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Introduction

Koopmans (1965)

Basically the Solow model with endogenous savings - explicit

consumer optimization

Probably the most important model in contemporaneous

macroeconomics, workhorse for many areas, including business cycle

theories

Basic setup

Closed economy

No government

One homogeneous final good

Price of the final good normalized to 1 in each period (all variables

expressed in real terms)

Two types of agents in the economy:

Firms

Households

Firms and households identical: one can focus on a representative

firm and a representative household, aggregation straightforward

Firms

Final output produced by competitive firms

Neoclassical production function with Harrod neutral technological

progress

Yt = F (Kt , At Lt ) (1)

Capital and labour inputs rented from households

Technology is available for free and grows at a constant rate g > 0:

At+1 = (1 + g )At

Maximization problem of firms:

max{F (Kt , At Lt ) − Wt Lt − RK ,t Kt }

Lt ,Kt

(competitive factor markets)

First order conditions:

∂F ∂F

Wt = RK ,t = = f 0 (kt ) (2)

∂Lt ∂Kt

Michal Brzoza-Brzezina/Marcin Kolasa (WSE) Ad. Macro - Ramsey model 4 / 47

Households I

renting them to firms

Labour supplied inelastically, grows at a constant rate n > 0:

Lt+1 = (1 + n)Lt

savings (equal to investment):

Wt Lt + RK ,t Kt = Ct + St = Ct + It (4)

Households II

and future):

X∞

U0 = β t u(C̃t )Lt (5)

t=0

where:

Ct

C̃t = Lt - consumption per capita

β - discount factor (0 < β < 1)

u(Ct ) - instantaneous utility from consumption:

1−θ

C̃t

u(C̃t ) = (6)

1−θ

where:

θ>0

If θ = 1 then u(C̃t ) = ln C̃t

Households III

Remarks:

Literally: household members live forever

Justification: intergenerational transfers, people care about utility of

their offspring

Discounting: households are impatient

Remarks on the utility function:

u(C̃t ) is a constant relative risk aversion function (CRRA):

C̃t u 00 (C̃t )

− =θ

u 0 (C̃t )

u(C̃t ) is a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution function:

˜

∂ ln CC˜1 1

2

− =

u 0 (C˜1 ) θ

∂ ln u0 (C˜ )

2

Michal Brzoza-Brzezina/Marcin Kolasa (WSE) Ad. Macro - Ramsey model 7 / 47

Households IV

Households’ optimization problem: maximize (5) subject to the

model’s constraints:

Capital law of motion (capital is the only asset held by households),

incorporating income definition and savings-investment equality (4)

Transversality condition:

t

!

Y 1

lim Kt+1 =0 (7)

t→∞

s=1

1 + rs

where: rt = RK ,t − δ = f 0 (kt ) − δ is the market rate of return on

capital (real interest rate)

Interpretation of the transversality condition:

Analog of a terminal condition in a finite horizon

Non-negativity constraint on the terminal (net present) value of assets

held by households (capital)

No-Ponzi game condition: proper lifetime budget constraint on

households

Optimization by households implies (7) holds with equality

Michal Brzoza-Brzezina/Marcin Kolasa (WSE) Ad. Macro - Ramsey model 8 / 47

General equilibrium

Market clearing conditions:

Output produced by firms must be equal to households’ total

spending (on consumption and investment):

Yt = Ct + It (8)

demanded by firms

Capital supplied by households must be equal to capital input

demanded by firms

A sequence of {Kt , Yt , Ct , It , Wt , RK ,t }∞

t=0 for a given sequence of

{Lt , At }∞

t=0 and an initial capital stock K0 , such that (i) the representative

household maximizes its utility taking the time path of factor prices

{Wt , RK ,t }∞

t=0 as given; (ii) firms maximize profits taking the time path of

factor prices as given; (iii) factor prices are such that all markets clear.

Michal Brzoza-Brzezina/Marcin Kolasa (WSE) Ad. Macro - Ramsey model 9 / 47

Households’ optimization problem

∞ 1−θ

t C̃t

X

U0 = β Lt =

1−θ

t=0

∞ 1−θ

X C̃t

= L0 β̃ t (9)

1−θ

t=0

where:

β̃ = β(1 + n) β(1 + g )1−θ (1 + n) < 1

the last inequality is assumed and ensures that utility is bounded

Households’ optimization problem II

1−δ 1

K̃t+1 = K̃t + (Wt + RK ,t K̃t − C̃t ) (10)

1+n 1+n

Capital accumulation rewritten in intensive form (using (4) and

defining wt = W

At ):

t

1−δ 1

kt+1 = kt + (wt + RK ,t kt − ct ) (11)

(1 + g )(1 + n) (1 + g )(1 + n)

t

!

Y (1 + n)(1 + g )

lim kt+1 =0 (12)

t→∞ 1 + rs

s=1

Lagrange function and FOCs

∞ !

