1) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

SALVADOR ARROJADO, accused-

appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City, finding
accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 30
years of reclusion perpetua and to pay the amounts of P60,000.00 as civil indemnity, P80,000.00 as moral
damages, and the costs to the heirs of the victim Mary Ann Arrojado.[2]

The information against accused-appellant alleged:

That on or about the 1st day of June, 1996, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with intent to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and
stab one Mary Ann Arrojado, on the different parts of the body, to wit:

1. Stab wound, gaping, 1.5 cm. in length with a depth of 5 cm. located at the supra sternal area;

2. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 10 cm. depth, directed downward 5 cm.
above the left nipple area at the level of midclavicular line;

3. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 2.5 cm. in length, 5.5 cm. depth, located 4 cm. above the left
nipple area, midclavicular line;

4. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 18.5[3] cm. in depth, directed medially
downward, located 3 cm. above the left nipple, midclavicular line;

5. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 5 cm. depth, located 3 cm. medial to the left
nipple;
6. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 4 cm. in length, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed laterally
downward, located 2 cm. medial to the left nipple;

7. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length, 12 cm. in depth, directed laterally, located
2 cm. medial to the left nipple;

8. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 5.5 cm. in depth directed downward,
located at the xiphoid area;

9. Stab wound, elongated gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 4 cm. in depth, directed medially, located 4
cm. below the left nipple;

10. Stab wound penetration, measuring 4 x 4 cm. in length with [e]visceration of the small intestine;

thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her
death.

That by reason of the death Mary Ann Arrojado, her heirs incurred actual and moral damages which may
be awarded under the Civil Code of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

The information was read and explained to accused-appellant in his native dialect, after which he pleaded
not guilty.[5] Trial on the merits then ensued.

The evidence for the prosecution shows the following:

Accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado and the victim Mary Ann Arrojado are first cousins, their fathers
being brothers. The victims father, Alberto Arrojado, who was living in Canada, suffered a stroke for
which reason he decided to come home to Roxas City and spend the remainder of his days there. The
victim accompanied her father to the Philippines. They eventually settled in a house in Barangay Tanque,
Roxas City, where they lived on the financial support of the victims sister Asuncion, who continued to
live in Canada, and her brother Buenaventura, who lived in Manila.

Starting February 15, 1996, accused-appellant lived with the victim and her father. He helped care for the
victims father, for which he was paid a P1,000.00 monthly salary.[6]

In the early morning of June 1, 1996, accused-appellant went to the house of his cousin, Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo, and reported that the victim had committed suicide. In response, Erlinda, together with her
husband Romulo Magdaluyo and her father Teodorico Arrojado, went with accused-appellant to the
house in Barangay Tanque where they found the victim dead. The victim, who was bloodied, was lying
on her left side facing the bedroom door with her hands clasped together. On her bed was a rosary and a
crucifix. Near her was a knife (Exh. C).[7] Erlinda recognized it to be the knife kept in the kitchen.
Erlinda also noticed that the electric fan was turned on full blast, while all the windows were closed
except the window on the east side which was slightly open. As he went to the other room, where the
victims father stayed, accused-appellant told Erlinda that he was afraid he might be suspected as the one
responsible for the victims death.[8]

The matter was reported to the police which noticed that the victims room was very neat as if nothing
happened. The police saw no signs of forcible entry.[9] They made a sketch of the victims position in
relation to the whole house (Exh. D)[10] and took pictures of her (Exhs. EE-3).[11]

Dr. Ma. Lourdes Roldan, of the Roxas City Health Office, conducted the postmortem examination of the
victim at 1:30 p.m. of June 1, 1996. Her findings revealed that the victim sustained the following stab
wounds:

1. Stab wound, gaping, 1.5 cm. in length with a depth of 5 cm. located at the supra sternal area;

2. Stab wound, elongated gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 10 cm. depth, directed downward, located 5
cm. above the left nipple area at the level of midclavicular line;

3. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 2.5 cm. in length, 10.5 cm. depth, located 4 cm. above the
left nipple area, midclavicular line;
4. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 18.5 cm. in depth directed medially
downward located 3 cm. above the left nipple, midclavicular line;

5. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 5 cm. in depth, located 3 cm. medial to the
left nipple;

6. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 4 cm. in length, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed laterally
downward, located 2 cm. medial to the left nipple;

7. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length, 12 cm. in depth, directed laterally, located
2 cm. medial to the left nipple;

8. Stab wound, elongated gaping measuring 3 cm. in length and 5.5 cm. in depth, directed downward,
located at the xiphoid area;

9. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 4 cm. in depth, directed medially, located 4
cm. below the left nipple;

10.Stab wound penetration, measuring 4 x 4 cm. in length with evisceration of the small intestine;[12]

Dr. Roldan testified that the victim died at around midnight of May 31, 1996 from wound nos. 2, 4, 6, 7,
and 10, which she deemed fatal.[13] Thus, in the victims death certificate (Exh. B),[14] she listed
HEMORRHAGIC SHOCK as the victims immediate cause of death and multiple stab wounds as the
antecedent cause.

Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo testified that the relationship between the victim and accused-appellant had
been strained as the victim constantly picked on accused-appellant even for the slightest mistake. Erlinda
remembered the scolding that the victim gave accused-appellant on May 27, 1996 over the loss of keys.
Accused-appellant was badly hurt by the victims tonguelashing, according to Erlinda, and complained to
the victim, Youre too much. Erlinda said she offered to take the victim in her house, but the latter refused,
saying that her place was with her father. The victim entrusted, however, her jewelry and bank book with
signed withdrawal slips to Erlinda. Three days later, on May 30, 1996, Erlinda returned the same and told
the victim that she should not be afraid of accused-appellant because he was taking care of both her (the
victim) and her father. Erlinda said she again met the victim on May 31, 1996 when she reminded the
latter of their agreement to go out the following day, June 1, 1996. On that day, however, the victim was
found dead.[15]

Another relative of accused-appellant and the victim, Thelma Arrojado, corroborated Erlindas testimony.
The father of Thelmas husband, Roque Arrojado, is a brother of the victims father and that of accused-
appellant. Thelma said that she and her husband lived at one time with the victim, and she knew the latter
to be a snob (suplada) and overly strict. Because they did not get along with the victim, Thelma and her
husband eventually left. She testified that accused-appellant was angry at the victim and in fact passed by
her store thrice (on May 27, 29, and 31, 1996), complaining to her of the victims maltreatment of
him.[16]

Accused-appellant testified in his behalf. He told the court that on June 1, 1996, at around 6:00 a.m.,
Alberto Arrojado asked him for food, so accused-appellant went to the kitchen to find out if the victim
had already prepared breakfast. When accused-appellant found that the victim was not in the kitchen, he
proceeded to the victims room. From the doorway, he saw the victim lying on her bed, bloodied. He
thought that the victim had committed suicide because the victim had told him that she felt tied down
taking care of her father. She in fact once remarked that It would be better that my father and I commit
suicide. Accused-appellant said that the victim scolded him only once and that was for buying rotten
cabbage.[17] He said that the victim was the one who was constantly being scolded by her father who
often found fault with her. When presented with the knife found on the victims bed (Exh. C), accused-
appellant admitted he was familiar with the knife as he saw the victim using it in the kitchen.

On April 21, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds and declares accused Salvador Arrojado
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of murder, defined and penalized by Art. 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act 7659, and, there being no aggravating
circumstance, hereby sentences him to imprisonment of thirty (30) years of reclusion perpetua, and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Mary Ann Arrojado in the amount of P60,000.00, pay them moral
damages of P80,000.00, and pay the costs of this action.

In the service of his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, the accused, who is a detention prisoner
and not otherwise disqualified, shall be credited with the full time of his confinement under preventive
imprisonment, provided he voluntarily agrees in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
on convicted prisoners, pursuant to Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[18]

The trial court held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict accused-appellant for the
victims death. In its decision, the trial court said:

The accused was the only person in the world who had the strong motive to eliminate from earthly
existence the deceased, who had no known enemies, as he could no longer endure the verbal abuse to
which he was frequently subjected, even on trivial matters, by the deceased whom he must have perceived
as his evil tormentor. Being older [but] every now and then scolded, insulted, and humiliated, he must
have felt that the deceased had no respect for him as a person and elder cousin. Suicide being physically
impossible and there being no shred of evidence showing that an intruder could have surreptitiously
entered the house as all doors and windows were securely closed, the killing could have been done only
by someone who was already inside the house. Certainly it could not have been the deceaseds old and
invalid father who could not stand on his own, much less walk from his room to the kitchen, get the fatal
weapon, the kitchen knife, from where it was placed therein, walk to his daughters room, and then stab
her. As there were only the three of them inside the house, that leaves no one else, by the process of
elimination, who could have perpetrated the dastardly act but the accused who had the only motive to do
it and who was inside the house at the time of the commission of the crime. Reinforcing this conclusion is
the admission of the accused that when he peeped into the room of the deceased and allegedly saw for the
first time the lifeless body of the victim, he was already sure, even without going near or touching her
body and asking aloud what happened to her, that she was already dead because he himself killed her. He
saw to it that she would die because he stabbed her not only once, but ten (10) times, inflicting five (5)
mortal wounds. And he had the gall to attribute his cousins untimely death to suicide because he could not
concoct any other reason to save himself.[19]

