U n i t e d

S t a t e s

M i l i t a r y

A c a d e m y

Military Science 103 Introduction to Warfighting

STUDENT TEXT

MS 103 INTRODUCTION TO WARFIGHTING
SPRING 2004

Department of Military Instruction United States Military Academy SFC TONY B. DURHAM INFANTRY RANGER Course Director

McGraw Hill Information

The Warrior Ethos

The Warrior Ethos forms the foundation for the American Soldier’s spirit and total commitment to victory, in peace and war, always exemplifying ethical behavior and Army Values. Soldiers put the mission first, refuse to accept defeat, never quit, and never leave behind a fellow American. Their absolute faith in themselves and their comrades makes the United States Army invariably persuasive in peace and invincible in war.

Time. squad formations and basic squad movement techniques. OAKOC. . During the course these skills will be applied in the analysis of basic tactical situations in order to reinforce Cadet understanding. it is expected that Cadets will become familiar with these concepts and make them a part of everyday life. Cadets will learn the organization of a Light Infantry Squad and Platoon as well as the characteristics of its organic weapons. the Cadet will apply what he/she has learned in the tactical environment of CFT. Tactical instruction will include map reading and military analysis through an introduction to the military planning considerations of Mission. and Civil considerations (METT-TC). ° Understand the Organization of a Light Infantry Platoon. ° Define the requirements of basic mission planning and apply them in tactical situations (METT-TC. Finally. pre-combat inspections. Course Scope Statement: MS 103 Introduction to Warfighting is designed to provide 4th Class Cadets a foundation of military and tactical knowledge necessary for application during Cadet Field Training (CFT) and implementation in a future career as an Army Officer. Troops. and Task & Purpose). Course Intent: • • • • Purpose: The purpose of MS 103 is to introduce 4th class cadets to the following: Basic organization and structure of a military unit Basic tools of a small unit leader Basic military communication and the language of the Army Basic military analysis As an introduction. This is a foundation course of instruction upon which all of the Academy’s military instruction continues to build.COURSE INFORMATION Course Goal: At the conclusion of this course. Later. ° Demonstrate basic map reading skills. Additionally. cadets will also be introduced to the concepts of dismounted squad operations. ° State the responsibilities of each member of a Light Infantry Squad. instruction will cover the Troop Leading Procedures (TLP). Enemy. Terrain. a 4th Class Cadet will be able to: ° Function effectively as a member of a Light Infantry Squad.

Bailey • All DMI MEMBERS These individuals and others provided invaluable assistance and advice in the development of this text and the MS 103 course. Kennedy • CPT C. .Course Administrators: Director of Military Instruction COL A. Goodroe • MAJ K. Military Science Chief MAJ J. Zsido Course Director SFC T. Durham Acknowledgments: I would like to acknowledge the following individuals for their contributions to this material: • Patricia Durham • Susan Bailey • MSG T. Stanley Jr. Medina • CPT R.

The Introduction to Warfighting course is the first opportunity the Cadets are offered to discuss and develop fundamental tactical skills at the Academy. It is the second of a new series of eight Military Science core courses offered in the Cadet’s 47-month experience. 25pts. This course is a Cadet’s first step along the path of his/her chosen profession. The Cadets will have an opportunity to apply their knowledge gained through group discussion and classroom study utilizing situational vignettes and Tactical Decision Making Exercises (TDMEs). Course Graded Requirements: Leadership Exercise #1(1x25 pts) Quiz’s(3x25 pts) PCI Exercise (1x25 pts) Self-paced Text (1 x 50 pts) Instructor Points (1 x 100 pts) Capstone Test (1 x 150 pts) Planning Assessment (1x75 pts) Total Points 25pts. The foundation for a long and illustrious military service begins here. platoon level weapons.Student Introduction General: MS 103 Introduction to Warfighting is a one semester 20 hour course for Class Cadets at the United States Military Academy. This course provides the cadet with the initial foundation in order to prepare him/her for a commission in the United States Army. 500 pts . and military analysis are key elements of study. A close examination of the organization of units. 75pts. 50 pts 100 pts 150 pts 75 pts. 4th Graded Events: The following requirements will be evaluated in order to determine a Cadet’s comprehension of the subject material.

This is a comprehensive exam that covers all the course material. It contains several instructional units that must be completed during the course of the semester. The basis for the decision should come from the concepts and techniques learned from course study.9% 73-76.9% 90-92. Term End Exam: There is one Term End Exam issued on Lesson 19.9% 70-72.9% 83-86.9% 67-69.9% C+ C CD F 77-79. Self-Paced Text: There is one Self-Paced Text issued at the beginning of the semester. The Cadet must analyze a given military scenario and FRAGO in order to determine a sound course of action for his/her unit.9% 66. Cadets will be given the opportunity to demonstrate mastery of the basic fundamentals taught during this course.Grading Structure: A+ A AB+ B B97-100% 93-96. The Self-Paced Text will be periodically collected in order to evaluate student progress.9% 87-89.9% 80-82. . The Self-Paced Text will be collected at the end of the semester for a final grade.9% and below Planning Assessment: There is one Planning Assessment issued approximately 3/4 into the semester. Guest Speakers: There will be one guest speaker for the Warfighter lecture.

CONTENTS Course Information Student Introduction iii iv BLOCK 1 : WARFIGHTING Lesson 1: Lesson 2: Lesson 3: Lesson 4: Lesson 5: Lesson 6: Introduction to Warfighter Concept Organization & Mission of the Light Infantry Squad The Roles of Squad Members Weapon Systems of the Light Infantry Platoon Squad Level Maneuver Warfighter Lecture BLOCK 2 : MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS Lesson 7: Lesson 8: Lesson 9: Lesson 10: Lesson 11: Lesson 12: Lesson 13: Operational Terms and Graphics The Troop Leading Procedures The Warning Order Pre-Combat Inspections Basic Map Reading Military Grid Reference System Manipulating the Map .

BLOCK 3: MILITARY ANALYSIS Lesson 14: Lesson 15: Lesson 16: Lesson 17: Lesson 18: Lesson 19: Lesson 20: The Principles of War The Principles of War (continued) METT-TC METT-TC (continued) Capstone Test Review Capstone Test Cadet Field Craft Tips Appendix A: 1 TDME #1 2 3 TDME #2 TDME #3 .

(BLOCK 3 LSN 14) What acronym is used to analyze military situations and what do the letters represent? (BLOCK 3 LSN 16) • What does the acronym OAKOC stand for? (BLOCK 3 LSN 17) .MS 103: The 4th Class Cadets JANUARY •What is the maximum effective range of: (BLOCK 1 LSN 4) The M16A2 The M4 Carbine The M203 40mm Grenade Launcher The M249 Squad Automatic Weapon The M240B Medium Machine Gun • State the characteristics of: (BLOCK 1 LSN 4) The M16A2 The M4 Carbine The M203 40mm Grenade Launcher The M249 Squad Automatic Weapon The M240B Medium Machine Gun FEBRUARY •Describe the role of the Squad Leader. (BLOCK 2 LSN 8) • What are the four critical components of the Warning Order? (BLOCK 2 LSN 9) MARCH •Describe the purpose of military symbols and graphics. (BLOCK 2 LSN 7) • What are the five major terrain features found on a military map? (BLOCK 2 LSN 11) • What are the five basic map colors and what do they represent? (BLOCK 2 LSN 11) APRIL •List the nine Principles of War. (BLOCK 1 LSN 3) •List the eight Troop Leading Procedures.

BLOCK I INTRODUCTION TO WARFIGHTING .

o Annex B Command and Control. • Complete Self-Paced Text. • Describe the concept of the Warrior Ethos. • Complete Chapter 1 Questions. pg 5-4. Homework: • Read Text Chapter 1: Introduction to the Warfighter Concept and the Warrior Ethos. 1900 . • FM 7-8: o 1-3 Leader Skills. • Bring Lap tops to class • “LESSON QUOTE” • War is a game to be played with a smiling face. • Sir Winston Chruchill. Questions 1-5. horrible war! Amazing medley for the glorious and the squalid. o 1-4 Soldier Skills. the pitiful and the sublime! If modern men of light and leading saw your face closer. o Appendix 1 Command and Control pg 5-6 #1and pg A-4 #A3. Unit 1. simple folk would see it hardly ever. Remarks: • Bring all issued course materials to class. O. o 2-1 Mission Tactics.Lesson 1 INTRODUCTION TO WARFIGHTER CONCEPT Lesson Objectives: • Describe the Officer as a Warfighter.

he next volunteered for airborne training. Three months later. Training at Camp Toccoa. Winters quietly emerged as Easy Company's most dynamic and charismatic junior officer. His early heroes were Babe Ruth and Milton S. . Winters soon applied for Officer Candidate School and arrived at Fort Benning.. where he graduated in July 1942 as a second lieutenant of infantry. the additional jump pay might help pay off his father's home mortgage. he commented on his personal crusade to improve himself as an officer and to improve Easy Company as Fighters and as men.a proud and cocky bunch.. lean. the airborne training appeared to be "interesting work. Seeking adventure. was rugged. Winters spent his formative years in eastern Pennsylvania. Always weighing on his mind was the tremendous responsibility of preparing his men for combat. Winters became one of the original members of Easy Company. Assigned command of Easy's 2nd Platoon. Winters volunteered for military service. In Winters' eyes." being an officer with the responsibility to train the men. the physical training was very appealing to Winters. bronzed and tough . As a teetotaler. but Winters relished the camaraderie and challenges associated with airborne training. He described himself as a "half-breed. Winters preferred the life of quiet reflection and organized athletics within Easy. S. Graduating from Franklin-Marshall College in June 1941 as a business major. Standing 6 feet tall and weighing 177 pounds. When the 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment was formed in August. The net result was a highly motivated company that was poised to inflict maximum punishment on the enemy when the "big day" (D-Day) arrived. where he was stationed when he received word of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Pa. he had also assumed the duties of company executive officer. he was accustomed to lots of running and outdoor activity. then return to civilian life to pursue a private career. the 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) deployed to England to prepare for the ensuing invasion of the European continent. In mid-April 1943.Captain Courageous Dick Winters' path toward war mirrored that of millions of other American veterans of Tom Brokaw's "greatest generation. who had founded a school for boys in the town that now bears his name. Winters remained with Easy Company when the regiment joined the 101st Airborne Division in June 1943. he spent his basic combat training at Camp Croft." Moreover. From September 1943 until June 1944." The troopers were "hard. he never participated in the social life associated with the officer corps. Still a first lieutenant. 1918. he soon completed his five jumps and received his airborne wings. on January 21. Ga. but being an enlisted man at heart.C. a position that he found brought new challenges. In a private letter home. Hershey.. Also." Born in Lancaster... His intent was to spend the mandatory one year in the Army. He later attributed his success to his training and to the relationship that he had developed with the enlisted men. Following his induction in August.

"In combat you look for killers. With the first gun out of action. Winters grabbed two other soldiers and charged the second gun. they took the second howitzer. By 7:00 a. and Winters was summoned to the front. And it was on D-Day that Dick Winters had his rendezvous with destiny. The attack would consist of a frontal assault led by Winters with covering fire from several directions to pin down the Germans. roughly three hours since Winters had received the order . was to seize the causeways behind Utah Beach to facilitate the expansion of the beachhead. Winters ordered a withdrawal. Reinforcements led by an officer from D Company soon arrived. Winters and his men got close enough and knocked out the first gun. Winters briefly outlined the situation and then watched D Company capture the last gun.Gerald Lorraine. as with the other units within the 101st Airborne Division. Winters stumbled across the battalion staff and 40 men of D Company. E Company consisted of two light machine guns. sailors and airmen who participated in D-Day. Easy Company's mission. No one knew the whereabouts of the company commander. Three kilometers from Ste. They are. several kilometers from the intended drop zone. Throwing hand grenades and firing their rifles.' Many thought they were killers and wanted to prove it. Winters selected three soldiers for the assault: Pvt. the use of terrain to get into the connecting trench and taking one gun at a time. Jumping from a C-47 Dakota at 150 miles per hour and at 500 feet and less.. the column encountered sustained enemy fire. Marie-du-Mont. The guns were firing directly down a causeway leading to Utah Beach. It was 11:30 a. nine riflemen and two officers. Pvt. Winters came down near the town of Ste. With the mission complete. Winters made a careful reconnaissance and then issued orders for an assault. Mowing down the retreating Germans. Winters recalled. That was enough for Winters. the Germans in an adjacent hedgerow temporary lifted their fire so that they would not inflict friendly casualties. Popeye Wynn and Cpl. The battalion operations officer directed Winters to take the battery. Asked later why he selected these three. The battery was set up in a hedgerow and defended by a 50-man German platoon." Crawling on their bellies. few and far between. one 60 mm mortar. En route.m. Next to the gun was a case with a map that showed all the German artillery in the Cotentin Peninsula. Mere-Eglise. Joe Toye. The battalion commander informed Winters that there was a four-gun battery of German 105 mm cannons. Taking his company. however. who had a "sixth sense" that such a respite shifted the advantage to him. a few hundred meters to the front across an open field opposite a French farmhouse called Brécourt Manor. Rallying a couple of troopers. he soon was en route to Ste. one bazooka with no ammunition." The key was "initiative. an immediate appraisal of situation.For those soldiers.. June 6 was unlike any day in history. so Winters took command. Marie-du-Mont. the Division's drop was scattered across the Cotentin Peninsula. Winters sent the map back to battalion headquarters and then directed another assault which rapidly captured the third gun. Winters then placed a machine gun to fire down the trench. He had also noticed that as soon as he got close enough to assault the first gun. destined to be the Division's headquarters for most of D-Day." Winters saw the impending attack as a "high risk opportunity.m.

command of Easy Company was the culmination of a career that had begun but two short years earlier. In his own analysis. recommended Winters receive the Medal of Honor. he wrote in his diary that if he survived the war. the 506th PIR commander. Robert Sink. roughly 15 men. On October 5. a small town at the base of the peninsula. Winters also formally received command of Easy when it was determined that the company commander had been killed in the airborne assault. and taken 12 prisoners.L. but reasonable to say that it had made an important contribution to the success of the invasion. but only one man in the 101st Airborne Division was to be given that medal. For Winters and Easy Company that meant defending a 5kilometer wide "island" that lay between the Lower Rhine on the north and the Waal River on the south. The paratroopers wiped out the enemy position and Winters called up . Ever the self-effacing leader. in defense of the "island. he immediately moved forward. When the day was finally over. Winters was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. Winters deployed his men with two platoons forward and one in reserve along a dike that ran roughly parallel to his front. later reinforced by elements of D Company. Military Academy.to take the battery. Left unsaid was his leadership by example. Winters had destroyed a German battery. the American airborne divisions were not designed for sustained infantry combat. Promotion to captain followed on July 2. however. historian Stephen Ambrose notes that with 12 men. with Silver and Bronze Stars awarded to the men of Easy Company who participated in the assault. At the time. Marshall simply as laying down a base of fire to cover the assault. he would find an isolated farm somewhere and spend the rest of his life in peace. and then remain in Holland until late November. Instead. to making an accurate reconnaissance of the enemy position. from selecting the right men for each task. He would lead the company with great distinction during Operation MarketGarden in mid-September. At every turn he had made the correct decision." Winters again wrote a shining page in the history of Easy. It would be a gross exaggeration to say that Easy Company saved the day at Utah Beach. For Winters' heroic leadership under fire during the attack at Brécourt Manor. For Dick Winters. frequently studied at the U.S. Gathering half his reserve platoon. In summarizing Easy's action. wounded many more. Excessive casualties in Normandy and in subsequent operations. Now a veteran company commander. Winters credited his training and preparing for D-Day. but not before Winters led the company in another attack to capture Carentan. Winters described the action to combat historian S. to leading the maneuver element in person. Winters received word that an enemy company was attempting to penetrate his defenses.A. killed 15 Germans. Winters brought his men up to a small ditch adjacent to an enemy machine gun nest. Col. Winters' action at Brécourt Manor was a textbook infantry assault. Repeatedly halting the patrol to make a personal reconnaissance. dictated that both the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions remain in combat. Not until mid-July did the 101st return to England to prepare for contingency operations. what amounted to a squad. Trained for light infantry assault. his "apogee" in command. Easy Company consisted of 130 men and had to cover 3 kilometers along the front.

he had routed two German companies of 300 men. but rose to pour a withering fire on the retreating enemy. Winters instantly replied. he promoted Winters to executive officer of the 2nd Battalion. Carefully orchestrating another assault." with one man firing a total of 57 clips of M-1 ammunition into the enemy." As to what aspect of his military service provided him the greatest satisfaction. Winters left the Army and found solace far away from the battlefield. his battalion was at Berchtesgaden. Asked by one cadet what his toughest challenge as a commander was. but it had been a glorious close. it was a "duck shoot. Col. and above all. "To be able to think under fire. citing 1st Platoon's "daring attack and skillful maneuver. noting that "hardship and death bring a family together. By now. because it demonstrated Easy's overall superiority in every phase of infantry tactics: patrol. the family belongs to the men. Sink issued a general order." October 5 was also the last day that Dick Winters fired his weapon in anger. To a man. attack under a base of fire. the war would continue. he answered without hesitation. Other members of Winters' 1st Platoon did the same. knowing that I kept the respect of my men." Four days later. withdrawal. Without hesitation. Just then another SS Company arrived. he is a frequent lecturer at West Point. What made Easy so special under Winters? The answer was simple. behind which unknown numbers of the enemy were huddling. Winters reached the road first. Officers aren't family. superior marksmanship with rifles. the survivors acknowledge that Capt. and in March he received command of 2nd Battalion. machine gun and mortar fire. The greatest reward you can have as a leader is the look of . The original members of Easy Company still sit together at reunions because they formed the core. Winters later said this attack was "the highlight of all E Company actions for the entire war. not the officers. when the war was over. Winters' days in command of Easy were at an end. His toughest Fight was at Bastogne. For Winters. even better than D-Day. Winters had taken cover behind the ditch. As more Americans arrived. A highly successful businessman. captured 11 and wounded approximately 100 enemy troops -. With two squads providing covering fire. defense." True to his word. which he led with distinction until V-E Day. jumped over and saw a German sentry with 100 or so other Germans preparing for an assault. Winters shuns such acclaim. In peace the toughest challenge is to be fair. Winters ordered the remaining squad to fix bayonets and to follow him across 200 yards of open ground. but his heart was always with the men of Easy Company. With only 35 men. he emptied two M-1 clips into the enemy. the Germans turned toward the river and fled.all at a cost of one dead and 22 wounded Americans. "Knowing I got the job done.the remainder of the platoon. but Easy's fire was too intense and the enemy joined the flight. Dick Winters was the best combat commander they had during the entire war. At war's end. Shared hardship and stress created a bond that still exists today. His message to the cadets is always the same: Hang tough and take care of your soldiers. killed 50. For Easy Company. he then directed that his men attack toward the road.

Thomas Millett. Capt. Millett saw service in the U. Millett immediately dove into a ditch and with his M-1. Multinational Peacekeeping Force in the Sinai. "I'm a soldier. Massachusetts National Guard in 1938." Millett descended from military stock dating to colonial times. Lewis Lee Millett commanded another Company E. Where I go. now in England. According to Wolfhound folklore. Millett spotted a downed observation plane. a great uncle died at Andersonville Prison Camp. Millett had been wounded in the leg by a shell fragment. John Morton Millett. Lew Millett was already a legend in the 25th Infantry Division. Lew Millett's initial military service was with the 101st Field Artillery. a similar drama was being played amid the rugged hills of the Republic of Korea. Following a short stint in civilian life after the war. In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor." The physician replied.I. Army Air Corps." Half an hour later. Shortly thereafter. Before assuming command of Easy Company. two great-grandfathers served in the Maine regiments during the Civil War. blasted a path clear for himself and two other G. Before America's entry into World War II. a unit in the 27th Infantry. Capt. Millett was informed by a doctor that the Geneva Convention forbade weapons in ambulances. Later Milletts fought in the Revolutionary War. Bronze Star (V) and the Purple Heart. An infantryman at heart. When President Franklin D. . my rifle goes. "Get in. flying in observation planes as a forward observer for the 8th Field Artillery. where he was a graduate air mechanic specializing in aerial gunnery. was later killed in the Gander crash in December 1985 while serving with Task Force 502. Millett wound up in a field hospital but less than two days later. Ordering his own pilot to set down. One ancestor. He then evacuated the injured pilot to safety." Seven years after Winters commanded Easy Company. he went AWOL to return to the fighting. Crawling through enemy lines he evaded capture and reached American lines.s.S. 1st Reconnaissance Squadron. the wounded pilot beckoning for help. was killed during the Indian massacre at Brookfield. Millett. Millett's youngest son. was transferred back to the American Army. Ordered into an ambulance against his will. not a lawyer. Millett replied.' The key to a successful combat leader is to earn respect not because of rank. but because you are a man. the Chinese ambushed the truck convoy and machine-gunned the ambulances. Millett immediately deserted and enlisted in the Canadian army in order to fight the Germans. and an Uncle Roland served with distinction in World War I. 27th Infantry had lost its company commander in November 1950. Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1675. and half a world away.respect. 506 PIR. part of the 27th Regimental Combat Team (RCT). where he earned a battlefield commission along with the Silver Star. On one occasion. SSgt. Millett soon requested transfer to a frontline company when he heard that Easy Company. Millett again entered federal service from the Maine National Guard in 1949. Millett lifted the wounded pilot into his seat and fought off the enemy with his M-1. Roosevelt announced in 1940 that no American would fight on foreign soil. a regiment known as the "Wolfhounds. Commanding Easy during the retreat from the Yalu had been Capt.

On February 5. In his last fight. Have it ready. Easy Company was once again in the lead as Task Force Bartlett approached yet another hill. this one designated Hill 180. From his command post 50 meters in the rear. 1951. Marshall likened Hill 440 to a mountain. the men screaming at the tops of their lungs." According to S. Millett and the 1st Platoon reached the crest unscathed. Easy Company was in the RCT's lead along the left road when it encountered an entrenched enemy. Millett became Easy Company's skipper on January 1 and immediately moved to place his imprint on the command.L. Millett made an instant assessment and ordered his 2nd Platoon to fix bayonets and come in on the 1st's left.L. together the two divisions comprised I Corps. Temporarily protected by defilade." Millett shouted to 1st Platoon and rushed to the base of the hill. Seven miles north of Suwon stands Hill 440. "Fix bayonets and follow me. Millett's first platoon was soon pinned down on a frozen rice paddy by direct fire from a low running ridge directly to their front. Marshall. Shooting the fleeing enemy. To increase the firepower in his unit.A. just as the Chinese soldiers were beginning to evacuate their position. the men heeded Millett's warning: "In our next fight. On February 7. Marshall reported that Millett was in the lead. personally supervising all aspects of training. Next. jabs and butt strokes against stacks of rice straw or a mud bank. Adored by his men. With 3rd Platoon occupying a . S. He emphasized the bayonet. followed by daily thrusts.A. a dominating mass of ridges that blocks any advance on the two parallel roads that drive toward the Han River. considered by many to be a useless weapon unsuited for combat in Korea.Reginald (Dusty) Desiderio. Each soldier also received four to six hand grenades." which purportedly is Chinese for "I'm going to kill you with a bayonet. On the division's right was the 3rd Infantry Division. Sharpening the bayonets to a razor edge. but this seemingly inconsequential action was merely a dress rehearsal for what was to occur two days later. made even the most dubious members of the command believe that their new commanding officer was a fighter. he inculcated Easy Company with the spirit of the bayonet.200 enemy casualties at a cost of approximately 70 American dead. Easy Company's ensuing fight was only one small piece of the general engagement fought by the 25th Infantry "Tropic Lightning" Division in its advance from Suwon to the Han River in February 1951. Desiderio had led the company with great distinction since its arrival the preceding summer. we'll use this. who posthumously earned the Medal of Honor for heroism above and beyond the call of duty in the terrible fighting along the Chongchon River. Gibraltar itself did not look more formidable. Easy Company had achieved a spectacular victory at minimal cost. shouting "she-lie sa-ni. inflicting more than 4. Two days of intense two-hour training periods." Covered by the fire from 3rd Platoon. After savage fighting. Third Platoon was to support the attack by fire. he obtained an additional Browning Automatic Rifle per squad. he then led the platoon forward. Desiderio's undaunted courage and heroism under fire coupled with the indomitable spirit of his soldiers resulted in Easy Company being recommended for the Presidential Unit Citation. the Americans took Hill 440.

led the assault up the fire-swept hill. Lewis Lee Millett the Medal of Honor and Easy Company received its second Distinguished Unit Citation. Millett led the men forward toward the first of three knobs that characterized the hill. decorations with a statement that he was there to provide freedom for people under attack by tyranny and had no desire for personal recognition. Five months later President Truman awarded Capt. Millett placed himself at the head of two platoons and with fixed bayonet. Millett volunteered for duty during Operation Desert Storm. Easy Company took time to reflect on what they had done. Millett later founded the 101st Airborne Division's Recondo School. While personally leading his company. the Rangers of Vietnam and the Commandos of Laos. Millett bayoneted two enemy soldiers and boldly continued on. In the fierce charge. Regrouping under cover of a protective outcropping. Of the approximately 200 enemy soldiers who had occupied Hill 180 at noon. Positioning himself with 1st Platoon. Despite vicious opposing fire. the whirlwind hand-to-hand assault carried to the crest of the hill. he immediately prepared for an assault. he refused all U. directing his attached tank platoon to join 3rd Platoon in firing on the enemy position. clubbing and bayoneting the enemy. Millett yelled: "Get ready to move! We're going to assault the hill. just as they had two days earlier. Millett could be heard shouting for 3rd Platoon to join the assault: "Use grenades and cold steel! Come on up here. Of the dead that lay strewn on Hill 180. Millett refused evacuation until the objective was taken and firmly secured. 47 lay dead on the ground and later reports confirmed the Chinese and North Koreans had incurred an additional 60 wounded. Fix bayonets! Charge! Everybody goes with me. As a paratrooper. Millett had to fire his M-1 to release its bayonet by the recoil.reserve position to provide covering fire should the need arise. while urging his company forward by shouting encouragement. 18 had been killed with bayonets. Without hesitation. he voluntarily served as a hostage in a North Vietnamese battalion while its commander arranged to surrender to the South Vietnamese army. Out of range of artillery. During the Persian Gulf War. Millett received word that the enemy was in force atop Hill 180. throwing grenades. Millett's dauntless leadership and personal courage so inspired his men that they stormed into the hostile position and used their bayonets with such lethal effect that the enemy fled in wild disorder. but they had carried the hill. During the Vietnam War. with their commanding officer leading them. Amid the roar of battle. Wounded by a grenade fragment. Millett contemplated delaying the attack or seizing the opportunity at hand. ." Fortunately Millett and his men reached the base of the hill with minimal casualties. This time Easy Company had endured its fair share of casualties as well. the 82nd Airborne Division's Raiders. Millett's two remaining platoons approached the ridge. but was denied service because of age. That evening. The assault on "Bayonet Hill" was hardly the last contribution by this illustrious soldier whose career spanned three decades. While serving in the Phoenix Program.S. he made five jumps in Vietnam and eight in Laos. As he brought 1st Platoon abreast of the ridge. you sons of bitches!" At one point.

Temporarily recalled to active duty during the Korean War. Army during their respective wars. KINGSEED. Army in the 21st century. As brilliant a commander as George S. Inspirational leadership. too..S.. the unifying feature of their leadership has been their unquestionable competency in battle and a unique ability to inspire soldiers to perform beyond their highest expectations in the test of combat. His military career spanned 33 years and he served proudly as a military advisor to the governments and armed forces of Japan. KINGSEED. Millett has served with distinction as the Honorary Colonel of the 27th Infantry Regiment since 1985. Ph. Recipient of every major award for valor. which. In later years. In direct contrast to Winters. Winters. if not the best. who enlisted in the Army in May 1941 because enlistment was the most viable alternative to being drafted as the United States edged toward global war. he had a difficult time defining the essence of military leadership." Patton mused. "but I'll be damned if I can explain it. COLE C. MilitaryCOL. personified the American citizen soldier. Millett said it best 50 years after that fateful February day when he led his bayonet attack against an entrenched enemy: "One does not charge up a hill without men who are as crazy as their leader. were among the best. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- COL." Regardless of one's perspective. is a writer and consultant.. coupled with shared adversity in war's dark crucible..D. Dick Winters and Lew Millett have bequeathed a legacy of combat leadership that serves as a model for the U. Europe. he returned to civilian life after the war. he and his company became the subject of historian Stephen E. Ph. a former professor of history at the U. "I have it. USA Ret. the Republic of Vietnam.S. COLE C. at their peak. Serving his tour with the 101st Airborne Division from Normandy to Berchtesgaden. a former professor of history at the U. Military Academy.Over the span of two wars. companies in the U. Laos and Thailand. but he never deployed to Korea. .D. Though Winters and Millett never actually met. Winters always yearned for a quiet farm in southern Pennsylvania. USA Ret.S. Millett participated in combat in two armies and three wars in Africa. Patton was. Ambrose's Band of Brothers and an HBO series based on the book. he trained draftees for combat. Millett found comfort in war.S. Winters and Millett remained polar opposites who found common expression in leading soldiers in battle." Winters and Millett had it. and Asia. Greece. In the final analysis it is difficult to determine what made commanders as different as Dick Winters and Lew Millett so effective in combat. produced outstanding commands. Perhaps it was a unique combination of commander and unit coming together at a critical time that characterized these excellent organizations.

Lesson 1: Comprehension Short Answer: Write out your response to the short answer questions below. According to the Warrior Ethos. If you struggled with any question. all Army soldiers are: _______________________________________________________ What is the most important line in the Warrior Ethos to you? Why?___________________________________________________ _ 1. 5. The art of making sound decisions quickly lies in: ______________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________ A platoon leader is responsible for: _______________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________ 4. Describe the term “Mission Tactics. 3. .” ______________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________ 2. go back and review the material.

Homework: • Read Text Chapter 2. • Bring Student Text to class. • General Sir William Napier 1785-1860 . • Complete Chapter 2 questions 1-5. • State the organizational structure of the Light Infantry Platoon. Remarks: • Bring FM 7-8 to class. • FM 7-8 Appendix A. • State the organizational structure of the Light Infantry Squad. pg 1-1. • Complete Self-Paced Text Unit 2.Lesson 2 ORGANIZATION & MISSION OF THE LIGHT INFANTRY SQUAD Lesson Objectives: • State the mission of the Infantry. • FM 7-8. LESSON QUOTE • Infantry is the queen of battles. pg A-1 – A-8.

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What is the smallest unit in the Army organization? _______________________________________________________ 3. 1. List the Light Infantry Platoon’s organization: ___________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________ 5. go back and review the material. A squad consist of ______ of these units? (How many) 4.Lesson 2: Comprehension Mastered it lieutenant? Short Answer: Write out your response to the short answer questions below. State the mission of the Infantry: _______________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________ 2. . What is the symbol for: Light Infantry Squad:__________ Light Infantry Platoon:_________ If you struggled with any question.

or the rifle. • FM 7-8.Lesson 3 THE ROLE OF A MEMBER OF SQUAD (MOS) Lesson Objectives: • State the role of each member of the Light Infantry Squad. Section A-3. • Complete Self-Paced Text Unit 3. pg 1-3. • General of the Army George C. Marshall 1939 . • Review FM 7-8. Homework: • Read Text Chapter 3. or the crossbow. (1-4) – (A-7). • State the role of the Platoon Leader. pg. • Complete Chapter 3 questions 1-5. it was the man with the sword. who settled the final issue on the field. LESSON QUOTE • When the smoke cleared away. • State the role of the Platoon Sergeant. Remarks: • Cadets will complete Leadership Exercise #1 as an in-class activity.