C̃t1−θ

X (1 − δ)K̃t + Wt + RK ,t K̃t − C̃t −

LL = β̃ t + λt

1−θ −(1 + n)K̃t+1

t=0

∂LL

= 0 =⇒ C̃t−θ = λt (13)

∂ C̃t

∂LL

= 0 =⇒ β̃λt+1 (1 − δ + RK ,t+1 )) = (1 + n)λt (14)

∂ K̃t+1

Euler equation I

!θ

C̃t+1 RK ,t+1 + 1 − δ

= β̃ (15)

C̃t (1 + n)

θ

ct+1 RK ,t+1 + 1 − δ

=β (16)

ct (1 + g )θ

For consumption per capita, using also the definition of the interest

rate rt : !θ

ct+1 At+1 θ

C̃t+1

= = β (1 + rt+1 ) (17)

C̃t ct At

Euler equation II

For θ > 0: C̃t+1 > C̃t ⇐⇒ 1 + rt+1 > β −1

Interpretation: For (per capita) consumption to grow the (market)

interest rate must exceed households’ rate of time preference

Interpretation: It is optimal for households to postpone consumption

(i.e. save in the current period and consume more in the next period)

iff the related utility loss is more than offset by the rate of return on

savings

Role of θ:

The higher θ the less responsive consumption to changes in the interest

rate

In other words: The higher θ the stronger the consumption smoothing

motive (the lower intertemporal substitution)

Equilibrium dynamics in intensive form - summary

characterized by 3 equations: (16), (11) and (12). They are (after

some rewriting and using (4) and (8) in intensive form):

θ

f 0 (kt+1 ) + 1 − δ

ct+1

=β (18)

ct (1 + g )θ

= + (19)

kt (1 + g )(1 + n) (1 + g )(1 + n) kt

t

!

Y (1 + n)(1 + g )

lim kt+1 =0 (20)

t→∞ f 0 (kt+1 ) + 1 − δ

s=1

and (19) describe the future evolution of these variables: kt and ct .

The transversality condition (20) pins down the initial level of

consumption c0 .

Michal Brzoza-Brzezina/Marcin Kolasa (WSE) Ad. Macro - Ramsey model 15 / 47

Steady state equilibrium I

Using (18) and (19), the long-run solution to the Ramsey model:

(1 + g )θ

f 0 (k ∗ ) = −1+δ (21)

β

c ∗ = f (k ∗ ) − (n + g + δ + ng )k ∗ (22)

Steady state equilibrium II

ct ct+1=ct

c*

kt+1=kt

k* kG kt

Modified golden rule I

From (22):

f 0 (kG ) = n + g + δ + ng

t

(1 + n)(1 + g )

lim k ∗ =0

t→∞ f 0 (k ∗ ) + 1 − δ

This implies:

f 0 (k ∗ ) > n + g + δ + ng

Since f 00 (k) < 0 for any k > 0

Modified golden rule II

short of the savings rate consistent with the golden rule:

From (22), the steady-state savings rate is:

c∗ k∗

s∗ = 1 − = (n + g + δ + ng )

f (k ∗ ) f (k ∗ )

Using (23):

k∗

s ∗ < f 0 (k ∗ ) = α(k ∗ )

f (k ∗ )

Intuitive explanation: households are impatient (β < 1) and smooth

consumption (θ > 0, relevant if g > 0).

The role of the discount factor

From (21): if β goes up, f 0 (k ∗ ) goes down, which means that k ∗

goes up

The ct+1 = ct locus on the (k, c) chart shifts right

Steady-state consumption goes up

Intuition: if households are more patient, they save more, which

brings them closer to the standard golden rule

Phase diagram

From (18): k ≶ k ∗ =⇒ ∆c ≷ 0

From (19): c ≶ f (k) − (n + g + δ + ng )k =⇒ ∆k ≷ 0

ct ct+1=ct

c*

kt+1=kt

k* kt

Michal Brzoza-Brzezina/Marcin Kolasa (WSE) Ad. Macro - Ramsey model 21 / 47

Saddle path (stable arm)

Transversality condition (20) pins down the inital level of c0 for any

initial k0 , so that the system converges to the steady-state:

ct ct+1=ct

c*

kt+1=kt

c0

k0 k* kt

Michal Brzoza-Brzezina/Marcin Kolasa (WSE) Ad. Macro - Ramsey model 22 / 47

Uniqueness of equilibrium

If the initial level of consumption were below c0 :

capital would eventually reach its maximal level k̄ > kG

this implies:

f 0 (k̄) < f 0 (kG ) = n + g + δ + ng

which violates the transversality condition (20) since:

t

(1 + n)(1 + g )

lim k̄ =∞

t→∞ f 0 (k̄) + 1 − δ

households would hold very valuable assets, which cannot be optimal

If the initial level of consumption were above c0 :

capital would eventually reach 0 but consumption would stay positive,

which is clearly not feasible

Speed of convergence

Ramsey model depends additionally on the behaviour of the savings

rate along the transition path

For very small time intervals, the following implications hold (see

Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, ch. 2.6.4):