Hence this appeal. Accused-appellants assigns the following errors as allegedly having been committed
by the trial court:

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MARY ANN ARROJADO WAS
STABBED TEN TIMES AT HER HOME.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT MARY ANN ARROJADO COULD
NOT HAVE COMMITTED SUICIDE.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE HOUSE OF MARY ANN
ARROJADO WAS TOTALLY CLOSED AND LOCKED AGAINST INTRUDERS.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS

ABUSED AND OPPRESSED BY MARY ANN ARROJADO THAT LED ACCUSED-APPELLANT
TO KILL MARY ANN ARROJADO.[20]

First. Accused-appellant claims that most of the victims wounds were inflicted after she had already
committed suicide to make it appear that she was murdered. He says that he saw only one wound in the
victims stomach,[21] while Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo said she saw only two wounds, one on the
victims neck and the other in her abdomen. These are wound nos. 1 and 10 in the postmortem
examination.[22] Of these two, the stomach wound was fatal, according to Dr. Roldan.[23] Accused-
appellant says that the other wounds may have been inflicted on the victim between the time the body was
brought out of the house in the morning and the time Dr. Roldan examined the same at around 1:30
oclock in the afternoon of June 1, 1996 at the De Jesus funeral parlor.[24]

Accused-appellants contention has no merit. That accused-appellant only saw one wound while Erlinda
Magdaluyo saw two wounds on the victim does not necessarily mean that the other wounds were inflicted
upon the victim afterwards. The two might have simply missed seeing the other wounds. In accused-
appellants case, it may be because he did not go inside the room but only viewed the body from a
distance.[25] On the other hand, while Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo went near the victim, she said she did
not see if there were wounds on the victims chest because the latter was dressed.[26] But Dr. Roldan, who
conducted a postmortem examination, testified that the victim actually sustained ten wounds. Between the
cursory examination of the victim by accused-appellant and Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo and Dr. Roldans
exhaustive examination, there is no doubt that the latters findings are entitled to credence.

Accused-appellant also argues that the varying depths of wound nos. 2, 4, 5, 8, and 9 (10 cm., 10.5 cm., 5
cm., 5.5 cm., and 4 cm.) despite the fact that they had the same surface length of 3 cm. could only mean
that after the victim was found dead, she was again stabbed with a knife or knives other than the one
(Exh. C) found beside her.[27]

The contention is without merit. The variance in depth does not necessarily mean that more than one
weapon was used. As has been stated:
[I]t is not possible to determine the depth of penetration of a stab wound with any degree of accuracy,
inasmuch as effusion of blood into the tissues, changes in the position of the viscera, or numerous other
circumstances may alter the conditions existing at the time when the wound was inflicted. Consequently,
the depth of the track at autopsy may be different from the actual penetration of the instrument at the time
of the stabbing. Moreover, it is not always possible to correlate the depth of the wound with the blade of
the stabbing instrument. For example, a short blade of two inches can penetrate four inches into a soft
area like the thigh or through the anterior abdominal wall because the force of the thrust may dent the
tissues appreciably and thus deepen the wound. Conversely, a long blade may not be thrust into its full
length, and the wound may be shorter than the blade. For these reasons attempts to correlate the depth of
the track and the length of the weapon should be made with caution.[28]

Dr. Roldan in fact testified that the kitchen knife, marked as Exh. C, could have caused all the wounds
sustained by the victim.[29] She also testified that the stab wounds could have all been inflicted in the
span of one minute.[30] Having examined no less than 100 victims of violence,[31] Dr. Roldans
conclusions should be given credence.

Moreover, with the exception of wound no. 10, all the wounds were described by Dr. Roldan as gaping.
As stated in Forensic Medicine:

. . . An ante-mortem wound gapes; there is eversion of the edges; a large amount of blood is present, this
is coagulated and infiltrating the wound; and there is swelling and signs of inflammation and repair. In a
post-mortem wound there is no gaping. The bleeding is slight, if any, and it does not infiltrate the
wound.[32]

This belies accused-appellants theory that the victim committed suicide and that it was only after she was
found dead that she was again stabbed to make it appear that she had been killed.

Nor were the bloodstains which PO2 Orly Baril[33] and Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo[34] found on the
victims hands necessarily evidence of the victims suicide. The bloodstains could have come from the
wounds sustained by her rather than from her attempt to kill herself.

Accused-appellant also insists the victim committed suicide because she was feeling despondent over her
remaining single, her lack of regular employment which made her dependent on the support of her
siblings, and the responsibility of taking care of her father who had become an invalid. He cites Erlinda
Arrojado Magdaluyos testimony that the victim entrusted her jewelry and bank book to her four days
before she died.[35]
Erlinda, however, testified that the victim did this because she had a premonition that accused-appellant
might harm her, and not because of any intimation that she (the victim) would kill herself.[36]

Contrary to the claim of accused-appellant that the victim was a depressed person with a low sense of
self-worth, Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo described the victim as a jolly person who had many friends who
go to her house. Moreover, according to Erlinda, the victim, while not earning a fixed income, was not
without means of livelihood. The victim was good at cooking and took orders from neighbors. Erlinda
also disclosed that on the very day the victim was found dead, she and the victim had plans to go out for
relaxation.[37] This negates any theory that the victim committed suicide.

Second. Somewhat inconsistently with his claim that the victim was a suicide, accused-appellant disputes
the trial courts conclusion that only one of those residing in the house could have killed the victim
because the police found no sign of a break-in. Accused-appellant says that in the morning of June 1,
1996, he found that the kitchen door leading outside was open.[38]

Accused-appellants contention must fail. Accused-appellant admitted that it did not occur to him that an
intruder was in the house in the evening of May 31, 1996 because No person could get inside because the
windows were closed and besides the doors were closed.[39]

Significantly, Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo testified that accused-appellant also said that no person could
get inside the house because the doors and the windows were closed.[40] Accused-appellant never told
Erlinda that the kitchen door was open that morning. Indeed, Erlinda testified that it is not possible that
somebody would enter the house as the doors were securely locked . . . with additional barrel bolts, and
the windows have grills.[41]

Third. Accused-appellant contends that Thelma Arrojados testimony does not deserve consideration
because, by her own admission,[42] the victims sister Asuncion asked her to testify on accused-appellants
complaints against the victims treatment of him. He also claims that it was inconsistent for Erlinda to
testify, on the one hand, that the victim was loving, friendly, and reasonable and, on the other, to say that
she was strict and domineering. Accused-appellant cites the testimony of the victims brother,
Buenaventura Arrojado, that before her death the victim denied having any quarrel with accused-
appellant.[43]
To be sure, the evaluation of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal
unless it is shown that it overlooked certain facts or circumstances of substance that, if considered, could
have affected the outcome of case. This is because the trial court is in a better position to decide the
question of credibility having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment during the trial.[44] In
this case, accused-appellants contention that the testimonies of Thelma Arrojado and Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo are incredible is without merit. Thelma Arrojados admission that the victims sister Asuncion
had asked her to testify does not impair her credibility. Thelma was candid enough to say that at first she
was hesitant to testify because accused-appellant is also her relative. But she denied having been coached
on what to say, stating that she only testified as to what Salvador Arrojado said to me which is that he
could not bear the victims maltreatment.[45]

As for Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, she said that she suspected accused-appellant but she did not want to
say anything until she had proof.[46] She testified also that so far as she knew, only accused-appellant
harbored a grudge against the victim, and that accused-appellant himself told her so.[47] With regard to
Erlindas seemingly inconsistent description of the victim, suffice it to say that the victims treatment of
accused-appellant does not necessarily reflect her attitude and behavior toward other people.

Anent the testimony of the victims brother, Buenaventura Arrojado, that the victim denied having any
quarrel with accused-appellant when he called her up two weeks before her death,[48] it is possible that
the victim did not want to bother her brother who was after all too far (since he lived in Manila) to be of
much help. It is only to be expected that Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo and Thelma Arrojado, who lived
near accused-appellant and the victim, have a much more accurate assessment of the real relationship
between accused-appellant and the victim. Buenaventura Arrojado testified that it was Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo who told him of the alleged quarrel between the victim and accused-appellant.[49]

In sum, the following circumstances point to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime:

1. Accused-appellant, the victim, and the latters father were the only ones living in the house in which the
crime was committed in the evening of May 31, 1996.[50]

2. No one from the outside can gain entry since all doors of the house were locked and the windows had
grills.[51]

3. Accused-appellant had access to the victims bedroom because the bedroom doors were left unlocked so
that the victim could check on her fathers condition during the night. Accused-appellant sleeps in the
same bedroom as the victims father.[52]
4. The murder weapon was a kitchen knife readily accessible to the occupants of the house.[53] As the
Solicitor General observed, common sense dictates that if an outsider entered the house with the intent to
kill the victim, he would have brought his own weapon to ensure the execution of his purpose.[54]

5. None of the victims belongings was missing or disturbed, indicating that the motive for the crime was
not gain but revenge.[55]

6. Judging from the number and severity of the wounds (10 stab wounds, half of which were fatal),[56]
the killer felt deep-seated resentment and anger toward the victim. Accused-appellant had admitted those
feelings to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo and Thelma Arrojado.[57]

7. Aside from accused-appellant, no one was known to harbor a grudge against the victim.[58]

8. As the Solicitor General also pointed out, accused-appellants behavior in the morning of June 1, 1996
was inconsistent with someone who had just found his cousin and employer, a person he claims to get
along with, dead.[59] By his testimony, he did not even go inside the room to check on her condition on
the lame excuse that he was afraid. He also did not inform his neighbors about the incident for the equally
flimsy reason that he did not know them nor did he go to the police.[60]

Under Rule 133, 4 of the Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inference are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. As
the foregoing discussion shows, these requisites have been established in this case.

