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Social Functionality of Human Emotion


Paula M. Niedenthal and Markus Brauer

Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012.63:259-285. Downloaded from

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, France, and Department of Psychology,

University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin 53706; email:

by Umea University Library on 08/19/14. For personal use only.

Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2012. 63:259–85


First published online as a Review in Advance on

facial expression, vicarious emotion, group emotion, group-based

October 10, 2011

The Annual Review of Psychology is online at

emotion, embodied simulation


This article’s doi:

Answers to the question “What are human emotions for?” have stimu-


lated highly productive programs of research on emotional phenomena


c 2012 by Annual Reviews.

in psychology and neuroscience in the past decade. Although a vari-

All rights reserved

ety of functions have been proposed and examined at different levels



of abstraction, what is undeniable is that when emotional processing is compromised, most things social go awry. In this review we survey the research findings documenting the functions of emotion and link these to new discoveries about how emotion is accurately processed and transmitted. We focus specifically on emotion processing in dyads and groups, which reflects the current scientific trend. Within dyads, emo- tional expressions and learning and understanding through vicarious emotion are the phenomena of interest. Behavioral and brain mecha- nisms supporting their successful occurrence are evaluated. At the group level, group emotions and group-based emotions, two very different phenomena, are discussed, and mechanistic accounts are reviewed.


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Facial Expression of Emotion:





Vicarious Emotion: Learning Affective Associations MECHANISMS SUPPORTING









Simulating Facial Expression




Simulating Others’ Emotions FUNCTIONAL EMOTION



PHENOMENA IN GROUPS Group Emotions: Creation















. Group-Based Emotions: Sustaining










Viability .

and Maintenance of Group



Collective Action






Contagion of Emotion Within


. Self-Stereotyping and

























Emotion Norms







Can scientists study emotion? And if so, should they? And if they should, to what end? For cen- turies the dominant view of emotions within philosophy and later within psychology was that Passions endanger the lofty processes of Reason (Solomon 1976, 1993). For Plato and for the Stoics such as Zeno de Citium, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius, and yet again in the Enlight- enment period of eighteenth-century Europe, emotions were defined as animalistic impulses that threaten to disrupt the attainment of higher levels of existence. This opposition between Passion and Reason has finally been abandoned

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and replaced by more optimistic programs of research, given significant early boosts from neuropsychological (e.g., Damasio 1989) and economic (e.g., Frank 1988) analyses and from an emerging social psychological consensus (e.g., Frijda 1986, Oatley 1992, Scherer 1984). The study of the psychological experience of emotion and of the neural basis of emotion and its relation to other mental processes is a solid scientific enterprise (Barrett et al. 2007, Phelps 2006) and its importance in complex social in- stitutions undeniable (Brief & Weiss 2002). Still, answers to the question “What are emotions for?” strongly guide the application of scientific tools to the exploration of emo- tional phenomena. Modern writings on the function of emotion within psychology address the question “What roles do emotions play in the solution of problems that humans confront in living and surviving with others?” (e.g., Buck 1999, Cosmides & Tooby 2000, Frijda 1986, Frijda & Mesquita 1994, Keltner & Gross 1999, Johnson-Laird & Oatley 1992, Keltner & Haidt 1999, Oatley & Jenkins 1992, Scherer 1994); most of these roles derive from the dual needs to cooperate and compete. The scientific strategy that has emerged to empirically address this question involves linking specific emotions to distinct motivations, problems, outcomes, or effects (e.g., Barlett & DeSteno 2009, Fischer & Roseman 2007, Hooge et al. 2010, Tracy & Robins 2008, Williams & DeSteno 2008). For example, recent research found that when participants posed facial expressions of fear, they had subjectively larger visual fields, made more efficient eye move- ments when localizing targets, and showed increased nasal volume and air velocity during inspiration. Furthermore, the expression of disgust was associated with an opposite pattern of effects (Susskind et al. 2008). These findings are consistent with the claim that facial expressions aid in producing the bodily responses required to perform the actions taken to respond successfully to emotional challenges (Darwin 1872). Ethologists have also pointed out that smiles (Mehu ´ & Dunbar 2008) and facial expressions of aggression

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(Griskevicius et al. 2009) play roles that relate to the fundamental social tasks of relationship establishment and maintenance, hierarchy, and group management. General relations such as these can be subjected further to a consider- ation of the influences of culture on how the problems are construed and the ways in which emotions facilitate their solutions within a cultural context (e.g., Mesquita & Ellsworth 2001, Rodriguez Mosquera et al. 2008). A survey of the current literature suggests that it is now possible to evaluate functional- ity from a different angle. The present article reviews research programs and significant find- ings that begin from the conclusion drawn from extensive recent research on emotional process- ing gone awry: What happens when an indi- vidual does not express his or her emotions to others (Butler et al. 2003, Gross & John 2003, Srivastava et al. 2009) or share them with oth- ers (Rime´ 2007, Rime´ et al. 2004)? And what happens when a person cannot understand the (typical) emotions expressed by other individ- uals, as may be caused by the incursion of spe- cific brain lesions (e.g., Adolphs 2002, Adolphs et al. 2005), the development of diseases such as Parkinson’s (Wieser et al. 2006), autism (e.g., Clark et al. 2008, McIntosh 2006), or early maltreatment (Pollak 2008)? The conclusion is that, as a rule, what happens is not good. Dis- ruptions in emotion processes—the abilities to understand, express, and experience emotion— lead to the loss of social support, disintegration of groups, and failure of economic viability. Such a conclusion can also be drawn from research on emotional intelligence (e.g., Mayer et al. 2004, Salovey et al. 2003, Salovey & Mayer 1990). Indeed, the premise of the concept of emotional intelligence is that it is possible to define the processing of emotion in self and other as more or less precise, consensual, and useful. Therefore, our analysis of functionality entails a critical review of recent research that provides insights about the mechanisms through which emotions are accurately transmitted (expressed and experi- enced) in social units as a means of effectively pursuing dyadic- and group-level goals. The

decision to survey research on the function of emotion in social context reflects a clear trend toward going beyond the individual level of analysis, which, starting with Darwin, has been more intensively studied (Oatley & Jenkins 1992, Parrott 2001). We begin the review by examining the function of emotion when the emotion is exchanged between two interacting individuals. In particular, the functional role of facial expression and vicarious emotion take a central role in emotion processing within the dyad. We then review recent research and theory that illuminate the mechanisms by which emotion is transmitted in the dyad. Next we examine new research on the function of emotions in and for the group. The central phenomena here are group emotions (emotions that occur in collectives) and group-based emo- tions (or emotions on behalf of a group). The mechanisms by which emotion is transmitted within the group is the final consideration. Our analysis of function and mechanism for transmission will not be equally complete across all levels of analysis. This is inevitable and indeed deliberate. In highlighting the gaps in research, we hope to define, and motivate, programs of research for the future.


Dyads for this analysis are immediately inter- acting partners who have either an established or emergent interdependency. Emotion pro- cesses are required in dyads for the successful pre- and nonverbal communication of emotion and for the learning of adaptive behavioral re- sponses. Two specific emotional phenomena are important to examine at this level. One is facial expression of emotion. Through their communication of emotion and social motives, facial expressions of emotion efficiently sum- marize information about what the partners in the dyad are doing and why, who they are to each other, and how the present situation will or should unfold over time (Buck 1983, Buck et al. 1992, Horstmann 2003, Keltner & Kring

1998). Functionality of Emotions 261

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A second important phenomenon is vicar- ious emotion. In the treatment of vicarious emotion in this section, we are concerned with the experience of an emotion with, and ultimately for, another person. Although early in development vicarious emotion may neces- sitate that the observed person is feeling an emotion, which is reproduced in the self, over development the ability to feel vicariously for another individual does not necessitate that the observed individual is actually feeling an emo- tion. For example, a mother can feel vicarious shame for a child without the child yet know- ing that this situation should indeed provoke shame in the particular culture or value system.