Forty-Six Years in the A rm y. discipline. the N C O support channel. they are not born. the officer chain of com m and. you don't accept us: we were here first. 1897. no letters." A rm y D igest." Just like that.. C om petence. I wish you happiness. T his em phasizes the need for m utual respect. and when we do. Very few noncom m issioned officers were awarded stripes without showing som ebody som ething. p. and not even one old sergeant to teach them anything.and for both sides to take into consideration that the problem requires special efforts when young officers are inexperienced.Platoon Leader . W e accept you. pp. pp.. if he is slow to assum e responsibility. 71. on your shoulders. and success in the exciting and challenging years that lie ahead.. pp.. som eone failed to support his decisions. Leadership is developed within yourselves. 63 [Platoon Leaders:] Look at yourself from [your Platoon Sergeant's] viewpoint and seek to be the kind of Platoon Leader that you would like to have if you were the Platoon Sergeant. if he shies away from you.Platoon Sergeant P latoon Leaders A trem endous source of assistance in your learning is from your noncom m issioned officers and your fellow officers. on your caps. som etim e.. -M G Aubrey S. N o country ought to be so cruel to its soldiers as that.. T ake advantage of that from the day that you are com m issioned. and you will help us defend the country we have loved for so m any years. M ay G od bless you all! -SG M John G .. You are leaders in an Arm y in which we have served for so m any years. W e w on't beat drum s.. G entlem en. 1992. som ewhere... Be you lieutenants or generals. internal scars fade m ore slowly. N o orders. -LT G John M .K. we'll raise a canteen cup of beer and say. with m utual respect for each other. wave flags. If your platoon sergeant is m ediocre.. or carry you off the drill field on our shoulders. But.. luck. 5-6 Let your noncom m issioned officers handle the problem s of the platoon. Aug 1967. W hen the noncom has exhausted all m eans in trying to right these problem s. even in the m idst of war. T his m anual] identifies the place of the noncom m issioned officer in the U nited States Arm y. your Platoon Sergeant... and this perm eates every rank Arm ywide. authority. R em em ber one thing.while both you and they observe proper m ilitary courtesy. 1991.... w e're the guys you've got to convince and we'll m eet you m ore than halfway. T he sergeants in your unit can be a new lieutenant's best professional friends. Stepanek. m aybe som etim e not too long ago som eone refused to trust him .. you're O . you'll k now. and the relationship between noncom m issioned and com m issioned officers. but be sure they keep you inform ed. Your orders appointing you as officers in the U nited States Arm y appointed you to com m and. and plain hard work... and reciprocal good will. F o llow M e II. but you should read this m anual. with perfectly raw regim ents... m aybe at a com pany party. Vuono. no insignia of rank can appoint you as leaders.grows from study. T here are chapters on leadership. step in . som eone shot him dow n when he was right. "Lieutenant. -G EN C arl E. com prehend it. m utual professional com petence. It stays with you as long as you are privileged to wear the uniform . 262 W hat a hard tim e young officers of the arm y would som etim es have but for the old sergeants! I have pitied from the bottom of m y heart volunteer officers whom I have seen starting out.. and your noncom m issioned officers: if you do not have a copy of [T C 22-6. get one. "As a Senior N C O Sees It. N ew m an. duties and responsibilities of the noncom m issioned officer. C ollected W orks. As a young officer. It is specifically written for the noncom m issioned officer. W ith regard to the relationship between yourself. or on your calling cards. Internal wounds heal slowly. 18 A m ajor factor for success is how you get along with others. You do not wear leadership on your sleeves. 17.the corps of noncom m issioned officers that are throughout our rankssergeants of unm atched ability and dedication. you m ust tap one of the greatest sources of practical k nowledge. T he Arm y N oncom m issioned O fficer G uide. Leaders are m ade. Schofield.

Jul-Aug 1993. For some unknown reason good. "Officers and NCO's: A Working Relationship That M ust Endure.. Rich in accom plishm ents. Please. This in no way negates the responsibility of the officer chain of com m and. You'll be considered a good Joe if you accomplish your m ission and look to the welfare of your m en.but only in order to accom plish the m ission. Let him train you. Only when an NCO is involved for personal gain does he get burned. Rich. . in prestige. most all of whom have new ideas for improving upon the records of their predecessors. The im balance in experience is significant (although. 9 It is the job of the senior NCO to m old. proper haircut. pp. Most noncom missioned officers go through cycle after cycle of new leaders. Gillis. and incorporate the officer into the team he has to lead. 3 A platoon sergeant. never. -GEN Donn A." ARMY. Kroesen. A prudent lieutenant will appreciate having a seasoned NCO assist and advise him as he learns the art of leadership. It falls into many categories. Look.. outstanding noncom s have the knack.. Lieutenant. Don't offer the image of a hotrod teenager. Sep 1992. guide.. -CSM John W. p. when getting involved in this type of business. -LTC Cole C..has an inherent obligation to help his platoon leader becom e proficient at his job. [Do this right and there will be] fewer problems in the future. in the respect of your subordinates. the good ones never forget the NCOs who guided them to their successful careers. Kingseed. Starry. not only in dress. but forget about being a good Joe. Evaluate what he says. don't get involved. -SGM M orris J. but insist it is done in the proper m anner. but I will sum them up into four areas: shady.every inch an officer. but it should also be a very satisfying one because in the corps of Arm y officers." Military Review. I will say that you will never become wealthy in the Arm y. p. he m ust offer advice. Terrebonne. 66 [Platoon Leaders:] Listen to your platoon sergeant.except the one in which the NCO lives. W e call this NCO business.. "Training Second Lieutenants. If you do. Lieutenant.them aware that he recognizes a problem or a deficiency and how to correct it. Be pleasant and approachable. If you are going to be our leader we expect you to show m aturity. obviously. M ay 1978. spit-shined shoes... wealthy. and educate the officer to the subtleties of Arm y life. "Sergeants' Business. "The NCO M eets His Junior Officer." ARMY. funny.. There are tim es when noncomm issioned officers can accom plish a m ission for the officer that seem s alm ost im possible." Infantry.. So it is best for the young officer to give the noncom his head when he says he can get something hopeless accom plished. p. yes. -GEN Frederick J. It is a dem anding role." Infantry. M ay 1967. "The Platoon Sergeant. Jul-Aug 1981. sharp. one for which no formal training is provided. and it is the NCO who m ust restore it. sooner or later you'll get burned. Finally. These are things that aren't taught in any school. first sergeants have to be first-tim ers at som e time also). W ith full awareness of the need for tact and diplomacy.. There was a com petition am ong platoon sergeants as to who had the m ost proficient lieutenant. This m ission is important enough to be listed as one of the platoon sergeant's prim ary m issions. -CPT David M. Nov-Dec 1972.of com ing out smelling like a rose. p. Dacus. 10 Platoon Sergeants Most com pany grade officers arrive in a unit to do a job for the first tim e. 68. but having the stam p of a quality product... The NCO should show the officer how each job complem ents the other. He should be shown propriety and the unwritten laws of professional soldiers. prevent disasters. p.. "NCOs: Not Only the Backbone but the Vital Nerve System Link.. 11 Every platoon sergeant in our battalion took the attitude that it was his job to make sure his lieutenant was the best platoon leader in the battalion.. and monkey business. but the platoon sergeant is in daily contact with the platoon leader and is in a unique position to guide and assist him . fishy." Armor. I m ention this because during the past few years I have seen newly comm issioned officers use their first pay for a bom b with four on the floor. but decide for yourself what is right.

He brought me a tool box another time and said.Your knowledge and experience as a noncommissioned officer must be shared with the officer. So what if the lieutenant's choice doesn't work? The officer's ideas may turn out wrong.. if you don't mind. and polish the blade into a quality. and committed to mission accomplishment. pp. They are the bond to the citizen soldier." He said." So I learned how to take tanks apart and put them back together." NCO Journal. they are the soul of our Army. Peers will also provide advice and guidance. Show a genuine concern that he's learning the right way instead of the easy way." He brought me a general mechanic's tool box and said. p. you must be loyal enough to do your utmost to see that his solution works. p. his job. but train him. whatever else you want to look for. he came around and said. and be ready to tell the world proudly that he's yours. saluted and said. -GEN Donn A. 11 Senior NCOs. first sergeants. It's my tool box.. it's time for inspection. 70-71 A new lieutenant is a precious thing. lieutenants should become proficient at maintenance. Fall 1994. p. Do something about it.. Developing junior officers is our job. and then he came around.. sir..are a special breed of soldier. "Classes begin at motor pool at 1900... determined. and soldiers. The NCO can say to the officer. Oct 1985.. Remember that order and counter-order create disorder. Platoon Sergeant Lucas] came around to my tank. most important. maybe it's because you've neglected him or failed to train him properly. The first time we went out with [our platoon. "I think the left side is better. However. or. next time he has to decide. "The Junior Officer Meets His Noncom. W hen I became a company commander. It may be good experience merely to have him realize that your ideas or recommendations are good ones. He went out.. "This Is a Tough Business. can hone that metal. Dec 1966." Soldiers. It is this unique and special attribute of our senior NCOs which makes them so effective in Cadet Command. long lasting sabre that will serve the Army and its soldiers well. May-Jun 1989. How do you do that and still let the officer learn through experience? It isn't as hard as it seems.. -SGM Morris J.but the officer will learn through the experience. "Sir." So I did. Mellinger.. "Is there something that I should be doing?" And he said. but from their NCO roots. took him an hour or so. Terrebonne. -1SG Jeffrey J.. I recommend that we attack the hill from the right because." Infantry." He said.. These proud and caring professionals are tough. It requires a skill called tact. "Open Letters to Three NCOs. supply sergeants. Senior officers in the unit will mentor young officers. they supervise and overwatch the everyday conduct of Army business. Don't take advantage of him. company commanders don't use a tool box. That's what the lieutenant ought to be doing. "If the lieutenant would please sit under this tree. Tried and true. you must pass on the benefit of [your] wisdom and experience to your platoon leader as well as to the soldiers. "W e're going to learn how to do that. get range cards made out and so on." I said.". saluted and said. hardened by experience. sharpen the edges. I will put the platoon in position. here are the things I'd like you to add to your list. But they are much more. "Yes. Starry.." Now suppose the lieutenant says. "Sir. And. correct him when he needs it (remembering that diplomacy is part of your job description). on his own. who cares about his work and takes pride in it. W ithout complete loyalty from his noncommissioned officer the junior officer can never fully trust him. it may be good experience that will enable him to make a wiser choice. -SFC Michael D. the kind of maintenance that soldiers do. "Developing Junior Officers Is Our Business... "You gave it to me. I've come for the tool box. Right here is where the most important trait is expected to be demonstrated by the noncom: loyalty. "Sir.. A skilled craftsman... "Sir. sir." ARMY. only senior NCOs can guide them through the maze of motor sergeants.my job. If you are ashamed of him. But be careful not to undermine his authority or destroy his credibility.. I learned a lot about what officers and what NCOs are supposed to do from him.". W hether or not the officer accepts your ideas or approves your recommendations.. they know first-hand the price of freedom in peace and war. 20 Treat the new young officer like a freshly forged piece of steel." And I said. W hyte." That was the first lesson. "Sir. Sitting right under that tree. As the senior and most experienced NCO in the platoon.. Then I would like the lieutenant to inspect the platoon. they have compassion and an understanding of youth derived not only from formal education and training. 23 .

or what "the boss" is going to think. ensure that the troops can't get around one of you by going to the other. respect.you're never so knowledgeable that you can't learn something new for yourself. or general military knowledge. Your task is to convey your knowledge and experience to your lieutenant without being condescending or disrespectful. you earn it. resolve it immediately or get out of the leadership business. smooth-running platoon.is integral to caring for soldiers. Talk. timely counseling is absolutely necessary to maintain a motivated. and attitudes. It doesn't include an unhealthy preoccupation with personal rewards. If there is any question. you must be the most proficient soldier in the platoon. It's important for that platoon sergeant to remember that the "LT's" performance reflects not only the platoon leader's abilities but the platoon sergeant's abilities as well. it's as important as good training and good equipment. Set aside time each day to discuss training." Both of you should listen to guidance and directions from above. sports. Your soldiers will recognize and "tune out" a phony in a very short time.a recognition of the training. Winter 1993. As an NCO your professionalism should present a constant challenge to your platoon leader and to the soldiers assigned to you. In fact. you should be seen together often (but not always). listen. It's essential that the platoon leader and platoon sergeant begin with a common goal. talk. discuss who's responsible for what and ensure that neither can abdicate responsibilities. In order to build cohesion. and the dining facility. and aspirations of each leader. You and your platoon leader will work together to establish realistic. but you must work together. Then add some more "listen. Both sides must work at it. If either of you is more worried about these things than about the mission and the soldiers. you must be constantly aware of your role as teacher to your platoon leader. check the evening and weekend meals. you must correct soldiers who fall short. MOS competence. it requires constant. In most cases. and more established as a leader. Deep] respect does not come with the job." NCO Journal.) Prove to members of your platoon that you care about them as individuals and that you care for them as a team. unit social activities. you will earn the [deep respect of the young lieutenant. recognizable standards. Platoon leaders and platoon sergeants must communicate. "My LT and Me. Counseling. you set the example in appearance. We can sum up the essence of this relationship in four "C's". you will be older. disciplined. more experienced. and care of the troops. listen to your soldiers. the goal is simply good training. not weekday lunch. When it comes to common task. and it's here that foundations are laid and relationships formed which may last throughout a career. Meanwhile. etc. -CSM John D.to include rewards and punishments. abilities. talk. Be sure to include time for brainstormingsounding out new ideas and improvements. (If you want to get a true idea of how your soldiers eat. weapons. training. Woodyard. recognize those who meet the standards. physical fitness. 10-11 . As platoon sergeant. Then. The earliest level of direct NCO/Officer relationship is at the platoon level. listen. If you slip. mutual respect.If you've been around the Army for any length of time. Every day. evaluations. conscious effort. you've heard a platoon sergeant speaking of "My LT". You're not supposed to become buddies. you give someone else an excuse to slip with you. but you must counsel and you must communicate the results to each other. At this time. The next aspect of communicating is so important I almost give it a "C" of its own. mission accomplishment. dependability. activities. and problems. And remember. one person can't communicate. and to each other. One of your earliest sessions will include your NCOER counseling. Finally. and listen. It's not necessary for you to sit together during the counseling session. Good communication doesn't happen all by itself. pp. Orientation toward this goal begins with genuine. exasperation. and reward those who exceed them. Some important places to spend your time are: the motor pool. Set guidelines for how you will deal with routine business and how you will react to anything out of the ordinary. If you're doing all of this. These words can be given any number of inflections to convey any number of emotions: pride.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
West Point, New York 10996

Leadership Exercise #1 MS 103

You arrive at your new unit, fresh out of school. The Platoon Sergeant greets you while you lug your duffle bag and TA-50 to the HMMWV. “Welcome to Afghanistan. We lost the last L.T. to an RPG round. Stick close to me and you will be fine, sir.” After a week “in country,” you have the organization and names of your standard Light Infantry Platoon down. They are all trained to standard and all seem reliable and combat efficient. You haven’t seen any Taliban since you arrived, but you feel ready. The CO calls you into his CP tent: “The city lost power yesterday. The people need water and we have a generator at the U.N. compound. If we don’t get water out to the people, we will have some serious health issues. Lieutenant, I need for you to organize three water distribution points inside the U.N. compound. You will need to provide security for your three sites. Just make sure the people distributing water are not mobbed inside the compound. Here is an aerial photo; your sites are marked 1 through 3.“ “The company will secure the perimeter outside of the walled compound. We will control the flow of who gets inside the compound. You need to make sure the personnel distributing water at each water point are safe and order is maintained. The company won’t allow weapons on those entering the compound. It should be easy.” “Bring me a sketch of your plan for approval in 10 minutes.”You head back to the Platoon Sergeant thinking about various courses of action. What now, Lieutenant? [Note: U.N. personnel all wear a light blue hat of some sort.] In a time of ten minutes, answer the following questions: 1. 2. What do you have to do? (task) Why? (purpose) List the assets you have available to accomplish the mission (ie. The elements of a Light Infantry Platoon with weapon systems). Tell how you plan to provide security for the three water distribution points. (Important points: How many soldiers/assets where? Who’s in charge and why?) Why did you choose this plan?

2

3.

1 3

4.

Lesson 3: Comprehension Got it, Sir?
Short Answer: Write out your response to the short answer questions below. 1. List (5) five of the eleven tasks that a rifle squad leader is responsible for: _______________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________ 2. What is the most critical responsibility of the team leader? _______________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________ 3. Describe the relationship between the squad leader and his subordinates. _______________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________ 4. How many squads are in a Light Infantry Platoon? _______________________________________________________

5.

Describe in your own words the purpose of the Grenadier. _______________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________________

If you struggled with any question, go back and review the material.

Lesson 4
WEAPON SYSTEMS OF THE LIGHT INFANTRY PLATOON
Lesson Objectives: • State the characteristics and maximum effective range of the M-4 Service Rifle. • State the characteristics and maximum effective range of the M203 Grenade Launcher. • State the characteristics and maximum effective range of the M249 Squad Auto Weapon. • State the characteristics and maximum effective range of the M240B Machine Gun. Homework: • Read Student Text, Chapter 4. • Complete Chapter 4 questions 1-6. • Complete Self-Paced Text Unit 4. Remarks: • None. LESSON QUOTE • There is but one means to extenuate the effects of enemy fire: it is to develop a more violent fire oneself. • Marshal of France Ferdinand Foch, 1919

.

When in combat.155 ft) 150 meters (495 ft) . It has a leaf sight and a guardant sight.5 lb) Maximum effective range: Area Target Point Target 350 meters (1.The grenade launcher M203 is a single shot weapon designed for use with the M16 series rifles and fires a 40-mm grenade.28 kg (9.5 lb) 4. The grenade launcher M203A1 is a single shot weapon designed for use with the M4 series carbines When firing High Explosive (HE) grenades at targets within 130 meters (427 ft). do not fire at targets closer than 31 meters (102 ft).93 kg (6. be in a protected position. do not fire at targets within 165 meters (541 ft).35 kg (3 lb) 2. Weight: Launcher Rifle M16A1 Total 1. When training.

M249 Squad Automatic Weapon .

M240 Platoon Automatic Weapon .

go back and review the material. 1. . 4. What is the maximum range of the M-16A2 Service Rifle? ______________________________________________________ What is the maximum effective range of the M-203 Grenade Launcher (Area Target)? _______________________________________________________ What is the maximum effective range of the M-240-B Machine Gun(point target on tripod)? _______________________________________________________ What is the maximum effective range of the M-249 Squad Automatic Weapon(area target)? _______________________________________________________ What is the cyclic rate of fire for the Squad Automatic Weapon? _______________________________________________________ What is the cyclic rate of fire for the M-240-B Machine Gun?____________________________________________________ 2. 3. 5. 6. If you struggled with any question.Lesson 4: Comprehension Ready! Aim! Fire! Short Answer: Write out your response to the short answer questions below.

The Instructor shows the next slide (cycle continues to end of class). The Instructor picks a Cadet to explain his selection. The critical component of the exercise is the Cadet’s explanation of “why” he chose a certain weapon system.DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY West Point. In some cases. The class critiques the selection. and elicits Cadet response from each slide. the Instructor should transition to the Weaponeering Exercise. The Instructor begins to show the individual slides. Cadets may remain in their seats during the exercise. and their strengths in combat. The Instructor provides insight/experience on class’s decision. 2. 1. This exercise is not graded. . All Cadets state out loud what weapon from the standard Light Infantry Squad they would use in the situation pictured. The exercise consists of a simple PowerPoint Presentation. 4. one at a time. New York 10996 Weaponeering Exercise MS 103 PURPOSE: The purpose of the Weaponeering Exercise is to reinforce the Cadet knowledge of various weapon systems. INTENT: The intent of this exercise is to provide graphic reinforcement of the lesson the Cadets just completed in a fun-type of Practical Application Exercise. Upon completion of the classroom period of instruction. Instructors should view the exercise ahead of time to prepare questions and thoughts about each scenario pictured. their capabilities. more than one weapon system may be appropriate. 3. Example: The first slide is shown.

Lesson 5 SQUAD LEVEL MANEUVER Lesson Objectives: • State the definition of the term Mission Tactics. • LTG Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson 1824-1863 . • State the definition of Fire and Movement. to invade his country. pg. • Describe Team and Squad Formations. and do him all possible damage in the shortest time. (4-8) – (4-17) Complete Unit 5 Self paced text: [ Reference FM 21-60 (pgs 1-43)] Remarks: • None. LESSON QUOTE • War means fighting… The business of the soldier is to fight… to find the enemy and strike him. pg. Homework: • • • • • Read Text Chapter 5 FM 7-8 Section 2-1. (2-27) – (2-31) Battle drill pg. (2-1) – (2-3) Section III.

Self-Perspective: LT Roach never pulled rank on anyone. who had seen desperate action during WWII as an enlisted Army infantryman. He considered himself to be nothing more than a quarterback on a platoon football team and was never the least bit self-serving. Roach USMCR (Ret) finally succumbed to complications from war wounds suffered twenty-four years earlier at a place called Con Thien. These squads made no contact. He could sleep soundly until the last second before an opposed landing by his Special Landing Force.L. A brief look at his life and times may give platoon leaders of today some valuable insight into what it takes to succeed in combat. he hid it well. Then both Marines embarked for the Far East to meet their destiny. LT Roach knew instinctively to attack. Coolness under Fire: If LT Roach ever knew a day of fear in this life. but uniquely. What made LT Roach such and outstanding combat leader? Quiet Aggressiveness: Unaffected by the mixed signals of the Vietnam era. Jack “the Georgia Peach” Cox. The other platoon leaders followed standard operating procedures. and as such was a born leader. Meanwhile. As the Georgia Peach had been unabashedly loved by all ranks in the Battalion. his peers would nervously pace the bowels of the ship. LT Roach without fanfare decided to take his whole platoon on what could best be described as a tiger hunt around the periphery of an abandoned village. he roomed with an All-American from Georgia who would give anyone the shirt off his back. They made good contact that night. Jack joined D Company and went on to be killed in December of that year trying to single handedly outflank a dug-in NVA battalion at the Three Gateways to Hell portion of the trail between Gio Linh and Con Thien. He was also the product of the mean streets of the south side of Chicago. At Quantico. he did it without bravado. 4th Marines. Bill was the son of an Irish father. then LT Roach had been one of the most highly revered platoon leaders in 1st BN.Eulogy to a Fallen Platoon Leader On 27 February 1991. Bill joined A Company just in time to help 1LT Don Campbell’s Marines repulse the large NVA force that partially overran Cam Lo in August of 1966. He and several of his buddies had even worked in the Gary steel mills before joining the Marine Corps in 1965. He was so well respected by his men that he didn’t have to. Before he was hit in the small of his back by a fist sized piece of recoilless rifle shrapnel. his turn to “ante up” came. But Bill suppressed his grief and continued to happily guide his flock through many engagements along the DMZ until the early summer of 1967. He must have gained insight into the importance of the team concept in combat from his father and his buddies in Chicago. and each dispatched one squad to ambush a trail junction within their respective sectors. and a wonderfully compassionate Italian mother. his passing was deeply felt by all. he valued their . Captain W. much as the heroes of the movie “The Deer Hunter” had. One night on the Deck House VI Operation south of Chu Lai. Then. He instinctively knew how to hurt the enemy without suffering casualties himself. His SNCO’s were his equals and friends.

advice and he was deeply hurt when their professionalism would cost them their lives. He talked until his death about this PSG, SSGT Gus Gustafson, who loved his troops to the point of almost mothering them. A couple of weeks after Bill was hit, Gus died as he had lived, with this troops, facing an NVA flamethrower as the mouth of the troop compartment to this AMTRACK. Now CPT Roach belongs to the ages. The full depth of his character did not reveal itself until after Vietnam. The severity of his wounds should have killed him outright, and most certainly should have permanently sapped his drive. But as a paraplegic with a permanent colostomy, Bill never saw any reason to complain or to quit. With the encouragement of his lovely wife Betty and adopted daughter Susan, he went on in 1990 to earn a Ph.D. in English and then to land a job as a college profession. Even after he was sent home for the last time and he knew that his lungs were slowly filling with fluid, Bill couldn’t relinquish his humor or quietly putting others first. One wonders if it was coincidental that he died on the very day the Gulf War was won, or if he held back death just long enough to the cheer on his beloved Marines one last time.

Lesson 6
WARFIGHTER LECTURE
Lesson Objectives:

• Develop personal perspectives on the role of the small unit leader as a Warfighter.
Homework:

• Review course material to date. • Read Bio of Guest Speaker. • Write one pertinent question on a 3x5 index card.
Remarks:

• None.
LESSON QUOTE Fear is a natural reaction to the unknown; it is not necessarily a negative. A positive from fear is the heightened awareness that comes from being afraid. Harnessed, this heightened awareness is an asset. CSM Michael T. Hall

Guest speaker Bio

LOCATED ON

BLACK BOARD

BLOCK II MILITARY COMMUNICATION .

Napoleon Bonaparte . • Describe the purpose of Military Symbols and Graphics. • LESSON QUOTE “The secret of war lies in the communications" . Homework: • Read Student Text. • Depict and identify the Military Symbols listed in the Self-Paced Text.Lesson 7 OPERATIONAL TERMS AND GRAPHICS Lesson Objectives: • Define the Operational Terms listed in the Self-Paced Text. • Complete Chapter 7 questions 1-5. • Complete Self-Paced Text Unit 7. Chapter 7. Remarks: • Review all course materials to date.

Ideally. closing with the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting.Operational Terms and Graphics INTRODUCTION. assault — 1. but well-ordered attack against a local objective. alternate position — The position given to a weapon. such as a gun emplacement. assault position — That position between the line of departure and the objective in an attack from which forces assault the objective. It is critical that military leaders share a common understanding of the words and the language used within their profession. Below are several common military terms one must become familiar with in order to understand the language of the Army. interlocked. attack — A form of offensive operation characterized by coordinated movement supported by fire. or a machine gun nest. counterattack. gap. raid. The alternate position is located so that the individual can continue to fulfill his original task. 2. spoiling attack. or defile) so that they fall. unit. The principal attack options include hasty attack.to 2meter stump above the ground on both sides of a road. It may be designated as a main or a supporting attack. The climax of an attack. It is imperative that junior leaders quickly learn the military meaning of operational terms in order to meet the expectations of their peers and commanders. assembly area (AA) — An area in which a command is assembled preparatory to further action. using the firepower. abatis — A vehicular obstacle constructed by felling trees (leaving a 1. toward the expected direction of enemy approach. air assault — Operations in which air assault forces (combat. or individual to be occupied when the primary position becomes untenable or unsuitable for carrying out its task. combat support. trail. To make a short. deliberate attack. . it is the last covered and concealed position before reaching the objective. Military terms reduce ambiguity and allow for effective communication with minimal explanations. and demonstration. and total integration of helicopter assets in their ground or air roles. mobility. and combat service support). Each word or military term has a specific meaning and often a specific requirement when used by a military officer. a fort. feint. maneuver on the battlefield to engage and destroy enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain. ambush — A surprise attack by fire from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy. violent.

begin morning nautical twilight (BMNT) — The start of that period where. A battle position graphic control measure may be used independently or in combination with sectors. enough light is available to identify the general outlines of ground objects and conduct limited military operations. battle drill — Standardized actions made in response to common battlefield occurrences. extending in the direction of the enemy. It may be provided by a single weapon or a grouping of weapon systems. Deviations from an assigned axis of advance must not interfere with the maneuver of adjacent units without prior approval of the higher commander. normally used when the mission does not dictate or support occupation of the objective. often a road or a group of roads. (See also overwatch and support by fire). They are designed for rapid reaction situations. axis of advance — A line of advance assigned for purposes of control. or a designated series of locations. block — 1. A unit assigned a BP is located within the general outline of the BP. the commander must specify the intent of fire — either to destroy. attack position — The last position occupied by the assault echelon before crossing the line of departure. in good conditions and in the absence of other illumination. avenue of approach (AA) — An air or ground route of an attacking force of a given size leading to its objective or to key terrain in its path. A tactical task assigned to a unit that requires it to deny the enemy access to a given area or to prevent enemy advance in a given direction or an avenue of approach. or suppress. base of fire— Continuous and active suppression from a support-by-fire position of an objective (even though the enemy has not shown himself) to reduce or eliminate the enemy's capability to interfere by fire and movement with an assaulting unit. W hen assigning this task. This task is usually given to the supporting element during the offensive and as a counterattack option for the reserve during defensive operations. An attack by fire is not done in conjunction with a maneuvering force. battle position (BP) — A defensive location oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of approach from which a unit may defend.attack by fire — Fires (direct and indirect) employed to destroy the enemy from a distance. . fix. An obstacle effect that integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to stop an attacker on a specific avenue of approach or to prevent an enemy from exiting an engagement area. 2.

area. or fortification. . bypass — A tactical task that involves maneuvering around an obstacle. capturing. after the commander has identified the enemy's effort. cover — Shelter or protection from enemy observation that reduces the effects of enemy direct and indirect fire. canalize — A tactical task used to restrict operations to a narrow zone by the use of obstacles. or when a resolute defense creates an assailable flank. or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces such that they cannot interfere with the friendly unit's ability to accomplish its mission. defeat — A tactical task to either disrupt or nullify the enemy force commander's plan and subdue his will to fight so that he is unwilling or unable to further pursue his adopted course of action and yields to the will of his opponent. clear — A tactical task to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned zone. or enemy force to maintain the momentum of advance. or unit maneuvering or positioning. resist. and control combat operations. ridge.breach — A tactical task where any means available are employed to break through or secure a passage through an enemy defense. defend a battle position. counterattack — An attack with a reserve or lightly committed forward element that is launched after the enemy begins its attack. position. defend — A combat operation designed to defeat an attacker and prevent him from achieving his objectives. destroy — A tactical task to physically render an enemy force combat-ineffective unless it is reconstituted. minefield. Each control measure can be portrayed graphically. or location by destroying. It employs all means and methods available to prevent. or bank. defile — A narrow gorge or pass that tends to prevent easy movement of troops. and defend a strong point. fires. coordinate fires and maneuver. concealment — The protection from observation or surveillance. or destroy an enemy attack. obstacle. defilade — Protection from hostile observation and fire provided by an obstacle such as a hill. control measures — Directives given graphically or orally by a commander to subordinate commands to assign responsibilities. The defensive techniques are defend in sector.

The clearly defined. . W hen the line of departure is the same as the line of contact. or fire directed and adjusted. or. final protective fire (FPF) — An immediately available prearranged barrier of fire designed to impede enemy movement across defensive lines or areas. a line designated to coordinate the departure of attack elements. the seizure or holding of which is essential to the commander's plan. and attainable aims which every military operation should be directed towards. [i. observation post (OP) — A position from which military observations are made. decisive. final protective line (FPL) — A line of fire selected where an enemy assault is to be checked by interlocking fire from all available weapons and obstacles. the destruction of an enemy force without regard to terrain features). a definite terrain feature.e. The physical object of the action taken (for example. 2.disengagement — Breaking contact with the enemy and moving to a point where the enemy can neither observe nor engage the unit by direct fire. line of contact (LC) — A general trace delineating the location where two opposing forces are engaged. end evening nautical twilight (EENT) — At the EENT. line of departure is line of contact (LD/LC) — The designation of forward friendly positions as the LD when opposing forces are in contact. objective — 1. and which possesses appropriate communications. grazing fire — Fire approximately parallel to the ground where the center of the cone of fire does not rise above 1 meter from the ground. neutralize — To render enemy personnel or material incapable of interfering with a particular operation.) movement to contact — A form of the offense designed to develop the situation and to establish or regain contact. line of departure (LD) — In land warfare. there is no further sunlight visible. fix — A tactical task in which actions are taken to prevent the enemy from moving any part of his forces either from a specific location or for a specific period of time by holding or surrounding them to prevent their withdrawal for use elsewhere.

suppression — A tactical task to employ direct or indirect fires. and pursuit. overwatch — A tactical technique in which one element is positioned to support by fire the movement of another element by observing known or suspected enemy locations and engaging the enemy if he is visible or tries to fire on the friendly element. and to hold the enemy in position.and equipment on the opposing force. Normally. seize — A tactical task to clear a designated area and obtain control of it. or fix the enemy. a flank avenue of approach. to deceive or divert the enemy. weapons. The attacking force may or may not have to physically occupy the area. supplementary position — That location which provides the best sectors of fire and defensive terrain along an avenue of approach other than the primary avenue the enemy is expected to attack along. or can be a combination of both. sector — An area designated by boundaries within which a unit operates. usually a terrain feature extending across the zone of action. a unit. or smoke on enemy personnel. Obstacles can exist naturally or can be man-made. Offensive operations may be undertaken to secure key or decisive terrain. electronic attack. exploitation. to develop intelligence. support by fire — A tactical task in which a maneuver element moves to a position on the battlefield where it can engage the enemy by direct fire to support . primary position — A place for a weapon. principal direction of fire (PDF) — The direction of fire assigned or designated as the main direction in which a weapon will be oriented. and to deploy in a manner which prevents its destruction or loss to enemy action. sectors are used in defensive operations. or equipment to prevent or degrade enemy fires and observation of the friendly forces. attack. with or without force. offensive operations — Combat operations designed primarily to destroy the enemy. The overwatching element must be told if it is to destroy. and for which it is responsible. to deprive the enemy of resources or decisive terrain. suppress. secure— A tactical task to gain possession of a position or terrain feature. or an individual to fight that provides the best means to accomplish the assigned mission. Forms of offensive operations include movement to contact. phase line (PL) — A line used for control and coordination of military operations. for example.

section. or individual sectors of fire and observation usually within an engagement area. TRPs are designated by maneuver leaders from platoon through battalion to define battalion. and control fires. squad.target reference point (TRP) — An easily recognizable point on the ground (either natural or man-made) used to initiate. company. TRPs can be designated as indirect fire targets using the standard target symbol with letters and numbers issued by the fire support officer. . distribute. platoon.

as well as tactical and fire support control measures on a map.BASIC MILITARY SYMBOLS AND GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES References: FM 7-8. equipment. During MS 103 and later in your Army career. and services (supply trains and medical station) that impact on military operations. equipment. Military symbols are a tool used by leaders to graphically communicate the location. In this section you will learn to identify and construct basic military symbols for units. color or combination thereof. MILITARY SYMBOLS ARE USED PRIMARILY IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE FOLLOWING 1. number. Organizational charts. features (obstacles or fortifications). and what action they are to perform. you will combine symbols with graphics to communicate which units are executing. which is used to identify and distinguish a particular military unit. INTRODUCTION. and FM 101-5-1. 4. type of units. Field sketches and overlays. While military symbols allow you to show location and size of units. size. fortifications and obstacles. FM 7-10. DEFINITION OF A MILITARY SYMBOL A military symbol is a sign composed of diagram. SYMBOLS . Military symbols reduce the volume of material required in orders and more clearly communicate the plan than words alone while reducing the risk of misunderstanding. letter. Military graphics provide a symbolic means for demonstrating movement or activities. Aerial photographs. You will also learn the colors used in constructing military symbols and how to construct threat forces symbols. 3. where they are going. military graphics show a path for movement as well as what type of action is being executed. All types of situation maps and overprints. activity or installation (FM 101-5-1). 2. abbreviation.

and combat service support elements organic to combat units is a rectangle. or Battery ----------------------------------------.Section ---------------------------------. Example: Combat service support elements organic to a combat unit have an additional line drawn within the rectangle at the bottom. Example: For a command post.Battalion ----------------------------------------.Squad ----------------------------------------. command posts. Troop. a staff is extended from the lower left corner of the rectangle.The basic unit symbol used to represent units.Platoon or Platoon-size Detachment -----------------------------. Example: An observation post is depicted with a triangle.Company. Example: UNIT SIZE The symbols used to represent the size of units are shown below: SYMBOL UNIT SIZE ------------------------------------------.Brigade .

