Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE

RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,

vs.

VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:

Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed
against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal
"peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he
continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic
symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the
present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to
argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent
injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were
committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that

... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any
time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may
retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.

He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on
September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the

tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or
appeals without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
 xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our
Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who
ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations
of the Constitution with impunity.

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all
cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis
supplied)

Atty. Almacen's statement that

... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of
[sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity

was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28,
1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal
of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the
constitutional bases for impeachment."

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio
H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing,
rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision.
Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse
counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion.
Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of
service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his
first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for
reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal
motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the
appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial
court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:

Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee
praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by
defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the
appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-
113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing
thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not
interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was
perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not
decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in
Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.
Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:

Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the
supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for
reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.

Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and
that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-
16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967.
Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417,
May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by
appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.

There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co.

In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss
the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on
November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the
decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution
in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without
prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said
case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio
presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26,
1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic
vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.

Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute
resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as
his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of
judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by
him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.

It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as
unprecedented as it is unprofessional.

Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition
until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his
proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had
earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder
he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero
vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967
resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not
accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why
no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November
17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to
require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request,
otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this
resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he
preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that
this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written
explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest
latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral
argument.

His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from
being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time
embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:

At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —

"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment
you judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure,
it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy
brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or
how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy
eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite,
first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see
clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."

"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to
them: for this is the Law and the Prophets."

xxx xxx xxx

Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his

petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his
lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in
the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the
individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without
justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the
noble profession of law.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been
asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated
with the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the
members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings
will bear us on this matter, ...

xxx xxx xxx

 To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of
JUSTICE, — what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its
hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas
and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.

xxx xxx xxx

Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this
Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment
on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.

Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE,
CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their
stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is
given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis,
DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own
President, said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being
circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the
war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a
commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."

xxx xxx xxx

We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We
attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were
compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the
decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor
obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the
Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that
you have not performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence
and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth
and his Constitutional right of free speech.

xxx xxx xxx

The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we
sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .

xxx xxx xxx

What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling
Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are
committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy
name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."

xxx xxx xxx

 We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who
would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong
public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.

xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts
and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf
and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries
for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the
sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons
why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to
no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the.
impersonal state of things and nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this
Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the
offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to
when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves
to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our
Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of
this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.

But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied
disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.

He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have
been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We
have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who
tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have
his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this
Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-
impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in
giving due course to petitions for certiorari.

Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we
would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper
role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is
to decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate
importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:

A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition
different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .

Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for
denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court
indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the
 Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed
the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the
last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their
merits. For the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189
petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be
feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune
that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated
different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding
that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.

Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099),
this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this
matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of
Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:

In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised
before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be
entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even
ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a
petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial.
For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals'
opinion.

By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in
alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme
Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered "dismissed".

We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to
buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the
supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give
every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
which recites:

Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of right

but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully
measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be
considered:

(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;

(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower
court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.

Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the
pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of
his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from
the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this
Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its
supervisory power.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or
ought to have known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of
appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did),
but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This
rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:

The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule
15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state
the time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at
least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion
shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held
that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine
National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil.
81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and
Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant
sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to determine
whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him
on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he
may file his reply or opposition.

If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only
himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which,
incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his
carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a
martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this
Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there
is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.

Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration.
We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he
sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ
with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they
are handed down.

Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers.
This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is
articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions
and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and
the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit.
Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of
public opinion."

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence
and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have
been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in
such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the
aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the
tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise
the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and
judges. 11

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of
democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
The reason is that

An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in
the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the
courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of
the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487)
.

Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the
prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he
dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to
see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated
by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:

No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or

publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than
members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a
correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an
attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account
and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he
may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .

Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
"professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not
expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).

Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become
conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to
abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of
an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212,
216)

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of
those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly.
"Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed,
but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand,
and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux
and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more
basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He
vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court
constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude,
not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express
declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely
to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by
merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes
abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward
judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those
gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the
judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards
as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of
the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the
bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re
Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his
privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into
a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-
honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez
in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations
or communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to
bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.

Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.

1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of
his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608,
nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties,"
adding that:

It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is
beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of
decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in
the judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the
administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then
the rule is otherwise.

2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a
leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed
judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject
to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is
BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did
not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to
do.

The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and
besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.