Facial Expression of Emotion:

Behavior Regulators

One of the first types of dyadic emotion transmission occurs between infants and their caretakers through the facial expression of emotion (Campos et al. 2003). Although there may be hardwired emotional responses to particular challenges and opportunities in the environment (Mineka & Cook 1993), caretak- ers must also teach infants, within their cultural context, to have specific emotional reactions to (initially) ambiguous objects and events in order to generate in them appropriate and effective behavior. Objects that conduct elec- tricity are an example of an ambiguous stimulus in the sense that they are such a recent techno- logical development that there is no reason to believe that humans would be hardwired to be fearful of them in their current appearance (i.e., distinct from lightning, for instance). By ex- pressing explicit and acute fear when a toddler approaches an electrical outlet or an exposed wire, a caretaker can elicit fear in him or her, which in typically developing children usually results in the appropriate avoidance behavior of transmitters of electricity in the future (Askew & Field 2007, Hertenstein & Campos 2004). It is in this sense that Campos and colleagues (2003) aptly call facial expressions of emotion “behavior regulators”: Facial expressions func- tion as rewards (Matthews & Wells 1999) and

punishments (Blair 1995) that serve to increase and decrease behaviors, as in operant con- ditioning (for review, see Blair 2003, Gerull & Rappee 2002, Mumme & Fernald 1996). Infants who cannot learn through emotional transmission of this type are at significant risk (Field 1982), and maltreated infants may develop strategies that compromise accurate encoding of facial expression (Pollak et al.


Over development, emotional expressions communicate more nuanced information about the nature of, or the potential of, any dyadic relationship (Frijda & Mesquita 1994; Keltner & Haidt 1999, 2003). Recent research findings demonstrate that emotional facial expression, as well as posture and prosody, do an efficient job of conveying information about the dimensions of personality (Ames & Johar 2009, Harker & Keltner 2001) and the likelihood of the occurrence of social behavior, such as cooperative or prosocial action (Anderson & Thompson 2004, Brown et al. 2003). Consistent with the latter idea, Scharlemann and colleagues (2001) showed that in extensive-form bargaining games, indi- viduals who expressed smiles were trusted more than nonsmiling individuals. Facial expressions of emotion can determine the meaning of ver- bal communication (Krull et al. 2008) and may provide critical information in the absence of verbal communication (Bonnano et al. 2002). Consequently, when perceived accurately, facial expressions generate appropriate social intentions in the perceiver. For example, Marsh and colleagues (2007) tested whether the ac- curacy of fear recognition predicts prosocial behaviors. In a first study, participants were asked to help (with contributions of money or time) a young woman in a difficult situation. Then their accuracy of recognition of facial ex- pressions of anger, fear, happiness, and sadness was measured. Results showed that fear recog- nition accuracy was the best predictor of their donations. In a second study, participants com- pleted an emotion-recognition task and then rated the facial attractiveness of photographs of target individuals. In the “prosocial” condition,

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the targets were ostensibly other participants who would later be told how attractive they had been judged to be. In a control condition, the aim of the task was to validate a set of stimuli. As before, participants who could most accurately identify fear responded the most prosocially, and this was moderated by condition such that the effect was observed only in the prosocial condition. The third study replicated the prosocial condition of the second study and included a question that assessed the participant’s desire to behave prosocially in this context. Compared to measures of empathy and mood, and even gender, fear recognition accuracy was the best predictor of prosocial behavior. Moreover, the willingness to be kind mediated the relationship between fear recognition and prosocial behavior. These and similar findings suggest that the accurate recognition of fearful expressions produces prosocial responses in appropriate contexts (Marsh & Ambady 2007). And they complement the finding that selective im- pairments in identifying facial expressions of fear are observed in populations marked by antisocial behavior and a lack of empathy (e.g., Blair et al. 2001, Kropp & Haynes 1987). Furthermore, the conclusion is conceptually consistent with other findings showing that individuals who are dispositionally high in need to belong are better than others at identifying facial expressions and vocal tones of all sorts (Pickett et al. 2004). In sum, recent research on the processing of facial expression of emotion not only supports the idea that facial expression is a primary reg- ulator of social development and social interac- tion, but also that accuracy in facial expression processing facilitates the efficient operation of these social processes.

Vicarious Emotion: Learning Affective Associations

Emotions also occur in dyads when one indi- vidual feels an emotion because he or she ob- serves another person experiencing an emotion, or observes the other person in an emotion- ally evocative situation, even if the situation is

not immediately relevant (i.e., threatening or beneficial) to the observer (Iglesias 1996). For instance, people wince in pain when they see someone else get hurt (Bavelas et al. 1986), and they cringe with embarrassment for someone else even when their own personal identity is not threatened (Miller 1987). Early in development, vicarious emotions seem to play a fundamental role in learning, which complements the role of learning sup- ported specifically by facial expressive cues. As noted, facial expressions can serve to increase and decrease behaviors, as in operant condi- tioning (Blair 2003). In a complementary way, vicarious emotion is the supportive mechanism of more general observational learning (Olsson & Phelps 2004). Humans and nonhuman primates are able to learn about the emotional implications of objects and events vicariously, through observing the emotional reactions of a conspecific (Ohman & Mineka 2001). Vicar- ious or observational learning are thus social means of adaptive response acquisition that do not require direct experience with the object or event about which something must be learned. Vaughan & Lanzetta (1980) illustrated this in a study in which participants saw videotaped fa- cial expressions of pain while they worked on a paired associate learning task. The pain expres- sions followed a target word of the same word category (flower or tree names) and elicited vicarious emotional responses in the observer that became associated with the word category. Furthermore, Vaughan & Lanzetta (1981) showed that the vicarious emotional responses elicited by observing emotions in others can be modified by the extent to which the emotion is simulated in the self. Their instructions to participants to suppress or amplify facial expressions during observation of the emotions moderated the vicarious learning effect. The social analogue to laboratory instruc- tions to enhance or suppress components of a vicarious emotion is intimacy of the interacting individuals. That is, familiarity and inter- dependence also affect vicarious emotional responding (Lickel et al. 2005). This finding suggests that vicarious emotion is something Functionality of Emotions 263

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distinct from having an emotional reaction to an emotional stimulus (e.g., the sight of an indi- vidual in pain or distress; Fultz & Nielsen 1993). The dyadic relationship matters in this process. Later in development, vicarious emotion does not necessitate the expression or experi- ence of emotion in the target of observation; vicarious emotion may occur when the ob- server knows that the target could or should feel the particular emotion, according to a social or cultural rule (Kagan 2007, Tangney & Fischer 1995). In other words, the mature observer has learned to associate quite complex social situations with particular emotions and can now feel a given emotion for a target in a situation evocative of a specific emotion regardless of what the target actually feels. For instance, even if a child is feeling discomfort rather than pride when receiving a reward or successfully performing in public, the parents are likely to feel pride on behalf of the child (perhaps in addition to the recognition and empathic experience of discomfort) because in their culture, their appraisal of the situation is one that is appropriately associated with pride. These feelings will then motivate appropriate behaviors toward the target. In a recent experiment by Stocks and colleagues (2011), participants listened to an individual describe an embarrassing situa- tion. Participants were invited to adopt one of three perspective-taking sets: to remain objective, to imagine themselves in the same situation, or to imagine how the target felt. Dependent variables included measures of vicarious embarrassment, empathic concern, and desires to approach or avoid the target, given the opportunity. Results revealed that, compared with those who took an objective stance, participants who imagined themselves in the target’s situation experienced heightened vicarious embarrassment, but not heightened empathic concern, and a greater desire to avoid the target. In contrast, participants who took the target’s perspective felt empathic concern, but not vicarious embarrassment, and a desire to approach the target. These results distinguish vicarious emotion and its associated

motivations, perhaps as an associative learning process, from the experience of empathy and empathic concern. The distinction is not new (see, e.g., Batson et al. 1987), but it further highlights the fact that vicarious emotions, as well as the motivations and action tendencies that they produce, are distinct from the cognitive components of empathy.


