G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012
14 More
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,
vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of
Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief,
Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte,Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court)
filed pursuant to Rule 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,2 seeking a
review of the 9 September 2010 Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 of the
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br.
13).3 The questioned Decision denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of
habeas data.4
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa
(Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent
Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-
Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was
the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch,
both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.6
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent
Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the
Country."7The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa
Commission,8 was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups
(PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010
elections and dismantling them permanently in the future.9 Upon the
conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission released and
submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A
Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private
Armies’ Report to the President" (the Report).10
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos
Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her
aides,11 and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG.12Purportedly without
the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information
gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission,13 thereby causing her inclusion
in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.
specifically, she pointed out the following items reflected therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding
the status of PAGs in the Philippines.15
(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated
Special Task Group (STG) for each private armed group (PAG) to
monitor and counteract their activities."16
(c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated
by the PNP and captioned as "Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as
of April 19, 2010," which classifies PAGs in the country according to
region, indicates their identity, and lists the prominent personalities
with whom these groups are associated.17 The first entry in the table
names a PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked to herein
petitioner Gamboa.18
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP,
to wit:
The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held
in Malacañang on March 24, 2010 at which time, the Commission
was also asked to comment on the PNP report that out of one
hundred seventeen (117) partisan armed groups validated, twenty-
four (24) had been dismantled with sixty-seven (67) members
apprehended and more than eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.
Commissioner Herman Basbaño qualified that said statistics were
based on PNP data but that the more significant fact from his report
is that the PNP has been vigilant in monitoring the activities of these
armed groups and this vigilance is largely due to the existence of the
Commission which has continued communicating with the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and PNP personnel in the field to
constantly provide data on the activities of the PAGs. Commissioner
Basbaño stressed that the Commission’s efforts have preempted the
formation of the PAGs because now everyone is aware that there is a
body monitoring the PAGs movement through the PNP.
Commissioner Lieutenant General Edilberto Pardo Adan also clarified
that the PAGs are being destabilized so that their ability to threaten
and sow fear during the election has been considerably weakened.19
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly person in authority, as well as indirect assault and multiple attempted murder,
reflective of the situation in the field, the PNP complied with the Commission’s docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009.30
recommendation that they revise their validation system to include those PAGs
previously listed as dormant. In the most recent briefing provided by the PNP
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to
on April 26, 2010, there are one hundred seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these
comply with the following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data:
groups, the PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs have been reorganized.20
(a) the manner in which the right to privacy was violated or threatened with
violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b)
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the the actions and recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c)
portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be the location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the
maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information.31 They
appeared on print media.22 Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who also contended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to
maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not the
Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission.23 As a result, she proper remedy to address the alleged besmirching of the reputation of
claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of Gamboa.32
personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as
well as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the
harassment and police surveillance operations.24
Petition.33 The trial court categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in
the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted a
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation violation of her right to privacy, to wit:
maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons
officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her Petition, she prayed for the following
maintaining PAGs, Gamboa’s right to privacy indubitably has been violated.
reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte
The violation understandably affects her life, liberty and security enormously.
database; (b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials;
The untold misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG could even be
(c) rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to
insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her
refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining
security that at any time of the day the unlimited powers of respondents may
respondents from making baseless reports.26
likely be exercised to further malign and destroy her reputation and to
transgress her right to life.
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br.
13, which issued the corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed
Petition meritorious on its face.27 Thus, the trial court (a) instructed respondents
that there was certainly intrusion into Gamboa’s activities. It cannot be denied
to submit all information and reports forwarded to and used by the Zeñarosa
that information was gathered as basis therefor. After all, under Administrative
Commission as basis to include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b)
Order No. 275, the Zeñarosa Commission was tasked to investigate the
directed respondents, and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and
existence of private armies in the country, with all the powers of an
desist from forwarding to the Zeñarosa Commission, or to any other
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative
government entity, information that they may have gathered against her
Code of 1987.
without the approval of the court; (c) ordered respondents to make a written
return of the writ together with supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled the
summary hearing of the case on 23 July 2010.28 xxx xxx xxx