3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year
suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a
candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge
concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that
money." Said the court:

We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism
members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the
courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of
correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the
highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15
Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first
case mentioned it was observed, for instance:

"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication

by an attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and
of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its author."

Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than
those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which
requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the
strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness,
especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the
due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts
be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.

4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman
who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He
wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the
judge and others. The letter began:

Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is

protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be
compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.

Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois
declared:

... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for
serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his
grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of
the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the
people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges
personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts
and the law into disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot
be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and
influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the
unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and
calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.

5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by
corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear
that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged
with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:

A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the
court against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt,
undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with
the administration of justice. ...

Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of
disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he
possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases
that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment
and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism
that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well
understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a
vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.

6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an
appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal
was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension
from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that
the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court
said:

We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of
criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties,
 and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression
that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this
court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges
to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any
conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would
justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the
duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon
reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided
against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the
courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of
judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not
against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the
confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the administration of
justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by
their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is
guilty of professional misconduct.

7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:

I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible
temporary observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my
clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision
in their favor against a widow residing here.

The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:

... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and
innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima
facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from
this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court
as well as to his client.

The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.

8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an
article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the
court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:

The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of
the public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the
requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...

The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime
importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would
concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public
officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by
denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its
corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both
with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at
 all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating
facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of
the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less
impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a community
toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the
bar of the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in
them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights
he lends his strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the
part of the members of the bar the law itself demands retribution — not the court.

9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in
a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked
conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution,"
"calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming
of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of
attorneys.

10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater
latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This
lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning
both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of
certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published
in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:

You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the
burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court
acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable,
short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals
and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from
its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its
hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other
person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall
not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify
every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months,
delivered its opinion as follows:

The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in
sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have
found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and
the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by
him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made,
could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to
gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would
not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or
integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any
privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any
occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can
resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any
words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the
judge alone, he can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a
libelous communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute
an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these
respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly
different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly
different principles are applicable thereto.

The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he
exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by
considerations of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune,
as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as
a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this
court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally,
he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully
violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This
obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in
open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and
offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v.
Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as
regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney
upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by
written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or
elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial
acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical
and well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While
the court in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to
criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be
summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of
the court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any
person," said the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if
only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel
the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame
submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of
punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly
man would hold judicial office under such conditions."

That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes

professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has
been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a
personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his
integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court."
Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re
Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it
appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the
City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not
law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was
decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter
should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to
discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted
by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust
rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before
the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like
 manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the
administration of justice will fall into bad repute."

The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much
the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a
letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his
home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of
the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it
was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain
respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as
an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application to
the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L.
Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas.
408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's
Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.

Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained
as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him
and a suitable warning to others. ...

11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for
publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence
of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.

12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the
official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred
for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in
reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.

13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases,
criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the
court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public,
for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.

14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared
over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his
acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His
disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.

The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of
the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the
permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into
disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice,
constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser
appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent
in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.

Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of
counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature
have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although
resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that
universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.

A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.

1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although
conceding that

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not,
and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or
proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires.
The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their
institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation,

found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed

... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt
of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having
proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the
untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted
the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .

2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching
to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge
the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a
statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said
law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority
of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately
committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the
members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and
democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of
Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor
and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the first measures he
would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and
his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:

But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the

press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the
Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon
petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court
with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the
members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from
eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case,
who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to
influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct
the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and
 integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court
into disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... .

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding
in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse
party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases
decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of
the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which
the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands,
and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an
officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he
has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that

... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in

his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or
stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A.
[N.S.], 586, 594.)

3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al.,
supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly
adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the
Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal.
Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:

As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks
of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of
the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of
this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It
makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier
rulings without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent
statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these
is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the
industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the
point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line
drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is
that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are
not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and
respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members — and
some former members of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted
 yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against
splitting of jurisdiction."

Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of
brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal
rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks
or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion
thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied
emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court
had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.

The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality.
For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof,
however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with
the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to.
A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt
proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial
which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of
the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an
adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them
may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran
in Alarcon:

A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in

administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt
which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in
any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally
punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts
to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the second kind of
contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act
or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in
them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is
no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In
the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to
be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public
confidence in them is destroyed.

Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and
actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had
attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated
during the pendency of the said appeal.

More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for
such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of
November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns
Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this
Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to
safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of
unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-
pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is
to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose
misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney.

Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn
duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this
prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who
have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —

The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and
incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration
that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint.
Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated.
Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is
vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial
discretion to exclude them from practice. 23

This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy
of their confidence and respect. So much so that —

... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of
the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right,
but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the
privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost
universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts,
and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as
a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise
of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24

Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or
incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25

Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment
of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the
object of disciplinary sanctions.

The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's
part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere
offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said
move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition
bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and
its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically
denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With
unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to
the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding
its members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause
of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his
actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward
the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead,
with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the
Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites
incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks
for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the
permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the
spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this
Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the
orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature,
and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less
than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross
transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The
way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is
unavoidable.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a
critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of
last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy,
and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant
striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must
be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as
Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and
judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total
distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an
action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being
intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person
to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to
be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against
the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members
thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and
distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a
collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted
court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30So that, in a very real sense,
if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members
thereof — as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would
be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of
men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the
power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in
this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction
legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the
aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power
because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for
disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one
entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.

Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty.
Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere
suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the
imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being
neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled
by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the
dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be

overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed
where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be
futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive
language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there
is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the
circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance
nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last
and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are
empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also
because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to
completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which
is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The
merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for
himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes
effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is
hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.

Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the
Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.

Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and
Villamor JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.

A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.

A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975

IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ,
ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C.
Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for
disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction
and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho — who
flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%,
respectively — invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one
examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before
the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed,
according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar
Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe
that the grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations — to
raise the grades — prior to the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or
request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned
reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now
when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due
process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their
grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford
sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately
decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar
Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public International
Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate
with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and
authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the
bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who
flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%,
72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a
grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was
considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant
Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on
the matter, with which request they complied.

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same
was done and his reasons for doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or
re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar
Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed
only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court
required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within
ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing
average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him
"to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by
the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while
respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27,
1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his
answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his
unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by
the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-
110,) rec.).

In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-
evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and
Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo,
Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a
number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline
for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was
likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded
as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public
International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code
No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg.
Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a
notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to 50% This
notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify
in the investigation.

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of
the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y
Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University,
was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court
of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted
with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent
Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical
injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).

Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this
fact which he is required under the rules to do.

The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October
2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents
Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.

Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia,
where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.

At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only
his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their
direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became
the basis for their cross-examination.

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the
investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under
which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.

In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:

2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the
examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the
practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of
the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an
extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring
back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;

3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the
owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing mark;
 4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and
policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation
and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based
on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3
and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to
5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).

His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972
affidavit with following additional statements:

xxx xxx xxx

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no
longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation
and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;

4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did
not know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable
Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am
authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on
the following circumstances:

a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971,

relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the
point that with respect to the correction of the examination booklets of
bar candidates I have always followed him and considered his
instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable
Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative
but to take his words;

b) That considering this relationship and considering his

misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and policy of the
Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the
consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee.
Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the
Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for
fear that I might be identified as a bar examiner;

xxx xxx xxx

e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such

recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in
Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the original correction
of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and
Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:

On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the
last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400)
which according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at
about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least two
companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code
number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me
to review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears that the examinee
obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee
had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall
correctly, in remedial law.

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as
I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so
because the same was still within my control and authority as long as the particular
examinee's name had not been identified or that the code number decode and the
examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the
examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or
revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a particularly low
grade to said examinee.

Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as
it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I
re-examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with
the same standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with
the result that the examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing
with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me
that the code number of the examinee in question had not been decoded and his
name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade
card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized
grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my
personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy
thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy the grading sheet"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)

In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo
P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement
and in additional alleged that:

xxx xxx xxx

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international

law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to
know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his
name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that I have never met
him even up to the present;

4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such
review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to
make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of the
 examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's
assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of
express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the
Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained
as much as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be
identified as an examiner. ...;

5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening
at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did
not appear to me that his representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed,
the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and thus
looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour
that he used to see me:

xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when
I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661,
my aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not to make the
examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred,
because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering
especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had
obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial
law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar
Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know and that there
was nothing irregular in that:

8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with
notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points,
resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as
heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the
representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...