Fourth. With respect to the circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the trial court correctly
appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery against accused-appellant. To appreciate treachery,
two conditions must be present: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked
no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and (2) the means of execution is deliberately or
consciously adopted.[61] Both requisites have been established in this case.

Anent the first requisite, Dr. Roldan testified that based on her findings, the victim was not in a position
to fight the assailant and that she might have been stabbed while she was asleep.[62] As regards the
second requisite, the number and nature of the wounds sustained by the victim lead to no other conclusion
than that accused-appellant employed means in killing the victim which tended directly and specially to
ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might take.
Accused-appellant would not have inflicted so many wounds, a total of 10, half of which were fatal, if he
had not deliberately adopted such manner of attack.[63] Abuse of superior strength also attended the
killing since accused-appellant, a man and armed with a knife, attacked the victim, an unarmed and
defenseless woman.[64] However, since abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, there is no
need to appreciate it separately as an independent aggravating circumstance.[65]

The trial court correctly held that there was no proof of evident premeditation since the requisites
therefor, to wit, (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused had clung to his determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequence of his act,[66] have not been
established in this case.

Nor can the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling be appreciated against accused-appellant since
the latter and the victim lived in the same house.[67]

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, however, is present in this case. For this
aggravating circumstance to exist, it is essential to show that the confidence between the parties must be
immediate and personal such as would give the accused some advantage or make it easier for him to
commit the criminal act. The confidence must be a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the
culprit taking advantage of the offended partys belief that the former would not abuse said
confidence.[68] In this case, while the victim may have intimated her fear for her safety for which reason
she entrusted her jewelry and bank book to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, her fears were subsequently
allayed as shown by the fact that she took back her personal effects from Erlinda.[69] Thinking that
accused-appellant would not do her any harm, because he was after all her first cousin, the victim allowed
accused-appellant to sleep in the same room with her father and left the bedroom doors unlocked.[70]

The murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on December 31, 1993 which
increased the penalty for murder from reclusion temporal maximum to death to reclusion perpetua to
death. In view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence and in accordance
with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should have imposed the penalty of death on
accused-appellant. However, on December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect,
requiring that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating
circumstances.[71] This provision may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well settled rule that
statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent.[72] The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence not having been alleged in the
information, the same therefore could not be appreciated to raise accused-appellants sentence to death.
In accordance with the ruling in People v. Lucas[73] that the penalty of reclusion perpetua remains
indivisible notwithstanding the fixing of its duration from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40)
years,[74] the trial court erred in imposing on accused-appellant the penalty of 30 years of reclusion
perpetua. In line with the ruling in Lucas, accused-appellant should suffer the entire extent of forty (40)
years of reclusion perpetua.[75]

Consistent with current case law,[76] the civil indemnity for the crime of murder should be reduced from
P60,000.00 to P50,000.00, while the award of moral damages in the amount of P80,000.00 should be
reduced to P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua in its entire duration and to its full extent. Furthermore, he is ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim Mary Ann Arrojado the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the further sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and the costs.

SO ORDERED.

2) G.R. No. 184500 September 11, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PIIILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
WENCESLAO NELMIDA @ "ESLAO," and RICARDO AJOK @ "PORDOY," Accused-
Appellants.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The subject of this present appeal is the Decision1 dated 18 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
HC No. 00246, affirming the Decision2 dated 30 September 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 21-910, finding herein appellants
Wenceslao Nelmida @ "Eslao" (Wenceslao) and Ricardo Ajok @

"Pordoy" (Ricardo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and
double attempted murder, thereby sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellants
were likewise ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of each of the deceased victims, i.e.,
Police Officer 3 Hernando P. Dela Cruz (PO3 Dela Cruz) and
Technical Sergeant Ramon Dacoco (T/Sgt. Dacoco), the amount of P 50,000.00 each as moral damages
and P 50,000.00 each as civil indemnity for the death of each of the said victims. Similarly, appellants
were directed to pay, jointly and severally, Mayor Johnny Tawan-tawan the amount of P 50,000.00 for
and as attorney’s fees, as well as the costs of the suit.

Appellants and their co-accused Samuel Cutad @ "Sammy" (Samuel), Brigido Abais @ "Bidok"
(Brigido), Pedro Serafico @ "Peter" (Pedro), Eduardo Bacong, Sr. (Eduardo, Sr.), Eduardo Bacong, Jr. @
"Junjun" (Eduardo, Jr.), Alejandro Abarquez (Alejandro), Ruben Bartolo @ "Yoyoy Bulhog" (Ruben),
Arnel Espanola @ "Toto Ilongo" (Arnel), Alfredo Paninsuro @ "Tambok" (Alfredo), Opao Casinillo
(Opao) and other John Does, were charged in an Amended Information3 dated 3 October 2001 with the
crime of double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder, the accusatory
portion of which reads:

That on or about the 5th day of June 2001, at SAN MANUEL, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named appellants and their co-accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with assorted high-powered firearms
and hand-grenade, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery, evident
premidation (sic), taking advantage of their superiority in strength and in numbers, and with intent to kill,
ambush, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the persons of the following, namely:

1. PO3 Dela Cruz, Philippine National Police (PNP);

2. T/Sgt. Dacoco, Philippine Army (PA);

3. Private First Class (PFC) Haron Angni, PA;

4. PFC Gador4 Tomanto, PA;

5. Juanito Ibunalo;

6. Mosanif5 Ameril;

7. Macasubar6 Tandayao;

8. Mayor Johnny Tawantawan;7 and

9. Jun Palanas

by then and there firing and shooting them with said high-powered firearms thereby inflicting upon the
persons of PO3 De la Cruz, T/Sgt. Dacoco, PFC Haron Angni, PFC Gapor Tomanto, Juanito Ibunalo,
Mosanip Ameril and Macasuba Tandayao gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
the death of PO3 De la Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco and the serious wounding of said PFC Haron Angni, PFC
Gapor Tomanto, Juanito Ibunalo, Mosanip Ameril and Macasuba Tandayao that without the medical
assistance would have caused their deaths, while Mayor Johnny Tawan-tawan and Jun Palanas were not
hit.8

When arraigned, appellants Wenceslao and Ricardo, assisted by their counsel de parte9 and counsel de
oficio,10respectively; and their co-accused Samuel, likewise assisted by counsel de oficio,11 all entered
separate pleas of
NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. The rest of the accused in this case, however, remained at large.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

Meanwhile, or on 21 January 2003, however, the prosecution filed a Motion to Discharge Accused
Samuel To Be Utilized As State Witness,12 which the court a quo granted in an Order dated 12 February
2003.13 Also, upon motion of the prosecution, the court a quo issued another Order dated 17 March
2003,14 directing the release of Samuel from detention following his discharge as state witness.

As such, Samuel, together with 13 more witnesses, namely, Macasuba Tandayao (Macasuba), Mosanip
Ameril (Mosanip), PFC Gapor Tomanto (PFC Tomanto), Merlina Dela Cruz (Merlina), Senior Police
Inspector Renato Salazar (Senior P/Insp. Salazar), PFC Haron Angni (PFC Angni), Senior Police Officer
4 Raul Torres Medrano (SPO4 Medrano), Senior Police Officer 1 Ferdinand Suaring (SPO1 Suaring),
Senior Police Officer 2 Ivan Mutia Evasco (SPO2 Evasco), Senior Police Officer 4 Emmie Subingsubing
(SPO4 Subingsubing), Juanito Ibunalo (Juanito), Senior

Police Officer 3 Tommy Umpa (SPO3 Umpa), and Mayor Johnny Tawan-tawan (Mayor Tawan-tawan),
testified for the prosecution.

The factual milieu of this case as culled from the testimonies of the aforesaid prosecution witnesses is as
follows:

On 5 June 2001, Mayor Tawan-tawan of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, together with his security escorts
composed of some members of the Philippine Army, Philippine National Police (PNP) and civilian aides,
to wit: (1) T/Sgt. Dacoco; (2) PFC Angni; (3) PFC Tomanto; (4) PO3 Dela Cruz; (5) Juanito; (6)
Mosanip; (7) Macasuba; and (8) a certain Jun, respectively, were in Tubod, Lanao del Norte. In the
afternoon, the group went home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte, on board the yellow pick-up service
vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan with Plate No. JRT 818 driven by Juanito. Sitting at the passenger seat of
the aforesaid vehicle was Mayor Tawan-tawan while those at the back seat were Mosanip, Jun, and
Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind Juanito. Those seated on a wooden bench installed at the
rear (open) portion of the said yellow pick-up service vehicle were PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, PO3 Dela
Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco. PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni were sitting beside each other facing the right
side of the road while PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco were both seated behind PFC Tomanto and PFC
Angni facing the left side of the road.15

At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, appellants, together with their aforenamed co-accused, brought
Samuel to a waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, the one located on the left side
of the road going to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Samuel was instructed by appellants and their co-accused
to stay in the said waiting shed while they assembled themselves in a diamond position on both sides of
the road, which is more or less five (5) meters away from the shed. Then, appellants and their co-accused
surreptitiously waited for the vehicle of the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan.16

A few minutes later, Samuel saw the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan approaching
towards the direction of Salvador, Lanao del Norte. The moment the yellow pick-up service vehicle of
Mayor Tawan-tawan passed by the aforesaid waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused opened fire
and rained bullets on the vehicle using high-powered firearms.