In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the
bounds of their mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of
Gamboa.29 The information stored in their database supposedly pertained to
two criminal cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for
murder and frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077,
and (b) a Complaint for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she
accused respondents, who are public officials, of having gathered and
provided information that made the Zeñarosa Commission to include her in
the list. Obviously, it was this gathering and forwarding of information
supposedly by respondents that petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x.34
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on
the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that
the subject information originated from respondents, and that they forwarded
this database to the Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior
verification.35 The trial court also ruled that even before respondents assumed
their official positions, information on her may have already been
acquired.36 Finally, it held that the Zeñarosa Commission, as the body tasked to
gather information on PAGs and authorized to disclose information on her,
should have been impleaded as a necessary if not a compulsory party to the
Petition.37
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September
2010,38 raising the following assignment of errors:
1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zeñarosa Commission be
impleaded as either a necessary or indispensable party;
2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present
sufficient proof to link respondents as the informant to [sic] the
Zeñarosa Commission;
3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the
Zeñarosa Commission to [sic] the PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an
assumption;
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct
to PNP as an agency.39
On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a)
Gamboa failed to present substantial evidence to show that her right to
privacy in life, liberty or security was violated, and (b) the trial court correctly
dismissed the Petition on the ground that she had failed to present sufficient
proof showing that respondents were the source of the report naming her as
one who maintains a PAG.40
Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order,
fulfilling the mandate to dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in
accordance with due process, such that the gathering and forwarding of
unverified information on her must be considered unlawful.41 She also reiterates
that she was able to present sufficient evidence showing that the subject
information originated from respondents.42
In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of
habeas data, this Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right
to privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as an extraordinary
remedy that seeks to protect the right to informational privacy; and finally,
contextualize the right to privacy vis-à-vis the state interest involved in the case
at bar.
The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been
recognized as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43 thus
enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus
resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that
the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and
liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be
said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must
mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must
include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let
alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom." As a matter of fact, this right to
be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men."
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel
respect for his personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and
interference demands respect. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking
for five members of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of
privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition
against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace without the
consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment
explicitly affirms the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a
zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his
detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: ‘The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." After referring to various American Supreme
Court decisions, Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness that the
right of privacy which presses for recognition is a legitimate one."
 xxx xxx xxx
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the
idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal
life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute
and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all
aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government, safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can
control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other words, of the
dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly important as
modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age —
industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow the area
of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to
maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between
a democratic and a totalitarian society."44 (Emphases supplied)
In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of
the right to privacy in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is
recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly
recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill
of Rights, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil
Code provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as
actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the
privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private
individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of
another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of
secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass
to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-
Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual
Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise
recognize the privacy of certain information.
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x.46 (Emphases supplied)
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be
protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v.
Senate Committee on Banks,47 this Court underscored that the right to privacy
is not absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has
violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true
that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights
of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the
right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry.
In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access
information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to
privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the
right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state
interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v.
Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the
requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to
ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking
transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities.
Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to
proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.48
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state
objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases,
although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may
nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed
legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of
an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy.49 It seeks to protect a person’s right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ
to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the
one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and
jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on
which our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from
the European tradition of data protection,51 this Court can be guided by cases
on the protection of personal data decided by the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v. Sweden,52 in which the ECHR
balanced the right of citizens to be free from interference in their private affairs
with the right of the state to protect its national security. In this case, Torsten
Leander (Leander), a Swedish citizen, worked as a temporary replacement
museum technician at the Naval Museum, which was adjacent to a restricted
military security zone.53 He was refused employment when the requisite
personnel control resulted in an unfavorable outcome on the basis of
information in the secret police register, which was kept in accordance with
the Personnel Control Ordinance and to which he was prevented access.54 He
claimed, among others, that this procedure of security control violated Article
8 of the European Convention of Human Rights55 on the right to privacy, as
nothing in his personal or political background would warrant his classification
in the register as a security risk.56
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information
relating to the private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the
opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an interference in his right to
respect for private life.57 However, the ECHR held that the interference was
justified on the following grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a
legitimate aim, which was the protection of national security,58 and (b) the
Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens adequate indication as to the
scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the collection, recording and
release of information by the authorities.59 The following statements of the
ECHR must be emphasized:
58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds
to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter alia, the Gillow judgment of 24
November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, § 55).
59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy
a margin of appreciation, the scope of which will depend not only on
the nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on the particular
nature of the interference involved. In the instant case, the interest of
the respondent State in protecting its national security must be
balanced against the seriousness of the interference with the
applicant’s right to respect for his private life.
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting
national security, for the Contracting States to have laws granting the
competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to collect and store in registers
not accessible to the public information on persons and, secondly, to use this
information when assessing the suitability of candidates for employment in
posts of importance for national security.
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leander’s
legitimate interests through the consequences it had on his possibilities of
access to certain sensitive posts within the public service. On the other hand,
the right of access to public service is not as such enshrined in the Convention
(see, inter alia, the Kosiek judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20,
§§ 34-35), and, apart from those consequences, the interference did not
constitute an obstacle to his leading a private life of his own choosing.
In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation
available to the respondent State in assessing the pressing social need in the
present case, and in particular in choosing the means for achieving the
legitimate aim of protecting national security, was a wide one.
xxx xxx xxx
66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not
communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the
interference was not "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security", as it is the very absence of such communication which, at
least partly, ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see,
mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A
no. 28, p. 27, § 58).
The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of
the Ordinance of 1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the
Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule of
communication to the person concerned, as contained in section 13 of the
Ordinance, should be effectively applied in so far as it did not jeopardise the
purpose of the control (see paragraph 31 above).
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the
safeguards contained in the Swedish personnel control system meet the
requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having regard to the wide
margin of appreciation available to it, the respondent State was entitled to
consider that in the present case the interests of national security prevailed
over the individual interests of the applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The
interference to which Mr. Leander was subjected cannot therefore be said to
have been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. (Emphases
supplied)
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific
component of the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state
interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether the privilege of the writ
of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case
entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of
Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.
The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis-à-vis the interest of
the state to dismantle private armies.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and
other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.60 It also
provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and
civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police
commission.61
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of
A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence
of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it
with the powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon
witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents, books,
and records.62 A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to
deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law
enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance of its
functions.63
Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a)
enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and
properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to
ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes.64
Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing
powers and functions accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the
latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs,
monitored them and counteracted their activities.65 One of those individuals is
herein petitioner Gamboa.
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data
contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP.
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information
by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated
or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding
PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the
existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was
explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the
former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the
latter.
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP
released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication
to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same
cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that
act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and
investigation.1âwphi1 Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP
had a validation system, which was used to update information on individuals
associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the
field.66 Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the information
collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her
and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police
surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the
investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in
which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of
regularity, which she failed to overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling
PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa,
especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information
against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the
writ of habeas data must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in
Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court,
Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of
habeas data, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to

make any further determination as to the propriety of sharing information
during specific stages of intelligence gathering. To do otherwise would
supplant the discretion of investigative bodies in the accomplishment of their
functions, resulting in an undue encroachment on their competence.

However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established
in existing law and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to
caution these investigating entities that information-sharing must observe strict
confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the
authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent
to the right to privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of one’s
person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."67

In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but

emphasized its confidential nature.1âwphi1 That it was leaked to third parties
and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be
stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for
this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her
to address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the
extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.
GAUDENCIO B. PANTILO III, PEREZ, JJ.