How do facial expressions get interpreted and emotions get experienced vicariously by per- ceivers in such a way that they can be useful in supporting regulation, communication, and learning? The reproduction of perceived facial and bodily emotional gestures in the self has long been thought to be important in both pro- cesses (Lanzetta & Englis 1989, McIntosh et al. 1994, Vaughan & Lanzetta 1980; for discus- sion, see Levenson 1996), but the details of such a claim are only beginning to be worked out. Within social psychology, this idea is inspired by an integration of facial feedback theory and affect-as-information theory. According to the facial feedback theory, the mimicry of a target’s facial expression provides the perceiver with af- ferent feedback that can provide cues to infer the internal state of the target (McIntosh 1996, Zajonc et al. 1989). And according to the affect- as-information theory, when perceivers believe that their affective state has been caused by the target of perception, they rely on that state to make judgments of the target, such as how the target is feeling (Clore & Storbeck 2006). In neuroscience, the reproduction of perceived emotional gestures and states has been inter- preted in terms of mirror neurons and mirror systems and in terms of the idea that brains can resonate with the states of perceived objects, es- pecially those that are biologically similar (e.g., Gallese 2007, Keysers & Gazzola 2007). These theories and mechanisms come to- gether to inspire an embodied- or simulated- emotion approach to the processing of emotion in social context (e.g., Atkinson 2007; Decety

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& Chaminade 2003, 2005; Gallese 2003, 2005; Goldman & Sripada 2005; Keysers & Gazzola 2007; Niedenthal 2007; Niedenthal et al. 2005; Wilson-Mendenhall et al. 2011; Winkielman et al. 2009). Emotion simulation refers to the idea that in order to understand emotions in others, individuals use their own body and brain representational capacities to simulate them- selves making the same gestures in the same context. They can then use this simulation to infer what the other person is feeling and how they should or would respond in this situa- tion. An embodied-emotion approach has been used to account for both the processing of fa- cial expression of emotion and the experience of vicarious emotion.

Simulating Facial Expression

Recently, the behavioral and neural mech- anisms implicated in the accurate encoding of facial expression of emotion have received intense empirical scrutiny (Niedenthal et al. 2010). A fundamental mechanism proposed by embodied-emotion accounts is bodily and facial mimicry. We focus here on the mimicry of fa- cial expression of emotion and how it serves to support access to the meaning of the facial ex- pression (see Heberlein & Atkinson 2009 for a review of research on perceiving emotions from moving bodies). Facial mimicry is the visible or nonvisible use of facial musculature by an observer to match the facial gestures in another person’s facial expression (Hess 2009, Niedenthal et al. 2010). Perceivers of expressions often automat- ically mimic them. Recordings of the electrical activity of skeletal facial muscles, for instance, reveal that when individuals view a smile, their zygomaticus major muscle contracts, usually within 500 milliseconds after the onset of the stimulus (Dimberg & Thunberg 1998). Mojzisch et al. (2006) demonstrated that observers automatically mimicked facial ex- pressions displayed by virtual characters in dynamic animations (see also a review in Hess et al. 1999). Automatically mimicking one expression of emotion also interferes with the

concurrent production of an incongruent facial expression, such as anger (Lee et al. 2007). Facial mimicry exerts a number of effects that together support the idea that it is an important mechanism in the receiving end of emotion transmission. First, mimicry seems to be related to generating a corresponding emotional state in the perceiver. In one demonstration of this, experimenters injected botulinum toxin (Botox) in the forehead mus- cles of experimental participants (Hennenlotter et al. 2005). Then, the experimental partici- pants and controls who had not received Botox were invited to mimic angry and sad facial expressions while their brains were scanned. When participants were exposed to the pho- tographs of the angry expressions, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) revealed that Botox-injected participants had signif- icantly less activation in their brain’s limbic system compared to the control participants. This same effect was not observed when par- ticipants were exposed to sad expressions. Still, the finding for the anger expressions supports a causal link between mimicry and emotional responding because it indicates that inhibiting mimicry decreases activation of the brain’s emotion centers. A similar finding was reported by Lee and colleagues (2006), who showed that the more that individuals mimicked facial ex- pressions of happiness (smiles), the greater the activation in the reward centers of their brain (see also Schilbach et al. 2006). In addition to playing a role in generating the emotion corresponding to the perceived emotional expression, mimicry may also be important in defining what the motor movements that constitute the expression “feel like” when the emotion is produced (Niedenthal et al. 2010). The possibility that the production of the corresponding state and the feeling of the fa- cial expression grounds interpretation of the meaning of a facial expression is suggested in some studies, although the claim is by no means clearly supported. Recent research sug- gests a link between the mimicry of facial ex- pression and performance on tasks that measure recognition and interpretation (Adolphs 2002, Functionality of Emotions 265

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Heberlein & Atkinson 2009, McIntosh 2006). For example, Stel & van Knippenberg (2008) showed that inhibiting facial mimicry decreased the speed, although not the accuracy, of evaluat- ing facial displays as expressing positive or neg- ative emotion. In a more recent study, Maringer and colleagues (2011) presented participants with dynamic displays of smiles determined in pretests to be “genuine” or “not genuine.” Participants were assigned to either a control condition in which they were free to mimic the smiles (presumably as the pretest participants had done) or to an experimental condition in which facial mimicry was inhibited. All partici- pants rated the extent to which the smiles were “genuine.” Results revealed an effect of condi- tion such that the control participants distin- guished between the genuine and nongenuine smiles, whereas the experimental participants, who could not mimic the smiles, did not distin- guish the genuine from the nongenuine smiles to the same degree. The important role of mimicry in the deep processing of facial expres- sion is also suggested by the observation that individuals who mimic facial expressions auto- matically also show higher levels of empathy (Sonnby-Borgstrom 2002, Zajonc et al. 1987). Recent experiments by Neal & Chartrand (2011) are consistent with the specific role of afferent feedback in the interpretation of facial expression of emotion. In the first experiment, individuals who had received Botox injections to the face and members of a control group who had received a treatment to the face that does not reduce afferent feedback (a dermal filler called Restylane) performed a task that assesses the encoding of facial emotion. The task was the revised Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET; Baron-Cohen et al. 2001). The findings supported a causal role for afferent facial feedback in helping people accurately perceive others’ facial expressions. When afferent signals were dampened by Botox injections, emotion perception was impaired significantly compared to the performance of the matched control sample that had received Restylane injections. The impairment was observed for both positive and negative facial

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expressions. In the second experiment, facial afference was amplified or facilitated in the experimental condition. This manipulation in- creased performance on the RMET compared to the performance of a control group. Such research is complemented by brain- imaging and brain lesion research, which pro- vides insights about the role of somatosensory cortices in processing facial expression of emo- tion. In a pioneering study in this area, Adolphs and colleagues showed that right-hemisphere cortices play an important role in simulating emotional expressions (e.g., Adolphs et al. 1996). Adolphs et al. (2000) assessed 108 sub- jects with focal brain lesions and found that the right somatosensory cortex was central for rec- ognizing the facial expressions associated with the six basic emotions. Such findings suggest that the right somatosensory cortex produces an “image” of the felt state, that is, a representation of the afferent feedback, which is used to pro- duce inferences about how the perceived person feels (e.g., Adolphs 2002, Atkinson 2007). This interpretation is further supported by recent research using transcranial magnetic stimulation to inhibit processing in brain areas responsible for perceptual processing of the face versus inhibition of the right somatosensory cortex. For instance, Pourtois and colleagues selectively interfered with right somatosensory cortex activation while participants performed a matching task and found significant impairment in the discrimination of different facial expres- sions (Pourtois et al. 2004). Selective interfer- ence with right somatosensory cortex activation also disrupted performance on a similar task in a study by Pitcher and colleagues (2008). Specif- ically, accuracy on same-different discrimina- tion dropped when pulses were delivered to the right occipital face area, which is responsible for visual processing of the face, at 60–100 ms after the onset of the target stimulus and when they were delivered to the right somatosensory cortext at 100–140 and 130–170 ms after onset. Such impairments provide evidence in favor of both embodied accounts of expression recog- nition and hierarchical models of face process- ing, or the idea that both visual and nonvisual

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cortices are involved at very early stages of facial expression processing. Despite the importance mimicry may have in processing facial expression of emotion, we end this section by noting that recognition of facial expression can also be accomplished by at least two other processes, namely perceptual analysis and the application of preexisting stereotypes and beliefs. The latter are espe- cially useful when the facial expressions are prototypical in nature. As Niedenthal and colleagues (2010) have outlined in a discussion of smiles in particular, recognition of proto- typic facial expressions can be accomplished by perceptual analysis alone (e.g., Adolphs 2002). For example, high-functioning autistic individuals, who do not spontaneously mimic others’ facial expressions (e.g., McIntosh et al. 2006), do classify facial expressions of emotion as well as typically developed controls do (e.g., Spezio et al. 2007a). In addition, facial paralysis seems not to disrupt performance on such tasks (e.g., Calder et al. 2000a,b; Keillor et al. 2002). Still, it is undeniable that inappropriate or deficient mimicry is related to behavioral and attachment disorders (de Wied et al. 2006, Sonnby-Borgstrom & Jonsson 2004) as well as the autism spectrum disorders (Beall et al. 2008, Hepburn & Stone 2006, Moody & McIntosh 2006). Future research will be re- quired to outline the precise effects and con- tributions of mimicry and corresponding brain input into the process of understanding facial expression of emotion.

