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Section 10 (d), Rule 39 provides "When the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the

judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the
court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a
reasonable time fixed by the court."


When a party refuses to yield possession of a property as ordered by a writ of execution, contempt is not the proper remedy. The
sheriff must oust the deforciant from subject property. If a demolition is necessary, there must be a hearing, upon motion and with
due notice, for the issuance of a Special Order under Sec. 14 (now Sec. 10 [d]) of Rule 39. [4]

Paragraph (d), Section 10 contemplates the only instance when a special "break-open" order is required. It is only when there is no
occupant in the premises that the sheriff may lawfully cause a demolition without the need of securing a "break-open" order


[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1395. March 28, 2003]

“A simple perusal of the said decision and alias writ will readily show that both directed respondent sheriff ‘To remove the wire fence
she (defendant) erected on the property at her (defendant) own expenses.’ Simply stated, the removal of said improvements must be
done at the expense of the defendant (the complainant in this case). Thus, in the event that the respondent failed to implement the said
directive, the procedure laid down under Section 10(d), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court must be followed as a matter of
course, to wit: ‘when the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment
obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the
court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee, after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same
within a reasonable time fixed by the court.’

“Hence, as clearly stated in the above-quoted rule, it is only upon the filing of a motion by the proper party that a ‘Special Order
of Demolition’ is issued by the Court. Without the said special order, the sheriff cannot arrogate upon himself a duty that is not
directed for him to perform. Thus, there is no doubt that respondent sheriff violated a rule, which specifically provides for a procedure
before a certain act should be done. A sheriff’s function [is] purely ministerial, not discretionary. In this case, respondent sheriff
exercised his discretion. In this case, respondent sheriff exercised his discretion by stretching the provisions of the writ. It was clearly
established during the investigation that respondent sheriff was fully aware of the need to secure a prior order from the court before a
demolition could be effected. In fact, the complainant’s counsel even called his attention regarding the provisions under Section 10(d)
of Rule 39. This notwithstanding, he continued with his wrongful act. For this reason, respondent sheriff must be administratively

Sec 9 & 10 Rule 39


November 30, 1962 18565

We agree with appellants. In the Goyena de Quizon case, (the facts of which are practically on all fours with those of the case at bar
except that in the Goyena case it was a final judgment that was being executed, while here it was a judgment of the Municipal Court
under appeal but was immediately executable under the special provisions of Section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, a difference
which is immaterial for the purposes of this incident), appellant Angela Goyena de Quizon was declared by the court below guilty of
indirect contempt of court under Section 3 (b), Rule 64, of the Rules of Court and sentenced to imprisonment, for her disobedience
to its judgment requiring her to vacate the premises and deliver possession of the property belonging to appellees Alex F. Magtibay
and Paulina B. de la Cruz, as well as the order of execution levied by the Sheriff, by refusing to vacate the premises in question and
deliver possession thereof to said appellees. On appeal to this Court, we reversed the order of the court below and acquitted
appellant of contempt stating as follows:

The judgment involved here requires the plaintiff "to vacate the premises and deliver the possession thereof to the said defendants
Alex F. Magtibay and Paulina B. de la Cruz." Under Section 8 (d) of Rule 39, if the judgment be for the delivery of the possession of
real property, the writ of execution must require the sheriff or other officer to whom it must be directed to deliver the possession of
the property, describing it, to the party entitled thereto. This means that the sheriff must dispossess or eject the losing party from
the premises and deliver the possession thereof to the winning party. If subsequent to such dispossession or ejectment the losing
party enters or attempts to enter into or upon the real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession or in
any manner disturbs the possession of the person adjudged to be entitled thereto, then and only then may the loser be charged
with and punished for contempt under paragraph (h) of Section 3, Rule 64.

