Professional Documents
Culture Documents
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30,
2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or
render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has
no power to cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in
our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize
E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely
new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission”
with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman
created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar
species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive power and
power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD
No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the
DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to
create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official
action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing
is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right”
in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He has to
show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds
reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers
of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc
committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in
the performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be
the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function of
determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be
with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent
transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It
is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear
mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a
class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must
conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
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GARCIA v. DRILON
FACTS: Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) admitted having an affair with a bank manager. His infidelity
emotionally wounded private respondent which spawned several quarrels that left respondent
wounded. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann.
The private respondent was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take
away their children and deprive her of financial support. He warned her that if she pursued legal battle,
she would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to
hold office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses. Hence, no source of
income.
Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against
respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) pursuant to RA
9262.
Republic Act No. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.
RULING: No. The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition
against classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put
them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of
women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences between
men and women.
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable
victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting
human rights, insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and
the special remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in
fact essentially necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review
or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the
equal protection clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
Brief Fact Summary. A slave sought his freedom under the Missouri Compromise.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Slaves are not citizens under the United States Constitution.
Facts. Dred Scott (Plaintiff) was a slave living in the slave state of Missouri. His owner took him to Illinois
and then to Minnesota, which were both free states under the Missouri Compromise. Plaintiff and his
owner returned to Missouri, and Plaintiff was sold to Sanford (Defendant). Plaintiff sued Defendant for
his freedom, claiming to be a citizen of Missouri, based on having obtained freedom by domicile for a
long period in a free state.
Issue. Can a slave be considered a citizen and as such become entitled to all the rights, privileges and
immunities granted to citizens under the United States Constitution?
Held. No.
Slaves were not intended to be included under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution. At the time the
Constitution was written, slaves were considered an inferior and subordinate class. No state can
introduce a new member into the political community created by the Constitution.
The Declaration of Independence clearly never intended to include slaves.
The Constitution never intended to confer on slaves or their posterity the blessings of liberty, or any of
the personal rights so carefully provided for the citizen. Plaintiff is clearly not a citizen and not entitled
to sue.
An act of Congress, which deprives a citizen of his property merely because he brought his property into
a particular part of the United States does not comport with due process of law. The right of property in
a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. An act of Congress, which prohibits a
citizen from owning slaves in any territory in the United States is void. So, Plaintiff did not become free
by going into a state, which prohibited slavery.
Discussion. This case is remembered for the decision that blacks were not citizens, but merely property.
It is also remembered for voiding the Missouri Compromise.
Plessy v. Ferguson
The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892,
Homer Adolph Plessy -- who was seven-eighths Caucasian -- took a seat in a "whites only" car of a
Louisiana train. He refused to move to the car reserved for blacks and was arrested.
Question
Is Louisiana's law mandating racial segregation on its trains an unconstitutional infringement on both
the privileges and immunities and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
No, the state law is within constitutional boundaries. The majority, in an opinion authored by Justice
Henry Billings Brown, upheld state-imposed racial segregation. The justices based their decision on the
separate-but-equal doctrine, that separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the Fourteenth
Amendment so long as they were equal. (The phrase "separate but equal" was not part of the opinion.)
Justice Brown conceded that the 14th Amendment intended to establish absolute equality for the races
before the law. But Brown noted that "in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a
commingling of the two races unsatisfactory to either." In short, segregation does not in itself constitute
unlawful discrimination.
This case was the consolidation of four cases arising in separate states relating to the segregation of
public schools on the basis of race. In each of the cases, African American minors had been denied
admittance to certain public schools based on laws allowing public education to be segregated by race.
They argued that such segregation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The plaintiffs were denied relief based on the precedent set by Plessy v. Ferguson, which established the
“separate but equal” doctrine that stated separate facilities for the races was constitutional as long as
the facilities were “substantially equal.” In the case arising from Delaware, the Supreme Court of
Delaware ruled that the African American students had to be admitted to the white public schools
because of their higher quality facilities.
Question
Does the segregation of public education based solely on race violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
Yes. Chief Justice Earl Warren delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. The Supreme Court held
that “separate but equal” facilities are inherently unequal and violate the protections of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the segregation of public
education based on race instilled a sense of inferiority that had a hugely detrimental effect on the
education and personal growth of African American children.
Griswold v. Connecticut
Syllabus
Appellants, the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut, and its medical director, a licensed physician, were convicted as
accessories for giving married persons information and medical advice on
how to prevent conception and, following examination, prescribing a
contraceptive device or material for the wife's use. A Connecticut statute
makes it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent
conception. Appellants claimed that the accessory statute, as applied,
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. An intermediate appellate court and
the State's highest court affirmed the judgment.