1

θ < s ∗ =⇒ st − s ∗ depends positively on kt − k ∗

1

θ = s ∗ =⇒ st = s ∗

1

θ > s ∗ =⇒ st − s ∗ depends negatively on kt − k ∗

Intuition (suppose the economy starts from k0 < k ∗ , so c0 < c ∗ ):

if households care much about consumption smoothing (θ is high),

they wll try to shift consumption from the future to the present

if households care little about consumption smoothing (θ is low), they

will try to postpone consumption to reach steady-state sooner

For standard parameter values 1θ > s ∗ , so the Ramsey model predicts

relatively fast pace of convergence

Michal Brzoza-Brzezina/Marcin Kolasa (WSE) Ad. Macro - Ramsey model 24 / 47

Wealth and consumption

∞ ∞

X Ct X W t Lt

C0 + = (1 + r0 )K0 + W0 L0 + ≡ Ωt

Rt Rt

t=1 t=1

Ct+1 1

= (β (1 + rt )) θ (1 + n)

Ct

1 1

(β (1 + r1 )) θ (1 + n) β 2 (1 + r1 ) (1 + r2 ) θ (1 + n)2

C0 +C0 +C0 +. . . = Ωt

R1 R2

Wealth and consumption cont’d

so that

" ∞ 1 #−1

X (β t Rt ) θ (1 + n)t

C0 = Ωt 1+

Rt

t=1

C0 = [1 − β (1 + n)] Ωt

has a small impact on current consumption!

Efficiency of equilibrium

What does it mean? If markets are efficient the equilibrium allocation

maximizes households welfare.

Then government intervention is pointless (see Adam Smith’s invisible

hand)

But we know many situations where markest fail. E.g.:

externalities

imperfect information

principal-agent problem

How about the Ramsey model?

Social planer’s problem

household welfare

Constrained by technology and available resources

For simplicity consider a model without labor or technology growth

∞

X

max U0 = β t u(ct ) (24)

ct ,kt+1 ,yt

t=0

subject to

yt = f (kt )

and

ct + kt+1 = yt + (1 − δ)kt

Lagrangean and FOC

∞

X ∞

X

t

L= β u(ct ) − λt [ct + kt+1 − f (kt ) − (1 − δ)kt ] (25)

t=0 t=0

FOC:

ct : β t uc,t = λt

t→∞

Optimal allocation

uc,t

= f 0 (kt+1 ) + 1 − δ

βuc,t+1

t→∞

yt = f (kt )

ct + kt+1 = yt − (1 − δ)kt

Comparison to decentralized (competitive) equilibrium

after ignoring labor and population growth become:

uc,t

= β (RK ,t+1 + 1 − δ)

uc,t+1

kt+1 = (1 − δ) kt + (wt + RK ,t kt − ct )

t

!

Y 1

lim kt+1 =0

t→∞ 1 + rs

s=1

Competitive equilibrium cont’d

Use zero profit condition:

kt+1 = (1 − δ) kt + yt − ct

Note that

uc,t+1

= β(1 + rt+1 )

uc,t

so that

t

Y 1 βuc,1 βuc,2 βuc,t β t uc,t

= ··· =

1 + rs uc,0 uc,1 uc,t−1 uc,0

s=1

Hence TVC condition is equivalent to

t→∞

Welfare theorems

economy reflects two fundamental welfare theorems.

2 Second welfare theorem: any efficient allocation can be supported as

a competitive equilibrium (possibly with lump-sum transfers).

(Adam Smith would like it).

Second gives the equivalence beween an efficient and competitive

allocation and thus, the possibility to solve the (simpler) planners

problem.

The government

G

Y is 40-50% (once all government expenditure is accounted for)

Some problems worth analysing:

difference/ similarity between tax and debt financing of gov.

expenditure

reaction of economy to government shocks (spending, taxes)

Ricardian equivalence

Government plans sustainable - initial debt plus net present value of

expenditures equals net present value of revenues

∞ ∞

X Tt X Gt

T0 + = (1 + r0 )B0 + G0 +

Rt Rt

t=1 t=1

where

t

Y

Rt ≡ (1 + ri )

i=1

Ricardian equivalence cont’d

∞ ∞ ∞

X Ct X Wt Lt X Tt

C0 + = (1 + r0 )K0 + (1 + r0 )B0 + W0 L0 + − T0 −

Rt Rt Rt

t=1 t=1 t=1

P∞ Tt

Substitute from government budget for t=1 Rt

∞ ∞ ∞

X Ct X Wt Lt X Gt

C0 + = (1 + r0 )K0 + W0 L0 + − G0 −

Rt Rt Rt

t=1 t=1 t=1

Financing expenditures with lump-sum taxes equivalent to financing

expenditures with debt

Michal Brzoza-Brzezina/Marcin Kolasa (WSE) Ad. Macro - Ramsey model 36 / 47

Ricardian equivalence in practice

Why? Some explanations can be given within our modeling

framework.

