve higher energy and ultraviolet, radio frequency). Given the diversity
power densities, lengthen vehicle range, and lower of these processes and the varying contexts in
up-front vehicle costs. which they are used (scale and organization of
Biofuels, especially liquid biofuels, offer the pros- the industrial processes), it is highly uncertain
pect of decarbonization with the continued use of whether industrial processes can be decarbon-
existing infrastructure and technologies, including ized using available technologies. Much greater
internal combustion engines, oil pipelines, and gas efforts of RDD&D are therefore required in this
station pumps. Yet biofuels have a clear downside. under-studied area to ensure deep decarboniza-
Many existing biofuels, e.g. maize-based ethanol tion by mid-century.
in the United States, compete with other critical
land uses, such as food and feed production and
4.2.6  Negative emissions technologies
ecosystem needs like land and water utilization.
Advanced biofuels aim to overcome the competition Many low-carbon scenarios, including some in
between biofuels, food, and ecosystems. Possible IPCC AR5, project an “overshooting” of the carbon
technologies for such advanced biofuels include bio- budget in the first half of the 21st century, which
engineered organisms (e.g. algae, bacteria) to pro- must then be offset through net negative emis-
duce biofuels and the processing of non-foodstuffs sions in the second half of the century. The pop-
from non-arable land into biofuels (e.g. cellulosic ular placeholder for net negative emissions is the
biofuels produced from wood products). Efforts to integration of bioenergy (BE) with CCS, both as
produce fuels directly from sunlight, water, and technologies for electricity generation and biofuel
CO2, without using biological organisms (“artificial production. BECCS combines the dual challenge
photosynthesis”), are still at an early research stage of large-scale biomass production and large-scale
and focus primarily on producing hydrogen. Success storage of CO2. The feasibility of each component
here could greatly decrease the land area required of BECCS is uncertain, and their combination is
to produce a unit of fuel as compared to biomass, therefore even less certain at this stage.
but important challenges, such as competing land An alternative approach for net negative emissions
uses, limited water resources, and sustainable sourc- would be the direct air capture of CO2 followed
es of carbon for fuel synthesis will still need to be by geological storage. Air capture refers to tech-
overcome. nologies that extract CO2 from the atmosphere at

19 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

Research, Development, Demonstration, and Diffusion of Low-Carbon Technologies

the ambient concentration of CO2 (i.e. 400 ppm). around shared priorities and ensure effective use
The advantage of direct air capture is that it can of scarce resources for RDD&D. They will be a
be done anywhere without the need for transport key tool in driving directed technological innova-
of the CO2 to a storage site. A disadvantage is tion for low-carbon technologies. The scope and
that the process of isolating and removing the content of these technology roadmaps should be
CO2 from air at low ambient concentrations is frequently updated, to make sure the necessary
technically challenging, currently expensive, and RDD&D push does not preclude any technolo-
unproven at scale. gy that could play a role in the achievement of
cost-effective emissions reduction in every sector.
Multi-stakeholder technology roundtables can
The role of technology roadmaps
develop these technology roadmaps. Such round-
and roundtables
tables should gather governments, businesses,
There are strong reasons to believe that the nec- investors, and other critical stakeholders with an
essary technologies for deep decarbonization interest in a particular technology. The round-
are within reach from an engineering and cost tables would prepare and update technology
standpoint. But their commercial readiness needs roadmaps, identify priority areas for public and
to be accelerated by providing appropriate policy private RDD&D, and mobilize public and private
support and by building global international col- funds for RDD&D. As one example, the IEA has
laborative public-private partnerships on RDD&D. been operating technology roundtables for key
Effective global strategies for deep decarboniza- energy technologies.
tion must include strategies for promoting the
development and diffusion of low-carbon tech-
Previous examples of successful technology RD-
D&D share a number of characteristics: clear goals
and timelines for technology performance were
set; public and private actors organized around
long-term technology roadmaps; industry both
competed and cooperated to identify promising
lines of inquiry and demonstration; grants were
issued on a highly competitive basis; and intel-
lectual property was frequently shared or open
source. Key RDD&D mechanisms include tech-
nology roadmaps and technology roundtables.
They complement market-based instruments for
low-carbon transition such as carbon taxation,
emissions permit systems, and regulations.
Technology roadmaps have been used success-
fully in many technology areas, including sem-
iconductors and genetics, to identify priorities
for research and technology development. Such
roadmaps help mobilize and organize the pub-
lic and private players in expert communities

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 20

 Part II

The Deep
Pathways Project

Chapter 5. Developing Country-Level Deep Decarbonization Pathways (DDPs)   23
5.1. The objective of developing country-level illustrative DDPs   
5.2. Backcasting approach consistent with the 2°C target   
5.3. Bottom-up approach, with transparent technological assumptions   
5.4. Summary of general assumptions   

Chapter 6. Aggregate Results and Cross-Country Comparisons from the 15 National
Deep Decarbonization Pathways (DDPs)   29
6.1. Introduction   
6.2. Deep decarbonization in the context of sustainable development    
6.3. Aggregate results   
6.4. Examining the pillars of deep decarbonization at country level    
6.5. Sectoral strategies    
6.6. Areas for further analysis   

21 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

Part II 

pathways to
deep decarbonization

The Deep
Pathways Project

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 22

1. Summary of general assumptions   27 limiting the increase in global mean surface temperature to less than 2°C. exploring options for even deeper decarbonization. This 2014 report of the DDPP focuses on an initial analysis of the technical feasibility of DDPs within each country. Developing Country-Level Deep Decarbonization Pathways (DDPs) 5.2. Chapter 5 Developing 5 Country-Level Deep Decarbonization Pathways (DDPs) Contents 5. such as equity and the principle of “Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities” (CBDR-RC). But it will also take a broader perspective.1  country-level illustrative DDPs   23 level illustrative DDPs 5. The objective of developing The objective of developing country- 5. It will refine the techni- cal analysis of deep decarbonization pathways. at this stage without consideration of economic and social costs and benefits or who should pay for them. Bottom-up approach. The 2015 DDPP report will address these issues. It will analyze in more detail how the twin objectives of devel- opment and deep decarbonization can be met through integrated approaches and suggest policy frameworks for implementation. We have not yet looked at important issues that are critical in the context of UNFCCC negotiations.3. Backcasting approach consistent with the 2°C target   24 The Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project (DDPP) is a collaborative initiative to understand and show how coun- 5. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 23 . with transparent technological assumptions   27 tries can transition to a low-carbon economy and how the world can meet the internationally agreed objective of 5. beyond technical to specifically consider economic and social costs and benefits.4.

including those by IPCC and IEA. a 2050 per-capita emissions Partners presented in this report are intended benchmark. At times. tries. Brazil. We have taken the 2°C limit in glob- s tocks. This chapter describes the methodology adopted search Partners composed of leading researchers by the consortium of 15 Country Research Part- and research ins tit utions from some of the ners of the DDPP for the technical feasibility stage world’s aggregatively larges t emitting coun. Japan. account their country’s socio-economic condi. government of- s t udies also h ig hlig ht common actions and ficials have struggled to reconcile different views technological challenges associated with deep on how to fairly divide a certain global carbon decarbonization across many regions. Germany India. representing more than 70% of global GHG emissions and at very different stages of Backcasting approach consistent 5. but rather have that would be consistent with particular tem. including 2°C. tentious question on precise allocation of indi- Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 24 . with the intent of taking into get is identified by moving backward in time. and al temperature increase as the target. France. Chi- with the 2°C target na. only a few countries with both the global target and their own national had studied pathways with emissions reductions circumstances. In past perature change limits. used it as a benchmark for exploring DDPs. global studies can be insufficient national carbon budgets. with individual countries’ socio-economic de. Indonesia. The term “backcasting” is used to denote a pro- the UK. explored pathways to 2050 that would be line tions. Each DDPP Country Re. and the Country Research Partners global-level studies of deep emissions reduc. development aspirations. Global 5. Russia.2. cess in which a target is fixed for a future date. however. On their budget or GHG emissions reduction target into own. this target into a global CO2-energy budget for The DDPs developed by the Country Research the period 2011-50. Such disagreements over the equitable sharing of velo pment objectives and may lack en oug h global mitigation efforts have been a stumbling granularity on individual country’s economic block for many years in UNFCCC negotiations. the assumptions emissions. Global international climate negotiations. and sectoral performance indicators to provide a complementary analysis to existing benchmarks. Mexico. Prior to the DDPP. South Korea.Chapter 5 Developing Country-Level Deep Decarbonization Pathways (DDPs) Currently the DDPP comprises 15 Country Re. translated other relevant factors. and the USA. Our project falls squarely within the backcasting tions. and the basis for GHG accounting rules. search Team d evelo ps a “pathway” for d eep and then a pathway towards achieving the tar- decarbonization. have consideration not taken up at this stage offered a framework for analyzing of deep de- carbonization at a high level and have identified We have not allocated the cumulative CO2-ener- total worldwide emission reduction trajectories gy global budget across countries.2  development: Australia. These disagreements in- to make a clear and convincing case for action clude whether or how to take into account historic at the country level. of the analysis. Canada. large enough by 2050 to be consistent with the objective of staying within the 2°C limit. a technical roadmap for policy implementation The DDPP has sought to de-emphasize the con- at the country level. South Africa. nat ural resources endowments.1  Burden-sharing and equity based studies. infrastructure framework. sectors and existing infrastructure to present leading to insufficient international action to date. the potential options and cost for mit- underlying global studies may be inconsistent igation.

2050. to stay within the 2°C Country Research Partners used a 2050 global limit every country will have to undertake a average per capita emissions level as a bench- deep transformation of their energy systems mark but not as a target in a strict sense.4 – 15.6 25 – 42 Asia Final energy demand per capita in buildings 11.85 (tC02/GJ. the rules on GHG emissions. index 1=2010 value) Cement _ 0.6 9.Developing Country-Level Deep Decarbonization Pathways (DDPs) vidual budgets or targets.78 (GJ/p-km. and instead to focus 5.65 0.3 9.7 – 13 Latin America 11. bold actions that will be eventually as a benchmark.2  Level of per capita emissions by 2050 on common. Globally. index 1=2010 value) Total Transport Carbon intensity of 0. For the to low-carbon energy by 2050.8 Buildings (GJ) Africa & ME 10. the cumulative can be shared equitably across countries.39 Carbon intensity of industrial production Industry Iron and steel _ 0.7 – 13.47 – 0.2 29 – 43 EIT 31.84 (tCO 2 /ton industrial product) Paper _ 0. not as a target needed within nearly all countries.6 – 0. Of course.24 – 0.7 0.8 10. and change negotiations and will be addressed in the 2DS scenario reaches 15 Gt of CO2-energy by the next phase of the DDPP.75 0. This 2050 level translates to a benchmark Table 5. the purposes of developing the DDPP 2050 bench- question of who pays for such transformation. mark.1 Range and median value of sectoral performance indicators in the IPCC 2°C scenarios Sub-sector / Benchmark in 2050 Benchmark in 2050 Sector Indicator Region Median value Range Carbon intensity of power generation Power generation _ 20 -30 – 50 (gCO 2 /kWh) OECD 37.45 – 0. The plain fact is that. we have chosen the IEA 2DS scenario as and how the cost of climate change mitigation our reference scenario.58 – 0.16 – 0. index 1=2010 value) Energy intensity of freight transport Transport Freight transport 0.9 (GJ/t-km. regardless of the precise allocation To guide the exploration of their DDPs. will emissions trajectory from the IEA 2DS results in a necessarily have to be resolved in the climate 50% chance of staying within the 2°C limit.2.2 Energy intensity of passenger transport Passenger transport 0.20 25 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .

catch-up Research Partners will explore further options for economic growth in low-income countries that deep decarbonization. not as targets related either to their technical potential for de- carbonization.6 tons today will be able to go far below limit. Technological assumptions provided by the DDPP Secretariat for when improved low- carbon technologies will become available for deployment at scale Starting date Sector Technology of deployment at scale Power CCS (coal and gas) 2025 .2025 Electric boilers and process heaters 2020 . in line with the medium fertility projec. very for this choice was not to constrain the analysis few countries with CO2-energy per capita much within a 50% chance of staying within the 2°C above 1. existing economic structure and energy used sectoral performance indicators to guide the Table 5. Indeed. assuming a global population of 9. to 2050.2025 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 26 . In fact. to implement mitigation 2050.2025 Hydrogen fuel cells 2030 .2030 Advanced geothermal 2025 . in particular levels of In addition to the level of per capita emissions by economic development. criterion for the equitable allocation of the global carbon budget across countries is that it fails to 5.6 tCO2 per capita will higher than 50% chance of staying within the increase their per capita emissions in the interval 2°C limit. then very few countries can be significantly The reason why the convergence of per capita above. On the other hand.2030 Advanced energy storage 2030 . and all countries should converge close to emissions by 2050 cannot be used as a single the global average. As a consequence. tions.6 tons of CO2-energy emissions per capita by ment of their own DDPs. and country results of the 2DS with the Country if very few countries can go significantly below Research Partners to assist them in the develop. The reason exploration of country-level DDPs. Developing Country-Level Deep Decarbonization Pathways (DDPs) of 1. 1. even as they decrease the carbon inten- ganization and has shared the global assumptions sity of their economic growth.2035 Industry CCS in industry (close to pure CO 2 streams) 2020 . and they could lead to a currently emit less than 1. the Country Research Partners have also actions.2.2040 Transport Global availability of long range EVs across all vehicle types 2020 .3  Sectoral performance indicators as capture important differences across countries benchmarks.6 tons of CO2-energy emissions per capita by infrastructure.2035 IV gen nuclear 2035 . capabilities. 2050. or historical and cumulative emis- 2050. But the IEA is a key DDPP Partner Or.2.2025 Second generation biofuels 2020 .5 billion sions. While recognizing these important limita- by 2050. during the next phase the Country this level by 2050. it provides a useful benchmark to guide the tion of the UN Population Division.

and A key element of the DDPP approach was to advanced biofuels. or historical and cumulative utilize the technologies if their country has the emissions. early. costs. we emphasize that the DDPP is still at an interim stage in considering the full range of 5. All of these technologies sistent with the 2°C limit. and financing of the various in chapter IV. not as a be available. transport. y yThere is ample public-private partnership and ance to the Country Research Partners made cooperation to enable the rapid development. For example. The depth and breadth of technology deployment but as a consequence of a higher share of industry strongly depends on country-specific circum- in its GDP than the world average. in particular those regarding therefore base the 2015 report on a more de- the availability of technologies that are not tailed and considered assessment of the timing. There is continued debate transparent technological around certain technologies such as the future assumptions of CCS. the national deep decarboniza- commercialization of these technologies is often tion pathways produced by the DDPP Country beyond the reach of any individual country or Research Partners are based on a number of as- company. Sectoral performance did not have to be deployed by the dates listed indicators have important limitations and do not in each and every DDP and were provided to of- account for possible differences in the technical fer guidance to the Country Research Partners. acceptance and support). and public generation. both among the Country define a common set of shared assumptions Research Partners and more generally. 27 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . buildings. by using it possible for them to project that the deep this indicator. provided by the DDPP Secretariat to offer guid. achieving deep decarbonization low-carbon technology options. Moreover. actions to combat climate change. The following assumptions. the infrastructure to sup- define sectoral performance indicators for power port the deployment of technologies. But Country Research Partners had the option to ment these actions. through global internation.4  Summary of general assumptions mercially available or not currently competitive with conventional technologies. different capacities to imple. geological potential for their sectoral strategies in the DDPs developed by carbon storage) and if the technologies were nec- the Country Research Partners were thoroughly essary and cost-effective to achieve the objective evaluated. We will across countries. indeed rests on the accelerated deployment at scale of technologies that are not yet com- 5. and industry con. a country could have higher emis. We have used stances (including the availability of alternative the scenarios reviewed by the IPCC AR5 WG3 to technological options. al colla borative public-private partnersh ips. fourth-generation nuclear power. yet economically viable. result of lower efforts to decarbonize its industry. y yAll countries operate in a supportive global in the development and early deployment of policy environment that is firmly directed at these technologies. As discussed in detail scalability. d ecarbonization techn ologies would ind eed sions per capita than the world average. But we have used them to ensure that physical potential (e. mitigation potential. with technology options.3  Bottom-up approach. the 2°C limit. and coordinated invests massively.Developing Country-Level Deep Decarbonization Pathways (DDPs) exploration of their DDPs. Achieving full To summarize. sumptions and enabling conditions: try Research Partners assume that the world y yAll countries take strong. of deep decarbonization.g. The DDPs developed by the Coun.

vestments. Developing Country-Level Deep Decarbonization Pathways (DDPs) demonstration. as all countries will have to make real power to CCS to energy efficiency. y yLow-carbon technologies become available and affordable to all countries. costs. deep decarbonization scenario in line with the nologies.6 tons per capita y yFinancial flows are re-directed from high-carbon global average or sectoral performance indicator to low-carbon portfolios and projects. be relatively small. use of large quantities of offsets to minimize y yOpen global markets ensure the global diffu. We as- countries with lower capacities to implement sume that the volume of such offsets will at best mitigation policies and finance low-carbon in. which shares equitably the costs and benefits across countries. and diffusion of the requisite Previous studies have frequently assumed the low-carbon technologies in all key sectors. though such support is not modeled in this phase of the project. ranging from renewables to nuclear 2°C limit. we did not explore y yFinancial support is provided implicitly to global “offsets” in the national scenarios. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 28 . efforts to come close to the 1. speed technology development and improve this assumption becomes unlikely under a global the reach and performance of low-carbon tech. As noted previously. The implicit assumption is that developed sion of low-carbon technologies and their cost countries could fund emissions reductions in de- reduction through scale and learning effects. benchmarks. For this reason.  veloping countries in exchange for reducing the y yMajor global international collaborative efforts need for local reductions. for example through a technology cooperation mechanism and fund.

No definitive judgments based decarbonization at country level    33 on the details of the country DDPs or their aggregate results 6. But the DDPs are based on socio-economic assumptions. and focus more on CO2 emissions trajectories and cumulative CO2 emissions from 2010-2050.5. Introduction   29 All results presented in this chapter are drawn directly from the 6. without regard 6. which reflect each Country Research Partner’s vision of its national development trajectory to 2050.6. Aggregate results   31 technical feasibility of DDPs within each country. Deep decarbonization in the context of 6. Deep decarbonization in the context of sustainable development    29 DDPs developed by the 15 Country Research Partners. Aggregate Results and Cross-Country Comparisons from the 15 National Deep Decarbonization Pathways (DDPs) 6. Sectoral strategies    34 should therefore be drawn at this stage.1  Introduction 6.2  sustainable development The full costs of the DDPs developed by the Country Research Partners have not yet been examined in detail.1. Examining the pillars of deep to economic and social costs.2. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 29 . 6. These preliminary analyses will be revised in the coming months to explore the options for even deeper decarbonization pathways. better take into account the existing infrastructure stocks. These results are preliminary: they represent an initial analysis of the 6. Areas for further analysis   40 The focus in the country analyses was on achieving deep reduc- tions in CO2 emissions in 2050.4. Chapter 6 Aggregate Results 6 and Cross-Country Comparisons from the 15 National Deep Decarbonization Contents Pathways (DDPs) 6.3.

0%  5.2.5% UK South Korea -2. Average annual rate of change of energy per capita between 2010 and 2050 2.0 3. Assumed tries and therefore have room for catch-up growth GDP growth rates are especially strong in today’s (Figure 6.0 8.1).5%  Brazil   China Indonesia 1.0% Australia 0% 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 GDP per capita in 2010 (thousand US$/cap) Figure 6.5% India  2.0 5. which start from lower All 15 DDPs assume continued—and for some coun.1  Economic growth assumptions middle-income economies.0%   Indonesia China 6.0%   South Korea South Africa Brazil  Japan Canada 2.5%  Russia  Germany Australia  Canada -1.5%  Mexico 0.0%   Japan  -1.0%  UK    Mexico    USA France Germany  1. Average annual growth rate of GDP per capita between 2010 and 2050 7.5% Energy per capita in 2010 (toe/cap) Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 30 .0%  South Africa 1. levels of GDP per capita than high-income coun- tries rapid—economic growth to 2050.0 4.0% Russia 3.0% India 6.0%   USA France -2. Figure 6.0% 0.0 1.0 7.0 -0.0 2.0% 0.Chapter 6 Aggregate Results and Cross-Country Comparisons from the 15 National DDPs 6.

4 and 6. energy to 2.4 tCO2– part driven by energy-intensive industries. 0. which is a 47% reduction from the 21. Howev. this increase is lower than it would otherwise decline in the CO2–energy intensity of GDP (from be because of improvements in energy efficiency. the 15 DDPs thus achieve a 56% decrease in improved energy access and rapid GDP growth. average energy consump. population and GDP growth over the 2010-2050 where energy efficiency improvements outweigh period. Across the 15 DDPs. 346%. tion per capita converges to two metric tons of This decline in CO 2–energy emissions is even oil equivalent (toe) by 2050 (Figure 6. on the other hand. energy consump.055 kgCO2 per $ GDP) by mid-centu- ry (Figures 6.3  Aggregate results capita and a 5.4 tCO2–energy per capita) and a 88% er. Energy-related CO2 emissions reduction trajectories in the 15 DDPs GtCO2  Canada  France 25  Korea  UK  Australia 20  Germany  Japan  Russia 15  South Africa  Mexico  Indonesia  Brazil 10  USA  India  China 5 0 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 31 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .2% annual decrease of emissions All 15 DDPs achieve very significant reductions per unit of GDP over 2010-2050. 2010 (Figure 6. Between Figure 6.3. in CO2–energy emissions by 2050.0% annual decrease of emissions per 6. more significant when accounting for continued clines in absolute terms in high-income countries.8 Gt that these 15 countries emitted in Across the 15 DDPs. In aggregate.2). the 15 DDPs also represent a very CO2–energy emissions from the 15 DDPs fall to significant departure from current trends. It de.3).5). from 2010-2050.2. in per capita CO2–energy emissions (from 5. population and GDP population and GDP growth.5 Gt by 2050. This corresponds to an average 2. In aggre- tion increases in absolute terms as a result of gate.2  Energy demand 11.464 to 0.Aggregate Results and Cross-Country Comparisons from the 15 National DDPs 6. In middle-income (in 2005 US$) are expected to grow by 21% and countries. In aggregate. respectively.

which are available for least a 50% chance of limiting average global 7 of the 15 countries covered by the DDPP: Brazil.4 . temperature increase to 2°C. Russia. average per capita CO2–energy of GHGs. to. Mexico. we look to the IEA Energy Technology Per.5 4 0. South Africa. These 7 countries represent 78% of the reduction in 2050 CO2–energy emissions relative total emissions from our 15 countries in 2010 and to an extension of current trends (6DS). energy efficiency.88% 2 0. as the focus ETP 2014. It describes an energy system con- instead was on DDPs. the 2DS (Figure 6. In the aggregate DDP.S. a more 90% of total projected emissions in 2050. trends in total and recent pledges made by countries to limit per capita emissions are reversed. The Country Research Partners did not y y The 2°C Scenario (2DS) is the main focus of produce BAU scenarios of their own. scenarios. but slightly higher than. and are close y y The IEA 6°C Scenario (6DS) is largely an ex. India.6). China.5. sistent with an emissions trajectory that recent ison. In the absence of It is still too early for the DDPP to compare the efforts to stabilize atmospheric concentrations cumulative emissions from our 15 DDPs with the Figure 6. tension of current trends. which than halving of 2050 emissions relative to recently makes the comparison meaningful: promised mitigation efforts (4DS). For an illustrative compar. Average energy-related CO2 intensity of GDP. Figure 6. average global temperature is pro- emissions increased by 1. and the declining emissions and increased efforts to improve trend in CO2–energy intensity of GDP is accelerated. It serves as the primary The aggregate DDP also marks a very significant benchmark in ETP 2014 when comparisons departure from projected trends under business are made among scenarios and it projects a as usual (BAU) trajectories or weak climate policy long-term temperature rise of 4°C. energy intensity of GDP decreased by only 1. and Our seven country DDPs achieve a roughly 70% the U.4. Aggregate Results and Cross-Country Comparisons from the 15 National DDPs 2000 and 2010.6% y y The 4°C Scenario (4DS) takes into account per year. and CO2– jected to rise at least 6°C in the long term. Average energy-related CO2 emissions per capita.56% 3 0.1 0 0 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 32 .2 1 0.6 kgCO2/$ 5 0.0% per year.3 . historical and DDPs for 15 countries historical and DDPs for 15 countries 6 tCO2/cap 0. climate science research indicates would give at spectives (ETP) scenarios.

4  of the methodology adopted at this stage.0 only by 2050. and the CO2 intensity of energy carbonization strategies across countries. the en- The interim DDPs developed by the Country Research ergy intensity of GDP decreases by 70% between Partners help to illuminate key elements of deep de. and the most important The relative importance of these two elements in challenges moving forward. and the USA to match the countries analyzed as part of the IEA scenarios. As Figure 6. focusing decarbonization at country level on the 2050 level of emissions.0 to give a 50% chance of keeping below 2°C. But this should not be interpreted as proving that strong early mitigation actions such as those in the IEA 2DS are impossible. of final energy consumed). In the intensity of GDP (tCO2 emitted per $ GDP) by coming months.7). Reducing presents and discusses these preliminary findings. and show that the decarbonization achieved by 2050 switching to low-carbon fuels. Russia. Mexico. and will pay more attention to the consumed per $ GDP) and (2) a decrease in the management of the transition to 2050. not the lowest possible level of  6DS cumulative emissions to 2050. 33 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . to have a 50% chance of staying within the 2°C South Africa. with the CO2 intensity of energy (tCO2 emitted per toe objective of lowering cumulative emissions. As a consequence. is already very substantial and well on its way to All 15 DDPs achieve a large decrease in CO 2 becoming consistent with the 2°C limit. low-carbon electricity. The rest of the chapter the DDPs changes over time (Figure 6. the main decreases by 60%. our DDPs have 0. Combined seven country DDPs compared to the CO2-energy emissions reduction trajectories of IEA scenarios already emphasized.Aggregate Results and Cross-Country Comparisons from the 15 National DDPs global CO2–energy budget for 2011–2050 to have a likely chance of staying within the 2°C limit. and 6DS) ysis at this stage was reaching the lowest possi- 2. All 15 DDPs share three common “pillars” for the Given the purpose of the analysis at this stage. Country Research Partners will 2050 compared to 2010: 88% on average. it is only a consequence Examining the pillars of deep 6.5 (index 1= 2010 level) ble level of emissions in 2050. limit.5 assumptions for the rest of the world. As the comparison with the IEA 2DS scenario for a subset of 7 of our countries also shows. the primary focus of the anal.0 tors benchmarks.5  DDPs higher emissions during the 2011-2050 period. 4DS. options in different countries. deep decarbonization of their national energy sys- we are encouraged by the initial results. 2010 and 2050. On average. (2DS. China. Under reasonable 1. India. energy intensity of GDP is more important in the 1 The decrease of the final energy intensity of GDP combines technical efficiency and structural economic change towards less energy-intensive activities. the cumulative emissions from our 15 DDPs is also certainly higher 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 than the global CO2–energy budget for 2011–2050 Note: The comparison only includes the DDPs for Brazil.6. driven by our per capita emissions and sectoral performance indica- 2. not  2DS 0. the 2050 level of emissions of our 15 DDPs is still too high  4DS 1. the economic and social costs of the crease in the final energy intensity of GDP (toe pathways. which tems: energy efficiency. This explore options for even deeper decarbonization is the result of the combined effects of: (1) a de- pathways.

8). but their share in total emissions . electrification -15% -12% only has a small effect on the CO2 intensity of energy. with an 85% 2010 21. from 14% to 12% and 11% to 9%.5 by 13%. Direct CO 2 emissions from the resid ential building and passenger 30%  Industry transport sectors also fall in absolute terms. since electricity generation is still rather -20% carbon-intensive. Its share in total emissions 8%  Freight transport falls from 37% to 11%. by the effects of electrification. while industry emissions decrease only by 2050 10%  Passenger transport GtCO2 14%. by 56% each.8. to -7% -10% different extents. Though electrification plays a -25% -22% big role in the decrease of the CO2 intensity of -25% -26% energy over the longer term as electricity sup- -30% -28% -27% ply is decarbonized.7. The dynamics in Figure 6. CO2 emissions from freight transport and industry 11%  Electricity appear to be relatively more difficult to reduce. from 7% to 16% and 31% to 52%.5  Sectoral strategies 6. 11. different sectors contribute to different levels of CO 2 emission reductions 10%  Buildings (Figure 6. 11%  Buildings Emissions from freight transport increase slightly.12 Gt CO 2) by 2050 (1. Sectoral shares of CO2-energy emissions.47% decreases only slightly. Aggregate Results and Cross-Country Comparisons from the 15 National DDPs early phase. the share of freight and 17%  Freight transport industry in total emissions increases significantly by 2050. Figure 6. while reductions in the CO2 intensity Figure 6. As a consequence. Decadal percent change in Energy/GDP and CO2/Energy for the 15 DDPs.26 Gt CO 2).1  Sectoral shares of total emissions 40%  Electricity Across the 15 DDPs. In the short-run. 2010 to 2050 of final energy consumption play a larger role in the long-term. All 0%  Energy intensity Country Research Partners use decarbonization of of GDP electricity supply and electrification of energy end -5%  Carbon intensity of final fuels uses as a strategy for deep decarbonization. respectively.5. This demonstrates the importance of finding additional and innovative ways to reduce emissions in these two sectors. 2050 compared to 2010 6. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 34 .8 12%  Passenger transport GtCO2 reduction in 2010 emissions (8. in part. re- 51%  Industry spectively. These kinds of sequencing -35% challenges and their implications for cumulative -35% CO2 emissions will be further explored in the next phases of the DDPP. The power sector ach ieves the larges t reduction in emissions.7 are 2020/2010 2030/2020 2040/2030 2050/2040 driven.

geological storage capacity for CCS.10). Across countries. Electricity generation mix in 2050 Australia Brazil Canada China France Germany India Indonesia  Fossils fuels Japan  Fossils fuels w CCS Korea Mexico  Nuclear Russia  Other RW South Africa  Solar UK  Wind USA  Hydro 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 35 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . the CO2 36% intensity of power production is reduced by 94%. Power generation is almost completely de.11). from 590 gCO2 per kilowatt-hour (kWh) in 2010 to 34 gCO2 per kWh by 2050 (Figure 6. Carbon intensity of electricity production (gCO2/kWh) To reach such a low level of carbon intensity.5. But by 2050.  2010 Electrification and the decarbonization of electric.2  Power generation: switch to low-carbon electricity Figure 6.10. South Africa UK almost all electricity in all 15 DDPs is generated USA -10 from zero. rising from 20% to Increase in the share of electricity in final energy for the 15 DDPs 36%.94% of electricity in final energy consumption almost doubles from 2010-2050. 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 Figure 6. The share 34 .9). Electricity 590 has a much larger role in energy supplies.9. or fossil fuels China France with CCS.  2050 Decline in carbon intensity of electricity for the 15 DDPs gCO 2 /kWh ity plays a central role in all 15 DDPs. and Mexico social preferences and degrees of public support for Russia nuclear power and CCS (Figure 6. Figure 6.or low-carbon sources in all countries: Canada renewable energy. Australia  2010 power needs to be generated almost exclusively Brazil  2050 from zero. nuclear power.and low-carbon sources (Figure 6.Aggregate Results and Cross-Country Comparisons from the 15 National DDPs 6.11. On average. the DDPs achieve the Germany deep decarbonization of power generation through India a diverse mix of low-carbon energy sources because Indonesia Japan countries have different potential for renewable Korea energy. 20% + 16 pt carbonized in all countries.

. all 15 DDPs show a significant d ecrease and appliances. Figure 6.0 0. energy use per square meter or power (CHP) in others. cooking.13. use.g.0 3. Energy e fficiency in. Aggregate Results and Cross-Country Comparisons from the 15 National DDPs 6. Figure 6. driven primarily by increased these energy uses varies both between and electrification of resid ential energy in mos t with in countries. difficult because of the many uses of energy For the CO 2 intensity of resid ential energy in buildings.0 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% tCO2/toe percent Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 36 .0 2.5 2.5 3. Carbon intensity Share of electricity of residential energy in residential energy use  2010  2010  2050  2050 Australia Brazil Canada China France Germany India Indonesia Japan Korea Mexico Russia South Africa UK USA 0. in part due to differences countries (Figure 6. The relative importance of (Figure 6. such as heating.3  Residential buildings Measuring aggregate improvements in the per capita) are thus imperfect for cross-coun- energy e fficiency of resid ential buildings is try comparison and are n ot reported here. solar thermal energy and combined heat and dicators (e.13) and increased use of in climatic conditions.12.5.12).0 1.5 1. cooling.5 4.

Figure 6. China. gy consumed) (Figure 6. South Africa). the only high-income country with low passenger transport (tCO2 per toe of final ener- 2010 levels of passenger mobility. USA) or a All 15 DDPs achieve a sharp decrease in the energy small increase (Australia.14).5 2. Some middle-income carbonizing the energy used in passenger transport.14. n.16.  2010 Passenger mobility Energy intensity Carbon intensity  2050 of passenger transport of passenger transport energy Australia Brazil Canada China France Germany n. Figure 6.0 0.5 3. Mexico. increases in passenger Among the 15 DDPs.0 3.08 0. fuel cell vehicles powered by renewable hydrogen. Japan.04 0.15.0 2.g. India) see a sharp increase but Country Research Partners use other decarbon- in passenger mobility.5. combined with per capita) between 2010 and 2050 (Figure 6.00 0.g. see a modest reduction (Canada.c.0 1..5 1. countries (e. South Korea. a decrease in the CO2 intensity of energy used for Russia. France. sees a large in.c. In other middle-income countries (e.15). India Indonesia Japan Korea Mexico Russia South Africa UK USA 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 0.5 thousands of p-km per capita toe / thousands of p-km tCO2/toe 37 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . The electrification of crease in mobility that brings it more in line with passenger vehicles plays an important role in de- other high-income countries.10 0. Figure 6. most high-income countries mobility are more moderate.06 0. UK) in intensity of passenger transport (toe per passenger passenger mobility (passenger kilometers traveled kilometers traveled) (Figure 6.02 0. or are close to.4  Passenger transport tries. today’s high-income coun.16).. including biofuels and match. converging to levels that ization strategies as well. Indo- nesia.Aggregate Results and Cross-Country Comparisons from the 15 National DDPs 6.

compressed or liquefied low-carbon gas. total CO2 emissions from nificant CO 2 reductions. Figure 6.c. Aggregate Results and Cross-Country Comparisons from the 15 National DDPs 6. eral options for reducing the CO 2 intensity of and transportation patterns. through optimized production.c.c.02 0. Freight mobility intensity of GDP Energy intensity of freight mobility Carbon intensity of freight transport energy Australia  2010 Brazil  2050 Canada China France Germany n.2 1.0 0.18 and 6. Figure 6.6 0. n.8 1.0 1. n. consumption.4 1. modal shifts. Korea n. sustainable biofuels—they all face challenges in bility (freight ton-kilometers) from GDP growth deploying at the scale needed to achieve sig- (Figure 6.4 0.5 1 1. The results from these freight transport increase because reductions in preliminary DDPs underscore the importance the energy intensity of freight transport (toe per of a strong global R&D push on technologies ton-kilometer traveled) and the CO2 intensity of and s trategies to reduce CO 2 emissions in freight transport energy (tCO2 emitted per toe) freight transport.5 t-km/$ toe / thousands of t-km tCO2/toe Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 38 . Although there are sev.18.17). in general.c.05 0.5.c. Figure 6.8 0.01 0.06 0.07 0 0.2 0.5 2 2. However.5 3 3.5  Freight transport freight transport—electrification.17. n.04 0. Beyond technology.19). freight transport differently (throug h modal sh ifts) transport is more difficult to decarbonize than and to reduce the need for freight transport passenger transport. and All 15 DDPs (except one) decouple freight mo. India Indonesia Japan n.03 0.c. should also explore ways to organize freight The 15 DDPs illustrate that.00 0.19. the sector are relatively small (Figures 6.6 1. Mexico Russia South Africa UK USA 0.

the diversity of sub-sectors within industry.0 3. 51% of total emissions.5 2. requiring fewer tons of materials) and less switching. Electricity’s share of indus- As with residential buildings. Figure 6. Carbon intensity of industrial energy Share of electricity in industrial energy use Australia  2010 Brazil  2050 Canada China France Germany India Indonesia Japan Korea Mexico Russia South Africa UK USA 0.e.20).5. and CCS— most DDPs achieve large carbon-intensive production materials.20. industrial emissions account for and the complex nature of the modern global trad. there are similarities in results suggest the importance of developing innova- decarbonization strategies across countries. aggregate industrial emissions in the 15 DDPs rise in industrial sector composition between countries over time. ures to reduce energy consumption in industry.21).0 0. up from 31% in 2010.0 0 % 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 60 % 70 % tCO2/toe percent 39 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .e. By 2050. as well as less materials-intensive production meth- Using three main strategies—electrification.Aggregate Results and Cross-Country Comparisons from the 15 National DDPs 6.6  Industry reductions in the CO2 intensity of energy used in industry (Figure 6..21.0 1. Nation.5 1. from key industrial sectors (i. Even with reductions in energy CO2 intensity in indus- al comparisons are difficult because of differences try. These ing system.5 4. Nevertheless. All 15 tive technology pathways for reducing CO2 emissions DDPs include aggressive energy efficiency meas.5 3. measuring aggregate trial final energy consumption increases significant- energy efficiency in industry is difficult because of ly across all countries (Figure 6.. fuel ods (i. tCO2 per ton output).0 2. Figure 6.

Country Research Partners have shared their technical and macroeconomic assumptions. and reducing the level of these drivers will reduce CO2 emissions (e. approaches.6  Areas for further analysis casting approach. range of national contexts. rather than focusing only on a single year (2050). while preliminary. analyze in more detail how This report is only a start. and this process has led to the development of much before we quantify the costs and benefits of de. the Country Research Partners will explore a greater array of technology options. reductions in passen- ger kilometers traveled will reduce CO2 emissions from passenger transport). CO2 per passenger kilome- ter traveled) in the DDPs. Second. Over the eight months since the project challenges for deep decarbonization across a wide began. as well as the more comprehensive decarbonization can be met through integrated report to be published during the first half of 2015. they will further explore energy drivers in their models through scenario analysis. they will con- sider in further details the issue of infrastructure stocks. and data sources. But it is our hope that the twin objectives of development and deep this report. sectoral expertise. and map out the policy frameworks will make a useful contribution to the debate by for implementation. identify national and international ous studies of national mitigation potential. they have incorporated emerging technolo- gies and energy system configurations to different extents in their analyses. An important outcome of the DDPP so far is that it has fostered interactive learning and a coop- erative problem-solving mindset among the par- ticipants. spurring the development and international com- ners will explore four areas that were not included parison of country-level DDPs and by promoting in the first round of technical feasibility analysis. the global cooperation required to achieve them. finance requirements. Aggregate Results and Cross-Country Comparisons from the 15 National DDPs 6. Fourth. including several face-to-face meetings.g. So far. although the feasibility of technology deployment at the national level will have to be examined carefully. The back- Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 40 .. including some that are still at the pre-commercial stage.. il.g. As a next step. they will estimate cumulative CO2 emissions from 2010-2050. for innovative thinking and produced creative lustrate both the technical possibilities and the results. created a framework The DDPP results thus far. more ambitious DDPs than found in many previ- carbonization. which was new to many of the Country Research Partners. and there is likely still potential to further reduce CO 2 emissions per unit of activity (e. First. Third. Most of the DDPs are based on conservative assumptions about activity drivers. the Country Research Part.

 Part III National Deep Decarbonization Pathways Developed by Country Research Partners Australia   43 Brazil   59 Canada    71 China   83 France    93 Germany   105 India   115 Indonesia    129 Japan   139 Mexico    149 Russia   157 South Africa   167 South Korea   179 United Kingdom   189 United States   201 41 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .

Part III  pathways to deep decarbonization National Deep Decarbonization Pathways Developed by Country Research Partners Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 42 .

Aus tralia Australia Frank Jotzo. Centre of Policy Studies. ClimateWorks Australia decarbonization and sustainable development Andy Jones. 1 1 Country profile ClimateWorks Australia The national context for deep 1. ClimateWorks Australia Australia is a mid-sized developed economy with high per capita greenhouse gas emissions. with the relative importance of specific commodities changing over the decades in response Niina Kautto. ClimateWorks Australia economy. Seven new liquefied natural gas liquefaction facilities are expected to enter the export market by 2022. ClimateWorks Australia Aus tralia has a bundant renewa ble and n on-re- Paul Graham newa ble energy resources and relatively easily (technical advisor). minerals. Australia is the world’s largest exporter of met- allurgical coal and the second largest thermal coal exporter by volume. Exports of Rob Kelly. Crawford School of Public Policy. Australia is a major supplier of minerals such as Victoria University 1 BREE. 2014. Organisation (CSIRO). the country is also Organisation (CSIRO).1  Amandine Denis. Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research recovera ble reserves of coal. and uranium. Australia Australia is one of the leading exporters of coal Steve Hatfield-Dodds and domestic coal production is forecast to con- (technical advisor). gas. Commonwealth tinue to increase. 2 In addition. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 43 . Australian National University Anna Skarbek. and agricultural commodities have always played an important role in the Australian Scott Ferraro. 2 BREE. to international demand. 2014. 1 With a number of liquefaction Scientific and Industrial Research projects under construction. Australia set to soon become the world’s largest export- Philip Adams. ClimateWorks Australia energy. er of lique fied nat ural gas (LNG).

sions from mining and manufacturing contribute a nium but does not generate any electricity from relatively large share (over one third) of Australia’s nuclear power. Figure 2 shows the sectors is strongly influenced by exchange rates. This is due to: have stabilized. These changes would present of the economy has almost doubled. including education.2 GHG emissions: current levels. driven by a significant expan- y yThe predominance of coal-fired generation in sion in renewable energy. a drop in demand for Australia’s electricity supply. harnessed under decarbonization. wind (2%). Electricity between the urban centers. has nearly halved and emissions per capita have decreased by approximately 25% over this period (see Figure 3f). 2013a. uranium. potential through carbon plantings could be y yThe historically low cost of energy. solar PV and wind have grown 95% and 20% over the past five years. generation makes up about half of energy emis. The data is for 2011/12. and export revenues. The remainder is mostly supplied by renewable from fossil fuel combustion). composition of energy-related CO2 emissions (i. and a tripling in the rate 3 BREE. emissions from fuel combustion highest in the world. and solar what unique in the global context insofar as emis- photovoltaic (PV) (1%). As a re- both challenges and opportunities for Australia. with coal fired power accounting for 69% emissions by source and Figure 1b shows the de- of generation and gas providing a further 19%. and past trends and increased plantation forestry. grid-supplied electricity. In and finance are important in Australia’s econ. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 44 . of which about Service industries. Australia’s abundant renewable emissions-intensive industrial activity to the energy resources and significant sequestration Australian economy. On average. Australia has made some recent pro- change demand for Australian exports while do. Increasing emissions from energy 1. respectively. sulting from the concentration of Australia’s ity supply. the emissions intensity of Australia’s GDP both within the energy sector and more widely. proportional contribution of industry sectors to and these industries are likely to expand over the Australia’s total greenhouse gas emissions. and Australia’s economy is highly emissions-inten. about 15% of Australia’s total emissions omy. Global deep decarbonization would significantly However. gress in decarbonizing its economy. Over the mestic decarbonization would require fundamen. y yThe economic importance of agriculture. medium term. 3 Australia exports ura. Oil and other sources (including multi-fuel fired power plants) contribute 2%. one third are process and fugitive emissions. alumina.e. Figure 1a shows Australia’s 2012 greenhouse gas sions. bioenergy (1%). Energy accounts for two-thirds of population in urban centers and large distances Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions. sult. including meth- GDP. iron ore. The competitiveness of exports from these ane emissions from livestock. addition. y yThe relatively large contribution of energy and and lithium. including hydroelectricity Australia’s economic circumstances are some- (6%).Aus tralia Australia bauxite. y yThe long distance transport requirements re- sive due to the extensive use of coal in electric. past two decades Australia’s greenhouse gas tal changes in Australia’s energy system over the emissions have remained stable while the size coming decades. energy technologies. tourism. Australia’s per capita emissions are among the Since 2008/09. co pper. contributing more than half of Australia’s are attributable to agriculture. GDP. use were roughly offset by reduced deforestation drivers. total greenhouse gas emissions.

2012. Gas & Water  Residential Source: ABS. Decomposition of GHG and Energy CO2 Emissions in 2012 1a. 45 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .Australia of energy efficiency improvement in large indus. Rising energy prices and govern. Data variations are193 68 error. GDP and exports. Figure 1. and support programs for renewable energy) have ment programs and policies (including standards helped achieve this outcome. Department of the Environment. carbon pricing. and subsidies for energy efficiency. Land Use Change. Composition (%) of total greenhouse gas emissions. Energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and sectors 250 MtCO2 MtCO2 eq 373  Energy-related emissions 200 Electricity 31  Processes (Allocation 150 by End Use Sector) 555 87  Agriculture 100 40  Fugitive Total MtCO2 12  Waste 50  Natural Gas 64  Petroleum Products 127 0  Coal 180 + 11  LULUCF Electricity Generation Transportation Other (Land Use. Department of the Environment. 2014.90 due to rounding 13 8 373 Figure 2. trial companies. 2014. GHG emissions. by source 1b. 2013b. and Forestry) Industry Buildings Source: BREE. 2012 Agriculture & Forestry Transport Agriculture & Forestry 19% 7% 2% 11% 6% 10% 19% 8% Mining 2% 7% Services 5% 7% 2% Emissions 15% GDP 16% Exports 5% 5% 4% 14% 20% 52% 51% Manufacturing Services Mining  Agriculture & Forestry  Mining  Manufacturing  Services  Transport  Construction  Electricity.

6 Energy related 500  Agriculture 1. Energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors 40% Five-year variation rate of the drivers 500 MtCO2 30% 400 20%  GDP per capita 372  Other 356 10% 322  Buildings  Population 300 280 0% 255  Transportation  Energy 200  Industry -10% per GDP -20%  Energy Related CO2 Emissions 100 -30% per Energy  Electricity Generation -40% 0 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 3c. Department of the Environment. Energy related CO2 emissions and drivers 3d.0 0.2  Population  Energy intensity 1.6 0.0 1.0  Forestry 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Source: ABS. 2012.0 0. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 3b.2 0. BREE. 2013b. 3a.6  Other GHG Electricity 0. Net CO2eq emissions underlying drivers (all sources) Total net CO2eq emissions (MtCO2eq) Change from 1990 700 2.8 emissions  Transport 200 0.4  CO2 emissions  Commercial 1.4 emissions 100  Generation 0.0  intensity CO2 emissions 1. 2014.2  GDP 1.0 1. Australia Figure 3. Net CO2eq emissions (all sources) 3f.8  GDP 600  Waste 1.0  Net CO2eq 300 0.2 0.6  Energy-related 1. Energy-related energy and CO2 intensity Change from 1990 Change from 1990 2.0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 3e.8 0.2  Population 400 & Residential  Industry 1.8 1.4 0.4 0.8 Emissions 1. 2013. 1990 to 2010 Note: Figure 3a and 3b for international comparison. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 46 .6 of GDP 0.4 of energy  Energy use 0. Decomposition of historical energy-related CO2 Emissions.2 0 0.