In United States vs. Ramayrat, 22 Phil. 183, a similar writ of execution was invoked to punish the defendant for contempt of court.
The defendant, who had been adjudged in a civil case to deliver the possession of a certain parcel of land to the plaintiff, manifested
to the sheriff in writing that he was not willing to deliver to Sabino Vayson [the plaintiff] or to the deputy sheriff of this municipality,
Cosme Nonoy, the land in my possession, as I have been directed to do by the said sheriff, in order that, in the latter case, he might
deliver the same to the aforementioned Vayson, in conformity with the order issued the justice of the peace of this municipality. In
affirming the order of the Court of First Instance acquitting the defendant of contempt, this court, interpreting the provisions of the
Code of Civil Procedure from which paragraph (d) of section 8, Rule 39, was taken held:

"According to these sections, it is exclusively incumbent upon the sheriff to execute, to carry out the mandates of the judgment in
question, and, in fact, it was he himself, and he alone, who was ordered by the justice of the peace who rendered that judgment, to
place the plaintiff, Vayson, in possession of the land. The defendant in this case had nothing to do with that delivery of possession
and consequently, his statements expressing his refusal or unwillingness to effect the same, are entirely officious and impertinent
and therefore could not hinder, and much less prevent, the delivery being made, had the sheriff known how to comply with his duty.
It was solely due the latter's fault, and not to the alleged disobedience of t defendant, that the judgment was not duly executed. For
that purpose the sheriff could even have availed himself of the public force, had it been necessary to resort thereto".

xxx xxx xxx

Appellant cannot be punished for contempt under paragraph (b) of Section 3, Rule 64, for disobedience of or resistance to the
judgment of the trial court because said judgment is not a special judgment enforcible under Section 9 of Rule 39, which reads as

"SEC. 9. Writ of execution of special judgment. — When a judgment requires the performance of any other act than the payment of
money, or the sale or delivery of real personal property, a certified copy of the judgment shall be attached to the writ of execution
and may be served by the officer upon the party against whom the same is rendered, or upon any other person required thereby, or
by law, to obey the same, and such party or person may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment."

In other words, when as in this case, the judgment requires the delivery of real property, it must be executed not in accordance
with Section 9 above quoted but in accordance with paragraph (d) of Section 8, Rule 39, and any contempt proceeding arising
therefrom must be based on paragraph (h) of Section 3, Rule 64, and not on paragraph (b) of the same section in relation to Section
9 of Rule 39.

Sps. Canezo v. sps apolinario

GR # 170189

Civil Code. Article 434 of the Civil Code reads: “In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff
must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s claim.” Accion reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of
ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria is an action
whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession.[8]

In order that an action for the recovery of title may prosper, it is indispensable, in accordance with the precedents established
by the courts, that the party who prosecutes it must fully prove, not only his ownership of the thing claimed, but also the identity of the
same.[9] However, although the identity of the thing that a party desires to recover must be established, if the plaintiff has already
proved his right of ownership over a tract of land, and the defendant is occupying without right any part of such tract, it is not
necessary for plaintiff to establish the precise location and extent of the portions occupied by the defendant within the plaintiff’s

de leon v. PEA
GR # 181970

As a general rule, a writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed; an execution is
void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award.[21] The settled general principle is that a writ of execution must
conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to
enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed.[22]

However, it is equally settled that possession is an essential attribute of ownership.[23] Where the ownership of a parcel
of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land should be considered included in the decision, it
appearing that the defeated party’s claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership.[24] Furthermore,
adjudication of ownership would include the delivery of possession if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the
land independently of his claim of ownership which was rejected.[25] This is precisely what happened in the present case. This
Court had already declared the disputed property as owned by the State and that De Leon does not have any right to possess the land
independent of his claim of ownership.

