You are on page 1of 12

I.

a.
The following are the distinctions between crimes mala in se and crimes mala prohibita:
(1) In crimes mala in se, there must be a criminal intent. While in crimes mala prohibita, it is
sufficient that the prohibited act was done;
(2) Crimes mala in se are wrong from their very nature but crimes mala prohibita are wrong
merely because they are prohibited by a statute;
(3) Crimes mala in se are punished under the Revised Penal Code, while crimes mala
prohibita are violations of special laws;
(4) In crimes mala in se, good faith, lack of intent or negligence are valid defenses. On the
other hand, in crimes mala prohibita, good faith or lack of criminal intent is not a valid
defense, it is enough that the prohibition was voluntarily made;
(5) In crimes mala in se, criminal liability is incurred even when the crime is attempted or
frustrated. In crimes mala prohibita, criminal liability is incurred only when the crime is
consummated; and
(6) Mitigating and aggravating circumstances are appreciated in imposing the penalties in
crimes mala in se. In crimes mala prohibita, such modifying circumstances are not appreciated
unless the special law has adopted the scheme or penalties under the Revised Penal Code.

b.
No.
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse
under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is
punished under the Revised Penal Code.
In this case, it was not shown that Tony, in hitting Juanito, intended to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of Juanito. The facts showed that Tony’s act had been
done at the spur of the moment and due to his anger.

II.
a.
Yes.
The law provides that when homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of rape,
the resulting crime is the composite crime of attempted rape with homicide. The phrase, by
reason of the rape means that the killing was committed because of the rape. It is also necessary
that the victim of the rape is also the victim of the homicide. On the other hand, the phrase on
the occasion of the rape refers to a killing that occurs immediately before or after, or during the
commission itself of the attempted or consummated rape, where the victim of the homicide may
be a person other than the rape victim herself for as long as the killing is linked to the rape.
In this case, the Investigating Prosecutor is correct that there should be two separate
informations because Aliswan committed two separate crimes. He cannot be charged with the
composite crime of attempted rape with homicide because the killing of Alleso was not
committed on the occasion of the attempted rape.

b.
No.
The law provides that a person who is fifteen years of age and under when he committed
a crime or offense is exempt from criminal liability. A person who is above fifteen years old but
under 18 years old, if he acted without discernment is also exempt from criminal liability.
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act.
In this case, Aliswan was 16 years old when he committed the crimes charged. He is not
exempt from criminal liability because he could not have acted without discernment. Aliswan’s
act of forcibly undressing Amethyst and undressing himself. However, he left because of the
hapless condition of Amethyst. Moreover, after Aliswan fatally stabbed Allesso, he immediately
went into hiding. These showed that Aliswan was fully aware of the consequences of his actions.
(or his act of immediately going into hiding after fatally stabbing Allesso showed that was fully
aware of the consequences of his actions.)

c.
I will charge Amante of the crime less serious physical injuries and a *violation of
Section 10 (a) in relation to Section 3 (b) (2) of RA 7610.
Under the Revised Penal Code, any person who inflicts upon another physical injuries not
described as serious physical injuries but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for
ten (10) days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of
less serious physical injuries. Section 3 (b) (2) of RA 7610 provides that child abuse includes any
act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being.
Alisto received medical attendance for ten days due to the physical injuries inflicted upon him by
Amante. *Amante’s act of draping Alisto’s body with a tarpaulin stating that the latter was a
rapist showed that Amante intended to debase, degraded, or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of the child, Alisto, as a human being. Hence, he is also liable for child abuse.
(*not sure)

d.
The defense of Amante is error in personae or a mistake in the identity.
In error in personae, it was the actual victim upon whom the blow was directed, but he
was not really the intended victim. The criminal liability of the offender is not affected, unless it
resulted to a crime different from what the offender intended to commit, in which case, the lesser
penalty between the crime intended and the crime committed shall be imposed but in the
maximum period.
Amante’s defense will not prosper. In this case, Amante actually directed his attack at
Alisto because he mistook the latter to be Aliswan, who was the intended victim. Amante’s
contention that he did not incur any criminal liability is not correct because the defense of
mistake in the identity of the victim does not affect his criminal liability. It is only a mitigating
circumstance under the case provided for by the law.

III
a.

b.
Wheel conspiracy is one of the two structures of multiple conspiracies. It occurs when
there is a single person or group, the hub, dealing individually with two or more other persons or
groups, the spokes.
Chain conspiracy is the second structure of multiple conspiracies. It happens when there
is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business
operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer
and consumer.

III.