9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee
consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the
rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it
as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the
names of the candidates.

10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no
knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did
not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or
rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.;
emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:

1. xxx xxx xxx

2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books
to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
 3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in
Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another
subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying
that that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a
percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to
75%then he would make the general passing average.

4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I
remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the
mark and revised also the mark in the general list.

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the
Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in
question who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any
personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney
Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854
Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's notebook in
Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me
that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He
requested me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I
had previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had done well in
other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him
in Remedial Law his general average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked
that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving
of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my
attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in
good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would
reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was entirely within my
discretion.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to
address such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the
presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item
of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I increased
the grades in some items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the same
grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the
new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few
points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his
sworn statement, adding the following:
 xxx xxx xxx

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade
of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein
respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not having
verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the
request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of
such omission, that —

a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not
aware, not having been apprised otherwise, that it was not within the
authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or
suggest that the grade of a particular examination notebook be
revised or reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing to the
highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the
request was legitimate.

xxx xxx xxx

c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein

respondent carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court,
and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular subject
that the said examine failed, herein respondent became convinced
that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously
given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's
honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should also
be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers, herein respondent
downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by the examinee,
from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:

xxx xxx xxx

That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar
Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other
subjects except Mercantile Law;

That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate
the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.

That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No.
1613) showing a grade of 61%;

That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular
Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
 That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade
sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn
statement of April 17, 1972, and

xxx xxx xxx

2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-

evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in
absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made during one of
the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only
one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of
the candidate concerned, which I did.

3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-
evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up to this time
this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:

xxx xxx xxx

As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and
the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers
on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that
those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to the
examiners shortly earlier to the effect that

... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be

given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),

I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation
and/or re-checking.

It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the
results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees
that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and
have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them would file motions
or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of
such motions or requests which we are reading for submission to the Honorable
Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be
denied because the result of the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.

It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to

bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his

hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his
intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was
inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does
not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers
having brought to the attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter
concerning another examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a
grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the
disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject, respondent brought the
notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus
enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned
is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".

Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such
serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all good
faith.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing
that the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the
matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so merited on the
basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo,
particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the
examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation
was in order,

2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:

Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of
February, 1972, on my way back to the office (Bar Division) after
lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it
a point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from any
object and the first number that comes into my sight becomes the
basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I
saw was "954" boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently
belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the
right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court building
from San Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern
corner of the fence of the Araullo High School(photograph of the
number '954', the contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of
 the post to which it is attached is identified and marked as Exhibit 4-
Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).

With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to

look for a ticket that would contain such number. Eventually, I found a
ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to
"954". This number became doubly impressive to me because the
sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was "27", a number that
is so significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively
to link or connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus even
in assigning code numbers on the Master List of examinees from
1968 when I first took charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant
up to 1971, I either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with
said number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as Exh. 5-
Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a
Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at
the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as
Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as
Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and
the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).

The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these

incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the
Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the
last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still
confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by
Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties.
From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a
new life for me having been saved from the possibility of being
among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out
of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27,
1947, I got married and since then we begot children the youngest of
whom was born on February 27, 1957.

Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I
resumed my work which at the time was on the checking of the
notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing
the office code number "954". As the number was still fresh in my
mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of
the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language
and the apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in
all good faith on the basis of the aforementioned Confidential
Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they
merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to
the respective examiners for possible review recalling to them the
said Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to
their discretion and judgment.

3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of

the two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during the meeting
and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely:
 (a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but
with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of
this examinee bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked
as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the
Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of 4% increased to
50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and

(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average

of 73.15% with a grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the
time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the
data thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and
International Law under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The
notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified
and marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and
International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with the
original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh.
10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International Law is
precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of
Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only
one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile
Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the latter, under the
facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee and pursuant to which the
Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners
concerned;

5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-
check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that
there was very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless
very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the
weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is
devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of
notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the
first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets
and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the
number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of
respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;

1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio

Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as required by the latter
respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.

xxx xxx xxx

4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider
"failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a
"passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar confidant
 do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary course of official
business?

It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a
reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?

5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated
March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio
Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the
respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized
anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.

But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the
Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to the
benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of
Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or
especially for him and not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar
candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's
grades was done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of
policy of the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's
examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-
evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not
far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in
herein Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused
actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume this
could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the members of
the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves
and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these
inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only
goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this

Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well
as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy
between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied and it is
contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that
they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this case.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).

