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SULPICIO INTOD vs. CA (G.R. No.

103119 October 21, 1992)

Doctrine: Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of
the intended crime.

FACTS: Some time in February of 1979, the petitioner, together with three other armed men, went to Salvador Mandaya’s house and fired
gunshots at his bedroom. Unknown to them, Mandaya was not in his bedroom, and the house was occupied by his son-in-law and his family.

RTC convicted Intod of attempted. Petioner raised the case to CA but the same affirmed the decision. Petitioner now contends that he is only
responsible for an impossible crime under par. 2, art. 4 of RPC.

ISSUE: WON is guilty of impossible crime only.

RULING: YES. Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation
of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence
resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be,
although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is done is a sort to create
alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of attempt takes cognizance
of is in reason committed.

Further, factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been
as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.

Petition GRANTED, respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner guilty of an
impossible crime and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided
by the law, and to pay the costs.

Gemma T. Jacinto vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009

The Supreme Court found an accused guilty of an impossible crime and sentenced her to six (6) months of arrresto mayor.

Here, the accused was a collector for a company called Mega Foam Int’l Inc. (Mega Foam) and received a PhP10,000 check as payment from a
Mega Foam customer. However, instead of turning over the check to Mega Foam, the accused took the check and had it deposited into her
brother-in-law’s bank account. It turns out the the check was not funded.

Both the regional trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the accused was guilty of qualified theft. The Supreme Court modified the
judgment and ruled that the accused was guilty of an impossible crime. According to the Supreme Court:

. . . the personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen. This is further
bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.

In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was
subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.

The Court must resolve the issue in the negative. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR.

G.R. No. 116736 July 24, 1997

TOPIC INVOLVED: SUFFICIENT COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION

FACTS: On October 15, 1992 5:30 pm: Andre Mar Masangkay, Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres, Searfin, Boyet and Diosdado
Quitlong were having a drinking spree with gin and finger foods. At 11:00 pm: Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia (brother in law of Appellant
Ortega) who were already drank joined them. At midnight:, Masangkay answering a call of nature went to the back portion of the house and
Benjamin followed him. Suddenly, they heard a shout from Andre “Don’t, help me!” (Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!)

Diosdado and Ariel ran and saw Benjamin on top of Andre who was lying down being stabbed. Ariel got Benjamin Ortega, Sr., Benjamin’s father
while Diosdado called Romeo to pacify his brother. Romeo, Benjamin and Manuel lifted Andre from the canal and dropped him in the well. They
dropped stones to Andre’s body to weigh the body down. Romeo warned Diosdado not to tell anybody what he saw. He agreed so he was allowed
to go home. But, his conscience bothered him so he told his mother, reported it to the police and accompanied them to the crime scene.

ISSUE: WON Appellants Ortega and Garcia are criminally liable

RULING: Ortega is criminally liable; Garcia is not.


LIABILITY OF ORTEGA: SC found no reason to reverse the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies insofar as
Appellant Ortega is concerned. The narration of Eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong appears to be spontaneous and consistent. It is straightforward,
detailed, vivid and logical. Thus, it clearly deserves full credence.

LIABILITY OF GARCIA: There are two legal obstacles barring his conviction, even as an accessory

First. The Information accused Appellant Garcia (and Appellant Ortega) of "attack[ing], assault[ing], and stab[bing] repeatedly with a pointed
weapon on the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA." The prosecution's evidence itself shows that Garcia had
nothing to do with the stabbing which was solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. His responsibility relates only to the attempted concealment of
the crime and the resulting drowning of Victim Masangkay.

The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or
information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense
other than that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutional right.

By parity of reasoning, Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide through drowning in an information that charges murder by means of
stabbing.

Second. He can neither be convicted as an accessory after the fact defined under Article 19, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The records show
that Appellant Garcia is a brother-in-law of Appellant Ortega, 38 the latter's sister, Maritess, being his wife. Such relationship exempts Appellant
Garcia from criminal liability as provided by Article 20 of the Revised Penal Code.