C.
With respect to the multi-billion contract for the development of an economic and tourism
hub, Bokal Diva is liable for violation of Section 3(b) while Governor Datu is liable for Section
3(b) and 3(g) of RA 3019.
It was unlawful for the Governor and Bokal Diva to receive any gift of substantial value in
connection with their official duties to grant the contract in behalf of the government. Both
officers have the right to intervene in the contract, the Sanggunian Member, having the power to
delegate authority to enter into the contract and the Governor having the delegated authority to
enter into the same. Governor Datu, although not directly receiving the consideration, indirectly
received the same through coursing the amount to his wife, First Lady Dee.

First Lady Dee is liable for Section 4(a) of RA 3019 as well. It is unlawful for the spouse of
the public official to receive any consideration, in behalf of her spouse who is a public officer,
from any person having transactions with the government in which such public officer has to
intervene. Her act of depositing the amount in her personal account constitutes directly receiving
the amount.

Mr. Gangnam is liable for Section 4(b) of the special law.

It is unlawful for any person to knowingly cause any public official to commit any of the
offenses in Section 3.

Mayor Dolor however cannot be held liable for any of the prohibited acts under Section 3
since he had no power to intervene in the grant of the contract.

With respect to the previous contract to construct a Sports Arena, none of the provisions of
R.A. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act were violated by any of the persons above
mentioned.

Mayor Dolor, the public officer concerned and the possible main perpetrator of the offense,
could not be liable for either Section 3(b) or 3(g) of the law. One of the elements of the offense is
missing. The public officer in these instances should have the right to intervene in such contract
or transaction in his official capacity.

In the instant case, Mayors generally do not have the power to enter into contracts for the
building of Sports Arenas, absent any authority from their respective Sanggunians, an existing
ordinance or by provision of law. Mayor Dolor therefore has no authority to intervene in the
granting of the contract. He cannot be prosecuted for Section 3(b) of the special law.
Using the same argument, absent any indication of such delegated authority, Mayor Dolor’s
act of entering into the contract is deemed invalid. Prosecution for Section 39(g) would not be
prosper because there is no valid contract to speak of.

Neither could Bokal Diva nor Mr. Gangnam be prosecuted for violations of Section 4 (a)
and (b) of RA 3019, respectively. These offenses are predicated on a violation of Section 3 of the
law. The public officer concerned did not commit acts of graft and corruption under the law, the
corollary prohibited acts therefore of the private individuals could not have materialized.

D.

No crime under the Revised Penal Code was committed.

Direct Bribery could not have been committed because the giving of the consideration in
both contracts were not for the purpose of committing a crime, neither for the commission of an
unjust act nor to restrict the officer from doing an official act. In fact, the considerations in each
instance was paid after the performance of the public officer’s acts tantamount to a reward.

Indirect Bribery may not as well prosper. The giving of the rewards were not per se by
reason merely of the public officers’ offices but rather as a form of reward for their acts. Neither
were the gifts given on anticipation of future favors from the public officer.

Since Direct and Indirect Bribery could not be charged, the corresponding crime of
Corruption of Public Officials by the private party, Mr. Gangnam, cannot materialize since the
circumstances constituting Direct or Indirect Bribery are elements of the crime.

IV

A.

Both informations against Solito were improper. He should have been charged with Rape
and a separate charge of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
The principal objective of Solito and his two cohorts in abducting AAA from Dapitan Street
and in bringing her to another place was for Solito to rape and ravish her. This objective became
evident from the successive invitations for sexual intercourse proposed by Solito. Although
forcible abduction was seemingly committed, under the circumstances, the rape absorbed the
forcible abduction.

The information charging him of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs is improper. The elements
of the crime of Illegal Sale are: 1. Identity of the buyer and the seller must be established; 2. the
object and the consideration and 3. delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof.

In the case at bar, the third element was not present. The premature arrest of Solito prior to
the sale of the dangerous drugs which constitutes the offense punishable by law.

He may be charged with possession of dangerous drugs since all the elements are present,
namely: 1. the accused is in possession of an item or object determined to be a dangerous drug;
2. such possession is authorized by law and 3. the accused freely and consciously possessed the
drug.

B.

Branch 29 was not correct in their ruling.

Under the Revised Penal Code the court having jurisdiction over the offense has the right to
dispose of property used in the commission of the crime, such disposition being an accessory
penalty to be imposed on the accused, unless the property belongs to a third person not liable for
the offense that it was used as the instrument to commit it. Hence it was proper for Branch 8 to
release the vehicle.

In drug-related cases there is a reiteration of the rule in the RPC. the confiscation or seizure
of items pertains to all the proceeds and properties derived from the unlawful act, including but
not limited to, money and other assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which
the particular unlawful act was committed unless they are the property of a third person not liable
for the unlawful act. Section 20 of The Dangerous Drugs Act therefore gives the express
exception to the properties to be confiscated.
Since the Toyota Innova was proved to be owned by his brother who is not charged of the
unlawful act, it cannot be subject to confiscation by the government.

A.