BRANCH SYMBOLS The following are samples of branch symbols to show the type of unit depicted: FIELD ARTILLERY AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY ARMOR AVIATION ENGINEER INFANTRY BFV UNIT INFANTRY (LIGHT) AIRBORNE MILITARY POLICE SIGNAL SUPPLY .

etc. company. battalion. a combination of numbers and letters are added to the right of the symbol.UNIT DESIGNATION The unit designation is placed to the left of the symbol. Only one unit designation is placed to the left of the symbol. Company E.) are separated by a slash. 3rd Brigade is drawn below. 1st platoon. 187th Infantry Regiment. Example: B = B Company 1 = 1st Sqd To further identify the unit. and it agrees with the unit size depicted at the top of the symbol. platoon. 1st Bn of the 30th Inf (a Regimental unit) is written: 1 2/E/1-30 . 1 B/3-187/3 Different levels of command (squad. 1st Squad. B company. 2nd Platoon. 3rd Battalion. Numerical designations of the regimental system are always written together and separated by a dash. For example.

and observation or listening posts. combat service support elements. Examples: . -Friendly or enemy man-made obstacles. -Friendly or enemy areas of NBC contamination. Red 3. Yellow 4. equipment and activities. Examples: Proposed location for Infantry Squad Proposed location for Infantry Company Units and installations are often located in close proximity and it is difficult to graphically depict their location. -Enemy units. To avoid cluttering symbols and preserve clarity.COLORS Colors in conjunction with military symbols denote the following: 1. installations. installations. the offset technique is used. Green -Friendly units. When using the offset technique a line is extended vertically from the bottom center of the symbol. installations. command posts. The point at which the offset staff ends indicates the location. Blue or Black 2. equipment and activities. The staff may be straight or it may be bent one time in any direction as illustrated. A broken line on the outside of a symbol indicates a future or proposed location for units. _________________________________________________________________ LOCATION A solid line symbol represents the present location of a unit or installation.

so it is indicated: _________________________________________________________________ THREAT SYMBOLS Enemy activities.The center of mass of the symbol indicates the general vicinity of the center of mass the unit. example a company covers a large area so the company area would be indicated: The company headquarters is in one small area. and units are shown using a diamond in lieu of a b The symbols enclosed in the diamond remain the same symbols as used for the U equivalent (i.e. Enemy Infantry Battalion Enemy Armor Platoon . Observation Post Supply Trains Strongpoint Battle Position (Company) The point at which the staff ends indicates the exact location of the command post. – an infantry unit is still an infantry unit). equipment.

and heavy weapons: Light (60-m ) m M edium (81-m ) m Heavy (107-m ) m . The approxim size of a weapon. m e edium . ap ate (light. m edium or heavy). For exam ple.50 cal) Light A ntitank Rocket M edium A ntitank M issile Heavy A ntitank M issile [NOTE: The LAWsym represents both the M bol 72A2 and the M 136. the base of the shaft indicates the location of the weapon. autom weapons: atic Light M achinegun (SA ) W M edium M achinegun (M M 240 G) Heavy M achinegun (. W a weapon sym appears bols hen bol on a m or overlay. One horizontal cross-bar represents m ediumand two for heavy. bars are added for increased size.] Indirect fire weapons in an infantry battalion (m ortars) are drawn using the sam guidelines for light. bol allest) sym and horizontal bol. is denoted by using the appropriate sym for the light (sm .W PONS SYM EA BOLS Sym are used to indicate the type and location of a weapon or group of weapons.

Weapon Fighting Position Trench System Tank Ditch Roadblock Wire: Concertina and Barbed Mine Field Antipersonnel Mine Antitank Mine _________________________________________________________________ INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT SYMBOLS You will be required to identify and construct the following symbols: Note: Be familiar with the definition of each symbol so you will know their proper use. use a “staff” originating at the exact point of the fortification. To show a specific location. . Obstacles are generally depicted by showing the general location of the activity (a mine field). or by showing a specific point (a road crater).FORTIFICATIONS AND OBSTACLES Fortifications represent fighting positions in a general area or a specific location.

They usegraphic control m easures toregulateor direct eachunit's m ent. andensuresynchronization. easures canm clearly andconcisely ore depict toyour subordinates theconcept youhavefor m aneuver thanw alone. ovem C ontrol m easures arenot intendedtorestrict theexerciseof initiative. odel. W com hen binedw unit andequipm sym control m ith ent bols. C N O MAU E O TR L E S R S IN O U TIO TR D C N Tactical leaders com unicatetheir intent for com operations usingw andsym m bat ords bols. Leaders shouldstrivetokeepcontrol m easures easily identifiable(terrainfeatures) andsim ple. C ontrol m easures canbedraw onam overlay. or terrainm n ap. Unit or weapon size is indicated. focus theunit effort. with an assigned target number. sketch. Indirect Target Reference Point AG1201 Same as Target Reference Point.Target Reference Point 007 An easily recognizable point on the ground used for identifying targets or controlling fires. E control m ach easureshouldhaveaspecific purposethat contributes tom issionaccom plishm ent. andfire. ords Y instructor m requireyoutolearnandapply additional control m our ay easures not listedinthis chapter. Final Protective Fire AM 1201 FPF 1-91 IN (M) MORT An immediately available preplanned barrier of direct and indirect fire to provide close protection to friendly positions. Four digits preceded with a two letter designator to designate the responsible unit. Leaders usecontrol m easures toclarify their intent. . leaders shouldnot useit. Designated by the company commander or platoon leader. position. Consists of three digits. If acontrol m easurefails thepurposetest.

DEFINITION. SYMBOL: ASLT PSN CURRAHEE CONTROL MEASURE: Assembly Area. Ideally. SYMBOL: CONTROL MEASURE: Assault Position. it is the last covered and concealed position before reaching the objective. DEFINITION: An area in which a command is assembled prior to further action. SYMBOL: . That position between the line of departure (LD) and the objective in an attack from which forces assault the objective.CONTROL MEASURE: Ambush Position. DEFINITION: The location from which a surprise attack is conducted from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy.

A unit assigned a BP is located within the general outline of the BP. Security. often a road or a group of roads. DEFINITION: A line of advance assigned for purposes of control. or a designated series of locations. and combat service support (CSS) forces may operate outside a BP to provide early enemy detection and all-around security. combat support (CS). SYMBOL: AXIS DOG CONTROL MEASURE: Battle Position.CONTROL MEASURE: Attack Position. SYMBOL: ATK RED CONTROL MEASURE: Axis of Advance. SYMBOL: 3-1 RALPH . DEFINITION: The last position occupied or passed through by the assault echelon before crossing the line of departure (LD). extending in the direction of the enemy. Deviations from an assigned axis of advance must not interfere with the maneuver of adjacent units without prior approval of the higher commander. DEFINITION: A defensive location oriented on the most likely enemy avenue of approach from which a unit may defend or attack.

Within their boundaries. DEFINITION: A predetermined point on the ground used as a means of coordinating friendly movement. Indirect fire also may be used after prior coordination. provided friendly forces are not endangered. units may maneuver within the overall plan without close coordination with neighboring units unless otherwise restricted. SYMBOL: CONTROL MEASURE: Coordination Point. DEFINITION: A control measure that indicates a specific location for the coordination of fires and maneuver between adjacent units. SYMBOL: A C CONTROL MEASURE: Checkpoint. They usually are indicated whenever a boundary crosses the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and may be indicated when a boundary crosses report lines or at phase lines (PLs). direct fire may be placed across boundaries on clearly identified enemy targets without prior coordination. Depending on the unit's SOP. SYMBOL: . Checkpoints are not used as reference points in reporting enemy locations. DEFINITION: A control measure normally drawn along identifiable terrain features and used to delineate areas of tactical responsibility for subordinate units.CONTROL MEASURE: Boundary.

SYMBOL: INFILTRATION LANE CONTROL MEASURE: Limit of Advance (LOA). Infiltration lanes are normally marked by a scout or lead element to aid follow-on units from being detected. DEFINITION: An easily recognizable terrain feature beyond which attacking elements will not advance.CONTROL MEASURE: Direction of Attack. SYMBOL: LOA LOA . May be used by individuals or small groups. DEFINITION: A specific direction or route that the main attack or the main body of the force will follow. If used. or units involved in limited visibility operations. It usually is associated with infantry units conducting night attacks. it is normally at battalion and lower levels. SYMBOL CONTROL MEASURE: Infiltration Lane. DEFINITION: A designated axis of movement that implies contact is avoided by the infiltrating unit. and units are not free to maneuver off the assigned routes. Direction of attack is a more restrictive control measure than axis of advance.

DEFINITION: The designation of forward friendly positions as the LD when opposing forces are in contact. DEFINITION: A line designated to coordinate the commitment of attacking units or scouting elements at a specified time. When the line of departure is the same as the line of contact. SYMBOL: . linkup points normally are established where the moving force's routes of advance intersect the stationary force's security elements. Linkup points for two moving forces are established on boundaries where the two forces are expected to converge.DEFINITION: A general trace that delineates where opposing forces are in contact . Time of attack given in an order is the time at which the attacking unit crosses the LD with its lead element. [i. When one force is stationary. SYMBOL: L/C L/C CONTROL MEASURE: Line of Departure (LD). The physical location of the start line. DEFINITION: An easily identifiable point on the ground where two forces conducting a linkup meet. SYMBOL: LD LD CONTROL MEASURE: Line of Departure is Line of Contact (LD/LC).e.) SYMBOL: [Enemy side] LD/LC LD/LC CONTROL MEASURE: Linkup Point.

SYMBOL: OBJ RED . or. the seizure and/or holding of which is essential to the commander's plan. DEFINITION: The physical object of the action taken (for example. PLs are often used to prescribe the timing of operations.CONTROL MEASURE: Phase Line (PL). I usually a recognizable terrain feature extending across the zone of action. DEFINITION: A line used for control and coordination of military operations. a definite terrain feature. SYMBOL CONTROL MEASURE: Objective. the destruction of an enemy force without regard to terrain features).

blown bridges. minefields. rivers. terrain. Obstacles can include abatis. An ORP should afford concealment. DEFINITION: Any natural or man-made obstruction that canalizes. built-up areas. The effectiveness of an obstacle is enhanced considerably when covered by fire. and wire. road craters. An Objective Rally Point (ORP) is a location where a unit can temporarily halt to reorganize and prepare prior to actions in the objective area. or on a designated enemy location. An ORP IS NOT AN ASSAULT POSITION! SYMBOL: CONTROL MEASURE: Support by Fire Position. delays. DEFINITION: The location from which a unit supports the maneuver of another unit by providing suppressive fire in a specified direction. DEFINITION: An easily identifiable point on the ground at which units can reassemble/reorganize if they become disbursed. be easy to defend. and be within close proximity to the objective. or diverts movement of a force. restricts. SYMBOL: CONTROL MEASURE: Rally Point. antitank ditches. SYMBOL: .CONTROL MEASURE: Obstacle.

MS103 MAP EXAMPLE .

000 Prepared By 1LT Smith TF 1-84 152300 Oct 03 FP 12 82 UNCLASSIFIED .MAP WITH OVERLAY EXAMPLE UNCLASSIFIED 1 SP A/1-84 18 P1 86 C CP 2 CP 3 CP 4 Security Patrol #3 152300 Oct 2003 Tenino 1:50.

Over…. Define: Assembly Area: ____________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ End Evening Nautical Twilight:_________________________________ _________________________________________________________ Cover:____________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ Grazing Fire: ______________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ Target:___________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________ 5. . 1. 1st Battalion. _______________________________________________________ 4. 1st Brigade. Make the military symbol for 2nd Platoon.Lesson 7: Comprehension Say Again. What is the definition of a military symbol? _______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ 3. Short Answer: Write out your response to the short answer questions below. Order these military symbols from smallest to largest unit: Direction of main attack:________ If you struggled with any question. 188th Infantry Regiment.. go back and review the material. A Company. Make the following symbols: Support by fire position:_______ Anti-personnel minefield:________ Link-up point 6: _____________ Ambush position: ____________ 2.

pg. • Define the purpose of a Pre-Combat Inspection. • LESSON QUOTE: • When making a plan. Student Self-Paced Text Chapter 8. and think what course it is least probable he will foresee and sorestall. 2 Remarks: • Bring the TLP Handbook to class as an outline to the classroom instruction. Read Goose Green. FM 7-8(2-3)-(2-10) TLP Handbook. pg. 1944 . Homework: Read Text Chapter 8. 169-212. • Captain sir Basil Liddell Hart. The surest way to success in war is to choose the course of least expectation.Lesson 8 THE TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES Lesson Objectives: • List and describe the eight steps in the Troop Leading Procedures. try to put yourself in the enemy’s mind.

ISSUE WARNING ORDER 3.TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION 1. MAKE TENTATIVE PLAN 4. COMPLETE PLAN 7. ISSUE OPERATIONS ORDER • MISSION ANALYSIS • DEVELOP COURSES OF ACTION • ANALYZE COURSES OF ACTION • COMPARE COURSES OF ACTION • SELECT BEST COA METT-TC MISSION ENEMY TERRAIN-OCOKA TROOPS/FIRE SUPT TIME CIVILIAN CONSIDER 8. Information discovered during Reconnaissance is “plugged back in” to both METT-TC & the estimate of the situation. CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE 6. SUPERVISE Reconnaissance is conducted based on the Tentative plan. . INITIATE MOVEMENT 5. RECEIVE MISSION 2.

weapons maintenance. he will learn to fill in all the blanks on his card. I would like to offer several TTP based on lessons learned at JRTC while following the eight-step TLPs as found in FM 3. Here are some items. As a group. and squad leaders (SLs) need three laminated copies of order formats. These TTP need to be prepared. This saves a lot of time by keeping leaders from writing the same thing twice. he had been taught to prepare and give an OPORD. here was his first tactical mission and he was suffering from information overload. be back at 1500 for the Operations Order (OPORD). but all the other tasks that had to be accomplished were overwhelming. With training. but they have great difficulty accomplishing all specified and implied tasks prior to crossing the line of departure (LD). the platoon needs to establish some planning standing operating procedures (SOPs) to assist with TLPs in the field. They understand the concepts and procedures. but lack experience implementing them in real-world scenarios. 2LT Smith stared at his WARNO notes with amazement.8 (FM 7-8). and seek out that information when he does not have it. the company commander." concluded CPT Jones. The PSG should keep several additional copies in case of attachments or loss by a subordinate. this ensures that the soldier understands what information he needs to know. The PL should have three laminated copies of the company OPORD for himself. The chart allows the leaders to manage by Fire Team and Gun ensuring that all necessary personnel . as a minimum. The WARNO and OPORD formats should be identical. standardizing and simplifying field operations. and load rucks into the 5-tons by 1500? New platoon leaders (PLs) face a steep learning curve when they first join their platoons. • Preplanned Priorities of Work (POW): By using or creating your own version of Chart 1. it allows leaders to easily spot-check information dissemination by asking a soldier for his information card and quizzing him on it. platoon sergeant (PSG). you can easily manage and track POW in your platoon.Platoon Troop-Leading Procedures (TLPs): Tactics. Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. Thus. they do an excellent job preparing and issuing their OPORDs. rehearsed and understood by all members of the platoon. I have noticed several trends with Infantry lieutenants' use of TLPs. Techniques and Procedures (TTP) "Gentlemen. Standardize Planning Products Before even going to the field. that the platoon should prepare: • Laminated OPORDs: Regardless of the format used.21. they will save the platoon time by streamlining. How in the world was he going to manage rehearsals. the PL. If done properly. PLs and PSGs can assign POW by issuing a number off of the left-hand column. chow. Second. After several rotations as a Rifle Platoon Observer/Controller at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Laminated Information Cards: Team leaders and all soldiers should have laminated cards with the information that their leaders expect them to know for the upcoming operation. Sure. that concludes the company warning order (WARNO). leaders facilitate steps two and six of the TLPs. First.

• •

anything important. That alone is a premium once sleep deprivation sets in on a Sketch Board/Terrain Model: Platoons need a way to visualize an operation. The easiest way is to have a terrain model kit and then designate the soldiers who always build it. Sometimes it is easier to laminate several pieces of butcher-block paper and use dry erase markers to portray the mission. Whatever the method, platoons need to think through any mission and allow SLs to visualize the operation before briefing their subordinates. Standardized TLPs: By using or creating your own Chart 2, you develop a tentative timeline that ensures you accomplish most of the implied tasks while still preparing for your mission. The chart has several TTP to help leaders manage the myriad of assigned tasks. Paragraph 1 is an example of who can assist the PL during TLPs. Paragraph 2 helps streamline TLPs across the company. It provides suggested activities that can occur simultaneously with other events. The last three paragraphs provide shell timelines that can further help PLs manage time. I recommend you modify them based on your battalion and company's field battle rhythm. Pre-Combat Checks (PCCs)/Pre-Combat Inspection (PCI) Checklist: Creating a detailed list for all leaders to follow on PCC/PCIs sets a standard for the platoon. All subordinate leaders know exactly what their jobs are in the POW. With training, senior leaders gain confidence that their subordinate leaders can accomplish them to standard.

Standardize the Planning Process
1. Receive the Mission: Step 1 occurs when the PL receives the company WARNO. The PL needs to issue guidance on POW to be executed in his absence. A good idea is to focus on nonmission-specific POW such as chow and personal hygiene. At JRTC, while the PL is off getting the WARNO, the platoon often does nothing but wait. Once the PL returns, he needs to take some time before he issues his WARNO. That should include a solid timeline for his platoon. Too often, the PL returns to his platoon and fumbles through a platoon WARNO that just regurgitates what the company commander said. 2. Issue a warning order: The PL should issue a solid WARNO using the five-paragraph OPORD format. Using the laminated copies mentioned above, a SL shows up understanding what is going to be said. The WARNO should include a detailed timeline using the 1/3-2/3 rule, guidance on squad rehearsals, PCCs and PCIs, and time and place for the OPORD. The more detail the PL places in his WARNO, the better. Subordinates will know everything to be accomplished prior to the OPORD and will free the PL up to develop his plan. The less he puts out, the more questions subordinates will have while he is planning. 3. Make a tentative plan: The PL should spend a good portion of his time developing the plan. If the WARNO contained enough information, the PSG can run the platoon while the PL is free to think about his plan. Chart 2 provides examples on how long to spend on each paragraph of the OPORD based on the overall timeline. Too often, PLs spend too much time on one paragraph and rush to complete the rest. Some simply rush the process and provide no worthwhile information to the SLs. The PLs need to use observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA), mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T), and intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to develop the plan. Finally, the PL should use a shell OPORD format. This allows the PL to fill in all the blanks and ensures that no information is missing. 4. Start necessary movement: If necessary, the WARNO should contain all information needed to execute this step. The non-commissioned officers (NCOs) can handle the movement allowing the PL to continue planning. 5. Reconnoiter: This step is frequently overlooked at the platoon level. In the defense,

there is no excuse for not walking your entire engagement area with subordinate leaders. By doing this, the PL provides a common picture for the platoon. In offensive operations, this can be done via map reconnaissance, a TTP seldom used anymore at JRTC. Consequently, platoons routinely fumble through the route given by higher. They decide where to execute actions enroute. A simple map reconnaissance can confirm or deny routes, crossing points, help the PL evaluate the enemy, and tentatively determine likely objective rally points (ORPs), release points (RPs), SBF, and assault positions. 6. Complete the plan: During the preparation of the OPORD, the PL needs to step away from the plan for five to ten minutes to spot-check POW he issued in the W ARNO. The shell timelines in Chart 2 allows for this. This accomplishes two things. First, the PL is supervising his plan. It gives him a break from the orders process so he can go back to it ready to re-evaluate what he was planning. The PL should spot-check his terrain model, sketch, and OPORD tasks which he has delegated. Finally, he should rehearse briefly before giving the OPORD. 7. Issue the complete order: The PL should issue the plan to SLs using either a terrain model or a sketch to assist visualization. The laminated OPORD should be used. This allows the SLs to know how they will receive the information; if something is missed, they will have a blank that needs to be completed. Matrix orders tend to save space and time in issuing but they lack the detail of the more traditional written orders. Common mistakes in platoon OPORDs: • • Area of Operations and Area of Interest. PLs don't give Area of Operations and Area of Interest at the start of the Order. This is important since it gives subordinate leaders a look at the bigger picture and how they can influence the fight. OAKOC. PLs do a good job of talking each part of OAKOC in order. However, they need to go into detail about cause and effect of each factor. Just announcing that a hill is key terrain is not enough. W hy that hill is key terrain, and the tactical advantage it provides needs to be discussed. The Enemy. PLs don't reanalyze the enemy forces. They need to break down the enemy as it relates to the platoon fight. Finally, they need to refine the enemy situation template (SITEMP) as given by the commander. The Mission Statement. PLs rarely say the mission statement slowly and they almost never say it twice. This is important since it is the mission statement. It needs to read slowly and be said twice to ensure everyone understands it. Graphics. Friendly graphics never make it down to the SL prior to the OPORD, so that it can be referenced during the brief. Concept of the Operation versus Maneuver versus Tasks to Combat Unit's Subparagraphs. PLs routinely mix these up in the OPORD. Remember: The Concept of the Operation is a simple paragraph of no more than six sentences briefly talking in generic terms the operation. The Maneuver paragraph addresses all elements by name and should give excruciating detail using the terrain model and/or sketch. Tasks to combat units should specify by element what must be accomplished to complete the mission. Coordinating Instructions. This subparagraph doesn't go into enough detail about the basics of the operation. Reference STP 21-76 and FM 3-21.8 (FM 7-8) for everything that needs to be included in your laminated order for this subparagraph. Supervise! This NEVER stops! Rehearsals. Rehearsals need to be planned in the timeline and ruthlessly protected. W henever possible, a full-force rehearsal needs to be executed. Full-force means every soldier with every piece of equipment for the entire rehearsal.

• • • • • • • • • •

Briefbacks. All leaders do briefbacks throughout the TLPs. A laminated information card down to the soldier level ensures he receives all pertinent information. It is then up to leaders to inspect cards, and ensure he has a thorough understanding at all

levels.

Inspections. All leaders from TL through PL inspect and then reinspect. Platoons should develop a PCC/ PCI checklist that details who is responsible from TL through PL to inspect an item or action.

Conclusions
Whether a lieutenant or SFC, a PL has a lot or responsibilities in the field when he usually has the most to accomplish with the least amount of time. By the time higher headquarters (at all levels) abuse the 1/3-2/3 rule, platoons are left with an inadequate amount of time to plan, prepare and rehearse. Through a better understanding of TLPs, standardizing the POW in relation to TLPs, and standardizing the orders' process, platoons can save themselves time. This time can be spent on the important items such as rehearsals and better planning. Most of the recommended actions need to be prepared and planned in garrison before deploying to the field. Remember planning for the expected allows greater flexibility in meeting the unexpected.

Which is the most important and why? ________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________ 3. What is the acronym the military uses to analyze situations and what does each represent? ________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________ 4. List the (8) eight Troop Leading Procedures: 1. . _______________________________________________________ 6. 1. go back and review the material. ________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________ 5.Lesson 8: Comprehension Follow Me! Short Answer: Write out your response to the short answer questions below. _______________________________________________________ 2. Describe the 1/3 . What must you have before you make your Leader’s Reconnaissance? Why? ________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________ If you struggled with any question. _______________________________________________________ 8.________________________________________________________ 2. _______________________________________________________ 7. _______________________________________________________ 5.________________________________________________________ 3.2/3 Rule. _______________________________________________________ 4.

The important and difficult thing is to see. that it is obeyed. Tenino 1:50. • Write a complete Squad Warning Order. and. • Write a Squad Mission Statement and delineate the Task and Purpose. 08 July 1941 . Patton Jr. Remarks: • Ensure you bring the TLP Handbook.000 map. • Issue a Warning Order. first. Homework: • None.Lesson 9 THE WARNING ORDER Lesson Objectives: • List and describe the five requirements of the Warning Order. • LESSON QUOTE: • The issuance of an order is the simplest thing in the world. second. that the order is transmitted. • GEN George S. and protractor to class.

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Do not wait for complete information. and there are several methods for organizing the necessary information. concise communications between higher and lower levels of command. battle drills. and it allows for simplicity. The information contained in the platoon leader's OPORD is derived from the company commander's OPORD. OPORDs have a TASK ORGANIZATION plus A STANDARD FIVEPARAGRAPH FORMAT. Most people are familiar with this format. The warning order has no specific format. The OPORD is like the warning order. We will use thirty minutes as the course standard for passing a warning order from platoon leader to squad leaders. Make the best warning order possible with the information at hand. ensure completeness of their plan. they must rely on previously rehearsed actions. in that the platoon leader extracts what his . and any other information that the platoon leader has obtained through reconnaissance. One technique is to use the fiveparagraph operations order format. The successful execution of Mission Tactics depends on cogent. Subordinate leaders need time to begin preparations and rehearsals. OPERATION ORDER An operation order (OPORD) is a directive issued by the leader to his subordinate leaders in order to effect the coordinated execution of a specific operation. leaders can plan and prepare in depth. and to clearly explain their concept for accomplishing an assigned mission. If available.Combat Orders This section discusses combat orders. Format is not as important as getting the "word" disseminated quickly and accurately. Combat orders serve as a means of facilitating this communication. With less time. Commanders use combat orders to organize their thoughts. Completeness and brevity are the keys to success in orders presentation! With more time. the following information may be included in a warning order • • • • • The type of mission Who is participating in the operation The earliest time of movement Any special equipment or changes to the task organization Time and location of the operations order See Figures 9-1 to 9-3 for an annotated Warning Order format and oral example. and update it as needed. and standing operating procedures. WARNING ORDER The warning order is used to alert a unit of impending action and may be issued at any time.

It helps to clarify the operation order. and key terrain in relation to each other. (4) An operation overlay is a tracing of graphic control measures on a map. for offensive missions. • The next step after orienting the model to the ground is the construction of grid squares. The terrain model should depict key terrain. and airborne insertions).units. or will not have sufficient detail to allow your squad leaders to take effective action. the leader uses the actual terrain or a terrain model to brief his OPORD. (3) Annexes provide the instructions for conducting specific instructions (such as air assault. computer assisted graphics. These ensure a more accurate model. stream crossings. (5) W hen possible. It shows boundaries. Squad leaders transfer control measures on their maps as needed. He normally uses the OPORD format. or aerial photographs. objectives. • It should be built oriented to the ground (north on the model is north on the ground) and should show the main terrain features in the model. and incorporates scaled models. (2) The leader uses a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to change an existing order. • . and other control measures.large. boat. Overlay and concept sketches assist the platoon leader in visualizing the company commander's plan. The leader should identify the grid squares that the model will show. The OPORD by itself is a good means of communicating a plan. The leader should make his instructions brief. if they are so detailed that a unit SOP is insufficient for a particular situation. and enemy dispositions. clear. The sketch shows the locations and positions of objectives. The model may be very detailed at battalion or brigade level. but addresses only those elements that have changed. He may also use concept sketches . simple. priority should be given to building a model of the objective area. However. and truck movement. (1) The leader briefs his OPORD orally from notes that follow the fiveparagraph format below. Platoons normally trace their overlays from the company operations map. It is effective for briefing and discussing the actions on the objective. but an overlay or sketch makes it even clearer. unit positions. Terrain models are also used when time allows. routes. The subordinate's need for higher unit graphics must be balanced against the risk of the enemy obtaining this information. Concept sketch. It may depict the entire mission area. establishing patrol bases. rough drawings of the objective areas . friendly control measures. control measures. One or more members of the headquarters are assigned the responsibility for developing a terrain model to support the leader's OPORD.to show the flow of events and actions clearly. and specific. The format is the same as the five-paragraph OPORD.

The why of the mission statement. measurable.TACTICAL TASKS: A clearly defined. Tasks are specific activities that contribute to the accomplishment of encompassing missions or other requirements. measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations. The most important component of the mission statement. Allow Cause Create Deceive Deny Divert Enable Envelop Influence Open Prevent Protect Support Surprise OPERATIONS: “A military action or the carrying out of a military action to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. and decisive (achieve the purpose). Enemy Attack by fire Block Bypass Canalize Contain Defeat Delay Demonstrate Destroy Feint Fix Interdict Isolate Neutralize Penetrate Pursue Recon Rupture Suppress Terrain Clear Occupy Reconnoiter Retain Secure Seize Friendly Breach Cover Disengage Exfiltrate Follow and support Guard Infiltrate Retire Screen Support by fire Withdraw PURPOSE (in order to): The desired or intended result of the tactical operation stated in terms related to the enemy or the desired situation.” Types of operations include – Attack Movement to contact Countermobility Crossing Exploitation Deception Counterattack Retrograde Survivability Breakout Defend Mobility River Security . A task should be definable.

Task Organization: Describe the allocation of forces to support the leader’s concept. This information is in paragraph 1b. The enemy situation in higher headquarters’ OPORD (paragraph 1. This is an annotated example of one. 2 and 3 of higher headquarters’ OPORD. SITUATION a. Identification Composition/order of battle Recent activities Strength Current location Most probable course of action Most dangerous course of action W eaknesses b. but the leader refines this to provide the detail required by his subordinates. (1) • • • • • • • • Enemy Forces. Task organization may be shown in one of two places: preceding paragraph one. • • • • • Observation and fields of fire Cover and concealment Obstacles Key terrain Avenues of approach NOTE: Describe the effects on enemy and friendly forces for lines (1) and (2) above.SAMPLE OPERATIONS ORDER FORMAT. There are several similar formats for the five-paragraph operations order. which attempts to reflect current doctrine for a light infantry platoon. 1.a. . See Figures 9-4 to 9-14 for an annotated Operations Order format and oral example. if the task organization is long and complicated.) is the basis for this. (1) W eather and Light Data and General Forecast: High Low W ind Speed W ind Direction Moonrise Moonset Moonphase % Illumination Sunrise Sunset BMNT EENT (2) Terrain (factors of OCOKA). Friendly forces. or in an annex. Enemy forces.

may be prepared as a separate annex. and the desired end state. Units providing fire support (if any) a. a. if unusually lengthy. My intent is to suppress all enemy forces that can place effective direct fires against 2 nd platoon as it assaults across the objective. • Prevent effective enemy fires against the company as it passes through the choke point. 3. Additionally. However. particularly adjacent unit patrols. and W hy (purpose). The concept statement should be concise and understandable and describe. list units that are attached or detached to the headquarters that issues the order. Do not repeat information already listed under Task Organization. MISSION. right. on commitment of the reserve). are the basis for subordinates to exercise initiative when unanticipated opportunities arise or when the original concept of the operation no longer applies. The concept of operations should be based on the COA statement from the decisionmaking process and will designate the main effort.• • • Higher commander’s concept of the operation two levels up Adjacent unit missions/locations (units to the left. It is not merely a restatement of the why (purpose) from the mission statement. W here. front. W e will maintain this suppression until 2 nd platoon begins its maneuver. State those units’ task and purpose and how those units will influence your unit. State when attachment or detachment is to be effective if different from when the OPORD is effective (such as on order. • Be prepared to defend the choke point against a counterattack from the southeast. The concept of operations may be a single paragraph. 2. and rear). State the mission derived during the planning process. concise statement of what the platoon must do to succeed in relation to the enemy. when not in the Task Organization. Concept of the Operations. may be divided into two or more subparagraphs or. EXECUTION Intent. how the unit will accomplish its mission from start to finish. Attachments and detachments. It provides the link between the mission statement and the concept of the operation by stating the key tasks that. W hen. For example— My intent is to accomplish these actions during the operation: • Control the choke point until the company has passed. terrain. along with the mission. The intent is a clear. There are no subparagraphs in a mission statement. we must be prepared to assume 2 nd platoon assault to seize the objective should they fail. W hat (task). The intent can be expressed in bullets or a paragraph. in general terms. Include the 5 W 's: W ho. .