2013. Within the modelling parameters port sector modelling. which identified commodities.291 102. directly attributable to the production of exports search Organisation (CSIRO) power. The modelling for nomic and population growth trajectory.0 tCO2 per capita in 2050. with less emphasis on change in economic activities such as renewable energy generation and structure or consumption patterns beyond current forestry is offset by significant reductions in prima- projections. resulting in an economy nearly 150% ways could be modelled. and trans. Assumptions about the availability and ry industries such as coal production. oil extrac- cost of technologies are deliberately conservative tion. and are lower still at 1.1  Summary (aggregate vision for 2050) decarbonization pathway Australia can maintain economic growth and prosperity. In the illustrative more costly than assumed in the modelling.240 80. In 2012.3.72 25. 5 IEA.6 tCO2 per capita if emissions cluding Commonwealth Science and Industrial Re. section 2. Table 1. real GDP grows at 2.5% per annum.53 29. are excluded. land. and decarbonize by 2050. Potential step changes in technology and eco. and storage (CCS). has pathway. Table 1 summarizes the eco- parameters and methodology. and bioenergy.5 deeper decarbonization of Austral- that stakeholder views diverge on the viability. likely extent and costs of options such as carbon capture 4 Graham et al. 2012. Development Indicators and Energy Service Demand Drivers 2012 2020 2030 2040 2050 Population [millions] 22. 2009. the economy. Australia’s energy related emissions were nomic structure are not included in the example approximately 17 tCO2 per capita and for Austral- pathway but are being explored qualitatively. Australia 2 2 National pathways to deep decarbonization Illustrative deep 2. with this report describes and presents results for one 43% growth in real wages and exports growing illustrative pathway in line with the global project at 3. The ia to contribute to the objective of limiting global possibility that some technologies included in the temperature to <2°C. This is discussed in in the context of a decarbonizing world.01 GDP per capita [$A/capita] 65.17 32. Reedman & Graham. and heavy manufacturing. the illustrative pathway prioritizes continued eco.. 2013.1. The results 2.677 47 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . including the forecast by the feedback gathered via consultation with over growth in global demand for energy and mineral 40 industry and academic experts. on average.2 under the ‘Industry’ heading.62 36.4 It has also been informed of the illustrative pathway. this would need to decrease example pathway are not available.4% per year bonizing its economy and multiple possible path. now and 2050. Australia’s energy-related emissions are been explored in section 2.1. in. Productivity keeps rising. substantially reduced to 3. Growth driven by the increase in tions. or end up being by an order of magnitude by 2050. However the analysis in larger than today. carbon forestry. The analysis builds on previous Australian work. However economic growth is not uniform across nomic growth and focuses on technological solu.1  High-level characterization from the illustrative pathway show that between Australia has a broad range of options for decar.715 72.862 91.

0 3. switching leads to nearly a 75% reduction in the yy Decarbonization of energy transformation: emissions intensity of energy use across all econom. mass wherever possible. Thermal coal use in industry Decarbonization of energy transformation (mainly is considerably reduced via a shift to gas and bio- electricity generation) combined with electrifica. continued growth of the service sec- and/or reduce the cost of decarbonization options. Freight fuels move away tion (supplied by decarbonized electricity) and fuel from diesel with a significant shift to gas. (refer to section 2.54  Oil 0. by source 4a.81 3. y y Energy efficiency: Energy efficiency is assumed most entirely phased out (the only remaining use to continue to improve at current rates until is for coking coal in iron and steel).30 4.81 EJ 4.0 + 22 % 1.22 0.0 1.30 4.99  Electricity and Heat 1.37  Liquids 1.40  Natural Gas 1.3). with some on-site gas fired y y Structural change: The illustrative pathway electricity generation particularly in remote (non- only assumes changes in economic and/or in. Electricity generation is almost completely de- ic sectors.79  Renewables & Biomass 1. Primary Energy EJ 6. Final Energy 6. Figure 4.0 0. while a description is provided below: supply of electricity. Australia ia’s energy-related emissions would likely require existing and emerging trends in consumer pref- technological advances that increase the viability erences. The contribution of these pillars is shown carbonized via 100% renewable grid-integrated in Figure 6b. coal use is al. In 21% from 2012 to 2050 while final energy use combination. but accelerates thereafter. Australia’s energy-related CO2 emissions pathway yy Electrification and fuel switching: Electrification from 2012 to 2050 is shown in Figure 5a to 5c.0 0.53 2. buildings and industrial processes such as heating processes Pillars of decarbonization (energy) or material handling.21 5. Other mixes of technologies dustrial structures that occur in response to for electricity generation are modelled as variants domestic and global macroeconomic trends.68 0. becomes widespread. grid integrated) areas. ment of direct fossil fuel use with bioenergy.0 1.06 . tor.11  Biomass 2. especially for cars.78 0. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 48 .30 3.05  Coal 2012 2050 2012 2050 Note: For international comparison.0 4.04 2. especially in increase in renewables and biomass.21 % 4b.0 2. and gas use. these changes lead to a halving of increases by 22% (see Figure 4a and 4b). There are final energy use per dollar of real GDP by 2050.0 0. and a plateauing of distance travelled per Australia’s total primary energy use decreases by capita in cars and other modes of transport.78  Gas 0 0 0. and there is an 2020.0 1.08  Coal 0. the building and transport sectors.24 1. There is significant replace- These include global demand for commodities. Energy Pathways. significant changes in the fuel mix.

The forestry and land use) modelling assumes that best practice is applied in The illustrative pathway includes considerable farming and livestock production.0 1. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pathway. The pillars of decarbonization 100% Ten-year variation rate of the drivers Pillar 1. -80% Electrification of end-uses Share of electricity in total final energy -100% 2012 + 24 pt 22 2020 2030 2040 2050 2012 2020 2030 2040 2050 46 % 49 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .2 .Australia Non-energy emissions (industry.00 193 109 6  Other 100 0.5  Population 400  Energy use 1. 0%  Population Decarbonization of electricity Electricity Emissions Intensity -20%  Energy per GDP 2012 773 gCO 2 /kWh -40%  Energy-related CO2 Emissions 2050 23 . 2012 to 2050 5b. and that global reductions in non-energy emissions. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Drivers.51 % 20%  GDP per capita Pillar 2. Energy efficiency Energy Intensity of GDP 80% 2012 2. 2012 2020 2030 2040 2050 Figure 6.40 0 13  Electricity Generation 0.71% 6 0. including beef demand decreases slightly in response to Figure 5a. Energy-related energy and CO2 intensity 200 1.5 8  Energy related 0.0 Change from 2012 500 MtCO2 2.20 Emissions intensity 2012 2050 0. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 6b.4 MJ/$ 60% 40% 2050 1.97 % -60% per Energy Pillar 3. industrial process and fugitive emissions.0 372 .5  GDP 2.20 Change from 2012 1.00  of energy Note: For international comparison. 6a. by Sector. agriculture. Energy-related CO2 drivers decomposition 3.0 300 CO2 emissions 87 2012 2020 2030 2040 2050 78 5c. 2012 to 2050 Note: For international comparison.60 Energy intensity 37  Transportation  of GDP 53  Industry 0.80 1  Buildings 0.

5 Agriculture  3. 2012 and 2050 8a.82 % 1.7 Other  . Fuel combustion emissions 8b.00 300  Agriculture 1. at least 50% below 2000 levels Figure 7.decomposition Total net CO2eq emissions (Mt CO2e) Change from 2012 600 3.50 Energy related 0   Electricity CO2 emissions Generation 0 -100 -0.0 0.9 3.6 0. Figure 7 shows the underlying drivers sions intensity and land constraints).6 2012 -6.50  GDP 400  Waste 2. Net CO2eq emissions (all sources) drivers . The illustrative sources and sinks.9 1. Net CO2eq emissions (all sources) and underlying drivers. Greenhouse gas emissions per capita by sector and source. markets.00 100  Industry  Transport 0.00  Other ghg emissions -300 2012 2050 2012 2020 2030 2040 2050 Figure 8. of decarbonization (Figure 7a) for all emissions sions via land sector sequestration.8 1. the pathway includes intermediate emis- where profitable for land holders. but it does not sions reductions milestones of 19% below 2000 include the sale of emissions offsets into overseas levels in 2020.2 Buildings  5.50  Population 200  Commercial & Residential 1.9 2.50  Net CO2e emissions -200  Forestry -1.5 16.0 3.6 Fugitive.7 Forestry  0. sinks. Net CO2eq emissions (all sources) by sector 7b. driven by carbon abatement incentives.6 0.7 0. Net emissions 24.8 2012 2050 2050 Total Net of exports 2050 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 50 . pathway includes a shift in land use toward carbon After accounting for all emissions sources and forestry. Australia increases in price (due to its relatively high emis. 2012-2050 7a.1 Fuel combustion  16.0 Industry  5. of decarbonization (Figure 7b) and the pathway Australia has substantial potential to offset emis.1 1. process & waste  3.9 Transport  4. tCO2eq per capita.00 500 2.

and to net zero emissions by 2050. and solar thermal Change Act 2011. to continued high levels of activity in mining and manufacturing. due remote (non-grid integrated) areas.2  Sectoral characterization be widely used in the transport sector.Australia in 2030. 51 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . The In 2050. with one quarter (or 4% of total demand) sup- gies required in each sector. as currently there are  400 limited options for reducing emissions from the agricultural sector. generation (see Figure 9). 2014. This would require strong miti. maining electricity demand is met by distributed ies substantially among sectors. fuel combus tion emissions reduce gCO2/kWh 800 by about 80% compared to 2012. enhanced geother- dependent body established under the Climate mal systems. 100  Wind 6 Climate Change Authority. depending on supply. industry is plied by on-site gas fired electricity generation in the largest contributor to energy emissions.7 The re- The trajectory of decarbonization pathways var. followed by transport (see Figures 7 and 8). which would also 2. in the the inclusion of both flexible and variable renew- context of a strong global decarbonization effort. mostly for production of industrial commodities (see Figure 8). voltaic panels. Sequestration via carbon 200  20 forestry of approximately 7 tCO 2e per person 800 TWh  0 is required for Aus tralia to ach ieve zero net  emissions (see Figure 8). mostly from renewable energy generation the availability and relative cost of technolo. 0  Hydro 7 This can be thought of as a “co-benefit” or “spill-over”  Natural Gas effect whereby a sector is unintentionally impacted by 2012 2020 2030 2040 2050  Coal an action taken by another sector. wave. In 2050. onshore wind. ergy emissions in 2050 are directly attributable by Source to exports. biomass. Nearly half of Australia’s en- Figure 9. 790 By 2050. however the substantial change in Austral- ia’s electricity generation mix leads to a greater 300 than 95% reduction in the emissions intensity of 200  Solar electricity to 0. 700 600 Power (electricity generation) Electrification across all sectors drives a two and 500  Other renewables one-half fold increase in electricity demand by 400  Biomass 2050. This is possible through gation action in all sectors of the economy.1.6 an in. Energy Supply Pathway for Electricity Generation.021 tCO2/MWh. The main  600 contributor to Australia’s non-energy emissions in 2050 is agriculture. able energy technologies as well as advances in energy storage technologies. with Australia’s carbon budget recommended mostly from rooftop and large scale solar photo- by Australia’s Climate Change Authority. 84% of electricity demand is met by cumulative emissions to 2050 are compatible grid-integrated renewable energy generation.

in coal and oil production of 60% and 30% respec- search Organisation (CSIRO). (variants are explored in section 2. which could help refine estimates of future Australian coal production. Australia’s production of coal is assumed to decrease in line with global demand.g. and iron ore) growth frameworks. For some manufacturing activities. as well as to CO2 emissions from cial vehicles. manufacturing sector energy efficiency im. Metal ores. a near-zero emissions power system slows. such as the progressive closure of all nearly 60% while the economic value added of in. use of bioenergy (Figure 10a). A substantial shift from internal combustion tution. and gas contribute nearly two thirds of the stituted by biofuel refining. Process emissions and fugitive emissions are reduced via various means Transport including process improvements. materials substi. energy e fficiency of cars and lig ht commer- tive emissions. industry energy demand by fuel source. 2013c).3). demand for non-ferrous metals and other minerals such as uranium and lithium is expected to increase. the partial use of bio-coke in iron and steel engine vehicles to electric and hybrid vehicles. while vehicle kilometers travelled nearly double. reduced de- elled for the illustrative pathway is based on work mand for coal9 and oil is expected to drive decreases by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Re. energy intensity doubles Greenhouse gas emissions from commercial and instead of tripling or quadrupling (in the absence residential buildings reduce by 95% to 2050 due to of energy efficiency improvements). Buildings Across the mining sector. Industry In addition. There is strong increased energy efficiency. As a result. freight. eration. some domestic trends are estimated By 2050. growth in distributed. oil refining capacity in Australia – approximately dustrial activities more than doubles. grid integrated electricity gen- Industrial processes are electrified where feasible.8 Depending on the tively. and the use of de- provements continue in line with recent trends carbonized electricity. Australia The mix of power generation technologies mod. of commercial building and per residential dwelling placements by more energy efficient stock drive decreases by approximately 50%. 9 For the illustrative pathway. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 52 . industrial energy emissions decrease by to continue. Conversely. mand for commodities. and 80% of these emissions are attributable to commodities produced for exports. At the same significant energy efficiency. In particular. Figure 10a shows the total industrial energy-related emissions in 2050. and CCS. Fur- ther analysis could be conducted in the future on the relative competitiveness of the Australian coal industry in a decarbonizing world. Gas is used extensively for road fuel combustion for the liquefaction of natural gas. and consequently their proportional contri- could comprise different energy sources and mixes bution to economic activity decreases. including development of technologies. Energy use per square meter for the first two decades then capital stock re. d ecreases by 85% between 20 1 2 and 2050 Global decarbonization drives changes in global de. one-third of this capacity is expected to be sub- metals. cles. production. electrification of direct time. costs and regulatory metals production (iron. increased combustion/catalyzation of and to a lesser extent hydrogen fuel cell vehi- gases with high global warming potential. Figure 10b and there is a shift from coal to gas and increased shows the building energy demand trajectory. results in over 70% improvement in the CCS is also applied to industrial process and fugi. and the capital cost reduction time path developed by Hayward & Graham (2012). 8 Electricity generation plant technology performance and costs are based on BREE (2012. fuel use (e. steel. oil use for road transport where it has been applied for fugitive emissions. gas for heating). in particular rooftop solar PV.

0 & Biogas 1.5  Liquid fuels  Pipeline gas  Electricity 0 0 0  Pipeline gas  Coal  Pipeline gas 2012 2050 2012 2050 2012 2050 10a. Buildings 10c.0 EJ 2. Transportation Figure 11.0  Hydrogen  Liquid fuels  Electricity 0.8 20   20 35.6 30 19.5 0. cars and light commercial vehicles. by Fuel.2 20 3.5  Biomass  Other 1. 2012 – 2050 gCO2/MJ 70 Carbon intensity  gCO2/MJ 60 60 gCO2/MJ 50 50 67. Figure 10.0 1.0 EJ  Electricity 1. Industry 10b. Transformation of the transport sector 11a. Cars and Light commercial vehicles drive type 11b. trajectory and Figure 11 shows the composition as th is is one of the only d ecarbonization of drive train technologies from 2012 to 2050 for o ptions currently availa ble for th is sector.5 0.5 1.5  0 0 2.0 2. and the fuel Figure 10c shows the transport energy demand mix for freight and aviation over the same period.5 1.Australia Biofuels replace 50% of oil use in aviation.0 EJ 10 5.6 30  30 23. Energy Use Pathways for Each Sector.0 50  40 40 40 45.9 10 10 0 2. Fuel use for freight and aviation transport 300 (billion vehicle kms travelled) 600 (PJ) Hydrogen  250  Hybrid 500  Coal 200 400  Plug in hybrid  Oil 150 300 Internal 100 combustion 200  Gas  Electric 50 100  Bioenergy 0  Fuel cell 0  Electricity 2012 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2012 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 53 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .

10 As such.g. The increases in agriculture and forestry jor developed economies. Energy As already described in section 2. and grasslands.11 The industrial-scale Gorgon Carbon Diox- in activity that sees agricultural emissions grow ide Injection Project is one of the world’s largest by 20% between today and 2050. and is modelled in the illustrative pathway. In addition. is at. it is expected to production. 2014. but harnessing the potential.1. challenge for Australia is not the availability of In addition. trification technologies are likely to be a global tential identified. Australia’s rate of energy and are used primarily in the aviation and mining efficiency improvement is lower than in other ma- sectors. large shifts in land use from ag. R&D focus. see also Geoscience Australia & ABARE. Transport systems chains as well as regional capabilities and work. demand is expected to result from increases in Australia also has substantial potential for geologi- beef prices in a decarbonized world. Under price incentives domestic appliances within) required to be built for for afforestation. intensification The potential for generating energy from renew- of breeding. Together. 2011 12 CCS Institute. However. equivalent be necessary for all country pathways and elec- to approximately 40% of the total economic po. commence operation in 2015. in particular for beef (e. as well as enhanced breeding and herd Australia’s total energy use today. this with more energy efficient capital stock by 2050 as would require significant development of supply part of natural asset life cycles. considerable po- activities required to collect and gather this bi. Australia efficiency improvements are driven by much higher has great potential to offset emissions via for. For the illustrative pathway. also have significant potential for greater energy forces. cal carbon storage with large potential storage ba- these factors drive a 45% reduction in emissions sins across the country. approvals for capturing and re-injecting carbon di- Feedstocks for the production of bioenergy are oxide from the extraction and processing of natural sourced from agricultural and forestry residues and gas have been granted for this project. Australia Agriculture and forestry 2. dedicated energy crops. efficiency through modal shift and urban planning. and all government tributable to exports. improvement in feeding and pasture able resources in Australia is far greater than practices. CO2CRC. However. tential for energy efficiency improvements remains omass has been accounted for in the modelling. energy efficiency in the new housing stock (and estry bio-sequestration. the total uptake of carbon forestry was capped by the volume Conditions influencing the example pathway required to meet the budget recommended by The electrification of industrial processes will Australia’s Climate Change Authority. 2011 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 54 . including a number in close intensity of agricultural activity. this proximity to fossil fuel reserves and major industrial is not sufficient to compensate for the growth areas. Large technological advances in the 10 AEMO.1. many ricultural land (in particular grasslands) to carbon of Australia’s aging industrial assets are replaced forestry would become profitable. Some of this CCS projects under development. Australia’s growing population. bon storage and energy efficiency niques. geological car- the implementation of best practice farming tech.2  Assumptions Soil and livestock emissions are reduced through Potential for renewable resources. Despite recent increases. and the associated emissions.12 wastes. 2013. a small relative reduction in beef renewable resources. the selection for lower livestock methane emissions). Thus. 2010 11 CO2CRC.

conveyors) are assumed. 100% grid-supplied ceptable. tion options. As such.04 tCO 2 e/MWh 14% nuclear 11% gas 55 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . could still have the potential to decarbonize.77 tCO2e/MWh. This may limit the potential for further and fugitive emissions. and cost-effective. mixes result in a similar relative emissions inten- ciency improvements enable low carbon energy sity of electricity generation by 2050. Australia offsetting a large proportion of non-energy emis. renewable energy electricity generation was modelled. and fuel combustion emis. and car. tion. bioenergy fuel substitution in industry.02 tCO 2 e/MWh 4% gas (onsite) CCS included 71% renewables 0. ing agriculture. The use of bioenergy for fuel switching in indus- bon forestry. development. energy effi. also at smaller scales. CCS. processing and distribution to Carbon forestry has large potential to offset emissions end-use locations. if compared with other industrialized countries and one or more of the technologies is not deployed currently there are very few options for reducing or to the extent assumed in the modelling. well below supply to contribute a greater proportion to to. aggregation. Emissions from all electricity Table 2. socially ac. depending on the scale of substitu- Australia’s non-energy emissions are substantial tion and corresponding marginal costs. Hence these technologies are likely to try will necessitate increased feedstock collec- be critical to Australia’s decarbonization pathway.g. is highly dependent on CCS being demonstrated as viable (including the Electricity generation variants modelled long-term risks of fugitive emissions). as sum- tal energy supply. sions in LNG production. even though many such Electrification of industry and the use of bioenergy technologies are not yet available and/or not yet and/or CCS may be interchangeable decarboniza- widely deployed. the present intensity of 0.Australia potential for electrification (e. If additional bioenergy is required elled) so it could contribute more to decarbonization there may be trade-offs in the allocation of land in the event that other technologies do not contribute for feedstocks with other land use needs includ- to decarbonization to the extent anticipated. All three By reducing total energy demand. and ecosystem The role of CCS in sequestering industrial process services. sions other than the use of bioenergy. For the illustrative pathway. carbon forestry. heat pumps and most cost-effective way of reducing emissions.05 tCO 2 e/MWh 14% coal CCS 7% gas CCS 9% gas Nuclear included 75% renewables 0.3  demonstrate contingency for any uncertainty robustness about the viability of the 100% grid-supplied Pathway robustness renewable energy electricity pathway. two additional electricity generation technology mixes were modelled as variants to Alternative pathways and pathway 2. Electricity generation variants modelled Technology Generation mix in 2050 Emissions intensity of electricity in 2050 100% renewables grid 96% renewables 0. and a focus on supply chain (more than twice the amount that has been mod. Energy efficiency is also the marized in Table 2.

5  Step changes in technologies Enabling Conditions y y Bioenergy potential in Australia is partially de. preferential sourcing of less emis- ergy generation. offering better public transport. sions-intensive products and services. However productivity improves then the potential of bio.g. y ySmaller houses. There are various technological. this report focuses on the technological chal- energy could increase. accounting standards). through 3D printing) Structural change could significantly reduce emissions by reducing y yUrban design for shift to rail for passenger travel the demand for minerals and base metals. increased proportion of greater flexibility of future decarbonization options. could be applied to reduce energy emissions ogas are secured). based on the lenges. deeper than modelled.8 tCO2/capita. sions-intensive manufacturing and mining to more services. it gas generation (provided further resources in bi. Co-benefits. Challenges pendent on improvements in agricultural pro. larly batteries. y yBreakthroughs in storage technology. more widespread availability and throughs could speed up decarbonization. CCS. However. Challenges.15 tCO2/capita. so- ductivity. For example.g. could see a more rapid adoption y ySubstitution of business travel with telecon- of electrification and distributed renewable en- ferencing. and only yy Breakthroughs in fuel cell technology could lead structural changes in response to domestic and to fuel cell vehicles penetrating the market sooner global macroeconomic trends. and rigorous carbon forestry of nearly 30 MtCO2 in 2050 or 0. greater range of tolerance in yy The cost of renewable energy technologies has heating/cooling requirements (where feasible). For example. pending on the life cycle emissions of materials y yProactive and accelerated transition from emis. an additional 1000 PJ of biomass could be technologies (e. changes or step changes in technology.5 MtCO2. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 56 . If agricultural decarbonization pathways in Australia. Australia generation technology mixes could be further y yIf CCS for small scale fuel combustion appli- reduced by the use of biogas in on-site and peak cations could be developed cost-effectively. less emissions-intensive products in shopping. if half of the gas used pathways could be achieved via the following: for road freight was replaced by hydrogen by 2050. which include: highest estimates of combined feedstock availa. and 2. emerg- used to replace gas and oil use in industry and ing renewables such as wave and enhanced ge- transport. energy storage. from many of Australia’s energy-intensive sec- tors. or 0. required for manufacture.12 tCO2/capita. this could lead to a further reduction in transport Behavior change emissions of 5. particu- decreased beef consumption. de- and freight transport. given agricultural residues are a large cial and political challenges to implementing component of potential feedstocks. CCS applied to a third of all cement and non-ferrous metals production 2. y yMaterial efficiency (e. y yDemonstrating the viability of decarbonization bility. economic. For example. fallen faster than anticipated and further break- less travel.4  Additional measures and deeper sites (excluding aluminum) could lead to a fur- pathways ther reduction in industrial emissions of over The illustrative pathway does not model behavioral 4 MtCO2in 2050 or 0. driving a further emissions reduction othermal systems.

Realizing this efforts focused on low carbon technologies such comparative advantage could result in a revival in as electrification. such as biogas or 2. approaches for the development and deployment and social and cultural inclusion challenges. Long-term neously address climate change. CCS and bioenergy. biodiversity protection. tribute effectively and efficiently to deep decar- Australia has the opportunity to be a global leader bonization. Australia’s abundant re. lithium. mines. and workforce productivity gains in y yPlanning for increased electrification of the more naturally lit and energy efficient workplaces. uranium. and key areas Other co-benefits include better air quality and for further investigation include: improved health due to reduced fossil fuel use. carbon The fundamental enabler for the decarbonization forestry technologies and accounting methods). Grundy. y yR&D for renewable energy technologies. clear signals about Australia’s likely in CCS expertise and technology development long-term emissions pathways are required to thanks to its great potential for carbon capture inform investment decisions. Battaglia & Keating.g. 2012. health. applying traditional land man.14 of these solutions will be required. omies face strong carbon constraints. including the transport system. 2009. Australia’s substantial potential for bioenergy gen. Stucley et al. and approach to R&D investment in technologies is improved water quality. sive assets. storage increased production levels due to improved ener. and power stations. 13 See for instance Eady. for gies and their costs is subject to steep and of- instance. investment decisions. economy. and other precious hold-ups and to reduce the risk of suboptimal metals may also be attractive. and the potential to develop renewable energy carriers for export markets. to the economic revitalization of regional ten unpredictable learning curves. technologies that will achieve the deepest emis- agement practices. ensure new technology developments can con- mand favoring products from zero-carbon sources. either through industrial plants. buildings. This will generation. Prospects for the extraction. energy-intensive manufacturing such as aluminum smelting. bioenergy. especially for new vehicles. To their domestic frameworks or through import de. For Australian industries to remain In a decarbonized world. 2012. The development of decarbonization technolo- eration and bio-sequestration could contribute. A portfolio and rural communities. also encourage public and private sector R&D vantage possessed through fossil fuels. replacing the existing comparative ad. sions reductions at the lowest costs. biodiversity. The prerequisite Australia faces the risk of locking in energy-inten- for these co-benefits is that all major producing econ.. of the Australian economy is the simultaneous decarbonization of all other major industrialized Co-benefits countries. competitive in global markets. offer the opportunity to simulta.Australia yy Developing the supply chains and workforce for new Enabling conditions technologies and services (e. 14 Green & Minchin.6  Near-term priorities solar-thermal based energy carriers.13 Indigenous-led carbon required to maximize the chances of developing mitigation projects. refining a vital role to play in providing predictability of and export of minerals such as non-ferrous metals policy settings in order to minimize investment and ores. their competitors newable energy resources could form the basis of in other countries must also be exposed to the a new comparative advantage in low carbon energy decarbonization pressures and drivers. Government has and storage. 57 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . gy efficiency. and grid-integration.

S..0 . Modelling the Future Dec 2012. (2009). J. J... tics). S. jects. from http://www. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 58 . Australia. Nature tion-project 2013. Reducing Australia’s 641–643. Injection Project. (2014). including R&D and deployment of stand. and large-scale production of biofuels. from http://ageis... Accounting Framework. 2013 Aus. (2013). C.. B. Marino. y yContinued energy efficiency improvement Transition to a decarbonized world will require throughout the economy.Modelling Greenhouse Gas Emissions: (2012). z z ABS (Australian Bureau of Statis.Australian Capture and Storage Institute. 5206.Kyoto Protocol Outlook 2012. (2013c). z z CCS Institute (Global Carbon z z Graham. Q. New South Wales: Bioenergy z z BREE (Australian Government. (2013b). St Leonards. Strategies for the Next Industrial z z BREE (Australian Government.. new forms of international collaboration. CCS z z IEA (International Energy Agen- Energy Technology Assessment. National Greenhouse Agency). Commonwealth of Australia. Economics). Canberra: Com. z z AEMO (Australian Energy Market z z Climate Change Authority. and y yInvestigation of options for zero-carbon energy y yReducing food waste and the emissions attrib- industries. (2009). World Energy Commonwealth of Australia. tics). March ics) (2010).au/NGGI. (2013).0 . Canberra: and Opportunities. Brinsmead. & Minchin. Renewable Study . from http://www. ble energy study: Projection of Environment. 2013 climatechange. Schuck. An CSIRO.. Dunstall. S. (2012). Operator). Ward. Bureau of Resources and Energy April 2014. Grid Forum globalccsinstitute.. Bureau of Resources and Energy z z CO2CRC (CRC for Greenhouse Newcastle: CSIRO. Canberra: (2014). T. Retrieved (2013). 2(September). (2012).au/research/auspro. Commonwealth of Australia.. z z Geoscience Australia. Transport Greenhouse Economics). Resources tural and Resource Econom- and Energy Quarterly. M. Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics). Paris: OECD/IEA. Australia. Elgindy.. Gas Inventory . Bureau of Resources and Energy Mitigation and Carbon Seques.aspx Gas Emissions Projections 2013- Australian energy statistics. 100 Per Cent z z Hayward. Reedman. CSIRO.. 2050. Paris: OECD/IEA. R. (2012).Australian The co-benefits of carbon gorgon-carbon-dioxide-injec- Demographic Statistics. National Accounts: National In. P.. and y yApplied research and on-ground experiments to a concerted approach to collaborative national determine tree species. z z BREE (Australian Government. Australian tration Opportunities from Rural ka. Queensland: 2013 Model Update. J. z z BREE (Australian Government. Bland. AEMO 100% renewa- z z Green. Melbourne: Commonwealth of electricity generation technology z z BREE (Australian Government. Climate Change. Bureau of Resources and Energy (Australian Bureau of Agricul- Economics). & Graham. L. M. June 2014. July. (2013). Energy Technol- Canberra: Commonwealth of June 2014. soil types. L. … Thomas. capital costs for Scenario 1. Retrieved z z Reedman. projects in Australia. come. conditions that will maximize the potential for carbon forestry. Report No. Retrieved cy). co2crc. & Graham. Borowitz- Economics). ogy Transitions for Industry. Battaglia. (2012). … Hayward..html Revolution. Australia References z z ABS (Australian Bureau of Statis. Resource Assessment. & Keating. Gorgon Carbon Dioxide L. Grundy. z z Eady. EP139979. T. M. B. Canberra: monwealth of Australia.. J. (2014). Sep management on country. Analysis of Greenhouse Gas z z Stucley. and growing knowledge creation and problem solving. & ABARE Australia.. (2013a). P. (2012). St Lucia. CSIRO. Australian Gas Technologies) (2011). Expenditure and Product. y yR&D on advanced bio-sequestration options alone industrial applications. D. Canberra. (2014). z z Department of the Environment. Energy Technology Assessment Bioenergy in Australia: Status Land Use. Australia y yCCS. 3101. z z IEA (International Energy tralian Energy Update. P. Department of the Targets and Progress Review. utable to the food production.. Australian Energy Quarter 2014.

p. as the economy grows. mostly for the industrial and transportation sectors (oil products are neither used significantly in electricity generation nor in the residential sector. Federal University 1 1 Country Profile of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) Claudio Gesteira. Brazil had been strongly dependent on oil imports.. In parallel.O. COPPE. E. deforestation has recently slowed down consid- erably. C. Dubeux.1  of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) and Sustainable Development Brazil has a unique position among major greenhouse gas (GHG) emitting countries due to relatively low per capita energy-related GHG emissions. COPPE.S. A. volume 13. The agriculture and livestock emissions have been driven by the expansion of the agricultural frontier in the “cerrado” (savannah) and Amazon biomes for crop and cattle raising activities. Major emissions have been historically concentrated in agriculture. Brazil Brazil Emilio Lèbre La Rovere. Climate Policy. Brazil beyond 2020: from deforestation to the energy challenge. and 1 other land use (AFOLU). supplement 01. as Brazil is an important world supplier of soybeans and meat.L. In Brazil. 1 La Rovere. related mostly to deforestation. Pereira Jr. In the past. emissions related to the combustion of fossil fuels for energy production and consumption have been increasing significantly and are expected to become the dominant source of GHG emissions over the next decade.Wills.B. W.1 Brazil faces the challenge of building upon the low historical GHG emission levels through new decarbonization strategies while pursuing a rise in the living standards of the population. forestry. crop growing and livestock.71-86. which is attributable to the use of abundant clean energy sources. to the point where forestry has ceased to be the major source of emissions. Federal University The National Context for Deep Decarbonization 1. 2013. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 59 .

fuel combustion in total GHG emissions has been arcane for ethanol. The country is not endowed with GHG Emissions: Current Levels. which is already widely used steadily increasing in recent years. future as new discoveries are fully exploited. major oil exporter.9 percent ity generation. ulation growth rates have declined to 0. whereas the energy-related CO2 in- consumption of most fossil fuels. CO2 in the GHG emissions mix has declined sharply.25 GtCO2e in 2010. gy potential. Hydropower provides more than 70% from 73% to 57% between 2005 and 2010.pdf Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 60 .2 Therefore. and. Oil imports have in particular fue. The country also over the period 2005-2010. the share of Brazil is also endowed with a large renewable ener. Available at: http://www. five years have witnessed an increase in the use of Among fossil fuels.g. Transportation is the largest energy-related emis- although the level remains high. and.mme. GHG emissions increased from 1. followed by natural gas and coal (see a low energy emissions growth trajectory appears Figure 2b). eration. keeping of emissions. followed by industry. ranking second after has a great wind and solar potential. ‘Balanço Energético Nacional’ . Pop- mills. Due to the lower rate of deforestation. cement) and to some complementary electric. Drivers and Past Trends and the coal use is limited to a few industries that The Brazilian population has increased from 145 to need it for their specific processes (e. with the possible tensity per unit of GDP increased from 1990 to 2000 exception of natural gas. el. with the lower increase in income than the national average. and the share of fossil used to produce biofuel feedstocks. The half). country’s own consumption needs and current gov- ernmental plans do not envision using these reserves for internal needs. followed by a substantial reduction (by from Bolivia or as liquefied natural gas (LNG). Population and economic growth have feasible.4 in 1990 has not matched the rapid growth in demand. large offshore oil reserves were found. but decreased from 2000 to 2010 (see Figure 3a). having only a low-grade variety. coke for steel 191 million people between 1990 and 2010. On this point. and the last agriculture and livestock in 2010 (see Figure 2a). if carefully planned and BEN/2_-_BEN_-_Ano_Base/1_-_BEN_Portugues_-_Ingles_-_Completo.2  large coal reserves. Brazil also tion of the large Brazilian cattle herd (numbering has an abundance of land that can be sustainably 213 million heads in 2012). needs of the whole population while decarboniz- raising the expectation that Brazil can become a ing the economic activity remains a key challenge. been consistent drivers of increased energy-related economic growth can be achieved with a declining CO2 emissions. Natural gas produced in the country per year.Brazil Brazil as ambient heating is needed only sparingly in the come strata of the population witnessing a greater south of Brazil). electricity gen- visible progress in recent years. to 2. The of the country’s electricity and has great untapped recent growth in GHG emissions has been driven potential. Over the the need to provide enough energy to fulfill the last decade. creat. 2 EPE (2013). Re- led on-road modes of transportation that dominate gional inequality is also high and is the subject of the sector both for urban and long distance trav. oil is by far the dominant source wind for electricity generation. reaching 1. from 16% to 32% as a fuel for light-duty vehicles. since these reserves exceed the although not an insurmountable one. there has been sions source. 1. Income inequality is another major concern. especially sug. some regional incentive programs. thanks to the need to import natural gas will be eliminated in the sharp fall of deforestation (see Figure 1 below). and buildings (see Figure 3b).5 billion metric tons CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e) ing a need to import gas either through the pipeline in 2004. although not all of it will be used due to by methane emissions from the enteric fermenta- concerns over environmental impacts. whether freight or passenger-related.

GHG emissions. Figure 2. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 3b. Energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors 400 MtCO2 40% Five-year variation rate of the drivers 348 30% 292  Buildings 300 269 20% 200 203  Transportation 10%  GDP per capita 163 0%  Population  Energy per GDP 100 -10%  Industry  Energy Related CO2 Emissions 0 1995 2000 2005 2010 per Energy  Electricity Generation 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 61 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . Decomposition of GHG and Energy CO2 Emissions in 2010 2a. by source 2b. Energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and sectors MtCO2 eq 200 MtCO2 375  Energy-related emissions 175 82  Processes 150 Electricity (Allocation 125 by End Use Sector)  100 1240 437 Agriculture 75 Total MtCO2 50  Natural Gas 53 49  Waste 25  Petroleum Products 266 18  Fugitive 0  Coal 30 Electricity Generation Transportation Other 279  LULUCF Industry Buildings (Land Use. 1990 to 2010 3a.Brazil Figure 1.2013: Estimativas Anuais de Emissões de Gases de Efeito Estufa no Brasil. Decomposition of historical energy-related CO2 Emissions. Brazilian GHG Emissions by Source 1990-2010 3000 MtCO2eq 2500 2000 1500  Land Use & Forest 1000  Agriculture & Livestock 500  Industrial Processes 0  Waste  Energy and Fugitive 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2000 2009 2010 Source: MCTI. and Forestry) 38 128 162 20 348 Figure 3. Land Use Change.

1.5 launched to meet efficiency measures and structural changes that the voluntary goals set for 2020. there will be an increase structure changes that would allow for the signif.933 217.84 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 62 .619 220.54 14.634.1  High-level characterization country. which with biologic nitrogen fixation techniques will be are assumed to increase until 2050.236.014. which Control of Deforestation in the Amazon4 and of the will focus on the expansion of existing systems. increased. to peak the planted area under low tillage techniques will around 2030. and there would be greater use of tech- initiatives promoting decarbonization outside the nologies for proper treatment of animal wastes. However. and then decline through 2050. way assumes the extension of the policies and zilian energy mix will form a strong starting point measures of the Action Plan for Prevention and for the process of deep decarbonization. which Table 1. In addition.3 launched to meet the realized through actions outside of the energy voluntary goals set for 2020.756 206.1  Non-energy related GHG emissions Decarbonization Pathway Insofar as agriculture and livestock is currently the most important source of GHG emissions in the 2. Development Indicators and Energy Service Demand Drivers   2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Population [Millions] 190. It thus assumes mit- sector. also be expanded.95 26. while expected to grow in the immediate future. In fact. the decarbonization path- The large share of renewable resources in the Bra. the Illustra. Brazil`s energy-related emissions are agriculture/ husbandry/forestry activities). areas cultivated Since Brazil has sizable biological CO2 sinks.24 20.84 35. the decarbonization pathway assumes Through 2030 the illustrative Brazilian deep de.928. Brazil 2 2 National Pathways to Deep Decarbonization Illustrative Deep 2. Thus. In forestry and land use. a tripling of GDP per capita. afforestation and reforestation activities. with forestation in recent years (see Figure 1). pasture land. Moreover. and icant reduction of energy-related emissions after more intensive cattle raising activities (integrated 2030. in land covered by agroforestry schemes. and total popula. energy sector. replacing the use of nitrogenous fer- tive Pathway will be strongly complemented with tilizers.715 222.857 GDP per capita [$/capita] 11. the proposed decarbonization path- tion will stabilize at around 220 million people way assumes the successful implementation of between 2040 and 2050. Moreover. as shown in Table 1. the extension of the policies and measures of the carbonization pathway assumes that a majority Plan for Consolidation of a Low Carbon Emission of the economy-wide emission reductions will be Economy in Agriculture.305. These action plans can reinforce the mitigation gains while at the include a number of initiatives that combine both same time improving living conditions and fueling economic and command-and-control policy tools economic growth. Action Plan for Prevention and Control of Deforest- Deep decarbonization will be further supported by ation and Fires in the Savannahs. actions will need to be taken in igation actions such as the recovery of degraded the near-term to set in motion the major infra. economic growth is that succeeded in bringing down the rate of de- assumed to be very strong through 2050.

. Barioni.E.21 a%C3%A7%C3%A3o-para-cerrado-%E2%80%93-ppcerrado 6 B.14 Liquids 4.17  Biomass 5 5 7. waste disposal for the pulp and paper industry. it to meet a majority of final energy needs.64 20 + 116 % 20 13. V. would be used to replace some fossil natural gas. and. “When enough should be enough: Improving the use of current agricultural lands could meet production demands and spare natural habitats in Brazil”. renewables and biomass become the 2020’s.31  Coal 2010 2050 2010 2050 would lead to a dramatic increase of forest and industrial effluents treatment units and charcoal use in the production of pig iron and with methane capture and burning facilities that steel.N. not only investments in sewage pipelines. and biofuel.D. there is a huge availability of degrad. so that as early as the mid In 2050. A.34  Coal 0.06  Gas Final Energy Energy 23. M.23  Oil Energy efficiency has The robustness of such a pathway was demon. J. Latawiec. and biogas programs would be developed with both envi. by 2050. wood. Vianna. a renewable fuel source is created.42 0..11 10  Electricity 0. Valentim.B.82 EJ + 112 % 25 and decline thereafter as a result of opposing crops. Global Environmental Change 28 (2014) 84-97 63 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .58 0. and several energy strated by a recent study using various models saving initiatives have been set in motion in re- and climatic datasets: an estimate of the carrying cent times and will be extended across the board capacity of Brazil’s 115 million hectares of cultivat.67 5. Assad. Nobre.. 3 Available at: http://www. ronmental and economic benefits.20  Natural Gas 4. nota- would be capable of offsetting a substantial share bly through direct use of biomass and low-car- of the emissions from the energy sector. land-use change and forestry will become dominant source of primary energy and are used a substantial net carbon sink. Energy Pathways..04 6.F.88  Renewables & Biomass 2. In fact. It is assumed that such initiatives will continue and expand in Energy-related GHG emissions the coming decades.21 1. by source 4a.N. With the capture of meth- ed land in the country where these afforestation ane.30  1.6 is only slightly higher than in 2010 (see Figure 5).gov. a strong potential in Brazil.89 15 15 11. B.Brazil Figure 4. ed pasturelands has shown that its improved use Energy-related CO2 emissions stabilize by 2030 would free enough land for expansion of meat.B. The waste management system will require large tations using eucalyptus and pine trees. respecting biophysical drivers that result in a 2050 emission level that constraints.71 0 0 4.P. Primary EJ 4b.A. (see Figure 4).25 4. E. da Silva.pdf 4 Available at: http://www.. and including climate change impacts.. Strassburg. may curtail emissions.08 10  Nuclear 9.58 5. L. C. but also for timber facilities. bon electricity a%C3%A7%C3%A3o-para-amaz%C3%B4nia-ppcdam 5 Available at:

2. -40% Electrification of end-uses Share of electricity in total final energy -50% 2010 17 + 7 pt 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 24 % Figure 6. tapping set by a decreasing demographic pressure (where the potential for doubling the installed capacity population stabilizes by 2040) and. 40% Energy efficiency Energy Intensity of GDP 30% 2010 4. social acceptance. Nuclear energy currently provides tation and industrial sectors will be responsible only 2. due to high costs compared to but surpassed by emissions from industry in 2050 other electricity generation options and uncertain (see Figure 6). Energy-related CO2 Emissions Drivers.85 % -30%  Energy-related CO2 Emissions per Energy Pillar 3. The pillars of decarbonization 50% Ten-year variation rate of the drivers Pillar 1. by a substantial fuel shift towards with an expansion of bioelectricity generation and renewable energy supply and a decrease in final a limited amount of wind and solar photovolta- energy intensity per unit of GDP. and the share of agriculture 0 19  Electricity Generation and livestock remains constant (capturing increas- 2010 2050 ing global demand for food).64% 10%  GDP per capita Pillar 2. +8% 375 348 but the structure of the Brazilian economy features 30 300 20 a partial evolution towards the commercial sector. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 5b. whereas the share of heavy industry decreases (as a consequence of the uncer- 250 128 173  Buildings  Transportation tain growth prospects in a globalized and mobile 38  Industry industrial landscape). even more with environmentally acceptable projects. in this pathway. Brazil Figure 5. along importantly. but this effect is off. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pathway. Electricity generation Emissions will be pushed upwards by the strong The illustrative deep decarbonization pathway in- growth of GDP per capita. see Table 3.7% of total electricity in Brazil. 2010 to 2050 400 MtCO2 All sectors experience growth in absolute terms.6 . see Table 2. The transpor.3% in 2050. cludes a further expansion of hydropower. 2010 to 2050 5a. with transportation further increase of this output level is considered emissions dominating across most of the period.1.2 MJ/$ 20% 2050 2. ic generation. The commercial sector increases the 200 154 162 share in GDP by 1 percentage point per decade to 100 reach 70. and no for the bulk of emissions.2  Sectorial characterization by Sector. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 64 . 0% Decarbonization of electricity Electricity Emissions Intensity  Population -10% 2010 90 gCO 2 /kWh  Energy per GDP -20% 2050 14 .

3 67.Brazil The full utilization of the country´s hydropower po.089 4.133 1.e.7 Agriculture and Livestock 122 176 248 334 449 Heavy Industry 28. which will progressively displace all coal- Table 2.0 26.3 Figure 7.856 7. In recent years hydropower construction has This renewable electricity mix can be designed to included minimal reservoirs (i. (i. Sectorial GDP (Billion 2010 US$) Table 3.058 5. cerns.7 5.7 5. plants. for renewable biomass.3 69.358 5.870 Agriculture and Livestock 5.533 Commercial 66.3 68. Sectorial GDP Shares (%)   2010 2020 2030 2040 2050   2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Total GDP 2. mainly from wood and tion of hydropower plants with reservoirs. bagasse. Energy Supply Pathways. and stillage). while from sugarcane byproducts of ethanol production simultaneously meeting local environmental con.079 2. In addition.Electricity 7b.0 25. renewable resources and by including a sizable istics.6 40    20  40 2000 TWh  0   20 1750 28.7 5.421 2.0 24. mostly run-of-the match the country’s variable electricity demand river plants) with limited energy storage capacity by exploiting the complementarity between the and without dispatchable generation character.3 70.0 27.7 5. Liquid Fuels 65 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . Therefore improved designs are needed to standby capacity of dispatchable generation com- decrease the reliability concerns associated with ing from natural gas. by Resource 89.143 3. tops and leaves.and biomass-fired power this potentially intermittent resource.0 Heavy Industry 600 834 1.889 Commercial 1.e.5 gCO2/MJ 60  13. the pathway includes use of the huge potential tential requires an improved design and construc.3  Other renewables 7 EJ 0 1500  Biomass 1250 6  Solar 5 1000  Wind 4  Biofuel 750  Hydro 3 500 2  Oil 250  Nuclear 1 0  Natural Gas 0  Petroleum products 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050  Coal 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 7a.976 4.464 1.6 gCO2/kWh 100 Carbon intensity   80 60 55.