The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and
cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the
answers of respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners
to make the desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected
notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the
custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before
Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was
in the process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that
as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if
he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one
on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change
of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-
examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the
examinee who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said
subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-
examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in
doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75%
from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and
with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang.
Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said
booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56,
57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil
Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the
passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.

Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street,
Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and
previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review
the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that
"they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other
subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent
Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent
Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook were
reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar.
Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in
his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore, respondent
Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum
that read as follows:

4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal

fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of
memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to clarify of
language and soundness of reasoning.

Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that
respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further believing
that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of
Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law,
from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by
him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136,
instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53,
rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing
grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.

Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to
deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in
Political Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a
notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said
notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and Public International
Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%,
said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is
possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help
out examinees who are failing in just one subject — respondent Pablo acceded to the request and
thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-
evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased
to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding
corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with
Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp.
43-46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the
passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter,
who was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he
had already finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law
— that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a
fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then
the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and
seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of the
examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the
revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The
examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65,
66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when
the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to
him that where a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a
matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing
subject. He recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this
was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by
him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing
grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision
of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of
his quite ingenious scheme — by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the
examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner
concerned would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee
adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63;
Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).

At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by
respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This
information was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely
seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular
paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's
notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then
reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to
71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration or
decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular
examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make
the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that
there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he
had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook
of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and
with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).

A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned
to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second
week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondent
Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No.
661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-
examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine
who owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is
84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the
grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an
increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It
belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V,
pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

II

Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias

ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners
concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that
eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%,
or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971
Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's
examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his
lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee
to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed
only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo
sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential
Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No.
1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He
maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation;
that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant
but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left
alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum
was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination
papers and never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not
only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose
declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent
Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No.
1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing
of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the
records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him
by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and
confidence that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers
of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein,
ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied
and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners
concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang
failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only
66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee
failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang
was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark
and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The
averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as
follows:
 BAI

1. Political Law Public

International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points

BAI

Labor Laws and Social

Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.

2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points

or 33 weighted points.

Taxation 74% 74% = no re-

evaluation made.

3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.

or 30 weighted points.

4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or

22 weighted points.

5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =

11 pts. or 44 weighted points.

Legal Ethics and Practical

Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5)
subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was
increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the
integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor
only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty
dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who — Political Law and
Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation
or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him
by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects
taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative
data showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to
the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing
average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of
the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the
Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the
examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be
addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such
initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as well as the image of
the Court.

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of
betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite
belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation,
leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from
70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more
properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of
absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For
certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any
dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of
reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave
injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said
more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the
Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said
re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of
good faith.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto
Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the
case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far
better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of
Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject.
Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter
shown.

The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook,
unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3-
Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to
why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man
desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent
Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he
filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing
that it was just an after-thought.

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO

RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE
ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO
FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT
FROM 57% TO 66%.

Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on
Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the
Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and
Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these
two cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI,
pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-
evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty
dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of
these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of
the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of
the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing
the date of the two examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not
presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the
Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45,
rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential
Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162,
p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in
Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and
record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613
(Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however,
that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing
in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of
Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the
notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as
Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the
figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to
their admission in evidence.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee
presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the
Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the
examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was
not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an
examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that
was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging
to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the
Examiner concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code
Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-
evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was
taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp.
59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the
Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political
Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of
the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the
Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V,
p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo,
Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
72, rec.).

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back
to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:

Labor Laws 3%

Taxation 69%

Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political
Law are as follows:

BA

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27

weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————————

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner
Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing
grades. These are:

Political Law 70%

Taxation 72%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:

BA

Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation

Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
 Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in
Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which
violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.

It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner
Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee
because even at the time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his
answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-
evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential
Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-
evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.

Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations
and undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.

As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and the
corresponding investigation conducted.

III

Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.

The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his
answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law,
Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.

The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and
principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a
decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan —
Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a
bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and
Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a
member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners
in the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer
between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the
Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court.
Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the
admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules
of the Court and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar
Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in
connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and
must be strictly adhered to.

The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in
five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any
authority from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as
Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971
Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not
possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not
clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-
evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the
examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether
the proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with
the rules.