Complainant,

Promulgated:

- versus - February 9, 2011

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

JUDGE VICTOR A. CANOY,

Respondent. This administrative complaint against Judge Victor A. Canoy (Judge Canoy) of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29 in Surigao City stems from a
complaint filed by Gaudencio Pantilo III (Pantilo), charging Judge Canoy with
several counts of gross ignorance of the law and/or procedures, grave abuse
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2262 of authority, and appearance of impropriety (Canon 2, Code of Judicial
Conduct). Pantilo prays for Judge Canoys disbarment in relation to Criminal
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. Case No. 8072 for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide entitled People
of the Philippines v. Leonardo Luzon Melgazo.
08-3056-RTJ]

The facts of the case, as gathered from the records, are as follows:
Present:

The complainant, Pantilo, the brother of the homicide victim in the above-
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
mentioned criminal case, recounts in his letter-complaint that, on September 3,
2008, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he, along with police officers
VELASCO, JR.,
Ronald C. Perocho (Perocho) and Santiago B. Lamanilao, Jr. (Lamanilao),
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, acting as escorts of Leonardo Luzon Melgazo (Melgazo), the accused in
Criminal Case No. 8072, went to the City Prosecutors Office, Surigao City, to
DEL CASTILLO, and attend the inquest proceedings.[1] Later, at around 8 oclock in the evening,
Pantilo was informed by Perocho that Melgazo had been released from
detention.[2]
The following day, September 4, 2008, Pantilo went to the Surigao City Police
Station to verify the information. Upon arriving there, Custodial Officer Anecito
T. Undangan told him that Melgazo had indeed been released at around 6:30
p.m. on September 3, 2008, as shown in the Police Logbook of Detention
Prisoners and as authorized by Chief of Police Supt. Ramer Perlito P. Perlas.[3]
Further, the logbook showed that Melgazo was temporarily released upon the
order of Judge Canoy after he posted bail in the amount of thirty thousand
pesos (PhP 30,000), as evidenced by O.R. No. 0291794 dated September 3,
2008.[4]
Pantilo proceeded to the Office of the Clerk of Court to request a copy of the
Information, only to find out that none had yet been filed by the Surigao City
Prosecutors Office.[5] Puzzled, he inquired from the City Prosecutors Office the
details surrounding the release of Melgazo. He learned that no Information
had yet been filed in Court that would serve as the basis for the approval of
the bail. Likewise, he also learned from the City Police Station that no written
Order of Release had been issued but only a verbal order directing the police
officers to release Melgazo from his detention cell.[6] One of the police officers
even said that Judge Canoy assured him that a written Order of Release
would be available the following day or on September 4, 2008 after the
Information is filed in Court.
On September 5, 2008, Melgazo filed a Motion for the Release of his
impounded vehicle as physical evidence pending the trial of the case.[7] The
motion was received by the Office of the Clerk of Court at 8:30 a.m. that day
and was subsequently raffled in the afternoon. In the Notice of Hearing of the
said motion, Melgazo prayed that it be heard on September 5, 2008 at 8:30
a.m. According to Pantilo, this clearly violated the rules which require that the
other party must be served a copy of the motion at least three (3) days before
the hearing.
Nevertheless, Judge Canoy issued an Order dated September 5, 2008,
directing Assistant City Prosecutor Robert Gonzaga (Prosecutor Gonzaga), the
prosecutor-in-charge of the case, to give his comment on the said motion
within three (3) days upon receipt of the Order. Three (3) days later, Prosecutor
Gonzaga submitted his comment. And despite his opposition, Judge Canoy
granted Melgazos motion.[8]
Subsequently, Pantilo filed a motion for inhibition of Judge Canoy which was
later denied.
Aggrieved, Pantilo filed a letter-complaint dated November 3, 2008 before the
Office of the Court Administrator charging Judge Canoy with (1) gross
ignorance of the law and procedures; (2) grave abuse of authority; and (3)
appearance of impropriety (Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct). Pantilo also
prays for Judge Canoys disbarment.
On January 5, 2009, the Court Administrator required respondent judge to
comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt.
Accordingly, on February 5, 2009, Judge Canoy filed his comment, arguing
that the facts in this case were exceptional. In his comment, he admitted that
the inquest proceedings of Melgazo before Prosecutor Gonzaga concluded
around 5:00 p.m. on September 3, 2008, after which, Melgazo, with his counsel,
Atty. Cacel Azarcon, went to his office to post bail for Melgazos provisional
liberty.[9] He noted that because of the time, most of the clerks in his office
and the Office of the Clerk of Court had already gone home. Thus, it was no
longer possible to process the posting of bail and all the necessary papers
needed for the release of Melgazo.
Bearing in mind the constitutional right of the accused to bail and coupled
with the insistence of Melgazos counsel, Judge Canoy summoned Prosecutor
Gonzaga and inquired about the result of the inquest proceedings.
Thereupon, Prosecutor Gonzaga relayed to him that the charge against
Melgazo was for Reckless Imprudence with Homicide and the recommended
bail bond was thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000). However, since it was Similarly, he denied the motion for inhibition filed by Pantilo owing to the
already past 5:00 p.m., Prosecutor Gonzaga claimed that he could no longer absence of an express imprimatur of the prosecutor handling the case.
file the Information and that it would have to be filed the next day.[10]

Despite all this, Judge Canoy informed Prosecutor Gonzaga that he would
allow Melgazo to post bail in the amount recommended. He then called Mrs.
Ruth O. Suriaga (Suriaga), Clerk IV, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Surigao
City, to accept as deposit for bail the thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000) from
Melgazo.[11] Likewise, he instructed Suriaga to earmark an official receipt
which would have to be dated the following day or September 4, 2008.
On February 9, 2009, Pantilo filed his Reply to the Comment arguing that there
is no such thing as constructive bail under the rules. He adds that, while he
does not dispute the accuseds right to post bail, the granting of such should
be in harmony with the rules, i.e., an application or motion to that effect and a
corresponding order from the court granting the motion.