Section 2 (b) of RA 9160 defines a Public officer as elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service
receiving compensation, even nominal, from the national government, the local governments, the
government-owned and government-controlled corporations, and all other instrumentalities or
agencies of the Republic of the Philippines and their branches.

B.

The crimes charged against Mr. Gulang under the Revised Penal Code constituting
Malversation of Public Funds or Property is proper.

A private person may also be held liable for Malversation of public funds in cases where the
private person is made the custodian in whatever capacity of public funds or property whether
belonging to the national or local government and he misappropriates the same.

The charge for Graft and Corruption under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is improper. The law
under Section 4 thereof, categorically provides only two acts of private persons which constitute
violations of the special law. Section 3(e) of the Act is punishable only when committed by a
public officer. The separation of the prohibited acts committed by the public officers and private
persons under the law manifests the intendment of the law to restrict the punishable acts that can
be committed by each offender.

VI

A.
`
Attempted rape by carnal knowledge is committed when the offender commences the
commission of the rape by carnal knowledge through overt acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony as a result by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance.

In Attempted Rape by carnal knowledge, there must be an apparent intent to effect sexual
cohesion or to penetrate the woman’s vagina with the perpetrator’s penis, although unsuccessful.

VI.
b.
A Capataz is liable for Estafa under Art. 315(2) (a).
The elements of Estafa under the said provision are:
a. Using fictitious name;
b. Falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; or
c. By means of other similar deceits.

In this case, the capataz also known as a foreman used two fictitious names in the payroll
which allowed him to collect the supposed daily wages when in fact, he had no authority to do
so.
(Hindi two counts kasi continuing crime naman? Haha
Sabi ni google: Supervisor or foreman daw ang Capataz.
Hindi siya responsible for collecting wages ayon sa case: Cuison v.
Norton & Harrison Co., et al., G.R. No. L-32774, October 14, 1930)
c.
A child 15 years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense is exempt from
criminal liability. A child above 15 but below 18 years of age is presumed not to have acted with
discernment and will be criminally liable only upon rebuttal of that presumption by proof that he
acted with discernment. Thus, there is a presumption of lack of discernment on the part of a child
(which presumption is conclusive if she is 15 years of age and below and disputable if she is over
15 but below 18 years of age) (Malto v. People Of The Philippines, G.R. No. 164733, September
21, 2007).
(Marami yung meaning na nahanap ko ng doli incapax at eto yung corresponding answers:
1. Rebuttable presumption - child above 15 but below 18 will be criminally liable only upon
rebuttal of that presumption by proof that he acted with discernment.
2. Conclusive presumption - a child 15 years old and below cannot have acted with
discernment
3. Incapable of committing a crime – yung sagot ko. hehe)
d.
There is no crime of frustrated physical injuries because the crime of physical injuries is a
formal crime which is penalized on the basis of the gravity of the injury sustained. What is
punished is the consequence and not the stage of execution. Hence, it is always consummated. It
cannot be committed in the attempted and frustrated stage.

VII.

The conviction of direct assault with murder is justified.


Since Bernardo stabbed the judge without warning when the Judge Samsonite was not in
a position to defend himself nor retaliate, treachery was present in the stabbing. Hence, the death
caused by such stabbing was murder.
Direct assault may be committed without public uprising, by attacking a person in
authority on the occasion of his past performance of official duties.
In this case, Judge Samsonite, a person in authority, was the one who convicted Bernardo
which was the latter’s reason to kill the former.
In the case of People Of The Philippines v. Recto, G.R. No. 129069, October 17, 2001,
direct assault is aggravated when:
a. The assault is committed with a weapon,
b. When the offender is a public officer or employee, or
c. When the offender laws a hand upon a person in authority.
As such, the following may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance:
1. Nighttime because the crime was commence and completed at nighttime. (Hindi ko
sure kung mag-aassume ako na illuminated yung kitchen?)
The following cannot be appreciated as aggravating circumstances:
1. Disregard of rank and age of the victim because it is inherent in the crime of direct
assault
2. Dwelling because the victim is not a dweller of the house (unless considered dwelling
niya yung bahay ng mistress?)
3. Cruelty because there is no indication that the offender intended to prolong the
suffering the victim, causing him unnecessary moral and physical pain considering
that the victim instantly died
4. Quasi-recidivism because the offender was not yet convicted of a previous offense by
final judgment.
VIII.
a.
The two kinds of unlawful aggression are:
1. Actual or material unlawful aggression which means an attack with physical force or with
a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause
the injury; and
2. Imminent unlawful aggression which is an attack that is impending or at the point of
happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude (People v. Mapait, G.R. No.
172606, November 23, 2011).