Simulating Others’ Emotions

A related theoretical account may explain vicarious emotion and even empathy. The in- spiration for this analysis from within neuro- science was the discovery of mirror neurons and the subsequent demonstrations that seeing or hearing actions of others could activate specific neurons in monkeys’ premotor and posterior parietal cortices, which also fire when those ac- tions are performed by the monkey itself (e.g., Gallese et al. 1996).

In consideration of vicarious emotion, the immediate potential application of the general concept of mirror neurons or mirror systems was for the perception of pain. An early study reported that specific pain-related neurons fire when a painful stimulus is applied to an individual’s own hand and also when he or she watches the painful stimulus applied to an another individual’s hand (Hutchison et al. 1999). This finding motivated subsequent fMRI studies, which documented pain-related brain regions (i.e., a “pain matrix”), especially the dorsal anterior cingulated cortex, middle to anterior insula, and the cerebellum, which were activated during the personal experience of pain and during the perception of the same type of pain incurred by one’s partner (e.g., Singer et al. 2004). These areas code specifi- cally for the affective-motivational rather than sensory aspects of pain (e.g., Lamm et al. 2007). Such studies also suggested that the extent of activation in overlapping sites was related to the participants’ level of empathy, suggesting that there is moderation of the effect by motivation to stimulate. Similarly, other fMRI studies documented increases in the activation of pain-related regions during observation of a confederate receiving a painful stimulus, but only if the confederate had played fairly in a previous economic game (Singer et al. 2006). Vicarious experience of pain, as we sug- gested above, should be distinct from the broader notion of empathy because we can em- pathize with dissimilar others and can respond in ways that indicate empathy without dysfunc- tion or distress. How we might do so requires consideration of the cognitive components of empathy, which may be said to be unique to humans and other primates (Decety & Lamm 2006, de Waal 2008). The cognitive compo- nents of empathy include the ability to distin- guish between self and other and the operation of executive functions, including controlled attention to currently relevant ideas as well as inhibiting irrelevant ones. The brain’s support of these processes has been documented in recent fMRI studies. In one study by Cheng and colleagues (2007), physicians who practice Functionality of Emotions 267

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acupuncture and control participants were shown body parts being pricked by needles. Activation of the pain matrix was observed in controls but not in the physicians. In the latter, activation of dorsolateral and medial prefrontal cortex, subserving self–other distinction, occurred. In a related study, the perception of stimuli that are normally painful for the self but clearly not painful for a target (e.g., because the inflicted body part was anesthetized) was associated with activation in areas again involved in self–other distinction, as well as prefrontal cortical areas that subserve processes of appraisal (Lamm et al. 2007). It seems thus that vicarious emotion and empathy are quite distinct in both behavioral and in neural ways. In addition to establishing the neural basis of vicarious pain, research has shown that simi- lar circuits support vicarious emotions of other types. It would be very useful to avoid ingesting substances that are toxic, and so vicarious disgust is an important emotion to analyze from this perspective. Wicker and colleagues (2003) compared the brain systems involved in (first-person) experiences of disgust to those involved in the perception of someone else’s (third-person) experience of disgust. To this end, they scanned the participants’ brains either while they smelled noxious odors or while they watched a video of another person smell and respond with disgust to the same odors. Similar brain areas, including the anterior insula, and to lesser extent the anterior cingulate cortex, were activated when individuals felt disgust and when they perceived it in someone else. The anterior insula receives connections from olfactory and gustatory brain structures as well as from anterior sectors of the ventral part of the superior temporal sulcus. Cells in the latter structures of monkey brains have been found to respond to the sight of faces (Bruce et al. 1986, Perrett et al. 1982). This suggests that the anterior insula links gustatory, olfactory, and visual input with visceral sensations and the related autonomic and visceromotor responses. Recent research also documents the role of the amygdala in vicarious fear learning. Olsson et al. (2007) tested the hypothesis that

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observational fear-learning recruits neural mechanisms, including bilateral amygdala activation, which is similar to the mechanisms underlying fear conditioning. In other words, they expected to find significant overlap in first- person and third-person circuitry responsible for processing first- and second-person expe- riences of fear. Indeed, their study showed that bilateral amygdala activation occurred both when their participants observed another per- son enduring an aversive event, knowing that the same treatment awaited themselves, and when they were placed in an analog situation. As with processing facial expression, a final important neural mechanism for simulating others’ emotions is the somatosensory cortices. Whereas the parts of the insular and cingulated cortex just mentioned are considered to be part of the somatosensory “system” and support the affective-motivational responses to seeing someone having an emotion, the somatosen- sory cortices are used to process tactile, proprioceptive, and nociceptive information. These cortices can support processing the more localized, somatic sensation of pain or the cause of another emotion (for review, see Keysers et al. 2010). Taken together, however, the somatosensory system seems to be able to represent, for an individual, what it is like to feel a stimulus, produce a facial expression, and generate an integrated bodily state, and in this way provide extensive emotional information about the state of a perceived individual in a particular emotional situation (Heberlein & Atkinson 2009). Whether or not a shared circuits approach can provide a full account of constructs as complex as empathy is not clear (e.g., Decety & Lamb 2006), and the relations between these brain areas and their precise involvement in the production of vicarious emotion and associated behavior responses will require more research (e.g., Niedenthal et al. 2010). Nevertheless, it is clear that deficits in the mechanisms known to be involved in vicarious emotion are associated with dysfunction in social relations and social information processing (Blair 2007, Dapretto et al. 2006, Iacoboni & Dapretto

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2006). Furthermore, it may not be surprising from an emotion-simulation perspective that vicarious or observational learning largely relies on the same emotion-processing centers of the brain as instructed learning (Olsson & Phelps 2004). This suggests that many types of learning within dyads rely on emotion simulation. For instance, eating a spoiled fruit, seeing someone eat spoiled fruit, and hearing from someone that fruit is spoiled seem to involve reproduction of the experience of disgust within the self (Barthomeuf et al. 2009). The capability of the human mind and body to reproduce an emotion in the self and use it in dyadic interaction is clearly extraordinary, and this notion, although quite old, should be a leading one in future research.