List CS units in subparagraphs in the same order as they appear in the task organization. b. Include organization for combat. Fires. Use these subparagraphs only as necessary. . engineer assets. the mechanics of the operations. c. Specific targets are discussed and pointed out on the terrain model (see chapter 3. (1) Time Schedule (rehearsals. clearing.• • A plan of fire support or “scheme of fires” supporting the maneuver with fires. Use CS subparagraphs to list only those specific tasks that CS units must accomplish and that are not specified or implied elsewhere. Only state tasks that are necessary for comprehension. EPW and search. allocation of. engagement/disengagement criteria. in detail. These include. This is always the last subparagraph in paragraph 3. and emphasis. aid and litter. Those squads may be tasked to provide any of the following special teams: reconnaissance and security. and air defense. if applicable. Specifically address all subordinate units and attachments by name. priorities for. Actions on the objective will comprise the majority of this paragraph and therefore could address the plan for actions on the objective. List units in the same sequence as in the task organization. and demolitions. Fire Support). if not clear from task organization. List only instructions applicable to two or more units and not routinely covered in unit SOPs. and restrictions for fire support. Maneuver. Tasks to combat support units. clarity. back briefs. The maneuver paragraph addresses. giving each its mission in the form of a task and purpose. and a withdrawal plan. Use a separate subparagraph for each maneuver unit. Place tactical tasks that affect two or more units in subparagraph 3d. intelligence assets. Platoon leaders task their subordinate squads. inspections and movement). assault. Clarify scheme of fires to support the overall concept. A target list worksheet and overlay are referenced here. reconnaissance and security elements. and pace man. for example. This paragraph should state which maneuver unit is the main effort and has priority of fires. (2) Commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) 1. Clearly state the missions or tasks for each maneuver unit that reports directly to the headquarters issuing the order. an alternate plan in the event of compromise or unplanned movement of enemy forces. The integration of other major elements or systems within the operation. including reserves. Detailed instructions may also be given to platoon sergeant. RTOs. Complex instructions should be referred to in an annex. to include stating purpose of. 2. support. The main effort must be designated and all other subordinates’ missions must relate to the main effort. Coordinating instructions. compass man. Tasks to maneuver units. d.

Class IX – Repair parts f.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (a) Essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). Personnel support. Class V – Ammunition c. Rules of engagement (ROE). a. Method of handling EPW s and designation of the EPW collection point. b. – Critical aspects of friendly operations that. friendly and enemy personnel. Class VII – Major end items (weapons) d. SERVICE SUPPORT Address service support in the areas shown below as needed to clarify the service support concept. Materiel and Services. 5. (1) Supply a. Movement Plan. General: Reference the SOP’s that govern the sustainment operations of the unit. Risk reduction control measures. (b) Friendly force information requirements (FFIR). State azimuths. casualty. would compromise. Force Protection control measures. if known by the enemy. Method of evacuating dead and wounded. operational exposure guidance. Provide current and proposed company trains locations. Include priorities and location of CCP. Environmental considerations and control measures. and damaged equipment collection points and routes. ammunition status. Medical evacuation and hospitalization. directions. (2) Location of key personnel and CP during each phase of the operation. Distribution Methods (2) Transportation (3) Services (Locations of Laundry. b. procedures for KIA) (4) Maintenance (weapons and equipment) a. and grid coordinates. vehicle recognition signals. and leadership capabilities. 4. lead to failure. – Information the commander needs about friendly forces available for the operation. These are measures unique to this operation and not included in unit SOPs and can include missionoriented protective posture. and fratricide prevention measures. Use terrain model and/or sketch. Showers. Class I – Rations Plan b. or limit success of the operation. Subparagraphs can include: a. mortuary. Class VIII – Medical e. (1) Location of the higher unit commander and CP. COMMAND AND SIGNAL This paragraph states where command and control facilities and key leaders are located during the operation. Command. May include personnel status. .

ISSUE ANNEXES. (5) Challenge and password (used when behind friendly lines). (4) Code words. (7) Running Password. c. GIVE TIME HACK. ASK FOR QUESTIONS.(2) Methods of communication in priority. (3) Pyrotechnics and signals. (6) Number Combination (used when forward of friendly lines). . (8) Recognition signals (near/far and day/night). Special Instructions to RTOs. to include arm and hand signals.

(If it isn’t on the paper. Assign Instructor Points as necessary. or try to be a FRAGO? Ensure to collect all written work.000 map. 2. 3. Ensure they have out the Tenino 1:50. read the FRAGO as if issuing it to a subordinate. When complete. The intent is to build confidence and demonstrate the ability to experience receiving orders and issuing instructions to a group of soldiers. Ensure that the slide with the map is on the screen. allow them to ask a few questions. Then.DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY West Point. Allow them a few moments to get out some paper and pens and prepare to copy the order. Allow the Cadets 15 minutes to read and write out their Warning Orders. Select (1) one Cadet from each squad to take a turn standing and issuing his WARNO to the class. Critique the WARNO as a group. well organized. Intent: This Exercise will provide the necessary elements for the Cadets to craft their WARNO and issue it to the class. 4. Comments include: Did Cadet cover basic information requirements? (5 Elements) Did Cadet present it clearly. Prepare to copy FRAGO. New York 10996 MS 103 The Warning Order Leadership Exercise #2 1. then you do not know the answer. Purpose: The purpose of the Leadership Exercise is to ensure that the Cadets have fully grasped the concept and demonstrate the ability to craft a Warning Order. .) Allow the cadets 12 minutes to form a quick Warning Order. They may use the format page from the TLP Handbook. confident? Accurate? Focus on squad? (or did Cadet regurgitate platoon Leader’s FRAGO?) Did it warn. Instructions: Inform the cadets that they are about to receive a FRAGO.

Leland. S. Homework: • Prepare Uniform and TA-50 for inspection. Commander of Fort Irwin 1987 .Lesson 10 PRE-COMBAT INSPECTIONS Lesson Objectives: • Demonstrate the ability to conduct a Pre-Combat Inspection. Remarks: • Prepare yourself for Combat Operations according to your squad leaders warning order and the CFT TACSOP. • Read and follow USCC SOP. • MG E. • Meet in designated location at designated time. This normal class period is a drop. • LESSON QUOTE: • A unit that does well only those things the boss checks will have great difficulty. • Ensure you prepare your “knowledge” as well as your uniform/equipment. • Learn Cadet Knowledge Questions to date.

Pyrotechnics are properly carried and easily identified. b. c. Number Combo and Running Password. Ammunition is clean and serviceable. Shotgun is loaded. How are we going to exfil and from where? e. b. Shells are carried properly. Operational. a. Firing systems are separate from charges.EXAMPLE AS PER RANGER BATTALION Pre-Combat Inspection Format 1. Individual aid packs are carried. 2. Chem-lights are carried and easily accessed. b. Casualty care: a. LBV is properly rigged. Load Carrying Equipment: a. b. Israeli Litters/SKEDCO’s are carried. e. a. 1. 5. 3. Grenades and Flash-bangs are properly carried and rigged IAW SOP. c. f. NVG’s are tied down or have a tie down present and IAW the SOP. HLZ’s. don't limit your inspection to only these areas. 3. Commanders Intent (Company and Platoon or two levels up). b. Optics and lasers are tied down IAW the SOP. b. Sledge/Axe is rigged and can be accessed rapidly. Check mission knowledge and that each individual has no sensitive information on them. c. IR tape armband present and 1" x 1" square for K-pot. These items should be inspected during initial and final inspections. 4. d. Rucksack or Assault pack are properly packed and rigged. Charges are carried in easily accessible area. f. b. Each man has an IR Chem-light on an 18” piece of 550 cord to signal CSAR aircraft (in pocket). d. All sensitive equipment is tied down. b. The following areas will be inspected. d. Properly rigged for an airborne assault. The Emergency Link-Up (ERV) plan and/or E+R Plan. d. Ammunition: a. Spare batteries are taped in pistol grip. 2. e. assets. Serviceability. d. Mission Statement for Ranger’s element. c. 6. c. . 7. Body armor is rigged properly and has Ranger’s name on it. Slings are properly rigged and taped. d. Prior to any mission. Equipment is marked with A Company markings. Squad aid bags are carried. c. First Aid Bags are marked with red-cross or red tape and in easily identifiable location. b. d. Cleanliness. Individual Commo is properly rigged and works. Shotgun is easily accessible. Accountability. location of litters and medic. NVG’s: a. Water is present in proper quantity. Pre-combat inspections will focus on the following areas: a. VS-17 (2” x 12”) strip in K-pot. Signals: a. Spare batteries are present in LBE/RACK. c. leaders at all levels. d. Breaching Equipment: a. padding is present. Weapons: Weapons are clean and lubricated. Hooligan tool is properly rigged and can be accessed rapidly. 8. c. c. this list is the minimum. will inspect their subordinates on the items listed below at a minimum. Every Fire Team member knows where charges are. White E-tape (18”) to mark tree landings or breach points in LBE/RACK. MEDEVAC plan is understood. Ammunition is properly loaded in magazines and placed in LCE. CCP’s. f. especially Team Leaders.

Person: ____ Facepaint (to standard) ____ Haircut ____ Shave Cadet Section: _____ LBV ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ (2) Canteens (1) Canteen cup (2) Mag pouches Dummy cording First-aid pouch Compass with case Buttpack Properly rigged according to SOP (6) Magazines (1) Poncho (1) Pair Black gloves (1) BFA Overall Appearance: Overall Attitude: Overall Preparations: _____________ _____________ _____________ Final Grade: _______ Instructor: _____________________ BRING TO INSPECTION Enclosure (1) . Uniform/Equipment: Uniform ____ Serviceability ____ Cleanliness ____ Accountability ____ Rank ____ Boots (buff shine) ____ Glasses (as req) ____ ID tags / allergy tags ____ ID card ____ Notebook with pen ____ Camo stick ____ Protractor ____ Watch ____ Red lens flashlight ____ Whistle on lanyard ____ Kevlar helmet 2. Knowledge: ____ Cadet knowledge questions ____ USCC SOP ____ Mission of the Infantry 3. New York 10996 Pre-Combat Inspections Grade Sheet MS 103 Name: ___________________________ Cadet Inspector: ___________________ 1.DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY West Point.

and endstate of a properly conducted Pre-Combat Inspection. . Cadet Team Leaders will have 15 minutes to inspect and make onthe-spot corrections. The Instructor should view each of the inspecting Cadets. Cadet squad leaders will conduct the PCI for their entire squad. The squad leader will have 30 minutes to conduct his inspections. Be prepared to provide guidance or feedback on the Cadet’s methodology or technique. Make notes and assign Instructor Points (or take Instructor Points) to Leaders and to MOSs as necessary. Intent: The intent of the exercise is to immerse the Cadet in a real military inspection environment. Enclosure (1) is the PCI Grade Sheet. 2.) The Instructor will also post the grade sheet next to his door for all to see as they stop in to check the W ARNO. New York 10996 Pre-Combat Inspections Leadership Exercise #3 MS 103 1. They will conduct/stand a “green” inspection to standard (vice a Cadet “grey” inspection. Instructions: The Cadet Leaders are required to have written and posted their own W arning Order to all members of their units according to Instructor’s directions (prior to this event).DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES M ILITARY ACADEM Y W est Point. Purpose: The purpose of this exercise is to familiarize the Cadet with the expectations. The Cadet Platoon Sergeant (Section Marcher) will form the Platoon in the designated area at the designated time. 4. Timeline: The first 5 minutes are for admin and setup. (Note: The Cadet should have posted it outside of the Instructor’s door. He is still responsible to report accountability to the Instructor at the beginning of the class period. The Instructor should check to ensure timeliness and compliances.) 3. methodology. The last 10 minutes are for admin and cleanup.

1927 . found neither the Himalayas nor the farstretching Carpathians a barrier to progress.Lesson 11 BASIC MAP READING Lesson Objectives: •Identify a Topographic Map. Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart. •Review the following CBT Lessons: List and describe the five major terrain features of a map. LESSON QUOTE: It is worth recalling that the Mongols. •Bring Tenino Map and Protractor to Class. Determine an Azimuth between two specified locations on a map. Identify a Map’s Basic Symbology. Homework: •Complete Self Paced Text Unit 11 Remarks: •Review all course material to date. Locate and identify a Map’s Marginal Information. For mobile troops there is usually a way around. Define the term Azimuth. although their army was entirely composed of mobile troops. Determine Straight Line and Curve Line distance on a map.

You must remember that when using a standard military map. heights of natural features. An attempt to plot each feature true to scale would result in a product impossible to read. cannot be spread flat without distortion. It also indicates variations in terrain. lines. on a 1:250. why not use a globe and forget about the flat and inaccurate map? Consider the Indian Head . conventional lines.Maps and their Properties Cartography is the art and science of expressing the known physical features of the earth graphically by maps and charts. categories. But a study of history reveals that the most pressing demands for accuracy and detail in mapping have come as the result of military needs. for legibility. and forms must indicate features. and distance between ground features. such as populated places and routes of travel. The construction of a map from data obtained by earth measurements would be a relatively simple process if the world were flat. and the extent of vegetation cover. symbols. a single track railroad (which is actually five meters wide) must be depicted by a symbol 200 meters wide on the map.25 inch. This chapter explains maps. the complexities of tactical operations and deployment of troops is such that it is essential for all soldiers to be able to read and interpret their maps in order to move quickly and effectively on the battlefield.000 inches on the ground). Obviously. However. To be understandable. and scale.000 scale map. the prescribed symbol for a road is 100 meters wide on the map (whereas the actual road is certainly much smaller in width). for many items would be delineated so minutely as to defy recognition. or any portion thereof. colors. colors. Symbols. all appropriate information contained within a square mile of the earth's surface must be condensed into a small area approximately . (Visualize drawing a picture on an inflated balloon and the distortion of that picture when you let the air out of the balloon. such representation is impossible. it includes the definition and purpose of a map and describes map types. molded.25 by . No one knows who drew.000 (one inch on the map equals 250. Today. A map provides information on the existence. or scratched out in the dirt the first map. most of these symbols must be exaggerated in size. you are actually looking at a portion of the earth's surface projected onto a flat piece of paper. orientation. laced together. A topographic map is a graphic representation of a portion of the earth's surface drawn to scale on a flat surface.) Distortion is a major problem of all mapmakers when trying to represent a portion of the earth's surface on a flat piece of paper (a map). Since only a sphere will present a true picture of the earth. For example. the world is spherical in shape and a sphere. This is evident when one considers that on a map at a scale of 1:250. and proportion with legibility retained. The ideal representation would be realized if every feature of the area being mapped could be shown in true shape. location. and forms depict man-made and natural features.

which is essential to effective navigation.Location . Objects. occupy the same location on the globe. All you need to be aware of now is that the military uses the UTM Projection to divide the world into smaller and smaller sections or grids. This means that the map must have a constant scale in all areas of the map sheet and that any straight line on the map would trace the path of a great circle on the globe.Area LOCATION: Every map projection satisfies one basic property. This property is location. SHAPE: In the process of transposing the spherical surface of the earth onto the flat surface of a map. which an ideal map would preserve. which are the grid lines that you see on your map sheet.) The cartographer (map maker) initially seeks to accurately translate to the map all spherical characteristics of the earth's surface. A map projection is an orderly arrangement of parallels of latitude (east-west) and meridians of longitude (north-south) upon which a map is drawn. It is more convenient to visualize these spherical characteristics in terms of five properties. If this were not true. You then transpose the Military Grid System onto the UTM Projection until eventually the world is divided into sections or grids. These properties are: . the user would wish to compute the true distance between two points with the use of a straightedge ruler and map scale.equipment for a lieutenant to carry about in a rucksack. After the grid forming the framework for a map has been laid out on paper. it is necessary to cut or stretch parts of the projection. Unfortunately. Now consider the remaining four map properties. There are several different types of map projections that are used throughout the world. Using a map projection solves the problem of representing the spherical three-dimensional grid on a flat two-dimensional sheet of paper.Distance .Direction . the latitude and longitude of selected reference points are determined and plotted on the grid to provide control points from which additional points may be accurately located. This causes the patterns to appear distorted on a flat surface. for your purposes you will work only with the map projection called the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Projection. DISTANCE: On an ideal map. which experience some degree of distortion with all map projections.Shape . it would be pointless to develop the map sheet. which are depicted on a map sheet. however. (Grid lines are the north/south and east/west lines on your map. this is .

GREEN RED OTHER Identifies vegetation of military significance. All maps are not the same. such as buildings. Occasionally other colors may be used to show special information. main roads. Indicates cultural features. MAP COLORS There are five basic colors used on a map which represent the following features: BLACK BLUE Indicates cultural (man-made) features. orchards. so every time a different map is used the marginal information should be carefully examined. DIRECTION: On an ideal map. No flat map has a constant scale in all directions. and vineyards. railroads. except location. and boundaries. is unattainable without some degree of distortion. However. surveyed spot elevations. This property. if a projection is selected which allows all points on the earth to be connected with straight lines. BROWN . Refer to the Tenino 1:50. such as contours on older edition maps. AREA: On the ideal map. drainage and swamps. such as woods. such as lakes.Identifies all relief features and elevation. all relief features. the direction between two locations would be conveniently shown as a straight line. The azimuth of this line would be determined with a protractor.000 map sheet while we examine the marginal information. MAP SHEET MARGINAL INFORMATION The marginal data printed around the outer edges of a map is considered to be the instructions for the use of the map. Accuracy in direction inevitably results in distortion in distance measurements. on older maps.an impossible requirement. and all labels. and cultivated land on red-light readable maps. as with all the previous properties we have discussed. . which will come closest to this ideal of a constant scale and true distance computation. other properties of the map will be distorted. Identifies hydrograph or water features. NOTE: The colors red and brown are combined to identify cultural features. rivers. and elevation. such as built up areas and contour lines on the newer red-light readable maps. The following diagram is a quick-reference explanation of the marginal information found on most maps. and minor roads. The cartographer's task is to select a projection. equal areas on the ground will be represented as equal areas throughout the map. ponds. These are indicated in the marginal information as a rule. such as populated areas.

MAP MARGINAL INFORMATION 2 3 1 4 5 6 7 3 8 9 10 12 13 14 11 15 Sheet Name Series Name Scale Edition Number Series Number Sheet Number Legend Bar Scales Contour Interval Grid Reference Box Declination Diagram Elevation Guide Adjoining Sheets Diagram 14. 5. 4. which gives the ratio of map distance (MD) to the corresponding ground distance (GD). the name of the largest city depicted on the map is used. Index to Boundaries 15. The map series name is found in the upper left margin. 6 5 4 1 16 (1) Sheet Name. The sheet name of the Tenino 1:50. The sheet name is found in two places: the center of the upper margin and either the right or left side of the lower margin.000 of the same units measured on the ground. The name given to a series is that of the most prominent area. A map series usually includes a group of similar maps at the same scale and designed to cover a particular geographic area. 11. (2) Series Name. Whenever possible. 8. 9. The scale is a representative fraction (RF). (3) Scale. Representative Fraction = Map Distance or Ground Distance RF = MD GD Therefore. 10. Stock Number 1.000 map sheet is TENINO. The series name of the Tenino map sheet is Washington. and in the center of the lower margin. after the series name. 12. Hydrographic Datum 16. 13. 2. the scale of 1:50. 7.000 means that one unit measured on the map is equal to 50. 6. A map is named after the most prominent cultural or geographical feature depicted. 3. The scale is found both in the upper left margin. .

000 and larger are used for tactical.000.or four-digit numeral (V791 for the Tenino map sheet). medium. This map covers a very large land area at the expense of detail.000 and 1:1. .000 are used for operational planning. The sheet number for the Tenino 1:50. and logistical planning. Medium scale maps = between 1:75.Map scales are classified based on the amount of area covered and the detail shown." (4) Edition Number. Small scale maps = 1:1. a map bearing a higher edition number is assumed to contain more recent information than the same map bearing a lower edition number. followed by a three.000 and smaller Those maps with scales 1:1. It represents the age of the map.000.000 are also frequently encountered. and large scale: Large scale maps = 1:75.000. (6) Sheet Number. and the agency responsible for its production. The map issued in MS103 is a large scale map. Symbol design is logical. They contain a moderate amount of detail. It is used as a reference number for the map sheet. administrative.000 but smaller than 1:75. It is a sequence reference expressed either as a fourdigit numeral (such as 1125) or as a letter. Medium scale maps of 1:100. 1 Series Number. The standard medium-scale map is 1:250. The classifications are small. the smaller the scale.000 The maps with scales larger than 1:1. The legend is located in the lower left margin.000 and larger Those maps with scales of 1:75.000. many areas have been mapped to 1:25. The series number is found in both the upper right margin and the lower left margin. but terrain analysis is best done with the large-scale maps described above.000. It illustrates and identifies the topographic symbols used to depict some of the more prominent features on the map.000. These are the maps that you as a junior leader are most likely to encounter (Platoon and Company level) standard largescale map is 1:50. Edition numbers run consecutively. in relation to other editions of the same map.000. A rule of thumb states that: "The smaller the representative fraction.000. 7-DMA indicates the seventh edition prepared by the Defense Mapping Agency.000 map sheet is "1477 IV". (7) Legend. however. The sheet number is found in both the upper right margin and the lower left margin. The edition number is found in the upper right margin and in the lower left margin. The standard smaller scale map is 1:1.000 and smaller are used for general planning and for strategic studies (Corps and Armies). and the symbol will resemble what you would see on the ground if you looked down from an aircraft.000.

(13) The Index to Adjoining Sheets Diagram. The extension scale is the left most portion of the bar scale and is divided into sections representing tenths of the unit of measure. It contains instructions for constructing a grid reference. They are rulers used to convert map distance to ground distance. Statute Miles. This box is normally located in the center of the lower margin.. For our purposes. where the ". normally below the bar scales. The GM angle always consists of an azimuth and a direction (either east or west). Yards. it provides a quick means to identify the general area that would contain the highest or lowest point. and major drainage features. The bar scale is divided into two sections: the primary scale and the extension scale. Care should be exercised when using the bar scales.144". The primary scale is the right most portion of the bar scale and is divided into sections representing whole units of measure. It usually contains nine rectangles. magnetic north (arrow head). The symbol for a spot elevation on the Tenino 1:50. especially in the selection of the unit of measure that is needed.error when reading the map. Their sheet numbers identifies all adjoining map sheets. the interval is indicated on the supplementary contour line. This is normally located in the lower right margin. Maps typically have three or four bar scales. This is located on the right side of the lower margin and indicates the angular relationships of grid north (GN)." indicates the location and the "144" indicates the elevation.e. (8) Bar Scales.000 map sheet is ten meters. The contour interval is located in the center of the lower margin. The contour interval of the Tenino 1:50. The bar scales are located in the center of the lower margin. representing adjoining map sheets. It is a miniature characterization of the terrain shown on the map sheet. spot elevations. (9) Contour Interval. Meters. The adjoining sheets diagram is located in the lower right margin. It also contains specific instructions on converting azimuths from grid to magnetic or magnetic to grid. (12) Elevation Guide. and the 100. each in a different unit of measure (i. The terrain is represented by shaded bands of elevation. (11) Declination Diagram.000 meter square identification for the map sheet. When supplementary contour lines are used. Dashed lines represent map sheets of an adjoining series that are at the same scale and their series number is indicated along the appropriate side of the division line between the series . The zero mark separates the two sections of the bar scale and is not located on an outer edge. (10) Grid Reference Box. The elevation guide provides the map reader with a means of rapid recognition of major landforms. and true north (*). the grid zone designation. and Nautical Miles). It states the vertical distance between adjacent intermediate contour lines. While the guide does not always specifically list the highest or lowest points of elevation on the map sheet. with the center rectangle representing the map being used (indicated by bold lines).000 map sheet is ". the only important angle is the angle between grid north and magnetic north (The Grid-Magnetic or GM angle).

the sheet num ber of the individual m ap. The stock num ber is located in the lower right margin and is a unique designation that is com posed of the series number. The index to boundaries diagram appears in the lower right margin. identification of the m aps needed can be obtained from the index to adjoining map sheets. A close look at the index will reveal that a regular numbering system exists to quickly identify adjoining map sheets. then the letter "X" is substituted as the fifth digit. It is a miniature of the m ap. The stock number for the Tenino 1:50. on recently printed m aps. The first five digits are the series number. if present. however. The sheet num ber is the next component. (14) Index to Boundaries. It illustrates and identifies the topographic symbols used to depict the more prom inent water related features on the map. (15) Hydrographic Datum. The last two digits.This index is used when determ ining the requirements for additional maps. The hydrographic datum is an extension of the legend and is located in the lower right margin. when the series num ber is less than five digits. the Roman numerals are converted to Arabic numerals for simplicity. which appear on the map. such as county lines and state boundaries. . depicting the boundaries. and the edition num ber. and. are the edition num ber.000 map sheet is V791X14774. (16) Stock Number. If a planned tactical operation extends into an area not covered by the user's map.

Hachures. c. above or below sea level.) a. Layer Tinting. Hachures are used extensively on smallscale maps to show mountain ranges. The elevation represented by contour lines is the vertical distance above or below sea level. Form lines are not measured from any datum plane. Layer tinting is a method of showing relief by color. such as hills and ridges. but are mainly used to show large. Shaded Relief. effectiveness of military units. However. They do not represent exact elevations. Relief shading indicates relief by a shadow effect achieved by tone and color--that results in the darkening of one side of terrain features. Shaded relief is sometimes used in conjunction with contour lines to emphasize these features. All points on the contour line are at the same elevation. Soldiers must know how to determine locations of points. they must first understand how the mapmaker indicates the elevation and relief on the map . b. A legend is printed on the map margin to indicate the elevation range represented by each color. Form Lines. plateaus. Hachures are short. identify map symbols. and. Form lines are represented on a map as dashed lines and are never labeled with representative elevations. positioning. represents a definite elevation range. Contour Lines. and Distance PORTRAYAL OF ELEVATION AND RELIEF There are several techniques used to indicate elevation (distance above mean sea level) and relief (shape of the surface due to differences in elevation) on a map. d. and mountain peaks. rocky outcrop areas. ELEVATION AND RELIEF The elevation (vertical distance above or below mean sea level) of points on the ground and the relief (shape of the terrain) of an area affect the movement. in many cases. Each shade of color. Elevation.Terrain Features. this method does not allow the map user to determine the exact elevation of a specific point--only the range. Form lines have no standard elevation and give only a general idea of relief. measure distances and azimuths. the steeper the slope is. broken lines used to show relief. To do this. or band. e. A contour line represents an imaginary line on the ground. Some of the more common techniques are: (See figures on previous page. Contour lines are the most common method of showing relief and elevation on a standard topographic map. Hachures are sometimes used with contour lines. and determine the elevation and relief. as depicted on the map. The darker the shading. A different color is used for each band of elevation.

usually every fifth line.Contour lines (the brown lines on your map) Contour lines are the most common method of showing relief and elevation to a standard topographic map. Index contours make determining elevations easier. . The three distinct types of contour lines normally present on standard military topographic maps are as follows: .Index contour lines are the heavier lines. and are normally labeled with their elevation. The elevation represented by contour lines is the vertical distance above or below sea level.

Locate the hill at grid coordinate WL74839180 on your West Point and Vicinity 1:50. they are labeled only in places in which their values are not obvious. The elevation of the heavy dark contour line around this hill is 150 meters.. Supplementary contours are usually labeled with their elevation.Intermediate contour lines are the lighter contour lines between the index contours. then the point's elevation can be determined by adding 1/2 the contour interval to the elevation of the lowest adjacent contour line. The elevation of points and the relief of an area affect the movement and tactical employment of units. Count the contour lines. Normally. then the point's elevation is the same as that of the contour line. The contour line immediately below the 150-meter contour (downhill) would indicate 140 meters above mean sea level. particularly in relatively flat areas. If the point's center of mass is not directly on a contour line. (Look at the bottom center of your map sheet. There are normally four intermediate contour lines between index contour lines. which are used to produce a more complete picture of relief.000 map sheet. The vertical distance between adjacent contour lines is called the contour interval. we . If the point's center of mass falls directly on a contour line. The contour interval for your West Point and Vicinity 1:50. upward or downward. THE CONTOUR INTERVAL DEFINES THE VERTICAL DIFFERENCE IN ELEVATION BETWEEN THESE TWO LINES. You see that there are many other contour lines in addition to the one that you found to be 150 meters in elevation.Supplementary contour lines are short dashed lines. or is located in between contour lines. For military purposes. The size of the contour interval is given in the marginal information. The elevation of a point on a map can be determined as follows: Identify the point and the map contour interval. Locate the nearest index contour line. A contour line above or below the 150 meter contour would be at a different elevation. from the index contour line to the point.000 map sheet is 10 meters. The stated contour interval separates adjacent intermediate contours. NOTE: NO MATTER HOW FAR APART TWO ADJACENT CONTOUR LINES ARE DRAWN ON A MAP.) Refer again to grid square WL7491. They are normally placed at half contour intervals from the surrounding contour lines and are extended only as far as necessary to properly portray relief. .

and the highest points of rounded hilltops are examples of such places. If there is no index contour line nearby. you are actually finding the surface elevation of the water. saddles. Spot elevations are shown by printing the elevation directly on the face of the map. the center of the x is the actual location. a dot indicates the point of elevation (. Frequently the surface elevation of a body of water has previously been determined and is indicated by a spot elevation printed within the body of water. A monumented benchmark means that there is physically a marker or a monument at that point on the ground. On small-scale maps. can be used as a reference. the body of water is treated like any other symbol or point between two contour lines. There are many places on a map where the true relief picture cannot be shown exactly. such as a benchmark or spot elevation. On large-scale maps. Look at Offutt Lake located in grid square EG1395 on the Tenino 1:50. no matter how near or distant they are from the contour line.1664). . pinnacle rocks in a landing area. The elevation of the lake is labeled as 70 meters so there is no need to interpolate. As such. At these places a spot elevation can be very useful or even critical to a military operation. the points of elevation are symbolized as x1664. however.lines are at the same height. where BM represents the presence of the benchmark. Spot elevations are either checked or unchecked. A checked spot elevation means that the elevation has been measured and verified by a surveyor. then any labeled elevation. Benchmarks are either monumented or nonmonumented. and the number (792 in this example) is the elevation. where the center of the x is the actual location and the number (1664 in this example) is the elevation. the elevation has been verified. while a nonmonumented benchmark does not have a marker located at the point. Benchmarks are normally symbolized as BMx792. W hen finding the elevation of any body of water. while an unchecked spot elevation is the cartographer's best guess. Prominent crossroads.000 map sheet.