The attack against Porthos by Aramis displayed an actual or material unlawful


aggression since he shot Porthos.
b.
Aramis’ claim of self-defense is untenable.
Self-defense may be claimed when there is an unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. In the case of People v. Mapait, G.R. No. 172606, November 23, 2011, there
is an unlawful aggression when the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or
personal safety of the person defending himself.
In this case, Porthos shouting back aggressively is not sufficient to be considered
as an unlawful aggression. Thus, Aramis cannot claim self-defense.
The prosecution’s contention is untenable.
The following are the requisites of self-defense:
1. Unlawful aggression;
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

As such, it is not necessary that the killing must be consummated in order to claim
self-defense.
c.

The contention of Porthos is untenable.

Treachery cannot co-exist with passion or obfuscation (People v. Pansensoy, G.R.


No. 140634, September 12, 2002). Passion and obfuscation refer to emotional feeling
which produces excitement so powerful as to overcome reason and self-control. It must
come from prior unjust or improper acts. The passion and obfuscation must emanate from
legitimate sentiments.

In the present case, the act of Porthos in bumping the car of Aramis and the
consequent act of shouting aggressively at Aramis produced the act of Aramis of firing at
Porthos.

The contention of Aramis is untenable.


Frontal attack does not negate the presence of treachery Although frontal, if the
attack was unexpected, and the unarmed victim was in no position to repel the attack,
treachery can still be appreciated (People v. Pelis, G.R. No. 189328, February 21, 2011).

In this case, the act of Aramis of drawing his gun from his waist was unexpected
while Porthos was unarmed and had no means to repel the attack.

IX.

Percy, Pablo, Pater and Sencio are…

1. Liable for carnapping because all of the elements of the crime are present.
2. Robbery because the cash and other personal property of the passengers were taken with
intent to gain by means of force using their firearms.
3. Liable for direct assault with homicide. A barangay tanod is an agent of a person in authority
and was acting within his capacity when he tired to maintain peace and order as when intervened
in the instant case. When Pater, instead of heading to the tanod’s intervention fired at the latter,
Pater ted in defiance over of an agent of a person in authority. Hence, death caused by such firing
was homicide and having been committed with direct assault, a complex crime of direct assault
with homicide was committed by Pater.

***another answer: not liable for direct assault with homicide on the ground that the facts of the
case does not expressly show that the accused had knowledge that the person who intervened
was an agent of a person in authority. In consideration of which, the crime committed was
homicide.

4. Not liable for kidnapping. For kidnapping to exist, there must be an indubitable proof that the
actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the passengers of their liberty, and not where such
restraint of their freedom of action were merely incident in the commission of another offence
primarily intended by the offenders. (People v. Puno, GR No. 97471)

5. Arson - - - hinahanap ko pa lang po yung case na ang pagsunog ng bus ay malicious mischief.
(Magtatanong rin at maghahanap ng other sources)

X.

a. Indeterminate Sentence Law is applied in crimes punishable under special laws by fixing a
maximum term which shall not exceed which shall not exceed the maximum term fixed by
the special law and a minimum term which shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same.

In instances where the special law punishing the offence provides for penalties with the same
nomenclature as that of the Revised Penal Code, then any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance shall be dealt with accordance with Section 64 of ISLAW; on the other hand,
when a special law does not use the nomenclature of penalties under the RPC, the presence
of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances shall not be appreciated.

b. Yes, the judge was correct in imposing a straight penalty of imprisonment for one year.
*** Penalty if ever ISLAW is to be applied - - -
Arresto Menor in any of its periods as the minimum penalty to Prision correctional in its
minimum term as the maximum penalty… but then again…
ISL is not applicable since the range of Arresto Mayor is only from 1 month, 1 day to 6 months
which is BELOW 1 year. (This I am really confused with this one. Please enlighten me)

XI.

Policeman Stone may be properly charged with interruption of religious worship under
Article 132 of the Revised Penal Code on the ground that the elements of the offense are present,
to wit:

1. That the offender is a public officer;


2. That religious ceremonies or manifestations of any religion are about to take place or are
going on;
3. The offender prevents or disturbs the same.

In the instant case, there was showing that Policeman Stone, who is a public officer has
disturbed the religious ceremonies when he approached the priest during the homily and
displayed his firearm; thus, he may be properly charged with interruption of religious worship.

On the other hand, he may not be charged of offending the religious worship on the
ground that for one to be charged of the said crime, he must have a deliberate intent to hurt the
feelings of the faithful; it is necessary that the act/s done be directed against a religions practice
or dogma or ritual for the purpose of ridicule, as mocking or scoffing at or attempting to damage
an object of religious vexation (Viada; People v. Baes, 68 Phil. 203)

In the said case there was no showing that Policeman Stone’s action was with the purpose
of displeasing the members of the congregation. More so, the facts clearly state the acts were
directed to Fr. Chris and not to the congregation as a whole.

*not sure