2010 – 2050 gCO2/MJ 70 Carbon intensity 60 gCO2/MJ 50 gCO2/MJ 50  50  40 40 55. Industry 8b. half of total energy used in transportation would tinue to contain a 25% mandatory ethan ol be renewable and the carbon intensity of fuels content.’ capable of running on 100% ethanol. Also. more than Regular gasoline sold in the country will con. and a shift in freight towards trains and waterways diesel and biokerosene from a combination of would be promoted (when possible) for a deep sugarcane and palm oil. used by Transportation trucks and buses. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 66 . by Fuel. and trucks. el. Transportation Note: Carbon intensity for each sector includes only direct end-use emissions and excludes indirect emissions related to electricity generation. and most new cars manufactured for per unit of energy would be cut by more than the internal market will continue to be ‘flex-fu.7 30 30  30 16. buses. Energy Use Pathways for Each Sector. will increase. Buildings 8c. production of ethanol from sugarcane and bio. would be further increased to In the transportation sector.6  40 26. The ethanol to fuel most of the light-duty vehicle resulting carbon intensity of electricity generation fleet (with some natural gas used by taxicabs in 2050 is therefore much lower than the (already in major cities) and blending aviation jet fuel low) 2010 level (see Figure 7a). Brazil and petroleum product-fired power plants. Therefore.5   13. An Energy efficiency standards would be used to in- ambitious biofuel program will increase the crease fuel economy of cars. This would allow for a decarbonization of the transportation sector.9  10  10 25. with biokerosene for long distance transpor- tation. The biodiesel blend to diesel. especially ethanol. increase from 5 to 7%). significant substitution of gasoline by renewable the pathway includes a significant extension of ur- Figure 8.2 10 EJ     12 0 0 0 10 Non-grid  electricity 8 Grid 8 EJ 8 EJ  electricity 6 6 6  Grid electricity  Solid biomass 4 4 4  Liquid biofuels  Liquid fuels  Grid electricity 2 2 2  Pipeline Gas  Solid biomass  Liquid fossil fuels 0  Coal & 0  Liquid fuels 0  Pipeline Gas petroleum  Pipeline Gas 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 coke 8a. the reliance on 25% (the government has just announced an renewables. half in 2050 (see Figure 8c).9   20 20 20  7.

the share fuel switching is not always feasible in industrial of lighting will be reduced due to the emergence processes. panels in residences through a proper regulatory with almost a doubling in absolute terms despite framework and smart grid infrastructure would the assumed widespread adoption of energy ef- be stimulated. of energy emissions would grow (Figure 6) since For household electricity consumption. scrap steel. building energy use would compared to 2010.Brazil ban mass transportation infrastructure (subways energy efficiency for all LPG uses (cooking and and trains. from electronic equipment and appliances would In the illustrative pathway. biogas. In the end. where insulation and other More than half of the emissions are energy-re- efficiency measures can considerably reduce lated. allowing for the introduction of ficiency measures. industrial processes are also significant. wood and charcoal. This will central air conditioning. ment of LPG by natural gas. e fficiency in all uses of petroleum products. As a consequence. GHG emissions. the growth in indus- increase. all electricity uses to reduce some of the growth meter of travel would be reduced by 40% in 2050 in demand.) (Figure 8a). Demand for energy in buildings is likely to rise strongly. and despite the use of duction in both the energy intensity of industrial more efficient technologies (such as split units. complemented by a transition to greater use lar to those in the residential sector. In the commercial sector (including both private natural gas. added decreasing by 30% in 2050 compared sions follow economic growth. 67 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .). recycling in selected industries (plastics. etc. corre- Fuel shifts in households would be focused on sponding in 2010 to roughly 40% of the industrial solar thermal for hot water. small hydropower) and by increased levels of In both the residential and commercial sectors. Energy e fficiency is to be Most of the industrial (productive sector includ- pursued. The adoption of solar photovoltaic demand would remain relatively stable over time. given the light emitting diodes (LEDs). while consumption inflexibility of some of those processes. Decarbonization to 2010. reflecting economic growth and so. and ing installations. As water heating) and greater energy efficiency in a result. solar energy. The non-energy emissions of industri- of compact fluorescent light bulbs (CFLs) and al processes are also likely to increase. the expansion the industrial energy intensity per unit of value of energy consumption and the associated emis. products and in the emission factors. although the efforts are not likely to ing energy-related emissions from agriculture and produce as significant a reduction as in countries livestock) GHG emissions are composed of CO2. and heat pumps). its share photovoltaic power. ethanol. Air conditioners will become more wide. and grid It is assumed that the share of industry in energy electricity. This reduction in energy intensity is measures to be adopted in this sector are simi. the energy intensity per passenger-kilo. weight given to energy efficiency in air condition. with more of renewable energy sources (biomass residues. alu- the decarbonization pathway includes increasing minum. with some replace. but non-energy emissions resulting from the relative weight of sizable heating needs. with colder climates. their come about by substantially increasing energy total consumption of electricity will increase. to more than double and most energy needs of this sector would be met by low-carbon electricity Buildings (see Figure 8b). which will result in businesses and public institutions). bus rapid transport systems. Industry cial-inclusiveness. etc. paper. and electricity. trial energy emissions will be tempered by a re- ly adopted in the future.

costs. PPCerrado and Strassburg et al.7 gas production system (platforms and transport While some second generation biofuels from facilities). increased use of green efficiency. complemented by bioelectrici- sel-based electricity generators by grid electricity ty (to ensure reliability) along with emerging or locally produced biomass. Brazil might be designed with a larger deployment ing. carbon 7 Sources: INPE. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 68 . hydro power. NIPE-UNICAMP. they see limited growth in the assumed that the rate of natural gas venting and transportation sector due to the current high flaring can be reduced. have already demonstrated tech- infrastructure and some technical progress. Actually. according to the level of degradation (high. as the huge resources of the pre-salt sugarcane. Electric cars tion of ethanol from sugarcane is acknowledged are not an immediate priority in Brazil for GHG as an advanced first generation biofuel and reductions purposes because “flex fuel” light duty production levels can be considerably extend. 8 Estimates vary from 20 to 60 million hectares. Nassar et al. as gies such as second generation biofuels. see PPCDAm. it is nical feasibility. as demonstrated electric cars have other benefits (less urban air by recent trends since the doubling of sugarcane pollution and noise. leum products would be required.P. Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publ. J. Brazil A substantial effort will be required to reduce most production occurs more than two thousand CH4 and CO2 fugitive emissions from the oil and kilometers away from the Amazon.3  The Illustrative Pathway designed for a deep robustness decarbonization of the energy system would be Alternative deep decarbonization pathways in achieved through efficiency gains and fuel switch.(eds). the bulk of GHG emissions associated increase given the potential to grow the feed- with agriculture and livestock are not related to stock on the huge surfaces of degraded land energy use. mostly relying upon existing technologies. In or solar energy coupled with increasing energy the productive sector.. sug. CTC. breakthroughs and cost reductions in technolo- arcane production areas are far from forests.2  Assumptions Alternative pathways and pathway 2. With the deployment of new (“diesel oil”). Biodiesel production from palm oil would In Brazil. in ICONE.) and may be an alter- areas between 2004 to 2011 (from 5 to 10 million native option. 2. of electric vehicles coupled with a substantial such as hydropower and bioenergy. However. increase in clean power generation. electricity and biomass coupled with an interim diesel) to replace diesel in tractors and agricultural substitution of natural gas for coal and petro- equipment would also be important. The decarbonization measures that available in the country. 2008 in Sugarcane Ethanol: Con- tributions to Climate Change Mitigationand the Environment. Vooren. such as biokerosene and farnesene layer are exploited. The produc. vehicles can run on ethanol with a near-zero net ed without causing any competition with food emissions and lower transition costs. Electrified buses could also reduce hectares) has occurred in parallel with a notable GHG emissions and local pollution. etc. medium and low). The use of biofuels (ethanol and bio. UNICA. 2012. small hydropower onshore wind and solar photovoltaic energy. IBGE. 8 will be adopted to curb sectorial energy-related Clean power generation would be provided by emissions are the progressive replacement of die. Zuurbier. 2014. production or deforestation. Other path- fall of deforestation rate (from nearly 3 to less ways would be made possible by technological than 1 million hectares per year).

further reducing GHG emissions from power The availability of new technologies could even. gers of climate change and the pitfalls of inaction. with the use of natural gas could support deep- nologies. Offshore The main risk here is the temptation to chan- wind farms may become a relevant option. er decarbonization. could become more ef. use of coal is very limited. bi. become increasingly available in Brazil. The first is ficient if financial resources are made available for a strong public awareness of the potential dan- substantial investment in railways and waterways. other clean power genera- omass. however. CCS coupled the diffusion of second-generation biofuel tech. obtained without some preconditions. CCS could also be helpful to ute to further expand the already large Brazilian lower fugitive emissions from oil and gas pro- biofuel production. omass production and use. and green electricity generation. CCS remains unclear. the abundance of offshore sites. the political resolve that is neces- tance freight transportation. currently carried out sary to muster the forces for change cannot be almost entirely on roads. and solar energy) and the relative tion facilities may be built. ethanol production from lignocellulos. expansion. and its losers. Advanced batteries could overcome the non-dis- patchability of intermittent renewable power sources. such as solar and wind. given its high future availability from throughs. given the abundance of non-fossil natural tional sources of clean power generation may resources in the country. and other biomass being developed by Petrobras through the injec- wastes) would allow for a much higher ethanol tion of CO2 for offshore enhanced oil recovery. could be further decarbonized with the ex. thanks to the and concentrated solar power.5  the transportation sector. In addition. In the case of substantial cost duction. electric vehicles. and more substantial modal shifts towards railways and waterways in Challenges and Enabling 2. the pre-salt country’s resources. Conditions The infrastructure of urban mass transportation. due to its continuous deployment and reductions brought about by technological break. world. a number of addi. producing mix will depend mostly on the outcome of the dispatchable energy. given nel the recently discovered huge offshore oil 69 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . may contrib. making it possi- 2. wind. tually help Brazil follow a deeper decarbonization CCS in Brazil is not important for the purpose pathway than the illustrative pathway discussed of reducing GHG emissions from coal. generation. offshore wind.Brazil capture and sequestration (CCS). potential synergy with the huge effort on off- Brazil has a huge renewable energy potential from shore oil and gas drilling that would help reduce a number of different sources (hydropower. use in Brazil. Among the promising technologies. technological race towards economic feasibility. A deeper pathway would be made but the feasibility of large-scale deployment of feasible by the combination of high-efficiency bi. CCS is already ic materials (wood. its costs.4  Additional Measures and Deeper ble to replace natural gas as the base load sup- Pathways ply. such as concentrated shares of these technologies in the future energy solar power units with thermal storage. bagasse. country’s economy will certainly have its winners pansion of urban and suburban trains. In order to make possible a substantial shift to Brazil would clearly benefit from a decarbonized low-carbon electric vehicles. since the hereinabove. Given that such a formidable society-wide trans- relying mostly on a large privately owned bus formation as that implied in decarbonizing the fleet. when proven economical. Long-dis.

at most. together with transportation such as railways and waterways. there are a number of immediate to stick to this policy. The financial flow will need to largely come smart grid technologies would also produce short- from outside of Brazil given the low savings ca. confirmed by Congress. and the estab. an aspect materials useful to bring down the investment of Brazilian infrastructure that needs improve- costs of renewable power sources. fund. A similar priori- power plants in the Amazon that would avoid the ty should be granted to substantially expand the disruption of ecosystems. subsidies on energy markets favor the widespread ing. in the near-term it is tance transportation and urban mobility). concerning urban mobility.6  Near-Term Priorities in education and health. also be crucial. The through a low pricing policy that would help worldwide adoption of carbon valuation schemes to curb inflation down. with a realistic chance of delivering on the most energy and emissions-efficient modes of promise of a climate-stable planet. term returns. providing the bioelectricity to replace fossil fuel generation. a set of technical and policy ac. Drafting a detailed and feasible plan pacity of the Brazilian economy. The barriers to so that the net effect of the system of taxes and their implementation are related to pricing. a convincing case for the perils of inaction.g. A similar initiative should development of safe and energy-dense renew. The essential to cut subsidies to gasoline and diesel. for restructuring long-distance transport in Brazil. ciency options. appropriate financial schemes to meet the upfront Many of the strategies would require structural costs. the announced and cutting back of fossil fuel subsidies would governmental policy. would is another initiative that would both cut down be required to mobilize the resources needed for emissions and respond to the concerns of the initiatives such as: accelerated research on the business community. ment and is currently high in the political agenda. and prompting electricity providers to adopt terms. especially in two fields: adoption of renewable energy and energy effi- power generation and transportation (long-dis. vestments in renewable energy resources to other ed institutional arrangements (e. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 70 . and vested interests. research on industrial processes and authorities. aiming to export the bulk of the oil resources and channel the oil revenue to finance government investments 2. avoiding the use of the policy and planning measures that can be rec- newfound oil resources in such a way as to ommended. also be undertaken. To this end. in collaboration with local able fuels. goes in the opposite direction. Reinforcing the initiatives aimed at weaken the efforts to foster energy efficiency curbing deforestation is one such measure to and renewable energy use. ensure that there would be no major deviations The main technological challenges here are the from a trajectory that leads to no illegal deforest- design and building of a new generation of hydro. public/private types of equipment such as PV and solar heat- partnerships) to provide funding in appropriate ers. Internationally. building low carbon transportation infrastructure Extending the already existing incentives for in- will require substantial financial flows and upgrad. ation within a decade. So far. Another required effort is to pass legislation changes and higher upfront costs. It is imperative for For Brazil to get engaged in a deep decarboniza- the feasibility of a low-carbon future in Brazil tion process. Brazil and gas resources to expand its domestic use lishment of technology transfer mechanisms. and using dispatchable forest plantations in degraded land. prioritizing an infrastructure that allows for the tions. huge upfront costs and long construction times and redress the financial health of the electricity involved in tapping the hydropower potential and generation sector.

Navius Research & Simon Fraser University Faculty of the Environment 1 1 Country profile Jacqueline Chan (Sharp). The Canadian context presents a number of challenges re- lated to achieving deep decarbonization: y y First. Canada Canada Chris Bataille. Emissions would need to be transformed from 20. The national context for deep 1. 1 Excludes LULUCF emissions Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 71 . Challenges include Canada’s vast land area (which drives substantial transportation demand). Canada would need to dra- matically reduce CO2 emissions from energy.61 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per capita (tCO2e/cap) in 2010 to less than 2 tCO2e/cap in 2050. This represents a nearly 90% reduction in emissions from 2010 levels by 2050. To contribute to a path that limits the global increase in Carbon Management Canada temperature to less than 2°C.1  Carbon Management Canada decarbonization and sustainable development Richard Adamson. national circumstances create structural impedi- ments to decarbonization.and indus- trial process-related activities. Navius Research Dave Sawyer. climate (which drives winter heating and sum- mer cooling demand). and the importance of the resource extraction sector to the economy.

both in Canada and drivers. processing. emissions are will be needed both domestically and interna. Finally. Canadian electricity production has is that the Canadian emission reductions are started shifting toward lower and zero emission achieved domestically. ternational competitiveness concerns associated While the overall carbon intensity of energy with differential action are alleviated.2 GHG emissions: current levels. Another use did not change significantly between 1990 important simplifying assumption in the analysis and 2010. Global demand These assumptions are necessary in order to for fossil fuels and other primary resources is look beyond the s tat us quo and inves tigate projected to rise even in deep decarbonization the transformative technological pathways that scenarios. Technical constraints currently limit In 20 10. These factors have the current phase of the DDPP process—identi. in order to achieve the objective of transportation d emand. even options that meet both Between 1990 and 2010. energy-related emis- of these feasibility criteria may fail to be imple.8 tCO 2 e per capita (20. as CCS). significant political. are other challenges that must be overcome particularly re fined petroleum products and for technologies to be widely deployed (such nat ural gas. sions rose by 101 Mt CO2e. driven by population mented due to public opposition and political and economic growth (Figure 2a). been offset by improvements in energy efficien- fying national technological pathways to deep cy: between 1990 and 2010 energy efficiency d ecarbonization—the analysis also looks be. technologies are deployed. and deployment efforts LULUCF). equiva- drogen use for personal travel). need to be overcome. The Canadian federal government re- Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 72 . and the growing pop- ter considers and incorporates these factors. Canada’s natural resource develop. economy. As a result. output (particularly in the oil and gas sectors) The Canadian analysis presented in this chap. As shown in Figure 1. tial buildings. total Canadian G HG emissions (in- the availability of many options (such as hy. access to globally sourced GHG reduction op- ment aspirations are consistent with a global portunities will be politically and economically 2oC pathway only if deep decarbonization important to Canada’s decarbonization effort. the continued develop. including extrac. and technical barriers to deep decarbonization 1. However. economic. Cost and competitiveness outcomes sectors and driven by the use of fossil fuels. despite the fact that sources. Industrial pressures.6 excluding research. dominated by the industrial and transportation tionally. and past trends abroad. development. and significant lent to 22. regulations drove an improvement of approx- yond current political realities and envisions a imately 15% in the average fuel efficiency of hypothetical future in which Canada and other the Canadian car fleet and approximately 25% nations are aligned on the need to implement in the heating energy intensity of new residen- stringent policies to drive these changes and in. ulation and economy have spurred increasing However. and end-use.Canada Canada y y Second. has risen substantially. ment of Canada’s fossil fuel and mineral natural The insights gained from this analysis can then resources for global export can be consistent be used to inform policy discussions. deep decarbonization in Canada will require. this requires that identify the implications of global decarboni- transformative GHG mitigation technologies zation-driven technological shifts for Canada’s be deployed at every stage. tion. cluding LULUCF) were 775. as well as with a 2°C pathway.2 MtCO 2 e. y y Third.

Decomposition of historical energy-related CO2 Emissions. 1990 to 2010 2a. a renewa ble portfolio combined cycle gas t urbine or better. Land Use Change. Each standard in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.2  Other  Petroleum Products 271 + 76  LULUCF 0  Coal 91 (Land Use. by source 1b. Decomposition of GHG and Energy CO2 Emissions in 2010 1a.Canada cently imposed regulations effectively requiring feed-in-tariffs and a coal-fired power ban in all new and retrofitted electricity generation Ontario. and Forestry) Electricity Generation Transportation Other Industry Buildings 98 147 198 69 0 512 Note: Combustion CO2 emissions does not include upstream fugitive emissions (58 Mt in 2010). Energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and sectors 250 MtCO2 MtCO2 eq 570  Energy-related 200 emissions Electricity 54  Processes (Allocation 150 by End Use Sector) 775 55  Agriculture 100 20  Waste Total MtCO2 50  Natural Gas 150 0. a flexible levy on marginal industrial to have the G HG intensity of a nat ural gas emissions in Alberta. Figure 2. province also has carbon regulations in place and a net zero GHG standard for new gener- that drive electricity decarbonization. such as ation in British Columbia. Energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors 20% Five-year variation rate of the drivers 1000 MtCO2 15% 800 10%  GDP per capita 5% 600 590 596 569  Population 0% 531 471  Buildings Energy -5%  per GDP 400  Transportation -10% Energy Related  CO2 Emissions 200 -15% per Energy  Industry -20% 0  Electricity Generation 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 73 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . Figure 1. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 2b. GHG emissions.

Canada 2 2 National deep decarbonization pathways Illustrative deep 2.2 Over this period.7 37. The analysis is based on a nificantly by a dramatic reduction in the car- set of global and domestic assumptions about bon intensity of energy use. The results provide insight into the decarbonization pathway key areas where decarbonization will occur.26 trillion to $3. as well as where deep emission reductions will be 2. technology availability. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 74 . 2050. (Figure 3 and Figure 4a). Development Indicators and Energy Service Demand Drivers 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Population [Millions] 33. Summary of Results tion. GDP rises from this pathway is not a forecast. Overall. related to demand for Canadian oil and gas ex.81 trillion (real $2010 USD).882 2 Net LULUCF emissions are omitted in the DDPP process. as renewables and key emissions drivers. uncertainties. but rather an $1. the carbon intensity of Canada’s total ports. the availability of globally sourced tween 2010 and 2050. and economic structure that The Canadian deep decarbonization pathway are consistent with continued growth in the achieves an overall GHG emission reduction of po pulation and econ omy and a nearly 90% nearly 90% (651 MtCO2e) from 2010 levels by reduction in G HG emissions from 20 10 lev. energy use. a tripling of Canada’s economy. It is important to remember that (see Table 1). the electricity sector could energy-using technology pathways that firms d ecarbonize using more renewa bles and/or and individuals would follow under the DDPP nuclear. The Canadian deep decarbonization pathway examines the major shifts in technology adop.754 67. Table 1. current political realities were sus.1  High-level characterization challenging to achieve.3 GDP per capita [$/capita. and the extent to which global to several technology scenarios. and important assumptions were made nearly completely d ecarbonizes (Figure 4b).1. not viable the transport stock could transition nities for Canadian goods and services. and there is broad fuel switch ing across technological pathways to deep decarbonization the economy toward electricity and biofuels in Canada. biomass become the dominant energy sourc- and economic activity. commercial availability of transformative primary energy supply d eclines by 90% be- technologies. These to increased use of electricity generated with assumptions are discussed at the end of this renewables and fossil fuels with CCS.500 78. The reduction in emissions is driven most sig- and opportunities. If CCS model (CIMS) was then used to simulate the is n ot availa ble. If biofuels are decarbonization creates new export opportu. challenges. A technology-specific energy-economy if better batteries become availa ble. This result is resilient GHG reductions. while maintaining strong economic growth els by 2050. illustrative scenario designed to identify tech. Electricity production pended. 2010 price] 37. especially section. In order to reveal the es. and vice versa. nology-related needs.787 57.8 48.4 44.288 49.1  scenario.6 41.

Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 4b. while output from the electricity. Final Energy EJ EJ + 24 % 14 14.  GDP per capita 0% Decarbonization of electricity Electricity Emissions Intensity  Population -20% 2010 184 gCO 2 /kWh  Energy per GDP -40%  Energy-related CO2 Emissions 2050 4 .6 . Figure 3. Energy efficiency Energy Intensity of GDP 80% 60% 2010 7. This is due to both structural chang.23 2 0.68  Coal 0.25 7.18 14 1. lime sectors falls compared to the reference End-use energy consumption rises by only 17% case scenario.50  Natural Gas w CCS 2.Canada The other major driver of emission reductions is economy diversifies away from the industrial the dramatic reduction in the energy intensity sector to some extent.30 4  Natural Gas 3.30  Coal w CCS 0. compared to a 203% increase biodiesel.66 0.70 1. Primary Energy 3b.40 + 14 % 1. Output in GDP. and shown in Figure 4a and Pillar 1 of Figure 4b. -80% Electrification of end-uses Share of electricity in total final energy -100% + 24 pt 2010 19 2020 2030 2040 2050 2050 43 % 2010 2020 2030 2040 75 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .90  Liquids w CCS 1.87  Electricity 6  Renewables & Biomass 6 0.00 9.01 1. as sector.42  Coal w CCS 0 0. 2010 to 2050 4a.10 10 10 10.36  Gas 4 0.98 % -60% per Energy Pillar 3. by source 3a. The the reference case.90 8 8 1. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Drivers. but it still doubles. Energy Pathways.71  Gas w CCS 1. cement.2 MJ/$ 40% 2050 2. output from the refining.82 3.30 0 0. The pillars of decarbonization 100% Ten-year variation rate of the drivers Pillar 1.63 % 20% Pillar 2. over this period.68  Liquids 3. and ethan ol sectors rises.30 2  Oil 3.10  Nuclear 4. and within the industrial of the economy between 2010 and 2050.60 2.10 12 12 11. from the oil and gas sector falls slightly from es in the economy and energy efficiency.30  Coal 2010 2050 2010 2050 Figure 4.

3. Other ele. These as- 38 25  Industry 101 0 sumptions are discussed further in Technical 5  Electricity Generation 2010 2050 Options and Assumptions for National Deep Decarbonization. rare earths. oil and ly including biomass (as cellulosic ethanol gas production (as well as the end use of fos. 2. these factors drive a nearly com. achieving decarbonization in Canada. Decarbonization. primary metals (iron. and/or energy efficiency technologies 600 MtCO2 (particularly in the vehicle sector). potential- decarbonization scenario. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pathway. sil fuels) substantially decarbonize by 2050. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 76 . and electricity sectors. There will be significant domestic innovation and global spillovers in transformative low-car- 300 bon technologies. hydrogen 100 5  Transportation production. with since the DDPP process is focused on identify- significant progress already achieved. in prac- demand (and hence emissions) from the heavy tice. monia-based sources derived from natural by Sector. including global reductions in each country. contributor to the national economy. plete decarbonization of the buildings. fertilizers (both from mined potash and nitrogen/am- Figure 5. and industrial sectors. International demand for crude oil and nat. Depending on ysis is based on four key characteristics: the decarbonization pathways followed by 1. These dynamics will be explored in future phases of the DDPP. Global demand patterns for Canadian goods To address these uncertainties. This by 2050 Canada’s remaining emissions in the assumption is discussed further in Technical deep decarbonization scenario come primarily Options and Assumptions for National Deep from industry. sumption is being made by all country teams. transporta. However. The analysis assumes that all emission reduc- Key Scenario Characteristics tions are achieved domestically. and services do not change.93 % uncertain. portation sectors—are well understood. natural gas processing. nickel. international cooperation to maximize the industrial and energy extraction and processing efficiency of worldwide emission reduction ef- sectors and the availability of transformative forts will be critical. GHG abatement technologies. as well as CCS in the electricity 3  Buildings generation. Canada In combination. and the sector is able to remain a thriving tion. As shown in Figure 5. ing the decarbonization pathways and technical ments of the pathway are less certain and more changes that are likely to drive deep emission susceptible to global factors. other countries. despite the Two of the core foundations of the Canadian importance of lower-cost global reductions to deep decarbonization pathway—nearly com. 569 the scope and scale of this impact is highly 500 69 . demand for various Canadian ural gas remains substantial under a deep goods and services could increase. This as- plete decarbonization of the buildings and trans. 2010 to 2050 gas). However. leading to the commercial viability of next-generation cellulosic ethanol 200 201 and biodiesel. and uranium). As a result. or biodiesel). 400 198 4. zinc. the Canadian anal.

Liquid Fuels 77 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .354 TWh.0  Hydrogen  Wind 2. this is Sector % of Total led by an increase in the share of renewable energy Electricity 5.5% bonize coal and natural gas-fuelled generation.5 400 1. while biofuels become the core liquid fuel.5  Oil  Natural Gas 0 0  Coal w CCS 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050  Coal 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 6a.5 800 2. to the feedstocks for cellulosic ethanol and bio- dian energy supply is transformed between 2010 diesel was assumed.2  Sectoral characterization Oil and natural gas consumption decline.5  Solar 1000 3. Note: Total exceeds 100% due to rounding. Agriculture 11.1% due to facility siting and political challenges. while the sector’s total emissions fall by 95%. As shown in Figure 6. Table 2: Remaining GHG Emissions in 2050 by Sector (% of Total) from 101 to 5 MtCO2. by Resource gCO2/kWh 200 Carbon intensity  150 69 181 100 gCO2/MJ 60   40  50 4 28 20   1600 TWh 0   0   1400 4. wind.0 EJ 1200  Biomass 3. Over this period.0  Biofuel 600  Hydro 1. the Cana. Energy Supply Pathways. however. the electricity gen- and 2050. Figure 6. from 505 to 1.9% mix and supported by the use of CCS to decar- Buildings 3.Canada 2.Electricity 6b.0  Nuclear 200  Natural Gas w CCS 0. solar.9% (hydro. and hydrogen Energy Supply enters the energy mix (Figure 6b). consumption of elec- tricity rises nearly 70%. Sufficient access In the deep decarbonization scenario.9% Nuclear output was assumed to remain constant.1. Industry 74. and biomass) in the generation Transportation 5.

0  Liquid fuels  Grid electricity 2.0 EJ 1. electricity. and the Cana. while in the freight trans- decarbonization is initially driven by vehicle effi.0  w CCS 3. transportation. this (transit.0 EJ 0. Passenger kilometers travelled remain fairly con- sion reductions in each of these sectors. primarily in favor of rail.0 2.0 Pipeline Gas Grid  w CCS  electricity  Hydrogen 1.0 1. Buildings 7c. Energy Use Pathways for Each Sector.0 1. the use of heavy trucks declines ciency improvements and then by substantial fuel substantially. there is a slight mode shift between 2010 and 2050. portation sector. 2010 – 2050 gCO2/MJ 70 Carbon intensity  gCO2/MJ 60 60 gCO2/MJ 50 69.0 Liquid fuels 3. and new vehicle stock is on track to almost dian emissions profile is dominated by a subset completely decarbonize by the late 2030s or early of industrial emissions that are very difficult and 2040s if regulatory goals continue to strengthen expensive to reduce (Table 2). by Fuel. Due to these fuel supply shifts. while freight movement per dollar of GDP falls by 35% between 2010 and 2050.0  0  0   5. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 78 .0 2.0 4. at their recent rate.0 EJ 5.3 29. and building sectors have substantial GHG reductions in the transportation almost completely decarbonized. Canada eration mix does not include net sequestration of switching to biofuels (predominantly cellulosic eth- biomass.8 10 10 0  6. tions highlight the key changes that drive emis.5 50  50   40 40 40 47. Structurally. Industry 7b. sector. and rail). transport).0  electricity 4. The following sec. given insufficient information regarding anol for personal transport and biodiesel for freight the availability of sufficient sustainable feedstock. by 2050 the elec.6  30 17. from 198 to 5 MtCO2. Transportation Note: Carbon intensity for each sector includes only direct end-use emissions and excludes indirect emissions related to electricity or hydrogen production. In from personal vehicles to mass transportation the personal and freight transportation sectors.0 3.0 5.0  Pipeline Gas  Biofuels  Coal w CCS  Liquid fuels 0 0 0  Coal  Petroleum products  Pipeline Gas 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 7a. Energy efficiency regulations have already led to tricity. as the econ- Transportation omy becomes less dependent on the movement Overall transportation sector emissions fall by 97% of freight. bus. stant. and hydrogen (Figure 7c).4 30 30 20    20 20 10   7.5 Grid 4. Figure 7.

capture.Canada Buildings (from 55 to 9. iron and steel. output from the oil and gas sector still dou. (Figure 7b). The bulk of the enteric fermentation. particularly (particularly to electricity) and the widespread in the transportation and buildings sectors. this since it is a precondition to reducing emissions study included an analysis of strategies to reduce throughout the rest of the economy through elec- agricultural non-CO2 GHG emissions. ing energy use. and commercial floor area into the key areas where Canada can take action per dollar of GDP falls by 36%. The vast majority of the industrial sector’s End-use energy efficiency improvements are a key emissions reductions are a result of fuel switching decarbonization pathway in Canada.5 MtCO2e). providing insight more space efficient. and oil and gas extraction sectors. and no-till agricultural practices. yy Eventual decarbonization of the electricity sector. of the industrial sector shifts.2  Assumptions Per capita residential floor area remains fairly The Canadian decarbonization pathway is domi- constant. electricity. Building energy to decarbonize: efficiency has already improved substantially. These reductions result Overall building sector emissions fall by 96% between from efforts to reduce atmospheric emissions due to 2010 and 2050. will continue to drive reductions in space heat. While slightly lower than in the reference Improved energy efficiency for all energy case. ethanol. Air and ground source heat pumps are the primary energy supply technologies in use. The structure capture and storage and process changes). bonized energy carriers (e. trans- port biofuels and hydrogen).g. investment in a wide range of reduction in these emissions between 2010 and 2050 low-emitting electric generation technologies will 79 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .g. chemical production. while the commercial sector becomes nated by four major dynamics. by 2050. end-uses bles. efficiency regulations. y yReinforced and deepened energy efficiency im- and forthcoming energy efficiency regulations provement trends in all energy end-uses. from 313 to 64 MtCO2e. Decarbonization of electricity generation Agriculture Decarbonizing electricity production is essential. 2. and Industry y yDirect GHG reduction for industrial processes Industrial emissions fall by 80% between 2010 and thermal heat generation (e. with some peaking with baseboard electric heat. via carbon and 2050. and include measures such as methane with natural gas use virtually eliminated and electric. To decarbonize Canada’s electricity nadian decarbonization pathway includes an 83% generation stock. manure management. and biodiesel sectors ris- ing. While not the focus of the DDPP at this stage. trification. with output from This section discusses each of these decarboniza- the refining and cement and lime sectors falling tion opportunities and the key assumptions and compared to the reference case and output from uncertainties involved. from 69 to 3 MtCO2. and the Ca. controlled anaerobic digestion and flaring or ity providing nearly all of the sector’s energy by 2050 generation. cultural soils. the electricity. keeping the sector on a trajectory y yFuel switching to lower carbon fuels and decar- toward nearly complete decarbonization. and agri- emission reductions are the result of fuel switching. En- adoption of CCS to reduce chemical by-product ergy efficiency roughly doubles in both sectors and process heat related emissions (Figure 7a). which is consistent with the trajectory Process emission controls are also put in place already established by existing and forthcoming for the cement and lime.

since the cement. Other ele- ments depend on technological innovation and Direct GHG reduction in industrial processes stronger climate policy signals.3 ty. (which provide a virtually pure CO2 waste stream) The literature conflicts on whether production or a technology of equivalent GHG intensity will be from the oil sands can be cost-effective in a deep used to achieve approximately 99% CO2 capture. Fuel robustness switching to advanced biofuels will also depend on Several elements of the Canadian decarboni- the development of a decarbonized fuel source zation pathways are well understood and are with adequate feedstocks (e. industrial. and res. oil sands production idential/commercial sectors switching to electrici. down-hole oxy-com. factors of wind and solar improve to a degree that allows 17% of generation to come from wind and 10% Assumptions from solar PV. along with If CCS does not achieve commercial viability in other transformative technologies that are not yet the electricity production sector or is blocked commercially available (e. demand for crude oil and natural gas remains sub- In addition to intermittent renewables. alternative Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 80 . due to public acceptability concerns. hydrogen. with the transportation. However. and advanced biofuels. continued growth of the large-scale switching to decarbonized electricity. carbonization pathway assumes that international courage high intermittent renewable content. of CCS falls into this latter category. the cost of reducing production emissions. The commercial availability (e. petroleum extraction sector and switching from Our modelling assumes that the cost and capacity pyro to hydro metallurgy in metal smelting). and significant technological innovation to make such as energy efficiency improvements in the these fuels commercially available.3  plug-in hybrid vehicles) and hydrogen storage. and their future To achieve significant decarbonization.g. Canadian oil sands sector (with decarbonization The analysis assumes that post-combustion CCS measures) can be consistent with deep emission will be commercially viable for the electricity sector reduction efforts and would support continued by 2020 and that eventually solid oxide fuel cells economic development. If international oil prices remain above deployment of CCS will be required to facilitate the cost of production. Canada need to more than double from baseline levels in bustion or in-situ electrothermal extraction in the the deep decarbonization scenario. Fuel switching to decarbonized energy carriers and assumptions regarding transport energy use The Canadian decarbonization pathway includes and efficiency. lime.g. a cost-ef. and steel production) and process techn ology is n ot commercially via ble with heat-related emissions is essential. Both require restructuring of electricity As mentioned previously. the Canadian deep de- markets and transmission grids to allow for and en. Fuel switch- ing in the transportation sector will require further developments in batteries (less so for hybrid and Alternative pathways and pathway 2.g. contribution to Canadian emissions reductions fective method of reducing chemical by-product is more uncertain. cellulosic ethanol expected to provid e an essential foundation and biodiesel based on woody biomass or algae) for deep decarbonization under all pathways. significant stantial. could remain at levels similar to today or higher. the answer depends on policy. that even in a 450 ppm world. decarbonization scenario. buildings and transportation sectors. the deployment of CCS in these sectors. from natural gas processing and hydrogen. the International Energy significant fuel switching to decarbonized energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2013 indicates carriers. This will require current climate policy stringency.

worldenergyoutlook. However. we have not considered this transportation sector has more flexibility than option due to potential feedstock limitation issues. in natural gas processing. omy. bially. et al. Carbon Mineralization in Mine Waste. As a result. This could offset the GHG emissions from The analysis also assumes substantial deploy. World Energy Outlook 2013.5  tive decarbonization pathways could be based on enabling conditions greater electrification of transportation or more aggressive fuel switching to hydrogen (although Challenges there are currently technical issues with practical The fossil fuel production and mineral extraction hydrogen storage in personal vehicles.4  Additional measures and deeper increased generation from either nuclear power pathways or renewables. 2013. electricity. deeper reductions is the use of biomass with CCS tor. www. and further reduction option that is currently being investi- expansion would depend on development of gated in Canada is accelerated weathering of mine a North American-wid e h ig h voltage direct wastes. hydrogen production. alterna. which relies on the assumption that these in electricity generation to create net sequestration fuels will be commercially viable. many other sectors. the sinks. opportunities and 2. if public acceptance and siting chal. turning mine wastes into a significant carbon and industrial sectors. and researchers are working on ac- supply and demand or significant breakthroughs celerating this process. If this does not occur. However. and hydrogen all contribute to the sector’s emission reductions. and there sectors play a major role in the Canadian econ- is currently no hydrogen supply network). If biofuels are not available. few additional measures theoretical potential to expand further. but their and deeper pathways are available. mining projects and has the theoretical potential ment of CCS to address process heat emissions to sequester much larger quantities of emissions. Some mine tailings mineralize atmospheric current transmission grid to balance renewable carbon dioxide. which includes and evaluates challenges associated with siting new facilities. another pathway that may allow ethanol and biodiesel in the transportation 4 Dipple. G. both currently available technologies and those tent/uploads/2012/06/Greg-Dipple. Challenges. power are already projected to play a major role reducing emissions by nearly 90% between 2010 in electricity generation by 2050. 2012. Finally. Renewables such as solar and wind pathway is extremely aggressive and ambitious. The Canadian be relaxed. They have the and 2050. both abiotically and micro- in storage technologies. due to the simulation model. their export-oriented nature is a 3 International Energy Agency (IEA).cmc-nce. this constraint could for future commercial availability. since biofuels. One emission intermittency is a limiting factor.pdf 81 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .4 Another known decarbonization pathway key alternative is direct electrification of industrial not included in this version of the analysis is the full processes. The Canadian decarbonization The Canadian decarbonization pathway was de- pathway assumes that nuclear generation is veloped by using a technology-rich stock turnover limited to current installed capacity. the electricity production. metallurgy (using heat) to hydro metallurgy (using The Canadian decarbonization pathway also acid solutions and electricity) in the metal smelting includes significant fuel switching to cellulosic sectors.Canada decarbonization pathways could be based on 2. such as substituting hydro metallurgy suite of potential options for switching from pyro for pyro metallurgy. still under development but with the potential lenges were overcome. Available online at http://www.

oxide fuel cells and other technologies. Changing global demand patterns could ergy storage technologies to allow more elec- lead to the expansion of existing industries or tricity generation from intermittent renewables. ment and innovation and global research coop- sures. ing pre-combustion capture. While the current are consumed in other countries. the development of new industries. Canada challenge. and deployment efforts will be required in be earned through continued engagement and the following priority areas: dialogue and cannot be assumed. as well as to In parallel with efforts to collaborate on the deploy- implement a global equimarginal abatement ef. develop- is dependent on public acceptance. yy Improving post-combustion CCS. dampening y y Development and commercialization of cellulos- adverse decarbonization impacts and supporting ic ethanol and advanced biofuels derived from continued economic development. woody biomass. the path toward deep decarbonization. development. which The Canadian deep decarbonization scenario de- will require public support and in many cases will pends on significant technological innovation and be driven by public pressure. The commercial phase of the DDPP project focused on identifying availability of CCS will be essential to economi. national technological pathways. ment of critical enabling technologies. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 82 . y yEnhanced transmission grid flexibility and en- tage. for both electric- ity generation and industrial process applications. com. algae or other feedstocks. this topic will be cally address these emissions. includ- carbonization pathway is how global decarboniza. and in which Canada has a competitive advan. since they create significant produc. To remain on is a critical component of the Canadian pathway. While ble technologies very high in the heavy industrial challenging to implement. which must ment. Knowledge Gaps y yDevelopment and commercialization of solid A significant knowledge gap in the Canadian de. a global equimarginal and energy extraction and processing sectors. transportation sector. and deployment of crit. Technological innovation and deployment eration and technology spillovers. More broadly. and y yDevelopment and commercialization of batter- Enabling Conditions ies and hydrogen storage to enable electrifi- International cooperation is required to support cation and fuel switching to hydrogen in the research. that either reduce tion efforts will change demand for products and GHG intensity or reduce the cost of CCS by services that support low-carbon development producing a pure CO2 waste stream.6  Near-term priorities will not occur without strong policy signals. national) emission reductions is the most efficient tion emissions in Canada even though the outputs way to address this challenge. the significant differential in abatement opportuni- Technical constraints make the marginal cost of ties and marginal abatement costs across countries emissions abatement based on currently availa. ical decarbonization technologies. addressing fort through GHG reduction sales and purchases. increased but large-scale deployment of new technologies investment and accelerated research. A focus on global (rather than purely strong economic growth. key in the next phase of the DDPP’s work. This requires both domestic invest- or indirectly through external market-access pres. many of the major changes de- scribed in the Canadian decarbonization pathway 2. and sectors must be an international priority. whether domestically deployment. abatement effort through GHG reduction sales and pared to other Canadian decarbonization options purchases has the potential to be the most efficient and to the cost of reducing emissions in many other way to achieve the global target while maintaining countries.

Environment development and Economy.3% National Center for Climate to GDP in 20 13. wh ich contributed 48. Despite fas t growth over the las t d ecad e Institute of Energy. Change Strategy and International Due to econ omic and social d evelo pment. its GDP was 5.5 percentage points since 2000. but th is sector’s contribu- Change Strategy and International Cooperation  tion has declined by 12.930 billion Change Strategy and International US$. Tsinghua University over 2000-2012). while the tertiary sector of the Zheng Xiaoqi. Environment and (with an average GDP growth rate of 10% Economy. Tsinghua University Liu Qiang.433 US$. National Center for Climate economy increased by 12 percentage points. Tsinghua University Yang Xi. In 2010. Ch ina China Teng Fei. of the econ omy. Cooperation  China’s level of urbanization has risen from Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 83 . 1 1 Country profile National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation The national context for deep 1. China is still a developing Chen Yi. Institute of Energy.1  Gu Alun. and per capita GDP was just 4. country with a low level of economic devel- National Center for Climate opment. decarbonization and sustainable Institute of Energy. Cooperation  China’s has a very significant secondary sector Tian Chuan. Environment and Economy.

and 633 MtCO 2 per capita emissions are still lower than IPCC Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 84 . cement. Th is indus trialization promote more efficient. thoug h th is was tempered in the 11 th Five-Year Plan. energy activities are the coal-intensive power nese inhabitants move to cities every year to generation and industrial sectors (Figure 1b). pursue a h ig her s tandard of living. GDP. 63 4 MtCO 2 . 13 million Chi.” The growth of Ch ina’s econ omy has been the n ot leas t because pollution is harming lives major driver of increasing emissions in the past and livelihoods. emissions. 2010. current and historical 2. Although China is now the country with the portation. Ch ina’s Presid ent. energy activities rep. er-emission activities and helped to d ecouple sources other than coal.7% in 2013.999 MtCO 2 . supporting economic growth with on Climate Change” in 2005. indus try. as the main sector driving economic also the most populous country in the world. and past trends Coal has dominated China’s energy mix over the According to “Second National Communication past decades. The structure of this growth has recognizes the problems created by pollution. nitrous oxide for 5%. China’s total GHG a high carbon intensity fuel. s truct ural change favored low- due to the limited availability of natural re. growth in emissions has been energy efficiency. The only factor that emissions were approximately 7. growth. Th is shows the crucial im- pact of econ omic s truct ure on Ch ina’s fut ure 1. and ethylene has described the country’s recent model of production). econ omic d evelo pment as “unsus taina ble. This is essentially from a few energy-in- it is under heavy pressure to improve environ. as methane for 13%. to tion. highest emission levels. the first ten years of China’s openness policies ticles. had o pposite dynamics over the las t d ecad es both from greenhouse gases (GHGs) that cause with direct consequences on emissions. and buildings at 2. wh ich saw a double digit growth rate make Ch ina an inn ovative country. the industry sector accounts for 68% by the end of 20 13. emission rates. The major emitting increase in urbanization rate.929 MtCO 2 . The total net GHG per unit of GDP (Figure 2a). Ch ina is Notably.2 GtCO 2 ) with direct coal-based power units. emissions from electricity. about 20% of the world total. tensive industries. China is also facing growing constraints (1980-1990). Th is was has signaled its intention to accelerate the followed by a rapid process of indus trializa- transformation of Ch ina’s growth mod el. particularly in cities. Xi Jinping. and to in the heavy indus tries. Ch ina’s po pulation was of total final energy consumption and almost 1. drivers. Ch ina three decades.Ch ina China 26. 71% of total energy-related CO 2 emissions in Although China has made remarkable progress. With a 1% respectively (Figure 1a).4% in 1990 to 53. Electricity generation removals through land use change and forestry has been the major driver of the increase in carbon was about 421 Mt CO 2 eq. trans. During climate change and from other gases and par. steel. which consume about 50% mental protection due its resource-intensive of energy use in the industry sector (iron and d evelo pment. since the growing needs for electricity Of total GHG emissions. and seen in the reduction of China’s energy intensity fluorinated gases for 2%. have been satisfied by the fast development of resent 77% in 20 10 (7. sustainable accelerated growth in emissions fas ter than economic development. equal and.36 billion. Ch ina’s lead ersh ip emissions from aggregate growth.2 GHG emissions: current levels.5 Gt CO 2 eq has significantly contributed to slow the rate of of which carbon dioxide accounted for 80%. synthesis ammonia.

Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 2b. 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Source: Second National Communication on Climate Change (2005) 85 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .c. by source (2005) 1b. Decomposition of historical energy-related CO2 Emissions.4tCO 2 e/cap) or cumulative (95 tCO 2 e/ be expected in the future with business as usual cap over 1850-2009) basis. Energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors 100% Five-year variation rate of the drivers 8000 MtCO2 80% 7247  Other 7000 60%  Buildings  GDP per capita 6000 40%  Transportation 20% 5000 5060  Population 0%  Industry 4000 -20%  Energy per GDP 3000 2997 -40% 2357  Energy Related 2000 -60% CO2 Emissions per Energy 1000  Electricity Generation -80% -100% 0 n.421  Petroleum Products 1018 0  Coal 6035 Electricity Generation Transportation Other LULUCF Industry Buildings (Land Use. GHG emissions. Decomposition of GHG and Energy CO2 Emissions 1a. trends. Given these recent economic growth.China Annex I country levels. continuously increasing emissions can al (5. Energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and sectors (2010) 6000 MtCO2 MtCO2 eq 5757  Energy-related 5000 emissions Electricity 768  Processes 4000 (Allocation by End Use Sector) 7468 820  Agriculture 3000 111  Waste 2000 Total MtCO2  Natural Gas 195 13  Fugitive 1000 . whether on an annu. Land Use Change. 1990 to 2010 2a. and Forestry) 2927 2999 634 633 54 7247 Figure 2. Figure 1.

contributing 17% and are significantly decoupled from this growth with 43% respectively.8 MJ/$ 80% 60% 2050 4.2  Coal w CCS 3.2  Oil 16.9 EJ 150 150 125 + 71% 125 114. and the completion to control emissions in a context of continued of the industrialization process. by source 3a.9 19.1  High-level characterization tively (Figure 3). This increase is mainly triggered The illustrative deep decarbonization pathway by the industrial sector (+28%).7 100 21. but energy trends non-fossil fuels increase.8 25 32.2 17.4 EJ in 2050) respec- 2.4 . the economic growth.0 75 2.9 16. reductions in energy inten. 2010 to 2050 4b. Energy efficiency Energy Intensity of GDP 100% Ten-year variation rate of the drivers 2010 15. China 2 2 National deep decarbonization pathways Illustrative deep 2.5 51.7 EJ in 2010 to 166.0  Natural Gas w CCS 66. along with changes in economic structure. buildings sector combines an acceleration of the evolution of (+141%).5  Electricity 20.72 % 40% Pillar 2. while the use of natural gas and to satisfy development needs.7 50 14. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers Pillar 1.1  Renewables & Biomass 4. In particular. an sity and the promotion of non-fossil fuel energy increase in urbanization rate.1  an increase of primary and final energy of 78% decarbonization pathway (from 93.5  Natural Gas 64.2 Coal 2010 2050 2010 2050 Figure 4. Figure 3.9 EJ in 2050) and 71% (from 66. GDP per capita is assumed to share of coal in primary energy consumption falls increase by more than 6 times from 2010 to 2050 to 20% in 2050. Final Energy EJ Energy 175 + 78 % 166.9 EJ in 2010 to 114.8 25 35. economic structure.6  Coal 29. -60% per Energy Electrification of end-uses Share of electricity in total final energy -80% 2010 21 + 24 pt 2020 2030 2040 2050 2050 32 % 2010 2020 2030 2040 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 86 . Energy Pathways.3  Gas 0 0  22.4 0.7 93.2 50 36.3  Nuclear 100 7.4  Liquids 11. 20%  GDP per capita Decarbonization of electricity Electricity Emissions Intensity 0% 2010 743 gCO 2 /kWh  Population -20% 2050 32 .0  Heat 8. The pillars of decarbonization 4a. and transportation sector (+204%).1. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Drivers.96 %  Energy per GDP -40%  Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pillar 3. Primary 3b.8 75 6.

The 2999 4000 application of CCS technologies in power generation 3000 and the industrial sector is also a crucial feature of 66  Other this illustrative pathway. The latter mainly 7247 7000 54 comes from decarbonizing the power sector and 633 . the industry sector emissions 2018  Industry 0 329  Electricity Generation remain the largest. with a large decrease of the share of energy-inten. 2010 to 2050 sive sectors of the economy and improvement of 8000 MtCO2 economy-wide energy efficiency. Table 1.  Wind opment. 2010 price] 4455 8708 14666 20945 27789 energy per unit of GDP by 73% and of energy-related CO2 emissions per unit of energy by 61% (Figure 4a). contributing 18% and 17% 87 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .2  Sectoral characterization  gCO2/kWh 600 Carbon intensity Power sector 743  Electrification is an important indicator of economic  400 and social development.34% the electrification of end-uses (from 21% in 2010 6000 634 to 32% 2050) while increasing living standards and 5000 4766 modernizing energy use patterns (Figure 4b). intermittent renewables (installed capac-  Coal ity of wind and solar respectively equal 900 GW 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 and 1. especially from coal.000 GW in 2050. The former is largely explained by structural change Figure 5.  Nuclear 2500 This is permitted by the large-scale use of nuclear  Natural Gas w CCS (which reaches 25% of electricity production in  Natural Gas 0  Coal w CCS 2050).143 TWh in 2050. by Sector. contributing 1. Population [Millions] 1360 1433 1453 1435 1385 essentially due to a decrease of both the primary GDP per capita [$/capita. the decarbonization of power sector is of signifi.77 GtCO2 in 2050. from 17% in 2010 to 49% of 2050 emissions (Figure 5).8 GtCO2 respectively.3 GtCO2 and 2000 752  Buildings 0.China In the illustrative deep decarbonization pathway. 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 from 7. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pathway. The carbon emission intensity of power  Hydro 5000 generation in 2050 will decrease from 743 gCO2/ kwh in 2010 to 32 gCO2/kwh in 2050 (Figure 6a). 1000 2927 1601  Transportation At the sectoral level. or 7. but buildings and transporta- 2010 2050 tion increase in share. Figure 6.  Solar 7500 cance for the achievement of low-carbon devel. The development indicators and energy service demand drivers in China energy-related CO2 emissions decrease by 34%. Since thermal power. is an  Other renewables 10000  Biomass important source of local pollutants and GHGs.1. by Source 2.5 times the 2010 level).300 kWh  12500 TWh per capita (around 2. and electricity consumption 200  32 in the illustrative deep decarbonization scenario is 0 projected to reach 10.25 GtCO2 in 2010 to 4. Energy Supply Pathway for Electricity Generation.

increase (a ten-fold increase of kilometers per capita and eliminating backward production capacity. energy consump- bly. By promoting the trans. 66% final energy consumption to 28% (from 46 EJ in and 75% for regular and central air conditioners). particularly (which accounts for an additional 18%). limiting the rise of and appliance energy efficiency increases (e.g. 45. ultra. 2010 to 58 EJ in 2050). and enhancing the use of electricity. and the output of some 2010 to 28. The proportion of coal in energy use decreases formation of coal-fired boilers to gas-fired boilers gradually (from 39% in 2010 to 5% in 2050). This diffusion supposes that CCS technolo. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 88 . portant role in limiting this rise of energy demand. the illustrative as electricity and gas rise (reaching 50. generation technologies). Total floor area will continue to grow (from all new coal power plants after 2020 will be super. from 9. it 2050. or IGCC power gener. and hydro CO2 emissions in the industry sector. replacing converter with electric furnace or using waste heat of low temperature flue gas in sintering and pel- letizing in iron and steel industry and replacing vertical shaft kilns with new dry production process and enforcing low-temperature cogeneration in cement industry. Fossil-fu. Nota. If CCS el power generation units still represent 24% of is deployed appropriately on a commercialized electricity generation in 2050 (notably because scale after 2030 in key industry sectors. In addition. due to the contribution of CCS technology.supercritical.. This pushes total energy gy will become commercialized after 2030. urban consumption per value added of the industry sector residential and rural residential units respectively by 74% from 2010 to 2050.5% and pathway reduces the share of coal from 56% in 33. ce. to reach 20.g. consumption up by 140% (from 11 EJ to 27 EJ) in line with a 33% increase of energy consumption Industry per capita. This triggers a de- 2010 to 30% in 2050. representing a rising share of high-energy-intensive industry products (notably. That ensures a 34% lower emissions level is not expected that further significant changes in in 2050 compared to 2010 (Figure 7b). critical. This would permit a reduction of energy 10% from 2010 to 2050 for commercial. gree through technological innovation in industrial where performance improves by 25%. A partial decoupling will allow the carbon These different options lead a 57% decrease of emissions to rise by only 149% (from 652 MtCO2 in 1 E.2 billion m2 in 2010 to 80. Pushed by rising mobility demand along with wealth controlling overcapacity of main industry outputs. it is ex- natural gas power generation technologies act as pected to sequester 28% of total CO2 emissions an important back-up technology for intermittent in the industry sector in 2050 (Figure 7a). from 14% in 2010 to 24% ment and crude steel) are anticipated peak by 2020.7 gCO2/MJ in to change feed composition in some industries.8 gCO2/MJ in 2010 to 32.000 km/cap in 2050). Buildings ployment of efficient technology options (notably. process of urbanization. Energy efficiency measures play an im- Energy efficiency could be improved by a large de. while increasing that of gas crease of the average carbon emission intensity and electricity in final energy use. Since it’s hard from 119.3 EJ in experience a slower growth. many high-energy-intensive industry sectors will tion in transport will almost triple. Fossil-based emissions are reduced by a large percentage due to the de.1 EJ in 2050. 22% and sectors1. in 2050.2% in 2050 respectively). energy structure are possible. China of electricity generation respectively). structural changes in industry could be Transport achieved through developing strategic industries. and the urban and rural residential building floor ation technologies) and CCS facilities on 90% of areas per capita will increase (reaching around coal power plants and 80% of natural gas power 36 m2 and 47 m2 respectively) in parallel with the plants.3 billion m2 in 2050). total energy consumption.

36 railway electrification. which will play a dominant times higher than in 2010). in gasoline and diesel use also occurs because of tems in cities (attaining 50. provement of light duty vehicles’ energy intensity where rail and water transport grow over time.8 20  20 20 70 32. Buildings 7c. improvement of shifts. Industry 7b. 2010 – 2050 Carbon intensity gCO2/MJ 120 gCO2/MJ 120    100  100 gCO2/MJ 100 119. Energy Use Pathways for Each Sector.7 0 0 0 60  Heat 50 Grid  electricity 40 40 EJ 40 EJ 30  Liquid fuels 30 30  Heat  Grid electricity Pipeline gas 20  w CCS 20 Grid 20  Biofuels  electricity  Pipeline gas  Solid biomass 10  Coal w CCS 10  Liquid fuels 10  Petroleum products  Coal  Pipeline gas 0 0 0  Coal  Pipeline gas 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 7a. 89 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .China 2010 to 1. role in the railway energy mix by 2050. Within the passenger transporta. to control the rapid growth of demand. Non-commercial low-carbon energy options (e.g. and the transportation management is an important option promotion of electricity and biofuel use (Figure 7c). biomass and biogas used in rural buildings and residential solar water heating) that reduce use of fossil fuels and electricity in the buildings sector are included in the scenario analysis but not shown in the Figure 7b. Transportation Note: Carbon intensity shown in Figure 7 for each sector includes both direct end-use emissions and indirect emissions related to electricity production.621 MtCO2 in 2050) due to transport mode For the 0n-road transportation. In and the deployment of high efficiency diesel vehi- freight transportation.8 112. cles in freight transportation. In intra-city tion. plug-in hybrid electric vehicle (PHEV). road transportation will be kept at 35% in transportation low-carbon vehicles gradually play a 2050 and railway transportation will remain the more dominant role with the adoption of pure elec- main transportation mode (45% of total passenger tric vehicles.000 km by 2050. the share of gasoline and diesel vehicles the highest share (about 42% in 2050) and railway sold significantly decreases by 2050 because of the grows to 24%.7 60 60   60      40 40 70. An increase The primary mode shift encompasses a transition in fuel economy is also crucial. And. with a 70% im- from on-road to off-road modes of transport. adoption of alternative fuel vehicles. Figure 7b only includes energy use for commercial buildings. A reduction of high-speed railway and rail-based transit sys. mobility in 2050) notably due to the development biofuels and fuel-cell vehicles (FCV).6   80 80 80 37. an increase of vehicle fuel economy. by Fuel. road transportation is limit. Figure 7.6 40 80 EJ  57. water transportation maintains portantly. even more im- ed to 32% in 2050.

development of high-energy-efficiency significantly from current trends. and 26%. In order to achieve the decarbonization experiences a fast development. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 90 . urban buildings. Both CO2 utilization and geologic existing and new buildings through innovative storage have great potential compared to the technologies (like advanced. and residential ap- fall from 2010 to 2050 of the energy consump. There are still uncertainties with some key tion per unit of product output of crude steel. from 2% in 2012 to 50% in 2020 and help to more than 1 billion ton annually for the latter). fully elec. the improvement across all sectors. ammonia and ethylene by 48%. It is expected trified rail-based transit for both long-distance that CCS is developed and demonstrated from and short-distance by 2050. achievement of this pathway. 2020 and deployed at a commercialized scale yy Buildings: increasing energy efficiency for both from 2030. wind power reaches 1. Hydro pow- is vital for the achievement of the Illustrative Deep er production of 500 GW approaches its potential Decarbonization Pathway. amount of CO2 captured in the illustrative path- which will increase their share in urban regions way (0. low-carbon transition in electricity generation even the large-scale use of renewable energy. a 30% improvement of fuel economy nology and will be deployed in both the power and for conventional high duty vehicles. brid vehicles. energy saving technologies in in energy efficiency concerns key industrial sec- high-energy-intensive industries permitting a tors. low-carbon buildings. and penetration of electric vehicles.1 to 1 billion ton per year for the former. biomass-fired technologies must be distributed across the country. pliances. application of CCS facilities. demonstration) and exceed 300GW by 2050. reduce the heating and cooling demand). by 2050. such as ground source heat robustness pumps and decentralized solar heating systems as In order to achieve the illustrative decarbonization well as natural gas boilers and CHP for centralized pathway. in the ative cost. significant technological and economic effort and solar thermal reach approximately 1. nuclear power generation technologies illustrative pathway are discussed below: will be developed (due to learning from foreign y yTransport: high-efficiency diesel vehicle or advanced technologies and domestic research and gasoline cars. The former dimension y yIndustry: high-efficiency waste heat recycling depends on the development and deployment of technologies.000 GW in 2050 ogy R&D and incentives for technology deployment (70% off-shore). electricity vehicles. especially limited due to resource constraints and high rel- energy saving technologies in end use sectors. measures and technologies that might affect the cement. supply of non-fossil fuel power generation technologies is natural gases. This includes a cooling systems. end-use energy efficiency. power generation and other renewables will be The most important low-carbon options. China 2. 32%. vehicles. high efficiency boilers and motors non-fossil fuel power generation. and low-carbon and 150GW respectively in 2050. respectively. and fuel cell vehicles in passenger yy CCS technologies will be another important tech- transport.2  Assumptions the major contributor to the reduction in the car- Emphasizing technology development and innovation bon intensity of electricity generation. to sub- stitute for coal boilers. plug-in hy. tion of intermittent renewable power into the pow- yy Electricity generation: an increased reliance on er system. there are key measures that must deviate heating. lighting system and appliances. such as the integra- 26%. the application of advanced Alternative pathways and pathway 2. where solar PV pathway. industry sectors at scale in 2050.000GW needs to be made in different sectors. such as as electricity demand increases faster than gains in solar water heaters in residential buildings. Sufficient input on technol.3  heating facilities. solar energy power generation are necessary.

2% in the next of buildings and transportation infrastructures will decade. the proportion China needs to increase the productivity of its of non-fossil fuel electricity is 41% in 2050 in the investment. from industrial sec- coal power (with CCS) or renewable power might tors to service sectors). To maintain the growth rate at a relative- proaches could be envisioned. A large portion of China’s emissions are linked to First.” critical and ultra-supercritical units. However. pathway that will also contribute to the growth of China’s energy consumption per unit of GDP is twice China’s economy in other ways. This reduction of 3 to 4 percentage points contribute to further deeper decarbonization by is more than the typical growth rate of developed combining a reduction of material consumption in. China will maintain its growth structure and change the mode of development rate around 7%. capital intensive sectors (e. GDP. 2) improving the efficiency grow in its place. the large the average level of the world.4  Additional measures and deeper China’s future development is the source of much pathways uncertainty when examining potential emission Dematerialization reduction pathways. Increase reliance on wind and so. especially labor and energy.China In case the magnitude of the measures discussed rate. the level of economic growth is largely uncer- the process of urbanization since large quantities of tain. countries. However. Deep decarbonization strategies can illustrative deep decarbonization pathway. saving and investment rate in the past three dec. In the future. of capital investment to produce output. the focal point in China is to adjust the industrial ades. emissions scenarios. especially lar energy in the power sector is possible. though through energy saving. shifting the structure of the economy towards less if the nuclear development is hindered in the future. Challenges. For example. which means there scale of the Chinese market. leading to different ly high level while reducing the investment rate. some alternative ap. The maintain urban infrastructure. opportunities. varying from 5% to 10%. in line with China’s development strategy power plants are newly-built with efficient super- to grow “strategic emerging industries. and for ener- Structural change gy-intensive industries the efficiency gap compared China’s growth has been characterized by a high to developed countries is low (10%-20%). Notably. This expected variation will have a significant Technology innovation impact on the actual level of energy demand. the decline cannot depend on cost reductions and diffusion of low-carbon energy incremental technology change. China’s economy will continue to devel- tensity and reuse of waste construction materials. especially cement 18th CPC National Congress has projected that the and steel. and 2. and learning-by-doing can help accelerate intensity. Measures to decrease the demolition GDP growth rate will be around 7. reduce its saving and investment towards less heavy and chemical industry as well 91 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . because China’s options. of which contribute to this gain in productivity through: 1) nuclear power represents a share of 31%. production economies is a significant opportunity for reductions in energy of scale. The average Chinese growth rate has been a construction materials will be required to build and little more than 10% in the past twenty years. new energy storage solutions or enough natural gas power units to manage the resource intermittency. op at a relatively high speed.Therefore. and increase the share of consumption in its above is less than assumed. and 3) increase the produc- it largely depends on the possibility of developing tivity of other factors.5  enabling conditions 2.g. The early deployment of key mitigation technolo- The second aspect is future adjustments to industrial gies can help China follow a deeper decarbonization structure and changes in the mode of development.

the issues of and fiscal taxation system. Although China’s energy how to adjust and how to identify the degree and price remains high in developing countries. the price intensity of the adjustment have great uncertainties. by burning coal. domestic environmental quality. 25% of energy is used China has established 7 pilot emissions trading for the production of export products in China. the reached 10. as is practical and reliable compa- The reduction of CO2 emissions is not only a re- ny-level measurements. The not an easy task. losses. reporting. The reform be an increase of 1 percentage point in the urban. China as less production of energy-consuming products moted. price system and fiscal and financial field. there may does great damage to the environment. exports are an important factor in the econ. Furthermore. The central and western regions need to coal mining causes the collapse of areas that have be redesigned and readjusted so as to draw more been mined. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 92 . conventional evaluation mechanism of officials must be revised. A careful design is key for the success of China’s ETS. such as sulfur dioxide.6  Near-term priorities electricity sector. but it also leads to slag pen- off between GDP growth highly dependent on etration and deposition. opment must be changed among all cadres. Reduce coal consumption Methods for reducing the use of coal have many Change the concept of development synergistic effects. the reduction of coal Deepen the energy reform consumption is essential for China to improve The reform of the energy sector needs to be pro. of resource taxes and the proposal of a carbon tax ization rate each year. must be considered in energy policy. pollutants. The current price demand of social development. but it also addresses the of emissions. and schemes (ETSs) at provincial and city levels with a given that adjustments of the structure of exports is view to establish a national ETS around 2020. Currently. and verification sponse to climate change. the strategy of linkage with these ETSs in the future. structure and pricing system is very reasonable. At the same time. The Substantial coal mining not only consumes a large central government should understand the trade- amount of water. and dust (including the thick fog and haze on the growth rate of GDP but should also look at weather in Beijing and Tianjin) are partly caused a comprehensive analysis of gain and loss. The area of subsidence in China has attention to climate change. This area of potential emission re- resemble the approach taken in the EU ETS and the ductions would benefit from further investigation. nitrogen ox- The promotion of a position should not only rely ides. According to estimates. If the coordination works well. especially in the 2. production of which significantly contributes Pricing Carbon to total emissions. including the reform of the price system like steel and cement. omy. The main way to improve the The guiding ideology and the concept of devel- domestic environment is to reduce coal mining. Therefore. An early stage of harmonization with urgent demand of developing the national econo- design of other international ETSs will facilitate the my. and so the exploitation of resources urbanization. The demand for of coal and electricity does not include the environ- steel and cement is very large in the process of mental cost. resulting in the serious resource industry and the cost paid for resources pollution of groundwater resources. Australian and Californian schemes. es- The third aspect is urbanization. climate change mitigation and sustainable devel- opment will lead to a win-win situation. along with the Finally.000 km2. manufacturing exports (and asso- future development of China’s ETS should build ciated emissions) are expected to remain important upon the experience gained in regional pilots and in the long run. Nevertheless. In addition. triggered by the pecially that of coal and electricity.

France was therefore on the verge of adopting a carbon tax for diffuse emissions Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 93 . Faced with this situation. France is today already a relatively low energy consumption country (2. rising to €200 (150-350) in 2050 as the implicit value of the constraints for reducing CO2 emissions entailed by the targets for 2020 and 2050. The experts who drafted the Quinet report in 2009 recommended a carbon tax set at a rate of €32 per ton of CO2 in 2010. Université Grenoble Alpes. which supplies 77% of the electricity produced and 24% of total final energy. France has developed a specific energy security strategy resorting notably to the launching of an important nuclear energy program in the 1970s. a deficit close to the total external trade deficit in 2012). Rocard 2009). Today. compared with 1990. France France Sandrine Mathy. Quinet 2013. In 2009.7 tCO2/cap). More recently the discussion on carbon taxation has given rise to several commissions and reports (Quinet 2009. CNRS. In the French policy debate. and sustainable development Centre International de Recherche sur France has a low endowment of domestic fossil resources (domestic l’Environnement et le Développement (CIRED) production represents less than 2% of primary consumption) and energy imports. mostly oil and gas.6 toe/cap) and has GHG emission intensities at the lowest end of OECD countries (5.1  Jean-Charles Hourcade. Université Grenoble Alpes. are a substantial source of total external trade deficit (these imports represent around 110 billion US$ (2012). PACTE-EDDEN 1 1 Country profile Patrick Criqui. As a result. France is in particular equipped with 63 GWe of installed nuclear capacity. decarbonization was first introduced in 2005 with the adoption of a Factor 4 emission reduction target for 2050. PACTE-EDDEN The national context for deep decarbonization 1. CNRS.

Between 70% and 75% of the GHG emis- generation. the highly controversial issue of nuclear energy a deliberative process between different groups beyond 2025. raising the G HG emissions in France amounted to share of EU energy consumption produced from 549 MtCO 2 eq and 392 MtCO 2 in 1990 (ex- renewable resources to 20%. and the 2. target set in sions are CO2 emissions (Figure 1 and Figure 2). combined with the threshold defining fuel poverty (expenditures ETS for large industries and electricity. which repre- in the economy has been steadily falling dur. which has through ambitious infrastructure deployment. extending their Three policy commitments structure the decar.France France (transport and building) that. on average. The 17% increase since 1990 has been served over the last 40 years (industry’s share mostly triggered by road transport. and 7% decrease.2 GHG emissions: current levels. LULUCF). down to 50% by 2025. in particular. in 2010. sents almost all the emissions from this sector. which represents 6% of the French population is below the almost all the emissions from this sector. ing the last 30 years from 25% in the 1980s The main sector for GHG emissions is the transport to 19% in the 2010s). Trade Unions. more than mostly triggered by road transport. nearly 30-year old and an intense MPs. decarbonization has been an important planning towards more sustainable patterns component of the Energy Transition. the reduction of energy poverty. been set as a priority by President François Hol. 2012 by President François Hollande Key challenges for the French economy and so. To investigate this issue. the constitutional council dismissed the towns spend on average 15% of their income law on the eve of its enforcement. In 2010 they were down to in the EU’s energy efficiency) 501 MtCO2eq and 366 MtCO2. which has LULUCF). objectives: EU 3x20 for 2020 targets (20% re. needs in a relatively low-density country. More 3. 20% improvement cluding LULUCF). The 17% increase since 1990 has been become a crucial issue as. low-income house- incentives through carbon prices in all sectors. the National De. for housing and transport. Mayors) aiming at identifying and assessing debate concerns the choice between upgrading the consequences of different scenarios. while it had on energy. emissions and 38% of CO2 emissions (excluding 2. would have on fuel and heating represent more than 10% provided a comprehensive system of economic of income). LULUCF induce negative emis- pared to 1990 (-75%) sions (-24 MtCO2eq in 1990 and -37 MtCO2eq in y yThe reduction of the share of nuclear in power 2010). holds living mostly in rural areas or in small However.6 million fall sector with 138MtCOe representing 27% of GHG of employment in industry. and past trends duction in EU GHG from 1990 levels. the rebuild of industrial competitiveness to emissions and 38% of CO2 emissions (excluding counterbalance the de-industrialization ob. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 94 . of stakeholders (NGOs. France’s nuclear power plants are. Business. them with new nuclear plants. drivers. a long term effort in directing land and urban recently. or replacing them al- bonization scenarios (or “energy transition trajec. Transport ciety that are directly or indirectly related to the The main sector for GHG emissions is the transport purpose of decarbonization include: sector with 138MtCOe representing 27% of GHG 1. service life in some cases. tories”) for France: y yEuropean targets to be translated into domestic 1. bate on Energy Transition took place in 2013 as 4. respectively a 9% y yFactor 4 reduction of emissions in 2050 com. This is in particular crucial to control mobility lande. already been voted upon by the parliament. together with other technologies.

at an even faster rate than GDP. Decomposition of GHG and Energy CO2 Emissions in 2010 1a. demand for freight transport has targets. the rise of mobil. and the ity. 1990 to 2010 2a. Energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors 15% Five-year variation rate of the drivers 400 MtCO2 392 389 405 414 366 10%  Other 300 5%  GDP per capita  Buildings 0%  Population 200  Transportation -5%  Energy per GDP 100 -10%  Energy Related  Industry CO2 Emissions 0  Electricity Generation 1995 2000 2005 2010 per Energy 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 95 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . Land Use Change. has also played an important role in the increase Energy efficiency improvements have also been sig. notably driven by a rise of the distance per cap. GHG emissions. According to the government’s levels.France In the passenger transport sector. the rise of emissions in 2010) that were only partially compensated by has been driven by a continuous rise of activity energy efficiency. rail share (from 27% in 1984 to 8% in 2010) and ficient to compensate for the rise of activity levels. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 2b. particularly in the last decade. indeed. has been the main source of sectoral emissions nomic crisis has only moderated this rise without increases. of carbon emissions. Energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and sectors 150 MtCO2 MtCO2 eq 371  Energy-related 125 emissions Electricity 21  Processes 100 (Allocation by End Use Sector) 506 93  Agriculture 75 14  Waste 50 Total MtCO 2  Natural Gas 100 6  Fugitive 25 -37  Petroleum Products 224 0  Coal 43 Electricity Generation Transportation Other LULUCF Industry Buildings (Land Use. The evolution of the modal breakdown remained stable at an 80% share for individual cars. and Forestry) 34 90 138 94 10 366 Figure 2. with a continuous decline of nificant. notably because modal breakdown has reversing it. Decomposition of historical energy-related CO2 Emissions. partial decoupling observed since the 2008 eco- ita. (+57%). by source 1b. Figure 1. the domination of road (84% of freight transport In the freight transport sector. rail and water transport modal share has increased very fast over the 1990-2008 period to reach 25% in 2022 compared to 14% in 2007. but not suf.

results obtained with the IMACLIM-France mod. structural to the weight of nuclear. 2 2 National deep decarbonization pathways Illustrative deep 2. or waste heat. and The residential and tertiary sector represents 19% technical progress has permitted significant re- of GHG emissions. ductions of the CO2 content of production (e.1  High-level characterization gram and a diversification of low-carbon energy The assessment of the Illustrative Deep Decar. by 8%. see http://www.imaclim. -17% and -27% for of electricity production. Energy efficiency sions. The main drivers for the significant power sector because of the contribution of nu- decrease in emissions between 1990 and 2010 clear (77%) and hydro (11%) energies. On average. bio- bonization Pathway for France is based on the energy and renewables. Important decarboniza. duction driving the emission rate from 1. sources of emissions include land fertilization sive thermal regulations for new buildings and to (46%) and enteric fermentation (27%). (excluding hydro) currently represents only 2% ergy-intensive industries (e. in milk production inten- Industry sification and in the size of cow livestock. Between the introduction of fiscal incentives for thermal 1990 and 2010 GHG emissions have decreased Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 96 . notably triggered by the European European average 347 gCO2/kWh. Major notably thanks to the implementation of succes. developed at CIRED. a 42% fall since 1990.centre-cired. half of it being due Power to the drop of industrial production over the last France is characterized by low emissions in the three years. and its increase has been driv.1. and methane being major contribu- improvements developed during the 1980s and tors (51% and 41% respectively) while CO2 from have been reinforced between 2000 and 2010 energy consumption represents only 8%. 1 This Illustrative Deep for France anticipate an average annual growth 1 For more information on the IMACLIM modelling platform. In particular. 1980s because of the electrification associated with the nuclear program. N2O. particularly because of the decrease in mineral fertilizing uses. and nowadays electric. en by demographic trends and a steady increase the diffusion of electric arc furnace for steel pro- in the per capita surface.g. Agriculture ity is one of the main carriers used for heating. France Buildings steel and cement production respectively). Agriculture represents 18% of total GHG emis- which is a French peculiarity.1  Decarbonization Pathway combines an overall decarbonization pathway ambitious energy efficiency improvement pro- 2. due Emission Trading Scheme. However. Industry represented 18% of GHG emissions in 2010. this is to be compared with the efficiency. are the overall decarbonization of the energy used current emissions in the power sector amount to in industry and further improvements in energy 62 gCO2/kWh. economic projections el.78tCO2/t tion of the energy consumption happened in the steel in 1990 to 1. renewable electricity evolutions have gone towards a decrease of en.g. carriers mobilizing electricity penetration.32tCO2/t steel in 2010). Between 2010 and 2050.

52 % -60%  Energy-related CO2 Emissions per Energy Pillar 3.0 1. Energy Pathways.0 0.02  Coal 0.42  Renewables & Biomass 0.85 . population is expected to increase by creasing by 20% in absolute terms.39  Natural Gas 0. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Drivers. Final Energy 4. sees its share 11%.40 EJ EJ 4.8%.26 0. although de. and the structure of the economy is sup.90 0. The development indicators and energy service demand drivers in France 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Population [Millions] 65 66 69 71 72 GDP per capita [$/capita] 33400 39400 45400 52500 61500 Figure 3.57 1. increasing from 24% to 39% in 2050.49 % 0. Energy efficiency Energy Intensity of GDP 80% 60% 2010 3.6 MJ/$ 40% 2050 0.22 0. and electricity.84 3.82 0.13 0. by a massive Table1.74 0. crucial for the transport sector.18  Oil 0.France of 1.02  Coal 2010 2050 2010 2050 Figure 4. The d ecrease of the carbon intensity of fu- The deep efficiency measures would reduce final els in end-use sectors is allowed by a division energy consumption by nearly 50 percent in 2050 by three of coal consumption and.  GDP per capita 0% Decarbonization of electricity Electricity Emissions Intensity  Population -20% 2010 62 gCO 2 /kWh  Energy per GDP -40% 2050 30 . The pillars of decarbonization 100% Ten-year variation rate of the drivers Pillar 1.50 % 4.96 2. even more compared to 2010. posed to be stabilized during the next decades.76 % 20% Pillar 2.74  Electricity 1.35 2.0 0.21  Nuclear 0. -80% Electrification of end-uses Share of electricity in total final energy -100% 2010 24 + 15 pt 2020 2030 2040 2050 2050 39 % 2010 2020 2030 2040 97 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .0 .0 . Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 4b. 2010 to 2050 4a.17  Liquids 0.60 3.0 1.0 1.0 2. by source 3a.68  Biomass 1.74 0. Primary Energy 3b.28  Gas 0 0 0.87 3.

electricity demand slightly decreases over 2010-2050 as a result of strong efficiency 450 gains in the energy system and a convergence 400 of net exports (30 TWh in 20 10) to zero by 366 2050. and other 100 3  Other non-hydro renewables produce 140TWh. 2010 to 2050 Energy supply Despite the deep electrification of energy con- 500 MtCO2 sumption. this is notably because of the assumption crease of the modal share of collective transport of constant structure of the economy which and soft modes alternatives (bicycles) is permitted assumes in particular a constant share of en. in particular. in 2010 to 71% in 2050. limitation of urban sprawling. second generation biofuels and biogas deep diffusion of renewable electricity—mostly represent.2  Sectoral characterization Figure 5. France 2. nuclear represents 25% of 150 138 production. 70TWh 68 15  Buildings and 14TWh respectively. 22% of liquid fuels and hydro. deployment for urban and local mobility and ii) Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 98 . the decrease of the share sources in the long term. while wind. Under this pathway. wind and PV—which increases from 17% 53% of gas.1. ancing of the network with high intermittent On the supply side. respectively. and in spite of an important techni- 19  Industry 0 34 9  Electricity Generation cal potential. but given the high initial mobility (remote working) and the deployment emission level transport still represents 30% of a functionality economy (car sharing systems). Power-generation technologies are deeply 350 10 . a 250 significant long-term decrease in nuclear share in the mix. a 30% in- (26%).81 % modified over the period towards a diversifi- 300 94 cation of energy carriers with. In parallel. photovoltaic. of nuclear (from 77% in 2010 to 50% in 2025 Other energy carriers are also deeply decar- and 25% in 2050) does n ot create a rise of bonized thanks to the diffusion of bioenergy: carbon emissions because it is accompanied by in 2050. Due to environmental 50 90 21  Transportation constraints. Industry becomes the which decrease the global demand for mobility second major emission contributor in 2050 particularly at local level. total passenger mobility of emissions remaining in 2050 comes from the is stabilized over the period notably thanks to a transport and industry sectors. buildings and electricity Transportation emissions are deeply decarbonized and the core In the transport sector. a significant increase of renewable 200 energy: in 2050. Combined-cycle gas t urbines are need ed to ensure both the transition between the decrease of nuclear and the full deployment of renewables and the bal- substitution of oil by gaseous fuels and biomass. by Sector. of 2050 CO 2 emissions. combined with the very important reductions are obtained over the development of new services for the reduction of 2010-2050 period. by i) organizational measures and infrastructure ergy-intensive industries. hydro production is considered to 2010 2050 remain stable around 60TWh. As for transport. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pathway.

Significant energy Buildings efficiency improvements are assumed: +50% for More than two thirds of the dwellings that will cars (2.2 62. Concerning trucks. fer more flexibility in uses (range extender and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles). Electricity 6c.0 EJ 22.0 200  Wind 1.France new investments in rail infrastructures and the Rail transport reaches 25% of freight transporta- retrofitting of existing rail infrastructures.1 60  gCO2/kWh 60  34. by Resource gCO2/MJ 80 Carbon intensity 60. the technology side. Energy Supply Pathways.8  50  40   40 20 1.000 retrofitting per year after 2020 in the ception or new technologies such as 3D printing. improvement through the thermal retrofitting of A decoupling of freight volumes and economic existing buildings is a crucial component of the activity driving a stabilization of freight demand decarbonization strategy. On tion in 2050 and water transport is developed. Pipeline Gas 400  Other 72. exist in 2050 are already built so that efficiency +40% for planes. major evolutions are energy versified to adjust to specific mobility segments efficiency improvements (reaching 30% in 2050) (hybrid electric and full electric vehicles) and of. and the switch to natural gas.0 gCO2/MJ 80  Other renewables  Biomass    60  300   Solar 2. A proactive strategy is in the medium and long term is obtained through necessary to address nearly all existing building better logistics and the development of eco-con. +20% for buses.0 0  Hydro 100 0.5    20  Biogas 0  Natural gas 600 TWh 10 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 0 500 6b. residential sector and 21 Mm2 in the commercial Figure 6.5 20 1.0 EJ 40 58. (600. motorization types are di.6  30 0. Liquid Fuels 99 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .5  Nuclear  Natural Gas  Biofuel 0 0  Coal  Oil 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 6a.5l/100km on average).

in the range of sid ers n o major change on the s truct ure of 600. combined with 30% become dominant heating fuels and specific elec.0 Grid 0.0  50   40 40 40 58.5 EJ 1. neither on final industrial -65% in the residential).4  25.” standards impose new buildings of biogas and of renewable energy. allel. energy mix. Buildings 7c.5 Grid  electricity  Solid biomass  electricity  Solid biomass  Liquid fuels  Liquid fuels  Liquid fuels 0  0  Pipeline Gas 0  Pipeline Gas Pipeline Gas  Coal Coal  2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 7a. the share of multi-dwelling buildings should which is obtained by the diffusion of optimized increase. This will require a com- Figure 7. industry remaining at a constant considered (-55% in the commercial sector and 20% share in GDP. correspond- ing to a pervasive penetration of the most energy 2.5 1.5  electricity 0.0 1. Transportation Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 100 . The major to consume less than 50 kWh/m2 in 2020 and to breakthrough specific to the industrial sector is reach zero energy consumption after 2020. a significant reduction of energy consumption. 2010 – 2050 Carbon intensity gCO2/MJ 70  gCO2/MJ 60  60 gCO2/MJ 60  50 50 69.1  30 30 30   20 20  20   10  10 10 21. inducing only a small increase in the per industrial processes (circular economy and in- capita surface.5 EJ 1. Industry 7b. tricity consumption is controlled by a 30% perfor- mance improvement for all appliances.3 1. France sector) and ambitious improvements per unit are production. In par.000 units per year.2  Assumptions efficient appliances currently available. the Industry retrofitting of existing buildings will have to be The Illustrative Decarbonization Pathway con.5 Grid 0. Electricity and off-grid renewables dustrial ecology principles). by Fuel. Additionally and con.3 0  0 0 EJ 10.0 1. While low or zero energy solutions may be rel- atively easily implemented in new buildings.8 33. implemented at a very large scale. Energy Use Pathways for Each Sector. the decrease of the carbon inten- sistently with the measures from the “Grenelle de sity being essentially due to the development l’Environnement. energy efficiency gains.

gas vehicles in France could be facilitated by its and define a set of minimum requirements to development in neighboring countries. and behavioral changes. age energy efficiency gains of 45%). the role of (Ardity et al. EFF for efficiency. or to a diversified set of energy carriers). and DEC for decarbonization implying 600. way may be questioned. a switch from indi- ized essentially thanks to power-generation re. 2012). the intensity After consideration of 16 pre-existing energy of some actions driving the pace and ultimate scenarios (from NGOs. energy efficiency improvements & Vidalenc. In particular. 15Mm 2 of commercial surface with an aver- way. This concerns particularly ble pathways: SOB for sobriety. y yIn the transport sector. and specific policy All these trajectories describe a plausible deep measures to overcome legal and regulatory barriers. the National Debate on Energy energy decarbonization in the Illustrative Path- Transition in 2013 identified four families of possi. to renewables. (at least 20%) and optimization of industrial processes These common features provide a robust identifi- Alternative pathways and pathway 2. Factor 4 emission reduction target (SOB and EFF nation of land and urban planning. the development transport and important efficiency gains in of all these sources being in line with available vehicles (at least 50%) assessments of their potentials for 2030 (Tanguy y yIn industry. technological breakthroughs are not (at least 300. Technolog. the retrofit of the whole building stock by 2050 DIV for diversity. energy production is highly decarbon. The common features among these four pathways brid electric. since they all reach the The transport pathway is supported by a combi. plug-in hy. decarbonization pathway. efficiency Finally. innovations in materials and control instruments). and by the pro.000 annual retrofits. or potentials of energy demand reduction and of public agencies).. replac- bonization of the French energy system along two ing the conventional car (electric vehicles. of new technologies. to leave more flexibility on other GHG gases) and ical innovation is also decisive to promote smart the Illustrative Deep Decarbonization Pathway be- logistics and support the diffusion of alternative longs to the EFF family. capacity building in the industry. the optimization of industrial practices (cir. motorization types (hybrid electric. in particular: gressive deployment of biogas combined with the y yIn the building sector: a deep retrofit of build- decrease in gas consumption for heating. However. This concerns already adopting this technology. and natural gas vehi. vidual cars and trucks to rail and collective newables. or academic research. including biofuels. which are reach the Factor 4 overall target. although each supposes different cles). full electric. a phase cular economy and industrial ecology principles) out of oil product uses for heating and sys- is the key option to decouple energy use and tematic improvements of appliances’ energy carbon emissions from production.3  cation of the key dimensions of the decarboniza- robustness tion strategies for France. biogas and biofuels. hybrid 101 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . are numerous. the mix but consistent alternatives for the deep decar. the development of natural ambition levels for sector by sector developments.000 units in the residential and central to the Illustrative Decarbonization Path. ings with important efficiency improvements In industry.France bination of technical advancements (incremental dividing lines: the level of demand and the energy innovations in the building practices and radical mix (between a priority to nuclear. 2012). organizational even reach more ambitious reductions of carbon innovations. Each describes contrasted biogas as an important combustion fuel.

integrate the constraints and be adjusted in due y yCarbon capture and storage: significant stor- time. but play a central role the extra investment by decreases in the energy in alternative scenarios presented above. a higher level of decarbon. such pathway then offers a solution if it appears that the implementation of Implementation of a carbon tax an EFF-type trajectory does not allow to reach One of the most important instruments to trigger the deep decarbonization trajectory because of the necessary changes in technologies and behav- unexpected barriers and difficulties in mobilizing iors for the energy transition is the implementa- energy efficiency potentials. tion of a price signal through carbon taxation. particularly sue. Even Some technical options are not considered in if the energy transition will more than compensate the Illustrative Pathway. tions (notably CCS). then the decarbonization strategy should energy for transportation. well as high final level for renewable electricity. development. Whatever the energy pathway. or be transferred as a lump sum to tion proves to be optimistic for future nuclear households. If th is assump. Challenges. can be used to supply heat for buildings biomass and waste heat. and finally the introduc. particularly in industry. in the sense that associated with the capacity of the agricultural it is not the most robust given its dependence sector to develop an important bio-energy supply upon the availability of a vast set of not cur. more renewable energies can be mobilized for electricity production reorienting Financing the energy transition the scenario in a SOB-type trajectory. although a sensitive is- more of other decarbonized sources. one of the main y yMethanation: synthetic methane from a recom. and industry. heat and a catalyzer can be used as storage Should these targets prove to be too difficult to capacity in gas network and as a non-carbon attain. notably: bills of households and industries. France vehicles. diversified mix – trajectory would provide such an alternative pathway resort. and NGV) and the rapid scaling-up as tion). A DIV – i. energy substitution.4  Additional measures and deeper (the building retrofitting program only would re- pathways quire between 20 bn€ and 30 bn€ each year). with second generation biofuels and biogas for rently commercially available technological op. lack of short-term profitability of energy transi- Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 102 . the energy tran- sition would require very large investments amounting to around 2. It is worth Bio-energy supply noting that a DIV-type trajectory can be consid. tion of carbon capture and storage. To compensate for weaker reduction in final age capacity in the North of France could store energy consumption.5  ing to less ambitious assumptions on efficiency enabling conditions but still reaching deep emission reductions thanks to more low-carbon supply in due time.000 bn€ over the period 2. development. relies on the assumption of an economic com. particularly the more vulnerable ones. 40 MtCO2/year from 2040 mainly for industry. and 2. The Illustrative Deep Decarbonization Pathway which could be used to lower taxation on labor. to finance energy efficiency and renewable energy petitive nuclear in the fut ure. ization could be sought with more nuclear and y yNuclear cogeneration.e. barriers to finance the energy transition is the bination of carbon dioxide (from fuel combus. opportunities. hydrogen (from renewable electricity). A crucial challenge for the Illustrative Pathway is ered as a “second-best” pathway.

lization.a. exist: orienting household savings. gy objectives newable resources in function of specific uses. creating Stability in climate policy orientations an entity for the financing of the energy transi. car industry. governance. industrial strategies for low carbon technologies icies at the urban or municipality levels. With around 10% of active population significantly slowed down and the 20% target currently unemployed. the acceptability of energy for renewable energy development in 2020 may transition is conditioned upon credible answers for become unattainable. as road freight transport. foster resource mobi- accounts (1. and social efficiency of public policies. national proposals for triggering the financing capabilities policies could leverage existing local experiments. local credibility and acceptability of national policies. and collective transports.” Several empowering local governance systems. between private discount rates (typically 10-15% land planning. 103 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . New skills will official objectives have been observed notably have to be developed (for thermal retrofitting for for wind and photovoltaic policies: administra- instance) at a very large scale and as rapidly as pos. economic development and train- p. infra. Regional and economic competitiveness issues. by as the major cause of the “efficiency gap. and also social pol. optimizing local re. and engage local stakeholders. construction. many other local policies: urban planning. show objectives are also of paramount importance for that concrete actions already happen at local numerous reasons: leverage effect of EU objec- level. As a result. feasibility Concrete examples of energy transition actions Ambitious EU and international climate ener- such as building retrofitting. or more) and social discount rates (2-6% p. such as saving accelerate policy responses. Energy issues are indeed directly linked to tives and induced directives on national policies.France tion investments for private agents: the difference authorities are already in charge of transportation.) ing. wind and PV d evelo pment have ar energy.a. The implementation a professional transitions in these sectors. some govern- potentials in renewable energy. Further. of consumers and econ omic agents in their low-carbon investment decisions. housing . creating a public bank such as the KfW in Germany for the thermal retrofitting of buildings. the feed-in tariffs programs will be needed for jobs in activities such for photovoltaic are revised every 3 months. pre-established increasing carbon price would be central for a full environmental and economic Local authorities. or in nucle.. Ambitious EU and international climate energy developing networks for heat or for gas. a medium to Professional transitions and formation long-term stability of climate policies is need- Employment has become a very central issue of ed. Although this target has been unopposed the energy transition debate. by any stakeholder group since its very first ies of the energy transition in France conclude to introduction by the Mission Interministérielle a positive assessment with massive job creation pour l’Effet d e Serre in 2003. Participatory processes are also an element has since a long time been identified everywhere of acceptability of energy transition. Quantitative stud. and on a legal target in 2005 is an important catalyst the development of renewable energies) with a for climate policies by stabilizing expectations guarantee from the State. tive decisions impose new constraints on wind sible. since 2011.300 bn€). occupational retraining development and. mental decisions apparently contradictory to structures. in low-carbon investments. On the other hand. wastes. The long term Factor 4 objective that became tion (focusing on the retrofitting program. transports.