The dynamics of group processes differ from the dynamics of dyadic interaction, and emo- tions play a role in the unfolding of group- level phenomena as well. Whether assessed within small groups or much larger societal- based groups, the functionality of emotions at this level of analysis can be abstracted from the dyadic level just considered. For the group, emotion processes seem necessary for the cre- ation and maintenance of group viability and for long-term commitment to actions that achieve the goals of the group (Chekroun & Brauer 2002, 2004; Frijda & Mesquita 1994; Haidt 2003; Keltner & Haidt 1999). An account of group viability and sustained collective action requires recourse to two emotion phenom- ena: group emotions (or collective emotions) and group-based emotions (or group-level emotions). The first construct, group emotion, refers to emotions that occur in and are shared within a collective of interacting individuals at a moment in time, as when a small group becomes energized with excitement and joy (Barsade 2002, Bartel & Saavedra 2000, Kelly & Barsade 2001) or a crowd becomes gripped by fear or galvanized with anger (Hatfield

et al. 1994, Le Bon 1895). The question of whether group emotions are different from emotions within the individual has been a subject of debate (Niedenthal et al. 2006), and the analysis can be extended to societal groups as well (Bar-Tal et al. 2007). It should be noted immediately that all emotions that arise because of cultural prescription are group emotions, but we do not review the cultural approaches to emotions here. The interested reader should refer to Mesquita et al. (2011). The second construct, group-based emo- tion, involves an individual having an emotion on behalf of a group of which he or she is a member and due to his or her identification with this group (Iyer et al. 2004, Leach & Tiedens 2004, van Zomeren et al. 2008). Individuals can have emotions on behalf of their group even when they are alone and are not in a situa- tion that is the elicitor of the emotion or the topic of the emotion. For example, although they had not been involved in any acts against Indigenous Australians themselves, Australian participants in a study by McGarty et al. (2005) reported feeling guilt on behalf of the coun- try, their group of identification. Moreover, as discussed below, these reports of guilt predicted the level of their support for a formal apology to these Indigenous Australians by the Australian government. Thus, group emotions are the emotions that arise as a function of being in a collective such as a work team or a crowd; they occur in groups. Group-based emotions are emotions that are elicited in an individual because of his or her identification with a group and knowledge that the group has caused or been the target of an emotion-inducing event. In the next sec- tions, we review research documenting these phenomena and their effects.

Group Emotions: Creation and Maintenance of Group Viability

A funeral service is a good place to observe the generation of group emotion. Collective grief in this setting emerges as verbal and nonver- bal messages provide evidence for the justified Functionality of Emotions 269

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experience of sadness. A potent story or a gasp of unbearable sadness will cause ripples of sobs and tears. Group emotion is difficult to de- fine and study, but its validity is never in ques- tion. In an early illustrative study, Totterdell et al. (1998) asked community nurses working

in teams to fill out daily measures of mood, work hassles, team commitment, and team climate over a period of three weeks. Analyses of these measures showed that a nurse’s mood on one day was significantly predicted by the mood of teammates on the same day. Furthermore, the relationship was significant even when the ef- fect of work hassles was controlled, which shows that the concordance in mood was not com- pletely explained by shared problems and ex- periences. In a similar way, Totterdell (2000) found that the mood of professional cricket players during a match varied as a function of the mood of their teammates, independent of the objective features of the match itself. In summarizing the writings of Le Bon (1895/1963), McDougall (1923), and Freud (1922/1959), Barsade & Gibson (1998) de- scribe group emotion as follows: “The diverse emotional tendencies of individuals, then,

are submerged into a group emotion



emotional character thus produced tends to be more extreme than the tendencies of individual members” (p. 84). So people grieving in a group setting will cry more, and more overtly, than they would if they were alone. To what end? As we have already suggested, the literature indicates that group emotions function, first, to create groups. That is, the experience of group emotion can be a basis for the formation of social units per se (Barsade et al. 2000), even if the emotions are negative (Gump & Kulik 1997, Schachter 1959). Recent research on small groups within organizations has provided evidence for this idea, with a focus on positive emotion (Spoor & Kelly 2004, Walter & Bruch 2008). Group experiences of ecstasy and awe can also provide members of groups with a heightened sense of group identity (Heise & O’Brien 1993). Taken together, such research suggests that the collective experience of grief described above can temporarily create in

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individuals the feeling that the entire set of peo- ple gathered together constitutes an emergent group that could work together, for instance, to care for the family of the deceased. Notice that this group process, with emotion serving to mobilize solidarity through perceptions of enhanced similarity, is the opposite of the pro- cess of diffusion of responsibility in the areas of helping (e.g., Forsyth et al. 2002, Latane´ & Nida 1981) and social control (e.g., Brauer & Chekroun 2005, Chekroun & Brauer 2002). If group emotions serve to create groups by increasing perceived similarity, they maintain established groups’ viability through a process of reinforcing group boundaries in intergroup contexts (e.g., Wohl et al. 2010). This effect has been known for a long time with regard to the joy that is propagated among fans and members of the winning team at a sporting event. In such an intergroup setting, group emotion appears to cause particularly strong feelings of cohesiveness among the fans (compared to the opposing team’s fans), who then display explicit signs of group identification in the form of team clothing and other insignias (Cialdini et al. 1976). Similar group dynamics are also observed when groups experience collective anxiety (Wohl et al. 2010). In a series of studies, Wilder & Shapiro (1989) induced high (or low) levels of anxiety in four-person groups by hav- ing them compete (or cooperate) with another group. After working together on a task, the members of the group watched another four- person group give them feedback on their own performance through a TV monitor. Although the “real” group of participants did not know it, the second group was composed of confed- erates of the experimenter. Three of the four members of the ostensible other group gave negative feedback, whereas one gave positive feedback and was in this sense an atypical group member. Later, the real participants judged the members of the ostensible evaluating group. Group anxiety caused the judgments of the atypical member to be assimilated toward those of the other three group members, such that the high-anxiety participants rated that person sig- nificantly more negatively than did low-anxiety

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participants. Such findings have been replicated with other manipulations of anxiety as well, and together they suggest that group emotions in intergroup settings make the demarcations between in-group and out-group more defined and salient. Similar effects have been observed in individual emotions in intergroup settings as well (van Zomeren et al. 2007). Group emotions can be negative or positive, and claims can be made about whether negative or positive emotions are in general more func- tional in the sense of inhibiting or facilitating characteristics of group behavior. For instance, Barsade (2002) showed that positive emotions were related to greater cooperativeness and less conflict in small groups. And Duffy & Shaw (2000) found that intragroup envy was related to greater social loafing, less cohesiveness, and thus lower productivity. However, consistent with our analysis of emotions in dyads, our point is that collective emotional processing per se is necessary for the creation and maintenance of the group as a social unit (Brief & Weiss 2002).

Group-Based Emotions: Sustaining Collective Action

Intergroup Emotion Theory (Mackie et al. 2000) holds that when people identify them- selves as a member of a group, they can experience emotions on behalf of, or from the standpoint of, this group (e.g., Branscombe & Doosje 2004). This emotion can of course be experienced when the individual is alone, but the important difference from other emotion phenomena is that the individual experiences the emotion for the group instead of for himself or herself. Thus, when individuals think of themselves in terms of group membership, their reported emotions differ from their re- ported individual emotions, and this difference is stronger to the degree that they identify with the group (Bizman et al. 2001, Doosje et al. 1995, Gordijn et al. 2006, Magee & Tiedens 2006, Miller et al. 2004). The types of groups that provide the context for group-based emotions can be social as well as political (Iyer et al. 2003, 2004; Leach et al. 2006),

and most recently, research has focused on opinion-based groups in this regard (McGarty et al. 2009, Musgrove & McGarthy 2008). Smith and colleagues (2007) established that group emotions are distinct from individual- level emotions and that indeed group emotions depend on the person’s degree of group identi- fication. Their work showed further that group emotions contribute to regulating intragroup and intergroup attitudes and behavior. To examine this latter idea, the authors measured intergroup attitudes on thermometer scales and action tendencies (i.e., ingroup support, ingroup solidarity, outgroup confrontation, and outgroup avoidance). They found that

intergroup attitudes and action tendencies were predicted by group emotions (“When you think about yourself as an American, to what

extent do you feel


but not by individual

emotions (“When you think about yourself as an individual, to what extent do you feel ...”). The results further showed that anger at the outgroup and positive group emotions were the most powerful predictors across all categories of action tendencies. The important role of group-based emo- tions in sustaining collective action has now been demonstrated in a number of domains. Some analyses of group-based guilt, for in- stance, suggest that this group-level emotion is related to a commitment to the call for apolo- gies and reparations on the part of governments and institutions (e.g., Berndsen & McGarthy 2010, Branscombe et al. 2002, Doosje et al. 1998, McGarty et al. 2005, Wohl & Branscombe 2005). Other analyses have linked feelings of moral outrage and of anger to a com- mitment to collective action aimed at righting social inequalities, including discrimination and prejudice (e.g., Crisp et al. 2007, Leach et al. 2006, Thomas 2005, Wakslak et al. 2007, van Zomeren et al. 2004; see Sturmer ¨ & Simon 2009 for further interpretation and discussion). Importantly, group-based emotions such as these have been shown in meta-analyses to be better predictors of collective actions against social injustice than are perceptions of the injustice itself (e.g., van Zomeren et al. 2008). Functionality of Emotions 271