Both Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind the driver, and PFC Tomanto, who was then sitting
on the rear (open) portion of the yellow pick-up service vehicle, saw appellant Wenceslao on the right
side of the road firing at them in a squatting position using an M-16 armalite rifle.
Macasuba was also able to identify appellants Ricardo, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido and
Alfredo as among the ambushers. Mayor Tawan-tawan ordered Juanito to keep on driving to avoid greater
casualties. The vehicle stopped upon reaching the army and Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit
(CAFGU) detachment in Curva, Miagao, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Mayor Tawan-tawan then asked
assistance therefrom.17

Immediately after the ambush, appellants and their co-accused ran towards the house of Samuel’s aunt
located, more or less, 10 meters away from the site of the ambush to get their bags and other stuff. The
house of Samuel’s aunt was the place where appellants and their co-accused stayed prior to the incident.
Samuel followed appellants and their co-accused to the house of his aunt. Thereafter, appellants and their
co-accused hurriedly ran towards Barangay Lindongan, Municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte.18

On the occasion of the ambush, two security escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan, namely, PO3 Dela Cruz and
T/Sgt. Dacoco, died, while others suffered injuries. In particular, Macasuba was slightly hit on the head
by shrapnel; Mosanip sustained injury on his shoulder that almost severed his left arm; PFC Tomanto was
hit on the right and left sides of his body, on his left leg and knee; PFC Angni was hit on his left shoulder;
and Juanito was hit on his right point finger, right head and left hip. Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun were
not injured.19

All the victims of the ambush, except Macasuba, were brought to Bontilao Country Clinic in Maranding,
Lala, Lanao del Norte, and were later transferred to Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital in Tibanga, Iligan
City. PO3 Dela Cruz, however, died before reaching the hospital while T/Sgt. Dacoco died in the hospital.
PFC Tomanto stayed at Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital for 13 days before he was transferred to Camp
Evangelista Hospital in Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, and then in a hospital in Manila and Quezon City.
PFC Angni stayed for seven (7) days in Mindanao Sanitarium and Hospital before he was transferred to
Camp Evangelista Hospital, where he was confined for one (1) month. PFC Angni was transferred to V.
Luna Hospital in Quezon City and was confined therein for two (2) months.20

On the other hand, Mayor Tawan-tawan, Macasuba and the members of the CAFGU went back to the site
of the ambush but appellants and their co-accused were no longer there. Not long after, SPO4 Medrano,
Chief of Police of Salvador Municipal Police Station, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, and his troops arrived. It
was while inside the Salvador Municipal Police Station that SPO4 Medrano heard gunfire and he came to
know that the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed prompting him and his troops to go to the
scene of the crime. Mayor Tawan-tawan informed SPO4 Medrano that appellant Wenceslao was one of
those responsible for the ambush. SPO4 Medrano and his troops, then, conducted an investigation during
which he noticed Samuel at the scene of the crime. Upon interrogation Samuel denied any involvement in
the ambush. Even so, SPO4 Medrano still found Samuel suspicious, hence, he and his fellow police
officers arrested him and turned him over to a certain SPO4 Micabalo, Chief of Police of Lala, Lanao del
Norte. Samuel was then brought to Lala Municipal Jail in Lanao del Norte.

Subsequently, SPO4 Medrano, together with the members of the CAFGU, PNP and the rest of the troops
who were at the scene of the crime, found a trail of footprints believed to be from the culprits. They
conducted a hot pursuit operation towards Barangay Lindongan, Municipality of Baroy, Lanao del Norte,
where appellants and their co-accused were believed to have fled. They were able to recover an M-16
armalite rifle caliber 5.26 concealed near a nipa hut. SPO4 Medrano then sent a Spot Report and a follow-
up report about the ambush. He did not, however, reveal the identity of appellant Wenceslao so that with
a warrant of arrest, appellant Wenceslao could be arrested at the earliest possible time. SPO4 Medrano
also informed the provincial headquarters about the incident through a radio message.21
The following day, or on 6 June 2001, Samuel informed SPO1 Suaring, member of PNP Lala Municipal
Police, Lala, Lanao del Norte, that there were electrical supplies and radio antenna in San Manuel, Lala,
Lanao del Norte, left by the malefactors. SPO1 Suaring, together with Samuel, Senior P/Insp. Salazar,
SPO4 Subingsubing and a certain SPO4 Sumaylo, proceeded to San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte,
where they found the materials near the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) canal, which is 30
meters away from the house of Samuel’s aunt. These were photographed.22

Later, SPO2 Evasco, who was assigned at Lala Police Station, received a call from Barangay Kagawad
Renato Senahon (Brgy. Kgwd. Senahon) that a black backpack was found in Mount Curay-curay, Rebe,
Lala, Lanao del Norte, which is two (2) kilometers away from the highway. Immediately, SPO2 Evasco
and Brgy. Kgwd. Senahon went to the location. Upon inspection, they recovered from the backpack an
army camouflage with name cloth, one Garand pouch and one fragmentation grenade cacao type. SPO2
Evasco then brought these to the police station in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and turned it over to
Senior P/Insp. Salazar.23

On 8 June 2001, Samuel executed his sworn statement identifying appellants and their co-accused as the
persons responsible for the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his companions. Samuel was, thereafter,
incarcerated at the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) in Tubod, Lanao del Norte.24

On 29 August 2001, or more than two (2) months after the ambush, appellant Wenceslao was arrested
while he was in Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. Appellant Ricardo, on the other hand, was
arrested on 20 December 2001 while working in Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte. It was Senior
P/Insp. Salazar who effected the arrest of the appellants.25

Appellants denied having any involvement in the ambush. Appellant Wenceslao presented as witnesses
Armida Nelmida (Armida), Jeffrey Paninsuro (Jeffrey), Luzviminda Apolinares (Luzviminda), Rudy
Alegado (Rudy), Sergeant Teofanis Garsuta (Sgt. Garsuta) and Master Sergeant Pio Cudilla (M/Sgt.
Cudilla). Appellant Ricardo, on the other hand, did not present any witness other than himself.

Appellant Wenceslao testified that on 5 June 2001, he was in their house with his family. At around 1:00
p.m., he went outside their house to clean the pigsty and feed the pigs. Then, at around 2:30 p.m., Jacob
Pepito, Rudy and a certain Romy, who is a military personnel, arrived to get a copy of the election returns
of the 15 May 2001 elections upon the orders of Tanny Pepito, a gubernatorial candidate. He told them
that he has no copy of the returns. He then advised them to get it to Atty. Aldoni Umpa (Atty. Umpa) who
has a copy. At that time, he, Jacob Pepito and Romy were outside the house while his wife and nieces
were just eight (8) to 10 meters away from them. After 10 minutes, his visitors left. 26 Suddenly, appellant
Wenceslao heard gunfire coming from the direction of the house of Mayor Tawan-tawan. His nephew,
Jeffrey, approached and informed him that Mayor Tawan-tawan and the latter’s group were ambushed.
After about one (1) or two (2) minutes, he again heard gunfire. This time the bullets were already hitting
the roof and walls of their house. He then instructed Jeffrey, who is also a CAFGU member, to report the
said incident and to ask help from the members of the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Allere,
Salvador, Lanao del Norte.27

When Jeffrey left, appellant Wenceslao stayed at their house. He did not know where his wife and the rest
of the women, who were in their house, went after the gunburst. After more or less 15 minutes, he walked
barefooted and unarmed towards Camp Allere. There he saw M/Sgt. Cudilla and he informed the former
regarding the incident happened in their house. Not long after, a certain Captain Esmeralda (Capt.
Esmeralda), Commanding Officer of Bravo Company of the Philippine Army, arrived. He also
approached and informed Capt. Esmeralda about the incident in their house. Capt. Esmeralda then
ordered his men to board the samba and a six-by-six truck to fetch appellant Wenceslao’s wife and
relatives in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. A six-by-six truck returned to Camp Allere carrying
appellant Wenceslao’s wife and relatives.28

On the evening of 5 June 2001, appellant Wenceslao, together with his wife and daughter, slept in his
father’s house located, more or less, 100 meters away from Camp Allere and stayed there for five (5)
days. Appellant Wenceslao’s wife then requested for transfer to their son’s house in Kolambugan, Lanao
del Norte, as she could no longer sleep because of what happened at their house. Thus, they went to their
son’s house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, and stayed there for eight (8) days. During that period of
time, he did not hear of any case filed against him. No policemen even bothered to arrest him. His wife,
however, was still afraid, so they left the house of their son and moved to Katipa, Lopez Jaena, Misamis
Occidental. They stayed there until he was arrested on 29 August 2001.29