Accordingly, he summoned the escorting police officers, Perocho and
Lamanilao, and verbally ordered them to release Melgazo from detention. He
also said that the written order would be issued the following day.[12]
In his defense, Judge Canoy invokes the constitutional right of the accused to
bail and Section 17(c), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which does not require that a person be charged in court before he or she
may apply for bail.[13] To his mind, there was already a constructive bail given
that only the papers were needed to formalize it.[14] It would be unreasonable
and unjustifiable to further delay the release of the accused. Nevertheless, he
submits that if he would be faulted for such act, he does humbly concede but
he merely acted in accordance with what he deemed best for the moment x
x x.[15]
On October 18, 2010, Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez issued his
evaluation and recommendation on the case. In his evaluation, the Court
Administrator found that respondent judge failed to comply with the
documents required by the rules to discharge an accused on bail. Further, the
Court Administrator noted that Judge Canoy also has another pending case
(but filed on a later date, September 3, 2009): OCA-IPI No. 09-3254-RTJ, entitled
Cristita Conjurado Vda. de Tolibas v. Judge Victor A. Canoy for Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service.
Consequently, he recommended the following: (1) the instant complaint be
re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (2) Judge Canoy be fined
forty thousand pesos (PhP 40,000) with a stern warning that a commission of
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The Courts Ruling

As to his Order dated September 8, 2008 directing the release of the vehicle
subject of the case, he contends that there was no deliberate intent to
disregard rules and procedure. In fact, he points out that the prosecution was We find the evaluation and recommendations of the Court Administrator well-
given three (3) days within which to file its comment on the motion of the founded.
accused. The grounds raised by both parties were well taken into
consideration, but he found the grounds raised by Melgazo to be more
reasonable and practical and, hence, he granted the motion.
It is settled that an accused in a criminal case has the constitutional right to
bail,[16] more so in this case when the charge against Melgazo, Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide, is a non-capital offense. However, the
letter-complaint focuses on the manner of Melgazos release from detention.
Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure allows that any
person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any
court in the province, city or municipality where he is held. In the case at bar,
Melgazo did not file any application or petition for the grant of bail with the
Surigao City RTC, Branch 29. Despite the absence of any written application,
respondent judge verbally granted bail to Melgazo. This is a clear deviation
from the procedure laid down in Sec. 17 of Rule 114.
In addition to a written application for bail, Rule 114 of the Rules prescribes
other requirements for the release of the accused:
SEC. 14. Deposit of cash as bail.The accused or any person acting in his behalf
may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or
provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or
recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon
submission of a proper certificate of deposit and a written undertaking
showing compliance with the requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the
accused shall be discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be
considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs while the
excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the
deposit.
SEC. 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements.All kinds of bail are subject to the
following conditions:
(a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled,
shall remain in form at all stages of the case until promulgation of the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was
originally filed in or appealed to it;
(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by
the court or these Rules;
(c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and
despite due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat.
In such case, the trial may proceed in absentia; and
(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of
the final execution.
The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the
amount of the undertaking and the conditions required by this section.
Photographs (passport size) taken within the last six (6) months showing the
face, left and right profiles of the accused must be attached to the bail.
In the case at bar, Melgazo or any person acting in his behalf did not deposit
the amount of bail recommended by Prosecutor Gonzaga with the nearest
collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer. In clear
departure from Sec. 14 of Rule 114, Judge Canoy instead verbally ordered
Clerk IV Suriaga of the Surigao City RTC, Office of the Clerk of Court, to accept
the cash deposit as bail, to earmark an official receipt for the cash deposit,
and to date it the following day. Worse, respondent judge did not require
Melgazo to sign a written undertaking containing the conditions of the bail
under Sec. 2, Rule 114 to be complied with by Melgazo. Immediately upon
receipt by Suriaga of the cash deposit of PhP 30,000 from Melgazo, Judge
Canoy ordered the police escorts to release Melgazo without any written
order of release. In sum, there was no written application for bail, no certificate
of deposit from the BIR collector or provincial, city or municipal treasurer, no
written undertaking signed by Melgazo, and no written release order.
As regards the insistence of Judge Canoy that such may be considered as
constructive bail, there is no such species of bail under the Rules. Despite the
noblest of reasons, the Rules of Court may not be ignored at will and at
random to the prejudice of the rights of another.
In BPI v. Court of Appeals, We underscored that procedural rules have their
own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to
be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness,
caprice, or whimsicality.[17] In other words, [r]ules of procedure are intended
to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive
rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings.[18] In this case, the reason of
Judge Canoy is hardly persuasive enough to disregard the Rules.[19]
From the foregoing, the Court finds Judge Canoy guilty of a less serious charge
of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars under Sec. 9, Rule
140 for which a fine of more than PhP 10,000 but not exceeding PhP 20,000 is
the imposable penalty under Sec. 11(b), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. A fine
of PhP 11,000 would be the appropriate penalty under the circumstances of
the case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Victor A. Canoy is found GUILTY of violation of
Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars. He is meted the penalty of a
FINE of eleven thousand pesos (PhP 11,000). He is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of similar or analogous infractions in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, Petitioner, v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2
dated August 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224
(RTC) in SP No. 12-71527, which extended the privilege of the writ of habeas
data in favor of respondent Police Superintendent Neri A. Ilagan (Ilagan).
The Facts
In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data3 dated June 22, 2012,
Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former
common law partners. Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter’s
condominium, rested for a while and thereafter,proceeded to his office. Upon
arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was missing.4 On August 23,
2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter’s office regarding a purported sex
video (subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera involving
Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to
return the camera, but to no avail.5 During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly
slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his office and walked
away.6Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing various
complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for violation of
Republic Act No. 9262,7otherwise known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004,” before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati; and (b) an administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).8 Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of
reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the
upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated
not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other
woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is
warranted.9
Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas
Data10 dated June 25, 2012, directing Lee to appear before the court a quo,
and to produce Ilagan’s digital camera, as well as the negative and/or
original of the subject video and copies thereof, and to file a verified written
return within five (5) working days from date of receipt thereof.
caused him to suffer humiliation and mental anguish. In this relation, the RTC
opined that Lee’s use of the subject video as evidence in the various cases she
filed against Ilagan is not enough justification for its reproduction. Nevertheless,
the RTC clarified that it is only ruling on the return of the aforesaid video and
not on its admissibility before other tribunals.15
Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

In her Verified Return11 dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted that she indeed kept
the memory card of the digital camera and reproduced the aforesaid video
but averred that she only did so to utilize the same as evidence in the cases
she filed against Ilagan. She also admitted that her relationship with Ilagan The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly
started sometime in 2003 and ended under disturbing circumstances in August extended the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.
2011, and that she only happened to discover the subject video when Ilagan
left his camera in her condominium. Accordingly, Lee contended that Ilagan’s
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data should be dismissed
The Court’s Ruling
because: (a) its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence against
Ilagan in the cases she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in the gathering,
collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan.12
The petition is meritorious.