Held:
1. Appellants have standing to assert the constitutional rights of the married
people. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, distinguished. P. 481.
2. The Connecticut statute forbidding use of contraceptives violates the right
of marital privacy which is within the penumbra of specific guarantees of the
Bill of Rights. Pp. 481-486.
Loving v. Virginia
In 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were
married in the District of Columbia. The Lovings returned to Virginia shortly thereafter. The couple was
then charged with violating the state's antimiscegenation statute, which banned inter-racial marriages.
The Lovings were found guilty and sentenced to a year in jail (the trial judge agreed to suspend the
sentence if the Lovings would leave Virginia and not return for 25 years).
Question
Did Virginia's antimiscegenation law violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that distinctions drawn according to race were generally
"odious to a free people" and were subject to "the most rigid scrutiny" under the Equal Protection
Clause. The Virginia law, the Court found, had no legitimate purpose "independent of invidious racial
discrimination." The Court rejected the state's argument that the statute was legitimate because it
applied equally to both blacks and whites and found that racial classifications were not subject to a
"rational purpose" test under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court also held that the Virginia law
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Under our Constitution," wrote Chief
Justice Earl Warren, "the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the
individual, and cannot be infringed by the State."
Eisenstadt v. Baird
William Baird gave away Emko Vaginal Foam to a woman following his Boston University lecture on birth
control and over-population. Massachusetts charged Baird with a felony, to distribute contraceptives to
unmarried men or women. Under the law, only married couples could obtain contraceptives; only
registered doctors or pharmacists could provide them. Baird was not an authorized distributor of
contraceptives.
Question
Did the Massachusetts law violate the right to privacy acknowledged in Griswold v. Connecticut and
protected from state instrusion by the Fourteenth Amendment?
Conclusion
In a 6-to-1 decision, the Court struck down the Massachusetts law but not on privacy grounds. The Court
held that the law's distinction between single and married individuals failed to satisfy the "rational basis
test" of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Married couples were entitled to
contraception under the Court's Griswold decision. Withholding that right to single persons without a
rational basis proved the fatal flaw. Thus, the Court did not have to rely on Griswold to invalidate the
Massachusetts statute. "If the right of privacy means anything, wrote Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. for
the majority, "it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child."
Lawrence v. Texas
Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John
Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private,
consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse
in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate
sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that the statute was not unconstitutional
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), controlling.
Question
Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under the Texas "Homosexual Conduct"
law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex
couples, violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do their criminal
convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital interests in liberty and
privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Should Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), be overruled?
Conclusion
No, yes, and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the
Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual
conduct violates the Due Process Clause. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated
premises of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were
free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process
Clause. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their
conduct without intervention of the government," wrote Justice Kennedy. "The Texas statute furthers
no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual," continued Justice Kennedy. Accordingly, the Court overruled Bowers. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, with
whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Thomas joined, filed dissents.
Edith Windsor is the widow and sole executor of the estate of her late spouse, Thea Clara Spyer, who
died in 2009. The two were married in Toronto, Canada, in 2007, and their marriage was recognized by
New York state law. Thea Spyer left her estate to her spouse, and because their marriage was not
recognized by federal law, the government imposed $363,000 in taxes. Had their marriage been
recognized, the estate would have qualified for a marital exemption, and no taxes would have been
imposed.
On November 9, 2010 Windsor filed suit in district court seeking a declaration that the Defense of
Marriage Act was unconstitutional. At the time the suit was filed, the government's position was that
DOMA must be defended. On February 23, 2011, the President and the Attorney General announced
that they would not defend DOMA. On April 18, 2011, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House
of Representatives filed a petition to intervene in defense of DOMA and motioned to dismiss the case.
The district court denied the motion, and later held that DOMA was unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
Question
Does the executive branch's agreement with the lower court that the act is unconstitutional deprive the
Supreme Court of jurisdiction to decide the case?
Does the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives have standing in the case?
Does the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines the term "marriage" under federal law as a "legal
union between one man and one woman" deprive same-sex couples who are legally married under
state laws of their Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection under federal law?