In addition, a judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to place the prevailing party
in possession of the property.[26] If the defendant refuses to surrender possession of the property to the prevailing party, the
sheriff or other proper officer should oust him.[27] No express order to this effect needs to be stated in the decision; nor is a
categorical statement needed in the decision that in such event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to
remove the improvements on the property if the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of time.[28] The removal
of the improvements on the land under these circumstances is deemed read into the decision, subject only to the issuance of a
special order by the court for the removal of the improvements.[29]

It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but also those
necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.[30] In the present case, it would be redundant for PEA to go back to court and
file an ejectment case simply to establish its right to possess the subject property. Contrary to De Leon’s claims, the issuance of the
writ of execution by the trial court did not constitute an unwarranted modification of this Court’s decision in PEA v. CA, but rather,
was a necessary complement thereto. Such writ was but an essential consequence of this Court’s ruling affirming the nature of the
subject parcel of land as public and at the same time dismissing De Leon’s claims of ownership and possession. To further require
PEA to file an ejectment suit to oust de Leon and his siblings from the disputed property would, in effect, amount to encouraging
multiplicity of suits.


This urgency is even more pronounced in the present case, considering that this Court’s judgment in PEA v. CA, finding that
De Leon does not own the subject property and is not entitled to its possession, had long become final and executory. As a
consequence, the writ of execution, as well as the writ of demolition, should be issued as a matter of course, in the absence of
any order restraining their issuance. In fact, the writ of demolition is merely an ancillary process to carry out the Order
previously made by the RTC for the execution of this Court’s decision in PEA v. CA. It is a logical consequence of the writ of
execution earlier issued.

Finally, the Court reminds the De Leon that it does not allow the piecemeal interpretation of its Decisions as a means to
advance his case. To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and read in this
context, but the same must be considered in its entirety.[35] Read in this manner, PEA’s right to possession of the subject property, as
well as the removal of the improvements or structures existing thereon, fully follows after considering the entirety of the Court’s
decision in PEA v. CA. This is consistent with the provisions of Section 10, paragraphs (c) and (d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
which provide for the procedure for execution of judgments for specific acts, to wit:

SECTION 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. -


(c) Delivery or restitution of real property. - The officer shall demand of the person against whom the
judgment for the delivery or restitution of real property is rendered and all persons claiming rights under him to
peaceably vacate the property within the three (3) working days, and restore possession thereof to the judgment
obligee; otherwise, the officer shall oust all such persons therefrom with the assistance, if necessary, of appropriate
peace officers, and employing such means as may be reasonably necessary to retake possession, and place the
judgment obligee in possession of such property. Any costs, damages, rents or profits awarded by the judgment shall
be satisfied in the same manner as a judgment for money.

(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. - When the property subject of execution
contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy,
demolish or remove said improvements, except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment
obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the

As a final note, it bears to point out that this case has been dragging for more than 15 years and the execution of this Court’s
judgment in PEA v. CA has been delayed for almost ten years now simply because De Leon filed a frivolous appeal against the RTC’s
order of execution based on arguments that cannot hold water. As a consequence, PEA is prevented from enjoying the fruits of the
final judgment in its favor. The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General in its contention that every litigation must come
to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution
and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the “life of the law.”[36] To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is
to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts.[37] It is in the interest of justice that this Court should write finis to this


G.R. No. L-23509 June 23, 1966

in the case of Shoiji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil. 333, we pointed out that "Independent of any statutory provision, ... every court has
inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction." In
line with this doctrine, it may be stated that respondent Judge, in the instant case, has the inherent power to issue the writ of
demolition demanded by petitioner. Needless to say, its issuance is reasonably necessary to do justice to petitioner who is being
deprived of the possession of the lots in question, by reason of the continued refusal of respondent Clemente Pagsisihan to
remove his house thereon and restore possession of the premises to petitioner.


A.M. NO. P-03-1724. September 18, 2003]

It is clear that respondent refused to perform his duty to enforce the writ when he returned it to the Municipal Trial Court
unimplemented. It is stated in his Sheriff’s Return dated March 7, 2000 that he was unable to implement the writ because of the
refusal of defendant Ico to vacate the premises, the latter showing him a pending Petition for Review with the Supreme Court. Under
section 10(c), Rule 39, Rules of Court, [20] he is mandated to oust the defendant Ico from the subject premises. If there is resistance,
he is authorized to employ the assistance of peace officers and use such means necessary to take possession of the property and place
the complainant in its possession.