The RTC Ruling

A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data
Rule), was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available
remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
In a Decision13 dated August 30, 2012, the RTC granted the privilege of the writ
enforced disappearances.16 It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy
of habeas data in Ilagan’s favor, and accordingly, ordered the implementing
enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy
officer to turn-over copies of the subject video to him, and enjoined Lee from
of individuals,17 which is defined as “the right to control the collection,
further reproducing the same.14
maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself.”18

The RTC did not give credence to Lee’s defense that she is not engaged in the
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now
gathering, collecting or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan, finding
stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
that her acts of reproducing the subject video and showing it to other people,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
i.e., the NAPOLCOM officers, violated the latter’s right to privacy in life and
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to
support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data
Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others,
“[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the
petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to
privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other
.19 Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim.20 In this relation, it bears pointing out that
the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are
vague and doubtful.21
instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s reputation.
Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason
why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as
evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against
Ilagan.23 Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the
glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse
the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Issuance of the Writ of
Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that
his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through SO ORDERED.
the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex
video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video –
which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the
internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between
such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed,
courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the
rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually
proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life,
liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure
on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in
this case.

In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would
equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As
the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-
serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as
prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would
indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the
end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would
anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude22 that Lee was
going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends – say for
A.M. No. 11-10-03-O July 30, 2013
RE: LETTER DATED APRIL 18, 2011 OF CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEY PERSIDA RUEDA-
COSTA REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM THE PAYMENT OF SHERIFF'S EXPENSES
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
This case stemmed from the February 7, 2011 letter1 of Attorney Persida V.
Rueda-Acosta (Atty. Acosta), Chief Public Attorney of the Public Attorney's
Office (PAO), to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In the said letter,
Atty. Acosta sought a clarification as to the exemption of PAO's clients from
the payment of sheriffs expenses, alleging that PAO's clients in its Regional
Office in Region VII are being charged with the payment of sheriff’s expenses
in the amount of P1,000.00 upon the filing of a civil action in court. She claimed
that sheriff’s expenses should not be exacted from PAO’s clients since Section
6 of Republic Act No. 94062 (R.A. No. 9406) specifically exempts them from the
payment of docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court
and other quasi-judicial bodies.
In its letter3 dated March 23, 2011 to Atty. Acosta, the OCA clarified that PAO’s
clients, notwithstanding their exemption under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 from
payment of "docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court,"
are not exempted from the payment of sheriff’s expenses. The OCA explained
that sheriff’s expenses, strictly speaking, are not considered as "legal fees"
under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court since they are not payable to the
government; they are payable to the sheriff/process server to defray his travel
expenses in serving court processes in relation to the litigant’s case.
In her letter4 dated April 18, 2011 to the OCA, Atty. Acosta maintained that,
while sheriff’s expenses may not be strictly considered as a legal fee, they are
nevertheless considered as a fee which is incidental to the filing of an action in
court and, hence, should not be exacted from PAO’s clients. She pointed out
that the imposition of sheriff’s expenses on PAO’s clients would render the
latter’s exemption from payment of docket and other fees under Section 6 of
R.A. No. 9406 nugatory. Considering that the matter involves an interpretation
of R.A. No. 9406, Atty. Acosta requested that the same be referred to the
Court en banc for resolution.
In its report and recommendation5 dated September 14, 2011, the OCA
maintained its position that PAO’s clients are not exempted from the payment
of sheriff’s expenses; it stressed that the P1,000.00 sheriff’s expenses are not the
same as the sheriff’s fee fixed by Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court and,
hence, not covered by the exemption granted to PAO’s clients under R.A. No.
9406. The OCA further alleged that the grant of exemption to PAO’s clients
from the payment of sheriff’s expenses amounts to disbursement of public
funds for the protection of private interests. Accordingly, the OCA
recommended that Atty. Acosta’s request for exemption of PAO’s clients from
payment of sheriff’s expenses be denied.
Adopting the recommendation of the OCA, the Court en banc issued
Resolution6 dated November 22, 2011 which denied Atty. Acosta’s request for
exemption from the payment of sheriff’s expenses.
On January 2, 2012, Atty. Acosta sought a reconsideration7 of the Court’s
Resolution dated November 22, 2011, which the Court en banc referred to the
OCA for appropriate action. In its report and recommendation8 dated March
22, 2012, the OCA averred that the exemption of PAO’s clients from payment
of legal fees is not an absolute rule and that the Court is not precluded from
providing limitations thereto. Thus, the OCA recommended the denial of Atty.
Acosta’s motion for reconsideration.
On April 24, 2012, the Court en banc issued a Resolution9 which denied the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Acosta.
Unperturbed, Atty. Acosta filed a motion for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration10 and a Second Motion for Reconsideration11 of the Court’s
Resolution dated April 24, 2012, alleging that the imposition of sheriff’s
expenses on PAO’s clients is contrary to the language, intent and spirit of
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 since sheriff’s expenses are considered as fees
"incidental to instituting an action in court." Further, she claimed that the said
imposition on PAO’s clients would hinder their access to the courts contrary to
the mandate of Section 11, Article III of the Constitution.
After a conscientious review of the contrasting legal disquisitions set forth in this
case, the Court still finds the instant petition devoid of merit.
At the outset, it bears stressing that this is already the third attempt of Atty.
Acosta to obtain from this Court a declaration exempting PAO’s clients from
the payment of sheriff’s fees – the initial request therefor and the subsequent
motion for reconsideration having been denied by this Court.
As a rule, a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.12 This
rule, however, is not cast in stone. A second motion for reconsideration may be
allowed if there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons therefor, and upon
express leave of court first obtained.13
Ordinarily, the Court would have dismissed outright Atty. Acosta’s second
motion for reconsideration. However, for reasons to be discussed at length
later, there is a need to give due course to the instant petition in order to
reassess and clarify the Court’s pronouncement in our Resolutions dated
November 22, 2011 and April 24, 2012.
In any case, it bears stressing that what is involved in this case is the Court’s
administrative power to determine its policy vis-à-vis the exaction of legal fees
from the litigants. The Court’s policy determination respecting administrative
matters must not be unnecessarily bound by procedural considerations. Surely,
a rule of procedure may not debilitate the Court and render inutile its power of