72p.. In addition. E. France 2. Rapport newable Electricity Potentials in de la commission présidée par France: A Long Term Perspective.a. z z Quinet. Rapports tique. Volume 20. M. but face strong be rapidly implemented. conférence des experts et de la tiques de la France ? Rapport du table ronde sur la contribution groupe de travail n°2 du conseil Climat et Energie. Rapport de la respect des engagements clima. Alain Quinet. 2013. Rapport de Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 104 . 354 p.. Stratégique. Re- tutélaire du carbone. M. 2012. publics. La docu- national sur la transition énergé. increasing rate (in the range of 4-5% p. 424 p. renewa ble energy d evelo pment and the im. La valeur z z Tanguy H. dans le z z Rocard. 2012. France References z z Ardity. 2012. be conceived to support in particular the massive These two actions are crucial for any deep de.6  Near-term priorities can increase the social and political desirability Near-term sectoral priorities should focus on of these measures. et al... specific financing mechanisms must plementation of the building retrofitting plan. Commissariat Général à énergétique en 2025 ? Quels la Stratégie et à la prospective. Pages 247-257. L’évaluation socio-économique des inves- tissements publics. ments N°16. types de scénarios possibles à Rapports et documents. 2009. Rapports et docu. retrofitting program and a carbon price has to carbonization pathway in France. the opment of specific skills that are not current. 2009. Quelle la mission présidée par Émile trajectoire pour atteindre le mix Quinet. Centre d’Analyse Energy Procedia. level of the social discount rate).. A. even at a low level inertias (both because they are associated to during the first years.. 84 p. but with a pre-established long-lived infrastructure and require the devel. z z Quinet. In addition. these actions have strong that has been already identified as consistent potential positive effects on employment that with the policy targets. Vidalenc. mentation Française. which make early development reach a level near to the 100 €/tCO 2 in 2030 crucial. in order to ly available). horizons 2030 et 2050.. E.

Germany. equaling 8. in parallel 1 with a complete phasing out of nuclear energy by 2022 (from its 22% share of 2010 electricity generation). Eight nuclear power plants in Germany were shut down in 2011.’ translates notably into the ambitious objective of reducing CO2-emis- sions in 2050 by at least 80% compared to 1990 levels (a more ambitious reduction target of 95% being also envisaged). the challenge is further com- plicated by two additional objectives: energy security and energy affordability (especially for the private consumer). Dialogik to deeply transform its energy system across all sectors of the econ- Ortwinn Rehn. Coal-fired power plants still play a dominant role (producing 45% of total generation). This transformation of electricity generation sources is therefore a sig- nificant challenge.6 GW at the end of 2012. and safe. known as the ‘Energiewende. In parallel. Beyond these technological changes. installed capacity of renewable energy reached 75. Dialogik omy with the goal of making the system highly efficient. decided Piet Sellke. which together Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 105 . Germany Germany 1 1 Country Profile The National Context for Deep Decarbonization 1.4 GW and the remaining nuclear power plants still represent 16% of production in 2012. with its substantial diffusion of renewable energy in parallel with the replacement of nuclear energy.1  and Sustainable Development In 2010. renewable. one of the largest economies in the world. This energy transformation. and gas power plants produce 12% of total generation. representing 23% of electricity produc- tion (where the largest contribution came from wind energy at 8% of total production).

1. creased until the early 2000s and then decreased oped to measure the progress and success of the to the present. and it (Figure 2a). The second from coal and significant efficiency improvements monitoring report was recently published.and end-energy pro. the largest share of CO2 emissions. transportation and buildings ernance structure for this transition. use sectors – industry. – contribute nearly equal levels of CO2 emissions. continuously measure the imple- deep diffusion of renewable energy sources. coal is responsible for because of Germany’s federal system. Since 1990. Several studies report that Germany does in fact have the potential to reach these goals GHG Emissions: Current Levels. These decreases have been pos- objectives. gross-end-power-consumption primarily from fuel switching and efficiency gains. biomass. it was neces. y yPower plants: share of heat-power-systems on Electricity emissions have decreased moderately. the federal govern. reaching a high of 9. ported by the inquiries of the commission on the tives. Overall. with energy-related emissions consti- energy efficiency. fossil power plants are still necessary ductivity of the economic system to provide reliable service.7 tCO2/capita Beyond technological innovation and diffusion.Germany Germany with climate (and environmental) protection are The monitoring of the federal government. end-use (of ‘final’) energy consumption sources. given mentation of the energy policies and objectives the objective that they provide 60% of end-use in these areas.and the industrial and buildings have been the sectors. Although energy Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 106 . energy consumption and 80% of electricity gener- ation in 2050. because of the intermittency of by source. decreased despite economic growth due to the ment initiated a new process called ‘energy of the combination of the transformation of the East future’ to constantly assess the implementation of German economy after 1990. The largest emissions reductions have occured in ble energies on the gross-end-energy. with a con. ent among them. However. followed by industrial and the innovative potential of the energy transition is agricultural processes (Figure 1a). Notably there was a continuous de- relies on indicators that synthetize the statistical crease in coal combustion while natural gas in- data from various energy sources that were devel. After an initial phase of doubt. followed by sary to launch several coordinating bodies to bring petroleum products and natural gas (Figure 1b). were dominated by the coal-intensive current activities associated with the Energiewende electricity generation system while the three end- focus on implementation of the required new gov. y yRenewa ble energy: share of the renewa. together actors from different levels of government. The primary indicators include: sible primarily because of increased reliance on y yEnergy supply: primary energy consumption by electricity generation from renewable energy re- source.2  with renewable energy by relying on a diverse mix Drivers and Past Trends of energy sources such as wind power. Energy-related currently accepted by German industry. a transition away each step towards the final objectives. the net-power production even as load has grown. certed effort to integrate a diversity of views on although the structure of fossil fuels is very differ- the energy transformation pathways. The level of G HG-emissions in 20 10 was and photovoltaic as well as a strong emphasis on 947 MtCO2e. tovoltaics. due to the decarboniza- y yGrid: investments in networks tion of generation (Figure 2b). sup- referred to as the ”energy policy triangle of objec. in 2010. tuting the largest source. CO2 emissions.” A crucial aspect of this transformation is the Energiewende. Specifically. energy-related CO2 emissions have To monitor the transformation. gross-power consumption renewable resources such as wind and solar-pho- y yEnergy efficiency: primary.

oecd. Instead. by source 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 107 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . economic savings are a major fac- efficient products is most likely the primary cause tor for increasing energy efficiency and decreasing of reduced energy use. given that consumers have consumption patterns. it is the same time as they are replacing old less effi- uncertain whether this led to a behavioral change cient products (the “rebound effect”). global report available at: http://www.dlr. In industry. GHG emissions.pdf Based on IEA(2012): IEA. the use of more on the contrary.5%.2012 edition » Figure 2. Decomposition of historical energy-related CO2 Emissions. « Energy balances of OECD countries. Energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and sectors 40 MtCO2 MtCO2 eq 792  Energy-related 35 emissions 30 Electricity 72  Processes (Allocation 25 by End Use Sector) 946 68  Agriculture 20 15  Waste Total MtCO2 15  Natural Gas 273 10  Petroleum Products 206 0  Coal 301 Electricity Generation Transportation Other Industry Buildings 309 159 149 163 0 780 Source: BMU(2011): “Long-term scenarios and strategies for the deployment of renewable energiesin Germany in view of European and global developments”. in energy consumption. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers industry is also the largest continued to purchase additional appliances at consumer of electricity with a share of 43. 1990 to 2010 2a. Figure 1. Decomposition of GHG and Energy CO2 Emissions in 2010 1a.Germany prices for individual households did increase. Energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors 20% Five-year variation rate of the drivers 1200 MtCO2 15% 10%  GDP per capita 1000 990 878 5%  Population 800 835 810  Other 779 0%  Energy per GDP  Buildings -5% 600 -10%  Transportation  Energy Related 400 -15% CO2 Emissions  Industry -20% per Energy 200 1995 2000 2005 2010  Electricity Generation 1990 1995 2000 2005 0 Source: Based on OECD database (http://stats.

3 tCO 2 /cap). from 81 to 69 million.6  Biomass 2.1  to 2% in 2050) in parallel with a rapid and strong Decarbonization Pathway diffusion of renewables and biomass satisfying more than half of total energy needs in 2050 2.43% 3. Table 1. as shown by a doubling of GDP per capita transportation).5 0.0 10.5 1. Germany 2 2 National Pathways to Deep Decarbonization Illustrative Deep 2.1.1  High-level characterization (Figure 3a).8  Liquids 3. The development indicators and energy service demand drivers in Germany 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Population (Million) 81 79 77 73 69 GDP per capita (US $/capita.0 3b. resid ential. Energy Pathways. 25%. Final Energy 14.110 52.0  Nuclear 2.48 % 1. from a notable decrease of population between 2010 9.026 43. private households.7  Oil 2.0 . and of energy used with a significant reduction of transportation are responsible for 48%.5 5. 33% in commercial and 40% in crease.7 5.7 3. biomass in end-use energy (Figure 3b). by a rising importance of electricity.949 35.0 5. which is will largely stay the same until 2050. These trends are accompanied over this time period (Table 1).1 9.8  Renewables & Biomass 0.5 7.1  Coal 2010 2050 2010 2050 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 108 .8  Gas 0 0 0.1 7. corresponding and 2050. On the other to a decrease in all end-use sectors (47% in hand.309 31. In parallel. Primary Energy EJ 15.5  Natural Gas 3.4 0. 2010 value) 27.5 12.2  Coal 0.5 1.2 EJ in 2050. and coal (from 25% of total primary energy in 2010 27% of final energy consumption.0 . and For the illustrative deep decarbonization path. a significant decrease of Forecasts based on demographic trends predict final energy consumption is experienced.3 7.217 Figure 3. respectively.5 EJ 1.4 2. heat.0  Electricity and Heat 4.1 EJ in 2010 to 5.5 0. by source 3a.1 0. way.3 10. GDP is expected to see a significant in. energy-related CO 2 emissions decrease to The share of different sectors in energy consumption 154 MtCO 2 in 2050 (2.2 3. where (com- attributed to significant change in the structure mercial and heavy) industry.

600 able energy. in electricity generation and industry.  Population Decarbonization of electricity Electricity Emissions Intensity -20% 2010 457 gCO 2 /kWh  Energy per GDP -40% 2050 37 . energy-intensive production. The pillars of decarbonization 60% Ten-year variation rate of the drivers Pillar 1. Electrification of end-uses Share of electricity in total final energy -80% 2010 21 + 6 pt 2020 2030 2040 2050 2050 27 % 2010 2020 2030 2040 109 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . Energy efficiency Energy Intensity of GDP 40% 2010 6.68 %  GDP per capita 0% Pillar 2. as measured by the 68% de. 284 55  Transportation 100 All sectors experience a deep reduction of their 36  Industry 0  emissions between 2010 and 2050 (Figure 5). 2010 to 2050 4a. a key aspect in industry 62% decrease of the CO 2 emissions intensity is structural change through a shift away from of energy by 2050. 21 Electricity Generation 2010 2050 which is achieved without a decrease in indi- vidual comfort or economic development and Figure 4. whereas the latter is permitted by the combination of Figure 5. 2010 to 2050 fossil energy sources (see discussion above).4 MJ/$ 20% 2050 2.92 %  Energy-related CO2 Emissions -60% per Energy Pillar 3. equal importance in the overall d ecrease of Emission reductions are particularly important CO 2 emissions. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Drivers.80% 700 carbon intensity dro pping to 37 gCO 2 /kWh 163 due primarily to increased reliance on renew.Germany Figure 4a shows that the decarbonization of conducted in such a manner that they give pos- fuels and energy efficiency are two drivers of itive impulses for the economic development. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 4b. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pathway. a 800 MtCO2 779 decarbonization of electricity. The former effect is triggered by significant im- provements in all economic activities. and the rise in electrification to 500 172 displace the combustion of fossil fuels (electri- 400 fication of end-uses increases to 27% in 2050) 158 (Figure 4b). three factors: an end-use fuel switch away from by Sector. beyond crease of the energy intensity of GDP and the technological aspects. which sees its 2 . These two effects are sufficient to 300 ensure a steady decrease of emissions despite  Other 200 154 42  Buildings continuous economic growth.0 .

Energy Supply Pathway for Electricity Generation. fossil  Biomass fuels are progressively replaced by low-carbon ener- 400  Solar gy sources for heating needs. changes in the fuel mix lead to a halving of the carbon intensity of industrial energy. In particular. In addition. leading to a significant 300 decrease in the carbon intensity of building energy. existing build- 600 ings will be aggressively renovated to new efficien- cy standards and new buildings will be built with 500  Other renewables ambitious low-carbon standards. in the illustrative deep decarbonization pathway in. playing an impor- Power tant role in the near-term by providing 25 percent In the power sector. As there is only a is insufficient wind and solar resource to support moderate decrease in electricity demand during this the load. To reach this level of decarbonization 700 TWh  0 in a sector with slow stock turnover. This is possible stability due to the intermittent nature of the wind due to a substantial decrease in energy demand and solar resources. Note that this is a national-scale vision. A majority of the growth comes from onshore and offshore wind.  400 Buildings 300 The buildings sector (in which private households  200 make up almost 60% of the consumption) expe-  37 100 riences a 73% decrease of carbon emissions from  2010 to 2050. Industry while a smaller but still substantial contribution is As part of this decarbonization pathway. Figure 6. the in- made by solar photovoltaics (Figure 6). in the south of Germany there coal-fired power stations by 2050. dustrial sector experiences the most significant al power plants fueled by natural gas (at 16% of reduction of all end-use sectors (a 77 percent re- generation in 2050) are still required to support grid duction between 2010 and 2050). Convention. Additionally.2  Sectoral trajectories and measures to the electricity generation mix. a substantial amount of new renewable to support such a high level of penetration.  Wind 200 Transportation 100  Hydro Passenger transport represented 71% of total ener-  Nuclear 0  Natural Gas gy consumption from transportation in 2010. combined heat and (a 33 percent reduction between 2010 and 2050) power systems fueled by natural gas will contribute resulting from efficiency gains and a restructuring of industrial processes towards low-energy activi- ties. by Source due to a nearly complete phase-out of coal and oil as well as a substitution of electricity for natural 453 gCO2/kWh 500 gas in activities where it is possible (Figure 7a). the transformation envisaged of generation in 2020. Additionally. energy is required to serve the load. and re- cludes the rapid phasing out of nuclear power (just source availability is not uniform across the coun- after 2020) and the long-term closing of almost all try. Germany 2. and  Coal this subsector experiences the most drastic drop 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 in energy needs (a reduction of 55% between 2010 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 110 . so upgrades to the grid will be needed time period.1.

0 1. the decarbonization freight transport.1 48. The personal vehicle fleet will see large effi.5 1. (CCS). biofuels. an increase in Deep Decarbonization the use electric and hydrogen-fueled vehicles and The transformation of the energy sector in Ger- a partial modal shift. pathway requires a significantly greater reliance Also note that biofuels become important for on renewable resources given the expected tri- (passenger and freight) air transport.0 1.5 2.0  30  30  30    20  20 36. out of nuclear power by 2022.0 EJ 4. However.5 3.1 gCO2/MJ 50 gCO2/MJ 50 67.Germany and 2050) due to a transformation in personal mo.5 2. 2010 to 82 GW in 2050) and the quadrupling of Figure 7. ergy in Germany in 2012 (at 12.6% of elec- all of which contribute to the decarbonization of tricity generation. 2010 – 2050 Carbon intensity   gCO2/MJ 60 45.5  Biofuels  Liquid fuels  Pipeline gas  Petroleum 0  Pipeline gas 0 0 Products  Coal  Coal  Pipeline gas 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 7a.4% of total final ket and electricity-fueled trains increase in use.5  Hydrogen  Grid electricity 1. Buildings 7c. meeting pling of installed wind capacity (from 27 GW in 35% of energy demand for this mode in 2050.0 2. is the phasing to increase slightly between 2010 and 2030 be. Given that ring the use of carbon capture and sequestration GDP almost doubles over this period.0 10 10 3.0 2. bar- fore decreasing to 2010 levels by 2050.5 0 0 0 3.5  Liquid fuels 0.5  Grid electricity and heat 1.0  Grid electricity  Solid biomass  Solid biomass 0. by Fuel. In renewables were the second largest source of en- addition.5 0.5 3. energy demand is expected of the decarbonization pathway.3 20 4. As a result. policy decision. this repre.0 and heat 1.0 EJ 10 23.0 2. which helps to define the nature For freight transport.2  bility.0 3. Technical Options 2. Transportation 111 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .0 3. this decision places an emphasis on energy sents a significant decoupling of freight transport efficiency and a reliance on renewable resources.5 2.6  50   40  40  40  23. The increased use of electric many is ongoing and many fundamental decisions vehicles.0 EJ 4. A core significant decrease in carbon intensity of fuels. which is possible though The long-term plan to substantially develop re- improved truck efficiency and a reorganization newable energy resources is on track given that of the production and distribution processes. and economic activity. and hydrogen also leads to a have already been made in the recent years. hydrogen-fueled trucks enter the mar. energy consumption) and represent 23. and Assumptions for National ciency gains across all vehicle types. Energy Use Pathways for Each Sector. Industry 7b.

which substantial investments (around 3. reducing the need for long-range electric cantly expanded. a highly unlikely.000 GWh per year in nuclear power plants were to continue producing 2050. from 1% annual efficiency improvements gies at the pace supposed in the Illustrative Pathway at its current rate to 2% per year as needed under (fossil energies drop from 62% in 2010 to 33% in deep decarbonization. the decar. assuming a significant decrease in costs (44% and 71% decrease in the cost per kWh produced for Alternative Pathways 2. non-intermittent renewables. could also be investigated. In principle.4  an industry that can undergo fast diffusion in the Pathways short-term to realize annual sales of one million The deployment of CCS in addition to the tech- electric cars in 2020. there needs nologies proposed in the Illustrative Pathway Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 112 . Given and Pathway Robustness such decreased costs. especially for commuters. in new transmission lines to link the load to the The robustness of the pathway may also be ques- generation. This is notable in the industrial sector. such as geothermal. transport. in particular at the European level. Innovations are urgently needed in urban depends not only upon national strategies but development for novel transportation solutions. al-scale deployment of renewables.5 billion euros requires development at the city level (notably per year on average from 2010 to 2050) when in terms of urban infrastructure). of the energy system. where technical constraints on the processes may In the buildings sector. 2050 of total end-use). since the highest potential for wind tioned by the deep changes in the energy mix in end- generation is located in the northern part of Ger. Another – more acceptable – al- mittency of renewables and increase the flexibility ternative option would be the deployment of CCS. if reaching approximately 60.3  wind and solar photovoltaic respectively). which is not included in the pathway but could it will be important that the federal government allow for decarbonization with continued use of takes on a coordinating role. given the strong political and cluding storage facilities to complement gas-fired societal commitment to nuclear phase-out this is power stations needed to help manage the inter. many and significant load is located in the south. Additionally. it is acknowledged that the buildings sector magnitude of these effects without additional net is one of the most important to achieve the overall CO2 emissions. Other sources of to achieve the long-term objective of a nation. requiring significant investments. commuters to cities can be steered away The electrification of passenger transportation is from individual car transport towards shared public also crucial. to decrease the ovations. objectives and that new standards are needed. question given the fairly high share of intermittent biomass is expected to play a large role in the plan. employed in the industrial sector. Although there is no common. Finally. However. The deployment of electric cars vehicles. and current progress must be signifi. the rate for energy-related ren. but further analysis of bonization strategy needs to invest significantly the technical potentials is needed. Furthermore. To achieve these objectives. in. use sectors. Germany solar photovoltaic capacity (from 17 GW in 2010 to be an increase in the use of public transport to 67 GW in 2050). electricity beyond 2022. requires international cooperation. renewables in the electricity mix. Finally. in order coal or gas-fired power plants. there will be substantial The robustness of the pathway could be called into incentives for innovation and investment. This in turn would require instead of cars. to ensure a development of Additional Measures and Deeper 2. the proposed pathway Substantial investments are also needed in the could accept more modest deployment of wind transmission and distribution electricity grid. and solar. limit the magnitude of overall energy efficiency and ovations will need to double in order to achieve the of the substitution of fossil fuel by low-carbon ener- objectives. CCS could be a solution ly agreed upon definition for the specific required ren.

with citizen initiatives forming medium-term.5  and how those costs are distributed across the Conditions entire society.Germany could further decrease emissions from the indus. havior would also require social science research the social consequences of the planned energy to complement natural and engineering sciences transformation need to be taken into account. wind power creates problems in many are not changed constantly but consistent for the communities. A crucial example is the Renew- trial sector and drive CO2 emissions close to zero ables Energies Act (EEG) guaranteeing the price by mitigating emissions from the natural gas-fired for power from renewables for the producer hence power stations. it must be noted emissions (e. ambiguous incentives and objectives need to be debate continues surrounding the best approach communicated to foster trust in the development to developing an energy system consistent with of sustainable energy markets. On a structural level. Finally. These emissions equal 21 MtCO2. 13% of the total. Similarly. intermittent renewable technologies construction. the state has currently not considered because of a lack of so- set some specific incentives to overcome market cial acceptance even though there has been no failures. when necessary. against the construction of wind farms in their The role of the state is important as long as energy neighborhood due to aesthetic and health con- prices do not reflect the true costs (economical cerns. which must be pursued and adjusted articulation discourse on technology trade-offs. the phasing out of ations. vironmental. Opportunities for behav. in 2050. nuclear power still receive support by the citizens. with the groundwork laid out now. the use of more efficient prod. routes face citizen’ initiatives that seek to prevent centralized. for lustrative Pathway) although they can significantly which the coordinating role of the federal gov- change overall energy consumption and provide ernment is necessary to articulate technical and options for reducing energy needs and carbon institutional aspects. that the European policy making process should ucts. en- for successful implementation. 113 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . Deep decarboni. notably. be found in the question of storage facilities. For stable rules and regulations of investments that example. in the renewables sector in particular to give room Behavioral changes towards lower-carbon lifestyles for a new holistic design of the electricity mar- have not been included extensively in the energy ket in the medium-term. implementation would require policy measures On the societal side. a clear framework is urgently Further challenges are the social acceptance of needed for all involved actors. Some technical options like CCS are will not make business sense. trade certificates are expected to have signifi- ioral changes need to be investigated. changes in traffic behavior with switching to be integrated with the national strategy. several issues need to be to encourage change. Un. This is public transport or heat and electricity efficiency notably the case for industry where European in private households). the planned energy transformation. It is important to consider the effects of new costs on households Challenges and Enabling 2. The current and past system was tricity transmission system from the north to the designed for centralized energy production and south of Germany faces opposition as all planned predisposes decision makers to believe that de. which could therefore reforms of the EEG can be tailored to future needs be largely abated through sequestration. Although its zation will be implemented by multiple gener. general concept and. leading to a massive investment into renewables. and climate policy. discussed and identified as challenges. and their cant impacts. the development of a new elec- and ecological). That also implies the different objectives of the transformation. An increased focus on be. research as technical solutions need public support without playing social policy against energy.g. Another example can transformation discourse (and therefore in the Il. First of all. Thus..

and if the a capacity management mechanism and energy energy generation of prosumers is fed into the storage facilities must been developed in the system in a transparent way.thus increas. which has to be accelerated a great deal to meet the 2022 objectives. rebound effects can counteract permitting the transport of renewable energy good intentions. increasing renovation work. e. This calls for conducting instruments must be set in place. from the north to the south. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 114 . energy market plays a pivotal role in the inter- ergy transformation does also mean that it must play of different generation sources. energy saving household goods are lic agreement.1% was without including citizens – a lesson nuclear power needed but only 1.g. Germany Thus. and to reach pub- for example. Rebound can occur in many ways. a challenge is to have citizens participate final energy intensity per unit of GDP has not in the energy transition in an appropriate way. Two cru- changes are often hard to implement through cial objectives are to adopt technical solutions goodwill alone. through dialogue. These questions need to saving standards for new buildings and buildings be addressed by social science research in order to under major renovation are necessary.e. Different proponents did not learn. example through solar photovoltaic). Therefore. and nological options and the interactions between monetary incentives. The implementation of several All of the following conditions are necessary for EU relevant guidelines is part of the program the effective transition of the energy system and to increase efficiency. the system needs to be more flexible in order to consumers and producers at the same time (for balance intermittent energy sources. To a large change consumption styles and to foster energy degree. even ignoring the fact that behavioral be a high priority for the next decades. Continued be independent of normative worldviews and efforts in research and development and incen- become an objective for societal development. including a wide public debate taking into account all tech. tives for investing in these energies must be and for this it must become more self-evident enforced. which they are supposed to replace . a successful implementation of the en. subsidies. Indeed. investigates neighborhood storage facilities that y yIncrease of grid construction: several laws and function like a bank. on the best often used in parallel with older household goods possible routing. Current research resources. action plans rely on a combination of efficient behavior. and research in the field call for short-term action: of energy efficiency is specifically subsidized. where an annual increase of 2.” i. y yBuildings: the implementation of higher energy ing energy consumption. financial instruments. speed of constructing power grids.6  Near-Term Priorities ciency standards. met expectations for the years 2008 through The energy transformation cannot be achieved 2012. if y yOptimization of the electric generation system: consumers of energy become “prosumers. y yEnergy efficiency: a crucial near – term priority of the planned energy transition is an increase in energy efficiency. which must However. where prosumers pay in regulations have been issued to increase the and withdraw the electricity they produce/need. regulations. for consumers to be part of it. these choices. this might increase near-term to facilitate the use of intermittent the willingness to participate. For example.1% was achieved. and regula- tion to foster the retrofitting of privately owned buildings and the implementation of high effi- 2. y yIncrease of renewable energy: flexibility of the In the end.

TERI University The National Context for Deep Decarbonization 1.9%. it does not imply that all the houses in these villages actually have access to electricity. While the last 3-4 years have seen a downturn in the GDP growth rate. and crop residue for cooking. dung. A significant proportion of households continue to use traditional fuels like firewood. 6% and 7.worldbank. while there has been significant progress on electrification of villages. TERI University and Sustainable Development Atul and reduce poverty through inclusive growth that increases equity in EG. India achieved a GDP growth rate of around 4. TERI large section of its population still lacks access to basic infrastructure (roads. Furthermore. providing improved education. and about 400 million people do not have adequate access to electricity2.ELC. Significant efforts need to be made towards providing farmers and businesses with better connectivity to markets. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 115 . the aspiration continues to be that of achieving a high growth rate over the next 1 This study does not reflect the views of few decades in order to increase the overall level of per capita income the Indian Government or Indian industry 2 http://data.8% during 1981-1991.ACCS. housing. India India 1 1 1 Country profile Ritu Mathur. education. housing. Further. and basic energy needs. infrastructure.ZS income distribution. even those that do have access often have intermittent and unreliable power supply. ade- quate health care services. TERI Development continues to remain the key consideration for India as a Aayushi Awasthy.1  Leena Srivastava. it is clear that India faces a huge challenge of providing its people with higher and better level of services. TERI ble energy forms. and social security across all segments of society. and health care facilities) and clean and relia- Ilika Mohan. Given that large unmet demands continue to exist. while attempting to contain the associated environmental implications. 1991-2001 and 2001-2011 respectively.

TERI Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 116 . socio-economic considerations. among the same group. as well as the lowest ency. With production of coking ogies that can provide a secure and sustainable and non-coking coal remaining around 50 MT and development path for the future. Continued fossil fuel use faces challenges in 1850 to 2011.nic. timated to have a potential of 148 GW while small tive Deep Decarbonization Path (DDP) identified in hydro has around 15 GW potential. suitability across regions and (estimated at 118 BT4) are not only of low quality applications.5 According to recent es. being and global environmental implications. is anyone listening ?.in/petstat. with crude oil India. energy resources have a relatively large potential in dia’s fossil fuel reserves are limited. On the other hand. timates.India India India is listed as the world’s aggregatively third and 50 BCM respectively during the last 4-5 years. as well as associated local at the median level among G20 countries. or economic factors. in 2010. While renewable In terms of the availability of energy resources.3 efficiencies of some of the new but it is also the world’s second increased. India’s coal reserves are vastly over stated. well below that of many developed economies. the exploration of the purely power has a potential of around 25 GW. In light of volatile and increasing fossil fuel India has the lowest current per-capita emis. concerns regarding energy security have in- per-capita historical responsibility reckoned from creased.coal. issues related to confidence in adoption of com- ical. and Can. Further. the share of renewables in total energy use and natural gas reserves estimated at around 760 is still small. relatively high costs compared to fossil fuel op- Around half of the country’s oil reserves and two. reliable studies exist at present. sto- Moreover. since not many facilitate the adoption of a mitigation trajectory. it is therefore in the country’s production. In. At present India is largely dependent on interest to tap opportunities wherein it could tran- fossil fuels. uncertainty regarding on-ground thirds of the natural gas reserves are offshore. due to several factors including the MT and around 1330 BCM respectively in 2012/13. mercially less established technological options. with renewable energy resources. terms of long-term domestic availability and energy the GHG intensity of India’s economy is virtually security considerations. prices. tidal. Large hydro is es- difficult challenge in trying to follow the Illustra. and but also inaccessible due of technological. 3 http://petroleum. India 500 MT respectively and domestic production of can avoid locking itself into inefficient infrastruc- crude oil and natural gas hovering around 40 MT ture and fuel choices that are import-intensive. geolog. In so doing. much of India’s proven coal reserves chasticity of supply. Biomass to this report. Australia. and trends of rising energy import depend- sions among G20 countries. With one-third of the world’s poor in India wind potential at 80 m hub height is around and a Human Development Index (HDI) rank of 500 GW while over 58% of the land receives global 135. Oil imports accounted for 8% of current largest country in terms of population and the third account deficit and approximately 30% of imports largest economy in purchasing power parity terms. national and international interventions that may and offshore wind is uncertain.nic. India is relatively well endowed including the United States. largest emitter of greenhouse gases based current the country’s dependence on energy imports has annual emissions. tions at present.html 5 Batra and Chand 2011. with coal accounting for around 54% of sition to a reliance on energy sources and technol- commercial energy use. India would be faced with an excruciatingly insolation of over 5 kWh/m2/day.pdf 4 http://www. However. The estimated ada. India’s extractable reserves are estimated In planning ahead for future energy and infrastruc- to last for only about 30 years at current rates of ture requirements. The exact technical potential of doing so may help prioritize potential of other resources like geothermal.

2012 Figure 2. and Forestry) 58  Waste becoming less energy intensive. increased Drivers and Past Trends at an annual average growth rate of only about As indicated in Table 1 and depicted in Figure 1. In. Source: India: 34  Fugitive Second National Communication to the UNFCCC. MOEF. Accordingly. as a result of several energy together account for a majority of the total emis. efficiency measures that have been implemented sions. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 2b. which 142  Processes . Distribution of GHG emissions by sector in economic activity and the consequent increase 1994 2000 2007 in overall energy requirements. India’s CO2 emissions have increased in total magnitude across all sectors. relative to 1990 but at a de- creasing rate in relation to GDP growth. not only as a result of growth Table 1. As illustrated in Figure 2a and Figure 2b.India GHG Emissions: Current Levels. as well as other shifts over time. 2012 dia’s primary energy requirement per unit of GDP has been continuously decreasing due to efficiency improvements across sectors as well as structural Figure 1. 1. 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 6 Post 2000. 1990 to 2010 2a. but also the grad- Agriculture 29% 23% 19% ual move from traditional biomass fuels towards Waste 2% 4% 3% modern commercial fuels. Source: India: Second national communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. the LULUCF economy has continuously been decarbonizing and (Land Use. for example. Energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors 80% Five-year variation rate of the drivers 1400 MtCO2 1378  Buildings and Other 60% Energy-related 1200  1218 CO2 Emissions 40% 1000 per Energy 1025  Transportation 20% 800  GDP per capita 779  Industry 0% 600  Population -20% 400  Energy per GDP -40% 200  Electricity Generation 1995 2000 2005 2010 0 n. ash instead of limestone in cement manufacturing. Ministry of Environment and Forest. 6% per year. 1947 373  Agriculture even though the total emissions are increasing. However. Energy consump.2  tion in the industry sector. Electricity generation7 Energy 62% 67% 71% is the largest contributor to the total emissions Industrial process 7% 6% 7% followed by industry and transport. Decomposition of GHG in 2007 changes in the economy. while this study includes captive generation within the industry sector 117 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . pg 82.177 have been increasing. This can also be seen 1340  Energy-related MtCO2 eq emissions through the CO2 emissions from fossil fuels. Therefore. and the share of these has been increasing across industry sub-sectors.c. Land Use Change. Decomposition of historical energy-related CO2 Emissions. we focus only such as the pronounced increase in the use of fly on energy and industrial process-related emissions. emissions from the iron and steel sector are not reported under process emissions 7 India’s emission inventory includes captive power plants within the electricity sector. although industrial production grew energy and industrial process6 related emissions at about 9% per year. in this study. Government of India.

although many of these are already at world-best levels. infrastructural or financial barriers/constraints. Onshore wind technology at hub exists height of 80 m is assumed to be deployed post 2030 Grid Technology Available  Available We assume the centralized grid becomes more reliable and uninterrupted now now power supply can be ensured such that industry could switch from captive power plants to grid based supply. reactors Thorium-based Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR) would be available at a commercial scale by 2035. Notes: [a] See Chapter 5 of the full report for more details. the DDP results for India represent a set of costs. India 2 2 National Pathways to Deep Decarbonization 2. at this stage the DDP assumes that the al- in which specific clean energy technologies would ternative options can be scaled up quickly across reach commercial viability. specific to the Indian upfront investments. which currently is in RD&D phase. without including any socio-economic. becoming competitive sectors. Transport Global availability of 2020 – 2025 2035 Uptake from 2035 to 2040 long range EVs across all vehicle types  Third generation biofuels 2020 – 2025 2035   Industry Solar thermal based [b] 2035 Heavy industries are able to continue reducing their energy intensity further. due to certain carbon prices and without consider. for India Although India is likely to face several barriers re- lated to the actual capacity to absorb and deploy Using a set of largely common assumptions for all technologies rapidly and at large scales due to var- 15 participating project partners in the different ious limitations affecting its ability to undertake countries. boilers though at lower rates.1 Technological Options and ing any adverse implications for the country’s GDP Assumptions considered in the DDP growth or income distribution across social classes. human and institutional capacities. and some others. Table 2. and the possible outcomes in terms of a “what-if” analysis. Solar achieves 20% of total capacity by 2050 (CSP with 15 hour storage) Nuclear Fast Breeder [b] 2035 We assume that India would progress with its 3 phased nuclear program. wherewithal for build-up of associated infrastruc- The common assumptions relate to the time frames ture. at no additional cost. Apart from strengthening and extension of the grid. and without any barriers at this stage. By 2050 nuclear is 16% of total power generation capacity Wind offshore [b] 2030 Offshore wind technology. operational and maintenance study. Technology assumptions for the India DDP Starting date of global deployment at scale – suggested assumptions for DDPP Country Research Partners [a] Sector Technology Deployment date assumed for India DDP Comments Power Advanced energy storage 2030 – 2035 2035 Uptake by 2035. we assume development and integration of smart grids and management of power systems to ensure balance of power and support the integration of renewables. [b] Starting date of global deployment at scale not specified in recommendations for DDPP Country Research Partners Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 118 . is assumed to be commercially available post-2030 Wind onshore and solar [b] Capacity Solar thermal with storage technology (15 hours storage) is assumed to already be commercially available from 2035.

pendent on agriculture has either stayed constant mands post 2030. Adequate infrastructure and compressed nat.1  High-level characterization Additional assumptions that are included the In terms of socio-economic framing. annual average rate of 1%. based on cost minimization. though at lower having a share of 39% by 2050). Hybrid and electric vehicles achieve significant been declining. included by assuming 100% electrification of metro. Population is assumed to increase at an preferred options by 2030. not achieve levels of appliance ownership or elec- eration biofuels by then. and at large scales of deployment. as efficient fans. Biodiesel plays a major role in the transport to fulfill only their most basic energy needs and sector post 2030 with availability of third gen. Improved access to modern energy forms. pled with an increase in percentage share of indus- ural gas (CNG) supply network is assumed to try in GDP. and LEDs). although many of these are already at to grow at an annual average rate of about 7% with world-best levels. These are envisaged at levels that supply options could be harnessed if these options are significantly beyond what the existing pol. however. were globally available at commercially viable costs icies and measures can achieve. People prefer more efficient appliances (such from 19% in 2010 to 34% by 2050. would make the growth trajectory more inclusive. and non-motorized transport modes) households by 2020. espe- more efficient personalized vehicles and more cially to the poorer sections of society has been efficient transport systems (use of public buses. shifts the share of traditional biomass use decreases as towards green buildings. apart cooking increases. based on the assumption or has only marginally decreased. tricity consumption which India’s middle class is 7. Domestic natural gas production is assumed to the need for increased energy supply to enable the reach 50 BCM by 2035 with commercialization country to achieve rapid economic growth leading of new discoveries. but rather a visuali- tation modes in both freight and passenger zation of the maximum levels to which alternative movement. but the proportion of people de- penetration in servicing surface passenger de. air-conditioners. On the demand side. Heavy industries are able to continue reducing of 1751 million by 2050 (with urban population their energy intensity further. thus ensuring increasing employment. and assuming a signif. access to modern energy forms such as LPG for ficiencies of existing industrial processes. In the past the value added from agriculture has 3. 2.2  Illustrative Deep Decarbonization across the study and the specific assumptions Pathway for India as considered in the DPP are listed in Table 2.India The global technology assumptions considered 2.2. be available across the country to support in. and GDP are the main drivers of such that family size cars become cheaper and growth. the share of industry in GDP assumed to increase 5. On the supply side. to higher per capita incomes over time. not a result of an optimization modeling exercise icant switch-over to more efficient transpor. resulting in a population 4. from including shifts towards alternative tech. This cou- 2. we assume significant able to afford today. category households are still assumed to be able 6. the illustrative DDP scenario is nologies and processes. It is assumed 119 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . the illustrative DDP analysis are provided below: DDP envisaged for India in this exercise respects 1. the lowest income enabling higher switch to these options. improvements in ef. tech- that electric vehicle technology would progress nological change. GDP is envisaged rates. Population. creased CNG use in the transport sector. The DDP also envisages that improvements in appliance efficiencies.

9 51. The primary energy per unit GDP is decreasing.5  Electricity 0. This DDP therefore assumes that not tors.3 29.4 6.751 GDP per capita [B$/capita] 1092 2364 5119 9997 17890 Electrification rate 73% 100% 100% 100% 100% Agriculture 16% 13% 10% 8% 6% Sectoral share in GDP Industry 19% 20% 20% 26% 34% Services 65% 68% 70% 66% 60% Note: Numbers are actually for 2011-2051 but represented in this document as 2010-2050 to ensure consistency with other country chapters and analysis Figure 3. Figure 4a illustrates the based on grid-connected renewables and nuclear.5 32. Primary Energy EJ 120 109. Growth in pushed to their limits across the demand sectors.8 3b. increase nearly 4-fold between 2010 and 2050 es across sectors.9  Liquids 2. Similarly. at a decreasing expert-based judgment of the technically feasible rate.0 20 6. and this dampens sharp is becoming cleaner and dependence on fossil fuels increases in final energy requirements across sec. Final Energy + 267 % 100 EJ 80 + 256% 80 81.1  Renewables & Biomass 8. indicating that final energy major role across sectors. by source 3a.370 1.2  Oil 1.523 1.1 4. Development Indicators and Energy Service Demand Drivers   2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Population [Millions] 1. energy efficiency is envisaged to play a gy decreases over time. An analysis of the DDP indicates that from an energy security point of view in India have India’s per capita income would increase decade been included to their maximum limits based on on decade (relative to 2010 levels).7 25.8 22.4  Coal 2010 2050 2010 2050 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 120 .651 1.3  Nuclear 2.6  Gas 0 0 11.8 60 60 40 21.2 5.8 40 21. with most of this increase being as indicated in Figure 3.1 20 27.201 1. efficient technological options implying reduction in energy intensity of GDP over that could enhance India’s energy security and bring time. India that the share of electricity based energy increas. overall picture of the Indian economy relative to Moreover. Energy Pathways.5  Renewables & Biomass 8.9 20. several options that are also of interest 2010 levels. both primary and final energy demands still only is the GDP growth achieved more efficiently Table 3. fossil energy based CO2 emissions per units of ener- Although. is decreasing. due to energy efficiency improvements as well in higher environmental sustainability are also as structural changes in the economy.5  Natural Gas 23. potentials.8  Coal 4.

energy and on the DDP envisaged in this chapter. 698 500 292  Transportation ever. energy efficiency. With the efficiency improvements that if the country were able to make massive and envisaged in the DDP. The pillars of decarbonization 160% Ten-year variation rate of the drivers Pillar 1. decarbonization of the electrici. 2010 to 2050 4a. As indicated in Figure 4 and Figure 5. but the energy portfolio also the country’s final energy requirements by 2050 shifts towards cleaner fuels.44 tons CO2 per capita in 2010. Energy efficiency Energy Intensity of GDP 120% 2010 27. energy efficiency is included at extremely 3193  Industry 0 691 ambitious levels across all the sectors. energy intensity reduces by rapid enough strides to bring in zero carbon fuel 78% from 27MJ per $ of GDP in 2010 to 6 MJ options into the energy mix and undertake large per $ of GDP in 2050.48 tons CO2 per capita in 2050. with the emissions could peak and possibly bend downwards introduction of renewables and nuclear based Three of the key areas that lend themselves to significant decarbonization in case of India as in- dicated by the DDP envisaged in this exercise are Figure 5. by Sector. and fuel-switching in the transportation 4500 MtCO2 4295 sector.  GDP per capita Decarbonization of electricity Electricity Emissions Intensity 0%  Population 2010 676 gCO 2 /kWh -40%  Energy per GDP 2050 84 . 2010 to 2050 ty sector.1 . playing a 571  Electricity Generation 2010 2050 crucial role in containing the rapid increase in Figure 4.4 MJ/$ 80% 2050 6. indicating infrastructure. It is important to note that the energy 2000 1679 demand curves in the end-use consuming sectors 1500 54 236 may not reflect a stabilization or a downturn by 1000 238  Buildings and Other 2050 due to India’s development needs.88 % -80%  Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pillar 3. how. In absolute terms despite the aspirations of better lifestyles and (Figure 4b) total emissions decline after 2040 based improved access to basic amenities. 3500 and 2. The DDP visualized for India results in an 4000 + 156% emission level of 1. per Energy Electrification of end-uses Share of electricity in total final energy -120% 2010 12 + 14 pt 2020 2030 2040 2050 2050 26 % 2010 2020 2030 2040 121 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . Energy efficiency as envisaged in the DDP plays 3000 a key role in the Indian economy and cuts across 2500 sectors.78 % 40% Pillar 2. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Drivers. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pathway. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 4b.India (with lesser energy). efficiency improvements across the energy chain.

increase in emissions during this period. compared to a 55% decline in emissions during 2040-2050 if the levels of zero carbon options could actually Figure 6. significant shifts fuel switching abilities. Coal based power generation re- 2000  Nuclear mains the most economical option for India. costs of these technologies are 5000  Solar still not competitive. As a result we envision the scaling up Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 122 . The gestation time associated with planning and implementing much of the energy and infrastructure requirements for gCO2/kWh 800 676 the country’s development path is an important di-  600 mension that would affect the actual uptake of the  options. 8000 TWh  0 Electricity Generation 7000 While India has a high technical potential for re- newables and the government has been encour- 6000 aging generation based on renewables by offering  Other renewables  Biomass various incentives. However. at this stage 400  we assume that the country is not limited by such  84 200 barriers and do not analyze these limits in detail. 0 For the DDP we assume a significant investments  Coal would be made in RD&D in renewable energy tech- 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 nologies globally to create a rapid improvement in technology. while the last ten from 14% at present to just about 5% by 2050 years of the analysis period visualizes prospects contingent on greater reliability as assumed for for much larger transformations of processes and the grid) in the industry sector. on account For example. leading to only 20% in- towards electric motorized vehicles and electric crease in emission. 2. Different sectors and options vary in terms of the In terms of electrification of the economy. the electricity gen- rail based movement.2  Sectoral characterization ty generation sector makes major contributions to the DDP. Similarly.2. from 12% to 26% during 2010-2050. for this exercise. Energy Supply Pathway for Electricity Generation. be commercially available and deployed at large by Source scales as envisaged in the DDP. and significant increase in eration sector has limited degrees of freedom in the penetration and use of electrical appliances in the next decade and therefore results in an 85% the residential and commercial sectors. and in some cases technol- 4000  Wind ogies also need to mature and improve further  Hydro to instill higher confidence and ensure uptake 3000 at larger scales. the mitigation and the degree of flexibility they offer share of electricity in total final energy increases in the short and longer terms. and because of this the current and planned genera- 1000  Natural Gas tion capacity continues to be coal based. India generation at the assumed levels the electrici. the industry sector illustrates lim- of the shift towards centralized electricity from ited flexibility in the shorter term with emissions captive generation (reducing captive generation increasing by around 70%.

Although India continues to face large demand-sup. the carbon 9% between 2040 and 2050. Further. by no means reflects a soft y yAll new cement production capacity would be path for the country. 2030 – as much of the potential that was relatively easy to tap in terms of efficiency improvements Industry Sector in the large sectors and units has already moved The DDP incorporates several assumptions specific towards higher efficiencies. because given the massive based on state-of-the-art technology.India of renewable based capacity more than ten-times y yWe assume that MSME units would be able to the current levels by 2050. based on the assumption that energy life. and handhold- 2030 such that the contribution of nuclear power ing them to understand the new technologies increases from 3% to 33% from 2010 to 2050. and relia. we also assume large scale deployment of and contingent on several factors like availability fast breeder reactors (FBR) based on thorium after of finance for these enterprises. With the changes envisaged. industrial ble grid that makes it possible for industry to rely energy use in the DDP scenario increases at only solely on centralized electricity rather than captive 2% while industrial production grows at around power. unorganized. or processes (as MSMEs are small. the highest achievable efficiency levels per unit. the 66th round 123 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . about 51%8 of India’s population depends 8 National Sample Survey Organization. curity. and cannot be compromised. integrated. as big industries 2040 can be produced with electricity using like iron and steel electrify. which are detailed below: massive scale-ups across MSMEs is difficult to en- y yAs much as 30% of the steel production in visage in the near-term. The carbon in 2010 to 93% in 2050. shut down after the end of their current economic Accordingly. India emanates from the fact that net cropped area y yPaper industry moves towards the efficient RCF has saturated while the country needs to provide process based on waste and 40% of the total higher and better quality of nutrition to a growing paper production in 2050 is from waste based population. the carbon intensity of fuel from 676 gCO2 per kWh in 2010 to 84 gCO2 per for the industry sector decreases and stabilizes post kWh in 2050 as shown in Figure 6. Apart from the concerns of food se- process. development and infrastructural growth require- y y Efficiency of the fertilizer sector is assumed to ments. try sub-sectors albeit at varying rates. intensity curve however. and because rapid and to the industry sector. We also assume that the country would have intensity reductions would continue across indus- a much more strengthened. the use of captive power plants from about 14% in the DDP we assume fossil-based plants would in 2010 to 5% in 2050. The few old and inefficient units that exist are Agriculture sector assumed to retire by 2030. potential gets captured in the electricity generation y yShare of blended cement can increase from 76% sector as opposed to industry sector. although this is a very optimistic decline Further. thus increasing the decrease their energy intensity about 1% per share of renewable generation from 5% to 39%. and use of naphtha The pressure to enhance agricultural productivity in as a feedstock is also discontinued beyond 2020. intensity of electricity generation falls dramatically As Figure 7 illustrates. year. ply gaps as a result of which any power generated y yThe DDP also envisages that industry will reduce (even if inefficiently) is important for the country. and disaggregated). industrial production needs to increase improve further by 2% although it is already near massively as well. the decarbonization scrap steel.