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As an example, in a recent study Iyer et al. (2007) assessed the appraisals (i.e., legitimacy, responsibility, and threat), emotions (i.e., guilt, shame, and anger), and political action inten- tions (i.e., compensation to Iraq, confrontation with those responsible, and withdrawal from Iraq) of American and British university students in the context of the occupation of Iraq. They also experimentally manipulated perceived threat to group image by having participants read a newspaper article in which the wrongdoings of the Americans/British were described as either unintentional (low image threat) or as due to their corrupt, arrogant mentality (high image threat). Image threat and appraisals had predictable effects on emotions. Of interest was the result that emotions were differentially related to preferred strategies for collective action. Anger predicted all three political action intentions. Shame predicted the intention to support policies advocating withdrawal. Guilt was associated with no par- ticular response and was characterized by these authors as a “passive” emotion. The complexity of the possible functions of guilt and associated behavioral responses has been the subject of dis- cussion of research and theory in the context of individual emotion (e.g., de Hooge et al. 2011). The notion of collective emotional climate (Bar-Tal et al. 2007) should also be mentioned here. Although in theory emotional climate is related to the concept of group emotion, given that it is assumed to involve emotions shared by a group rather than on behalf of one, research tends to use the individual self-report methods of research on group-based emotions. The idea of emotional climate is that an accumula- tion of repeated group emotional responses to societal events or sociopolitical conditions can produce a general and lasting emotional tone of the nation or society as well as the likely emotional responses to events. For instance, de Rivera et al. (2007) have characterized the emotional climate of countries in terms of the degree to which individuals feel social trust as well as social anger and fear. Interestingly, such climates are independent of the degree to which the country endorses a culture of peace.

Recent research has documented acute emo- tional climates surrounding terrorist attacks in Spain (e.g., Conejero & Etxebarria 2007) and genocide in Rwanda (Kanyangara et al. 2007). According to Bar-Tal and colleagues (2007), collective emotions play a “pivotal role both in shaping the individual and societal responses to conflicting events (i.e., collective and group- based emotions) and in contributing to the evolution of a social context that maintains the collective emotions that have developed” (p. 442). Emotional climate thus seems to play an important role in signaling the need for and motivating collective action as well as gauging its success.


The mechanisms for the successful and accu- rate transmission of group emotion and group- based emotions require the consideration of quite different processes, with those responsi- ble for the former more similar to processes discussed in earlier sections on facial expression and vicarious emotion, and the latter relying on basic group dynamics principles.

Contagion of Emotion Within the Group

Emotional contagion has been offered as a mechanism for the generation of group emotions (e.g., Barsade & Gibson 1998, Sullins 1991). It is defined as the tendency for group members to come to experience and express highly similar emotions (Hatfield et al. 1992, 1993). Similar to the basic components of embodied facial expression, the idea is that individuals unintentionally mimic the public displays of emotion of others. Then, afferent feedback from facial, postural, and vocal mimicry serves to produce a similar emotional state, with its corresponding action tendencies (e.g., Duclos et al. 1989, Neumann & Strack 2000, Strack et al. 1988). Contagion of this type occurs in group conversation, for instance,

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when members mutually and reciprocally influence each others’ affect such that all par- ticipants take on a similar emotional intensity and tone (e.g., Quinn & Dutton 2005). How- ever, controlled research on emotion contagion within groups is actually quite sparse. In one careful study of this phenomenon, Barsade (2002) composed groups of two to four na¨ıve experimental participants and one con- federate. Groups were randomly assigned to one of four conditions that resulted from two crossed factors: Pleasantness (pleasant versus unpleasant) and Energy Level (low versus high). The two factors referred to the confederate’s nonverbal emotional behavior during the group task. Specifically, groups engaged in a leader- less group discussion that involved making a group decision concerning the way to distribute a limited sum of bonus money to employees from different departments. Participants rated their own emotional state before and after the group discussion. They also evaluated the per- formance and the contribution of themselves and of other group members. Groups were also filmed during the group discussion. Find- ings showed a main effect of confederate pleas- antness on group members’ emotional states:

Participants who were exposed to a pleasant confederate were in a more positive state than participants who were exposed to an unpleasant confederate, as indicated by self-ratings and by judges of na¨ıve coders of the video recordings of behavior. Positive state was associated with greater cooperativeness and less group con- flict. In the context of group decision-making, Parkinson & Simmons (2009) recently docu- mented emotional contagion as well. So, emotions can spread among group members, but where does the emotion come from? Whose emotion causes a group emotion in interacting groups? As early as 1942, Redl proposed that group leaders largely determine the emotion that becomes contagious in groups. Cherulnik et al. (2001) note that observers mimic the smiles of especially charismatic lead- ers, who are particularly potent in expression and eliciting emotions (Friedman & Riggio 1981). And in a series of studies, Bono & Ilies

(2006) showed that particularly effective and charismatic leaders tend to use positive words and expressions and express positive emo- tions in facial expressions. Their studies also documented emotional contagion such that in- dividuals who were exposed to the charismatic leader felt more positive than did individuals exposed to a more neutral-emotion leader. Fredrickson (2003) further argues that lead- ers have this effect because of their position in the power hierarchy, and due probably to their motivation to maintain power, leaders express emotion. Indeed, Anderson et al. (2003) specifically showed that the convergence in the similarity of the emotions experienced by individuals in a long-term relationship is most strongly determined by the person in the po- sition of power. This effect was demonstrated for groups in a study by Sy et al. (2005), who manipulated leaders’ mood (using videotapes) and then had participants engage in a group task (erecting a tent while subordinates are blindfolded). Results showed that subordinates were in a better mood when their leader was in a positive mood, and this effect was interpreted in terms of emotional contagion. In summary, we know something about the transmission of emotion within an interacting group. Group leaders, and those perceived as leaders, are usually the focus of attention, the determinant of situational appraisal, and thus the managers of group emotion (e.g., Pescosolido 2002). Descriptions of emotion contagion seem to best depict the appearance of group emotion, and this process probably involves mimicry and the synchronization of bodies and voices that is grounded in the brain centers described in the sections above on vicarious emotion. On the other hand, if group emotion is indeed more intense or involves more loss of self than an individual emotion, researchers still have to account for how and why this is so. Too little research examines the propagation of emotion in interacting groups, no doubt due to the difficulty of producing this phenomenon in the laboratory. On the other hand, the development of virtual environments and their use in experimental research should Functionality of Emotions 273

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provide a platform for much-needed research on this topic (Blascovich & Bailenson 2011).

Self-Stereotyping and Emotion Norms

The generation of group-based emotion re- quires that a convergence in emotional state and readiness occur across individuals who identify themselves as group members, and this conver- gence has been understood recently in terms of the cognitive processes of self-stereotyping (as members of the group) and in terms of the de- velopment of emotion norms within the group. Smith and colleagues (2007) proposed self-stereotyping as an important mechanism in group-based emotion, akin to the role of self-stereotyping of attitudes, norms, and traits in producing the internalization and incorpo- ration of group characteristics as part of the self. The idea is that self-stereotyping causes group members to experience the emotions they perceive as currently characteristic of their group. Moons et al. (2009) tested this claim in studies that documented a pretest-posttest shift in participants’ ratings of the extent to which they felt a given group-based emotion after being told that their fellow in-group members reported high or low levels of that emotion. That is, when they categorized themselves as “Americans” (the category under study), participants converged toward the emotion stereotype in the group-based, but not individual, emotions that they reported to be feeling. Further work on self-stereotyping of emotion by Leonard et al. (2011) showed that knowledge of the anger of women as a group affected female participants’ anger (showing self-stereotyping), and this in turn pre- dicted their action tendencies to hypothetical situations of discrimination against women. The process of self-stereotyping of emo- tion is not unrelated to the second mechanism, the transmission of injunctive group norms for emotion. Emotion norms are considered as one of three important norms categories in Thomas and colleagues’ Normative Alignment Model of Collective Action (Thomas et al. 2009). These authors propose that group commitment to