administration and supervision over court procedures.
At the core of this case is the proper interpretation of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406
which, in part, reads:
Sec. 6. New sections are hereby inserted in Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of
Executive Order No. 292, to read as follows:
xxxx
Sec. 16-D. Exemption from Fees and Costs of the Suit – The clients of PAO shall
be exempt from payment of docket and other fees incidental to instituting an
action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies, as an original proceeding or on
appeal.
The costs of the suit, attorney’s fees and contingent fees imposed upon the
adversary of the PAO clients after a successful litigation shall be deposited in
the National Treasury as trust fund and shall be disbursed for special
allowances of authorized officials and lawyers of the PAO. (Emphasis ours)
The OCA maintains that sheriff’s expenses are not covered by the exemption
granted to PAO’s clients under R.A. No. 9406 since the same are not
considered as a legal fee under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Stated
differently, the OCA asserts that the exemption provided for under R.A. No.
9406 only covers the legal fees enumerated under Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court.
The court agrees.
It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,
unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal
meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers–who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers–to use statutory phraseology in such
a manner is always presumed.14
That Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 exempts PAO’s clients from the payment of
"docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court and other
quasi-judicial bodies" is beyond cavil. However, contrary to Atty. Acosta’s
claim, a plain reading of the said provision clearly shows that the exemption
granted to PAO’s clients cannot be extended to the payment of sheriff’s
expenses; the exemption is specifically limited to the payment of fees, i.e.,
docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action.
The term "fees" is defined as a charge fixed by law or by an institution for
certain privileges or services.15 Viewed from this context, the phrase "docket
and other fees incidental to instituting an action" refers to the totality of the
legal fees imposed under Rule 14116 of the Rules of Court. In particular, it
includes filing or docket fees, appeal fees, fees for issuance of provisional
remedies, mediation fees, sheriff’s fees, stenographer’s fees and
commissioner’s fees.17 These are the fees that are exacted for the services
rendered by the court in connection with the action instituted before it.
Sheriff’s expenses, however, cannot be classified as a "fee" within the purview
of the exemption granted to PAO’s clients under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406.
Sheriff’s expenses are provided for under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, viz:
Sec. 10. Sheriffs, PROCESS SERVERS and other persons serving processes.–
xxxx
In addition to the fees hereinabove fixed, the amount of ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) PESOS shall be deposited with the Clerk of Court upon filing of the
complaint to defray the actual travel expenses of the sheriff, process server or
other court-authorized persons in the service of summons, subpoena and other
court processes that would be issued relative to the trial of the case. In case
the initial deposit of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS is not sufficient, then the
plaintiff or petitioner shall be required to make an additional deposit. The
sheriff, process server or other court authorized person shall submit to the court
for its approval a statement of the estimated travel expenses for service of
summons and court processes. Once approved, the Clerk of Court shall
release the money to said sheriff or process server. After service, a statement of
liquidation shall be submitted to the court for approval. After rendition of
judgment by the court, any excess from the deposit shall be returned to the
party who made the deposit. x x x x (Emphasis ours)
Sheriff’s expenses are not exacted for any service rendered by the court; they
are the amount deposited to the Clerk of Court upon filing of the complaint to
defray the actual travel expenses of the sheriff, process server or other court-
authorized persons in the service of summons, subpoena and other court
processes that would be issued relative to the trial of the case. It is not the
same as sheriff’s fees under Section 10,18 Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, which
refers to those imposed by the court for services rendered to a party incident
to the proceedings before it.
Thus, in In Re: Exemption of Cooperatives from Payment of Court and Sheriff’s
Fees Payable to the Government in Actions Brought Under R.A. 6938,19 the
Court clarified that sheriff’s expenses are not considered as legal fees,
ratiocinating that:
The difference in the treatment between the sheriff’s fees and the sheriff’s
expenses in relation with the exemption enjoyed by cooperatives is further
demonstrated by the wording of Section 10, Rule 141, which uses "fees" in
delineating the enumeration in the first paragraph, and "expenses" in qualifying
the subsequent paragraphs of this provision. The intention to make a distinction
between the two charges is clear; otherwise, the Rules would not have used
different designations. Likewise, the difference between the two terms is
highlighted by a consideration of the phraseology in the first sentence of the
second paragraph of Section 10, Rule 141, which uses the clause "in addition
to the fees hereinabove fixed," thereby unequivocally indicating that sheriff’s
expenses are separate charges on top of the sheriff’s fees. (Italics supplied)
The Court, however, is not unmindful of the predicament of PAO’s clients. In
exempting PAO’s clients from paying docket and other legal fees, R.A. No.
9406 intended to ensure that the indigents and the less privileged, who do not
have the means to pay the said fees, would not be denied access to courts by
reason of poverty. Indeed, requiring PAO’s clients to pay sheriff’s expenses,
despite their exemption from the payment of docket and other legal fees,
would effectly fetter their free access to the courts thereby negating the
laudable intent of Congress in enacting R.A. No. 9406.
Free access to the courts and adequate legal assistance are among the
fundamental rights which the Constitution extends to the less privileged. Thus,
Section 11, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that "free access to the
courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty." The Constitution affords litigants—
moneyed or poor—equal access to the courts; moreover, it specifically
provides that poverty shall not bar any person from having access to the
courts. Accordingly, laws and rules must be formulated, interpreted, and
implemented pursuant to the intent and spirit of this constitutional provision.20
Access to justice by all, especially by the poor, is not simply an ideal in our
society. Its existence is essential in a democracy and in the rule of law.21
Without doubt, one of the most precious rights which must be shielded and
secured is the unhampered access to the justice system by the poor, the
underprivileged and the marginalized.22
Having the foregoing principles in mind, the Court, heeding the constitutional
mandate of ensuring free access to the courts and adequate legal assistance
to the marginalized and less privileged, hereby authorizes the officials and
employees of PAO to serve summons, subpoena and other court processes
pursuant to Section 3,23 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The authority given
herein by the Court to the officials and employees of PAO shall be limited only
to cases involving their client.1âwphi1
Authorizing the officials and employees of P AO to serve the summons,
subpoenas and other court processes in behalf of their clients would relieve
the latter from the burden of paying for the sheriff's expenses despite their non-
exemption from the payment thereof under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406. The
amount to be defrayed in the service of summons, subpoena and other court
processes in behalf of its clients would consequently have to be taken from the
operating expenses of P AO. In turn, the amount advanced by PAO as actual
travel expenses may be taken from the amount recovered from the
adversaries of PAO's clients as costs of suit, attorney's fees or contingent fees
prior to the deposit thereof in the National Treasury.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Second Motion
for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Persida V. Rueda-Acosta is DENIED. The
Court's Resolutions dated November 22, 2011 and April 24, 2012 are hereby
AFFIRMED. The request of Atty. Persida V. RuedaAcosta for the exemption of
the clients of the Public Attorney's Office from the payment of sheriff's
expenses is DENIED.
Nevertheless, the officials and employees of the Public Attorney's Office are
hereby AUTHORIZED to serve summons, subpoenas and other court processes
in behalf of their clients pursuant to Section 3, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in G.R. No. 197442 October 22, 2014
coordination with the concerned court. The amount to be defrayed in serving
the summons, subpoenas and other court processes could