4 to 13. The DDP considers the following options to de. nificant population is still envisaged to continue Apart from more efficient transportation modes. 13 times for freight movement between 2010 and modal shifts towards rail. we also optimisti. in the DDP we visualize the possibility of etration of clean and efficient fuels and tech- being able to put in place adequate state-of-the. the DDP envisages that several fuel switching options are also included they would be able to transition towards efficient in the DDP. the DDP indicates that by 2050. and are completely phased out by 2040 freight movement decrease by 75% and 86% of being replaced by electric pump sets. India’s mobility needs are projected to electric vehicles and biofuels after 2030. and rail based movement. contain the energy consumption levels and emis- apart from including continuous improvements in sions from usage of such fuels. reduction is attributable to the introduction of dicators. and all new capacity is efficient. electrical appliances. This With the envisaged growth in socio-economic in. Accordingly. and on the other try to of public transportation. India directly or indirectly on agriculture. Moreover.9 pliances and move to the most efficient options. and enable a higher penetration modern forms of energy. Past trends show a rapid increase in the use railways.0 gCO2/MJ as shown in 7b. electricity and biofuels. is expected to be able to afford all types of ap- take of third generation biofuels. using traditional fuels. The carbon intensi- ty of the transport sector as a whole decreases Transport Sector from 68. significantly. about vehicle efficiencies.000 km2 for algal based biofuels Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 124 . and electrification of 2050. 9 Assuming a land availability of 30. and mechanization is therefore important while y yElectric cars could comprise 50% of the total making efforts to decarbonize the sector. and with continual improvement in fleet efficiencies. as well as of public transport in cities. y yDecline in share of railways in both passenger carbonize this sector: and freight movement is assumed to be arrested y yThe efficiency of the stock of tractors improves such that by 2050 railways retain a share of 17%. y yDiesel pump-sets start are phased out after the carbon intensity of passenger transport and 2020. but not all of the population y yIncrease in the blend of biodiesel through up. passenger movement and 80% in freight by y yInefficient power tillers get phased out by 2015 2050).5 times for passenger movement. of personalized vehicles and a decreasing share of rail based movement in both passenger and freight Residential Sector transport. 12% and 65% of the rural and urban households cally assume that mobility needs can be reduced respectively were using LPG. Bringing in a y yAlmost all 2-wheelers could become electric larger share of the agricultural land under irrigation by 2050. Many lower income house- y ySubstitution from petroleum products towards holds that are electrified begin using a variety of CNG. In the residential sector we assume higher pen- However. In 2010. coming close to the most efficient y yIncreased electrification of railways (60% of tractors today. which is assumed to to a small extent by moving to compact cities that increase to 35% and 88% of the rural and urban would be set up during the process of urbanization households respectively by 2050. the 2010 levels respectively. While a sig- and development in the coming decades. passenger car stock in 2050. These include: cookstoves by 2050. along increase 4. nologies that on the one hand provide access to art infrastructure.

0 74. Transportation gCO2/MJ 20 gCO2/MJ 20 4. Industry 7b. shops.0    0 14. by Fuel.9  10     10   18. Buildings: Residential 7d. and 90% cial buildings. commer- penetration of clean cook stoves.India The DDP includes the following: Commercial Sector y yIncreased penetration of efficient (labeled) ap. etc. and y y100% penetration of efficient appliances. penetration of LED lighting in both rural and sewage.0 35  Non-grid electricity 30  Grid electricity 25 25 EJ  Liquid fuels 20  Pipeline gas 20  Grid electricity 15 15  Biofuels 10 10  Coal 5 5  Petroleum products 0 0  Pipeline gas 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 7a. 50% there is growth in the hospitality sector.4 15 EJ 15 EJ 10 10  Non-grid electricity  Non-grid electricity  Grid electricity 5  Grid electricity 5  Solid biomass  Solid biomass  Liquid fuels 0  Liquid fuels 0  Pipeline gas 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050  Pipeline gas 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050  Coal 7c. Energy Use Pathways for Each Sector. public services like lighting.5 40 40 68. Buildings: Commercial 125 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . is also of importance at the structural level as Figure 7.4  20 20  40 EJ 0 0 13. Growth in energy requirements in the commercial pliances for all income classes. sector is inevitable as the country develops. 2010 – 2050 Carbon intensity gCO2/MJ 100    80 gCO2/MJ 80   60    60 84. Growth in the commercial sector urban areas.8 0 8.

as robust pathways that countries can be pres- y yAdditionally. The challenge with regard to technologies to revisit the timings and levels of introduction is multi-faceted. alternative socio-economic trajectories needs themselves require significant invest- could also be envisaged. etc. intensity than the manufacturing sector. could. would be massive infrastructural related costs multaneously envisage higher capabilities to absorb to enable to technologies to be absorbed. India growth in services helps strengthen the econo. and my. declining global costs for technologies. growth. Integrated Habitat Assessment (GRIHA) certi. However. Further. education. etc. Since India’s basic development tion. si. The first and foremost consideration for India the implications of one particular deep decarbon. and capacities or capabilities of individual The emissions intensity of the sector as a result countries. frastructure. yet and/or are associated with uncertainties plications for GDP growth. It is new technologies and processes. Accordingly. penetration of efficient appliances surize into following. finance to developing countries to support up- However. access to basic services and in- for deployment in the time period under considera. surrounding their actual performance and ef- Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 126 . to need even faster growth and significantly structural growth in a shorter time period provid. A faster growth path with ment. ers. In this phase of this exercise we have delineated 1.0 to 14.3  India’s challenges in making a transition towards Additional Measures the DDP envisaged are several and significant. 2. accelerated development is envisaged inclusive development and transformational infra. take of higher cost alternatives in the near term. GDP increases rapidly in the commercial sector. sible conflicts with development priorities. alternative pathways be compromised and people should be better could internalize other technological options were off in terms of per capita incomes. every five years for air conditioned buildings. Even though the DDP scenario for India assumes quality and levels of housing. it is important 3. It is however important to note that progress The DDP includes the following: along any of the envisaged trajectories would be y yA 5% reduction in the energy performance index contingent on several factors including the costs. of these assumptions in the DDP falls from 18. socio-economic preference structures. employment these to be economically attractive and desirable opportunities. timing. there and public transportation. given that this stage of this study in. especially if there are pos- such as air conditioners. Several technologies exist of various alternative options based on an explicit globally but are not economically competitive assessment of the economic costs and their im. these cannot be seen 2050. is that the country’s development should not ization pathway. green rating for ture and get deployed at large scales globally.8 gCO2/MJ. lighting systems. for example. volved a purely technical analysis. larger levels of investment. and scale at which alternative options ma- y yPenetration of energy efficient. ing society with improved living standards. infrastructural barri. and adopt more therefore important to ensure adequate flow of innovative options for mitigation as well. while envisaging alternative DDPs fied buildings in new built area increases sharply can be meaningful to visualize the choices and from 2010 levels of 1% to 50% penetration in their broad implications.4  Challenges and Enabling Conditions Alternative Pathways and 2. healthcare. and is generally associated with lower energy affordability considerations. better 2.

Further.g. Identifying tem is also necessary. There are about 40 million MSMEs units op- bution capacity in the grid.10 only develop adequate transmission and distri.pdf 127 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . units to undertake higher upfront investments isting clean and efficient technologies at large (through grants/soft loans and other interna- scales to bring down their costs rapidly and tional mechanisms). and demonstrating a suite demonstrate their performance efficiencies to of possible transition options across industrial build investor/user confidence in all regions and clusters would be required. the challenge is to smart grids that can handle renewables based improve the efficiencies in these units without generation. Much greater interna. While we must recognize transfer. but also for technologies that blers to making clean energy transitions. developing adequate skill sets.g. standardized technologies used in larger scale ables needs to be addressed. It will be a great challenge to diffuse ex. given that countries. The MSME sector plays an important and a greater share of power being generated role in the economy as it contributes 8% of by renewables. There needs to be a global collabo. third gen. threatening their competitiveness. With the levels manufacturing units may not be applicable or of future electricity transmission requirements viable. The diversity in economic profiles and R&D phase (e. there is a strong need to not GDP and employs close to 70 million people. http://msme. poor sections of society as well. 5. with sharing India’s DDP. but also to further erating on a small scale. Moreover. confidence in their application and efficiencies. 3rd generation biofuels) and industrial units makes it important to identi- not implemented at commercial scales.India ficiencies on the ground. Moving towards etc. and balance the loads in the sys. India has several MSMEs that use a options such as solar thermal technology where wide mix of fuels and processes and for which the issue of intermittency related with renew. Capacity related challenges are also significant nologies assumed in India’s DDP are still in the for India. Accordingly. 10 Annual report of the Ministry of MSME. energy generation and supply. not only for technologies that are not that removing poverty and enabling greater yet in the commercial domain ( ANNUALREPORT-MSME-2012-13P. Similarly. some tech. high. clean energy access and affordability is key in rative R&D effort on technology. For are likely to be challenges in scaling up new example. and inclusive economic growth path for the and reduce their costs. for clean operations through awareness programs. country. water. helping small 4. There fy alternative options for all user groups. there is need the best technological solutions for the diverse for in-depth mapping of resource potentials. equity in incomes is one of the greatest ena- eration biofuels). there is a need to simultaneously push tional and regional co-operation is required clean technology solutions in the interim to the towards this end. options that can be envisaged to of benefits across all countries. For example. accounting for be- manage and strengthen the grid to be able to tween 30% and 40% of the industry energy handle the additional loads. user groups and hand-holding smaller enterpris- and assessment of the actual usable potentials es to make the transition towards efficient and based on availability of land. including by work among the relatively better-off urban user way of sharing of intellectual property rights groups may not be a possibility among the low- and/or other means of concessional technology est income classes. other are already implemented to further enhance than attempting to work towards a rapid.

efficient and improved bio. Rational energy pricing that promotes competi- tion and reduces distortions such that consumers are provided the correct price signals for making 2. needy. and rationalising energy pricing could help encourage a move towards higher levels of efficiency in these sectors. Updating of appliance the global level. compressors. delivered at end of supply could be tapped immediately. that transparent subsidies. India in case of cooking. Similarly.5  Near-Term Priorities efficient energy choices needs to be adopted. there ex. Enhanced and improved public transportation in both large and medium cities and towns could contribute significantly to increased energy ef- ficiencies in passenger movement. while this study assumes that alternative of both existing as well as new construction. are a potential challenge. much higher levels of bulbs. etc. issues with regard to gas based generation technologies can help con- availability of land for energy generation pur. energy-efficient appliances (such investment are required even in the immediate as refrigerators and air conditioners) have a large short term. labelling. In the short term. issues of resource scarcity and least in the next two decades. diverting a larger share of freight movement to rail from road by developing dedicated freight corridors and improving rail based connectivity Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 128 . of skill sets and knowledge base that would be air-conditioning. ists significant scope to reduce energy use. while India seems to have abun. while ensuring efficient use of resources. fans. focused on R&D and deployment at potential to save energy. tribute towards improving the efficiency of the poses as compared to other competing uses electricity generation sector. households that have access to biomass and are Energy saving opportunities exist in the indus- unable to afford modern energy fuels. energy on these technological fronts is desired. commercial viability of ultra-super critical boilers For example. chain to facilitate energy access by the genuinely In residential and commercial buildings. economically attractive costs globally so as to ting diodes) based lighting can bring in significant. need to continue to play a significant role at 6. Similarly. establishing the prioritization of competing uses is important. energy efficiency can play a key This can be achieved by designing effective and role in India. Further. if rapid and large scale progress energy norms and building energy codes. under Indian conditions and focusing on advanced dant renewable resources. required for future technologies and systems Given that fossil based power generation would likely to be part of a DDP. Another try sector and could be tapped by establishing important aspect in terms of capacity devel. Several “win-win” options exist. to demand centers could create efficiencies in mass cook stoves should be promoted for rural freight transportation. be able to make significant future inroads into ly higher efficiency levels than conventional light the country’s energy mix. CFLs technologies would mature and be deployed at (compact fluorescent lamps) and LED (light-emit. and further strengthening the existing ener- opment relates to the gearing up of education gy performance standards for various equip- and training programs towards development ment/appliances like pumps. in case Finally.

4%).000 islands with a population of 234 million.6%). Centre for Climate Risk and oil accounts for almost half at 46.4%). and the remaining 12% of final energy is provided as electricity.3% is shared by residential (11%). Indonesia. commercial biomass (3.2%).2%). Indonesia Indonesia Ucok W.4%).1  (CREP-ITB) decarbonization and sustainable development Iwan Hendrawan. a Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 129 .R. Siagian. The remainder is provid- Opportunity Management-Bogor Agriculture University (CCROM-IPB) ed by coal (26. natural gas (20. Indonesia’s electrification rate (the percent of the population with access to electricity) is around 78%. mining and construction (3. Located Bandung Institute of Technology between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. The majority of final energy consumption is in the form of fuels (oil. it bridges two (CREP-ITB) continents: Asia and Oceania.3%). Given that the country is an archipelago with many islands and remote rural communities.3%. 17. with a low per capita annual consumption of 660 kWh/capita. 1 1 Country profile Center for Research on Energy Policy- Bandung Institute of Technology The national context for deep 1. In addition to this commercial energy. and geothermal (1. The major energy consumers in Indonesia are industry (46. gas. commercial (4. and agriculture. coal. Center for Research on Energy Policy- Bandung Institute of Technology (CREP-ITB) Retno Gumilang Dewi. hydro (2. Out of the 189 Mtoe of primary energy supply in 2011. The major- Centre for Climate Risk and ity (almost 80%) of Indonesians live in the Western part of Opportunity Management-Bogor Indonesia on the islands of Jawa and Sumatera (see Figure 1).1%) and transport (35. Center for Research on Energy Policy. Indonesia is the largest archipelago in the world. and biomass comprise 88%). It consists of approximately Rizaldi Boer. Agriculture University (CCROM-IPB) Fossil fuels have historically been the major source of energy in Gito Emannuel Gintings. The remaining 18. traditional biomass is still used for cooking in rural areas.1%).

and past trends country’s annual economic growth fluctuated be.592 US$. This rep- economy was: 47% industry. and employment for   this additional population is critical. Despite continuous eco- Figure 1. then this resource will generate 263 TWh per year. rural communities will be fuels in part because of the country’s energy resource electrified using local renewable resources such endowment. The Indonesian economy al Communication (which reports the latest has shifted from one that was highly dependent official figures concerning the country’s emis- on agriculture to one that is more industry and sions).700 km coast line with approximately 11% of the population living 5. To lift the Jakarta  Maluku    population out of poverty.1% 33 provinces below the poverty line.2 GHG emissions: current levels. and 12% has been larger than average annual GDP growth. Through efficiency measures. the composition of the 1. as microhydro power and solar photovoltaic (PV) 8 billion barrels of oil. 7. The remaining 13% is pro. and combustion of fossil 1 This is a resource potential. energy has not been used efficiently in Indonesia because prices were kept artificially large number of Indonesians do not have access to low through government subsidies.3% and 5. The per capita GDP in 1. According to the Indonesian Second Nation- tween 4. 38% service. Historically. In 2012.9%. Many of the hydro resources are located in Eastern Indonesia. the drivers.6% 3. 50 GW of biomass. and plans for energy efficiency and the in- energy resources. It is expected that the Indonesian 2000. average annual growth of energy consumption and oil respectively represent 42%. hopes to reverse this trend by 2025. many Indonesians are still poor.9 milliom km2 land area nomic growth.9 million km2 maritime area Kalimantan Sulawesi 54. Indonesian GHG emissions were around service-based. 497 cities/regencies  the Indonesian population is expected to grow at  approximately 1% each year.1 29 GW creased use of renewable energy resources have of geothermal. As comparison. and 150 Trillion Standard Cu. technology. These subsi- electricity. energy for electricity generation.8% 1. In the next three decades. Indonesia is also endowed with renewable 2025. potential of 4. In addition to fossil all households will have access to electricity by energy. 2012 was 3. Map of Indonesia with basic statistics 1. Most emissions (63%) come from land use economy will move further toward a service-based change and peat fire. the government vided by hydropower (8%) and geothermal (5%). Indonesia is a developing nation with a GDP of 847 billion US$ (2012). which includes 120 billion tons of coal. and resents an increase of 400 MtCO2e compared to 15% agriculture. 32%. Assuming this could be converted into technical potentials and with capacity factor of 40%. and solar energy put Indonesia on a deep decarbonization pathway. far from electric demand center in the West.Indonesia Indonesia economy in the future. of the generation mix. Over the past 5 years. including 75 GW of hydro. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 130 .5 kWh/m2/day. The government has set a goal that bic Feet (TSCF) of natural gas. Fossil fuels are the dominant source of dies have helped fuel an increase in energy use. It is also Indonesia developed with this dependency on fossil expected that remote. coal. in 2010 the generation of hydropower was 16 TWh.5% Major cities  least 5% per year and has set a goal of reducing Sumatera Jawa Bali Nusa Tenggara Papua Percent of population % the poverty rate to below 4% by 2025. based on preliminary resource surveys.8% 7.800 MtCO2e in 2005 (see Figure 1). natural gas. Transmission from East to West requires construction of undersea cables. the government plans  to promote economic growth that averages at 21% 58% 1.

one. In the end-use sector. emission source (see Figure 2). and Forestry) Electricity Generation Transportation Other Industry Buildings Source: Second National Communication Indonesia 129 107 80 26 342 Figure 3. The second major As shown in Figure  3. Figure 2. by source 2b. Increasing energy use per unit of and building sectors. 1990 to 2010 3a.c. which increased at a rate of 5% for industrial activities. GHG emissions.c. GDP also contributed to the increase in emissions.  Population 200 -25%  Energy  Industry per GDP -50% 100 -75% -100%  Electricity Generation 0 n. n. Decomposition of GHG and Energy CO2 Emissions in 2005 2a. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 3b. Energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and sectors MtCO2 eq 200 MtCO2 344  Energy-related emissions 175 49  Processes 150 Electricity 80  Agriculture (Allocation 1792 125 by End Use Sector) 167  Waste 100 26  Fugitive 75 Total MtCO2 451  Peat Fire 50  Natural Gas 54 25  Petroleum Products 180 675  LULUCF 0  Coal 108 (Land Use. half of the direct combustion emissions are from showing that the economy simultaneously grew fuel burning in industrial activities. coal is the major and industry (40%) sectors. Land Use Change. Decomposition of historical energy-related CO2 Emissions.Indonesia fuels contributes around 19% of the emissions.c. 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 131 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . Coal is the main fuel in emissions over the past decade has been eco- power generation as well as a major energy source nomic activity. Emissions from more energy-intensive. Energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors 100% Five-year variation rate of the drivers 500 MtCO2 75% 428 Energy Related 400 370 50% CO2 Emissions  Buildings  per Energy 25% 300 281  Transportation  GDP per capita 0% n. the main driver of GHG source is oil combustion. power generation come from the building (60%) In the fuel combustion category. Oil is used in the transport to 6% per year.

76 10.74 3. the illustrative Indonesian de- in the next four decades. Primary EJ 4b.21 2. Development Indicators and Energy Service Demand Drivers 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Population [Millions] 234 252 271 289 307 GDP per capita [$/capita] 2.1  decrease use of coal. reduce coal share gy sources would be realized in part through fuel and equip most of the remaining coal plants with switching from coal to gas. Indonesia 2 2 National deep decarbonization pathways Illustrative deep 2. Energy Pathways. signifi. significant fraction of gas plants with CCS. The important features of y yFurther fuel switching to renewable resources decarbonization in final energy are: significantly is a critical component of the scenario in all Table 1.319 14.39 1. increase the share of natu- decarbonization pathway ral gas. oil to gas. and begin sil fuels would be equipped with CCS technology.59 0.02 8 3. and a switch CCS. increase the share of natural gas and equip a from onsite fuel combustion to use of electricity. The remaining large energy systems that burn fos- cantly increase the share of renewables.92 6  Renewables & Biomass 6 0.1  High-level characterization The drastic change of the primary as well as the As a developing nation.823 9.09 14 + 138 % 0. low.52 2  Liquids 2. Indonesia The key elements of the pathway are as follows: has to drastically change its energy supply and y yEnergy efficiency improvements would be de- demand mix (see Figure 4). Final Energy Energy 14. important features of decarbonization in primary yy The deployment of lower-carbon emitting ener- energy: reduce oil consumption.09  Biomass 1. to use nuclear power.306 3.13  Coal w CCS 0.68 0.71 0. and significantly increase share of electricity.49  Coal 2010 2050 2010 2050 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 132 . nologies. by source 4a. the Indonesian economy final energy mix is the result of many measures.72 3.974 Access to Electricity 70% 85% 99% 99% 99% Poverty indicator 12% 8% 3% 3% 2% Figure 4.58 2  Oil 2.69  Coal 0. significantly reduce oil consumption. As and population are projected to grow significantly shown in Figure 5. 2.97 10 + 131 % 10 8 2. The following are the ployed in all sectors.655 5.85  Nuclear 5.86  Gas 0 0 1.1.51  Electricity  Natural Gas w CCS 0.57 4.40 12 EJ 3.23  Natural Gas 0. To achieve significant decarbonization.75 4 4 2.and zero-carbon emitting tech- development indicators are shown in Table 1. The projections for these carbonization pathway is a combination of energy energy service demand drivers and other relevant efficiency. and structural changes in the economy.

and geothermal for power in emissions can be accomplished through six strat- generation. by Sector. -80% Electrification of end-uses Share of electricity in total final energy -100% 2010 12 + 23 pt 2020 2030 2040 2050 2050 35 % 2010 2020 2030 2040 133 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . The pillars of decarbonization 100% Ten-year variation rate of the drivers Pillar 1. forest management unit (FMU) in all forest areas to y yStructural changes in the economy (i. 500 MtCO2 -9% ry are the main sources of GHG emissions.  GDP per capita 0% Decarbonization of electricity Electricity Emissions Intensity  Population -20% 2010 825 gCO 2 /kWh  Energy per GDP -40% 2050 63 .e. 130  Industry 0 68 forest degradation.4 . 155 MtCO2 in 2010 to 221 MtCO2 in 2050. The emissions  Buildings 250  Transportation from this sector mainly come from deforestation. 80% Energy efficiency Energy Intensity of GDP 60% 2010 8. and peat emissions. and biomass. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pathway. systems to reduce illegal logging and increase the tion) are expected to contribute to the decar. and 400 428 23 391 they will continue to be so without new strate.8 MJ/$ 40% 2050 2. 2010 to 2050 5a. land use change and forest. egies: (i) the acceleration of establishment of a biofuels. industry and power ment of carbon sequestration by increasing forest generation remain the major sources of emissions in regeneration and land rehabilitation. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Drivers. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 5b.73 % 20% Pillar 2. (ii) creased role of industry in the formation of the introduction of mandatory forest certification national GDP through service sector substitu. Despite decarbonization efforts. Significant decarbonization will occur in the tion of forest conversion in meeting land demand power sector. and biogas in industry. the energy-relat. 300 28 120 74 gies in these areas. emissions from industrial sector will continue to increase. As shown in Figure 6. application of sustainable management practices.Indonesia sectors: solar. 2010 to 2050 As shown in Figure 2. A decrease  Electricity Generation 2010 2050 Figure 5. ensure the improvement of forest management. biofuels in transport.92 % -60%  Energy-related CO2 Emissions per Energy Pillar 3. (iv) the reduc- 2050. hydro. de. Therefore these sources have 200 been targeted for reduction as part of the national 155  Other 100 221 emissions reduction commitment. from Figure 6. low-carbon stock lands or degraded lands for the tainable manner by realizing deep decarbonization development of timber plantation and enhance- by 2050. (iii) a reduced dependency on natural forests in By implementing these strategies. from 130 MtCO2 in 2010 to 68 MtCO2 in 2050. bonization of the energy sector. meeting wood demands by increasing the use of ed Indonesian CO2 emissions will change in a sus.

5 EJ 20  Biomass 800  Solar 0 3. The breakdown of types of energy (vi) the issuance of financing/incentive policies and on the end user side is as follows: liquids (54%). Figure 7. lands. (v) a restriction on the use of peat land for and geothermal). and the remaining 7% comes from re- well as optimizing the cultivation of unproductive newable energy resources (biomass. ization pathway is a significant increase in the sink of CO2 emissions by 2030 at a rate of about share of biofuels in transportation. industry. the mix is currently dominated by fossil fuels. transport (34%). the feedstock of biofuels would be planted in unused 2.Electricity 7b. achieve decarbonization. Oil. a major transformation The implementation of the above strategies could will take place in the energy system. To ensure sustainability. These sources could become a net. Energy Supply Pathways.42tCO2e/capita (about 800 MtCO2e) ployment of renewables and application of CCS.5  Nuclear 2.0 gCO2/MJ 80 63    60 1200 TWh  0    40 1000 44. and of low-emission technologies in peat land. Indonesia for agriculture by increasing the productivity of the and gas together account for 93% of the energy existing agricultural land and planting intensity as supply. coal (15%). including the significantly reduce GHG emissions in these sectors electrification of transport and industry and de- from about 3.5  Coal with CCS 0 0  Coal 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 7a.0  Biofuel 400 1. and building (16%).0  Wind 600  Hydro 2. and as time As mentioned above.2 power generation.29tCO2e/cap (about 80 MtCO2e). Liquid Fuels Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 134 . and electricity (11%).0  Oil  Oil 0.5  Natural Gas w CCS 200  Natural Gas 1. in 2010 to about -1. the development of a financing system to support gas (18%).0  Other renewables 3.1. hydropower. and -0. coal feedstock will come from waste biomass.2  Sectoral characterization land (without disturbing forest stock). The end users of the energy are agricultural development and the implementation the industrial sector (50%). Another important element of the decarbon- CO2e) in 2050. To the implementation of the first five strategies.08tCO2e/cap (about -330 MT. by Resource 825  gCO2/kWh 800 600 Carbon intensity  400  200 71. Indonesia’s primary energy progresses and new technology is developed.

it is expected that 30% of personal cars sociated carbon intensity. and rice production will meet domestic demand (self sufficiency). will decrease from 27. from 825 gCO2/kWh in 2010 transport sector the decarbonization strategy in- to 63 gCO2/kWh in 2050. from 158 TWh in The energy demand in the transport sector is ex- 2010 to 1. and rice production are met. fuels (oil to gas). The land demand for settlement and commercial building will increase following the population growth.81 tCO2/toe in 2010 to in residential.02 tCO2/toe in 2010 to 1. 135 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . electrification of the electricity generation will decrease from of vehicles. Fuel switching to lower-carbon fuels and bioenergy Figure 8b shows the trajectory of energy use and the (solid biomass wastes and biofuels) is the dominant associated emission intensities of transport sector. Electricity demand will Transport Sector grow 5% per annum on average. The trajectory of industrial tricity.083 TWh in 2050. The government target for wood production from natural forest will be stable at about 18. hydropower. As a result of modal from petroleum fuels to biofuels. A shift of To achieve deep decarbonization. cles decreases from 60% in 2010 to 40% in 2050. use of more energy-efficient ve- hicles. Deep decarbonization in power generation will Improvements in efficiency are expected to reduce also require deployment of nuclear power plants industrial energy intensity from 365 toe/M$ in and efficiency improvements in existing power 2010 to 229 toe/M$ in 2050. port. Decarbonization of this sector is expected to reduce the emission intensity from Industry 3. The area for palm oil plantation. In the power sector. Similar strate- Liquid Fuels gies are also applied to freight transport. CO2 emission reductions are also Building Sector realized through industrial efficiency improvement Decarbonization in the building sector would result (decreasing energy intensity) and CCS for coal and primarily from fuel switching from oil to gas/LPG 2 It is assumed that all government targets on wood.54 million m3/year (starting from 2020-2050). and biofuels). massive de. and extensive use of biofuels. and power generation and their as. it is assumed freight transport from road to railway is expected that there would need to be a significant switch to decrease CO2 emissions. and timber plantation will reach 360 million m3 by 2050.88 tCO2/toe in 2050. plants. In 2050. palm oil. Decarbonization in pected to increase significantly with economic de- this sector will result in a decrease in the average velopment and population growth. geothermal.27 million ha. oil to gas). will increase to 15 million ha by 2050. industrial. which is now about 9. fuel switching to less-carbon emitting 130 MtCO2 in 2010 to 68 MtCO2 in 2050. A summary of this decarbonization path- way is shown in Figure 7. and transport toward elec. Figure 7b shows shift. These decarbonization meas- Electricity demand will increase significantly with ures would reduce the emission intensity of fuels economic development and a shift of energy use in industry sector from 3. dustry and heavy industry in the national economy ployment of CCS for remaining coal and gas power would also contribute to the emission reductions.73 tCO2/toe in 2050.Indonesia Electricity Generation gas in heavy industry. are electric vehicles. and the CO2 emissions cludes modal shift to mass transport. In addition. the decarbonization energy use and the associated emission intensities strategy includes fuel switching to lower-carbon are shown in Figure 8a. A decreased share of in- emitting fuels (coal to gas. and extensive deployment of renewables It is expected that the share of industry in GDP (solar.8% in 2010 to 17% in 2050. In the passenger CO2 emission factor. strategy for decarbonization in the industrial sec- tor. it is expected that the share of personal vehi- the trajectory of the total liquid fuels used in trans. industry. 1. plants.

0 2. and CCS and structural change of the the plants will be equipped with CCS facilities to Figure 8. it 2. this switch would lead Indonesian hydropower plants under the illustra- to emission reductions.1 40 40 40 29. fuel switching likely continue to use its abundant coal resourc- (including to electricity). As a tropical country with an average radiation of 1.0  Biofuels 2. which is approximately half of the total consumption.6 30   17.0  Grid electricity 1. economy. Indonesian geother- ficient equipment and the expectation that homes mal resources would amount to around 29 GW. Indonesia will most bination of measures: efficiency.0 20  20 20    7. electricity generation sector.0 EJ 10 10 10 6. es for electricity generation.5  Solid biomass 0.5 EJ 2. especially in the industrial sector.2  Assumptions is reasonable for Indonesia to envisage a scenario The deep decarbonization of energy activities in where 75 GW solar power is used in 2050. which supports the 25 GW of geothermal power ings energy use is shown in Figure 8c.0 0. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 136 . hydro resources (75 GW).0  Solid biomass  Grid electricity  Liquid fuels 1.5 products  Liquid fuels 0  Coal 0  Pipeline Gas 0  Pipeline Gas 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 8a. tive scenario would generate around 37 GW in increasing per capita income will increase energy 2050. For energy security reasons. The ficient electric equipment. assumed in the scenario.5 EJ Grid 5.5 1. 2010 – 2050 Carbon intensity  gCO2/MJ 70   gCO2/MJ 60 gCO2/MJ 60  60 71. Industry 8b. Indonesia can only be achieved through a com. However.6  30 30 46. For the residential sector. Transportation Note: Carbon intensity for each sector includes only direct end-use emissions and excludes indirect emissions related to electricity or hydrogen production. will remain relatively small.1   50 50 50   29. Switching from on-site success of the country’s decarbonization pathway fuel combustion to electricity would reduce direct is obviously dependent on the realization of many emissions from buildings.0  electricity 2.0 0 0 0 2. most of ble. but this will be balanced by more ef. nuclear. deployment of renewa. and with a decarbonized assumptions used in its development. The trajectory of build.0 4.45 kWh/m2/day. Buildings 8c.9 67.0  Pipeline Gas  Petroleum 1.0 1. Indonesia and from fuels to electricity along with more ef.5 3. Energy Use Pathways for Each Sector. by Fuel.

There is only a lim. As mentioned Therefore. The total CO2 that would need to be crease from 15 GW to 20 GW. the alternatives to CCS include: more Challenges. factor must therefore be maintained. Based on current techno. ited amount of research into the scale of geological To utilize the remaining large hydropower resource. The additional 10 million ha of 2050. Under the illustrative scenario. More aggressive efforts to substitute internal com- mestically. land needed to support biofuel for decarbonization Also. The increase in solar stored by 2050 equals about 3. the sions in the power sector. biomass.5  hydropower. 2. the light duty fleet is 35% EVs in 2050. given that the resource is the CO2 will be injected in depleted gas and oil located far away from the demand center. additional hydropower and geothermal pow- uncertainty of CCS deployment. The storage is assumed for grid reliability associated with resource inter- to take place in the abandoned and depleted oil mittency. the low-electric emission main tool of decarbonization is coal and gas CCS. the share of EVs in personal cars is 30% in biofuel feedstock. Under the current pathway. the uncertainty of the pathway lies in the above. The feasibility of this increase. which could be used as way. the share and gas reservoirs in Indonesia.3  to 50%. robustness requires further research. An increase in the and enabling conditions use of hydropower would require the construction The Indonesian illus trative d ecarbonization of long subsea cables. which is estimated to be around 50 million ha. pathways logical standards. It is estimated that of intermittent renewables is only around 14%. hydro would need to be increased from also be used to reduce emissions from natural gas 30 GW to 61 GW. of biofuels for transport. Many of the technol- 137 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . and solar. er could be harnessed to support this increased load. reservoirs.000 Mton. solar could be substantially three times the space required by the CCS scenario. The suitability of it would be necessary to construct a subsea elec- the CCS scenario is based on the assumption that tricity transmission line. which are Deep decarbonization also includes the massive use estimated to occur above a 25% threshold. and biomass would need to in- power plants. increased before reaching reliability limits. This level of electrification could conceivably be increased Alternative pathways and pathway 2. which is more than assumed in this scenario. industry. the total biofuel demand would be 2. An increase in electrified Power generation is one of the major contributors transportation and industry will create more emis- of CO2 emissions. to meet this biofuel demand do. In 2050.Indonesia capture CO2 and store it in geological formation. around 18 million ha of land are needed bustion engine cars with electric vehicles (EVs) to grow the biofuel feedstock. CCS will realized. opportunities. as the location of large hydro pathway is primarily composed of technological resource is in Eastern Indonesia. reduce direct emissions. envisaged in the illustrative scenario could not be Given the need for deep decarbonization. If half of the CCS mix of energy technologies. If all of this storage does not become available. If the volume of Indonesian depleted reservoirs could the use of hydropower were limited below what is store around 11. formation for CCS in Indonesia.300 Mton (with an power would eventually be constrained by concerns annual value of 286 Mton). more electrification in the light industry will would be available from unused non-forest land. Under the current pathway. Under the illustrative path- palm oil (CPO) production.4  Additional measures and deeper around 85 Mton per year. while the demand changes that are very different from the current center is in Western Indonesia. and power gener- ation. It may be further increased to 50% in 2050. however. Indonesia currently would help further reduce direct emissions in the has around 8 million ha of land devoted to crude transportation sector.

financing for investments in infrastructure. Indonesia ogies are still in their infancy (e. Research. crude sions 26% by 2020 (compared to business as usu. this fuel is currently limited.6  Near-term priorities vehicles. a government. the Indonesian Government announced production uses traditional feedstocks that a non-binding commitment to reduce its emis. are also needed for the food sector. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 138 . to make progress. nological approach would require massive devel. international cooperation is government must seek international partners for needed. One of the barriers is that invest- such as solar. internalized in Indonesian development agenda. The Deep decarbonization is a long-term develop- realization of the pathway is highly dependent ment objective. However. need to be taken now to begin implementing and CCS facilities). therefore. The technology development. y yBiofuels were introduced into the Indonesian ther technology development to lower costs. are ernment has to first adopt climate change as a key new to Indonesia. concern for climate change is not yet fully emphasized.). To y ySome technologies that are envisaged in the embrace a deep decarbonization pathway. and the right energy international cooperation and find assistance pricing policy for renewables. one of the main a decarbonization pathway: challenges of the pathway is how to finance the y yThe modal shift to public transport was initiated infrastructure investment. the of these challenges. just begun. decades ago. sary for deep decarbonization. and the incorporation of climate on the development and maturation of these change in the Indonesian national agenda has technologies in the coming years. Wide-scale deployment of these for the transportation sector are needed. the use of ing them competitive with conventional resources. pathway. low-carbon resources would therefore require fur. new efforts to explore financing options fuel technologies. and the tech. high efficiency power plants. development are needed.e. energy system in 2005. demonstration of these technologies needs to In summary. been limited. being a non-Annex I ment into other biofuel feedstocks must be country. In addition. significant efforts are necessary for a be conducted over a number of years in order deep decarbonization pathway to be realized: in. i. especially for infrastructure financing and the technology transfer of technologies neces- technology transfer. palm oil and molasses. Though necessary to explore how to convince Indonesians recently the government has subsidized bio- that nuclear power is a necessary part of the fu. Currently biofuel In 2009. but the success of these efforts has Some of the commercially available technologies. As a result. there are a number of near-term actions that gas transmission.g. Research and develop- al development). increased policies to promote biofuel ture energy mix. One of the barriers Deployment of nuclear power also poses a spe. such as electric vehicles and CCS. electric 2. new railways. infrastructure change in the political sphere. It is therefore dized petroleum diesel and gasoline. are ment in public transport has been limited. Nevertheless. for enabling mass public transport. y yThe key challenge of deep decarbonization is da. is that biofuels have to compete with subsi- cial challenge: social acceptability. the financing of low-carbon infrastructure. subsea electrical transmissions. Indonesia must continue to internalize climate opment of new infrastructure (e. However. To overcome some for infrastructure development. and component of its national development agenda.g. fuels. biofuel and geothermal power. As a currently more expensive than conventional fossil result. development. To embrace deep decarbonization. ternalizing climate change into the national agen. technology transfer. etc. CCS. has to begin to look for social campaign for nuclear. the gov. mak.

After the first oil shock in the 1970s. and economic efficiency. which has been the most important energy source until the Daiichi Nuclear Power plant accident in March 2011. National Institute for mestic reserves of fossil fuels. environ- ment protection. 1 1 Country profile Mizuho Information & Research Institute The national context for deep 1. liquefied natu- ral gas (LNG). Japan’s energy policy priorities have shifted to be framed around the three pillars of energy security. Japan Japan Mikiko Kainuma. National Institute for Environmental Studies and Institute for Global Environmental Strategies Ken Oshiro. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 139 . and imported coal to limit the depend- ency on oil.1  Go Hibino. This situation has raised important energy security issues since the 1950s when Japan has turned from domestic coal and hydro to imported oil to fuel its fast economic growth. which makes it highly Environmental Studies dependent upon importations. decarbonization and sustainable Mizuho Information & development Research Institute The Japanese economy is characterized by low do- Toshihiko Masui. with in particular the development of nuclear. The focus on energy security and climate change has favored the development of renewables and the domination of nuclear power.

191 MtCO2 or 94. During the 1st commitment period. The Innovative Strategy for Energy and sector plays a very important role in the Japa- the Environment (2012) and the comments on nese economy notably for exports. the d ecomposition of drivers of (1. the residential sectors are not large. 2007 saw the most GHG emissions for the 1990 regional electricity exchange is required.343 MtCO2eq in 2012. commitment period amount to 1. The trends demonstrate a get of reducing 80% emissions compared to continuous but moderate increase of total CO 2 the 1990 level by 2050 with lower nuclear emissions over 1990-2007 (+14%) before recent d epend ence.156 MtCO2eq. Since 2010. the GHG emissions during the 1 st Total GHG emissions in 2010 (excluding LU. of wh ich CO 2 represented a large majority In Figure 2.4% com- pared to KPBY. The to 2010 period. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 140 . because the vehicle transports of both Natural Resources and Energy (ACNRE.7% annual rate of production energy by imported coal and LNG (even in 2010 before intensity decrease.2 GHG emissions: current levels. The other Kaya drivers did nuclear was partly removed from the power not have such a consistent effect in that period. They increased by 6. GHG emissions increased by 1.4% decrease from KPBY. and those from the transport sector have To achieve the political GHG mitigation tar. reduced since 2000. GHG emis- electricity interconnection capacity between sions have resumed to increase and accounted for regions is not high in Japan and strengthening 1. 1990.256 MtCO 2 eq in Japan a 8. On the other hand. industry.Japa n Japan Energy strategies have changed after the 2011 generation mix). drastic changes (-8% between 2008 and 2010 duce energy consumption by reducing energy after the econ omic crisis and +7% between service demands and by increasing the use of 2010 and 2012 because the closure of nuclear energy saving technologies. the emissions power generation from nuclear power decreased from these sectors have increased because of substantially in 2012 from its level in 2010 and increasing distribution of electrical appliances. although shares of commercial and power should be decreased. The sectoral changes in CO 2 emission from fuel combustion decomposition shows that three activities were over 1990-2012 demonstrates that the Jap- dominantly responsible for these CO2 emissions anese economy has experienced a continuous at this date (Figure 1b): power generation. and past trends are counted. consequently. nota. As the potential increase of fossil importations).4% as Kanto area but in the rural regions such as compared to the emissions in the base year under Hokkaido and Tohoku areas. the emissions from the in- in spite of energy efficiency improvement in dustry sector have reduced continuously since end-use sector. if the carbon 1. and transport Basic Energy Plan by Advisory Committee for sector. diffusion of energy e fficiency permitting an bly because the power sector was largely fueled average 0. it is utmos tly necessary to re. compared to KPBY. 2013) passenger and freight traffic were increased. and to increase the plants after Fukushima triggered a temporary share of renewable energies. increased At the same time. of renewable energies is unevenly distributed. which was a 15% increase from major renewable energy capacity is not located base year under the Kyoto Protocol (KPBY).8%) (Figure 1a). The in the major electricity demand regions such total GHG emissions in 2010 decreased by 0. import of fossil fuels. especially LNG.5% interconnections is therefore a crucial issue. conclud ed that the d epend ency on nuclear Moreover. However current KPBY (excluding LULUCF). sink of LULUCF and credit of Kyoto Mechanism drivers. LUCF) amounted to 1. because the industrial accident.

by source 1b. Figure 1. and Forestry) Electricity Generation Transportation Other Industry Buildings 399 346 Source: Greenhouse Inventory Office of Japan (http://www-gio.go. while the increase of carbon intensity due mainly there was a substantial decrease in 2008 and to the suspension of nuclear plants after the 2009 due to the global economic recession. Energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors 20% Five-year variation rate of the drivers 1500 MtCO2 15% 1250 1167 1203 10% 1135 1123 1059  Other 1000 5%  GDP per capita  Buildings 0%  Population 750  Transportation -5%  Energy per GDP 500 -10%  Energy Related  Industry CO2 Emissions 250 -15% per Energy  Electricity Generation -20% 0 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 141 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . Land Use Change.html) 226 153 1123 Figure 2. Decomposition of historical energy-related CO2 Emissions.Japan Until 2007. GHG emissions. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 2b. growth of GDP per capita has been ment of energy efficiency was neutralized by the major driver of CO 2 emission increase.nies. In Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 and the 2011 and 2012. resulting comeback of fossil fuels. the contribution of improve. Decomposition of GHG and Energy CO2 Emissions in 2010 1a. Energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and sectors 500 MtCO2 MtCO2 eq 1145  Energy-related emissions 400 Electricity 66  Processes (Allocation 300 by End Use Sector) 1263 26  Agriculture 200 21  Waste Total MtCO2 100  Natural Gas 209  Petroleum Products 485 +6  LULUCF 0  Coal 429 (Land Use. 1990 to 2010

Energy Pathways. the model is composed of 10 regions and considers the regional differences in renewable energy potential and energy demand characteristics.19  Nuclear 0. This model has already been applied to assess the mitigation target in Japan.21  Biomass 4 4 2.58 6 2.20  Coal 0.84  Oil 0.1 Table 1 sum- marizes the major socio-economic indicators used 2. developed by the National Institute for Environmental Studies. Primary Energy EJ 18. 2012.41 8 2. the long-term GHG emission reduction target is of total GDP (from about 5.38 trillion USD in 2010 achieved by large scale energy demand reduction to 8.40 10 9.16 10 8.24  Gas 0 2.4 EJ 12 12 . that is to say.1. Kyoto University and Mizuho Information Research Institute. by 24% and 39% and the estimation of population by National In- respectively as shown in Table 1.37 trillion USD in 2050).25 0 0. technology selection model for the mid.1  The deep decarbonization pathways in Japan are Decarbonization Pathway assessed using AIM/Enduse model.86 2 1.16  Electricity 6 long-term mitigation policy assessment. Report on measures and policies after 2013. both total and active Japanese assumption by Working Group of Technology Per- populations are expected to experience a significant spective of Central Environmental Council in Japan decrease between 2010 and 2050.93  Liquids 4.76  Coal w CCS 1.21  Natural Gas 0. in population.52 % 3.22  Natural Gas w CCS 6.1  High-level characterization in the estimation of deep decarbonization path- In line with declining birthrate and growing propor. Final Energy 0.81 14 13. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 142 .7 1.4 3. Major socio-economic indicators 2010 2050 Variation 2010/2050 GDP (trillion JPY 2000) 538 837 +56% Population (million) 128 97 -24% Active population (Million) 82 50 -39% GDP per capita (US$/cap) 38003 82116 +116% Source: Central Environmental Council. in end-use sector and decarbonization in power Table 1.34  Renewables & Biomass 8 1. The 10 regions almost coincide with the business areas of 10 public power supply firms.85  Coal 2010 2050 2010 2050 1 AIM/Enduse model is a dynamic recursive. the continuous rise of GDP per capita In Japan’s illustrative deep decarbonization scenar- is projected to be sufficient to ensure a steady rise io. Japan 2 2 National Pathways to Deep Decarbonization Illustrative Deep 2.61 16 3.00 18 . Despite the decline stitute of Population and Social Security Research. ways in Japan. Figure 3.48 % 3b. The model applied for the deep decarbonization pathways is a multi-region version of AIM/Enduse model of Japan. The indicators are taken from the tion of elderly people.98 2 0.7 0. by source 3a.

natural gas without CCS in transport sector. fossil fuels. commercial. the pace of energy demand re. The pillars of decarbonization 100% Ten-year variation rate of the drivers Pillar 1. fossil fuel consumption falls by approximately 60% compared to the 2010 level 750 226 with an approximate 35% decrease of total primary 346 energy supply and increase in share of renewable 500 energy which accounts for approximately 40% (in- 15  Other 250 7  Buildings cluding hydropower) of total primary energy sup. duction is the most rapid in the mid. fuel efficiency Figure 5. by Sector. The shift to public transport.84 % 1000 153 energy. Among the 2010 2050 Figure 4.97 % -60%  Energy-related CO2 Emissions per Energy Pillar 3. Natural intensity become the major drivers to substantial gas supply increases in the mid term in place of oil CO2 emissions reductions in the mid and long terms. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 4b. improvement.Japan generation sector including deployment of CCS. -80% Electrification of end-uses Share of electricity in total final energy -100% 2010 25 + 24 pt 2020 2030 2040 2050 2050 49 % 2010 2020 2030 2040 143 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . but Total final energy consumption in 2050 decreases falls to the 2010 level by 2050 along with energy substantially and accounts for approximately 50% demand reduction and large-scale deployment of of the 2010 level (Figure 3. Hence. gy use) exist in 2050 while coal is almost phased improvements of both energy efficiency and carbon out because of its high carbon intensity. 2010 to 2050 portation service will promote the reduction of CO2 1500 MtCO2 emissions in the transportation sector. In 2050. Particularly renewable long terms. acts as a bridge technology. and industrial sectors. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Drivers. followed by residential. 0%  GDP per capita Decarbonization of electricity Electricity Emissions Intensity -20%  Population 2010 363 gCO 2 /kWh -40%  Energy per GDP 2050 11 . left panel). 180 41  Transportation 372 ply in 2050 despite almost complete phase out 105  Industry 0 12  Electricity Generation of nuclear power (Figure 3. and coal because of its lower carbon intensity. right panel). and efficiency improvement of trans. natural gas and oil (including non-ener- In parallel with continuous growth in GDP per capita. 80% Energy efficiency Energy Intensity of GDP 60% 2010 5 MJ/$ 40% 2050 2 . Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pathway. Dependency on fossil fuel is reduced substantial- 1250 ly compared to the 2010 level due to reduction 1123 in energy demand and deployment of renewable 27 .60 % 20% Pillar 2. 2010 to 2050 4a.

carbon intensity of discussion) and electricity generation from coal electricity falls to nearly zero in 2050.1. natural gas (equipped seismic exploration data for Japan is estimated by RITE). Th is rep- of total electricity generation through large. approximately 199 MtCO 2 is captured Renewable energy is developed over the mid by CCS technologies and cumulative captured to long terms and reaches approximately 59% CO 2 reaches a bout 3.html). contributes to improve significantly the carbon intensity of energy in 600 the mid to long terms (Figure 7a). Energy Supply Pathways. Japan MtCO 2 .  Other renewables Fuel switch ing. Combined with energy efficiency. Activity levels demon- 363 200 strate a moderation of activity in energy-in- tensive sectors in line with res truct uring of  100 the Japanese indus try: -2 3% for crud e s teel 11 production (from 111 Mt in 20 10 to 85 Mt 0   in 2050) and -11% for cement (from 5 6Mt 1200 TWh in 20 10 to 50 Mt in 2050).pdf (in Japanese)).2  Sectoral characterization with CCS) is developed to ensure balancing of the network and reaches about a third of total Power sector electricity generation in 2050.rite. it is suggested that about a half of Electricity the potential capacity can be economically attrac- tive by 2050 (http://www. without CCS is entirely phased out by 2050.5  Natural Gas Gt. resents a bout 60% of the potential of CO 2 scale deployments of solar PV and wind power storage in an anticlinal structure (the well and (Figure 6). Due to large-scale The nuclear power is assumed to be phased out deployment of renewable energy and natural gradually (see next section for more extensive gas equipped with CCS.  Wind 400  Hydro  Nuclear 2 The potential storage of CO 2 in an anticlinal struc- ture where well and seismic exploration data ac- 200 counts for about 5. In addition. etc. 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 According to the report by Central Environmental Council in Japan. In 2050. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 144 . (http://  Coal www.env. 2 Industrial sector Figure 6. the total potential storage capacity 0  Coal with CCS can be 146 Gt including the storage in geological structure with stratigraphic trapping.go.or. In addition. Moreover.2 Gt. the potential  Natural Gas w CCS storage in existing oil/gas fields represents about 3. by Resource The industrial sector is the largest emitter: its CO 2 emissions represent about 40% of total Carbon intensity GHG emission in 2050 because fuel demand   for high temperature heat is hardly replaced gCO2/kWh 300 by low-carbon r064-03/ccs. and n ota bly the phase-out  Other 800  Solar of coal without CCS. this ensures a reduction of 1000 final energy consumption by more than 30%.