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action relies on a process of “crafting a so- cial identity that has a relevant, congruent pat- tern of norms for action, emotion, and efficacy” (p. 195). Adoption of emotion norms, then, is one criterion for being a “good” group mem- ber (Reysen & Branscombe 2008). The way in which the norms for emotion are established is an importantly distinct emotion process that relies on common ways of appraising situations that are relevant to the group’s goals (Fischer et al. 2003). So, for instance, a group emotion norm that provides the basis of a group-based emotion of anger would be based on a collec- tive appraisal of the situation (e.g., an injustice) as being illegitimate, negative, and controllable by the group. Recent research on emotion norms and col- lective action has demonstrated that group em- pathy norms can motivate positive changes in attitudes toward outgroups (e.g., Tarrant et al. 2009). Other researchers have studied the pro- duction of an outrage norm within the group as an important basis for commitment to ac- tion. Thomas & McGarty (2009) constructed opinion-based novel groups of interacting in- dividuals (and noninteracting controls) in the laboratory. The topic under consideration was the Water for Life campaign introduced by the United Nations, which strives to reduce the in- cidence of waterborne diseases in developing countries by providing clean water and sani- tation. Introduced into the groups, of interest for the present treatment, was either a norm of outrage (i.e., toward the existing conditions) or no particular emotion norm. In comparison with noninteracting individuals and groups for which no emotion norm was primed, groups with an outrage norm were more outraged at the end of the discussion and were more com- mitted to the group and its intended action to facilitate the Water for Life aims. This study nicely illustrates the adoption of a group norm for outrage and its relation to collective action. Self-stereotyping in terms of emotions and self-reports of adherence to group-based emo- tion norms are clearly associated with commit- ment to a cause and the likelihood of commit- ting to collective action in the service of that

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cause. In other words, taking on the emotions of the group as part of the collective self has a motivating function. Future work will need to explore the different emotion mechanisms by which the transmission of group-based emo- tions, other than claims and social appraisals, actually occurs, and the extent to which group- based emotions are emotional processes or atti- tudinal ones. The component processes of emo- tion other than cognitive-appraisal ones, such as facial expression and physiological and cen- tral states of the organism, may be most likely to be involved when groups are actually formed and interacting and not when individuals re- ceive consensual information about the state or the norms of the group. In other words, future research in this area will need to focus on the emotional processes in addition to self-report of emotional state. Moreover, comparing online self-reports of emotion with retrospective or summary reports is a method that would be very productive in this domain. In a now classic study, Barrett and colleagues had participants provide global, retrospective ratings of their emotions (Barrett et al. 1998). Then, over a week-long period these same individuals provided momentary ratings of their emotions and the contexts in which the emotions were experienced. Results revealed gender differences in global descriptions of emotions but not in the aver- aged momentary ratings of emotion. This and similar findings suggest that when individuals produce global or retrospective self-ratings of emotion, they are more likely to rely on stereotypes and expectations than when they produce online emotion ratings. Showing that group emotion norms and online reports con- verge when participants are in groups would be a fascinating demonstration of the discrete effect of emotion norms in group processes.


There will never be an integrative theory of emotion, and no current theory can account for all emotional phenomena. Indeed, the manner in which emotions are defined, labeled, and

grouped together as similar and/or different

is based on the aims of a given program of research. When the biological basis of certain emotions is considered, categories of primary and secondary emotions may be employed (Damasio 1994, Leyens et al. 2007). When researchers focus on the developmental grounding and cognitive achievements that are necessary for the experience of particular emo- tions, then basic emotions are contrasted with cognition-dependent emotions (Ackerman & Izard 2004), and labels such as “self-conscious” and “self-evaluative” emotions are proposed (Tracy et al. 2007). When links between emotions and specific behavioral outcomes are under study, categories such as “moral” (Haidt 2003, Tangney et al. 2007) and “prosocial”

(Sturmer ¨

et al. 2005) emotions are common.

When relevant to structural features of inter- personal relationships, words like “powerful” and “powerless” emotions are used (Timmers et al. 2003). And when examining culture, researchers may derive categories from cultural models or values and characterize emotions as “socially engaged” and “socially disengaged” (Kitayama et al. 2006). In sum, emotions can be reasonably defined in terms of neural, peripheral, expressive, cognitive, linguistic, social, literary, historical, cultural, and societal processes and behavior; emotions occur in individuals and can have individual-level definitions, and emotions occur in groups of different sizes and have collective definitions. In the present review we have surveyed re- cent literature related to the social functionality of emotion. We propose that facial expression regulates behavior and social perception in dyads in a dense and efficient way. The ability to process facial expression of emotion accurately is thus a social necessity. Vicarious emotion plays a similar though more complex role in learning and social understanding. The brain bases of these two phenomena are slowly be- coming clearer as theory in social and emotions psychology is put to the test by techniques and methods in neuroscience. New accounts, such as theories of embodied or simulated emotion, provide an important impetus for such research. Functionality of Emotions 275

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Group emotions and group-based emotions seem to serve more abstract goals of group cohesion and collective action. Although group emotion may rely on many of the same mechanisms as vicarious emotion, group emotion will certainly never be reduced to independent vicarious emotions of a set of interacting individuals. The fact that group emotions can be triggered by powerful people and generated in increasing intensity over time suggests that accounts of this phenomenon are still in their infancy. Group-based emotions are also an emerging topic of study: Their


clearly important role in inspiring and main- taining collective action in the service of evolv- ing societies and even smaller groups is now clear. A fuller account of the emotional compo- nents of group-based emotions should be part of the research agenda in the coming years. In summary, emotion processing is a re- quirement of successful social living. We feel that its utility in dyadic and group dynamics has been established in these pages. We hope to have inspired researchers to pursue full ac- counts of the mechanisms in the accurate trans- mission of emotion in these social units.

The authors are unaware of any affiliation, funding, or financial holdings that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.


The authors acknowledge helpful discussions with Gerrod Parrott, extensive feedback from Keith Oatley, and superb technical help from Mary K. Lokken. The effort of the first author was sup- ported by a grant (FaceExpress–Blanc CSD9 2006) from L’Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR), France.


Ackerman B, Izard C. 2004. Emotion cognition in children and adolescents: introduction to the special issue. J. Exp. Child Psychol. 89:271–75 Adolphs R. 2002. Recognizing emotion from facial expressions: psychological and neurological mechanisms. Behav. Cogn. Neurosci. Rev. 1:21–62 Adolphs R, Damasio H, Tranel D, Cooper G, Damasio AR. 2000. A role for somatosensory cortices in the visual recognition of emotion as revealed by 3-D lesion mapping. J. Neurosci. 20:2683–90 Adolphs R, Damasio H, Tranel D, Damasio AR. 1996. Cortical systems for the recognition of emotion in facial expressions. J. Neurosci. 16:7678–87 Adolphs R, Gosselin F, Buchanan T, Tranel D, Schyns P, Damasio A. 2005. A mechanism for impaired fear recognition in amygdala damage. Nature 433:68–72 Ames DR, Johar GV. 2009. I’ll know what you’re like when I see how you feel. Psychol. Sci. 20:586–93 Anderson C, Keltner D, John O. 2003. Emotional convergence between people over time. J. Personal. Soc. Psychol. 84:1054–68 Anderson C, Thompson LL. 2004. Affect from the top down: how powerful individuals’ positive affect shapes negotiations. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 95:125–39 Askew C, Field AP. 2007. Vicarious learning and the development of fears in childhood. Behav. Res. Ther.


Atkinson A. 2007. Face processing and empathy. In Empathy in Mental Illness, ed. TFD Farrow, PWR Woodruff, pp. 360–85. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press Barlett MY, DeSteno D. 2009. Gratitude and prosocial behavior: helping when it costs you. Psychol. Sci.