Appellant Wenceslao, however, disclosed that it would only take, more or less, a 15 minute-vehicle ride
from his residence in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to the site of the ambush in San Manuel,
Lala, Lanao del Norte. Also, from his house to Camp Allere it would only take, more or less, 5 minute-
vehicle ride. Appellant Wenceslao also admitted that he ran for the vice-mayoralty position in Salvador,
Lanao del Norte, against Rodolfo Oban during the 2001 elections. Way back in the 1998 elections, he ran
for mayoralty position in the same locality against Mayor Tawan-tawan but he lost. On both occasions, he
and Mayor Tawan-tawan were no longer in the same political party. Similarly, during the term of Mayor
Tawan-tawan in 1998, appellant Wenceslao revealed that he and his son were charged with illegal
possession of firearm.30

Other defense witnesses, namely, Armida, Jeffrey and Luzviminda, who are appellant Wenceslao’s wife,
nephew and niece, respectively, corroborated appellant Wenceslao’s testimony on all material points.
They all denied that appellant Wenceslao has something to do with the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan
and his group. Nonetheless, Armida admitted that there is a road connecting San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del
Norte, to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. There are also vehicles for hire plying the route of Salvador, Lanao
del Norte, to San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and vice-versa.31

Another defense witness, Rudy, corroborated appellant Wenceslao’s testimony with respect to the fact
that on 5 June 2001, he, together with Jacob Pepito and a certain member of the army intelligence group,
went to the house of appellant Wenceslao to get the election returns. However, he could not recall
anything unusual that happened while he was in the house of appellant Wenceslao. They left the house of
appellant Wenceslao at around 2:45 p.m. Still, no unusual incident happened thereafter. Rudy similarly
revealed that he did not go inside the house of appellant Wenceslao but merely waited for Jacob Pepito
and a member of the army intelligence group inside their vehicle parked at a distance of, more or less,
three (3) meters from the house of appellant Wenceslao. As such, he did not hear the subject of the
conversation between appellant Wenceslao, Jacob Pepito and a member of the army intelligence group.32

Sgt. Garsuta, who also testified for the defense, stated that in the afternoon of 5 June 2001, while he was
at the legislative hall in Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, to secure the canvass of the elections, they
received a radio call from M/Sgt. Cudilla informing them that Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed and
the house of appellant Wenceslao was strafed. Thereafter, Capt. Esmeralda called them to board a six-by-
six truck and to proceed to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. As they passed by San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del
Norte, they stopped to get some information from the police officers therein. They proceeded to Camp
Allere in Salvador, Lanao del Norte. They arrived at Camp Allere at around 4:30 p.m. to 4:35 p.m. and
there he saw appellant Wenceslao waiting and talking to 1st Sgt. Codilla. Appellant Wenceslao then
requested that his family and some personal effects be taken from his house. Thus, Capt. Esmeralda
ordered them to board a six-by-six truck and to proceed to appellant Wenceslao’s house. Upon reaching
the house of appellant Wenceslao, nobody was there. Suddenly, appellant Wenceslao’s wife came out
from the nearby house. Then they ordered her to board a six-by-six truck after taking some personal
belongings of appellant Wenceslao in the latter’s house.33

M/Sgt. Cudilla alleged that at around, more or less, 3:00 p.m. of 5 June 2001, while he was at their
command post at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, his detachment commander, a certain T/Sgt.
Quijano, called and informed him through radio that an ambush incident happened in his area of
responsibility, i.e., Curva Miagao, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. He advised T/Sgt. Quijano to verify the
incident. M/Sgt. Cudilla then called Capt. Esmeralda to inform the latter about the said ambush incident.
He, thereafter, prepared a perimeter defense in the camp. In the second call of T/Sgt. Quijano, the latter
told him that Mayor Tawan-tawan was ambushed. After about 15 minutes, M/Sgt. Cudilla heard
gunbursts from Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Later, more or less, 10 civilians arrived at Camp
Allere.

M/Sgt. Cudilla further confirmed that on 5 June 2001, also at around 3:00 p.m., he saw appellant
Wenceslao at the back of the stage inside Camp Allere near Km. Post one. Appellant Wenceslao then
informed him of the strafing incident in his house. When their commanding officer arrived, appellant
Wenceslao approached the former. Thereafter, a platoon was organized heading towards Poblacion,
Salvador, Lanao del Norte.34

Appellant Ricardo, for his part, maintained that on 5 June 2001, he was also in his house in Purok 5,
Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, attending to his wife and children because his wife had just given
birth in April 2001. In the afternoon thereof, he heard a gunburst somewhere in Poblacion, Salvador,
Lanao del Norte, followed by some commotion in the street. Later, his brother, Joji Ajok, arrived and
informed him that appellant Wenceslao was shot in his house.35

Appellant Ricardo also confirmed that on the early evening of 5 June 2001, he and his family transferred
to the house of his parents-in-law at Camp Allere, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. He so decided when he
heard rumors that the supporters of Atty. Umpa, the political rival of Mayor Tawan-tawan in the 2001
local elections, were being persecuted. Being one of Atty. Umpa’s supporters, he got scared, prompting
him to bring his family to Camp Allere. They stayed there until the following morning and then he left
alone for Ozamis City, Misamis Occidental, and stayed there for three (3) months. Thereafter, he moved
to Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del Norte, where he worked in the farm of his friend. He stayed there until
he was arrested on 20 December 2001.36

Nevertheless, appellant Ricardo divulged that there was never an instance that Atty. Umpa was harassed
or intimidated by the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. He claimed that only Atty. Umpa’s supporters were
harassed. He also revealed that prior to the ambush incident, there was never an instance that he was
threatened by the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. He just presumed that Atty. Umpa’s supporters were
being harassed by the people of Mayor Tawan-tawan because others were already harassed.37

Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, most of whom were victims of the ambush, to be
credible, categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and consistent, coupled with their positive
identification of the appellants as among the perpetrators of the crime and their lack of ill-motive to
falsely testify against them, vis-à-vis the defense of denial and alibi proffered by the latter, the trial court
rendered its Decision on 30 September 2005 finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of double
murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder and imposing upon them the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the aforesaid trial court’s Decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered finding herein
appellants Wenceslao and Ricardo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of double murder with
multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder, and the Court hereby sentences them to suffer
the indivisible prison term of reclusion perpetua; to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the late PO3
Dela Cruz the amount of P 50,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of P 50,000.00 for and by way
of civil indemnity ex delicto; to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of the late T/Sgt. Dacoco the sum
of P 50,000.00 as moral damages plus P 50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity ex delicto; and to
pay, jointly and severally, Ex-Mayor Johnny Tawantawan the amount of P 50,000.00 for and as attorney’s
fees, and the costs of suit.

The Armalite rifle with defaced serial number, the hand grenade and the Garand pouch are hereby ordered
turned-over to the Firearm and Explosive Unit of the PNP Headquarters, Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao del
Norte, for proper disposition as authorized by law.

The full period of the preventive imprisonment of the appellantsshall be credited to them and deducted
from their prison term provided they comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code. Appellant Wenceslao was arrested on 29 August 2001 and detained since then up to the present.
While appellant Ricardo was arrested on 20 December 2001 and detained since then up to the present.

Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the part of the prosecution to
prosecute the case against the other accused who remain at-large, as soon as said accused are
apprehended.38 [Emphasis supplied].

Unperturbed, appellants separately appealed the aforesaid trial court’s Decision to the Court of Appeals
via Notice of Appeal,39 and, thereafter, submitted their respective appeal briefs.

In his brief, appellant Wenceslao assigned the following errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES ARE CREDIBLE AND NOT ORCHESTRATED LIES INTENDED TO FALSELY
IMPUTE THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY TO APPELLANT WENCESLAO;

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE INCONSISTENCIES OF PROSECUTION

WITNESSES ARE HONEST INCONSISTENCIES ON MINOR AND TRIVIAL POINTS;

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT [APPELLANTS WENCESLAO AND RICARDO]
FAILED TO CAST ILL-MOTIVE ON THE PART OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND THAT
THESE WITNESSES HAD NO IMPROPER AND NEFARIOUS MOTIVE IN TESTIFYING
AGAINST THE APPELLANTS;

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE TESTIMONY OF THE MILITARY MEN
WHO ARE NEUTRAL, IMPARTIAL AND OBJECTIVE WITNESSES;
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLANT WENCESLAO ABSCONDED AND
IN IMPUTING MALICE ON THE ACT OF [APPELLANT WENCESLAO] IN TEMPORARILY
LEAVING HIS RESIDENCE;

VI.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT WENCESLAO OF THE CRIME

CHARGED BASED ON TESTIMONIES WHICH ARE OF DOUBTFUL VERACITY;

VII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF [APPELLANT

WENCESLAO] BASED ON JURISPRUDENCE WHICH ARE NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT
BAR.40

While appellant Ricardo, in his brief, raised this lone assignment of error:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT RICARDO DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.41

On 18 June 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision affirming appellants’
conviction of the crime charged. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence on record disclosed that the
alleged inconsistencies pointed to by appellant Wenceslao refer only to minor matters. The same did not
damage the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, particularly that of PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni,
Juanito and Mayor Tawan-tawan. Honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial points serve to strengthen
rather than destroy the credibility of a witness to a crime. Moreover, since the prosecution witnesses
positively identified appellants in open court as among the perpetrators of the ambush, the same must
prevail over the alleged inconsistencies, as well as the defense of denial and alibi interposed by the
appellants. Denial is a negative and self-serving assertion that cannot overcome the victim’s affirmative,
categorical and convincing testimony. In the same way, for alibi to prosper, it must be established by
positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime
at the time of its commission and not merely assert that he was somewhere else. As in the present case,
the trial court took judicial notice of the distance of seven (7) kilometers between Salvador, Lanao del
Norte, where appellants reside, and San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, where the ambush incident took
place. Appellants, therefore, could not successfully invoke alibi as a defense because it was not physically
impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime.42 The Court of Appeals then decreed as
follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the separate APPEALS are DENIED, and the appealed
Decision is hereby AFFIRMED.43

Still undaunted, appellants elevated the aforesaid Decision of the Court of Appeals to this Court via
Notice of Appeal.