The feature you are viewing is a HILL. determining the elevation of a depression is a difficult task for most beginning map readers.ELEVATION OF DEPRESSIONS A depression is shown on a map as a closed line with short tick marks or dashes inside the enclosed area. Remember. however. On maps. Once you have found the lowest adjacent contour line. the elevation of the perimeter of the depression is 90 meters. However. the ground slopes down in all directions. The adjacent contour lines to the north and south are 100 meters. instead of the lowest adjacent contour line. Hills are usually the most easily identifiable terrain feature because the contour lines ALWAYS CLOSE on high ground. The open end of the tick marks will always point downhill. ovals. . Thus. Look at the depression located in grid square WL7893 on your West Point and Vicinity 1:50. the steeper the hill is.000. Thus. This perimeter line simply shows the outline of the depression and is the same elevation as the LOWEST ADJACENT CONTOUR LINE. The closer the contour lines. You should always check all contour lines that are adjacent to the depression.5 meters (1/2 contour interval) = 85 meters]. since they typically choose the closest adjacent. 1. TERRAIN FEATURES In the figure below. the contour line to the east is 90-meter contour line. Historically. the elevation of a depression is always measured as the elevation at the bottom of the depression and that all features on the bottom of the depression are considered to be at the same elevation. unless labeled otherwise. Depression IMPORTANT: The line that shows the outline of a depression on the map IS NOT A STANDARD CONTOUR LINE. which means the elevation of the bottom of the depression is 85 meters [90 meters . the area enclosed by the depression line is lower than the surrounding ground. you then use the reverse of the 1/2 rule (the opposite of for a hilltop) to determine the elevation of the bottom of the depression. and the contours close to form concentric circles. the hilltop is indicated by the last closed contour line. to ensure that you actually select the lowest adjacent contour line. Do not forget the 1/2 contour interval rule. or loops. the closed contour line does not represent the highest elevation.

This feature is called a SADDLE.e.The figure below shows contour lines that depict a relatively low point between two hilltops or along a formation of high ground. on both sides of a ridge are valleys. i. There is high ground in two opposing directions and low ground in two opposing directions. On a map. A ridge is seldom straight and seldom level along its crest. all points on the ridge are appreciably higher than the ground on both sides of the ridge. . Typically. A ridge is not simply a line of hills.. the ground normally slopes down in three directions and is generally high and fairly level in one direction. and on both sides of a valley are ridges. A RIDGE is a sloping line of high ground. ridges and valleys alternate with each other. the saddle resembles an hourglass or figure eight shaped contour lines. When you are on a ridge.

. the bottom of the "U" is in the downhill direction. a spur is much smaller than a ridge. sloping portion of ground extending outward from a ridge. A spur is usually indicated by a series of successive "U shaped" contour lines. the ground slopes down in three directions and up in one direction. Spurs bulge or protrude AWAY from high and toward low ground.A SPUR is usually a short. Like a ridge. however.

there is high ground in two opposite directions and a gradual inclination in the other two directions. the ground slopes upward on three sides and down in one direction. These three features are sometimes confusing when reading a map. A DRAW is a narrow or less developed stream course than a valley. It is distinguishable from a valley by being too narrow to allow maneuver within its confines. and SPUR. The following diagram shows a VALLEY. Lateral movement in a draw requires climbing out of the draw. usually formed by streams or rivers.A VALLEY is a stretched-out groove in the land. A valley begins with high ground on three sides. DRAW. In a draw. This is exactly the opposite of a SPUR! A draw is usually indicated by a series of successive "V" shaped contour lines with the point of the "V" pointing uphill. . If standing in a valley. and typically has a course of running water through it. It generally has enough level ground to permit limited maneuver within its confines.

A CUT is a man-made feature that is the result of cutting through high ground. A fill is shown with the hachured lines pointing away (toward the outside) from the man-made feature. These are usually produced when leveling or filling in the terrain feature. the hachures will point toward the inside of the man-made feature. if you see a straight contour line. are CUTS and FILLS. it is probably man-made. A FILL is exactly the opposite of a cut. Cliffs can also be depicted as a contour line with tick marks on one side pointing toward low ground. usually to form a level bed for a road or railroad track.A CLIFF is a vertical or near vertical slope so steep that it cannot be shown at the contour interval without the contour lines converging or overlapping. Since contours do not normally travel in a straight line. If shown with hachured lines. Two additional terrain features. . which are often confused when reading a map. Cuts are normally depicted as a straight line through a terrain feature.

to determine the straight-line ground distance from the road junction to the road intersection in meters. Therefore. To the left of the zero. To the right of the zero. Ensure that the straightedge passes through the center of mass of the other point of interest (Point B) and place a tick mark on the straightedge adjacent to the center of mass of the second point. First. measuring using meters but reading the yard scale. take a straightedge (a piece of paper) and place it on the map so that one corner is at the center of mass of one of the points of interest (Point A). The first common error is forgetting that the zero mark is within the body of the scale and not on either end of the scale.MAP DISTANCE AND GRAPHIC SCALE Map scale is the fixed relationship between map distance and the corresponding ground distance. Even though the bar scale is simple to use. many map readers make two common errors. STRAIGHT-LINE DISTANCE Using the below figure.250 meters (+/. place the straightedge adjacent to the bar scale for measuring in meters and align the second tick mark with a graduation on the primary scale which causes the end of the paper to align over the extension scale.e. each using a different unit of measure. meters. or vice versa. A bar (graphic) scale is a ruler printed in the marginal information of all standard military topographic maps and is used to convert distances on the map to actual ground distances. The other common error is measuring using one scale and misreading the distance by using a different scale on the bar scale. The bar scale is divided into two parts. the straight-line ground distance between the two points is 2. and nautical miles.. the scale is marked in full units of measure and is called the primary scale. i. yielding your total distance measured with only one reading. yards. Now. the scale is divided into tenths and is called the extension scale. The most common units of measure used on standard military topographic maps are statute miles. do the following. .50 meters). Most maps have three or more bar scales. Add the value of the graduation from the primary scale to how far the end extends over the extension scale.

Inches. straight segments in sequence on the edge of a sheet of paper. place the point of your pencil on the edge of the paper on the newest tick mark to hold it in place and pivot the paper until another approximately straight segment is aligned with the paper and make another tick mark. Remember. or any other curved-line. in kilometers. centimeters. rotate the paper to align the edge of the paper along the center of mass of a straight portion of the linear feature to be measured. On your Tenino 1:50.50 meters).000 map sheet. CURVED-LINE DISTANCE To measure distance along a winding road. the straight-line distance. Make a tick mark near one end of the paper and position the tick mark adjacent to the center of mass of the point from which the curved-line measurement is to begin. The equivalent straight-line distance of the curve can now be measured on the bar scale the same way that we measure straight-line distance. you have in effect "straightened out" the curve by ticking off short. or miles (any unit of measurement) on the map will always represent that same unit of measurement on the ground. the straightedge of a piece of paper is still used. Sometimes map-readers make the mistake of using one measure for map distance and a different measure for ground distance. from Chency School located at UH13638800 to Washington Mill School located in grid square UH1786 is 3. YOU MUST ALWAYS WORK WITH THE SAME UNIT OF MEASUREMENT. Keeping the end of your paper stationary. stream. . and make a tick mark on both the paper and map going from the paper onto the map when the edge of the paper begins to leave the center of mass of the feature being measured. Keeping the newest tick marks together. By measuring the length of a curved road in this manner.56 kilometers (+/. Continue in this manner until the entire measurement is completed.

To measure from either end of the bar scale. stay in the center of the feature being measured. Reading the distance from the wrong scale.000 map sheet.55 kilometers (+/. . you are including additional distance in the measurement. Both map and ground distance must be in the same unit of measurement. forgetting the zero mark is within the body of the scale.On your Tenino 1:50.63 miles (+/.100 meters). Always measure center of mass to center of mass. When measuring curved-line distance. NOTE: When measuring a curved-line. The topographical symbol covers more map distance than the actual object does on the ground. 3. from the road intersection located at UH10156850 to Chicamuxen Church located at UH06406746. 4. Your measurement should be 3. always stay in the center of mass of the linear feature. Two common errors of map-readers are: a. 2. Summary 1. measure the road distance. in miles. On your Tenino 1:50. from the road junction located at UH16426620 to the road junction located at UH18956846. Map scale is the fixed relationship between map distance and the corresponding ground distance. Your measurement should be 2. If you change from one side of a feature to the other.. in kilometers. b.000 map sheet.06 miles). measure the road distance.

What are the (5) five basic colors utilized on the military map and what do they represent ? 2. Does straight-line distance measurement take into consideration elevation differences when measured on a military map? 5. Where the legend located on a standard military map? degree(s). 4. Azimuths are always measured to the nearest 3.Lesson 11: Map Reading Queen of Battle! 1. What is a topographic map? __________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________ .

then determine if the unit has reached the correct answer. What is the sheet number of your Tenino 1:50. What are the 5 major terrain features of a topographical map? ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________ ____________ What is the sheet name of your Tenino 1:50. . Each member is to work on the same problem together. c. you find yourself unchecked spot elevation 68 (located in the EG 0794 grid square). What is the series name of your Tenino 1:50. 3. DO NOT DIVIDE UP THE PRACTICAL EXERCISE TO FINISH QUICKLY.000 map? 7.000 map? For the following map reading requirements.000 map? 4.000 map? 2. Unchecked spot elevation 68 and the Deschutes Fire Tower (located in the EG 1795 grid square). What is the contour interval of your Tenino 1:50.000 map? 5. Determine the straight line distance (in meters) between: a. 1.DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY West Point. b. New York 10996 Lesson 11 Practical Exercise MS 103 This is an in-class Practical Exercise. What is the series number of your Tenino 1:50. Assist one another in figuring out the problems. Unchecked spot elevation 68 and Hill 147 Unchecked spot elevation 147 (located in EG 1297 grid square).000 map? 6. It is critical to your mission that you determine the following: 8. Unchecked spot elevation 68 and Benchmark 86 (located in EG 0589 grid square). It is to be completed in your team size unit. What is the edition number of your Tenino 1:50.

U tilizing this as your starting position. T o the T V R elay T ower E G 1287 grid square: b. Locate the w ater tower (E G 0985 grid square) on your T enino 1:50.For the follow ing m ap reading requirem ents. determ ine the grid azim uth to the following points: a. . A long the C hicago M ilw aukee S t. W hat is the curve line distance (in statute m iles) betw een: a. B enchm ark 86 (located in E G 0589 grid square) and T he C hurch of G od B ridge (located in E G 0385 grid squa re) [rem ain on paved roads only]. you find yourself at B enchm ark 86 on the road (located in E G 0589 grid square). B enchm ark 86 (located in E G 0589 grid square) and the B eaver C reek overpass (located E G 0692 grid square). c. It is critical to your m ission that you determ ine the follow ing: 9. b. T o the S pot E levation 170 E G 0990 grid square: T o M onarch M ine E G 0278 grid square: 10.000 m ap. P aul and P acific R ail from the R oute 5 O verpass B ridge (located in E G 0393 grid square) to the W estern Junction B ridge (located in E G 1594 grid square).

(Reference on-line FM 21-26) Remarks: •Review Self Paced Text Unit 12. General of the Armies John J. LESSON QUOTE: A competent leader can get efficient service from poor troops.Lesson 12 MILITARY GRID REFERENCE SYSTEM Lesson Objectives: •Summarize the purpose of the Military Grid Reference System. •Review the CBT Lesson: *Determine an eight digit Grid Coordinate to with +or50 meters. •Define the term Grid Coordinate. while on the contrary an incapable leader can demoralize the best of troops. Pershing. Homework: •Complete Self-Paced Text unit 12. 1931 .

000-meter square into tenths (hundred-meter increments). The coordinate scales (triangular cutouts) are used to divide each side of the 1. so you must continue to subdivide the grid square. The precision desired determines the number of digits to be read beyond the four principle digits. A grid coordinate is defined as a series of letters and numbers which are used in conjunction with a military map and protractor to accurately identify a specified point on the surface of the earth. To locate the letter "X" to within 100 meters. The term "grid coordinate" always includes both the 100. Select the coordinate scale which corresponds to the scale of your map and orient the scale so it looks like a "backwards L". ensuring the "TIC" mark extensions of the scale are superimposed on both the horizontal and vertical grid lines. outline the grid square containing your identified point by placing the horizontal scale parallel to and directly over the horizontal grid line immediately below your identified point. we use a coordinate scale protractor. Now. Accuracy to within 1.000-meter square identification and the desired number of digits.000 meters is still unacceptable for most military operations. which enables you to locate specific points on a map quickly and accurately. which function as reference marks for .MILITARY GRID REFERENCE SYSTEM The Military Grid Reference System provides a method. In order to fully understand map reading. you should possess a general understanding as to how topographical maps are derived form the Military Grid Reference System.

When working with a map. you must replace the missing reference line. be the third and sixth digits of the grid coordinate. respectively. If the point is located exactly half way between two digits. no adjustments are necessary since the normal reference lines are available. use either the lower right corner (when on the left side of the map) or upper left corner (when on the bottom of a map) as your reference. These numbers will. rotate the protractor until the coordinate scale aligns with the new reference. Then simply read RIGHT (where the horizontal scale intersects the vertical grid line) and UP (where the vertical scale intersects the center of mass of the point). Whenever the lower left corner of a grid square (the point from which grid coordinates are normally measured) is unavailable to you. It is important to remember that you must now subtract this number from 100 since you are measuring the distance from the opposite side of the grid square. along the horizontal grid line. be the fourth and eighth digits of the grid coordinate. To locate a point to within ten meters. visually subdivide the hundred-meter increments of the scale into tenths (ten-meter increments) and estimate the last two digits of the grid coordinate. slide the scale to the left. you will not always be able to work within a complete grid square. always round down. Look around the outer edge of the Tenino map sheet and you will notice incomplete grid squares. These numbers will. The other half of the measurement will be read normally since you are using the normal reference line. until the vertical scale intersects the center of mass of the point you are measuring (Step 2). Next. .measuring (Step 1). When the incomplete grid square is located at either the top or right side of the map sheet. The most common and accurate method for determining grid coordinates in an incomplete grid square is as follows: The subtraction method. To accomplish this. The six-digit grid coordinate of the "X" in the diagram below is UH964052 and is accurate to within 100 meters. respectively. Now align the coordinate scale over the designated point and read its grid coordinate. To find coordinates within an incomplete grid square. The eight-digit grid coordinate of the "X" in the diagram above is UH96390519 and is accurate to within ten meters.

Incomplete grid square on bottom of map sheet.1. Therefore. Incomplete grid square on left side of map sheet. Therefore. 2. . the grid coordinate for point Z is UH14618375. the grid coordinate for point Y is UH13728425.

With this method. Once the grid square is completed. for determining grid coordinates within an incomplete grid square that is in common use. you will use your protractor as a guide and actually draw or complete the grid square on the map. because of the availability of flat desktop and sharp pencils. Always check the grid square you are working in to verify that it is a complete grid square. Draw or complete the grid square. the coordinate is read from a complete grid square.There is another method. . While this method may be acceptable in a classroom environment. it is not practical in a field environment and is not recommended.

What is the GM angle for the Tenino 1:50.000 map? 7.000 meter square identification of the Tenino 1:50.000 map? 5.000 map 1. or small scale)? 6. Tenino 1:50.000 map (large. medium. What is the contour interval of the Tenino 1:50. New York 10996 Lesson 12 Practical Application Exercise MS 103 Ref: 1. What is the eight digit grid of the following: a) Mud Lake: e) Cozy Valley Pump: b) South Union Church: c) Pattison Lake Bridge: God: d) Landing Strip No.000 map? . What is the 100.13: f) Black Prince Coal Mine: g) Mound Prairie Church of h) Forest Cemetery: 4.DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY West Point. What is located at the following grids: a) EG 086958: b) EG 142906: c) EG 103888: d) EG 022783: e) EG 071846: f) EG 158822: g) EG 078923: h) EG 176952: 3. What is the purpose of the Military Grid Reference System? 2. What scale map is the Tenino 1:50. Protractor 2.

units become mixed and all control is lost. Homework: • Complete basic operations overlay. plot and mark a Military Navigational Route on a map. L. unfamiliar ground. [Reference FM 7-8.Lesson 13 MANIPULATING THE MAP Lesson Objectives : • Review the following CBT Objectives: *Identify Easterly and Westerly GM Angle on a Declination Diagram. A. Marshall. Remarks: Overlay Paper will be provided in Class. 1970 . *Convert Grid Azimuth to Magnetic Azimuth. Voice recognition is about five per cent efficient in the dark. BG S. Too quickly. LESSON QUOTE: Night operations are a boon to troops who know the terrain like the palm of their hand and a reckless risk for those who don’t… There is no easier way to scramble a force than to deploy it at night on jumbled. • Given a situational vignette.101-5-1 and FM 21-26]. men drift away.

Locate the two specific points on the map. A protractor is used to measure azimuths on a map. adaptable to any part of the world. MEASURING AN AZIMUTH BETWEEN KNOWN POINTS To measure an azimuth between two points use the following procedure: a. The vertical line from 0o to 180o is called the base line of the protractor. b. When using the protractor. extend the line beyond each point. is the index or center of the protractor. The point from which the azimuth originates is the center of an imaginary circle which has been divided into 360o and the direction of interest is measured as an azimuth.Manipulating the Military Map Azimuth and Direction Military personnel need a way of expressing direction that is accurate. The unit of measure used by the military is the DEGREE and the angle measured clockwise from a north base line is an AZIMUTH. Its outer edge is graduated at 1o intervals from 0o to 360o. . Where the baseline intersects the horizontal line. the base line is always oriented parallel to a north-south grid line with the 0o mark toward the top (north) of the map and the 90o mark to the right (east) of the map. Use a sharp pencil to draw a line connecting the center of mass of the two points. respectively. between 90o and 270o. your start and end point. and has a common unit of measure.

N O TE: Azim uths are alw ays m easured to the nearest 1/2 o and distance has no effect on azim uths. K eeping the index over this intersection. R ead the azim uth by following the connecting line from the start point. note where the protractor's outer edge cuts. . Adjust the protractor's orientation until the num ber of degree m arks separating the grid line from the opposing cardinal directions are the sam e. R em ove the protractor and draw a straight line from the known location through the m ark on the m ap. through the protractor's index. the 90 o is toward the east.) C heck the accuracy of the plotted azim uth by placing the protractor's index over the intersection of the azim uth's plot and a grid line and aligning either the protractor's 0 o -180 o or 90 o -270 o line with the grid line. 2. ensuring that the 0 o m ark is to the m ap's north and the 90 o m ark is to the m ap's east.1. then you m easured the azim uth from the bridge to the reservoir. N ow count the num ber of degree m arks from 0 o and 180 o or 90 o and 270 o to where the protractor cuts the grid line.000 m ap sheet. Your answer should be 253 o (+/. P lace a pencil m ark adjacent to the protractor's outer scale at the desired azim uth. If your answer was 73 o . The protractor is now properly aligned. as appropriate. and the protractor's base line is parallel to a north-south grid line. PLO TTIN G AN AZIM U TH To plot an azim uth on a m ap. K eeping the index over the line connecting the two points. on opposite sides of the protractor. C onfirm the plotted azim uth by following the line you drew from the known point. 4. with the grid line. toward the end point. (Ensure the line extends a couple of inches beyond the m ark for ease of reading.1 o ). until it crosses the scale on the outer edge of the protractor. 3. P lace the protractor's index squarely over the center of m ass of the given point ensuring that the 0 o m ark is toward the m ap's north. O n your Tenino 1:50. 3. If this azim uth reading is not the sam e as the 4. until the line crosses the protractor's degree scale. a grid line. m easure the grid azim uth from the reservoir (located in 0499 grid square) to the Salm on C reek Bridge (located in 0198 grid square). First. A sim ple m ethod to check the orientation of the protractor is to use the protractor's degree m arks as a m easuring scale. use the following procedure: 1. align the protractor's 0 o -180 o line or the 90 o -270 o line. P lace the index of the protractor at the start point. slide the protractor along the line until the line connecting the two points intersects either a north-south or east-west grid line. 2.

500 meters away along an azimuth of 115o. plot a grid azimuth from the pit located at 0699 grid square to the oil storage tank in 0893 grid square. It is now night time.On your Tenino 1:50.000 map sheet. then you will be traveling back towards your commander's location. then subtract 180o from your azimuth. If you do an "about face" while facing your original direction of travel. then an "about face" would change your direction of travel by 180o. You are a platoon leader and at 1600 hours your company commander orders your platoon to set up an ambush at the bend in the road located 1. Since the azimuth circle contains 360o. The rules for determining a back azimuth are as follows: 1. If your original azimuth is 180o or less. let's apply this knowledge. it should be 166o. If your original azimuth is 180o or more. Therefore. so how can you reliably find your way back to your company commander's location? The answer is very simple. your company commander calls you on the radio to inform you that the enemy is about to attack the company's main defensive position and that your platoon must return immediately. 2. If you plotted the azimuth properly. BACK AZIMUTHS Now that you know how to measure and plot azimuths on a map. then add 180o to your azimuth. you need to follow a BACK AZIMUTH. you should follow an azimuth of 295o to return to your commander's location. At 2300 hours. .

the G-M angle must always include an azimuth and a direction. The conversion. Grid North: The north that is established by the vertical grid lines on a map. Magnetic North: The direction to the north magnetic pole (located in northern Canada) as indicated by the north-seeking needle of a magnetic compass. The figure below illustrates that there are actually three northerly directions to be considered when reading a map. Grid north is symbolized by a line with the letters GN Since standard military topographic maps use the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) projection for their northern reference (normally the top of the map sheet) and compasses use magnetic north as their reference. All lines of longitude are true north lines. True north is rarely used for military purposes. is contained within the declination diagram of the map. True north is symbolized by a line with a star at the apex. Consequently. The G-M angle is the angular difference between grid north and magnetic north measured to the nearest 1/2o. along with specific instructions on how to accomplish the conversion. True North: A line from any position of the earth's surface to the north pole. most commonly called the Grid-Magnetic angle (G-M angle). Magnetic north is symbolized by a line with a half arrowhead at the apex. The G-M angle can be either easterly (the arrow pointing to the right of Grid North or westerly (the arrow pointing to the left of Grid North) depending on where you are located relative to the North Magnetic Pole. we said that the azimuth is measured from the base direction of north.AZIMUTH CONVERSION Remember. . a conversion between grid and magnetic north is necessary. when we defined an azimuth.

in case your map does not contain the instructions. Right-Add.NOTE: The Hudson Bay is located in northern Canada and has nothing to do with the Hudson River. improper azimuth conversion is the most common error made by cadets during map reading. Always specify whether the azimuth is grid or magnetic. To avoid confusion over whether an azimuth is grid or magnetic. This information is contained in the map's declination diagram where "1990 G-M angle 14 o " is printed on the left side of the diagram and the magnetic north arrow points to the west of grid north.000 map sheet (14 o ) convert a 100 o grid azimuth to a magnetic azimuth. then it is always a magnetic azimuth. If the magnetic north arrow is to the right of the grid north line. Different G-M angles are shown on the following declination diagrams: Historically. then reverse the acronym: MGRALS: Magnetic to Grid.000 map sheet is 14 o west. then you subtract the GM angle from your grid azimuth to convert to a magnetic azimuth. If the azimuth is measured or shot with a compass. adhere to the following: 1. Since W est Point is southeast of the Hudson Bay. Here is an example: Using the G-M angle from the W est Point and Vicinity 1:50. then it is always a grid azimuth. the G-M angle on your W est Point and Vicinity 1:50. Left Subtract . 2. If the azimuth is measured or plotted on a map. conversion A simple rule of thumb to follow. then you add the G-M angle to your grid azimuth to convert to a magnetic azimuth. Add 14 o (the G-M angle) to 100 o (the grid azimuth). 3. the magnetic azimuth is 114 o If converting from magnetic to grid. Right-Subtract This means that when converting a grid azimuth to a magnetic azimuth: If the magnetic north arrow is to the left of the grid north line. then ask. is to use the acronym "GMLARS" as follows: GMLARS: Grid to Magnetic. If not stated. Left-Add.

then you subtract the G -M angle from your m agnetic azim uth to convert to a grid azim uth. Here is an exam ple: Using the G -M angle from the W est Point and Vicinity 1:50. which over the course of several years could have a significant im pact on navigation. the grid azim uth is 76 o Each year there is a sm all shift of the earth's m agnetic field. that it is no longer shown on standard large scale m aps. when com pared to the 1/2 o increm ents of the G -M angle. the Defense M apping Agency will update their m aps long before the annual m agnetic change will significantly effect your G -M angle conversion.000 m ap sheet (14 o ) convert a 90 o m agnetic azim uth to a grid azim uth. then you add the G -M angle to your m agnetic azim uth to convert to a grid azim uth. Sim ply subtract 14 o (the G -M angle) from 90 o (the m agnetic azim uth). the annual shift is so sm all. Norm ally. However. If the m agnetic north arrow is to the right of the grid north line.If the m agnetic north arrow is to the left of the grid north line. .

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
West Point, New York 10996

Lesson 13 Practical Application Exercise MS 103
Ref: 1. Protractor 2. Tenino 1:50,000 map 3. Self-Paced map 4. Map pens/scrap paper 5. Overlay paper

SITUATION: The Tenino rebels have been utilizing the local Grange as fuel storage and distribution for their small “technical” vehicles and resupply vehicles, traveling the Skookumchuck River. Read. The supplies and reinforcements these trucks are bringing is seriously hampering U.S. efforts to stabilize the Northern Tenino region. Current operations presents significant commitment of forces to the Skookumchuck River Valley. Higher has determined that a single combat patrol (raid type) will be conducted to eliminate the Grange Refuel Point. You have been assigned this mission. Your platoon commander has given you discretion to plan your squad’s combat patrol. He provided only this guidance: You have 2 days to conduct the patrol in order to use the helicopters. (Helos available tomorrow and the next day only.) Mission has priority. You may only have your squad and a medic attached. You must plot 3 artillery targets using Platoon ID: AB1001-AB1003. You must give three brevity codes. MISSION: NLT XX21002MMMYY 1ST Platoon will conduct a combat patrol (raid) to destroy the Grange Fuel Farm (EG 143832) IOT stop the flow of supply and reinforcements north to Tenino City. I. 1st Squad Task Organization (1) Squad Leader (+) = (2) Fire Teams (4 soldiers each) (1) Medic (attached) (1) RTO (attached) II. Platoon Leader’s Requirement of You: Provide the overlay to me in 20 minutes. It must include: o Mission Statement • Extract Point (plot) Name/Rank o • Enemy Position (plot) o Call Sign o Azimuth to: o Date/Time • Each leg of patrol o Map Reference • Back azimuth each leg o Grid Coordinate to: o Distance on each leg of patrol. • Objective (plot) o Must use proper military symbology. Each Checkpoint • o Alternate route (check points). • Each Mortar Target x 4 o Orientation tic marks. o 3 Brevity Codes • Insert Point (plot)

BLOCK III
MILITARY ANALYSIS

Lesson 14
THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR
Lesson Objectives: • List and describe the three Levels of War. • List and describe the principles of War. Homework: • Read Text Chapter 14

Remarks: • None
LESSON QUOTE:

The principles of the art of war are within reach of the most ordinary intelligence, but that does not mean that it is capable of applying them. General Mikhail I. Dragomirov, 1913

defeating an opponent requires reducing his combat power and increasing the disparity between friendly and enemy forces. The ability of Army forces to fight and win underlies success in all operations. commanders convert the potential of forces. or both. whether using lethal force or not. protection. resources. maneuver. protect. . that a military unit or formation can apply against the opponent at a given time. firepower. and opportunities into actual capabilities. No single element is more important than any other element.Elements of Combat Power & The Principles of War THE ELEMENTS OF COMBAT POWER Combat power is the ability to fight. Commanders combine them to meet constantly changing requirements. and maintain relevant Maneuver Firepower Information Situational Understanding Protection Leadership Elements of Combat Power information. Commanders combine elements of combat power to create overwhelming effects. information and leadership ⎯ to defeat an opponent. Combat power ensures success and denies an enemy or adversary any chance to escape or effectively retaliate. Commanders reduce the enemy’s combat power by interfering with the enemy’s ability to lead. Combat power is the surest means of limiting friendly casualties and swiftly ending a campaign or operation. Commanders combine all elements of combat power ⎯ maneuver. apply firepower. It is the total means of destructive or disruptive force. Conversely. By synchronizing effects at the decisive time and place.

Maneuver and firepower are complementary combat dynamics. In both the offense and defense. or a combination of both. Firepower produces effects — lethal. It also protects the force by keeping the enemy off balance. to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. The extended range and accuracy of precision munitions and target acquisition systems make firepower more lethal than ever before. supported by indirect fire. The range between combatants may vary between several thousand meters down to hand-to-hand combat. momentum. Their combined use makes destroying larger enemy forces feasible and enhances protection of friendly forces. Close combat has one purpose ⎯ to decide the outcome of battles and engagements. . Effective firepower is essential to overcoming an enemy’s ability and will to fight. shock. The threat of one in the presence of the other magnifies the impact of both. Direct or indirect. the synchronized effects of both are present in all operations. or fire potential. closely supported by indirect fires. Close combat defeats or destroys forces or seizes and retains ground. It renders his reactions ineffective and eventually drives him to defeat. Firepower generates destructive force. nonlethal. the outcome of battle depends upon the ability of Army forces to close with and destroy enemy forces with direct fire. either as a means to an end or an end in itself. Although one might dominate a phase of an action. Tactical maneuver wins battles and engagements. If the enemy is skilled and resolute. All tactical actions inevitably require seizure of terrain. The certainty of destruction through close combat persuades the enemy to yield before the event. or weapons system. air-delivered fires. One without the other makes neither decisive. FIREPOWER Maneuver is most effective when combined with firepower. Effective tactical maneuver continually poses new problems for the enemy.MANEUVER Maneuver is the employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire. Ultimately. Close combat is combat carried out with direct fire weapons. Integrated as part of the commander’s concept. it is the amount of fire that may be delivered by a position. fires alone will not compel an enemy to abandon his position. Maneuver is the means by which commanders concentrate combat power to achieve surprise. and dominance. and nonlethal engagement means. Close combat is inherent in maneuver. it positions forces to destroy the enemy. firepower includes fire support functions used separately from or in combination with maneuver. unit.

Soldiers are the Army’s most important resource.and will to fight. LEADERSHIP Confident and competent leadership unites the other elements of combat power and serves as the catalyst that creates conditions for success. technical. Safety reduces the inherent risk of nonbattle deaths and injuries. In unclear situations. They provide purpose. bold leaders who exercise disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent accomplish the mission. Effective firepower demands well-trained. conceptual. The duty of every leader is to be competent in the profession of arms. although training constantly emphasizes them. They are the sons and daughters of America. Fratricide avoidance minimizes the inadvertent killing or maiming of friendly troops by friendly fires. and motivation in all operations. Protection is neither timidity or risk avoidance. Massing maximum firepower requires Army and joint procedures for determining priorities. energy. and will. Commanders take special care to synchronize firepower with the effects of other systems. The professional competence. Leaders are soldiers first: they know and understand their subordinates and act with courage and conviction. personality. Leaders build teamwork and trust. and tactical. These are not skills that the Army supplies the leader. locating. They are skills developed by the individual and honed by constant self-study. Force protection. methods. and how to influence the action. safety. Competence requires four sets of skills: interpersonal. Trust encourages subordinates to seize the initiative. and will of strong commanders at all levels represent a significant part of every unit’s combat power. The Army operates in tough and unforgiving environments where casualties occur. identifying. Protection has four components: force protection. field discipline. when to make decisions. minimizes the effects of enemy firepower (including WMD). and fratricide avoidance. and information. maneuver. PROTECTION Protection is the preservation of the fighting potential of a force so that the commander can apply the maximum force at the decisive time and place. no commander can afford to waste this precious resource. Leaders who embody the warrior ethos inspire soldiers with the will to succeed. All Army leaders must demonstrate strong character and high ethical standards. direction. and assessing effects. During operations. Field discipline precludes losses from hostile environments. the primary component. competently led units with a high degree of situational understanding. they must know where to be. Leaders instill their units with Army values. and tracking targets. . allocating firepower assets.