MAJESTIC FINANCE AND INVESTMENT CO., INC., Petitioner,

be taken from the operating expenses of the Public Attorney's Office which, in vs.
turn, may be taken from the amount recovered by it from the adversaries of
PAO's clients as costs of suit, attorney's fees or contingent fees prior to the JOSE D. TITO, Respondent.
deposit thereof in the National Treasury, or damages that said clients may be
decreed as entitled to in case of the success of P AO' s indigent clients.
x-----------------------x

SO ORDERED.

ORNELIO MENDOZA and PAULINA CRUZ, Petitioners-Intervenors,

vs.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES

JOSE NAZAL and ROSITA NAZAL, Respondents-Intervenors.

Associate Justice

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated
October 30, 2008 and the Resolution3 dated June 22, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 81814, which reversed and set aside the
Order4 dated July 28, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 67
(RTC) in Civil Case No. 27958, and remanded the case to the court a quo for
further proceedings.
The Facts
Petitioner Majestic Finance and Investment Co., Inc. (Majestic) was the
judgment obligee in Civil Case No. 20538, a case for rescission of contract
(rescission case) filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 21 (CFI),
now the RTC. In order to satisfy the judgment by default, the Sheriff levied upon
the property of the judgment obligor, Thomas D. Cort (Cort), covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1104725 (subject property), and sold the
same at a public auction to Paulina Cruz (Cruz), the highest bidder, for a total
bid price of 54,460.00. After the redemption period had lapsed, Cruz secured
TCT No. 241118 on January 4, 1978 in her name and, thereafter, soldthe subject
property to Cornelio Mendoza (Mendoza) who was issued TCT No. 241177 on
January 9, 1978.6
On November 21, 1977, respondent Jose D. Tito (Tito) filed with the same CFI
against Majestic a petition to declare the proceedings and the Decision in the
rescission case null and void, docketed as Civil Case No. 27958 (annulment
case).7 He contended that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of his predecessor-in-interest, Cort,8 who had passed away on July 9,
1970, or almost five years (5) prior to the filing of the rescission case on January
5, 1975.9 His standing to file the annulment case was based on his purported
ownership of the subject property, which he allegedly inherited from Cort by
way of a devise under his Last Will and Testament dated June 4, 197010 that
was later probated and allowed in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania,
United States of America.11
Prior to the institution of the annulment case, Tito had, however, already
transmitted his interest over the subject property to spouses Jose and Rosita
Nazal (Sps. Nazal) on September 13, 1977,12 prompting the latter to join him in
the proceedings as intervenors, impleading Cruz and Mendoza on April 25,
1979.13 Earlier, or on January 5,1979, Mendoza filed against Sps. Nazal a case
for forcible entry and another case for recovery of possession, which were
dismissed on February 22, 197914 and archived pending the resolution ofthe
annulment case,15 respectively.
On August 16, 1979, the CFI allowed the intervention of Sps. Nazal in the
annulment case,16 which order eventually attained finality as shown by the
entry of judgment issued by the Court on August 29, 1985 in G.R. No. L-69353.17
In the interim, the proceedings in the annulment case were indefinitely
suspended.18
On December 9, 1987, Sps. Nazal moved that the annulment case be set for
pre-trial but the motion was not acted upon.19 It appears that the records
were among those gutted by fire on June 11, 1988, and none of the parties or
the court did anything for a period of almost eleven (11) years.20 Meanwhile,
Sps. Nazal remained in possession of the subject property.21 Sometime in 1998,
Sps. Nazal received summons in an unlawful detainer case filed by the new
registered owners of the subject property, spouses Mariano and Rhodora Lim
(Sps. Lim),22 which apparently prompted Sps. Nazal to set the annulment case
for hearing. Learning of the loss of the records, Sps. Nazal moved for
reconstitution23 of judicial records and for revival24 of the proceedings in the
annulment case, which was opposed by Majestic. Later, Majestic filed an
Urgent Motion to Declare Case as already Closed and Terminated with
Opposition to Revive the Case,25 contending, among others, that Tito, the
principal petitioner in the annulment case, had lost interest in prosecuting the
case and that Sps. Nazal have no personality to further prosecute the same.26
In another proceeding, Sps. Nazal opposed the unlawful detainer case filed by
Sps. Lim all the way tothe Court, but to no avail.27
The RTC Proceedings
In an Order28 dated February 2, 2000 (February 2, 2000 Order), the RTC
dismissed the annulment case withprejudice, and declared it closed and
terminated for failure of Tito and Sps. Nazal to prosecute their claim for an
unexplained and unreasonable length of time.29 It held that while it was
incumbent upon the Clerk of Court to include the case in the trial calendar,
set the date for trial, and notify the parties thereof, these did not relieve the
plaintiff of his duty to prosecute the case diligently and to call the attention of
the court to calendar the case if the latter has neglected to do so because of
the numerous cases it has to attend to.30
Upon Sps. Nazal’s motion for reconsideration,31 however, the RTC, in an
Order32 dated August 23, 2002 (August 23,2002 Order), set aside its earlier
dismissal order "in the interest of justice." It held that as both Majestic and Sps.
Nazal were guilty of inaction since 1987 after the latter’s Motion to Set Case for
Pre-Trial was filed, no one should be allowed to benefit from the other and the
case must be allowed to proceed on the merits,33 especially in this case