0 4. final In the transportation sector. CO2 emissions in 2050 energy demand is reduced by approximately reduce by almost 80% compared to the 1990 level 60%.1 30   20 20 20 26. as shown in Figure 4.5 30   30 45.0 5.9 60   64. the carbon intensity of fuels in 2050 (Figure 7c). thus a combination of energy efficiency.Japan Building sector Transport sector In resid ential and commercial sectors. electrification of explaining a temporary rise of the carbon in. by Fuel. hence reducing energy transport demand) corresponding to an increase of service needs in the residential sector. substitute for oil- significant decrease of the carbon intensity in based fuels and ensuring a continuous decrease of this sector in 2050.0  electricity  Solid biomass  Coal w CCS  Liquid fuels  Liquid fuels 0 0  Pipeline Gas 0  Coal  Pipeline Gas Coal  2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 7a. from 18.0  Liquid fuels Grid  Pipeline Gas  electricity Grid 1.1 50 50 50 40 40  40  32. Energy Use Pathways for Each Sector. Industry 7b.0 EJ 5. Figure 7.7  0 0 5.0 EJ 4. the fleet.3 Mm 2 in 2010 sions.5  6.0 Grid 3. In a context of a reduc- to 19 Mm 2 in 2050) and a 17% decrease of the tion of passenger total mobility (-10% of passenger number of households.0 1. Transportation Note: Carbon intensity shown in Figure 7 for each sector includes only direct end-use emissions and excludes indirect emissions related to electricity or hydrogen production.0  Non-grid electricity 3.0 3.0  electricity 2.0 4. Buildings 7c. 2010 – 2050 gCO2/MJ Carbon intensity   70    gCO2/MJ 60 gCO2/MJ 60 73.0 2. It is worth mobility per person. as well as hydrogen and a small diffusion tensity before electricity becomes the dominant of gas-fueled vehicles (for freight).0  Solid biomass 2. the 18% decoupling of freight noting that fossil fuels (notably gas) remain transport relative to production is made possible by important in the transition (until 2030).0 1. reaching in total energy over the long term. 145 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . hence ensuring a almost 50% of energy consumed. in line with a s ta bility of commercial and account for about 17% of Japan’s GHG emis- floor space (+3% only.0 EJ 10 10 10 0 3.


2.2  Assumptions tion and industrial sectors. In the power generation
sector, both coal plants and natural gas plants can
Low-carbon technology options be equipped with CCS technology, but bioenergy
A wide range of low-carbon technologies is taken into with CCS (BECCS) is excluded in this analysis. For
industrial use, CCS technologies are available in
account in Japan’s illustrative scenario, and include:
iron and steel and cement sectors. In 2050, the
yy In electricity supply: efficiency improvement of
amount of captured CO2 in the iron and steel sec-
power generation, coal and gas with CCS, reduced
tor and the cement sector reaches about 60 MtCO2
T&D (Transmission & Distribution) line losses,
and 20 MtCO2, respectively. A maximum capture
wind power, solar PV, geothermal, bioenergy.
rate of CO2 by CCS technologies is assumed to be
y yIn industry: energy efficiency improvement,
90% for all CCS technologies.
electrification wherever feasible in industrial
processes, natural gas use, CCS for iron making Electricity interconnection
and cement lime, fuel economy improvement In Japan, as the regions with large potential of re-
of agricultural machine, bioenergy use, nitrogen newable energy are different from the ones with
fertilizer management. large electricity consumption, reinforcement of in-
y yIn buildings: improvement of the energy effi- terconnection capacity would be helpful to facilitate
ciency performance of buildings, high-efficiency more effective use of local renewable sources. In the
equipment and appliances, electric heat pump illustrative scenario, due to reinforcement of elec-
water heaters, energy management system. tricity interconnection, carbon price to achieve 80%
y yIn transport: energy efficiency improvement, reduction target is reduced by about 9% because
gas-powered heavy duty vehicles (HDVs), ve-
power generation from renewable energy in Hokkai-
hicle electrification, hydrogen vehicles.
do and Tohoku regions becomes available in Tokyo
Nuclear power region, the largest electricity consumer in Japan. The
As future availability of nuclear power is still un- capacity of interconnection between Tohoku and
certain in Japan, electricity generation from nuclear Tokyo region is tripled during 2010 to 2050.
plants and availability of nuclear power is based
Demand-side management
on the premises of New Policies Scenario of World
Deployment of battery electric vehicle (BEV), heat
Energy Outlook 2013 published by International
pump water heater, and converting electricity into
Energy Agency. According to the illustrative sce-
hydrogen can provide flexibility to electricity sys-
nario, nuclear plants’ lifetime is limited to 40 years
tem through implementation of demand side
for plants built up to 1990 and 50 years for all
management. In 2050, electricity peak demand
other plants, and during 2013 to 2035 an additional
in daytime becomes higher relative to off-peak
3 GW nuclear plants capacity is included. Subject demand, and this necessitates integration of sub-
to these assumptions and maximum capacity fac- stantial solar PV into electricity system.
tor of 70% for all plants, electricity generation from
nuclear plants represents about 50 TWh in 2050.
Alternative pathways and pathway
Geologic carbon storage potential robustness
Complying with previous studies, CCS technolo-
gies are assumed to be available from 2025 and Decarbonization pathway without nuclear power
annual CO2 storage volume is assumed to increase The Illustrative Pathway considers a gradual
up to 200 MtCO2/year in 2050. The potential of phase-out of nuclear but it still represents 19%
storage of CO2 is set to be around 5 GtCO2. CCS of electricity generation in 2030 and 5% in 2050.
technology can be applied to both power genera- However, no nuclear plant has been in operation

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 146


since the end of 2013, though some nuclear plants 2.4  Additional measures and deeper
have been put under safety inspection by the Nu- pathways
clear Regulation Authority, and it is possible that The following measures should be considered for
a complete phase-out is decided. Therefore, it is deeper decarbonization.
worth considering a pathway that would consider a Further development and diffusion of inno-
complete phase-out of nuclear to assess robustness vative low-carbon technologies
of deep decarbonization pathways. In this scenario, The technologies listed in Table 2 are proven ener-
no nuclear plant is assumed to restart in the entire gy-saving technologies up to 2050. On the other
period of estimation after 2014. hand, further improvement in energy efficiency
In such an alternative pathway, higher carbon in- of low-carbon technology beyond the levels as-
tensity is experienced during the transition period sumed in the scenario analysis and development
where coal and gas without CCS compensates the of innovative technology provide additional po-
gap caused by the phase-out of nuclear. But the tential to reduce emission, especially in the in-
impact of nuclear phase-out as compared to the dustrial sector. In addition, system technologies
illustrative scenario is relatively small in the long such as reinforcement of electricity interconnec-
term, given the small share of nuclear in 2050 in tion and demand side management system would
any case. An 80% emission reduction in 2050 is be helpful for effective deeper decarbonization.
still feasible with additional deployment of renew-
able energy and natural gas equipped with CCS. Change of lifestyle to reduce energy service
Decarbonization pathway with less deploy- demand while maintaining standard of living
ment of CCS Both in the illustrative scenario and in alternative
As the feasibility of deep decarbonization path- pathways, substantial change in lifestyle and reduc-
ways crucially depends on the availability of CCS, a tion of energy service demand is not considered.
Limited CCS Scenario is prepared to assess further However, behavioral change has further potential
robustness. In this scenario, CO2 storage volume is to reduce energy demand affordably while main-
limited to 100 MtCO2/year (half of the volume as- taining the standard of living. For example, the
sumed in the Illustrative Scenario) and cumulative material stock in developed countries is likely to
captured CO2 reach about 1,550 MtCO2. saturate, and developing countries will also catch
Achieving long-term emission reduction target up with the developed countries in the future. The
proves to be still feasible with substantial increase enhancement of service economy or stock econ-
of renewable energy, particularly solar PV and wind omy will be able to reduce the material demand,
power, in the long-term electricity supply, in place and as a result, energy demand will reduce. Ana-
of natural gas equipped with CCS. In the scenario, lyzing these effects could help with more refined
the share of renewable energy in electricity supply assessment of deeper pathways.
reaches approximately 85% in 2050 and intermit-
tent renewable energies account for about 63% in Change of material demand and its energy
electricity generation in 2050, hence imposing a service demand
further challenge for integration into the electric- Both in the illustrative scenario and in alternative
ity system. The utilization of the technologies that pathways, substantial change in material produc-
provide the desired flexibility, such as pumped hydro tion is not considered. However, with existing
plants and demand side management using battery stock level of infrastructure and decline in future
electric vehicles can be helpful to integrate large population, a small amount of material produc-
amount of variable renewable energies (VREs). tion to maintain the stock level is likely to be

147 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report


sufficient. For example, stock of steel in devel- therefore, additional policy instruments such as
oped countries is estimated to be 4.9-10.6 ton dynamic pricing of electricity would be needed.
per capita. If the quantities of material production
Promoting public acceptance of deep decar-
are controlled, the energy service demand in in-
bonization pathways
dustrial sector could be reduced further, and as a
The pace of deploying low-carbon technology is
result, CO2 emissions also could reduce.
strongly influenced by public acceptance. In gen-
Redevelopment of cities designed to con- eral, higher discount rates provide further oppor-
sume less energy tunity to diffuse low-carbon technologies. Public
Further reduction in emission and energy demand acceptance of technologies may also involve so-
in cities can be achieved by change in urban form cial issues as well as economic barriers, because
favoring even more important shift from private there are a wide range of possible co-benefits
vehicles to public transport and reuse of waste and adverse side effects that can be caused by
heat. In addition, mitigation actions in cities often diffusion of low-carbon technologies.
provide multiple co-benefits.

Relocation of industrial firms where unused 2.6  Near-term priorities
energies are easily available Avoiding lock-in of high carbon intensity
Though reinforcement of electricity interconnec- infrastructure
tion is taken into account as an option in the Some infrastructures such as power plants and
scenario analysis, relocation of industrial firms buildings entail considerable lock-in risks be-
would contribute to more effective use of heat cause the majority of those introduced in the
from renewable sources and waste heat. Espe- near term would remain in 2050. As some gas
cially, at present most of the low temperature combined-cycle plants as well as coal plants have
heat is disposed of. Though the locations of var- to be equipped with CCS in 2050, newly built
ious industries and locations between industries plants should be CCS-ready in addition to the
and residential areas are well organized, there introduction of the best available technology.
is a potential to improve energy efficiency and
Continuation of electricity saving
utilization of heat by reorganizing the locations,
After the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011,
thereby further reducing CO2 emissions.
electricity use had been reduced in order to avoid
blackouts due to the Fukushima accident and the
Challenges, opportunities, and
suspension of other damaged power plants. Con-
enabling conditions
tinuing these actions could be helpful for deep
Energy system transformation
Deep decarbonization in Japan requires a large scale
transformation in the energy system. In particular, Reducing near-term impact of energy import
there is a huge challenge to integrate VRE, such price
as solar PV and wind power, into the electricity Since 2011, fossil fuel import values have in-
system. Additional plants that can provide flex- creased in Japan due to the rise in global crude
ibility, such as pumped hydro storage, are built oil price, the depreciation of Japanese Yen, and the
to complement large-scale deployment of VREs suspension of nuclear plants. Immediate actions
in the scenario analysis. In addition, demand side for deep decarbonization that decrease fossil fuel
management would be an effective option but may demand can contribute to reducing the impact on
not be implemented by a market mechanism alone, the economy in the near term.

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 148



Daniel Buira,
Instituto Nacional de Ecología
y Cambio Climático
Jorge Tovilla,
1 1 Country profile
Independent Consultant
The national context for deep decarbonization
and sustainable development
GHG emissions in Mexico are rising due to an increasing use of fossil
fuels. As the population slowly stabilizes (projected to be 151 million
by 2050)1 and continued economic growth is expected, it is crucial to
design a deep decarbonization strategy before new infrastructure is
built. Many actions to mitigate climate change have valuable co-benefits
(local health improvement, economic savings, and greater productivity,
among others), and some are also linked to poverty reduction and social
inclusion (for example food and energy security).
Proven reserves of oil in Mexico are estimated to be around 1,340 million
tons of oil equivalent (toe), while gas reserves represent an additional 430
million toe.2 The national energy reform approved recently is expected
to boost investments in oil and gas production. Electricity generation is
mainly produced from natural gas (50%), oil (11%), hydro (15%), and coal
(13%); energy-intensive industry accounts for 13% of GDP.
Urban population reached 72% in 2010, and it is expected to be close
to 83% by 2030. Around 98% of households have access to electricity
to date, and there are 210 vehicles per 1,000 people. In some rural
areas, wood is still used as the main fuel for heating and cooking.

1 Comisión Nacional de Población (CONAPO), at:
2 Data reported for January 2014. SENER, 2014,

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 149

banxico. wood (5%). energy urban centers expand in patterns that increase industries.1% to 2.5 The distri- energy consumption and land use change. increased as well. The significant increase in GDP reflects a recovery from the economic crisis of 1995. medium-sized cities million toe in 2010. capita would reach $20. Sistema de Información Energética. including all consumption by are expected to grow. and transmission losses. this decarbonization pathway analysis assumes a GDP growth rate of 3% every year. at an average rate of about 1% nomic activities in Mexico.GDP per The illustrative deep decarbonization scenario de.4 Energy use per capita has sive both in energy and in CO2 than other eco. and tainable green growth schemes in Mexico. which could account for nearly 70% of national Historically. LPG (10%).100 billion USD in 2050. which doubled from 2000 to 2010 to Total G HG emissions in Mexico reached approximately 207 vehicles per thousand people.Mexico Mexico The majority of future economic growth is ex. so only a limited amount of information can be gained from an examination of the 1995 to 2000 time period.1  sion-intensive alternatives. industry. 6 In this study we assume 3% annual growth as illustrative of long-term sustained growth.8% (Banco de México.2% between 1990 and 2010. Approximately 30% of all energy use is dedicated to transportation. Official estimates for an- nual GDP growth in 2014 have been recently adjusted from 3. 3 The largest source of This increased ownership and use has caused GHG emissions is the combus tion of fossil fuels emissions from the transport sector to increase at (56%). per capita (Figure 2a).1  High-level characterization in 2010 to some 3. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 150 . in 2010 they represented around driven by increases in both population and in GDP 62% of the total cialistas/%7BB22F53FD-4129-ECE1-85E3-BCA42D652B16%7D. Total energy consumption reached around 176 As GDP per capita increases. This trend reflects the increase in vehicle drivers. natural gas (11%). 2014. tensity of electricity generation coupled with a 3 Inventario Nacional de Emisiones de Gases de Efecto Invernadero USD/person by 2050. Historic trends show that final users (transport. As this sector is less inten. 2 2 National deep decarbonization pathways Illustrative deep 2.pdf). 748 MtCO 2 e in 2010. and close to 70% of that energy is consumed by passenger transport 1. and the greatest contributors to this an annual rate of 3. category are the transport sector and electricity pected to be driven by tertiary activities (services). 4 GDP increased 28% from 1995 to 2000 causing final energy per dollar of GDP to decrease noticeably in the same period. diesel (16%). and past trends ownership. 2013. way to transition towards more efficient and sus. GHG emissions in Mexico have been GDP by 2050. As shown in Table 1. INECC-SEMARNAT. 5 Balance Nacional de Energía. buildings). scribed in this report has been devised to achieve Much of projected reduction in CO2 emissions reductions of CO2 emissions as a result of changes across sectors relies on reducing the carbon in- in energy use and production towards less emis. electricity (16%).6 from around 950 billion USD (at 2008 prices) 2. Smart bution of final energy use was spread over the urban development has been identified as a key following fuels: gasoline (32%).2 GHG emissions: current levels. generation (Figure 1). this shift is expected per year between 1995 and 2010. communiqué: http:// www. to decrease GHG emissions. alone. SENER.

425 Figure 1. Energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and sectors 250 MtCO2 MtCO2 eq 421  Energy-related 200 emissions Electricity 61  Processes (Allocation 150 by End Use Sector) 748 92  Agriculture 100 44  Waste Total MtCO2 83  Fugitive 50  Natural Gas 126  Petroleum Products 246 + 47  LULUCF 0  Coal 33 (Land Use.407 15. Although some assumptions scenario modeled does not include the effects of Table 1.339 9. Development Indicators and Energy Service Demand Drivers 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Population [Millions] 113 127 137 145 151 GDP per capita [$/capita] 8.987 12. Decomposition of GHG and Energy CO2 Emissions in 2010 1a. Decomposition of historical energy-related CO2 Emissions.764 20. by source 1b. Energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors 30% Five-year variation rate of the drivers 500 MtCO2 20% 405 400  Energy per GDP 373  Buildings 10% 342  GDP per capita 300 295 269  Transportation 0%  Population  Energy Related 200 -10%  Industry CO2 Emissions per Energy -20% 100  Electricity Generation -30% 0 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 151 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . Land Use Change. 1990 to 2010 2a. the deep decarbonization is possible to do so. GHG emissions. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 2b.Mexico switch from the combustion of fossil fuels to use were made regarding the future energy consump- of electricity in those final uses of energy where it tion of some appliances. and Forestry) Electricity Generation Transportation Other Industry Buildings 162 56 153 33 0 405 Figure 2.

03 6 6 5.34 0.23  Coal 0.33 0. as well as partial choices will be made in Mexico. by source 3a.71 2 2.36 8 8 7. Final Energy 10. including the fact use of ethanol.05  Electricity 2.96%  Energy-related CO2 Emissions -60% per Energy Pillar 3.21  Coal 2010 2050 2010 2050 Figure 4.34  Coal w CCS 0 0 0.09  Nuclear 1.9 MJ/$ 60% 40% 2050 2. and biodiesel in trans. natural gas (Figure 3). this scenario in no way rep- Mexico migrate from a heavy dependence on oil resents an expected or recommended pathway. 2010 to 2050 4a. This exploratory deep decarbonization scenario planning.57  Natural Gas w CCS 0. and the presence of private sector pro- to 2050 assumes that primary energy systems in viders. 0%  Population Decarbonization of electricity Electricity Emissions Intensity -20%  Energy per GDP 2010 541 gCO 2 /kWh -40% 2050 22 . that the country is undergoing a major reform port to reduce gasoline and diesel consumption.59 0. However. Energy Pathways. -80% Electrification of end-uses Share of electricity in total final energy -100% + 32 pt 2010 19 2020 2030 2040 2050 2050 51 % 2010 2020 2030 2040 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 152 .40 + 48 % 10 EJ + 43 % 8. The pillars of decarbonization 100% Ten-year variation rate of the drivers Pillar 1. natural gas. to pipeline gas and renewables and that end-use and is neither government policy nor an official Figure 3.26  Natural Gas 3. diesel.93  Renewables & Biomass 4 3.38  Liquids 3. and impossible to anticipate what specific technology residual fuel oil used in industry.53 % 20%  GDP per capita Pillar 2.8 .11  Biomass 1.30  Coal w CCS 1.27 0. coking coal.47 0.21 4 2.14 0. Energy efficiency Energy Intensity of GDP 80% 2010 5. of its energy sector. which will affect regulation.85 4.04 2 1. As a result. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Drivers. it is important Non-electric fuel switches include a shift to natural to emphasize that a number of factors make it gas from petroleum coke.02 0. Primary Energy EJ 3b. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 4b. Mexico dedicated schemes to accelerate improvement energy will be provided mainly by electricity and of energy efficiency faster than historical trends.02  Oil  Gas 2.

by Sector. electricity generation was associated  Biomass with a CO2 emissions intensity of 541 gCO2 per 1000 kWh. To 600  Wind accomplish this. Energy intensity of 300 inventory estimate. 2010 to 2050 in order to explore possible interplays between technologies and their feasibility considerations. the 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050  Coal full potential for renewa ble energy resourc- 153 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .1.2  Sectoral characterization 541 gCO2/kWh 600 The prominent role of electrification as a de. 0 26  Electricity Generation The scenario assumes drastic reductions in the 2010 2050 GHG emissions from electricity generation and transportation and lower reductions in buildings when comparing emission levels from 2050 to Figure 6. Figure 5. 800  Solar ization objective. carbon intensity would need to fall to around 20 gCO2 per kWh by 2050. the illustrative deep decarboni-  Hydro zation scenario assumes electricity in Mexico will 400 be generated from a larger share of renewables  Nuclear (especially solar). and natural gas with CCS.44 % Note: 28 stantial (96%) reduction in the GHG emissions 400 2010 Industry data from the present analysis include an estimate for CO2 released per unit of electricity produced from emissions from the oil and gas production 155 industry that is not included in the official 2010 and 2050 (Figure 4). It merely seeks to lay out what a potential scenario could look like.Mexico document of planning or intent. at a less aggressive rate 254 of 2% each year to yield an overall reduction 200 116 of 53% from 2010 to 2050. 2010 (Figure 5). . 500 MtCO2 456 This deep decarbonization scenario shows a sub.  Natural Gas w CCS 200 The additional electrical power required to  Natural Gas ena ble the electrification of energy d emand  Oil 0 is substantial at nearly 1. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pathway.  Coal with CCS To meet this electricity generation need. GDP also decreases. there is a substantial increase in the share of electricity 100 20  Buildings in final energy use from 19% in 2010 to 51% 158 109  Transportation 99  Industry by 2050.  0  Electricity generation 1200 TWh  Other renewables In 2010. Finally.200 TWh by 2050.  400 carbonization strategy prioritizes a reduction  of GHG emissions intensity in the electricity  200 22 generation sector. Energy Supply Pathway for Electricity Generation. Results of an initial analysis show that in order to be consistent with the deep decarbon. by Source 2.

2010 – 2050  gCO2/MJ 70 Carbon intensity gCO2/MJ 60 60 gCO2/MJ 50 71.5  Solid biomass 0. final energy consumption would (by developing energy storage capabilities.5 2.500 TWh/year of solar. and buildings). nuclear (2%) fuel oil. share of intermittent renewable power of 50% count7.5 2.0 2.5 1. It is assumed that the rest sity of the industrial activity is achieved by the of the supply is provided by wind (11%). for amount to approximately 205 million toe by example) a balanced mix was composed with 2050 (from industry.9 48.0 Grid 3.0  Liquid fuels 0.5 0 0  Liquid fuels 0  Pipeline gas  Coal  Pipeline gas 2010 2050 2010 2050 2010 2050 7a. Mexico es identified to date has been taken into ac. 8 and 11 TWh/year of biomass. 70 TWh/year of hydro. CO 2 per kWh produced (Figure 6). Transportation Note: Carbon intensity for each sector includes only direct end-use emissions and excludes indirect emissions related to electricity or hydrogen production.0 20 20 5.5 3.5 2.0 0 0 3.5  Liquid fuels Grid  electricity 1. Energy consumption vances make it feasible to incorporate h ig h Under the deep decarbonization scenario illus- levels of intermittency into the grid by 2050 trated here. the two main energy sources: solar (40%) and In this exercise.9 30 28.0 EJ 10 10 10 4.9  50 50 40  50. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 154 .5  Pipeline Gas 0.5 1.0 1.1 30 30  20  11. diesel) by largely d ecar- and oil (1%). mal. The resulting carbon intensity after such the stringent CO 2 emission intensity discussed measures would be about half of the current a bove. transport. Assuming that technological ad. Buildings 7c.0 EJ 3. geothermal (2%).0 2. by Fuel.5  0 4. Figure 7.0  Grid electricity 1. coal (2%). 77 TWh/year of geother. Energy Use Pathways for Each Sector. hydro massive substitution of oil products (residual (6%).3 40 40 23. which includes 6.0 1. coke and. Electricity generation from all bonized electricity (to around 62% of energy fossil fuels (464 TWh) will require CCS in all demand projected by 2050) and natural gas generation plants (+60 GW) to comply with (30%). Such a generation mix would have a value (Figure 7a). Industry 7b.0 EJ  electricity 2. and an average emission factor of only 19 g of 88 TWh/year of wind. the reduction in carbon inten- natural gas (35%).

0 In the transport sector. steps must be taken to ensure 1. sibility of implementation of extensive electric Achieving this very ambitious solar target inter-modal mass transport systems. where these technologies would help limit switch to electricity. we have emphasized The preliminary approach followed to deeply de- the role of solar energy.5 the substitution of gas (both LPG and natural gas)  Personal car & taxi by electricity in final energy uses (Figure 7b). A theoretical storage potential of 100 outlined in this report relies heavily on the com. mission lines. 1. 60% of light vehicles (private cars and taxis) would grid. To reduce the building-re.0 0. are required. and integrate so much intermittent resource into the 3.0/ 8 Includes estimates for large and small scale hydropower. GHG emis. 9 The North American Carbon Storage Atlas (NACSA). the scenario explores 0. SENER. and investment in trans- travel demand.energia. as well as distributed production for house- transportation systems to satisfy the increasing holds and industries. generation and transmission infrastructure. GtCO2 has been identified in a preliminary study. and biomass resources.0 EJ high rates. assuming a capacity factor of be true at the required scale it would be neces- 20%) requires an aggressive cost reduction strat. sary to change the present urban growth patterns.2  Assumptions capacity to store approximately 200 million tons of The preliminary deep decarbonization scenario CO2 every year. require further exploration and technological In order to do this the implementation of large development to exploit lower-yield potentials in infrastructure and investments for clean energy wind. 2014. and 90% of freight would demand on the grid and the need for even more switch to natural gas and biodiesel by 2050. Further advances in energy storage 2. in http://iner. geothermal. Mexico would need the potential 2. In this scenario. together with extensive carbonize the transport sector assumes the fea- use of CCS techniques at gas power plants. 1st Edition. 2012.6 1. However. Figure 8. a massive fuel shift from 2010 2050 gasoline and diesel to electricity and natural gas has been considered as an illustrative decarbon- ization approach (Figure 7c and Figure 8). Freight shift to electric trains and gas powered technology and smart grids will also be required to trucks. A passenger modal shift to mass-public electric grid. by mode sions from buildings (residential and commercial sectors) have not historically been increasing at 2.nacsap. Increasing the amount of electricity produced ergy usage across sectors and the simultaneous from renewable sources other than solar would abatement of GHG emissions in the power sector. egy that allows massive roll-out of said technology. Given the large share of gas-fueled electricity project- ed in this scenario. For this to (≈270 TWh/year.9 plementarity between the electrification of en. using three exploratory assumptions: both as dedicated solar power plants feeding the 1.5 household energy consumption does not emulate  Short-distance rail North American trends.gob. Today’s medium-sized cities are expected to drive 7 Inventario Nacional de Energías 155 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .Mexico Due to the low energy requirements in households and Mexico´s relatively mild weather. Land passenger travels.9  Short-distance bus lated direct energy emissions.

zation and territorial planning could prove crucial ures considered in the illustrative deep decarbon. biogas from landfills and water treatment oper- ations might help lower future consumption of natural gas for electricity generation. processes redesigned to decrease energy intensity and provide an economically feasible route for and byproduct GHG emissions. perhaps by increasing the share of nuclear power or natural 2. and simultaneously improve quality of life. Given the dependence of this approach on the Amongst the enabling conditions that require decarbonization of the electricity generation sec. capacity in the present study and that may have A robust low-carbon electricity generation policy interesting potential are: additional renewables is required to evaluate different future alterna- (wind. some conclusions can 2.3  tive options for CCS. solar power robustness harvesting.4  Additional measures and deeper be drawn from the magnitude of the challenge pathways at hand. international cooperation. geothermal. opportunities and 2. increase certainty over governmental plans. and the technological availability of cost-effec- Alternative pathways and pathway 2. lack of resources to fund the transition. massive adoption of hybrid ve. we identify technol- tor. large-scale production of bio-fuels for trans. Although this is an initial exploration of deep de- carbonization in Mexico. to lower future energy consumption per capita ization scenario could be further reduced by addi. electric vehicles. potential. if such a solar plan is unfeasible. economic trains without major technical issues. large-scale CCS in future development. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 156 . enabling conditions This scenario also assumed that by 2050 electric Major challenges that may deter realization of vehicles will be widely available. and that it will be this scenario include current energy subsidies possible to divert freight from the road to electric (both for fossil fuels and electricity). storage systems that enable grids to include a and the development of zero carbon or carbon high share of intermittent sources (solar or wind negative agriculture and forestry techniques to power) and are valuable to manage overall de. reducing energy demand and thus reducing the Municipal and agricultural waste can be a source amount of funds needed to transition towards of biogas. an alternative pathway must be devised. Adoption of better practices in urbani- The projected GHG emissions resulting from meas. and biofuels production. However.6  Near-term priorities gas with CCS. Mexico most of the future growth and would need to Challenges. it is important to explore alternative techno. ogy development for energy storage and energy logical scenarios for this sector.5  adopt and enforce best smart growth practices. In this analysis management (smart demand and smart grids). and marine power). Energy efficiency programs coupled with appro- hicles. industrial facilities. and reduce emissions from these sectors. priate energy price signals could help decrease the port. industrial tives. rather than GHG emissions. Utilizing a deep decarbonization development pathway. Bet- tional actions that have not been yet evaluated. ter-organized cities could induce the behavioral Other options that have not been explored at full changes needed for mode shifts in transportation. we assume the presence of competitive energy carbon taxes to imports and exports of fossil fuels. support production of sustainable bioenergy crops mand. and partially substituting the natural gas in financial burden of the transformation needed by the pipeline network with lower-carbon alternatives.

which Russian Presidential Academy are importantly used for exports (around 40% of the 1. V. Since more than 80% of A.Fedorov. sive industries and sectors. and Administration crude oil is exported). acknowledgements to the Russian National production is structured around industrial production experts who provided very valuable (30%). transport and communication (8%). 12% and 20% of Economics.Lutsenko. crops. decarbonization and sustainable development Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy With the largest territory (17 billion km2. M. assets are more than 20 years old across all carbon-inten- O. coal. Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy 1 1 Country profile and Public Administration. Moscow world deposits of natural gas. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 157 . The forest area covers 1. M. industrial modernization is one A.Pluzhnikov. and coal.Shevelev.Rakitova. A.Saparov. of which 67% are and Public Administration & National on permafrost).2 billion hectares and the agricultural Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy land – mainly used for plowing. the Russian Federation is endowed with very Research University .7 billion of National Economy and Public tons of coal equivalent (tce) extracted natural gas. Moscow. less than We would like to express our half of which being utilized or treated. Total waste production is approximately 4 billion tons per year. construction (7%). services (31%). USA The national context for deep 1.Brodov. depreciation of industrial capital. Russia & Environmental Defense Fund. with special thanks to V. Similarly.Bezrukikh. agri- input to the project discussions in culture (4%).Stetsenko.Higher School of high fossil fuel reserves representing 34%.Yulkin and others.1  George Safonov. forage production and and Public Administration livestock pastures – occupies 220 million hectares. Vladimir Potashnikov. crude oil. Dmirty Gordeev. Kokorin.Berdin. O. respectively. L. The energy sector is logically dominated by fossils fuels. trade (20%). of the high priorities for the national government. characteristic of the industrial sector is the rather high overall P. An important Russia. Russia Russia Oleg Lugovoy. Yu.

or 8%). industrial plans and programs ( 6 http://government. “compensating” 29% of total increase of the share of inn ovative. The specific climate change ergy sector (403 MtCO2e.8 millions units or 257 cars per Russia’s GHG emissions are dominated by CO2 1. and petroleum rep- and become obsolete in 10-20 years. and past trends er generation sector is quite old and almost all Domestic energy consumption relies on fossil fu- large units will exceed their expected service life els. Another important specificity with 15% and nuclear with 3 The share of these sources and and adopted by Russia. 12%. 91 GW on thermal power plants (68% of total produc- were more than 30 years old and 46 were more tion). cov- long-term targets for carbon emissions by 2050 ering primarily CO 2 emissions from electricity have not been identified as yet. Electricity generation is mainly based combined heat and power (CHP) and many others). environmental important role in Russian carbon balance and policy. solvent. the net carbon diversification of the economy. transport. out of the 146GW thermal power and demand. 1980s.6 as well as the sectoral and jointly account for 221 MtCO2e (10%). and major alternatives include hydropower than 40 years old. and other product use Government (2014). and decarbonization strategy is still to be developed other sources. kn owl. modernization sequestration (in “managed forest”) amounted of its techn ological base and infras truct ure. are also of high political concern due to per- The main focus on longer-term development ception of the national forest as a source of goals in Russia concern the economic growth. and 35% of total in 2010.Russia Russia since main investments were made in the 1960. 5 http://kremlin. These emissions essentially velopment are stipulated in various official doc.economy. or 18%) and industrial mitigation policy objectives are provided in the processes (mineral products. waste. 4 Presidential metal production. In 2010. The sions related to the Russian energy sector. coal.000 people in 2013. edge-based sectors. related energy is described in Figure 1b. where natural The share of over recent years is the intense rise of the trans. global ecological gift. notably for private cars which primary energy production). and the deep generation. the overall capacity structure of the pow. emissions.1 Energy strategy–2030.5 Gt CO2e (according to UNFCCC) or 65% Development by 2020. industries. drivers. such as the Concept of Socio-Economic to 1.g.html 4 http://kremlin. 1. buildings.pdf Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 158 .2 GHG emissions: current levels. national GHG and population In this study. chemical industry. improvement of environ. the energy Carbon sinks (forestry and land use) play an efficiency improvement program. Other major sources of General Scheme of Electricity Units Allocation – emissions include fugitive emissions from the en- 2030. contributing to 73% of total GHG The long-term strategic goals of economic de. agricultural. production and consumption of Decree “On greenhouse gas emission reduction” halocarbons and SF6) (173 MtCO2e. have reached 38. 1 http://www. resent respectively 52%. Russian Climate Doctrine (2009). The (2013)5 and its Implementation Plan adopted by 2 http://minenergo. forestry. the main focus is on carbon emis- mental quality. renewable sources is negligible (below 1% of total portation sector. which amount uments. to 651 MtCO 2e. come from fossil fuel combustion.3 and others.2 of total GHG emissions. emissions (Figure 1a).

1990 to 2010 2a.352 to lution include economic growth. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 2b. growth of energy (Figure 2). from 3. with in particular a 38% decrease in the economy. prices. and Forestry) 820 237 226 127 13 1422 Source: UNFCCC.321 MtCO2e. GHG emissions. Figure 1. notably caused by dramatic drop of in. IEA (IEA data source is used for decomposition when official UNFCCC information is not available. 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 159 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . Energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors 200% Five-year variation rate of the drivers 2500 MtCO2 2282 150% 2000 100% 50%  GDP per capita 1500 1439 1327 1351 1422  Other 0%  Buildings  Population 1000  Transportation -50%  Energy per GDP  Industry  Energy Related 500 -100% CO2 Emissions 1995 2000 2005 2010 per Energy 1990 1995 2000 2005 0  Electricity Generation Source: UNFCCC. technological changes (moderniza- of energy-related CO2 emissions over 1990-2010 tion). Energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and sectors MtCO2 eq 1000 MtCO2 1422  Energy-related emissions 900 173  Processes 800 Electricity 142  Agriculture 700 (Allocation 600 by End Use Sector) 2218 78  Waste 500 403  Fugitive 400 Total MtCO2 300 1  Other  Natural Gas 880 200 100  Petroleum Products 252 -651 0  Coal 289 Electricity Generation Transportation Other LULUCF Industry Buildings (Land Use. by source 1b. structural changes 2. still important factors for carbon emission dynamics The 1999-2011 period was remarkable for Russia as it include transport and infrastructure development. and corresponding energy saving.Russia Total GHG without LULUCF emissions in Russia for 96% GDP increase). Land Use Change. Less but dustrial production after the collapse of USSR in 1991. World Bank. fuel switch from coal to gas. The main drivers of this evo- decreased by 31% over 1990-2011. agricultural production and for- and carbon emissions (only 18% increase of emission est policy (reforestation. Rosstat. Decomposition of GHG and Energy CO2 Emissions in 2010 1a. Decomposition of historical energy-related CO2 Emissions. demonstrated clear decoupling of economic growth waste management.) Figure 2. forest management).

726 32.89 15. (half of it with CCS).27 % 1.1 EJ in 2050. renewables’ share nologies development reviews.1%.1 15 4.5%. The simulation of to- The illustrative scenario discusses the technical tal primary energy supply (TPES) and final energy feasibility of a low-carbon economic development demand are shown in Figure 3.08 10 3. natural gas contributes 36% dependent.7 in.52  Oil 6. by source 3a.1  Illustrative deep The scenario assumes a population decline from decarbonization pathway 142 to 120 million people in 2050 and the tripling 2.30  Coal 1.08  Electricity and heat 4.2 and 2.1 .47 5 1. the Russian long-term economic development.67  Nuclear 15 6. and the share the Russian and international organizations. the share capita in 2050.67 t of CO2 per scenario: coal use to be phased out to 1.88  Biomass 5. Figure 3) in Russia should also be ulated with technological model RU-TIMES with a significantly transformed in the deep decarbonization decarbonization target set up at 1.31  Coal w CCS 3.52  Liquids 4. and projections by including biomass rises to 32.74 25 EJ 21. tal liquid fuel (including biofuels) to decline to 16.6%.76  Natural Gas w CCS 10 8.3.87 0.48 0.6%. of gas to reach 22. Final Energy 29. tech.41  Gas 0 0 0.116 19. The deep decar- under assumptions on economic growth (notably. The final energy consumption (from 20. as well as 2050. Russia 2 2 National deep decarbonization pathways 2.1  High-level characterization of per capita GDP (Table 1).25 % 20 20 16.8%. Primary Energy 3b.30 3.8% integrating a set of assumptions from official.1 EJ8 in 2010 Then the scenario of economic development is sim.5 20.5% of final energy consumption. share of oil should drop to 7. Selected assumptions and results about the socio-economic and energy sector development for the deep decarbonization scenario in Russia   2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Population (millions) 142 137 132 126 120 GDP per capita (constant 2012 US$) 13.63 0. and experts’ visions and assumptions of of TPES but almost half of it should use CCS.35 5 2. Table 1. with significant changes in the structure of increase of mobility) and patterns of development energy production: total coal use drops to 2. Uncertainties and robustness of con.1. as extensive expert consultations.25  Coal 2010 2050 2010 2050 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 160 . Energy Pathways.127 25.94  Natural Gas 0. to- clusions are discussed in section 2.97  Renewables & Biomass 0.5 EJ .833 Figure 3.75 7. as well of nuclear can reach 21.932 40. to 15. bonization results in a decline of TPES by 27% in increase of steel and cement production.