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the
character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for
admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending
in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was
required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character
(Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully
ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral
turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing
the Court of one's personal record — whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the
case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the
Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not
only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but also of all
other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application form used
by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the
disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to
show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all
his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and
determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it,
the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be
gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its
dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for
admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and
third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already
required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no
pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the
fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to
reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the
applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense before a
Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case
No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from
the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the
City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his
applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing
and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964,
1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he
declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the
Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally
to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that
he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license
to practice law is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:

[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in

withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to
whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an
indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).

[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he
applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of
the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law
Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).

The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the
clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).

Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:

[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the
Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed
truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and his
standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of indictments
against him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts
which should have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as were
available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the
court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).

Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his
having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case
including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by
the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen
years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite
attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member
of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him
to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was,
as early as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case.
Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was
allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar,
WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking
out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:

The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound
discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which
merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a
disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer
of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit
him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American cases)
[52 Phil. 399-401].

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is
not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the
admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others,
of (a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational
attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T.
Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in
their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack
of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar
examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil.
399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro,
the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the
crime of falsification of public documents.

IV

RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge),
Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty.
Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr.,
respondents.

All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction
of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All,
however, professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks
without knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the
same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and
WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-
evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the
Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care
and caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar
Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who
would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should
have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the
average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective
and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the
examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on
the Bar examinations could have been avoided.

Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath
that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with
respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political
Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the
grades of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent
Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said
that this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I
cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing
average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp.
60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have
passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook
and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I
believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before
to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and said
'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over
the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were
wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not
complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the
grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).

It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents
Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in
grades they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by
the misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:

Montecillo —

Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of

the paper?

A Yeas, your Honor.

Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the
absence of such information?

A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time"

(Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5,
Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer
dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
40-41, and 72, rec.).

Pamatian —

3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an
examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him the
 owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and
policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the
grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am
authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo,
..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Manalo —

(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent
carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the
answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the
benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that
particular subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced
that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but
he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing
grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Pardo —

... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that
particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the representation
of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the
herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the
re-evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded
integrity, honesty and competence notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the
said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).

At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which
were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE
find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-
examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the
highest consideration of public interest — absolute purity of the proceedings — and so are required
to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative
thereto.

V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that
respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or
support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into
helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said
examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations
(p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).

It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice
Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's
insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in
his words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the
investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against
Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia
"until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as
a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does
not invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the
grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar
Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for
the purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian
advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian
mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian)
before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was
divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an
indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his
actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to
undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.

VI

The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent
Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable
consideration.

There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official
release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary
as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.

1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes,
Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount
of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on
April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes,
Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No.
90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972:
Second mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5,
1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent
Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to
him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings
while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a
loan and received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars
($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from
his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.

In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in
the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under
Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00
bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00
was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in
his 1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein involved did not
push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965
to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married
sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000
(P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on
January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from his
sister at the time he received the $200 was not even presented by respondent during
the investigation. And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he
considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode
or time of payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the address
of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records.
Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her own, is
among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to him, the
conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-
gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.

On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes
house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14,
1972 — date of instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of inscription). On February 28,
1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed
by respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143.
Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry
No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled
on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor
of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to
respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a
month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection with his resignation
and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his
assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the
same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities).
 2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956
VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January,
1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car
was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to
1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in his
1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972)
Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was
P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.

The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to link or
tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by respondent
Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or to show that the
money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came
from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.

During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of
the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential
Letter and in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the
matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on
October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was
required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is
indicative of a consciousness of guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January
15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially
claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house
and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in
relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:

(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act

constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or allowing
himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or offense.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidence
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once
it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such
public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets
and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as
they are part of the records of this Court.

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E.
Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar
Confidant.

1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of
the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies
at the MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958,
respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the
governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the
Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of
Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans
Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time,
therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans
Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the
date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).

It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the
availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his
pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already
19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of
Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that
he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears,
however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the
MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita
Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-
56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St.,
Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).

Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine
Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location
of the said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational
benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings
(Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of
Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V,
pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building
and is obliquely across the City Court building.

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he

investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability
benefits; that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans
investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that
he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49,
rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at
Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later
he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the
Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During
the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no
communications with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not
remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the
Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII,
p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was
bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent
Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).

German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces,
otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof
on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served
into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta.
Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up
operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of
demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar
Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from
the Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the
bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS

HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG,
alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED
STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.