Actions include securing equipment and supplies from loss or damage. weapons. In combat. or tactics. Fatal accidents. Commanders must know how to employ them. Trained crews and operators must know the capabilities and limitations of their weapon systems. quick return of minor casualties. and field fortifications do the same. Command attention to safety and high levels of discipline . and missed tactical opportunities can follow. who may be native to the region. Camouflage discipline. and preventive medicine. commanders consider the margins of human endurance. Proper dispersion helps reduce losses from enemy fires and terrorist action. The increased emphasis on force protection at every echelon stems from the conventional dominance of Army forces. and critical information. This mastery can only stem from thorough preparation and training in fieldcraft skills. Force protection counters these threats. They balance the benefits and risks of sustained. opponents seek to frustrate Army operations by resorting to unconventional means. Field Discipline Field discipline. Effective operations security (OPSEC) keeps the adversary from exploiting friendly information. Force protection at all levels minimizes losses to hostile action. In designing operations. Skillful and aggressive counter-reconnaissance keeps adversaries from seeing friendly forces while defining enemy actions and positions. high-tempo operations. a second component of protection. security operations. Safety Safety is a third component of protection. weather. Tactical commanders take care of their soldiers’ basic health needs and prevent unnecessary exposure to debilitating conditions. and disease.Force Protection Force protection consists of those actions to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members). fatigue extends reaction times and reduces alertness. guards soldiers from the physical and psychological effects of the environment. Operational conditions often impose significant risks to soldiers’ lives and health and make equipment operation difficult. Often unable to challenge the Army in conventional combat. Commanders ensure systems are in place for adequate health service support. Hostile environment can sap soldier strength and morale far more quickly than enemy action. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents. Soldiers adapt to the point that they outperform their fully acclimatized opponents. resources. They provide effective systems for maintenance evacuation and rapid replacement or repair of equipment. loss of combat power. facilities.

positive weapons control. terrain. preparing. Situational understanding. process. Army leaders increase their situational understanding before maneuvering forces and engaging the enemy. confident that misdirected friendly fires will not kill them. and disseminate data and information. developed the situation. and disciplined operational procedures coupled with good leadership can do this. Fratricide Avoidance A fourth component of protection is fratricide avoidance. Commanders benefit from information in planning. particularly as soldiers reach exhaustion. The destructive power and range of modern weapons. Army forces are modernizing information systems to an unprecedented degree. While taking calculated risks. Fratricide is the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly firepower. In the past. . control of troop movements. coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of combat. This effort will have far-reaching effects on Army operations. The aim of these improvements is to provide every leader with real-time ability to understand the tactical situation and act within the commander’s intent. commanders assume the obligation to embed safety in the conduct of all operations. commanders made enemy contact. and gained information. Commanders seek to lower the probability of fratricide without discouraging boldness and audacity. store. and protection at decisive points. and weather conditions may increase the danger of fratricide as well. increase the potential for fratricide. Relevant information (RI) is information the commander and staff need to exercise command and control. It uses procedures and information systems to collect. The better commanders understand the situation.lessen those risks. the better decisions they can make and the more combat power they can generate. INFORMATION Information is a powerful operational and tactical multiplier. Today. Reducing fratricide increases soldiers’ willingness to act boldly. They use information as an element of combat power to shape the operational environment and create the conditions for employing the other elements of combat power. firepower. Information management (IM) is the direction of relevant information to the right person at the right time in a usable form to facilitate decisionmaking. display. Tactical maneuvers. Safe operations come from enforcing standards during training. It enhances leadership and magnifies the effects of maneuver. and executing operations.

major operations.THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR Understanding the principles of war and tenets of Army operations is fundamental to operating successfully across the range of military operations. and practice. At the operational and tactical levels. and tactical levels. the principles of war are powerful tools for analysis. and engagements. This is particularly true in stability operations and support operations. Military action cannot divorce objective from considerations of restraint and legitimacy. They do not apply in the same way to every situation. The principles of war summarize the characteristics of successful Army operations. At times. the Army adjusted the original principles of war. they may counterbalance each other. They guide and instruct each leader in proven fundamentals of the profession of arms. OBJECTIVE Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined and attainable objective. The nine principles of war provide general guidance for conducting war and MOOTW at the strategic. In the ensuing years. but overall they have stood the tests of analysis. The US Army published its original principles of war after World War I. The . The Principles of War Objective Offensive Mass Economy of Force Maneuver Unity of Command Security Surprise Simplicity The principles of war are not a checklist. battles. commanders should have a clear understanding of the expected outcome and its impact. The principle of objective drives all military activity. experimentation. When undertaking any mission. operational. Applied to the study of past campaigns. objective means ensuring all actions contribute to the goals of the higher headquarters. Their greatest value lies in the education of the military professional. They are the enduring bedrock of Army doctrine.

Offensive actions are those taken to dictate the nature. 4-1. ECONOMY OF FORCE 4-4. They mass combat power in time and space to achieve both destructive and constructive results. . Army operations concentrate the effects of combat power in time and space. Massing in time applies the elements of combat power simultaneously. MANEUVER 4-6. Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time. while not necessarily concentrating and massing forces. Offensive action is key to achieving decisive results. Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force requires accepting prudent risk in selected areas to achieve superiority— overwhelming effects—in the decisive operation. and exploit the initiative. The enemy is overwhelmed at the decisive time and place before he can assemble his force or react effectively. commanders select the method that best fits the circumstances. Offensive actions are the means by which commanders impose their will on an enemy. 4-7. Commanders mass the elements of combat power to overwhelm opponents and gain control of the situation. They force the enemy to react. retain. It is the essence of successful operations. adversary. and tempo of an operation. 4-3. Economy of force missions often require forces to conduct operations with minimum resources. Both achieve dominance of the situation. The aim is to strike a combination of critical elements whose loss shatters the coherence of the enemy force. 4-5. Offensive operations are essential to maintain the freedom of action necessary for success on the battlefield. scope.Seize. Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power. Massing in space concentrates the effects of combat power against a combination of physical points. To an increasing degree. or situation. Commanders concentrate elements of combat power against the right combination of points. Economy of force is the reciprocal of mass. MASS 4-2.

using unexpected systems. varying tactics and methods of operation. Factors contributing to surprise include speed. it is necessary only that he become aware too late to react effectively. commanders use cooperation. 4-6. and operations. espionage. multinational. Military deception greatly enhances security. interference. It is not essential to take the adversary completely unaware. Developing the full combat power of a force requires unity of command. and economy of force. SURPRISE 4-5. surprise. observation. but giving a single commander the required authority unifies action. ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander. Surprise is the reciprocal of security. SIMPLICITY . Unity of command means that a single commander directs and coordinates the actions of all forces toward a common objective. detection. Despite the absence of command authority. For every objective. and protection as well. and interagency nature of unified action creates situations where the military commander directly controls only some of the elements in the AO. It does not suggest excessive caution. 4-4. Surprise results from taking actions for which an opponent is unprepared. information. and consensus building to achieve unity of effort. Surprise applies across the range of operations. sabotage. firepower. conducting military deception operations. or annoyance. Security results from measures taken by a command to protect itself from surprise. Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. The complex joint. The threat of unconventional action and terrorism requires emphasis on security even in benign environments. It requires flexible thought. Calculated risk is inherent in conflict. 4-2. and the skillful application of mass. Cooperation may produce coordination. UNITY OF COMMAND 4-1. Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. plans.application of leadership. SECURITY 4-3. and enforcing OPSEC measures. Security protects and preserves combat power. negotiation.

Commanders at all levels weigh the apparent benefits of sophisticated.determine the degree of simplicity required. Simple plans executed promptly are better than complex plans executed late. complex concepts against the risks that subordinates will not understand or follow them because of their complexity. .

The purpose of the movement is to get the fire in a more advantageous place to play on the enemy flank. Homework: • Review Text Chapter 14 Remarks: • Ensure you fully understand the Principles of War and there Three Levels. “War as I know it. LESSON QUOTE: Battles are won by fire and by movement.Lesson 15 THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR (CONTINUED) Lesson Objectives: • Identify the appropriate Principle of War and its significance given a tactical vignette.” . This is from the rear of flank. Patton Jr. GEN George S.

Argentine aircraft lost near Goose Green Schoolhouse . With D Co at first in reserve.000 POW's including the 12th Inf Regt and a Co from the 25 th Inf Regt.3 (27th) SUMMARY OF MAIN EVENTS . By early Thursday morning 27 May 1982. 28 May 1982. and after allowance is made for the nearly 50 killed (not the originally reported 250).. However by the time of the surrender.A Co has taken and holds Darwin Hill. B & D Co’s 2 Para move forward towards Boca House 4.. Argentine aircraft lost on return to Stanley . and attack aircraft from Port Stanley.. 2 Para moves off the two miles to the start line with C (Patrol) Co leading the way. Sqdn Ldr Iveson ejects and hides out before being rescued three days later. Two patrols from C Co probe forward towards either side of the isthmus to plot some of the enemy defences. one of them is hit probably by 35mm Oerlikon fire and crashes to the west of Goose Green [b27]. With their approaches mined.[a59] Aermacchi MB-339A. 2. the mortars to their rear. 9. the men of 2 Para prepare for a night attack against largely unknown forces across the open ground of the Goose Green area. A later turret fault is repaired and she remains on station supporting the paras advance towards Darwin. and for support they can call on 105mm artillery. Meanwhile that same evening. and B and D Co's have finally silenced Boca House 7.. there are over 1.Late on Wednesday 26 May 1982 as some 500 men of 2 Para move south towards Darwin. Early on Friday. 2 Para has marched the eight miles from Sussex Mountain and reached the holding position at Camilla Creek House where most lie up all day. has to return to San Carlos Water.. A and B Co's wait on either side of Burntside Pond..[b27] Harrier GR. [a60] Pucara (both 1700 hrs) 12..28th May 1982 Early morning. but later pull back under fire. especially between Boca House and Darwin half way down the isthmus.. B Coy circles around airfield to cut off Goose Green 11. to dusk . Argentine helicopter-borne reinforcements continue to arrive . five miles long and ov er a mile wide. and the fire support company with its Milans initially across Camilla Creek from the forward Argentine positions. the three 105's of 8 Bty Royal Artillery and their ammo are flown to Camilla Creek House by No. and in a subsequent strafing run.[a58] Pucara (1200 hrs) From midday .. That night.. B & D Co’s come up against strongpoint at Boca House 6. British aircraft lost west of Goose Green .. there is much uncertainty about Argentine strength in the area. A Co comes up against main defenses along Darwin Hill . two Harrier GR. British aircraft lost west of Camilla Creek House .3's attack Argentine positions with CBU's (Cluster Bomb Units). A Co 2 Para occupies Burntside House 3.846 Sea Kings. Harrier GR3's hit Argentine AA positions 13. to dawn By midday . and HMS Arrow heads into Grantham Sound.map below) Early that afternoon.Approach to Darwin .. (1 . when with the threat of air attack at dawn.. the infantry are in well-prepared defensive positions. A Co moves past Coronation Point 5. D and C Co’s head towards Goose Green airfield 10. 1.[b28] Scout (1155 hrs) 8. anti-aircraft guns laid in the ground defence role. opening fire from there under the control of a naval gunfire observer.

Still under fire. As dawn breaks. (4) A Co moves past unoccupied positions at Coronation Point. and next morning. Leaving one platoon of A Co to provide covering fire from the north side of Darwin. (12) Then three Harrier GR. aircraft from both sides come on the scene. but limped back to Stanley. With evening approaching and the Argentines squeezed in towards Goose Green. (3) At 0410. Maj Keeble is called up from the rear. Supporting frigate HMS Arrow in more peaceful times . As A Co is hit and goes to ground. probably by a Blowpipe SAM. the attacks on both flanks bog down as (5) B Co comes up against the strongpoint of Boca House and (6) A Co finds that a small rise.The Battle for Darwin and Goose Green. while to the north. Not until midday will 2 Para break through. 3 Commando Brigade. A Co has taken and holds Darwin Hill. "Daily Mail". later known as Darwin Hill. (7) The next sortie by two more Pucaras catches two Royal Marine Scouts on their way in to casevac Lt Col Jones. starting with two MB.339's of CANA 1 Esc and two Pucaras of Grupo 3 which hit the school area. a Royal Engineer and the Marine pilot. Two Argentine POW's are sent in to start negotiations which last most of the night. (13) more reinforcements arrive to the south by helicopter. and another attempt to push forward is made which leads to two officers and an NCO being killed. B and D Co's are soon in confused action against a series of enemy trenches. Group Capt Pedroza surrenders all his forces to Maj Keeble. but Lt Nunn is killed by cannon fire and goes down near Camilla Creek House [b28]. Capt Niblett manages to evade them. By midday. Many of the 1.3's bring much needed relief by hitting the AA guns at Goose Green with CBU's and rockets. The first attack by Falkland's based aircraft took pla ce earlier when a Grupo 3 Pucara was hit. and is soon shot and dying in an action which leads to the award of a Victoria Cross. He then moves off virtually on his own. the battle continues with the Argentines helicoptering in their first reinforcements and flying more support missions. but finds no-one there other than four unhurt civilians. A Co moves off on the left and attacks Burntside House believed to be occupied by an Argentine platoon. Colour Sergeant Cotton. and leaving A Co to slowly crest Darwin Hill and pulling B Co slightly back from Boca House. and 30 to 40 paras wounded. and as they slowly make progress. B Co starts forward from the other side of Burntside Pond down the right flank with D Co following them long the middle. Brigadier J H Thompson RM. is the key to the Argentine defences. (9) D and C Co's head towards the airfield and Goose Green while (10) B Co circles east to cut off the settlement. During the attack towards the schoolhouse. J Co 42 Commando Royal Marine is flown in reinforce 2 Para but too late to join in the fighting. Friday 28 May 1982 . and B and D Co's have finally silenced Boca House. With artillery support on both sides. (8) One of the Pucaras is later found to have crashed into high ground returning to Stanley [a58]. and minutes later one of the Pucaras drops napalm and the other is shot down by small arms fire [a60]. Now in daylight. the remainder start to circle round the inlet to take the settlement. 2 Para. orders D Co to move round them on the far right along the edge of the sea. three men of D Co are killed in an incident involving a white flag. David Norris. British losses are fifteen men from 2 Para. (11) Now into the late afternoon.000 Argentine POW's including the FAA men sail on "Norland" to Montevideo in early June. Lt Col Jones and his TAC HQ come up. One of the Navy jets is brought down by a Royal Marine Blowpipe [a59].(2) At 0330.

Homework: •Read Text Chapter 16 (reference FM 7-8 the TLP Handbook. “My God. I know I could do better if I was in his place!” Frederick the Great. and say to his misguided self. •List and describe the five factors used to Analyze Terrain (OAKOC). and FM 21-26). 14 July 1745 . Remarks: •Do Your Readings! LESSON QUOTE: …the kind of person who could not lead a patrol of nine men is happy to arrange armies in his imagination. criticize the conduct of a general.Lesson 16 METT-TC Lesson Objectives: •List and describe the six factors of Military Analysis ( METT-TC).

The mission includes what tasks must be accomplished. The first five factors are not new. who is to do them. the analysis includes adversaries. together with the purpose of the operation. Troops and support available. and when. the nature of full spectrum operations requires commanders to assess the impact of nonmilitary factors on operations. civil considerations has been added to the familiar METT-T to form METT-TC. Commanders and staffs also Visualize. The results of that analysis yield the essential tasks that. the commander’s visualization. and other threats to success. The analysis of the enemy includes current information about his strength. Terrain and weather. Direct assess the most likely enemy courses of action. Enemy. However. where. Mission. Enemy.The Factors of METT-TC METT-TC refers to factors that are fundamental to assessing and visualizing: Mission. All commanders use METT-TC to start their visualization. Because of this added complexity. and Civil considerations. clearly indicate the action required. Threats may include the spread of infectious disease. Describe. In stability operations and support operations. activity. . and capabilities. and why the tasks are to be done. Commanders consider asymmetric as well as conventional threats. and add to. potentially hostile parties. Commanders determine the mission through analysis of the tasks assigned. location. regional instabilities. or misinformation. Time available.Staff estimates may address individual elements of.

Commanders consider the natural environment. enemy. to include cultural sites. obstacles and movement. and leaders within the AO. Commanders include civilian political. Time Available. in all operations directly or indirectly affecting civilian populations. and neutral forces. and executing the mission. combat support (CS). and psychological state of friendly forces. Terrain includes manmade features such as cities. and ports. airfields. and cover and concealment (OAKOC [see FM 6-0]). Commanders assess the time available for planning. . Civil Considerations.21). organizations. Weather and terrain also have pronounced effects on ground maneuver. Commanders assess the quantity. The analysis includes the availability of critical systems and joint support. avenues of approach. The nature of operations extends the analysis of the natural environment (weather and terrain) into the context of the physical environment of a contaminated battlefield. precision munitions.Terrain and Weather. economic. railroads. culture. and information matters as well as more immediate civilian activities and attitudes. Analysis of terrain and weather helps commanders determine observation and fields of fire. and CSS assets. commanders and staffs analyze and compare the limitations of the environment on friendly. preparing. Troops and Support Available. bridges. Commanders examine combat. Time available is normally explicitly defined in terms of the tasks assigned to the unit and implicitly bounded by enemy or adversary capabilities. Proper use of the time available can fundamentally alter the situation. Civil considerations relate to civilian populations. These assets include contractors (see FM 3-100. training level. air support. To find tactical advantages. They consider how friendly and enemy or adversary forces will use the time and the possible results. key terrain. and CSS operations.

. The local population and displaced persons influence commanders’ decisions. Media presence guarantees that a global audience views US military activities in near real-time. Civil considerations at the tactical level generally focus on the immediate impact of civilians on the current operation. Conflict often develops across boundaries. These considerations can be important at all levels. protection. these people are a central feature of AOs. Commanders factor public opinion into their vision of the battlespace. The activities of the force—including individual soldiers—can have far reaching effects on domestic and international opinion. economic. The media also affect activities and opinions within the AO and often prove a valuable information resource. and towns are important civil considerations. whether official or not.At the operational level. longterm diplomatic. civil considerations include the interaction between military operations and the other instruments of national power. Civil considerations define missions to support civil authorities. they also consider larger. and boundaries may impose limits on friendly action. and welfare affect the choice of courses of action and the allocation of resources. determine which civilian leaders and institutions can influence a situation. Political boundaries of nations. and informational issues. Civil considerations can tax the resources of tactical commanders while shaping force activities. Boundaries. Their presence and the need to address their control. however. In stability operations and support operations. provinces.

LESSON QUOTE: Rangers of Connaught! It is not my intention to expend any powder this evening. We’ll do this business with cold steel. Homework: •Review Text Chapter 17.Lesson 17 METT-TC (CONTINUED) Lesson Objectives: •Conduct Military Analysis of the situation given a tactical vignette. General Sir Thomas Picton before the assault on Badajoz 06 April 1812 . Remarks: •Review METT-TC and OAKOC.

he discovered that the position was occupied by a reinforced squad of Russian raiders. RPGs and 120mm Mortars for support during their raids. and the rest of the unit was off on a raid. Your Platoon is looking at you. What do you do? .” You are sure that the shots alerted the enemy on Hill 209. an Apache section located a raider resupply position on top of Hill 209. He fired us up and ran back toward the Hill. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union. the Russians are armed with AK-47s. Suddenly you hear three single shots from the vicinity of your lead squad. No casualties. Recently they have begun to raid surrounding communities for food. Contact with the raiders has always proven bloody and dangerous as they rarely surrender. Your platoon has been on the march for 3 hours and is now nearing the planned Assault Position.ATTACK ON HILL 209 ORIENTATION: You are the 1st platoon Commander. You have been operating for the last four months in the forested mountains of Finland. we ran into an enemy OP. You conducted rapid inspections and issued a quick FragO to your squad leaders. money. a radio (by the large antenna outside) and two UAZ(s) with trailers full of supplies. A trained conventional force. He also noted that they had a tent. Observing the hill with his FLIR. Your purpose for being deployed here is to defend the Finnish city of Kjahnd from Russian incursions. Company A of the 1st BN/504th (82nd Airborne Infantry). It didn’t take long for the Company Commander to receive the order to destroy the resupply site. and anything that they can carry off for their own use. He estimated that the unit on Hill 209 was a rearguard. SITUATION: While on an aerial patrol. RPKs. You hear over the radio: “Sir. Russian military forces have gone unpaid and live in near poverty conditions. Currently it is noon. To date you have been conducting defensive operations with limited security patrols to maintain the peace and halt the Russian incursions.

O.. As a Captain. shortly after service in the Boer War. in 1915.. he authored The Green Curve in 1909 and the great Tab Dope. Swinton. K. C. and contributing to many journals. Dutch for farmer. more than anyone else. . BOER: Descendents of Dutch Colonists in South Africa. and as Commandant of the Royal Tank Corps from 1934 to 1938 -. he wrote before World War I on the effects of air warfare.earning the rank of Major General. he wrote "The Defence of Duffer's Drift.. Republic of South Africa in 1652. ANT HILL: A large cone-shaped mound of earth. THE BOER WAR BACKGROUND INFORMATION The Boers. under the pseudonym O'le Luk-Oie (Olaf Shut-eye). scholar and professor. and the Transvaal.B. Lieutenant Backsight Forethought.S. served to create hostility between the Boers and British. His other works include The Study of War in 1926 and his final publication. GLOSSARY: ABATIS: A barricade of felled trees with branches facing the enemy. Considered by Field Marshal Earl Wavell as one of the most far-sighted officers the British Army has produced.E. The Boers initially outnumbered the British and were well equipped.B." using the pseudonym. He. was responsible for its early development. Even though the Boer armies finally surrendered. Duffer's Drift has become a military classic on minor tactics in this century. He served as Professor of Military History at Oxford from 1925 to 1939. Gradual commercial control by the British and discovery of gold and diamonds. author. In 1914 Sir Ernest completely revolutionized warfare by his invention of the machine that was to became known as the "tank". The war was finally ended by the systematic destruction of the Boer guerrilla units and hostilities were terminated by the Treaty of Vereeniging in May 1902. many of the Boers departed on the "Great Trek" and created the Republic of Natal. D. The Boer territories were annexed by Great Britain and were organized into the Union of South Africa eight years later. first settled what is now Cape Province. After Great Britain annexed this territory in 1806. An Eastern Odyssey written in 1935.About the Author: Major General Sir Ernest D. apparent victory for the British was retarded by extensive and coordinated guerilla warfare. among other things. scoring impressive victories in the areas adjacent to their territories. In addition to Duffer's Drift. resulting in the South African War or Boer War from 1899 to 1902. the Orange Free State. mining and of psychological warfare. was a noted English soldier. or BF.

and our very grave fault. "BACKSIGHT FORETHOUGHT" . by arousing the imagination. especially those who are now knocking at the door. assist to prevent in the future even one such case of disregard of principles. "who goes there?" SUBALTERN: A British officer holding a commission below that of captain. a sentry’s challenge. and now we must turn it to use. DUFFER: An incompetent. with certain deductions based thereupon.800 meters high. but merely a record of petty experiences against one kind of enemy in one kind of country only. it will not have been written in vain. to wit the very junior. given the conditions. But from these. highest British medal for valor. We have forty million reasons for failure. QUI VIVE: Fr. and assist to an appreciation of what may happen when they are not applied. VELD: A grassy plain of South Africa. even on small operations. a lieutenant. DRIFT: A ford. It embodies some recollections of things actually done and undone in South Africa. with dire results. Should this tale. awkward or stupid person. PREFACE: "It was our own fault. It is hoped that its fantastic guise may really help to emphasize the necessity for the practical application of some very old principles..ing and different weapons has to be met. VC: Victoria Cross. KRAALS: A village of South African natives surrounded by a stockade for protection. KOPJE: A rocky hill or butte of South Africa usually 200. This tale of a dream is dedicated to the "gilded Popinjays" and "hired assassins" of the British nation. KAFFIR: A fierce black tribe of South Africa (19th Century).DONGA: South African gully or ravine. or for those occasions when a different foe with different methods of fight. but not a single excuse. This practical application has often been lost sight of in the stress of the moment. 18991902. quite unrealized until the horrible instant of actual experience. The dreams are not anticipations. a shallow place in a stream or river that can be crossed by walking or riding on horseback. similar to the Western Tableland of the United States. it is not difficult to deduce the variations suitable for other countries." KIPLING.

by some curious mental process I had no recollection of the place whatsoever. for defence make spades. or at any rate too steep for wagons anywhere except at the drift itself. combined with a heavy meal. The whole series of dreams. It was an important ford. which formed a screen impenetrable to the sight.PROLOGUE: Upon an evening after a long and tiring trek. I felt lonely. were covered with dense thorn and other bushes. not now in flood. and were consequently very rough. left behind by my column with a party of fifty NCOs and men to hold the drift. Thus. is responsible for the following nightmare. " — Bridge Maxim." — Old Chinese Proverb. turn slowly into gold as it hung in the afternoon sunlight. I arrived at Dreamdorp. These finally produced success. however. and not a little sad. . where the earth had been eaten away by the river when in flood. It was just three o’clock. was carried on from dream to dream. and one only. One thing. it is necessary to explain that though the scene of each vision was the same. remained in my memory as a connected whole when I awoke. and that was the vivid recollection of the general lessons previously learnt. They were also broken by small ravines and holes. as I stood on the bank of the river near Duffer’s Drift and watched the red dust haze. "If left to you. consisting of a series of dreams. In each dream the locality was totally new to me. crawling along at the very bottom of its bed between steep banks which were almost vertical. First Dream "Any fool can get into a hole. The banks from the river edge to their tops and some distance outwards. and here I was on the banks of the Silliaasvogel river. raised by the southward departing column in the distance. I had not the great advantage of working over familiar ground. To make the sequence of the whole intelligible. and I had an entirely fresh detachment. The river was a sluggish stream. The local atmosphere. because it was the only one across which wheeled traffic could pass for some miles up or down the river.

for. The place I picked . with the traditions of a glorious regiment to uphold. The enemy had guns. I knew. my men. quite close to the drift. and equally open. and place a sentry. with martial ardour. if you are told off to guard anything.topped. As I turned towards my gallant little detachment. and warned me that my Colour-sergeant was waiting for orders. moreover. At last here was the chance I had so often longed for. shovels. which was also in its favour. but I had passed all my examinations with fair success. and with a Kaffir kraal. which I knew should be chosen for a camp whenever possible. and sandbags. I might possibly be attacked before that time. except that the true inwardness of the last piece of information did not strike me at the time. consisting of a few grass mud huts on top. rocky mountain. if possible. as no enemy were known to be within a hundred miles. but this was very unlikely. as every one knows. Between the river and the hills on the north the ground consisted of open and almost level veld.. My orders were to hold Duffer’s Drift at all costs. because it was slightly rising ground. It was. it is true. sparsely sown with small boulders. Though in company with fifty "good men and true. After a moment’s consideration. About 1000 meters south of the drift was a convex and smooth hill. The whole place was covered with ant-hills. which I confess had been rather forced on me. etc. I decided to pitch my small camp on a spot just south of the drift. This was my first "show. I was young and inexperienced." my first independent command. with ultimate victory and-but a discreet cough at my elbow brought me back to realities. visions of a bloody and desperate fight crossed my mind a fight to the last cartridge. my men were a good willing lot. and about a mile to the north-east appeared the usual sugerloaf kopje. covered with bushes and boulders-steep on the south. We were also well supplied with ammunition and rations and had a number of picks. do all I should require of them. but the chance of an attack filled me. It all seemed plain enough. but gently falling to the north. somewhat like an inverted basin. standing on top of it. and would. this had a farm on the near side of it." it certainly made me feel somewhat lonely and marooned to be left out there comparatively alone on the boundless veld. and then an appeal to cold steel. you mount a guard quite close to it. and I am quite sure.Some 2000 odd meters north of the drift was a flat. I should probably be visited by some column within three or four days time. and I was determined to carry out my order to the bitter end. on the south bank the veld was more undulating.

the more puzzled I grew. "Such a nice man too. pitch the camp. my Kodak. I could not possibly get all round before dark. and get their teas before dark. or Bull Run. After a little thought. and the south was my rear. and. be child’s-play after a little thought." with a pleasant face and long beard. Unluckily neither of these useful facts seemed quite to apply.out also had the river circling round three sides of it in a regular horse. I decided to explore the neighbourhood. it would. and these they insisted on showing me. which formed a kind of ditch. no doubt. the more I thought. and was surrounded by blue gums and fruit trees. or Sedan. About a quarter of a mile from the farm I was met by the owner. for. if they had given me a job like fighting the battle of Waterloo. having no horse. Besides. Andreas Brink. then. also. as the enemy were not within a hundred miles. and after all I wasn’t so very far from my "company. how to tie "a thumb or overhand knot." I was indeed lucky to have such an ideal place close at hand." How often. Between you and me. "a natural obstacle. However. I also knew how to take up a position for a division. Piet and Gert. there would be no need to place the camp in a state of defence till the following day." and as any correction might have confused him. most perplexing. a tame or surrendered Boer farmer. curiously enough. and it would be quite as much as they could do comfortably to arrange nice and shipshape all the stores and tools. or—"the place where the enemies come from. and was much impressed. Now. I was really relieved to be able to put off my defensive measures till the morrow. where naturally there were none. Mr. where there might possibly be enemies. I had never really considered such a thing. It was quite a snug little farm for South Africa. of course. there was always a front." and how long it takes to cut down an apple tree of six inches diameter. and off I trudged. in the light of my habitual dealings with army corps. The north. or the exams I had undergone. He would insist on calling me "Captain. The bulk of the enemy being away to the north. The only "measures of defence" I could recall for the moment were. and his two sons. which had been dumped down anyhow in a heap. as I had crammed it up and been examined in it too. which was most acceptable after . as the book says. being my front. but the stupid little subaltern’s game of the defence of a drift with a small detachment was. the men were tired after their long trek.shoe bend. I came to the conclusion that. nothing could have been more suitable. directing my steps towards the gleaming white walls of the little Dutch farm. or. I knew naturally that there must be a front. In fact. that of course must be the front. I had not thought of asking for them. because in all the schemes I had had to prepare. it flashed across my mind that obviously I should go to the north. and gave me a drink of milk. I knew all about that. with my field-glasses. had I not had trouble in getting out of a dull sentry which his "front" and what his "beat" was." The three of them positively bristled with dog’s-eared and dirty passes from every Provost Marshal in South Africa. I settled these knotty points to my satisfaction. I did not think it worth while to make any. They escorted me to the farm. but was for a moment puzzled as to which direction I should take. nestling under the kopje to the north-east. because I was a wee bit puzzled as to what to do. to have so many they must be special men. the east and west were my flanks. Having issued my immediate orders accordingly. or even an army corps. where the good wife and several daughters met us.

The three of them strolled about the camp. and as I walked the peacefulness of the whole scene impressed me. and the other some little way down the river. one at the drift. meditating over the rather curious names which Mr. and many exclamations of "Allermachtig. whose parting rays tinged most strongly the various heights within view. "Number one-all is well!.my long and dusty trek. and knew they were at their proper posts. and one of the numerous flappers was playing our National Anthem on the harmonium as I entered. one of which was for digging some trenches round the camp. asking most intelligent questions about the British forces and the general position of affairs and seemed really relieved to have a strong British post near. rising vertically in the still air. surrounded by a swarm of men. and that. and by the indistinct and cheerful camp noises. during the course of which I gathered that there were no Boer commandos anywhere within miles. which alone showed the position of my little post. each guard had built a bonfire silhouetted in the cheerful blaze of . congratulating myself on the good turn I was thus able to do myself and detachment. The nice Dutchman with his apostolic face and the lanky Piet and Gert were already there. as becomes good British soldiers." About dusk they left. and that Brink was really a most loyal Briton. The whole family appeared either to speak or to understand English. it was almost comforting to hear the half-hourly cry of the sentries. which gradually grew louder as I approached. I saw the two guards mounted. After writing out my orders for next day. disliked very much. and the hush of approaching evening was only broken by the distant lowing of oxen." and refused to converse with them. because there was an oleograph of the Queen on the wall. with many promises to return with a fresh supply on the morrow. I strolled along in quite a pleasant frame of mind. the flat-topped mountain some two miles to the north was called Regret Table Mountain. and the gently rising hill close to the drift on the south of the river they called Waschout Hill. Their loyalty was evident." They evidently appreciated them extremely. none of whom had even smelt such luxuries for weeks. but had been forced to go on a commando with his two sons. eggs and butter in the camp. Everything was going on well. I was pleased to find that they were both alert. even after I had taken a family group. After an uneventful round. They did not even take offence when some of the rougher man called them "blarsted Dutchmen. Brink had given me for the surrounding features of the landscape. as it was a cold night. to whom they were selling their wares at exorbitant rates. showing great interest in everything. I directed my steps back towards the thin blue threads of smoke. simple fellows! They asked and got permission from me to sell milk. and the camp was quite silent. and we had a very friendly chat. The landscape lay bathed in the warm light of the setting sun. that the whole family cordially hoped that there never would be again. and I strolled on my way. On going round sentries about midnight. Funny. especially a brand-new pair of the latest-pattern field-glasses. and regarded as fatigues. each furnishing one sentry on the river bank. When all had turned in. Number two-all is well!" By this sound I was able to locate them. The farmer and the boys took a great interest in all my personal gear. The kopje above his farm was called Incidentamba. but could not imagine any use for my Kodak in war-time. or buy their "skoff. and the men were at their teas when I got back. and had been much against the war. an operation which I knew my men. which they tried with much delight.

and dreamt of being decorated with a crossbelt made of V. This. including both sentries. the reports of Mausers rang round the camp from every side. once my favourite imposition. After impressing them with their orders. had surrounded it in the dark." Trekking all that day on foot. these. These they had at once shot on the alarm being given. through which he finally put his foot. Our losses were 10 men killed. There was some wild shooting in return from my men. made a hellish din. I suppose. and as I managed to wriggle out of my tent the whole place was swarming with bearded men. The fires they had built. as these are more important than the comfort of your men or the shipshape arrangement of your camp. and its rhythmic throbbing seemed gradually to take a meaning.S. my mind must have slightly wandered. I gradually gathered from the Boers what I had already partly guessed. mingled with the smack of the bullets as they hit the ground and stripped. at the order of the not ill-natured but very frowzy Boer commandant. by a hoarse cry. and hammeredout the following lessons. At that moment I must have been clubbed on the head for I knew no more until I found myself seated on an empty case having my head.C. and had carefully marked down our two poor sentries. Towards evening my head got worse. tied up by one of my men. the "zipzip" of the leaden hail through the tents. Later on. plainly see them at their posts. I was gloomily taking off the saucy warm spotted waistcoat knitted for me by my sister. besides being a comfort to themselves. I had much to think of besides my throbbing head." cut short by the unmistakable "plipplop" of a Mauser rifle. carrying a rifle and bandolier and my new field-glasses. about the grey of dawn. which was dripping with blood. . and in the boots of another. but it was all over in a moment. "Halt! who goes. because twice during the night when I looked out I could. the extent of their "beat. and "Pappa" was. to my horror. for I found myself repeating some Latin lines. " when suddenly the voice of the field cornet broke into my musing with "Your breeches too. sockless. and of wearing red tabs all down my back.. were also useful to me. which had succeeded so easily in crossing the drift I was to have held.s and D. . the result of much pondering on my failure: 1. the Boers’ had one killed and two wounded. and the curses and groans of men who were hit as they lay or stumbled about trying to get out. Do not put off taking your measures of defence till the morrow. . . The sight of the long Boer convoy with guns." and the direction of their "front. . and had then rushed the camp from the dense cover on three sides. and 21 wounded. that they had been fetched and guided all round our camp by friend Brink. . I was suddenly awoken. curiously enough. I noticed our friends of the previous evening in very animated and friendly conversation with the burghers. crawling about in the bush on the river bank. was a continual reminder of my failure and of my responsibility for the dreadful losses to my poor detachment. namely. captain. I recognized as my unhappy camera. .which stood the sentry-a clear-cut monument to all around that here was a British sentry fully on the qui-vive. I turned in. Before I was off my valise. without leaving my tent.O. shooting into the heaving canvas. as. He was laughing and pointing towards something lying on the ground.s. but forgotten since my school-days---"Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes." etc. I finally fell asleep. Here.