422 Mt in 2010 (IEA estimate is 1577. The total installed capacity accounts drivers and their pillars show that the growth of GDP for 226. Energy Strategy – 2030.4 . 1527 MtCO2 differs from the 2010 level reported in 1500 6 Figures 1&2 because of gaps in data y yThe electrification of the economy: the share 130 availability. Figure 5. The latter corresponds to 1250 official data from UNFCCC. the carbon intensity of electricity gener.4 MJ/$.87 % detailed enough to support the full should increase from 13% to 34%. for this purpose. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pathway. bonization of the Russian economy.96 % -60%  Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pillar 3. of which zero-emission per capita drives CO2 emission up but is offset by capacities include 46 GW of hydro and 23 GW the following emissions abating drivers (Figure 4): of nuclear power plants.5 GW (in 2013).7 MJ/$ 40% 2050 4. The share of renewables in electric power sector has 700 power and com- energy balance moves up to 10% in 2050 (0% in 2010). by Sector.8% of TPES 2.1. The Russian 1678 Mt) to 200 Mt in 2050. Electric power sector The scenario pinpoints a decline of energy-related CO2 The electric power sector is key in the decar- emissions from 1.Russia while the share of biomass should reach 5. and others. y y The decarbonization of energy production: in par. The rest is covered by y yThe reduction of the use of primary energy per unit of GDP: the energy intensity of GDP must decline from 15.2  Sectoral characterization and electricity and heat 53. 2010 to 2050 4a. 824 20  Buildings 250 200 74  Transportation tric power sector. The pillars of decarbonization 100% Ten-year variation rate of the drivers Pillar 1.9% by 2050. 310 sources were used combining IEA energy balance and CO2 statistics.72 % 20% Pillar 2. calibration of the model used in the analysis 1000 of DDPs. bined heat and power (CHP) plants (over 5 MW The decomposition of energy-related CO2 emissions of capacity). Note: The 2010 level of emission in Figure 5 ation should decline from 392 to 14 gCO2/kWh. 2014).8 to 4. Figure 4. 1  Other industrial and sectoral programs of development (elec. transport. Energy efficiency Energy Intensity of GDP 80% 60% 2010 15. IEA Technology Perspectives (2010. that are not of electricity in total final energy consumption 257 . metallurgy and others). 0%  GDP per capita Decarbonization of electricity Electricity Emissions Intensity  Population -20% 2010 392 gCO 2 /kWh -40%  Energy per GDP 2050 14 . 2012. additional data y yA declining population. 2010 to 2050 ticular. -80% per Energy Electrification of end-uses Share of electricity in total final energy -100% + 21 pt 2010 13 2020 2030 2040 2050 2050 34 % 2010 2020 2030 2040 161 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . 750 7 Concept of the Long-Term Socio-Economic Development 500 of Russian Federation (2008). 82  Industry 0 24  Electricity Generation 8 The estimate of the final consumption also includes en- ergy used by blast furnance processes for iron production 2010 2050 less transformed energy to blast furnance gases. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Drivers. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 4b.

leading to a 133% rise tidal.0 20 1400  Biomass  Solar 5. made necessary by their obsoles.0  Nuclear 600 2. The exces. to meet the low-carbon target (see discussion in cence. and geothermal (the “other renewables of passenger transportation by 2050 and an increase category” in Figure 6a). ing thermal power plants (coal and natural gas Several strategic developments can be envisaged fired) need to be equipped with CCS technology to decarbonize the power industry. creates both opportunities and challenges section 2. the significant expansion of this coming retirement of the majority of fossil-based latter category will be required only after 2040 power stations. Almost all remain- opportunities for investment in the industry. mobility demand continues. planned by the industry) as well as a growth of renewables’ share in the energy mix. The forth. Liquid Fuels Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 162 . Russia natural gas and coal-fired power plants.0  Natural Gas  Oil 0  Coal with CCS 0  Coal 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 6a. and they will play an important best available technological options.0 EJ 51. with assumed of light duty vehicles (LDV) and air transport. However.0 1200 0  Wind 1000  Large Hydro 4. Transportation newables consist essentially in a progressive It is expected that the recent trends of fast-growing deployment of wind as well as of small hydro.0 800 3.7 14    gCO2/MJ 80 2000 TWh 0   60 1800  40 1600   Other renewables 6. Figure 6. which is far below cially available. Energy Supply Pathways.Electricity 6b. for the industry.3 in case of lower availability of CCS). These re. role in the decarbonization strategy in the power sive capacities and slowly-growing demand limit sector in Russia beyond 2030.0 400  Biofuels  Natural Gas w CCS 200 1. CCS availability. The modernization will improve The CCS technologies are assumed to be commer- energy efficiency of the sector. by Resource gCO2/kWh 400  392  300 Carbon intensity 200  100 86. including by 2050 to reach the deep decarbonization target growth of nuclear and large hydropower (already (Figure 6).

native to the use of natural gas as fuel to trans- dating LDV to the best available technologies. The biggest polluter in transport sector will be troleum gas (LPG) engines in the mid-term and pipeline transport.Russia The reasons for this growth include growing GDP at relatively low costs. which will notably be permitted the share of electricity will move up from 7% in by the introduction of biofuels. 163 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . and increase of biofuels 4. There seem to be no alter- expansion of biofuel use in the long run with up. transportation.372 to from 60% in 2010 to 6%.5 MtCO2 . In final energy consumption. via pipelines. Industry 7b. LPG or biofuel may be more competitive. The heavy-duty vehicles per capita.9  20  20  20     10 10 24. with fall of oil products The freight transportation (rise from 2. 2010 – 2050 Carbon intensity gCO2/MJ 60  gCO2/MJ 50 gCO2/MJ 50  50 61. In the long-term. 2010 to 24% in 2050.9 5. plug. by Fuel.6 40 40 40  30 30  30  20. Figure 7. expansion of the loan market. options in the LDV sector include liquefied pe.4 12 12 12 10 10 10 8 8 8  Heat 6 6 6  Grid electricity 4 4  Heat 4  Solid biomass Grid  Liquid fuels  electricity Grid 2 2 2  electricity  Pipeline Gas  Solid biomass  Liquid fuels 0 0 0  Coal  Pipeline Gas  Pipeline Gas  Coal 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 7a. in hybrids with internal combustion engines on With all the decarbonization measures applied.5  32. port natural gas via pipelines. unless the technology improves. The low-carbon technological would be the primary option. and a (HDVs) could use LPG and liquefied natural gas shift from public transport to private light duty (LNG) in medium-term. Transportation Note: Carbon intensity shown in Figure 7 for each sector includes only direct end-use emissions and excludes indirect emissions related to electricity or hydrogen production. emissions of the transport sector in 2050 can Another challenge is limiting emissions from air reach 73. So the amounts Electric vehicles will likely experience delayed of consumed natural gas will be defined by the expansion in Russia due to tough (cold) climate domestic natural gas consumption and exports conditions. Energy Use Pathways for Each Sector. Buildings 7c.2 10  14 EJ 0 14 EJ  0 14 EJ 0 9. biofuels vehicles (LDVs).250 billion t*km in 2050) can be decarbonized up to 35%.

important source of carbon emissions and abate- idential and commercial sectors. In order to keep and enhance the carbon sequestra- 9 http://unfccc. chemicals and petro. with around 75% of heat being supplied ed iron and steel (IIS) production. and a moderate decarbonization poten- level of 60 kWh / m2 /year by 2050 (this is still a tial of the remaining industries is considered. of blast-furnace gas recycling technologies. will lead to 33% addi- to 30 m2 per capita in 2050. non-ferrous metals. to decline. such as direct reduced iron (DRI) on ping the existing reserves in energy efficiency natural gas with potential to reduce CO2 emissions improvement of buildings and overall residential up to 20-30% (with decarbonized electricity). which tries (which is around 35-45 m2 per capita). compared to the best prac. and a 6% energy efficiency growth mix structure should also be significantly changed from 2010 to 2050. duction in carbon intensity of steel production due The considered scenario assumes 30% growth of to retrofit and replacement of fixed capital. The will increase carbon intensity of the steel production decline of population over 2010-2050 however to EU level.pdf Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 164 . heating systems. and wide use of geo-heat pumps for heating. Further living space area per person. fishing) consistent with the deep decar- The commercial and residential buildings have bonization scenario is presented in Figure 7a. and cement) is assumed to grow (emissions will exceed sequestration) by the mid- significantly over the next four decades. other energy intensive industries. industry and other remaining sectors (agriculture. The overall losses in the improvement that resulted in more than 20% re- heat supply system are over 50%. The compatible with limitations of associated emissions. by means of electrification of the industries from tice estimated around 15 kWh/m2/year). Since 1990. low shares of Industry over-matured wood. land use and forestry sible and reduction of fossil energy consumption. expansion of forest fires and diseases. and other factors. as expected. by 41% forest. The scenario assumes a drop in Processes of other energy-intensive industries are energy consumption of buildings by 6 times to the very diverse. and by 10% in sufficient adaptation policies and measures. Russia Buildings gy efficiency gains and changes in the energy mix The residential buildings in Russia contain huge are then necessary to make this significant growth potential for energy efficiency improvements. The largest energy consumer in industry is integrat- tralized. mainly due to the adoption average living space per person for European coun. from 23 m2 per capita improvement. Important ener. be considered. electrification. and the net sink will become negative chemicals. further limits the expansion of total residential surface. mining. The land use and forestry sector (LULUCF) is a very Figure 7b shows total energy balance of the res. by 26% for 2040s9 due to an increasing share of over-matured steel production (from 66 Mt to 83 Mt). to follow the same strategy of energy efficiency growth. the by district boiler houses and combined heat and IIS industry showed significant energy efficiency power boilers (CHPs). etc. as a catch-up with tional energy efficiency. with additional electrification where pos. Industrial output of energy intensive industries (iron the carbon net sink in Russian forests is expected and steel. consistent with ment in Russia. energy efficiency improvement technologies should The deep decarbonization pathway requires tap. The total fuel mix structure of with notable increases in biomass. However. However. in- for cement (from 49 Mt to 69 Mt). mainly conservative estimate. heating system in Russia is historically highly cen. Since 1990. forestry. The fuel 14% to 34%. for deeper reductions. tration in LULUCF increased up to 628 MtCO2 due to relatively low levels of logging. the net carbon seques- the deep decarbonization target.

Decarbonization of transport sector via elec. Electrifica- power and CHP plants. additional measures could be trification. Utilization of huge biomass fuel potential. investment. Though the discussed scenario already has an 6. Russia has relatively lower potential for mainstream 3. 2. including location. and energy saving in residential and commer. and other). alternative low-carbon strate- 2. y yMaximizing energy efficiency of buildings. generation) versus other countries. process of de- itoring. 165 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . enhancement and strengthening of climate change With significant resources of biomass. 4. and technological support. reducing num- for district heating. and energy effi- 8. and maximize efficiency of thermal of nuclear power is another alternative. cial sectors.. tion of transport can be an alternative to biofuels. cement. biofuels potential. the technology transport. nuclear. Energy efficiency improvement of all type of notably through further electrification of indus- buildings. and use gas where able energy may reach more than 80%. where renew- 2. biofuel use. Although CCS has been tested ber of trips. the well as other renewable energy sources. The major technological conditions for reaching renewables might be used instead. In particular. costs and feasi- policy in the forest sector is required. ambitious target. Pursue aggressive end use efficiency across ergy in electricity production (about 25% in total all sectors.4  Additional measures and deeper 5. switching from private cars to public in pilot projects around the world. Electrify where possible. Deep decarbonization of industrial production pathways (e. final use sectors. ciency improvement.Russia tion capacity of Russian forests. there is more than significant the use of renewables. and it is uncertain if it will CO2 absorption from the atmosphere. and cluding transportation and steel production. hydropower potential of tidal and hydro energy. If CCS is not available. robustness y yCombination of biomass energy with CCS. Large-scale heat production using heat pumps y yMaximizing production of renewable electricity. chemicals.3  and iron and steel. especially in extraction.2  Assumptions gies should be considered. envisaged to trigger deeper emission reductions 7. and scope of application of geothermal heat pumps y y Optimizing public transportation. transport. including cement Alternative pathways and pathway 2. Decarbonize the power sector by increasing solar and wind power. and transportation of natural gas is can reduce demand for heat and geo-heat pumps. substantial be available under competitive costs in Russia. Use of carbon capture and storage (CCS). and from air-transport to trains. Methane leakage. y yApplication of CCS in industry. try. harvesting tidal energy. In case one of these technological assumptions cannot be realized. and following measures could be envisaged: 10. forest fire and disease control measures. Though not possible to electrify. not covered by the scenario but will require substantial reduction. hydro-power. A higher share plants. including bility of biofuels production depend on many factors. international cooperation in scientific. type of bio-resource. in- analysis is CCS availability. as conditions to be investigated more precisely. forest mon. etc. velopment. metallurgy.g. The current deep decarbonization in Russia include: scenario is quite conservative for renewable en- 1. The most critical technological assumption in the y y Hydrogen-based technologies where possible. under specific 9. as a large source of is not commercial yet. Higher energy efficiency improvements of buildings storage. and competitiveness of the technology.

when the major share of Rus. and others.). sia’s industrial capital assets are depreciated and yy Strengthening the current decarbonization efforts require renovation and modernization. energy saving. sion management (monitoring. the international “decarbonization re. Partly. tial. Involvement of emissions (adopted on February 4.).). etc. Rearrangement of the na. cap- In the current context. gic planning. 2014) and oth- Russia in international initiatives would be crucial. the second generation liquid and solid biofuels. It has the necessary natural capi. biofuels. REDD+). decarbonization of trans- cycle based on the deep decarbonization platform. However. ments under the UN. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 166 . through technologies (e. reporting on the source level). Near-term priorities for the Russian deep decar- certainly. global carbon pricing the creation of climate-neutral Russia. these measures gime” would play an extremely important role in correspond to the activities approved in the Russia’s mitigation efforts. and citizens. verification. er decisions. chemical. Russia Challenges. metal production. low-carbon energy production technologies. etc. etc. Russia has an enormous potential for deep y yEstablishment of the information basis for emis- decarbonization. etc. facilitate finding new solutions to deep decar- Obviously. and financial resources. forest carbon sequestration and ad- enabling conditions aptation mechanisms (LULUCF. bonization in Russia. and-trade schemes. new generation nu. etc. bonization pathway should include: Evidently. both in terms of scale Governmental Action Plan on reduction of GHG and speed of changes required. renewable opportunity for starting the new capital investment energy use. The competitiveness of the new types of energy These efforts will allow continuing decoupling will be unlocked by emission reduction targets GDP growth and GHG emission trends and will around the world. electrifica- boring countries. new of large-scale projects on tidal energy genera. The biggest challenge y yDevelopment and introduction of the GHG though is to channel the political will and business emission regulation system (providing incen- efforts towards the deep decarbonization pathway. tives for emission reduction.g. technological innovations. cement. production of icies and measures in forestry and agriculture. generation nuclear power plants. relevant transport standards and 2. and tal and territory. WTO. household behavioral changes and. These long-term cooperation frameworks need to businesses. project-based. environ- mental regulation. opportunities and 2. technological and scientific poten. technological. renewable energy sources. based on the implementation tion of transport and infrastructure. be provided in the new climate change agreement tional economy in favor of low-carbon production with active participation of all major-emitting technologies and a much less traditional use of countries. CCS.g. strong political will. supporting carbon sequestration capacities.6  Near-term priorities infrastructure. using Russian strategic planning of the economic development. as well as other international agree- fossil fuels will require dramatic changes in strate. energy efficiency.5  mechanisms. approach will require significant adjustments in tation of investment projects (e. and tion in the North-West and Far East of Russia y yImprovement of the adaptation/mitigation pol- (with unique natural conditions). will require significant efforts from government. the deep decarbonization including technological cooperation. scientific The deep decarbonization of Russian economy research on low-carbon development. implemen. Russia can also play a significant role in exporting y yEnhancing R&D in and implementation of break- clean (carbon free) energy and products to neigh. port. it is a great (gasification programs.). and institutional changes aimed at clear power projects.

given that society is divided along spatial. economic. resulting in one of the highest inequality levels of the world as indicated by a Gini coefficient of 0. South Africa South Africa 1 1 Country profile The national context for deep 1. this level of effort will enable South Harald Winkler.36 US$] per month in 2009 prices). and decline in absolute University of Cape Town terms thereafter to a range with lower limit of 212 MtCO 2eq and upper limit of 428 MtCO2eq. with an advanced service sector and a large energy-intensive industrial base.1  decarbonization and sustainable development The African Climate Change Response White Paper (DEA 2011) states. 614 MtCO2eq for approximately a decade. South Africa has a modern urban economy. technology. and social lines established in colonial and then Apartheid eras (South Africa. ature increase well below 2°C. Africa’s GHG emissions to peak between 2020 and 2025 in a Energy Research Centre. plateau with a lower limit of 398 MtCO2eq and upper limit of Energy Research Centre.” This is referred to as the Peak Plateau Decline (PPD) benchmark trajectory. There are high levels of inequality and poverty. dependent on huge mineral resources. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 167 . 2013a): y yThe top decile of the population accounts for 58% of income while the bottom half accounts for less than 8% (World Bank 2013). y y45% of the population lives under the upper-bound poverty level (R706 [66. range with a lower limit of 398 MtCO2eq and upper limits of University of Cape Town 583 MtCO2eq and 614 MtCO2eq for 2020 and 2025 respectively. With financial. Bruno Merven. and University of Cape Town capacity-building support. “South Africa is committed to contributing its fair share to global GHG mitigation efforts in order to keep the temper- Hilton Trollip.69. Energy Research Centre.

” This is at remain without electricity connections. 2013). estimates are made based on work by the Energy Research Centre (ERC) at the University of Cape Town (UCT) related to the SATIM energy and emissions model. of potential for concentrated solar power (CSP). There are important linkages discouraged work seekers [Gumede. 2013). This high level is the com- imported crude oil. and unemployment.1 2011. industrial one was drivers.8 m people in 2011. (DOE. namely the National Development 60% of foreign exchange export earnings. and South Africa’s recoverable coal reserves amount they are highly relevant in economic policies re. 56 GW. to approximately 49. tial socio-economic development is required to Hageman (2013) estimates wind potential at address poverty. odds with parts of the Industrial Policy Action Plan The average GDP growth of 3. Fluri (2009) estimates 548 GW relying on grants is not sustainable and substan.erc. giving the country lated to GHG emissions mitigation. the resource-intensive sectors and labor absorbing tween 4-7% is necessary (South Africa. which all envisage strong growth in 2011). bined result of an energy and electricity-intensive 1 This would require construction of regional transmission lines but projects are already under development and official planning (DOE 2013) includes Grand Inga in the Democratic Republic of Congo some 3000km from SA and other research reports indicate firm resource availability see IRENA 2013. and the economy relies on the primary and second- These issues are acknowledged in key policy ary sectors for much foreign direct investment and documents. South Africa will need omy is highly energy and (mineral) resource-in- to make provisions for the projected 8m new ur. an in. 2013).a. were extended to 14. tensive but states: “a resource-intensive develop- ban residents by 2030.2 GHG emissions: current levels. 2011a). but than 200 years. agricul- 1. are estimated based on: (i) DOE 2006 statistics (DOE 2009) which are the latest available official statistics covering all energy sub-sectors and related time series from 1992-2006. tracked by Bloomberg (Bloomberg. inequality. The shift in the twentieth century of the South African economy from primarily a rural. Of 10m households. and (iii) where public data is not available. 2014).South Africa South Africa Unemployment is also a major.5% accord. and past trends2 initially based on mining and then transitioned to GHG emissions in 2010 were around 543 MtCO2eq. is 60% urbanized. 2013) and a reserve/production ratio of more crease from 3. and grew 21% between The NDP recognizes that the South African econ- the 1996-2011 censuses. 2011a) to industrialization (South Africa. 78% of which were from fossil fuel combustion. (ii) Eskom statistics published in the Eskom annual report. tertiary sector accounting for 57% of total GDP in ing to standard definitions (40% when including 1984 to 70% today.5% over the past 2013-2016 (South African Department of Trade decade has not been associated with a significant and Industry. 3m ment path is unsustainable (NPC 2011). Social grants the world’s sixth-largest coal reserves (SACRM. The structure of the economy has evolved from a The unemployment rate reaches 25. and the NGP states that GDP growth be. There is a large regional The population of South Africa was some 52m in hydro potential. Plan (NDP) and the New Growth Path (NGP).htm Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 168 .4% until 2030 (NPC. greater than 40 GW.8 m in 2001 (Gumede. meet development objectives. The NDP envisages an the NGP and the current Integrated Resource Plan average GDP growth of 5. related concern. 2013]). this between the tertiary sector and the minerals-based is the highest rate out of 40 emerging markets components of the primary and secondary tural economy to an urban. the Beneficiation Strategy in increase in 2 Most energy-related figures in this chapter.000 Mt. see http://www. 157 TWh p. energy-intensive minerals-based industrialization. including energy GHG emissions. with the energy supply primarily based on coal and amounting to 10 t/cap.uct.

(South Africa did develop GHG inventories for the years 1990. sumption grew steadily for decades until 2007 Figure 1. and 15% of tricity generation.c. Land Use Change. 44% is for elec. buildings accounted for 60%. and commercial Of 250 Mt coal mined annually. since 95% of electricity is generated 65% is used in industry. between them there are wide variations in methodologies and results and the 1990 and 1994 versions do not have sufficiently detailed supporting information to resolve the variations to derive sufficiently meaningful trends for DDDP purposes. and Forestry) Electricity Generation Transportation Other Industry Buildings 223 53 56 40 52 424 Note: The “other” category includes both energy and process emissions of South Africa’s unique coal to liquids plants. 1994 and 2000. Industry and Buildings) 10%  GDP per capita 0%  Transportation  Population 200 -10%  Energy Related -20% CO2 Emissions 100 per Energy -30%  Electricity Generation 0 n. Figure 2. n. 23% in households. However. 169 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report .South Africa economy. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 2b. GHG emissions. Energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors Five-year variation rate of the drivers 500 MtCO2 40% 424 30% 400 384 390 20% Energy  Other  per GDP 300 (incl. CTL). industry. and from coal and about 35% of liquid fuels are man. by source 1b. 18% for CTL. 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Note: Sector specific data for 1990 and 1995 were not available for this report. In 2010. 28% exported. Electricity con- and 10% used directly. 20%. residences. ufactured from coal (coal to liquids. Decomposition of historical energy-related CO2 Emissions. Energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and sectors 250 MtCO2 MtCO2 eq 424  Energy-related 200 emissions Electricity 44  Processes (Allocation 150 by End Use Sector) 543 15  Waste 100 40  Fugitive Total MtCO2 50  Natural Gas 4  Petroleum Products 68 + 19  LULUCF 0  Coal 352 (Land Use. 2009). electricity demand respectively. The 2010 inventory has been released for comment in June 2014 and is therefore not final). 12% in commerce (DOE.c. 1990 to 2010 2a. Of the 10% used directly. Decomposition of GHG and Energy CO2 Emissions in 2010 1a.

Development Indicators and Energy Service Demand Drivers   2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Population [Millions] 50 58 67 69 70 GDP per capita [$/cap] 5.200) 24 14 9 5 0 • Middle Income (R19.24 0.23 3 0.1  High-level characterization dustry.16  Biomass 1 1. are under construction.201 .96 1  Liquids 1. which is still at work. business.008 11.355 8. solar photovoltaic (PV). 2 2 National deep decarbonization pathways Illustrative deep 2. Final Energy EJ 0.20 7 6 1.76 2 1.30 2 3.87  Nuclear 2.801 and above) 11 12 19 29 44 Figure 3. and in- 2.30  Natural Gas 0. More arose.36 6.800) 15 32 39 34 27 • High Income (R76.51  Electricity 0.6 GW. The Table 1.052 6.339 Electrification rate [%houses connected] 81% 90% 95% 97% 100% Household income distribution [m residents]           • Low Income (R0 .37  Renewables & Biomass 0. equivalent to some 25% of currently tracted or under construction. are also being con- 9.39 1.411 16.58 5 6 5 4 2. This is done while retaining the GDP structure The South African Illustrative DDP is based on an of the economy and configuring an energy supply and economy that prioritizes meeting socio-economic end-use system that is consistent with the PPD.1. Energy Pathways. mainly utility scale wind.R76. Electricity prices have more than doubled than 3 GW of low-carbon electricity generation. in real terms and are set to double again by 2015.92 4 3 0. Two large coal-fired power stations totaling and concentrated solar (CSP).06  Coal 0.4 8.23 8 + 149 % 6.55  Coal 2010 2050 2010 2050 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 170 .08  Gas 0 0 0.67  Oil 0.3 EJ 0.1  development needs in terms of adequate income decarbonization pathway levels and income distribution and providing energy services for South African residents.33 1.14 8. South Africa when a supply constraint. Primary Energy -2% 3b. installed capacity.R19. by source 3a.

52 trative economy is used as input to the ERC’s 40 TIMES model of the South African energy system 300 55 (SATIM) 3 using a cumulative energy emissions 260 cons traint over 20 10-2050 of 14 GtCO 2 eq.South Africa GDP structure is retained to provide products such for the DDP is achieved with a 2050 level of as steel and cement crucial for development and to energy emissions of 257 MtCO 2eq. 54 This is consistent with cumulative emissions 200 of the median of the PPD trajectory. Energy efficiency Energy Intensity of GDP 80% 2010 35 MJ/$ 60% 40% 2050 7 . primary energy over 2010-2050 and a significant tions are discussed in section 2.200 500 MtCO2 [around 1. -80% Electrification of end-uses Share of electricity in total final energy -100% + 17 pt 2010 30 2020 2030 2040 2050 2050 47 % 2010 2020 2030 2040 171 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . 0%  Population Decarbonization of electricity Electricity Emissions Intensity -20%  Energy per GDP 2010 879 gCO 2 /kWh -40%  Energy-related CO2 Emissions 2050 21 .ac.uct. NGP. These assump. the economy has aver- age GDP growth of some 4%. achieving the same cumulative emissions but a higher 223 21  Other 100 end level. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Pathway. Energy-related CO2 Emissions Drivers. there is an improvement by Sector. Over 2010-2050. decrease in primary energy per GDP.2.79 % 20%  GDP per capita Pillar 2. and by 2050 there are no households with “low incomes” (below R19.39 % Energy end-use demand per sector for the illus.htm.erc. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 4b. which is consistent with the low end of the range of the NDP and Figure 2010 2050 esystems-group-satim. see http://www. In the illustrative scenario. Figure 4. A technically feasible energy system 22  Buildings 61  Transportation 140  Industry 0 16  Electricity Generation 3 For details of the SATIM modeling framework and methodology. The pillars of decarbonization 100% Ten-year variation rate of the drivers Pillar 1. There is a maintain the macro-economic stability provided by large increase in end-use energy required for investments in and foreign exchange contributions the illustrative economy with a net decrease in of the minerals and industrial sectors. 2010 to 2050 4a. 2010 to 2050 in income distribution. 424 400 . Meaningful employment impacts could not be estimated.800 US$]).98 % per Energy -60% Pillar 3.

South Africa

Electricity sector emissions reduce radically, in 2010 to 20 g/kWh in 2050, mainly through the
emissions from buildings halve, and emissions replacement of coal-fired generation with CSP
from indus try increase three fold. Transport with storage and construction of significant ad-
emissions remain relatively constant. The “oth- ditional CSP, nuclear, and widespread rooftop PV.
er” sector (in Figure 1), which is largely CTL, With South Africa’s solar radiation resource, the
is phased out. extensive use of CSP with storage and PV across
a wide geographic spread combined with some
dispatchable generating assets provides a system
2.1.2  Sectoral characterization with satisfactory loss-of-load probability.

Electricity Liquid fuels
Electricity generation increases threefold. Electrici- Liquid fuels production emissions intensity is
ty generation emissions decrease from 880 g/kWh radically reduced through phasing out of CTL,

Figure 6. Energy Supply Pathways, by Resource

Carbon intensity
  gCO2/kWh 800
gCO2/MJ 180
879 600

186 
400 140

21 100
 0 80
    60
1200 TWh
1.6 EJ Coal to liquid
1000  Other Gas to liquid  20

1.4 0



400  Solar

0.4  Oil
200  Wind
 Hydro 0.2

0  Nuclear
 Coal
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

6a.Electricity 6b. Liquid Fuels

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 172

South Africa

and by 2050 all liquid fuels are produced locally Transport
from crude oil. Passenger Transportation
Supply of significant additional passenger
Industry transport from 285 bn p-km to 509 bn p-km,
The indus trial sector remains a cons tant pro- a per capita increase from 5,724 km/cap to
portional contribution to GDP, and it signif- 7,233 km/cap, meets basic development ob-
icantly expands at some 4% p.a. along with jectives. Private veh icle transport increases
the res t of GDP, wh ich leads to a significant from 2,669 km/cap to 3,861 km/cap and public
increase in energy d emand. Concurrent d e- transport from 3,055 km/cap to 3,327 km/cap.
creases in total emissions attributa ble to in- Public transport involves a significant sh ift
dus try (i.e. direct and induced emissions) are from mini-bus taxi (MBT) to Bus-Rapid-Transit
ach ieved throug h fuel switch ing from coal to (BRT) and rail, which are far safer and more
gas, improvements in e fficiency of end-use comfortable. The number of private vehicles
techn ologies, and sh ifting to electricity for doubles from 5m to 10m (9 people/vehicle to
some thermal applications. 6.5 people/vehicle).

Figure 7. Energy Use Pathways for Each Sector, by Fuel, 2010 – 2050

Carbon intensity gCO2/MJ 180

gCO2/MJ 60 gCO2/MJ 60 160
50 50 179  140
   40 40  120

30 30 100

20 20 80
28.6 
10  10  60
EJ 
0    0 73 40
6.4 30
3.0 3.0 EJ 3.0 EJ
2.5 Grid 2.5 2.5
 electricity 0
2.0 2.0 2.0

1.5  Liquid fuels 1.5 1.5

1.0 1.0 Grid 1.0
 Pipeline Gas  electricity Grid
0.5 0.5 0.5
 electricity
 Solid biomass  Liquid fuels
0  Coal 0 0
 Liquid fuels  Pipeline Gas
 Coal















7a. Industry 7b. Buildings 7c. Transportation

Note: Carbon intensity shown in Figure 7 for each sector includes only direct end-use emissions and excludes indirect emissions related to electricity or hydrogen production.

173 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

South Africa

Passenger transportation achieves a large increase Of some 10m households, 3m remain without
in supply combined with a small decrease (from electricity connections in 2010, but Tait and
31 Mt - 29 MtCO2eq, 2010-2050) in emissions Winkler (2012) show that providing adequate
through a combination of modal shift and ve- electricity for poor households in the medi-
hicle efficiency improvements. The emissions um term will n ot contribute significantly to
intensity of private transport improves from 160 emissions associated with coal-fired electricity
to 59 gCO2/p-km. in comparison with the emissions from other
The Illustrative DDP has a low 5% level of electric sectors. South African climatic conditions al-
private vehicles, but by 2040 around 19% of Bus low for provision of adequate energy services
Rapid Transit (BRT) vehicles introduced are elec- with little energy on average (<1000kW p.a.)
tric and 25% compressed natural gas (CNG)-pow- required for home space heating and cooling.
ered, increasing to 50% by 2050. 60% of water heating (currently largest single
Jet air transport emissions nearly double over the household energy component accounting for
2010-2050 period and remain largely un-mitigat- 50% of mid-income households) can be pro-
ed as standard fossil fuels are used. There is no vided with solar water heaters and with very
shift to high-speed inter-city rail. efficient lighting and electronic technologies
that are already commercially available, cooking
Freight Transportation
becomes the largest electricity energy service
More than 90% of freight is carried by heavy com-
at around 5,000 kWh p.a. Thus, with adequate
mercial vehicles (HCV) or rail in 2050 with export
thermal performance, an additional 6m house-
of minerals and beneficiated minerals accounting
holds could require only some 36 TWh p.a., less
for 20%; thus heavy haulage dominates.
than 5% of total demand in 2010.
Freight transport demand derives from sectoral
GDP growth and related transport requirements
and increases from 292 bn t-km to 998 bn t-km
(~240%) with an increase of 342 PJ to 492 PJ 2.2  Assumptions
in energy and 24 Mt to 32 Mt in emissions. The central assumption used in formulating the
The large increase in transport supply com- Illustrative DDP for South African is that it is
bined with the proportionally smaller increase based on known resources and technologies cur-
in emissions is achieved mainly through a com- rently deployed commercially although by 2050
bination of modal shift and vehicle efficiency industrial end-use technologies are assumed to
improvements: a sh ift from HCV to rail and improve significantly in efficiency beyond current
improvement in HCV fuel economy from 39.1 available levels.
to 16.6 l/100km. All rail is electrified. Average
freight emissions intensities improve from 83 Availability and suitability of electricity gen-
to 32 tCO 2/t km. eration technology and fuel and renewable
If biomass is sustainably harvested and paraffin is energy resources
replaced with biofuels, the liquid fuels and solid Achieving the required 14 GtCO2eq cumulative
biomass components in figure 7b reduce to zero, emissions, while maintaining a feasible energy
and the South African building sector contributes supply to industry as per economic development
a negligible amount to GHG emissions in 2050 assumptions requires early retirement of coal-fired
because all other energy services are supplied with electricity generation and deployment of low-car-
very low-carbon electricity. bon technologies to meet additional demand.

Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 174

South Africa

The specific configuration in the Illus trative Alternative pathways and pathway
DDP, with 80% CSP, is one of many very dif- robustness
ferent but equivalently feasible configurations The central assumption used in formulating the
that could provide similar performance; South Illustrative DDP for South African is that it is based
Africa has excellent low-carbon natural energy on known resources and technologies deployed
resources. at commercial scale.

Industrial end-use technology: efficiency
Decarbonization of electricity generation
improvements and lower-carbon alternatives
The electricity decarbonization relies heavily on
to coal
CSP with storage. There is a more than adequate
Generic assumptions were made regarding end-
solar resource. CSP technology is already oper-
use technology per major sub-sector: steady
ating at scale (NREL 2014), and bids have been
rates of improvement in end-use technologies
accepted by the South African government for
were implemented, as were rates for switching
supply of a Power Purchase Agreement for the
from coal to gas technologies, with limits for
totals. Th is conservative approach has been Bokpoort 50 MW station with storage which
taken in the a bsence of d etailed plant and is already und er cons truction. Thus, from a
end-use technology inventories. The rates and technical point of view CSP should be a robust
limits are considered to be conservative. For solution.
example, improvements made in the iron and However, should CSP not prove to be viable,
s teel sector, wh ich increases its production there are alternative configurations. A combina-
from 10 Mt p.a. to 47 Mt p.a. from 2010-2050, tion of wind generation, solar PV, and regional
achieve an intensity of 0.83 MtCO 2 eq/Mt by hydro could substitute all or at least most of
2050. This is at the top end of the range of the CSP and additional nuclear could make up
the international benchmark range of 0.47- the difference (See IRP 2010 documentation
0.84 tCO 2 eq/t. DOE 2013).
Switching from coal to gas is an essential com-
ponent to decarbonize industry. Although South
Industrial end-use technology: efficiency
Africa does not currently have significant gas
improvements and lower carbon alternatives
resources or the required capacity for gas im-
to coal
portation, transmission, and distribution, it is
As mentioned previously, assumptions are
assumed that it is technically feasible for this to
conservative and should n ot be a threat to
be provided.

Transport vehicle efficiencies
Efficiencies across the range of small-medium Transport: vehicle efficiency improvements
passenger veh icles increase by between 50- The 2050 vehicle efficiencies are robust. For ex-
60% from 20 10-2050. Gasoline and diesel ample, average light vehicle efficiencies assumed
veh icles improve from 9.0 to 4.0 and 7.5 to in 2050, namely 4 and 3.2 l/100km for gasoline
3.2 l/100km respectively, and diesel MBT and diesel vehicles, are already available for in-
improve from 11.3 to 5.5 l/100km. It is as- dividual commercial models available today. The
sumed that 5% passenger veh icle sales are 5% sales of EV’s by 2050 is a conservative target
EV’s in 2050. and hence robust.

175 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report

which is viewed as an option only conventional fossil-based liquid fuels are in the DDPP approach. South Africa Alternative pathways and 2. Most of these emis.4  of 4. portation also provides a potential deep cut. it is therefore reasona- (n on-electricity induced) emissions.7 MtCO 2 eq.2 MtCO 2 eq Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) could be ach ieved. and local requirements. 5 These estimations are not based on actual South African iron and steel plant performance metrics but on estimations based on public energy consumption data and aggregate projections 35 years ahead and thus are indicative only. “other” (24%). 0. The large contribution of 2010-2050 with emissions of 39 MtCO 2eq in kerosene combustion emissions for jet-trans- 2050. Substi. 4 considered.47-0. reducing emissions to CCS has not been included because South Africa 24 MtCO 2eq. providing for local demand. Th is can be com. further emissions reductions of some 12.e.73 t/tCO2eq/t to 0. Transport sions intensities in the iron and steel subsector There is a low level of electrification of pas- and/or limiting production of the subsector to senger transport in the Illustrative DDP. and chemical and petrochem. providing opportunities for signif- The DDP includ es an iron and s teel sector icantly deeper cuts involving electric vehicles that increases production from 10-47 Mt from (EVs) and biofuels. If biofuels were introduced for tuting the remaining coal with gas technology 50% of the remaining light passenger vehicles. or 4 MtCO 2 eq would be saved. but the lack of readily and pulp (6%) raise this to 97% of emissions. similar to those in the iron and steel subsec- ical (14%). If intensity were decreased 5 pathway robustness from 0.84 tCO 2 eq/t. reducing emissions with providing thermal end-use energy. proximately 80 PJ of gasoline + 35 PJ die- sions are coal and gas emissions associated sel p. would achieve 0. available or accessible data for other subsectors Opportunities for significant deeper cuts that has not allowed for meaningful estimations in have been quantifia ble. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 176 . could provide additional reduction potentials. by 8 MtCO 2 eq. Improvements are probably possible in cement and glass and paper and pulp but their relatively small contribution made this too minor to consider in this phase. A government d ecision 2050 production and the sector was limited to has been taken not to pursue ocean storage. Cement and glass (6%) and paper tor. 8 Mt. would be saved. i. another approxi- geological storage is still being investigated and mately one-th ird of 24 MtCO 2 eq.e.47 t/tCO2eq/t. namely ble that substantial improvements in energy iron and steel (28%). could be saved.83 tCO 2 eq/t. i. If this remained similar for to their exploration. a reduction 14%.e. quarrying (19%). mining and efficiencies and GHG emissions performance.73 tCO 2eq/t. based on data and this phase of the DDP project. knowledge accessible in this phase of the DDPP project. notably in the industrial sectors. i. pared with an international benchmark range If 50% of EVs were introduced by 2050. could be achieved. mainly exist through improving emis.a. If biofuels 4 Insufficient data has been (readily/publically) accessible in this phase on other industrial subsectors to assess cuts deeper than the DDP. has n ot id entified disposal sites d espite the The iron and steel sector exports about a third considerable efforts that have been devoted of its production. ap- of 0. The majority of South African energy intensive industrial plants were constructed in an era of Industry very low electricity and coal prices and no GHG Four subsectors account for 85% of direct emissions constraints.

strategic planning. Challenges. and operated by multinationals who own and y yFas t tracking of the necessary capacity to operate world-class facilities worldwide. 177 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . is necessary. and so by 2050 most of strained world. velopment of management and administrative capacity and sourcing of finance. finance. with the PPD is maintained and that investment Substituting 50% of the diesel used in freight remains attractive when the trade-offs between transport with biofuels would save 11 MtCO2eq. and administration to realize the BRT CTL facilities are the core of the largest industrial and rail projects and to implement complimentary complex and largest industrial company in South policies in road traffic management to achieve Africa. and plans to build transport infrastructure nationals to invest in the best-emissions class and to regulate and incentivize modal shifts facilities in South Africa. It is unlikely that South Africa could electricity generation will take up emissions cover such major costs without international space required by other sectors and maintain assistance. regulations and incentives will passenger emissions in 2050. or some 60% of have to be put in place to ensure that consistency passenger transport emissions. This will require significant de- presents a significant challenge. opportunities. The CCRWP defines the involved in the majority of emissions.South Africa were substituted for the jet-fuel. which PPD and elaborates how policies will be imple- are from large facilities. Indus tries to be implemented. a level of emissions in electricity that will cause induced emissions from other sectors Industry: Improvements in efficiencies and switching to gas and electricity to limit their potential to contribute to so- Production capacities in 2050 are multiples cio-economic development in a carbon-con- of 2010 capacities. project imple- CTL mentation. Phasing out or decarbonisation of CTL thus the modal shifts. then roughly If industry is to grow at a rate consistent with an 6 Mt CO 2 eq would be saved. and 2. The electricity generation system The early retirement of large coal-fired elec- tricity generation plants departs radically from 2.6  Near-term priorities official plans (DOE. Emissions from coal-fired network. These ballpark economy that can support socio-economic devel- es timates of fuel and techn ology subs tit u. The develop and implement transport strategies challenge would thus be to get these multi. the plant and equipment will be new and in y yThe PPD policy as specified in the Climate theory should be able to be at the best end of Change Response White Paper (CCRWP) needs international benchmarks’ ranges. 20 13) and requires the y yAvoiding lock-in to large emissions intensive construction of considerably more costly CSP energy sys tem assets with long econ omic plants and a large expansion to the transmission lifetimes is crucial.5  Transport enabling conditions The challenge will be to develop and mobilize policy. cost and reducing emissions intensity are con- sidered. opment and make an appropriate contribution to tions save 18 MtCO 2 eq of the 29 MtCO 2 eq of achieving the PPD. are typically owned mented to achieve the PPD.

2013a. ISBN: 978-1-920448. Pretoria (SACRM) 2013. gy Research Centre. November 2011. z z Merven. Department of Envi. South Africa 2009. Plan For Electricity 2010-2030 ment of Update Report November 2013 z z Economic Development. 2012. Overview retrieved March 31 25-7. and Winkler. Report by Statistician-General rica’s Wind Power Potential Dr of South Africa to the President Kilian Hagemann presentation of the Republic 2013. Research Centre. Pretoria. Pretoria. Ener- z z DOE 2009. National Climate Prospects for Renewable En. Stone. z z South Africa. International Renewable Commission (NPC). z z DEAT 2009. org/en/country/southafrica/ Plan 2010 Integrated Resource South African National Depart..pdf. z z IRENA 2013. Energy Policy Africa Millennium Development 37(2009)5075–5080. South in South Africa. T. z z World Bank 2013. Southern African Industrial Policy Action Plan Power Pool: Planning and IPAP 2013/14 – 2015/16.2000. Energy achieving universal access to (DEAT).za). 2009. Inventory for South Africa: 1990 the energy needs of the trans. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 178 . z z South African National Planning Change Response Whitepaper. sanedi. B. Greenhouse Gas A. 2012.. at Sasol Auditorium Rosebank. The potential vember 2011.P. A. overview.worldbank.. Affairs (DEA). z z South African Department of 18 June 2013. Department of Energy. Goals Country Report 2013. South Af. Department of Environment Energy Agency (IRENA). K. Estimating greenhouse gas . 2013.. H. 2011a. z z Hageman. The New 2014 at http://www. Elsevier. 2011. No- z z Fluri. of concentrating solar power z z South Africa. SANEDI (www. Digest of South Cape Town. National Development Plan. South Africa South Africa References z z DEA 2011. Hughes. Quantifying z z Tait. ergy. University of electricity in South Africa. Trade and Industry (DTI). z z South African Coal Roadmap of Cape Town. port sector for South Africa: emissions associated with ronment Affairs and Tourism A bottom-up model. Integrated Resource Growth Path – Framework. 2013. z z DOE 2013. University African Energy Statistics 2009. L. B.

159 US$ in 2010. Korea Energy Economics Institute Sang-Yong Park. The development of industry has also encouraged rapid urbanization. The Republic of Korea (‘South Korea’ or ‘Korea’. with the urbanization rate reaching 83% in 2010.3%.6%. South Korea South Korea Soogil Young. water. The national context for deep 1.a.1  Korea Institute of Energy Research decarbonization and sustainable Chang-Hoon Lee. following the export-led industrialization strategy. industry was the main sector of the economy (41% of GDP). and agriculture. development Korea Environment Institute Sung-Won Kang. they accounted for 46% of GDP. and con- struction accounted for 8.9% p. The Korean economy recorded a high growth rate of Korea University 6. Korea Energy Economics Institute Ji-Woon Ahn. Electricity. from the 1960s until the 2000s.3%. gas. dominated by manufacturing. Yong-Sung Cho. This fast industrial development has been driven by the strong growth of exports. Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 179 . here- Korea Environment Institute after) recorded per capita GDP of 20. for- estry and fishery made up the remaining 2. which alone represented 30. in 2010. As of 2010. 1 1 Country profile Korea Institute of Energy Research Nyun-Bae Park. KDI School of Public Policy and Management Dong-Woon Noh.

8% of total primary energy supply due Figure 1.0%. Decomposition of historical energy-related CO2 Emissions. Decomposition of GHG and Energy CO2 Emissions in 2010 1a. Given its very low for only 2. renewable energy. by source 1b. Energy-related CO2 emissions by fuel and sectors 350 MtCO2 MtCO2 eq 562  Energy-related 300 emissions 250 Electricity (Allocation 63  Processes 200 by End Use Sector) 668 22  Agriculture 150 14  Waste Total MtCO2 100 7  Fugitive  Natural Gas 85 50  Petroleum Products 186 . GHG emissions. Energy-related CO2 emissions by sectors 60% Five-year variation rate of the drivers 600 MtCO2 562 40% Energy Related 500  Buildings  462 CO2 Emissions per Energy  Transportation 20% 407 400  GDP per capita 350 0%  Industry 300  Population 236 -20%  Energy per GDP 200 -40%  Electricity Generation 100 -60% 0 1995 2000 2005 2010 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 180 . Korea’s economy is highly de. On the other hand.South Korea South Korea Manufacturing accounted for 51. 1990 to 2010 2a. and Forestry) 243 181 85 52 0 562 Figure 2. Land Use Change.5% final energy consumption. of this fossil fuel demand is met by importation. curity.6% of Korea’s domestic endowment of fossil resources. of which energy-inten. which represent 85% of including wastes and hydro power. pendent on fossil fuels. sive heavy industries constituted the dominant which poses the crucial question of energy se- share of 81. accounted total primary energy supply.44 0  Coal 291 Electricity Generation Transportation Other LULUCF Industry Buildings (Land Use. 96. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 2b.

63 tons steel industries and coal-power plants (Figure 2). final energy demand from oil and gas to electricity cus on GHG emissions reduction.1  emissions per person in 2050. oil-based fuels. the illustrative decarbonization pathway pathway seeks a very ambitious decarboniza- tion path for the Korean economy and reaches 2. Emissions are projected to fall from and to decline thereafter.7 tons of CO 2 consumption in 2010. first 5-Year Plan for Green Growth (2009-2013). lion in 2010 to 48 million in 2050. The economy This is permitted by a drastic decrease of energy is projected to grow at the annualized rate of consumption (-37. and lifestyles.1.0% of net emissions (Figure 1a). ciency.2 GHG emissions: current levels. and 90. The in the fuel mix. Large increases in Park Geun-hye has launched the 2nd 5-Year Plan electricity emissions reflected a massive shift in for Green Growth (2014-2017). and how. of emissions was a rise in energy consumption due transportation. decreasing from 50 mil.1  High-level characterization an 85. In addition. The key driver of the rapid increase tries. (2) the creation of new growth engines tion increased by 139% from 235 MtCO2eq to with investment in green technologies and indus.35% on the average over this period. 181 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report . about 12. is significantly reduced. Net GHG emissions rose during the past twen- proposing to pursue the following three objec. excluding sinks) energy supply in 2010. South Korea to the limited endowment of renewable energy per capita. Nucle. In particular. while promoting a to high economic growth dependent on ener- shift to high-value-added services over the period gy-intensive heavy industry that more than offset to 2050. the Ko. the importance of present study ignores this contingency altogether. and (3) greening of the national territory. possible by increases in nuclear power supply as well as the low electricity price policy of the gov- 1. which represent one-half of final With the global benchmark of 1. a sustainable due to a relatively low price of electricity made energy system.2% in final energy consump- 2. ernment. 562 MtCO2-eq. proposing to fo. and past trends tensity during the second half of the 2000s mainly Net GHG emissions including all sources and sinks due to an expansion of the coal-using iron and were 624 MtCO2-eq in 2010. tricity generation and industry are the two main rean government launched the National Strategy activities responsible for energy-related carbon for Green Growth (2009-2050). along with the emissions (Figure 1b). A major tion) due to large improvements in energy effi- uncertainty facing Korea is when. 2 2 National deep decarbonization pathways Illustrative deep 2. 560 MtCO2 in 2010 to 82 MtCO2 in 2050. ty years by 132% from 269 MtCO2eq (1990) to tives: (1) climate change action and energy inde. There was also an upturn of carbon in- drivers. there are important changes the inter-Korean unification is likely to occur. while emissions from fuel combus- pendence. which corresponded to 84. The succeeding government of President increases in energy efficiency.2% of total primary total emissions (668 MtCO2-eq. under President Lee Myung-bak. 561 MtCO2eq.4% reduction of CO2 emissions from fuel Korea’s population is projected to peak in 2030 combustion. such as solar and wind supply.1% of ar energy accounted for 12. if at all. Elec- In 2008. and adaptation to climate change. 624 (2010). Emissions from fuel combustion were resources.

06  Natural Gas 0.27 % 1. -80%  Energy-related CO2 Emissions per Energy Electrification of end-uses Share of electricity in total final energy -100% 2010 20 + 41 pt 2020 2030 2040 2050 2050 61 % 2010 2020 2030 2040 Pathways to deep decarbonization — 2014 report 182 . The pillars of decarbonization 100% Ten-year variation rate of the drivers Pillar 1. All sectors are concerned and see electricity from 531 to 41 gCO2/kWh.74 . CCS is applied their emissions decreasing radically over 2010. Energy-related CO2 emissions drivers 4b. Final Energy EJ EJ 10. South Korea and coal use is almost completely phased-out 2. Primary Energy 3b.98 8 .55  Renewables & Biomass 4 3.21  Gas 0 0.60 0.37 % 1.7% in 2050 (vs.96  Biomass 2 0. electricity Power (and notably of renewable sources) develops A broad set of low-carbon options for electricity with an electrification rate of final uses reaching generation (CCS.04 4 2.9 MJ/$ 40% 2050 1.04  Electricity and Heat 3.2  Sectoral characterization over the period (Figure 3). to 4% of coal power generation by 2050.1.77 % 20% Pillar 2. 0%  GDP per capita Decarbonization of electricity Electricity Emissions Intensity  Population gCO 2 /kWh -20% 2010 531 -40%  Energy per GDP 2050 41 . less than 20% in 2010) with and solar PV. from 531 to 41 gCO 2/kWh ply as measured by a fall in the carbon intensity of (Figure 4).26 1.32  Oil 2 0.22 0.57 6 0. 2010 to 2050 4a.10 8 7.22  Coal 1.99 1.05  Coal w CCS 0 0. coal without CCS