finite horizon of households

different interest rates

credit constrained households

distortionary taxes

Good to know the theoretical benchmark where Ricardian equivalence

holds

For instance to be able to construct models where gov. deficits have

macro effects

Distortionary taxation

(26)

where:

Gt - government purchases (exogenous)

τw , τk , τc , τi , τf - proportional tax rates on wage income, capital

income, consumption, investment and firms’ taxable profits,

respectively (all exogenous)

Vt - lump-sum taxes (net of lump-sum transfers) from households,

adjusted so that the balanced budget constraint (26) holds

Modified firms’ problem

Lt ,Kt

∂F rt ∂F

Wt = +δ = = f 0 (kt )

∂Lt 1 − τf ∂Kt

Firms are competitive so earn zero profits:

Yt = Ct + It + Gt (28)

Modified households’ problem

households’ lifetime utility is still given by (5)

Households’ budget constraint (4) becomes:

(29)

Note that, by (27), households’ factor income is no longer equal to

output

Modified transversality condition:

t

!

Y 1

lim Kt+1 =0 (30)

t→∞ 1 + (1 − τk )rs

s=1

Modified households’ optimization problem

∞

X C̃t1−θ

U0 = L0 β̃ t (31)

1−θ

t=0

1−δ 1

K̃t+1 = K̃t +

1+g (1 + g )(1 + τi )

(1 − τw )Wt + (1 − τk )RK ,t K̃t + τk δ K̃t

(32)

−(1 + τc )C̃t − Ṽt

Transversality condition:

t

!

Y 1+n

lim K̃t+1 =0 (33)

t→∞ 1 + (1 − τk )rs

s=1

Equilibrium dynamics

The equilibrium dynamics of the model at any time t is given by the

following equations:

Euler equation (maximizing (31), subject to (32) and using firms’

FOC):

=β (34)

ct (1 + g )θ (1 + τi )

constraint (26) and firms’ zero profit condition (27), with gt = AGt Lt t ):

kt+1 1−δ 1 f (kt ) − ct − gt

= + (35)

kt (1 + g )(1 + n) (1 + g )(1 + n) kt

Transversality condition (33):

t

!

Y (1 + n)(1 + g )

lim kt+1 0 (k

=0 (36)

t→∞

s=1

f t+1 ) + 1 − δ

Simplified variant - only capital tax

θ

1 + (1 − τk )(f 0 (kt+1 ) − δ)

ct+1

=β

ct (1 + g )θ

= +

kt (1 + g )(1 + n) (1 + g )(1 + n) kt

Steady state:

(1 + g )θ − β

f 0 (k ∗ ) = +δ

β(1 − τk )

c ∗ = f (k ∗ ) − (n + g + δ + ng )k ∗ − g ∗

Simplified variant - simulate shocks

lump-sum taxes)

Temporary increase in government expenditure (financed with

lump-sum taxes)

Permanent increase in capital tax

Conclusions from model with government

Ricardian equivalence holds as long as taxes are nondistortionary

Taxes on capital, investment and firm profits are distortionary (change

the equilibrium allocation)

Taxes on consumption and labor income are nondistortionary (but only

as long as labor supply is exogeneous)

Government expenditure crowds out private consumption one-to-one

but does not affect capital or output (if financed by nondistortionary

taxes)

Some simulations with the Ramsey model

Ramsey model

find initial consumption for given k0 that fulfils the equilibrium

conditions

simulate convergence from c0 , k0 to steady state

simulate a change (temporary or permanent) of:

rate of time preference

government expenditure

capital tax

Main implications of the Ramsey model

possible only with technological progress (exogenous in both models)

We should observe conditional, but not necessarily unconditional,

convergence (in line with the data)

Shows several important (though ratehr benchmark) features

Ricardian equivalence

Key role of permanent income (lifetime wealth) in driving consuption

Compared to the Solow model:

Explicit optimality criterion - households’ utility

If there is no distortionary taxation (i.e. if there is no government or all

taxes are lump-sum), allocations are Pareto optimal: decentralized

equilibrium coincides with allocations dictated by a benevolent social

planer (markets are competitive and complete, so the first welfare

theorem applies)

Savings rate endogenous and in the long-run always lower than implied

by the golden rule

Michal Brzoza-Brzezina/Marcin Kolasa (WSE) Ad. Macro - Ramsey model 47 / 47

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