Knowledge unto occasion at the first far view of Death?" KIPLING. After these lessons had been dinned into my soul millions and millions of times. I suddenly found myself dumped down at Duffer’s Drift with the same orders as already detailed. and an equal detachment composed of entirely different men. including the enemy. 3. one to the top of Waschout Hill. 2. To prevent any strangers. Do not in war-time show stray men of the enemy's breed all over your camp. a strange thing came to pass-there was a kaleidoscopic change . As soon as I received my orders. 4. Do not. and on every subsequent occasion. Second Dream "And what did ye look they should compass? Warcraft learnt in a breath. at such times a hole in the ground is worth many tents. by numerous "passes. be in tents when bullets are ripping through them. and the other some 1000 meters out on the veld to the . from coming into my position and spying out the elaborate defenses I was going to make. I began to make out my plan of operations without wasting any time over the landscape. if avoidable. I sent out at once two examining posts of one NCO and three men each. with this important exception. and making much noise every half-hour. by standing in the full glare of a fire. the setting sun. friendly or otherwise. I had ample stores. As before. therefore." at once to confide in them. and do not be hypnotised. which. or the departing column. Do not let your sentries advertise their position to the whole world. so that I could never forget them. be they never so kind and full of butter. ammunition. and tools. I was determined to carry out all the lessons I had learnt as well as I knew how. running through my brain were four lessons. My position was precisely similar to my former one. having off-loaded all our stores.I had another dream.Choose the position of your camp mainly with reference to your defence. soon vanished.

from coming anywhere near camp and to shoot at once on non-compliance with the order to halt. these were to be sent in with a list by one of the guard." which was the great thing.north of the drift. and give the alarm in the event of the approach of any body of men whatever (Boers were. to sell. which they did not relish. During this time one or two strangers had approached the guard of the north from a farm under Incidentamba. who would return with the money. Though. If the newcomers had any provisions to sell. the north was the front. of course. by which time the men were quite done up by their hard day. Still we were "entrenched. Having thus arranged a safeguard against spies. The man sent in with the stuff reported that the elder of the Dutchmen . we were only able by dark. which was quite unlikely. to make quite a low parapet and shallow trench. and the trench was all round our camp. a few being detailed to pitch camp and prepare tea. friendly or not. So long as I was entrenched. and the soil was hard. etc. I proceeded to choose a camping ground. which still appealed to me. even should we be attacked during the night or early next morning. We started making our trenches as soon as I had marked off a nice squarish little enclosure which would about contain our small camp. but the strangers were not to be allowed nearer the camp on any account. improbable. but still just possible). and for the same reasons. I chose the site already described in my former dream. of course. and also to stop any individuals. I thought. it would be best to have an all-round defence as a sort of obstacle. having a camp. As the length of trench was rather great for the available number of diggers. these were brought in as arranged for. Their orders were to watch the surrounding country. so we were well prepared. it appeared the best place around. As they had eggs and butter. The majority of the men were told off to dig..

and stood up. one was that the Dutchman who had presented me with eggs and butter was in earnest confabulation with the Boer commandant. with his compliments. but though he had a museum of "passes. that I had to hoist the white flag. but a perfect hail of bullets whistled in from every direction-from in front of each trench. and neglected no possible precaution for our safety. I also noticed that all male Kaffirs from the neighbouring kraal had been fetched and impressed to assist in getting the Boer guns and wagons across the drift and to load up our captured gear. and two guards were mounted close by the object I was to watch.was a most pleasant man. He was an old man. at the same places as in my previous dream. and the position seemed so utterly hopeless. and generally do odd and dirty jobs. so many men were hit." I thought. every bush and ant-hill up to 100 meters range seemed to have hid a Boer behind it. "there must be . As we were collecting ourselves preparatory to marching off there were one or two things which struck me." Again. This time. and the great proportion of our killed (who were nearly all shot through the head) to our wounded. After going round sentries to see everything snug for the night. namely. and were thus not unnecessarily exposed. BF. which resulted in close-range fire opening up to us from all sides. I lay down myself with a sense of having done my duty. We had by then 24 men killed and six wounded. nor were there any fires. At dark the two examining posts came in. This time we were not rushed. but in the trenches instead of in tents. Teas had been eaten. and looked as if they enjoyed it. and the strange part was. "if it wasn’t for the bushes in between. there was no half-hourly shouting. and after dark all turned in. I walked part of the way back to his farm with him." After vainly trying until bright daylight to see the enemy in order to do some damage in return. This close range explained the marvelous accuracy of their shooting. as I trudged with blistered feet that livelong day. and the sentries had orders not to challenge but to shoot any person they might see outside camp at once. we saw no one. the drift. As he seemed friendly. and all fires put out at dusk. who was calling him "Oom" most affectionately. here we were. I had done all I knew. It seemed so strange. "Ah. and over and through our parapet. not being such a fool as to allow him in my defenses. As the detachment wag plaintively remarked. As soon as the white flag went up the Boers ceased firing at once. in order to look around. Just before dawn much the same happened as already described in my first dream. His only information was that there were no Boers anywhere near. They were placed standing down the river bank. just high enough to see over the top. however. 24 of us killed. there was no "back chat" when an order was given—usually by friend "Oom. ignominiously captured. and yet. These same Kaffirs did their work with amazing alacrity. in case he had any information. I went out instead. It was sufficient to put a hand or head up to have a dozen bullets through and all round it. and the Boers over the drift." I was not to be chloroformed by them into confidence. and possibly loyal. and had sent me a present of a pat of butter and some eggs. and would I allow him to come in and speak to me? However. we could have seen lots of Boers. except that the ball was started by a shot without challenge from one of our sentries at something moving amoung the bush. my boy. did I think over my failure.

It is more the duty of a soldier to teach the lazy neutral the dignity of labour. moreover. Stuff well with chestnuts as to the large force about to join you in a few hours. It may even be much better to take up your defensive position some way from the spot. 6. How the bullets seemed sometimes to come through the parapet. This will very likely be sufficient for the nearest commando. letting them go free to warn their friends of your existence and whereabouts— even though they should not be under temptation to impart any knowledge they may have obtained. concealed and unperceived. and how those that passed over one side hit the men defending the other side in the back. I pondered deeply over the details of the fight. more economical in lives. garnish with corroborative detail." the river-bed. ." A non-bullet-proof parapet or shelter which is visible serves merely to attract bullets instead of keeping them out—the proof of thickness can be easily and practically tested. and by keeping him under guard to prevent his going away to talk about it. a low parapet and shallow trench are not of much use. that "natural obstacle. on the whole. and season according to taste with whiskey or tobacco. and show up. and to fire from cover which hides them even when shooting. and so away from concealed ground. It is not business to allow lazy men (even though they be brothers and neutrals) to sit and pick their teeth outside their kraals whilst tired soldiers are breaking their hearts trying to do heavy labour in short time. to have the enemy in the open. Probable cost—some heavy and glib lying. unless the locality is suitable to hold for other and defensive reasons. The Boers must have known of our position." In order to find out what these were. There seemed to be some fault in the position. but no lives will be expended. 7. It would be better.a few more lessons to be learnt besides those you already know. to guard a drift or locality does not necessitate sitting on top of it (as if it could be picked up and carried away). if possible. over us who had to show up over a parapet every time we looked for an enemy. Eventually the following lessons framed themselves in my head—some of them quite new. or to have what is called a clear "field of fire. How. where they could not be seen. When fired at by an enemy at close range from nearly all round. seemed to be more of a disadvantage than a protection. just in the very place where every Boer expected us to. would be as follows: Gather and warmly greet a sufficiency of strangers. but how had they managed to get close up all round within snapshooting range without being discovered? What a tremendous advantage they had gained in shooting from among the bushes on the bank. as what bullets do not hit the defenders on one side hit those on another. With modern rifles. some of them supplementing those four I had already learnt: 5." as the cookery book says. It is not enough to keep strange men of the enemy’s breed away from your actual defenses. "Another way. which enables the enemy to crawl up to very close range.

beyond all chance of forgetfulness. They were to visit all neighbouring farms and kraals and bring in all able-bodied Dutch men and boys and male Kaffirs. Third Dream "So when we take tea with a few guns. The very worst place for such a position seemed to be anywhere within the horseshoe bend of the river. . a strange thing happened. some 700 to 800 meters south of the drift. by persuasion if possible. o’course you will know what do do—hoo! hoo!" KIPLING.By the time the above lessons had been well burnt into my brain. and would also assist to solve the labour question. We started to make a trench about 50 meters long for my 50 men. and which gave excellent cover. but by force if necessary. My choice therefore fell on a spot to which the ground gently rose from the river bank. except that I now had seven lessons running through my mind. Here I arranged to dig a trench roughly facing the front (north). I had a fresh dream. as this would allow an enemy practically to surround it. I was at Duffer’s Drift on a similar sunny afternoon and under precisely similar conditions. which thus would have about 800 meters clear ground on its front. I decided that as the drift could not get up and run away. one to the north and one to the south. especially as such a position would be under close rifle fire from the river bank. it was not necessary to take up my post or position quite close to it. This would prevent the news of our arrival being carried round to any adjacent commandos. according to the usual rule. each of one NCO and three men. I at once sent out two patrols. to which the approaches were quite concealed. A small guard was mounted on the top of Waschout Hill as a look-out.

should the post be attacked." No one could tell whether some "brass hat" might not come round and inspect us next day. showed bundles of "passes. the leader of whom seemed a man of education and some importance. but in two portions. that it was. and was quite bulletproof. the patrols came in. and I hardened my heart. and about thirteen Kaffirs. were at first inclined to protest when they were given tools to dig trenches for themselves. The Kaffirs served as a welcome relief to my men as they got tired. I was particular as to this point. having collected three Dutchmen and two boys. so it was as well to be prepared for anything. but Westminster was far away. Finally they had the humour to see the force of the argument. in a small ravine. and even as to a question in the "House" about our brutality. because I once heard a certain captain severely "told off" at maneuvers by a very senior officer for having his trenches "out of dressing. as I could not help wondering what might happen to poor BF if the member for Upper Tooting should raise the point. Our trench was not all in one straight line. after all. though each half was of course as straight as I could get it.Some little time after beginning. so as to get a more divergent fire (rather cunning of me). broken back at a slight angle. It was astonishing what difficulty I had to get the men to dig in a nice straight line. The former. By evening we had quite a decent trench dug—the parapet was two feet six inches thick at the top." and talked very big about complaining to the general. necessary for their own health. . They also dug a separate hole for themselves on one side of and behind our trench. as they would otherwise be out in the open veld. This momentarily staggered me. as I tested it.

The tents were not pitched. A guard was mounted over our prisoners. we all "turned in" in our trenches. They were most probably the enemy. Of course. called . then ten minutes passed with no further sign of the enemy." and furnished one sentry to watch over them. was relieved and increased to six men. if they come on quite unsuspecting. Just as breakfast was over.hill about 400 meters away that I shall give the word "Fire!" However. and then to shoot them down.At dusk the guard on Waschout Hill. let the advanced party go past without a shot. but evidently the women gave information as to our arrival and position. each drop raising its own little cloud of dust. This. for whom a trench had also been dug. apparently for consideration. Yes. We were entrenched. when they were lost to sight. Before falling asleep I ran over my seven lessons. had a good bulletproof defence. and another going similarly to the west. It was with a contented feeling of having done everything right and of being quite "the little white-haired boy. The minutes seemed to crawl—five. After a short time the enemy halted. the sentry on Waschout Hill reported a cloud of dust away to the north. of course. by Regret Table Mountain. as we were not going to occupy them. Suddenly. and started off with their wagons behind Incidentamba. then the sound as of heavy rain pattering down some 200 feet in front of the trench. and it seemed to me I had left nothing undone which could possibly help towards success. it was not to be. I shall lie low. Two or three women ran out and waved. Whilst I was focusing my glasses there was a "boom" from the hill. all our rations and ammunition close at hand in the trenches. because the effect was electrical. they were all well out of range. or rather "guests. sir." that I gradually dozed off. and as we were quite ready. and cross the drift in a lump without discerning our position. Next morning dawned brightly and uneventfully. and it was no good merely showing up our position. of course. This was caused by a large party of mounted men with wheeled transport of some sort. the only thing to do was to wait till they came out in the open within range. and we had about an hour’s work improving details of our trenches before breakfasts were ready. The advanced Boers split up into two main parties." One of the men drew my attention to a few specks which looked like wagons moving about on the flattish shoulder of Incidentamba. whereupon these men galloped up to the farm at once. it will be just when they reach that broken ant. One man galloped back with the information obtained to the main body. and water-bottles filled. followed by a sharp report and a puff of smoke up in the air quite close by. What passed. I think I see something on top of that kopje on the fur side yonder. which became all bustle. "Beg pardon. one riding towards the river a long way to the east. and then open magazine fire into the thick of them. What a "scoop" I thought. The advanced men seemed to have a consultation. we could not tell. and after teas and giving out the orders for the next day. and wait until the main body gets over the side within close range. and then gradually approached Incidentamba farm with much caution. and seemed to be trekking in all innocence of our presence for the drift.

The guard on Waschout Hill. and there was no reason why the enemy should cease to rain shrapnel over us until we were all killed." we should have been blotted out before we could have hoisted it. which were plain enough. and the whole ground in front of the trench was covered with bullets. By this time we were crouching as close as possible to the parapet. At this moment rifle fire began on Waschout Hill. though they were close to the Kaffir huts.forth the time-honoured remarks of "What ho. Several men were hit. she bumps!" and "Now we shan’t be long. I was greatly surprised to find that no party of Boers came down from their artillery position on Incidentamba to take our surrender. What could they have discovered? I failed entirely to solve this mystery. but within three minutes some fifty Boers galloped up from the river bank on the east and the west. and a few more came up from the south round Waschout Hill. and the hillside some way behind the trench was spattered with bullets. keep under cover. with those beastly shells dropping their bullets down from the sky. though "we had not been long. During the day’s trek the following lessons slowly evolved themselves. at once shouted out. what difference it would have made to my defensive measures. As we were absolutely powerless to do anything. whose groans were unpleasant to listen to. The Boers had got the range of the trench to a nicety. and men began frantically to try and dig themselves deeper into the hard earth. now suddenly felt most woefully inadequate. one man being hit." A moment later there was a second boom. As there was some little uneasiness among my men. As soon as the gunfire ceased. a few more men were hit. had two men wounded by rifle fire. All I could do was to thank Providence that the enemy had no quick-firing field guns or." which proved only too true. men. quite cheerful in the security of our nice trench with the thick bulletproof parapet. Of course. with my then knowledge. and were stored in my mind in addition to those already learnt: . though it had seemed only quite a short time before so complete. This time the shell burst well. and they can’t touch us. Tools were seized. and the shells burst over us now with a horrible methodic precision. as our trench seemed to give no more protection from the dropping bullets than a saucer would from a storm of rain—but it was too late. I had quite forgotten the possibility of guns being used against me. I. had I remembered their existence. I put up the white flag. Not a single shell had come near them. but it was difficult to make out why the Boers had at first halted and begun to be suspicious before they had seen the women at the farm. though. the shell whistled over our heads. the women on the farm had betrayed us. What an anti-climax the reality had been from the pleasurable anticipations of the early morn. which. Almost immediately another shot followed which showered bullets all over us. Another boom. when I had first sighted the Boers. "It’s all right. which had done a certain amount of damage to the enemy. We could not sink into the earth fast enough. but no bullets came our way. I do not know. I was aghast.

if they are very numerous or very far off. As narrow a trench as possible. To see oursels as others see us!" BURNS. his manservant and his maidservant (who also have tongues). Though to stop a shrapnel bullet much less actual thickness of earth is necessary than to stop a rifle bullet. Fourth Dream "O was some power the gittie gie us. Against well-aimed longrange artillery fire it would be better to scatter the defenders in the open hidden in grass and bushes. yet this earth must be in the right place. or behind stones or ant hills. even though the parapet be bulletproof ten times over. To hollow out the bottom of the trench sides to give extra room will be even better. 9. Do not forget that. if guns are going to be used against you. With your men scattered around. a shallow trench with a low parapet some way from it is worse than useless. but their orders were slightly different. and gives no protection from shrapnel. I had yet another dream. because the open top of the trench can be kept the less wide. with the sides and inside of the parapet as steep as they will stand. this time with ten lessons to guide me. When collecting the friendly stranger and his sons in order to prevent their taking information to the enemy of your existence and whereabouts. you can safely let the enemy fill your trench to the brim with shrapnel bullets. Again did I find myself facing the same problem. 10. as we had no place for them. only do not then hope to surprise the enemy. While chewing over these lessons learnt from bitter experience. will give you the best chance. this is impossible. and his ox and his ass (which may possibly serve the enemy). . Of course." do not forget also to gather his wife and his daughter. For protection you must be able to get right close under cover. than to keep them huddled in such a trench.8. I started off by sending our patrols as described in my last dream. and any animals which could be of use to the enemy were to be shot. if you are wishful for a "surprise packet. the fewer the shrapnel bullets will get in. All human beings were to be brought into our post. The trench gives the gunners an object to lay on. The more like a mere slit the open top of the trench is.

which were nearly as hard as stone. as I feared the possibility of guns being used against us. we made the trench as narrow as possible at the top compatible with free movement. I treated the ladies with tons of "tact" in my suavest manner. each half being quite straight. I turned regretfully round to the Colours-sergeant. In plan it faced north generally. Each man hollowed out the under part of the trench to suit himself. they were not taking any. with a parapet about twelve inches high in front of it. it was of a very different section. and seeing an answering but respectful quiver in his left eyelid. I tried it.C.For my defensive post I chose the position already described in my last dream.D. Here was evidently an opportunity of making use of the short training I had once had as an A. in fact. The parapet was about two feet six inches thick at the top and quite steep inside. said— "Colour-sergeant. The women indulged in much useless abuse. and repeated the only Dutch words of comfort I knew "Wacht een beetje"—"AI zal rech kom"—but to no purpose. and made his own portion of the parapet to suit his height. for the reasons already given." "Sir?" "Which do you think is the best way of setting alight to a farm?" . We consequently dug a trench similar in plan to that already described. which seemed very suitable. but. taking the matter less philosophically than their mankind. women and children. winked solemnly and officially. and refused to obey orders. The patrols returned shortly with their bag of a few men. In section it was about three feet six inches deep. They had not been brought up to appreciate tact. and was slightly broken forward to the front. being built up of pieces of broken ant-hill.

all innocent of our presence. firstly to keep them safe. and (whisper) spat! The advanced party of the enemy came on. It advanced in the same manner. This was when they were some 1800 meters away. Upon these important details and breakfast a good two hours had been spent. The object of this move I could not quite see. A second and third followed. Very shortly "boom" went a gun from the top of Incidentamba. the trouble was over. At daybreak next morning. which turned off behind Incidentamba with its wagons. and a shrapnel shell burst not far from us. each man suiting the size of the trench to his own legs. They appeared to have a vehicle with them of some sort. When I saw this."Well. about on a level with the end of Incidentamba. except. and the firing trench." with the fresh red earth contrasting with the yellow of the veld. some prefer the large bedstead and straw. The ladies quite understood this sort of tact. but I think the ‘armonium and a little kerosene in one corner is as neat as anything. when a force was reported to the north in the same position as described in the previous dream. for there was a short palaver and much pointing." There was no need for more. when suddenly one man stopped and the others gathered round him. and after seeing everything was all correct and the ladies provided with tents to crawl under (they had their own blankets). A small number. I went to sleep with a feeling of well-earned security. rode off in a vague way to the west. as it was necessary to place them in a really deep trench. As all were still at long range. I was wondering if I should be able to surprise them. it only wanted an edging of oyster shells or gingerbeer bottles to be like his little broccoli patch at home. In the end the trench looked quite neat—"almost as nice as mother makes it. A messenger then galloped back to the main body. with a close-range volley. including a man on a white horse. I could not help patting myself on the back and smiling at the Dutch ladies in the pit. after which they soon picked up our . who only scowled at me in return. The existence of this ravine. the advanced men were met by no one at the farm. and secondly to prevent their waving or signaling to the enemy. of course. men prisoners. sir. As they appeared quite unwarned. as there were no signs of any enemy. and were put into a small ravine not far from the trench. The Dutchmen and Kaffirs were at once started digging shelters for themselves and the women and children. scouting carefully and stalking the farm as they came. altering the depth and alignment where necessary. we continued to improve our trench. as it only required some hollowing out at the bottom and a little excavation to suit admirably. As one of my reservists remarked. etc. therefore. saved much digging. and by night the shelters for the women and children. and then magazine fire into their midst. we could only wait. All arrangements for the guards and sentries were the same as those described in the last dream. All dug with a will. The advanced party split up as already described. The latter were placed together. They had evidently seen something and sniffed danger. were nearly done.

It then became clear. the most exposed part. The waste of good and valuable shrapnel shell by the enemy was the cause of much amusement to the men. were "as cosy as cockroaches in a crack.range exactly. In about a quarter of an hour. as one of them remarked. I was wise after the event. we were quite snug and happy in our nice deep trench. He too was badly hit. I thought. All we could do was to fire by sound at various likely bushes on the riverbank. I then ordered the whole lot to take cover in the trench. must be what is called being "taken in reverse." and it was. and was at once shot to powder before they had even used it. as it was to the rear). Nearly all these seemed to come from the riverbank in front." At the expenditure of many shells only two men were hit in the legs. for we had no chance of making them then. The mere raising of a head to fire seemed to be absolutely fatal. however. This. but we could see no Boers though the air began at once to whistle and hum with bullets. the enemy must evidently have got into the donga behind us (to which I had paid no attention. and I was impressing them with the necessity of keeping up a brisker fire to the front. I saw two poor fellows trying to build up a pitiful little kind of house of cards with stones and pieces of ant-hill through which to fire. Of course. and kept the parapet one continual spurt of dust as they smacked into it. but just had the strength to gasp out that except himself and the man who started with him. but not before it had suggested to me the remedy for this state of affairs. when I noticed a bullet hit our side of the parapet. and the shell began to burst all about us. . and. Suddenly the noise of firing became much more intense. we had had five men shot through the head. One poor fellow was dropped. At the same time the men seemed to be dropping much oftener. but with the smack of the bullets striking the earth all round quite close it was not easy to tell from which direction this fresh firing came. about a dozen more men had been bowled over. But no more could be done by us towards the rear than to the front. and only to pop up to take a shot to the front or rear. to the north and northeast. and this we did with the greatest possible diligence. The conditions were the same-no Boers to be seen. This was indeed cheering." As usual. all the guard on Waschout Hill had been killed or wounded and that the Boers were gradually working their way up to the top. but no visible results. where we contentedly crouched. who were in great spirits. as it had on a former occasion when we were attempting to fire at close range over a parapet against the enemy concealed. By the time I had gathered what was happening. we wanted in such a case "head cover" and "loopholes. At this moment two of the guard from Waschout Hill started to run in to our trench. and were shooting us in the back as we stood up to our parapet. After a time the guns ceased fire. even had we not been otherwise busy. and a terrific fusillade was opened on to them. but the other managed to reach our trench and fall into it. This was as conspicuous as a chimney-pot on top of the parapet. and we at once manned the parapet and stood up to repel an attack. the bullets kicking up the dust all round them as they ran.

and a covey of little shells whistled into the ground close by the trench. or the rear. for suddenly we heard. I surrendered. seven only had been hit by the shrapnel and rifle-fire from the front. two of these burst on touching the ground. nor indeed by rifle-fire from anywhere. Then I knew. mangling seven men. the enemy could do nothing. a sound as of someone beating a tin tray. and had 25 killed and 17 wounded. short of charging. but merely firing our rifles over the edge of the trench. must be being "enfiladed from a flank. Right out of rifle-range. and not exposing themselves at all. and its danger relative to the other points of the . its prolongation on the right was up above ground for some 3000 meters away on the veld on the north bank. Boers. for"We lay bare as the paunch of the purser’s sow. Of these. owing to the ground. however. To the hail of the Nordenfeldt. still it was in a small degree comforting to think that. I saw a party of Boers. Though we were huddled together quite helpless like rats in a trap. where there should be few enemies.So hot was the fire now that no one could raise his head above ground without being shot." It was so. we had all instinctively vacated the right half of our trench and crowded into the left half. Without any order. away on the open veld on the north. we had bayonets. far away out on the veld to the north. and by crouching down altogether and not attempting to aim. which by great good luck could not be enfiladed from any point on the south side of the river. For that we fixed bayonets and grimly waited. as usual. Alas! I was again deceived. and were shooting straight down our right half trench. there was nothing left but surrender or entire annihilation at long range. This. Some snipers must have reached the top of Waschout Hill. and they had not. for the men in the right half of the trench began to drop unaccountably whilst they were sitting well under cover. All the rest had been killed or hit from the flanks. If they did make an assault. As the bullets snicked in thicker and thicker. There was to be no chance of close quarters and cold steel. it was plain the number of snipers was being increased. I thought. we were now enfiladed from both flanks. and we could sell our lives very dearly in a rough-and-tumble. where there should be none! This fact convinced me that my preconceived notions as to the front. " This was the last straw. and the little steel devils ploughed their way into the middle of us in our shell-trap. But how had they managed to hit off so well the right spot to go to enfilade our trench before they even knew where we were? Pom-pom-pom-pom-pom again. with a white horse and a vehicle. We had fought for three hours. but the knowledge was acquired too late to help us. we remained for a short time without casualties. sprang up from all round. I gradually discovered the cause of this. This respite. I at once diagnosed the position with great professional acumen. as. was short.