In a Resolution44 dated 19 November 2008, the Court required the parties to simultaneously submit their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire. In lieu thereof, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation45stating that it will no longer file a supplement to its Consolidated Appellee’s Brief 46 dated
14 December 2006 there being no transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the
appellate court’s Decision was rendered.

Appellants, on the other hand, filed their separate Supplemental Briefs,47 which were a mere rehash of the
arguments already discussed in their respective Appellant’s Briefs 48 submitted before the appellate court.
In his Supplemental Brief, appellant Wenceslao reiterates that: the trial court and the Court of Appeals
committed reversible errors when they decided a question of substance which is not in accord with
established facts and the applicable laws.49 He, once again, enumerated the following errors committed by
the appellate court, thus:

I.

The court a quo and the Court of Appeals gravely erred when they ruled that the inconsistencies
committed by the prosecution witnesses are on minor and trivial points when these
inconsistencies are indicative of the innocence of appellant Wenceslao;

II.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider as indicative of innocence of appellant
Wenceslao the fact that the authorities did not include in the police report the name of appellant
Wenceslao and did not arrest him immediately after the ambush, or within a couple of months
from the date of the ambush;

III.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they deliberately
refused or failed to consider and appreciate the testimonies of the military officers who are
neutral, impartial, and objective witnesses;

IV.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals miserably failed to consider the evidence for the
defense despite the clear and unmistakable proof of their honesty and integrity;

V.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals clearly and deliberately misinterpreted the facts and
misapplied the laws regarding "flight" as an alleged indication of guilt;

VI.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals convicted appellant Wenceslaobased on jurisprudence on
"alibi" which are not applicable in the case at bar50 [Emphasis and italicized omitted].

Appellant Wenceslao contends that a thorough perusal of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
would show these are tainted with glaring inconsistencies, which are badges of lies and dishonesty, thus,
casting doubts on their credibility.
The inconsistencies referred to by appellant Wenceslao are as follows: (1) whether PFC Tomanto and
PFC Angni were already with Mayor Tawan-tawan from Salvador, Lanao del Norte, to Tubod, Lanao del
Norte, and vice-versa, or they merely hitched a ride in Mayor Tawan-tawan’s vehicle on their way home
to Salvador, Lanao del Norte; (2) if so, the place where PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni hitched a ride in
Mayor Tawan-tawan’s vehicle; (3) the officer from whom PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni got permission
in order to go home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte; (4) PFC Angni allegedly knew appellant Wenceslao
prior to the ambush incident on 5 June 2001 and he even saw appellant Wenceslao as among the
perpetrators of the ambush, yet, he did not mention the name of the former in his affidavit; (5) Mayor
Tawan-tawan should have mentioned the name of appellant Wenceslao as one of those responsible in the
ambush incident when he reported the same to SPO4 Medrano; (6) SPO4 Medrano should have included
the name of appellant Wenceslao in the Spot Reports he transmitted to the Provincial Police Office of the
PNP and should have immediately caused his arrest if he truly participated in the ambush incident; (7) it
would no longer be necessary to discharge Samuel and to make him as state witness if the victims of the
ambush incident, indeed, saw the perpetrators of the crime; and (8) if appellant Wenceslao was one of the
ambushers, Samuel would not have failed to mention the former in his sworn statement.

Appellant Wenceslao believes that the afore-enumerated inconsistencies only proved that he has no
participation in the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his companions. The declaration of his innocence
is thus called for.

Appellant Wenceslao further imputes ill-motive and malice on the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses in testifying against him. The motive was to remove him, being the only non-Muslim leader, in
the Municipality of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, who has the courage to challenge the reign of Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his clan. It was also an act of revenge against him for opposing Mayor Tawan-tawan
during the 1998 elections. As to Samuel’s motive, appellant Wenceslao claims that it was for self-
preservation, freedom, leniency and some other consideration. Evidently, after Samuel’s testimony, the
latter was released from jail.

Appellant Wenceslao maintains that he was not at the ambush site on 5 June 2001 as can be gleaned from
the testimonies of M/Sgt. Cudilla and Sgt. Garsuta.

Lastly, appellant Wenceslao argues that his flight was not an indication of guilt. He justified his
temporary absence from his residence by stating that it was because of the traumatic experience of his
wife, who had no peace of mind since their house was riddled with bullets by lawless elements without
any cause.

With all the foregoing, the resolution of this appeal hinges primarily on the determination of credibility of
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

Time and again, this Court held that when the issues revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses, the
findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of
the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high
respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe
the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the
truth.51 Moreover, credibility, to state what is axiomatic, is the sole province of the trial court. In the
absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case, the trial court's
findings on the matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.52 A careful perusal of
the records of this case revealed that none of these circumstances is attendant herein.
The affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the factual findings of the trial court places this case under the
rule that factual findings are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court. No
reason has been given by appellants to deviate from the factual findings arrived at by the trial court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

In the present case, most of the prosecution witnesses, i.e., Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC
Angni, Juanito and Mayor Tawan-tawan, were victims of the 5 June 2001 ambush incident. As such, they
actually witnessed what exactly happened on that fateful day, especially Macasuba and PFC Angni, who
vividly saw appellant Wenceslao on the right side of the road and in a squatting position firing at them
with his M-16 armalite rifle. Macasuba and PFC Angni, having seated behind the driver and on the rear
(open) portion of the yellow pick-up service vehicle, respectively, both facing the right side of the road,
were in such a position to see without any obstruction how appellant Wenceslao rained bullets on their
vehicle with his M-16 armalite rifle while they were traversing the road of San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del
Norte, on their way home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Macasuba was also able to identify appellant
Ricardo, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido and Alfredo as among the perpetrators of the ambush.

It bears stressing that the ambush happened at around 3:00 p.m., in broad daylight, such that it would not
be impossible for Macasuba and PFC Angni to have seen and identified their assailants, particularly
appellant Wenceslao, who was once chief of Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), then municipal
councilor and twice elected vice-mayor of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, i.e., 1992 and 1995 elections, and
appellant Ricardo, who is a resident of Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte.53

The aforesaid assertions of Macasuba and PFC Angni were equally confirmed by Samuel, an accused-
turned-state-witness, who, in his testimony before the open court, narrated how appellants and their co-
accused, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr., Brigido, Alfredo, Alejandro, Ruben, Arnel, and Opao, brought
him in the waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte; assembled themselves in a
diamond position on both sides of the road; surreptitiously waited for the vehicle boarded by Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group; and executed the ambush from the moment the vehicle boarded by Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group passed by the aforesaid waiting shed.

Samuel was in an advantageous position to substantiate the identities of the appellants and their co-
accused as the perpetrators of the ambush because he was near the scene of the crime, i.e., merely five (5)
meters away therefrom. This is aside from the fact that appellants and their co-accused were the very
same people who brought him to the site of the ambush. Appellants and their co-accused likewise stayed
for a long period of time in the house of Samuel’s aunt prior to the ambush incident and Samuel is very
well-acquainted with these people for he himself resided therein.54

Given the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that prosecution witnesses, Macasuba, PFC Angni
and Samuel, have firmly established the identities of appellants as the perpetrators of the ambush. In
addition, their testimonies on who and how the crime was committed were characterized by the trial court
as simple and candid. Even their answers to questions were simple, straightforward and categorical. Such
simplicity and candidness in their testimonies only prove that they were telling the truth, thus,
strengthening their credibility as witnesses.

Now, as regards the inconsistencies pointed out by appellant Wenceslao that allegedly cast doubt on the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses, this Court finds them frivolous, trivial, minor, irrelevant and have
nothing to do with the essential elements of the crime charged, i.e., double murder with multiple
frustrated murder and double attempted murder. In the same manner, they do not detract from the fact that
Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group, which includes PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni, were ambushed by
appellants and their co-accused on 5 June 2001 while on board the yellow pick-up service vehicle as it
passed by the waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte. And, said ambush resulted in
the death of PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco and injuries to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC
Angni and Juanito.

It is axiomatic that slight variations in the testimony of a witness as to minor details or collateral matters
do not affect his or her credibility as these variations are in fact indicative of truth and show that the
witness was not coached to fabricate or dissemble. An inconsistency, which has nothing to do with the
elements of a crime, is not a ground to reverse a conviction.55

Similarly, PFC Angni and Samuel’s failure to name appellant Wenceslao in their affidavits/sworn
statements as one of the ambushers does not necessarily render their testimonies implausible and
unworthy of belief.