Conclusion
No, unanswered, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The
Supreme Court held that the United States Government, despite the executive branch's agreement
regarding DOMA's unconstitutionality, retains a significant enough stake in the issue to support
Supreme Court's jurisdiction. Because the judgment in question orders the U.S. Treasury to refund tax
money, the Government stands to suffer a real economic injury and therefore maintains standing in the
case. The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) presented substantial arguments for the
constitutionality of DOMA that reflected an actual controversy under Article III, which allowed the
Supreme Court to address the case without needing to decide whether BLAG would have had standing
before a lower court. The Court also held that states have the authority to define marital relationships
and that DOMA goes against legislative and historical precedent by undermining that authority. The
result is that DOMA denies same-sex couples the rights that come from federal recognition of marriage,
which are available to other couples with legal marriages under state law. The Court held that the
purpose and effect of DOMA is to impose a "disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma" on same-
sex couples in violation of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote a dissent in which he argued that the Court lacked the jurisdiction to
review the case and that interests in uniformity and stability justified Congress' enactment of DOMA. He
also argued that the majority's opinion did not address the issue of state definitions of marriage
affecting same-sex couples. In his separate dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the Supreme Court
had neither the jurisdiction to review the case nor the power to invalidate democratically enacted
legislation. He argued that the majority's opinion wrongly asserted the supremacy of the Supreme Court
as the final arbiter of government. However, the majority opinion did not address the issue of whether
or not the Equal Protection Clause required laws restricting the definition of marriage to be reviewed
under a rational basis or strict scrutiny standard. He also argued that the majority misconstrued DOMA's
insidious intent and should not rule based on that presumption. Justice Clarence Thomas and Chief
Justice Roberts joined in the dissent. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. also wrote a separate dissent in which
he argued that the United States Government did not have standing in the case because the executive
branch declined to defend the statute, but that BLAG did have standing because it chose to defend the
otherwise undefended statute. He also argued that the Constitution does not guarantee the right to
enter into a same-sex marriage because that right is not "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition." Instead, the issue of the definition of marriage is left to the people to decide, a decision in
which DOMA does not interfere. Justice Clarence Thomas partially joined in the dissent.
Obergefell v. Hodges
Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and
Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on same-sex marriage or refusal to
recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The
plaintiffs in each case argued that the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the
Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex marriage and refusal to
recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment
rights to equal protection and due process.
Question
(1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the
same sex?
(2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the
same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state?
Conclusion
Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The Court held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to marry as one of the
fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it
does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty
because it is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate association
between two people, it safeguards children and families by according legal recognition to building a
home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the keystone of social order.
Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union with respect to
these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also
guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex
couples equal protection under the law. Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through both
parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply
with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right of same-sex
couples to marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment protects the rights of religious
organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples the
right to marry on the same terms as those for opposite-sex couples.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, while same-sex marriage might
be good and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and therefore it is beyond the purview of
the Court to decide whether states have to recognize or license such unions. Instead, this issue should
be decided by individual state legislatures based on the will of their electorates. The Constitution and
judicial precedent clearly protect a right to marry and require states to apply laws regarding marriage
equally, but the Court cannot overstep its bounds and engage in judicial policymaking. The precedents
regarding the right to marry only strike down unconstitutional limitations on marriage as it has been
traditionally defined and government intrusions, and therefore there is no precedential support for
making a state alter its definition of marriage. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that the majority
opinion relied on an overly expansive reading of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment without engaging with the judicial analysis traditionally applied to such claims
and while disregarding the proper role of the courts in the democratic process. Justice Antonin Scalia
and Justice Clarence Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the
majority opinion overstepped the bounds of the Court’s authority both by exercising the legislative,
rather than judicial, power and by doing so in a realm that the Constitution reserves for the states.
Justice Scalia argued that the question of whether same-sex marriage should be recognized is one for
the state legislatures, and that for the issue to be decided by unelected judges goes against one of the
most basic precepts of the Constitution: that political change should occur through the votes of elected
representatives. In taking on this policymaking role, the majority opinion departed from established
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to create a right where none exists in the Constitution. Justice
Thomas joined in the dissent. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the
majority opinion stretched the doctrine of substantive due process rights found in the Fourteenth
Amendment too far and in doing so distorted the democratic process by taking power from the
legislature and putting it in the hands of the judiciary. Additionally, the legislative history of the Due
Process Clause in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments indicates that they were meant to protect
people from physical restraint and from government intervention, but they do not grant them rights to
government entitlements. Justice Thomas also argued that the majority opinion impermissibly infringed
on religious freedom by legislating from the bench rather than allowing the state legislature to
determine how best to address the competing rights and interests at stake. Justice Scalia joined in the
dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Constitution does not address
the right of same-sex couples to marry, and therefore the issue is reserved to the states to decide
whether to depart from the traditional definition of marriage. By allowing a majority of the Court to
create a new right, the majority opinion dangerously strayed from the democratic process and greatly
expanded the power of the judiciary beyond what the Constitution allows. Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas joined in the dissent.