where Sps. Nazal has a material interest such that it would be them, not Tito,
who would be benefited or injured by the judgment in the said case.34
Dissatisfied, Majestic moved for reconsideration35 on September 27, 2002,
which was granted in an Order36 dated July 28, 2003 (July 28, 2003 Order),
declaring the February 2, 2000 Order to be final and executory. The RTC ruled
that an intervention is regarded as mere collateral or accessory, or ancillary to
the original action, suchthat the dismissal of the original case necessarily
includes that of the petition-in-intervention.37 It further held that even if Sps.
Nazal were to be consideredas real parties-in-interest, the better remedy for
them is to file a separate action, as principal plaintiffs, against Majestic.38
Aggrieved, Sps. Nazal elevated the matter before the CA.39
The CA Ruling
In a Decision40 dated October 30, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the
RTC’s July 28, 2003 Order, holding that Sps. Nazal are entitled to proceed with
the prosecution of their cause of action against Majestic after having been
duly allowed to intervene in the annulment case.41 It further held that to
require Sps. Nazal to refile another case for the settlement of their claim will
result in unnecessary delay and expense, and will entail multiplicity of suits,
hence, defeat the very purpose of intervention, i.e., to hear and determine at
the same timeall conflicting claims which may be made on the subject matter
in litigation,and to expedite litigation and settle in one action and by a single
judgment the whole controversy among the persons involved.42 Accordingly,
it remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings.43
Majestic’s motion for reconsideration44 was denied by the CA in a
Resolution45 dated June 22, 2011, hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA erred in
allowing Sps. Nazal to prosecute their claim against Majestic.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Sps. Nazal, who were joined as intervenors in the proceedings, had already lost
their right to participate therein, in view of the RTC’s dismissal of the main
action which was decreed pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court,46 stemming from the failure of the putative plaintiff, Tito, to diligently
and expeditiously prosecutethe same for an unjustified and unreasonable
length of time. Case law states that intervention is never an independent
action, but is merely ancillary and supplemental to the existing
litigation.1âwphi1 Its purpose is not to obstruct or unnecessarily delay the
placid operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an
original party, who is claiming a certain right or interest in the pending case,
the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert or protect such
right or interests. In other words, the right of an interven or should only be in aid
of the right of the original party. Thus, as a general rule,47 where the right of
the latter has ceased to exist, there is nothing to aid or fight for and, All told, whether one treats Sps. Nazal as mere intervenors or, properly
consequently, the right of intervention ceases.48 speaking, as the plaintiffs in the annulment case, the Court finds no cogent
reason as to why the same should not be dismissed. In fine, Sps. Nazal are
precluded from prosecuting their claim against Majestic. WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 30, 2008 and the Resolution
It bears pointing out that, despite having been joined in the annulment case dated June 22, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 81814 are
as intervenors, Sps. Nazal should have actually been deemed as the case’s hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered DISMISSING Civil
plaintiffs considering that Titohad already transferred his interest over the Case No. 27958. SO ORDERED.
disputed property to the former, even prior to the institution of the
proceedings. Verily, where a transfer of interest was effected before the
commencement of the suit – as in this case – the transferee must necessarily
be the plaintiff (or defendant, as the case may be)49 as it is he who stands to ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.50 Thus, on the supposition
that they were the case’s plaintiffs, Sps. Nazal should bear the obligation Associate Justice
imputed by the RTC upon Tito to diligently and expeditiously prosecute the
action within a reasonable length of time. The RTC, however, pointed out that
Sps. Nazal failed in this regard. As the records would bear, while Sps. Nazal
moved to set the case for pre-trial on December 9, 1987, no further action was
taken by them after the court a quo failed to calendar the case and set the
same for pre-trial. Disconcerting is the fact that it took Sps. Nazal almost eleven
(11) years, or on October 20, 1998 to move for the setting of the case for
hearing, as they were apparently compelled to act only upon the threat of
being dispossessed of the subject property with the filing of the unlawful
detainer case by the new registered owners, Sps. Lim. Notably, while under
both the present51 and the old52 Rules of Court, the clerk of court has the
duty to set the case for pre-trial, the same does not relieve the plaintiffsof their
own duty to prosecute the case diligently.53 Truth be told, the expeditious
disposition of cases is as much the duty of the plaintiff as the court.54

Furthermore, the Court has perused the records and found no sufficient
justification for Sps. Nazal's inordinately long inaction over the annulment case.
Other than the allegation that their counsel assured them that their claim of
ownership was well-founded,55 they failed to even offer an explanation as to
why they had to wait for more than a decade to proceed with the case. As
the Court sees it, this is an unreasonably long time for the defendant to wait for
the outcome of a trial that has yet to commence, especially as the case had
been filed by their predecessor-in-interest, Tito, as early as November 21,
1977.56