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Annual Review of Psychology Volume 63, 2012
Annual Review of
Volume 63, 2012



Working Memory: Theories, Models, and Controversies Alan Baddeley ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 1

Developmental Psychobiology

Learning to See Words Brian A. Wandell, Andreas M. Rauschecker, and Jason D. Yeatman ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 31


Remembering in Conversations: The Social Sharing and Reshaping of Memories William Hirst and Gerald Echterhoff ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 55

Judgment and Decision Making

Experimental Philosophy

Joshua Knobe, Wesley Buckwalter, Shaun Nichols, Philip Robbins,

Hagop Sarkissian, and Tamler Sommers ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 81 Brain Imaging/Cognitive Neuroscience

Distributed Representations in Memory: Insights from Functional Brain Imaging Jesse Rissman and Anthony D. Wagner ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 101

Neuroscience of Learning

Fear Extinction as a Model for Translational Neuroscience:

Ten Years of Progress Mohammed R. Milad and Gregory J. Quirk ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 129

Comparative Psychology

The Evolutionary Origins of Friendship Robert M. Seyfarth and Dorothy L. Cheney ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 153

Emotional, Social, and Personality Development

Religion, Morality, Evolution Paul Bloom ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 179


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Adulthood and Aging

Consequences of Age-Related Cognitive Declines Timothy Salthouse ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 201

Development in Societal Context

Child Development in the Context of Disaster, War, and Terrorism:

Pathways of Risk and Resilience Ann S. Masten and Angela J. Narayan ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 227

Social Development, Social Personality, Social Motivation, Social Emotion

Social Functionality of Human Emotion Paula M. Niedenthal and Markus Brauer ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 259

Social Neuroscience

Mechanisms of Social Cognition Chris D. Frith and Uta Frith ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 287

Personality Processes

Personality Processes: Mechanisms by Which Personality Traits “Get Outside the Skin” Sarah E. Hampson ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 315

Work Attitudes

Job Attitudes Timothy A. Judge and John D. Kammeyer-Mueller ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 341

The Individual Experience of Unemployment Connie R. Wanberg ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 369

Job/Work Analysis

The Rise and Fall of Job Analysis and the Future of Work Analysis Juan I. Sanchez and Edward L. Levine ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 397

Education of Special Populations

Rapid Automatized Naming (RAN) and Reading Fluency:

Implications for Understanding and Treatment of Reading Disabilities Elizabeth S. Norton and Maryanne Wolf ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 427

Human Abilities

Intelligence Ian J. Deary ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 453

Research Methodology

Decoding Patterns of Human Brain Activity Frank Tong and Michael S. Pratte ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 483

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Human Intracranial Recordings and Cognitive Neuroscience Roy Mukamel and Itzhak Fried ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 511

Sources of Method Bias in Social Science Research and Recommendations on How to Control It Philip M. Podsakoff, Scott B. MacKenzie, and Nathan P. Podsakoff ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 539

Neuroscience Methods

Neuroethics: The Ethical, Legal, and Societal Impact of Neuroscience Martha J. Farah ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 571


Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 53–63 ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 593 Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 53–63 ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣ 598


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New From Annual Reviews:

Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior

Volume 1 • March 2014 • Online & In Print •

Editor: Frederick P. Morgeson, The Eli Broad College of Business, Michigan State University

The Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior is devoted to publishing reviews of the industrial and organizational psychology, human resource management, and organizational behavior literature. Topics for review include motivation, selection, teams, training and development, leadership, job performance,

strategic HR, cross-cultural issues, work attitudes, entrepreneurship, affect and emotion, organizational change

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TAble oF CoNTeNTs:

An Ounce of Prevention Is Worth a Pound of Cure: Improving Research Quality Before Data Collection, Herman Aguinis, Robert J. Vandenberg

Burnout and Work Engagement: The JD-R Approach, Arnold B. Bakker, Evangelia Demerouti, Ana Isabel Sanz-Vergel

Compassion at Work, Jane E. Dutton, Kristina M. Workman, Ashley E. Hardin

• Constructively Managing Conflict in Organizations,

Dean Tjosvold, Alfred S.H. Wong, Nancy Yi Feng Chen

Coworkers Behaving Badly: The Impact of Coworker Deviant Behavior upon Individual Employees, Sandra L. Robinson, Wei Wang, Christian Kiewitz

Delineating and Reviewing the Role of Newcomer Capital in Organizational Socialization, Talya N. Bauer, Berrin Erdogan

Emotional Intelligence in Organizations, Stéphane Côté Employee Voice and Silence, Elizabeth W. Morrison Intercultural Competence, Kwok Leung, Soon Ang, Mei Ling Tan

Learning in the Twenty-First-Century Workplace, Raymond A. Noe, Alena D.M. Clarke, Howard J. Klein

Pay Dispersion, Jason D. Shaw

Personality and Cognitive Ability as Predictors of Effective Performance at Work, Neal Schmitt

Perspectives on Power in Organizations, Cameron Anderson, Sebastien Brion

Psychological Safety: The History, Renaissance, and Future of an Interpersonal Construct, Amy C. Edmondson, Zhike Lei

Research on Workplace Creativity: A Review and Redirection, Jing Zhou, Inga J. Hoever

Talent Management: Conceptual Approaches and Practical Challenges, Peter Cappelli, JR Keller

The Contemporary Career: A Work–Home Perspective, Jeffrey H. Greenhaus, Ellen Ernst Kossek

The Fascinating Psychological Microfoundations of Strategy and Competitive Advantage, Robert E. Ployhart, Donald Hale, Jr.

The Psychology of Entrepreneurship, Michael Frese, Michael M. Gielnik

The Story of Why We Stay: A Review of Job Embeddedness, Thomas William Lee, Tyler C. Burch, Terence R. Mitchell

What Was, What Is, and What May Be in OP/OB, Lyman W. Porter, Benjamin Schneider

Where Global and Virtual Meet: The Value of Examining the Intersection of These Elements in Twenty-First-Century Teams, Cristina B. Gibson, Laura Huang, Bradley L. Kirkman, Debra L. Shapiro

Work–Family Boundary Dynamics, Tammy D. Allen, Eunae Cho, Laurenz L. Meier

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The Annual Review of Statistics and Its Application aims to inform statisticians and quantitative methodologists, as

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table of contents:

What Is Statistics? Stephen E. Fienberg

A Systematic Statistical Approach to Evaluating Evidence from Observational Studies, David Madigan, Paul E. Stang, Jesse A. Berlin, Martijn Schuemie, J. Marc Overhage, Marc A. Suchard, Bill Dumouchel, Abraham G. Hartzema, Patrick B. Ryan

The Role of Statistics in the Discovery of a Higgs Boson, David A. van Dyk

Brain Imaging Analysis, F. DuBois Bowman Statistics and Climate, Peter Guttorp Climate Simulators and Climate Projections, Jonathan Rougier, Michael Goldstein Probabilistic Forecasting, Tilmann Gneiting, Matthias Katzfuss Bayesian Computational Tools, Christian P. Robert

Bayesian Computation Via Markov Chain Monte Carlo, Radu V. Craiu, Jeffrey S. Rosenthal

Build, Compute, Critique, Repeat: Data Analysis with Latent Variable Models, David M. Blei

Structured Regularizers for High-Dimensional Problems:

Statistical and Computational Issues, Martin J. Wainwright

High-Dimensional Statistics with a View Toward Applications in Biology, Peter Bühlmann, Markus Kalisch, Lukas Meier

Next-Generation Statistical Genetics: Modeling, Penalization, and Optimization in High-Dimensional Data, Kenneth Lange, Jeanette C. Papp, Janet S. Sinsheimer, Eric M. Sobel

Breaking Bad: Two Decades of Life-Course Data Analysis in Criminology, Developmental Psychology, and Beyond,

Elena A. Erosheva, Ross L. Matsueda, Donatello Telesca Event History Analysis, Niels Keiding • Statistical Evaluation of Forensic DNA Profile Evidence,

Christopher D. Steele, David J. Balding

Using League Table Rankings in Public Policy Formation:

Statistical Issues, Harvey Goldstein

Statistical Ecology, Ruth King

Estimating the Number of Species in Microbial Diversity Studies, John Bunge, Amy Willis, Fiona Walsh

Dynamic Treatment Regimes, Bibhas Chakraborty, Susan A. Murphy

Statistics and Related Topics in Single-Molecule Biophysics, Hong Qian, S.C. Kou

Statistics and Quantitative Risk Management for Banking and Insurance, Paul Embrechts, Marius Hofert

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