Inconsistencies between the sworn statement and direct testimony given in open court do not necessarily
discredit the witness. An affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is oftentimes incomplete and is generally
regarded as inferior to the testimony of the witness in open court. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact
that testimonies given during trial are much more exact and elaborate than those stated in sworn
statements, which are usually incomplete and inaccurate for a variety of reasons. More so, because of the
partial and innocent suggestions, or for want of specific inquiries. In addition, an extrajudicial statement
or affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in
writing the affiant’s statement, hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are not infrequent.
Indeed, the prosecution witnesses’ direct and categorical declarations on the witness stand are superior to
their extrajudicial statements.56 Similarly, the failure of a witness to immediately disclose the name of the
culprit does not necessarily impair his or her credibility.57

A meticulous perusal of Samuel’s sworn statement reveals that he categorically mentioned therein the
name of appellant Wenceslao as one of the ambushers. In his sworn statement, Samuel specifically stated
that during the ambush, he saw appellant Wenceslao at the other side of the road, just a few meters away
from the bridge, who, at that time armed with an M-16 rifle, was likewise firing towards the group of
Mayor Tawan-tawan.58

Above all, both PFC Angni and Samuel positively identified appellant Wenceslao in open court as one of
those responsible for the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group.59 Such open court declaration is
much stronger than their affidavits/sworn statements.

Mayor Tawan-tawan’s failure to disclose to SPO4 Medrano the name of appellant Wenceslao as one of
those responsible in the ambush and SPO4 Medrano’s failure to include the name of appellant Wenceslao
in the Spot Reports he transmitted to the Provincial Police Office of the PNP would not inure to appellant
Wenceslao’s benefit.

As can be gleaned from the transcript of stenographic notes, when Mayor Tawan-tawan and SPO4
Medrano met at the scene of the crime, the former immediately told the latter that appellant Wenceslao
was one of the ambushers.60This belied the claim of appellant Wenceslao that Mayor Tawan-tawan did
not tell SPO4 Medrano that he (appellant Wenceslao) was among the ambushers. Also, SPO4 Medrano
provided an explanation61 for his failure to state in his Spot Reports the name of appellant Wenceslao as
one of the ambushers. And, even granting that his explanation would not have been satisfactory, still,
SPO4 Medrano’s failure to mention appellant Wenceslao’s name in his Spot Reports was not fatal to the
cause of the prosecution. More especially because appellant Wenceslao was positively identified by the
prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
Even the discharge of Samuel to become state witness does not negate the fact that prosecution witnesses,
Macasuba and PFC Angni, indeed, saw appellants as among the perpetrators of the crime. To note,
appellants were not the only persons accused of the crime; they were many including Pedro, Eduardo, Sr.,
Eduardo, Jr., Brigido, Alfredo, Alejandro, Ruben, Arnel, and Opao. In order to give justice to the victims
of the ambush, especially those who have died by reason thereof, all persons responsible therefor must be
penalized. Since Samuel knew all those who have participated in the ambush incident, his testimony as to
the other accused in this case is material to strengthen the case of the prosecution against them.
Unfortunately, the other accused in this case remained at large until now.

As aptly observed by the trial court, thus:

x x x The Court is convinced without equivocation on the veracity of the testimonies of the prosecution
eyewitnesses who are all in one pointing to herein appellant Wenceslao as one of those who participated
in the ambush, and on the veracity of the testimonies of the two prosecution eyewitnesses – Macasuba and
Samuel – to the effect that appellant Ricardo was among the people who perpetrated the said ambush.

The testimonies of these witnesses were simple and candid. The simplicity and candidness of their
testimonies only prove that they were telling the truth. Their answers to questions were simple,
straightforward and categorical; spontaneous, frank and consistent. Thus, a witness who testifies
categorically, spontaneously, frankly and consistently is a credible witness.62

Appellant Wenceslao’s allegations of ill-motive and malice on the part of prosecution witnesses,
including Samuel, have no leg to stand on.

The records are bereft of any evidence to substantiate the claim of appellant Wenceslao that the motive of
the prosecution witnesses in testifying against him was to remove him as the only non-Muslim leader in
the Municipality of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, and that it was an act of revenge for opposing Mayor
Tawan-tawan during the 1998 elections. Appellant Wenceslao failed to present an iota of evidence to
support his aforesaid allegations. As properly stated by the Court of Appeals, "mere allegation or claim is
not proof. Each party must prove his own affirmative allegation." Also, it must be emphasized that during
the 1998 elections, it was Mayor Tawan-tawan who won the mayoralty position. It is, therefore, highly
implausible for Mayor Tawan-tawan, who emerged as the victor, to take revenge against the losing
candidate, appellant Wenceslao. As such, appellant Wenceslao failed to prove any ill-motive on the part
of the prosecution witnesses. It is settled that where the defense fails to prove that witnesses are moved by
improper motives, the presumption is that they were not so moved and their testimonies are therefore
entitled to full weight and credit.63

To repeat, most of the prosecution witnesses are victims of the ambush. Being the aggrieved parties, they
all desire justice for what had happened to them, thus, it is unnatural for them to falsely accuse someone
other than the real culprits. Otherwise stated, it is very unlikely for these prosecution witnesses to
implicate an innocent person to the crime. It has been correctly observed that the natural interest of
witnesses, who are relatives of the victims, more so, the victims themselves, in securing the conviction of
the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than the culprits, for otherwise, the culprits
would gain immunity.64

Contrary to appellant Wenceslao’s assertion, this Court is convince that his and appellant Ricardo’s flight
from the scene of the crime immediately after the ambush is an evidence of their guilt. It is noteworthy
that after the ambush incident, appellant Wenceslao immediately left his residence and moved to his
father’s house, then to his son’s house in Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, and lastly to Katipa, Lopez
Jaena, Misamis Occidental, where he was arrested. Appellant Ricardo did the same thing. From his
residence in Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, he transferred to his parents-in-law’s house, then he
left alone for Ozamis City, Misamis Occidental, and thereafter, moved to Puting Bato in Sapad, Lanao del
Norte, until he was arrested on 20 December 2001. If appellants were truly innocent of the crime charged,
they would not go into hiding rather they would face their accusers to clear their names. Courts go by the
biblical truism that "the wicked flee when no man pursueth but the righteous are as bold as a lion."65

Appellants’ respective explanations regarding their flight fail to persuade this Court. It bears emphasis
that after the alleged strafing of appellant Wenceslao’s house, all he did is to move from one place to
another instead of having it investigated by the authorities. Until now, the alleged strafing of his house
remains a mystery. If that strafing incident truly happened, he would be much eager to know who caused
it in order to penalize the author thereof. Appellant Ricardo, on the other hand, was allegedly afraid of
being persecuted for being one of the supporters of Mayor Tawan-tawan’s political rival. His fear,
however, was more imaginary than real. The aforesaid claim of appellant Ricardo was uncorroborated,
hence, cannot be given any considerable weight.

In light of the clear, positive and straightforward testimonies of prosecution witnesses, coupled with their
positive identification of appellants as among the perpetrators of the ambush, appellants’ defense of
denial and alibi cannot prosper.

As this Court has oft pronounced, both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail
over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that appellants committed the
crime.66 For alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to
prove that appellants were somewhere else when the crime happened. They must also demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the
crime at the approximate time of its commission.67 Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof,
such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.68 A mere denial, like alibi, is
inherently a weak defense and constitutes self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.69

In this case, both appellants claimed that they were just in their respective houses in Poblacion, Salvador,
Lanao del Norte, when the ambush incident happened and they have no involvement whatsoever in the
commission thereof.

To corroborate appellant Wenceslao’s testimony, the defense presented Armida, Jeffrey and Luzviminda,
who are appellant Wenceslao’s wife, nephew and niece, respectively. This Court, however, cannot give
credence to the testimonies of these defense witnesses. Being appellant Wenceslao’s relatives, their
testimonies are rendered suspect because the former’s relationship to them makes it likely that they would
freely perjure themselves for his sake. The defense of alibi may not prosper if it is established mainly by
the appellant himself and his relatives, and not by credible persons. 70 This Court further quote with
conformity the observation made by the trial court, viz:

FURTHER, the testimonies of the above-named witnesses for herein appellant Wenceslao were shattered
by the testimony of Rudy, another witness for appellant Wenceslao, who categorically told the Court that
during the time he and his companions Jacob Pepito and a certain Romy were in the house of appellant
Wenceslao in the afternoon of 5 June 2001, there was no unusual incident that took place, as well as no
unusual incident that happened when they left the house of appellant Wenceslao at about 2:45 in the
afternoon.

The foregoing testimony of Rudy clearly imparts that the visit of Rudy and his companions to the house
of appellant Wenceslao, if any, happened on another date. This will be so because if appellant Wenceslao
and his closely related witnesses are telling the truth that Jacob Pepito, Rudy and Romy were in the house
of appellant Wenceslao talking about the said election returns during that fateful afternoon, then
definitely, Rudy should have had known of the ambush incident, said incident being spreaded throughout
or shall we say, "the talk of the town" that afternoon of 5 June 2001.

If the ambush incident occurred on the day Rudy and his companions visited appellant Wenceslao, then,
no doubt that Rudywill tell the Court about it. But his testimony was otherwise.71 [Emphasis supplied].