"Enfiladed? Of course we’ve been enfiladed. we had again found ourselves at a disadvantage as compared with the concealed enemy shooting at close range. All my cherished ideas were being ruthlessly swept away. groping for something certain or fixed to lay hold of.far worse from both flanks. "Yes. when placing and making your defences. "Hi! Hi! Hi!--this way for the British defence. as they evidently must have done when they stopped and consulted in the morning? It was not until passing Incidentamba. wiggled about—that’s what it should have been. women. As one man said to a corporal. and something to keep the blighters from shooting us in the back wouldn’t `ave done us much ‘arm." There were evidently more things in earth than I had hitherto dreamt of in my philosophy! As we trekked away to the north under a detached guard of Boers. as I casually happened to look round and survey the scene of the fight from the enemy’s point of view. as conspicuous as the Long Man of Wilmington on the dear old Sussex downs. Beware of being enfiladed. you never know which way it will take yer. to put it otherwise." To which the gloomy reply. There were no men. Yes. "Things are not what they seem. children or Kaffirs who.compass." This expressed itself in different ways. that I discovered the simple answer to the riddle. How did they spot our presence so soon. which positively shrieked aloud. I call it. It is nasty from one flank . but I could not for some time solve the mystery of why we had not succeeded in surprising the enemy. that when you are engaged in shooting the enemy to the front of your trench. this enfilading racket. when he wrote that immortal line. Eventually I collected the following lessons11. Beware of being taken in reverse. and then there would not have been quite so much of it. Could Longfellow. " To which chipped in a third. needed considerable modification. There on the smooth yellow slope of the veld just south of the drift was a brownish-red streak. from having to show up at a fixed place In order to fire. . anyway. no rear. This ’ere trench should have been wiggled about a bit. or. knowing of our arrival. could have warned them. 13. there are no flanks. it is front all round. 12. when all had started so well with them in their "crack." I then grimly smiled to think of myself sitting like a "slick Alick" in that poster of a trench and expecting to surprise anybody! Besides having been enfiladed and also taken in reverse." ever have been in my position? The survivors were naturally a little disheartened at their total discomfiture. I’m fairly fed up. many little points such as the above sank into my soul. who was plugging a hole in his ear with a bit of rag— "Something sickening. and I was plunged into a sea of doubt. take care. his pal cannot sneak up and shoot you in the back. For a small isolated post and an active enemy.

or you can "wiggle" it about in many ways. . Do not have your trench near rising ground over which you cannot see. " DRYDEN. conceal your position. Give them air. Fifth Dream A trifling sum ot misery New added to the foot of they account. 18. and which you cannot hold. You can sometimes avoid being enfiladed by so placing your trench that no one can get into prolongation of it to fire down it. yet you may be open to it from long range. 19. 14. And he said. head cover with loopholes is an advantage. by means of gun or pompom fire. if the enemy can only get there. so as to draw fire. look at it from the enemy’s point of view. or it will be far more dangerous than having none. also. As once before—cover from sight is of often worth more than cover from bullets. so that it is not straight. or make "traverses" across it. `Now I shall be out ot sight. or dig separate trenches for every two or three men. To test the concealment or otherwise of your position. So over the valley and over the height In silence !’ll take my way’." GOULD.Remember. for defence it is not. To surprise the enemy is a great advantage. There are few straight trenches that cannot be enfiladed from somewhere. This should be bulletproof and not be conspicuously on the top of the parapet. 15. Though for promotion it may be sound to advertise your position. 17. If you wish to obtain this advantage. 16. "Jack Frost looked forth one still clear night. Do not huddle all your men together in a small trench like sheep in a pen. that though you may arrange matters so that you cannot be enfiladed by rifle fire. For close shooting from a non-concealed trench.

and a clear view of the river further east and west. and we had soon conveyed all our stores up to the top of the hill. in all the maneuvers I had attended and tactical schemes I had seen. besides. . but on consideration I decided to play cunning.Again I faced the same task with a fresh mind and fresh hopes. and started work. and up it I walked. where I could not be overlooked from any place within rifle range. I came to the conclusion that it was not any good being near the top of a hill and yet not at the top. formed the Kaffir kraal. I got an excellent view of the drift and its southern approach just over the bulge of the hill. As I stood near one of the huts. The Kaffirs of the kraal we had impressed to assist at once. etc. My duty was plain: Waschoiit H ill seemed the only place which did not contravene any of the 19 lessons I had learnt. I believed. I made out my plan of operations in detail. have "command.. Upon the return of the patrols with their prisoners. all that remained with me of my former attempts being 19 lessons. Having detailed the two patrols and the guard on Waschout Hill as already described. and that this same innocent-looking Kaffir kraal would materially assist me to hide my defences. with some empty kerosene tins and heaps of bones and debris. but I knew it was important—it says so in the book. the "defence" always held a position on top of a hill or ridge. were being arranged—in walking about to choose a position to hold in the light of my 19 lessons. I spent some 20 minutes—whilst the stores. and where I should. the Dutchmen and "boys" were told off to dig for themselves and their females. I would make my post on the top of Waschout Hill." I was not quite certain what "command" meant. I thought at first I would demolish the few grass and matting huts which.

as they would have a more favourable position than the men in the trenches below. stones. their heads would be just above the level of the ground.My arrangements were as follows: All round the huts on the hilltop and close to them. to a height that a man can fire over. the remainder being dealt with as described later.. we had got the firing trenches complete. cut through the hut sides above this parapet. In most cases the parapets were provided with grooves to fire through at ground-level. which were to be arranged as follows. which would have necessitated also the use of new sandbags. All the tents and stores were stacked inside one of the huts out of sight. As with the background the men’s heads were not really visible. the communication trenches were started. about four and a half feet. in spite of the hardness of the work. to allow men to fire standing up without being seen. and loopholes. but the others were not finished—they . of which there was ample. and each long enough to hold five men. When the men using these trenches were firing. In three of them I meant to place my best shots. would be built up with sandbags. we dug some ten short lengths of deep-firing trenches. which caused much grousing among my men. it was unnecessary to provide proper loopholes. leading from one trench to the next. That evening. the parapet on each side being high enough to just protect the head. really only serving as rifle rests. and also leading from each trench back to four of the huts. curved in plan. which would be quite invisible. Round the inside of the walls of these huts part of the excavated earth. ‘These were to be narrow and deep. There was room in each hut for three men to fire. some of the excavated earth being heaped up behind the trenches to the height of a foot or so. which would be rather conspicuous and troublesome to conceal. etc. to act as snipers. Once these firing trenches were well under way. and the fourth was a conningtower for myself. These trenches had extremely low parapets. pieces of anthill. and to a thickness of some two and a half feet at the top.

every two minutes we had to look round to see if the sentry at the camp had signaled any enemy in sight. the heaps of earth. looking most natural. To review the place generally.. no enemy in Sight. then every man would pop up and empty his magazine into any of the enemy in range. such as empty tins. and though our communications were not perfect quite. It was awkward trying to walk with our rifles hidden under our blankets. as before. and to us "it was nothing more." There were the heaps of debris usually round a kraal. in case any stray Boer should be lurking around. Ammunition and rations were distributed round the trenches the last thing before we turned in. We had. bones. screens. a very good position. anyhow. Next morning broke. everything was ready. these we could soon improve if we had any time to ourselves the next morning. After we had done our breakfasts. and before daylight we were hard at it. The earth walls inside the huts were also not quite completed. With great luck perhaps the Boer scouts would pass us on either side. so as to show nothing but some very natural smoke above the kraal. tins. and instructed them to walk down the hill in different directions to the riverbank and try if they could see the heads of the men in the firing trenches against the sky. would have betokened something unusual. and were quite keen on surprising Brother Boer if possible. some of which we found lying about. This was to be done by raising a pole on the highest hut. the "dixies" were being boiled for the breakfasts inside four grass screens. and that was that a few thoughtless men began. finishing the work still undone. and so allow us . in three of the huts. By this time the men had fully entered into the spirit of the thing. to spread their brown army blankets out in the sun on top of the huts and on the veld. and cooking-pots. from the loopholes of which I could see the drift. The result of our work was splendid. we doffed our helmets and wrapped ourselves in two beautiful orange and magenta striped blankets. Standing in my conning-tower. Having issued orders as to the necessity for the greatest secrecy in not giving away our position should Boers turn up early next morning. No head was to be raised nor a rifle fired until I whistled from conning-tower. I picked out one or two of my smartest NCOs. We could do nothing but wait and hope.were only half the necessary depth. as he might be interested to see two "khakis" wandering about on the veld. moreover. and every man knew what to do. I also had all water-bottle and every vessel that would hold water. I and my orderly walked off some half-mile to the north of the river. and. like squares of brown sticking-plaster all around the kraal. To the veriest new chum these square blots. and no trenches. There was only one fault. etc. filled and distributed in case of a long and protracted fight. To remedy this before it was too late I hastened back. While the digging was proceeding. If so. should be rearranged so as to give a background to every man’s head. the sentry in one of the huts reported a force to the north. the men in the huts could at once drop into the deep trenches and be safe. borrowed from our Kaffir lady guests. I thought over the possibilities before us. The Kaffirs and Dutch had deep pits. but no heads were visible. Kaffir gourds. This was excellent. as we looked. I went to sleep with confidence. As we were going some distance. and some three hours after dawn. If we were shelled. grass. We saw a Kaffir kraal on a hill.

they had not halted suspiciously. I determined to make the best of it. chatting. The other parties of scouts to east and west had at once galloped back to the river where they dismounted under cover and began to pepper us. it was no-good. unluckily. for they advanced "anyway" without care. also (though it was not much consolation). five or six of them on the ground threw up their hands and came into the post. I found that from these trenches neither the drift nor the road on the near bank of the river. . had not been put to the test of actual use. It was really a stroke of luck that I had discovered this serious fault. To my intense horror. but it would be at a much longer range than I had intended. where the slope of the hill was more gradual and showed them all up. it would betray our whole position at once. they evidently expected none on the open veld beyond them. and to signal back to the main body to the north. Our Dutch and Kaffir guests uttered no sound either. On the ground there remained a mass of kicking horses and dead or groaning men. and to marking the exact spot when it would be best to give the word. Here we could fire on them. but it was war. About ten of them succeeded in galloping off. I whistled. for how often had I not seen a "brass-hat" ride along on horseback. The little hill we were on would. except that after coming past Incidentamba Farm. and it meant possibly a fire. The kraal was also a suitable place to off-saddle for a few minutes while the main body came up to the drift. and from that height. Anyway. could be seen! The bulging convexity of the hill hid all this. With a view to seeing exactly how far I would let the latter come before opening fire. also some loose horses. My error was not going to escape the same way. was not under my fire! At most. for in their pits was a man with a rifle alongside them. and smoking quite unsuspectingly. They crossed the river in several places and examined the bushy banks most carefully. we had done something. Meanwhile the enemy’s scouts had advanced in much the same way as detailed before. They rode up towards it laughing. It was not magnificent. but finding no "khakis" there. and therefore a cup of coffee.to lie low for the main body. and if we were not discovered by the scouts. until it got a long way south of Waschout Hill. waiting for those in front. A few dismounted. but came on in small groups or clumps. fix the exact position for trenches in which the rifles would be little above the ground. Would they examine the kraal. The very spot where I could best catch the enemy. We uttered no sound. I could not now start digging fresh trenches further down the hill. or would they pass on? My heart pounded. I reflected. that I had erred in good company. the northern loopholes of the conning-tower and one other hut alone could give fire on the drift. where they must pass. Several of the clumps joined together. however. How I cursed my stupidity! However. be certain to prove an attraction for them. and came on chatting in one body of some 30 men. I got down into the firing trenches facing the drift and the road south to see how matters appeared from the level of the rifles. These trenches. it must be dead ground! It was. because it was an excellent vantage ground whence to scan the horizon to the south. At last they halted a moment some 250 meters away on the northeast. the rest started again straight towards us. to open fire on the main body when they were just on the other side of the river bunched up on the bank. for otherwise we might have let the bulk of the enemy cross the drift without discovering the little fact of the dead ground till too late.

but gradually came to the conclusion the Boers had retired. To these we did a good deal of damage. After dark. where they were safe from our fire. I feared a trap. as the enemy then apparently woke up and kept up a furious rifle fire upon us for over an hour. and were also under the intermittent shellfire from the two guns. for he made a very bold move. and continued from the southwest only for 20 minutes. well out of range. the firing died away into a continuous but desultory rifle fire. etc. but now ensued a period of stalemate. we opened fire on the main body some 1500 meters away. and it was instructive to see what a splendid target they made. they must know all about us and our isolation. dismounted. by which time we had one man killed and two wounded. he drove the whole of the wagons. and the rifle fire also gradually died away. We had so far scored. by now. Under cover of dark. horses. but towards midnight I was forced to withdraw them into the trenches. with an occasional dropping shell from the guns. At first we got it very hot from the north. This was done under cover of the fire from a large number of riflemen. After a little we discovered the riverbed was deserted as well. Some of the new white sandbags from inside the huts were scattered out in full view of the enemy. had all crossed the drift and trekked south! . after several casualties. After a little while the shelling on the north ceased. by making men stand up and fire at that level. which were soon knocked to bits. and opened fire at us. Until the Boers discovered that they could advance south from the drift without being under rifle fire from our position. The Boer in command of the main body must have gathered that the river-bed was clear. they were held up. but not till they had well served their turn. which had immediately been driven a short distance back and then outwards to the east and west. I tried to guard the drift and dead ground to the south of it. which had kept us to our trenches. which was comforting to watch. but the Boers had not retired. They must have drawn a lot of fire away from the actual trenches. We were being fired at from the riverbank on the north. and the deserted wagons.As soon as our immediate enemy were disposed of. It was really the best thing he could have done. and under the mutually supporting fire of their guns. he might have come straight on with a rush.. They had discovered the dead ground. and we were shelled for a short time from both sides. and if he had only known that we could not fire on the ground to the south of the drift. there were the dead men. pretty well all round. where the guns had been all along. They made most excellent practice at the huts. who had at once galloped up to the river-bank.. and from ant-hills. During this time the guns went through some mysterious evolutions. for they had to abandon two of their wagons on the way to the river. Their losses must have been heavy over this short distance. Would they discover it? As they had ridden all round us. who had at once halted and opened out. etc. causing great confusion. Then suddenly a gun was opened on us away from the southwest. and how often they were hit. and from two guns and a pompom. When day dawned not a living soul was to be seen. After this the guns ceased. straight on as fast as possible over the odd 400 meters to the river and down the drift into the riverbed.

During the next few hours we buried the dead. another little matter on my mind was what my colonel would say at my failure. In addition to these lessons. Lying on my back. Mr. we were not captured. and had very few losses. tended the wounded. Choose the exact position of your firing trenches. sleep evaded me. I was trying to get a few winks of sleep myself before we started to improve our defences against a possible further attack. and I had ample leisure to consider my failure and the causes. The lessons I derived from the fight were: 20. Beware of convex hills and dead ground. A conspicuous "bluff" trench may cause the enemy to waste much ammunition." leaving nothing but the awful frown across the sky.True. The clear blue vault of heaven was suddenly overcast by clouds which gradually assumed the frowning face of my colonel. looking up at the sky. and took some well-earned rest. Forethought. after all. It must have evidently been of great importance to them to go on. and the whole scene changed. This too finally dissolved. I had another dream. though it has "command. before more could be said. A hill may not. as they were about 500 to our 50. or they would have attempted to capture us. luckily for me. Sixth Dream . 22." necessarily be the best place to hold. Especially take care to have some place where the enemy must come under your fire. "What? You mean to say. but they had crossed the drift. and draw fire away from the actual defences. the Boers have crossed?" But. 21. but it was no use. the face began slowly to fade away like that of the Cheshire puss in "Alice in Wonderland. I had failed in my duty. with your eye at the level of the men who will eventually use them. and had severely mauled the enemy.

I resisted. which I saw would assist me much as concealment should I decide to hold this hill. an idea gently wormed itself into my mind. and. it was absolutely revolutionary. Trenches and protection against both rifle and gunfire practically ready made. find some other place which would lend itself to easy and good concealment. I struggled. " Once more was I fated to essay the task of defending Duffer’s Drift. This I was much inclined to do. but after a few minutes’ trial of the shape of the ground. ."Sweet are the uses ot adversity. which I wished to do. to see and fire on the drift and the approach on the south side. This was. and take up a position on the open hillside some way down. The more I said it was impossible. until each of my conscientious objections was enmeshed and smothered in a network of specious reasons as to the advantages of the proposal. which I at once threw out again as being absurd and out of the question. This time I had 22 lessons under my belt to help me out. But where to find such a place? As I stood deep in thought. quite feasible. I must. especially if I held a position at the top of the hill as well." After sending out the patrols. and also have the drift or its approaches under close rifle fire. On the top I found a Kaffir kraal. I found that its convexity was such that. and in the oblivion of my dream I was spared that sense of monotony which by now may possibly have overtaken you. with the help of some men walking about down below. near the huts on the east and southeast sides. No. The advantages I thus hoped to obtain were: 1. it was evidently the freak of a sorely tried and worried brain. to take the lowest ground. instead of seeking the nearest high ground. 2. Perfect concealment and cover from sight. dressed up in the plausible guise of reason. I considered deeply what position I should take up. of course. 3. and whilst the stores were being collected. "gentle reader. as it would be impossible to really conceal ourselves on the bare hillside. therefore. and walked up to the top of Waschout Hill to spy out the land. and I put it firmly from me. I would hold the riverbed. but. This idea was to hold the riverbed and banks on each side of the drift! To give up all idea of command. even though it should be all among thick cover. the more this idea obtained possession of me. and my eyes a little above ground level. and against every canon I had ever read or heard of. I should have to abandon the top of the hill. the more allurements were spread before me in its favour. which comes as natural to the student of tactics as rushing for a tree does to a squirrel. and placing a guard on Waschout Hill. But the more I argued to myself the absurdity of it. it meant giving up all idea of surprising the enemy. and so the friendly concealment of the Kaffir huts. Communications under good cover. as already described. instead of being nicely in the open. but finally fell to temptation. considering this knotty problem. I would have none of it.

All I could spare for this would be two NCOs and eight men. Plentiful water supply at hand. a suitable position for the enemy to occupy. In about a couple of hours the patrols returned with their prisoners. Having detailed this party. the scheme was that the trenches should be concealed much in the same way as described in the last dream. This detachment was to have a double lot of . was on the south limited by Waschout Hill. after all. The enemy would be out in the open veld except along the riverbank. one could not expect every luxury. but the carcasses could be quickly buried under the steep banks. and. but great care should be taken that no one in the post should be exposed to rifle fire from our main position in the river. there were a few dead animals near the drift. which was soon started. I decided to hold the top of it as well as the riverbed. As our clear field of fire. who would be able to defend the south side of the hill. I did not wish the fire of the main body to be in any degree hampered by a fear of hitting the men on Waschout Hill. which in the north was only bounded by the range of our rifles. would still have the advantage. and the tainted air seemed to hang heavy over the riverbed. If we knew it was not possible to hit them. 5.4. I gave my instructions for the work. especially at night. we could shoot freely all over the hill. which were dealt with as before. the north being under our fire from the riverbank. For the post on Waschout Hill. True. where we. being in position first.

by such shifting tactics might. the sides of the crooked waterways had to be merely scooped out a little. without exposing the position of his trench. owing to the concealment of the bushes. loopholes of sandbags were made. and would have been more so had we had the whiskers of the "brethren. be much exaggerated. it also meant that we should probably be able to mislead the enemy as to our numbers-which. were some "spoil" heaps of earth. The position extended for a length of some 150 meters on each side of the drift along both banks of the river. in the way of concealment. others were not bulletproof. Some had the new clean sandbags exposed to full view. were pitched for the women and children. In others. The general idea for the main defensive position was to hold both sides of the river. thus serving as mere whited sepulchres to their occupants. others were equally conspicuous from their absurd cock-shy appearance. in anticipation of a prolonged struggle. From these pits with our heads at ground level we could see quite clearly out on to the veld beyond. being below ground level. were quite invisible. and correct the numerous mistakes made in their construction. and were as rough as the banks in outline. I found it was necessary to examine personally every loophole. On each side of the river. just by the drift. splendid.waterbottles. These heaps were large enough to allow a few pits being made on them. and at its extremities. we were quite invisible. even from 300 meters distance. improving the existing steep banks and ravines into rifle-pits to contain from one to four men. we were enabled to dig many more of these pits than the exact number required for our party. which had the extra advantage of height. or into the ground at a few meters range. As such a large amount of the work was already done for us. As I corrected all these faults I thought that loopholes not made under supervision might prove rather a snare. They were placed well among the bushes. either from under the thicker part of the bushes or even through those which were close to our eyes. though in most cases this was not needed. with very little work. excavated from the road ramp. From the open. filled with water." It was quite evident to me that these same whiskers were a wise precaution of nature for this very purpose. only just sufficient scrub being cut away to allow a man to see all round. The numerous small dongas and rifts lent themselves readily to flanking fire. or up into the blue sky. for a time at least. where an attack was most to . besides every available receptacle collected in the kraal. so that we should be able to shift about from one position to another. and part of her universal scheme of protective mimicry. on the other hand. whilst others again would only allow of shooting in one direction. which. In one of these deeper ravines two tents. to give head-cover. The pits for fire to the north and south were nearly all so placed as to allow the occupants to fire at ground level over the veld. These stood some five or six feet above the general level. be made to give cover from all sides. according as we wished to fire. In some of the pits. and small caves cut for them in case of a bombardment. These could. Pathways leading between these were to be cut into the bank. and in many places the vertical banks required no cutting in order to give ideal protection against even artillery. Besides the advantage this would give us in the way of moving about. The result was. or a shelf cut to stand upon.

and explained what we were going to do. for it was from here we might expect to be rushed. Their scouts came in clumps of twos and threes which extended over some mile of front. and that no man was to fire a shot until firing had already commenced elsewhere (which sounded rather Irish). and orders in case of an attack given out. This was too much for some man on the east side. and we soon after saw from our position a cloud of dust away to the north. when we had nearly all the pits finished and some of the clearance done. or my whistle sounded.be feared. These also were concealed as well as possible. in order to prevent this. Firing having once started. tents and gear were hidden. etc. I had to rely on the outlying groups of men fully understanding my aims beforehand. and these we marked by a few empty tins placed on ant-heaps. This time was employed in perfecting our defences in various ways. approached as already described in the last dream. found everything all correct." To prevent our chance of a close-range volley into the enemy being spoilt by some over-zealous or jumpy man opening fire at long range. As the scouts got closer. and took the opportunity of showing the detachment the exact limits of our position in the riverbed. every man was to blaze away at any enemy within range as judged by our range marks. the natural impulse to make for the easiest crossing place was obeyed by two or three of the parties on each side of the one approaching the drift. During the morning I visited the post on Waschout Hill. As I could not be everywhere. ammunition and rations distributed to all. We managed to clear away the scrub in the dry riverbed and banks for some 200 meters beyond our line of pits on each side. except for a good fringe just on the edges of the banks. This force. and acting on their "own. the "brethren" stopped rather suspiciously. our greatest danger. everywhere below the ground level. I paced out some ranges to the north and south. We had about three hours next morning before any enemy were reported from Waschout Hill (the prearranged signal for this was the raising of a pole from one of the huts). I now blessed the man who had left us some cutting tools. who let fly. for at the extremity of this clearance a sort of abatis entanglement was made with the wire from an adjacent fence which the men had discovered. "Somebody in sight" was signaled. and actually attained to the refinement of an "obstacle". all we could do meanwhile was to sit tight in concealment. Finally we turned in to our pit for the night with some complacency. After about three hours work. When about 300 meters away. At dusk. This was unless the enemy were so close to him that further silence was useless. and we accordingly lay for it. to clear the scrub for as great a range as possible from the ends of the position. killing . and also on the level ground. and they inclined inwards and joined forces with it. as 1 had no wish to give away our presence by any suspicious nudity of the banks at each end of our position. pits were dug down the riverbanks and across the dry riverbed. This was evidently the largest party we could hope to surprise. This fringe I thought would be sufficient to hide the clearance to any one not very close. I finally decided. the centre of the line heading for the drift. I was undecided for some time as to whether to clear a "field of fire" along the river-banks or not. I gave orders that fire was to be held as long as possible. Whilst all this was being carried out. and not from the open veld. and the air was rent by the rattle as we emptied our magazines. which proved to be a commando. The flanks or ends were. of course. each eight men furnishing their own sentry.

for after the first volley from our Lee-Metfords and the subsequent minutes of independent firing. The Boer guns were shifted .one to the top of Incidentamba and one to the east and west in order to enfilade the river bank but. the reports of our rifles were soon mingled with the softer reports of the Mausers. and wasted many shells. we knew the enemy was endeavouring to surround the detachment. as far we were concerned of having one man wounded by shell-fire. and though. and not much was done on either side. We continued to fire at the scouts as they galloped back. and gradually work along the bed. So the night passed without much incident. crawling up the south side of the hill in order to get a good fire on to us in the river. out of range. The Boers were evidently quite at sea as regards to the extent of our position and strength. so as not to betray our presence. as betokened by the little spurts of dust. However. I should say the river was being shelled. Some men had even gone further. We knew the ranges fairly well. we soon put a stop to this maneuvre by firing a small volley from three or four rifles at each flash on the hillside. owing to our good cover. I confidently expected an attack along the riverbank that night. but it was not till near one in the morning that Waschout Hill had an inning. in order probably to get into close range during the night. and a large body of them. To be accurate. In a very few moments our position was being shelled by three guns. During this day the veld to the north and south was deserted by the enemy except at out-of-range distance. their panic did not last long. as we could not see our sights. but afforded a splendid target till it opened out. This ruse had been postponed until our position was discovered. but with the only result. and added a helmet here and a coat there peeping over the top. and also at the column which was about a mile away. and guessed that these were parties who intended to strike the river at some distance away. As I had hoped. the fact that we held the kraal had not been spotted by the enemy. During the dark we had taken the opportunity to cunningly place some new shite sandbags (which I had found among the stores) in full view at some little distance from our actual trenches and pits. dropping two more. but after the fighting had begun no harm was done by it. As these could not be our men.five of this special scouting party and two from other groups further out on either side. our position incidentally. though the firing went on slowly till dark. to judge by the sound. We noticed much galloping of men away to the east and west. and we shortly observed flashes on our side of Waschout Hill. in the panic following the first volley our men were able (as I learnt afterwards) to stand right up and shoot at the surprised burghers bolting down the hill. though of course we were on the qui vive all the time. but a continuous sniping fire was kept up along the riverbanks on each side. We exchanged a few shots during the night along the riverbed. Next morning it was quite a pleasure to see the very accurate shooting made by "Brother" at these sandbags. As the night was not very dark. the shooting was rather guesswork. we escaped with two killed and three wounded. for shells were bursting along the river for some half-mile. and slightly . struck a snag in the shape of a close-range volley from our detachment. The enemy did not shell quite such a length of river this time.

but. for they had hoisted a red rag at the masthead. owing to the abatis and the holes in the ground. and saw a cloud of dust to the northeast. for somehow the welcome sound at once drew the tired feeling out of us. The Boer guns had not been firing for some two hours. Shortly afterwards we heard musketry in the distance. and reinforcements reaching one of their sorely pressed forces at a critical moment. . and the silence was just beginning to get irritating and mysterious. whilst the guns shelled us for about an hour. and the fact that it was not a very dark night. I collected a few men and at once started to fire some good old British volleys into the scrub. However. of the prevention thereby of Boer guns. Next morning. and so enabled a victory to be won. and I did all I could to keep the spirits of the little force up by saying that relief could not be very far off. perhaps. 600 meters of the open veld on the north and round the edges of Waschout Hill on the south. with so many men out of my original 40 out of action (not to include Waschout Hill. even at the risk of dangerously denuding the north bank. Under cover of the dark. or rather our weakness. Luckily the enemy did not know our strength. We did our best to snatch a little sleep by turns during the day. though we. I was pleased to see that the detachment on Waschout Hill had still got its tail well up. I was not disappointed. and were saving themselves for another night attack. but it was not white. this was not the national flag. probably to distract our attention. and we all felt that the enemy must have by now guessed our weakness. did not know what vital results hung upon our action. True. it proved the neighbourhood of another force. or they would have persisted in their attempt and succeeded. but we had held the drift. and a few of the Boers did succeed in getting into our position. when the booming of guns in the distance aroused us to the highest pitch of excitement. relying upon our being tired out. and kept up a furious fire. whose losses I did not know) matters seemed to be serious. It is now. probably only a mere handkerchief." which were not to be mistaken. the enemy came up to within. The day wore on with intermittent shelling and sniping. In order to prevent any chance of the fresh force missing our whereabouts.strengthened my flanks. and I was greatly afraid that another night would be the end of us. All faces lighted up. "Ready—present—fire!!. and the ensuing victory gained by our side. as it was. But it was with a gloomy desperation at best that we saw the day wear on and morning turn into afternoon. they were unsuccessful. We were relieved! Our total losses were 11 killed and 15 wounded. only to be bayoneted. they must have lost 20 or 30 men killed and wounded. We were saved! We could not say what guns these were-they might be British or Boer but. anyway. public knowledge that this was the turning point in the war. I need not here touch upon the well-known and far-reaching results of the holding of Duffer’s Drift. ammunition. As soon as the gunfire ceased they tried to rush us along the riverbed east and west. of course. it was touch-and-go. the humble instruments.

Sir Backsight Forethought". We found some 25 dead and partly buried Boers. sir. we spent some time examining the lairs of the Boer snipers. I felt a rap on my shoulder. but lay down (in my own breeches and spotted waistcoat). sir. and. these gradually changed into clouds of rosy glory. and heard a gentle voice say.That evening the relieving force halted at the drift. . "Arise. after burying the dead. Corfy’s been up some time now. but in a trice my dream of bliss was shattered-the gentle voice changed into the well-known croak of my servant. to whom we gave burial. "Time to pack your kit on the wagon. and I heard brass bands in the distance playing a familiar air: "See the Conquering Hero comes. That night I did not trek." it sounded like. the men collecting bits of shell and cartridge cases as mementos-only to be thrown away at once. As the smoke from the "prime segar. was eddying in spirals over my head." presented to me by the Colonel." I was still in stinking old Dreamdorp.

James Baker . Be prepared to ask any questions you feel necessary. don't point the gun." . Homework: •Review all class materials in preparation for the Capstone Test. Remarks: •NO QUESTION IS A STUPID QUESTION!! LESSON QUOTE: "If you're not gonna pull the trigger.Lesson 18 TERM END REVIEW Lesson Objectives: •Review all lesson objectives and material presented during the course of instruction.

E. Adcock. wars are nearly always won by sergeants and privates." -F. British classical scholar .Lesson 19 ___________________________________________________________________________________ Capstone Test Lesson Objectives: •None Homework: •None Remarks: •Good Luck!!! LESSON QUOTE: "Battles are sometimes won by generals.

Homework: • None Remarks: • See you this summer at Cadet Field Training. I t can only be learned. LESSON QUOTE: Leadership cannot really be taught.Lesson 20 _____________________ Lesson Objectives: • Identify and take notes on Field Craft Tips and lessons learned that will assist the cadet during Cadet Field Training. Har old S.1997) US businessman Managing/ N ineteen Eighty-Four . Geneen (1910 .

and T-65 Tanks that support their defensive positions. it seems that once an enemy unit is located. The rest of the squad is looking at you. The soldier next to you pulls on your sleeve and says. “Hey Sarge. 3rd Platoon. Some Iraqi soldiers faked surrender while another group attacked the Americans. you see a group of three Iraqis struggling toward you and waving white shirts on sticks. there are a couple guys giving up. What do you do? . BMPs. Coalition forces never really know for certain if the unit is going to surrender or fight. Your squad has been brought up to within 500 meters of the complex. Taking advantage of the low visibility. Ahead. last night. Their attack consisted of uncoordinated AK-47. The road is critical for smaller wheeled vehicles as loose sand in the area prevents their rapid forward movement. SITUATION: It has been a long and exhausting ride. Company B of 3-7 Infantry. your unit has taken large amounts of prisoners as several units have surrendered without engagement. Currently it is dusk (1730). You all see about 19 Iraqi soldiers moving in the two positions. As you have closed on Baghdad. your squad dismounts and heads toward the bunkers. The bunkers are small concrete boxes and sandbag fortifications. and RPG fires. S-2 says that they have an assortment of BRDMs. resistance against Coalition Forces has stiffened. There is one BRDM in a hull down position. Your purpose for being deployed here is to liberate the people of Iraq and locate/confiscate all Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). RPK. the lead unit has located another small bunker complex near Checkpoint 55. Additionally. the crew outside digging a shelter. Now. For the last few days your squad has been moving across the open desert of Iraq in Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) in a swift attack toward Baghdad. cutting visibility to around 100 meters. Several sandbag fighting positions and two bunkers are directly in front of you. another company in the 3-7 had a tough firefight with Iraqi regulars in a small bunker complex it stumbled upon in its advance. A sandstorm is currently hitting the area hard. In the forward push to date. leaving the IFVs in overwatch.FIRST CONTACT! TDME #1 ORIENTATION: You are the 2nd squad Leader. The Platoon has been tasked with clearing it as it sits astride the road the 3-7 is using in the main advance. They appear to be preparing for combat.” On a small hill to your right.

DM #1 E X209 Legend = Tent = VAZ .

You have been operating for the last two months in the dry desert conditions of the South African country of Zymdoa. Enemy fire against you and the remainder of the squad is sporadic and ineffective at the moment. The steady fire from the vil has pinned down the first team. You have had no contact with enemy forces to this point. You can see a low wall and a road to your front. Your Platoon Leader informs you that the artillery is unable to provide you fire support in that area and denies you fires. Your squad has been on patrol for 2 hours and is now nearing a small grouping of hovels and some cultivated land. Your purpose for being deployed here is to enforce an unsteady peace between local tribes.AMBUSH ! TDME #2 ORIENTATION: You are the 1st Squad Leader. RPKs. They appear to be cooking and conversing and unconcerned about your presence. and RPGs has been rebelling against the presence of your unit and the arrests that have been made to keep the peace. Immediately you get on the radio and call for artillery support. as they tend to run upon contact with US forces. 1st Platoon. also begin to fire into your patrol from the village. Company A of the 1st BN/504th (82nd Airborne Infantry). You and your men are tired and ready for a rest. you estimate four AK-47s and another RPK. To date you have been conducting security patrols to maintain the peace and to assist with Humanitarian Relief operations. What do you do? . SITUATION: The Platoon Leader tasked you with conducting a security patrol South East to link up with 2nd Platoon and ensure that there were no guerillas operating in the valley between the two units. Villagers run about in a chaotic frenzy. Currently it is dusk (1930). Smoke from several fire pits obscures the fields beyond. and two rising hills on either side. Suddenly a RPK opens up from a hut behind the low wall downing a member of the first fire team. Several other weapons. As you approach. An elusive unconventional guerrilla force armed with AK-47s. The village is one kilometer away from the 2nd Platoon’s position. His team goes prone and begins to return fire. Contact with the guerrillas has always been brief. The rest of the squad is looking at you. you can see several villagers in and around the huts and water well.

TDME #2 55 .

and RPGs have been conducting a disorganized withdrawl back toward Baghdad. As you arrive at the bridge. RPKs. but there are still many Iraqi soldiers willing to fight what they see as an aggressive invader. arrives at the bridge first. You move your four Bradley IFVs close to the ridge and begin to disseminate your plan…. Your purpose for being deployed here is to liberate the people of Iraq from the harsh regime of Saddam Hussein. Currently it is noon. The objective of your push is to capture a large bridge that will allow the 3rd ID to conduct its attack on its assigned sector of Baghdad. Coalition forces have taken many prisoners. They have two trucks and a light anti-tank cannon there as well.ASSAULT ! TDME #3 ORIENTATION: You are the 3rd Platoon Leader. Their small arms fire is sporadic against the sand and rock formations to your front. Through the smoke you can see another squad-sized element with a machine gun across the bridge (near Check Point 4). SITUATION: Your unit has been moving slowly along the El Saib highway near the Tigris River. Several oil fires burn in the vicinity of El Basaria. The Company Commander planned for you to move across the bridge with support from the other two platoons in the company in a rapid frontal assault. One platoon apparently got lost and the other is engaged with another Iraqi force to the east. Regular Iraqi Army forces and Republican Guard forces armed with AK-47s. Company A of the 1-30th (3rd ID). Your platoon. They have seen the dust trails of your Bradley IFVs as you followed came upon their position. you can see about 13 Iraqis and a machine gun dug in around the bridge. For the last 2 weeks you and your unit have been racing across Iraq in an effort to reach Baghdad. Your unit has been encountering varying levels of resistance since the operation began. Your company is the Main Effort. Another 12 are on the hill next to them. Immediately you get on the radio and call for artillery support. It is only a matter of time until some indirect fires will be called in on you. as the lead element of the company. Your Company Commander informs you that the artillery is unable to provide you fire support in that area due to a “No Fire Area (Artillery)” that has been placed around the bridge. They all look to be ready for a fight. “We need that bridge intact! We have to take it before they can blow the thing up! Move in there!” He informs you that mortars and a single Apache helicopter with two Hellfire Missiles are available. What do you do? .

TDME #3 El Basaria 4 T P6 R N m eters 0 50 100 .

Introduction to Warfighting Military science 103 Self paced text Close With And Destroy The Enemy .

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