In the same breath, appellant Ricardo’s defense of denial and alibi cannot be given any evidentiary value
as it was unsubstantiated. Appellant Ricardo never presented any witness to support his claim that he was
simply inside their house attending to his wife and children during the time that the ambush incident
happened. This Court reiterates that mere denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a
self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law. Between the categorical and positive assertions of
the prosecution witnesses and the negative averments of the accused which are uncorroborated by reliable
and independent evidence, the former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater
evidentiary weight.72

Withal, it was not physically impossible for the appellants to be at the scene of the crime in the afternoon
of 5 June 2001. As observed by the trial court and the appellate court, Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del
Norte, where both appellants’ reside, is only about seven (7) kilometers away from San Manuel, Lala,
Lanao del Norte, where the ambush took place.73

All told, this Court affirms the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that, indeed, appellants
were among the perpetrators of the ambush against Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. Prosecution
witnesses’ categorical, positive and straightforward testimonies, coupled with their positive identification
of appellants as among the perpetrators of the crime, prevail over appellants’ defense of bare denial and
alibi.

As to the crime committed. The trial court, as well as the appellate court, convicted appellants of double
murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder. This Court believes, however, that
appellants should be convicted not of a complex crime but of separate crimes of two (2) counts of murder
and seven (7) counts of attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the victims in this case were not
the result of a single act but of several acts of the appellants, thus, making Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code inapplicable.

Appellants and their co-accused simultaneous act of riddling the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan
and his group with bullets discharged from their firearms when the said vehicle passed by San Manuel,
Lala, Lanao del Norte, resulted in the death of two security escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan, i.e., PO3 Dela
Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means
to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

xxxx
5. With evident premeditation. [Emphasis supplied].

Treachery, which was alleged in the Information, attended the commission of the crime. Time and again,
this Court, in a plethora of cases, has consistently held that there is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which
tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make. There are two (2) conditions that must concur for treachery to exist, to wit:
(a) the employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
to retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted. "The
essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected
manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape." 74

The deadly successive shots of the appellants and their co-accused did not allow the hapless victims, i.e.,
PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, any opportunity to put up a decent defense. The attack was executed
by appellants and their-co-accused in such a vicious manner as to make the defense virtually impossible.
Under the circumstances, it is very apparent that appellants had murder in their hearts when they waylaid
their unwary victims.75 Thus, as to the death of PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, appellants should be
held liable for murder.

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, however, cannot be appreciated as it is

deemed absorbed in treachery.76

Since the prosecution failed to prove the attending circumstance of evident premeditation, the
circumstance cannot likewise be appreciated. To prove this aggravating circumstance, the prosecution
must show the following: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time, between the
determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof, sufficient to allow the offender to reflect
upon the consequences of his act.77 None of these elements could be gathered from the evidence on
record.

As regards the victims Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito, although they were
injured during the ambush and were all hospitalized, except for Macasuba, it was not mentioned that their
injuries and wounds were mortal or fatal such that without the timely medical assistance accorded to
them, they would have died.78 However, it does not necessarily follow that the crimes committed against
the aforenamed victims were simply less serious physical injuries. Also, even though Mayor Tawan-
tawan and Jun did not sustain any injury during the ambush, it does not mean that no crime has been
committed against them. The latter were just fortunate enough not to have sustained any injury on the
occasion thereof. Since appellants were motivated by the same intent to kill, thus, as to Macasuba,
Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, Juanito, Mayor Tawan-tawan and Jun, appellants should be held
guilty of attempted murder.

What brings this case out of the ordinary is the issue of applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. Its resolution would determine whether the conviction of appellants must be for the separate crimes
of two (2) counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder or of the complex crime of double
murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder.

The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which explicitly states
that:79
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. [Emphasis supplied].

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in
the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed. There
are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as compound crime, or when a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as complex crime proper, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of the first kind is when a
single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule governs where separate and
distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from
separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.80

Evidently, there is in this case no complex crime proper. And the circumstances present in this case do not
fit exactly the description of a compound crime.

From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned that the killing and wounding of the victims were not
the result of a single discharge of firearms by the appellants and their co-accused. To note, appellants and
their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his
group. As a result, two security escorts died while five (5) of them were wounded and injured. The
victims sustained gunshot wounds in different parts of their bodies. Therefrom, it cannot be gainsaid that
more than one bullet had hit the victims. Moreover, more than one gunman fired at the vehicle of the
victims. As held in People v. Valdez,81 each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective
firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which
cannot give rise to a complex crime.82

Obviously, appellants and their co-accused performed not only a single act but several individual and
distinct acts in the commission of the crime. Thus, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code would not apply
for it speaks only of a "single act."

There are, however, several rulings which applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code despite the fact
that several acts were performed by several accused in the commission of the crime resulting to the death
and/or injuries to their victims.

In People v. Lawas,83 the members of the Home Guard, upon order of their leader, Lawas, simultaneously
and successively fired at several victims. As a result, 50 persons died. It was there held that the killing
was the result of a single impulse as there was no intent on the part of the accused to fire at each and
every victim separately and distinctly from each other.

If the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal impulse, it constitutes a single offense.
However, "single criminal impulse" was not the only consideration in applying Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code in the said case because there was therein no evidence at all showing the identity or number
of persons killed by each accused. There was also no conspiracy to perpetuate the killing, thus, collective
criminal responsibility could not be imputed upon the accused. Since it was impossible to ascertain the
number of persons killed by each of them, this Court was "forced" to find all the accused guilty of only
one offense of multiple homicide instead of holding each of them responsible for 50 deaths.84

Significantly, there was no conspiracy in People v. Lawas. However, as this Court held in People v.
Remollino,85 the Lawas doctrine is more of an exception than the general rule.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and then decide to commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly,
to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. Once established, each and every one of the
conspirators is made criminally liable for the crime actually committed by any one of them. In the
absence of any direct proof, the agreement to commit a crime may be deduced from the mode and manner
of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action, and community of interest. As such, it does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as each of
the actors incurs the same criminal liability, because the act of one is the act of all.86

The Information filed against appellants and their co-accused alleged conspiracy, among others. Although
the trial court did not directly state that a conspiracy existed, such may be inferred from the concerted
actions of the appellants and their co-accused, to wit: (1) appellants and their co-accused brought Samuel
to a waiting shed located on the left side of the road where the yellow pick-up service vehicle boarded by
Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group would pass; (2) appellants and their co-accused, thereafter, assembled
themselves on both sides of the road and surreptitiously waited for the aforesaid yellow pick-up service
vehicle; (3) the moment the yellow pick-up service vehicle passed by the waiting shed, appellants and
their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets thereon resulting in the killing and wounding of the
victims; (4) immediately, appellants and their co-accused ran towards the house of Samuel’s aunt to get
their bags and other stuff; (5) Samuel followed appellants and their co-accused; and (6) appellants and
their co-accused fled.

Conspiracy is very much evident from the afore-enumerated actuations of the appellants and their co-
accused. Clearly, their acts were coordinated. They were synchronized in their approach to riddle with
bullets the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. They were motivated by a single
criminal impulse ─ to kill the victims. Indubitably, conspiracy is implied when the accused persons had a
common purpose and were united in its execution. Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all
perpetrators at the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal
responsibility.87

With the presence of conspiracy in the case at bench, appellants and their co-accused had assumed joint
criminal responsibility ─ the act of one is the act of all. The ascertainment of who among them actually
hit, killed and/or caused injury to the victims already becomes immaterial. Collective responsibility
replaced individual responsibility. The Lawas doctrine, premised on the impossibility of determining who
killed whom, cannot, to repeat, be applied.

Interestingly, in People v. De los Santos,88 People v. Abella,89 People v. Garcia90 and People v.
Pincalin,91 this Court also applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code even though several acts were
performed by the accused and conspiracy attended the commission of the crime.

In People v. De los Santos,92 a prison riot occurred for two consecutive days inside the national
penitentiary between the members of two gangs, i.e., Sigue-Sigue Sputnik and Oxo. As a result, nine (9)
inmates were killed. Fourteen (14) inmates were then convicted for the crime of multiple murder. The
existence of conspiracy in the commission of the crime was duly proven. There was, however, no
discussion why the accused were convicted of a complex crime instead of separate crimes.

In a similar case of People v. Abella,93 involving the massacre of certain prisoners in the Davao Penal
Colony and a reprise of a similar riot that occurred in the national penitentiary on 16 February 1958
(subject of De los Santos), all the accused were also convicted for the complex crime of multiple murder
and multiple frustrated murder. Conspiracy likewise attended the commission of the crime. This Court
applied the ruling in De los Santos and elucidated that the ruling in the said case is predicated on the
theory that "when for the attainment of a single purpose which constitutes an offense, various acts are
executed, such acts must be considered only as one offense," a complex one. The Lawas doctrine was
equally applied although conspiracy had been duly proven. This Court then stated that where a conspiracy
animates several persons with a single purpose "their individual acts in pursuance of that purpose are
looked upon as a single act – the act of execution – giving rise to a complex offense. The felonious
agreement produces a sole and solidary liability: each confederate forms but a part of a single being."94

People v. Garcia95 and People v. Pincalin96 have the same factual background as De los Santos and
Abella. They were the third and fourth cases, respectively, of prison riots resulting to the killing of
convicts by fellow convicts while inside the national penitentiary. In Garcia, the accused were convicted
for the complex crime of multiple murder and double attempted murder, while in Pincalin the accused
were convicted for the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder. In both cases, this Court
found conspiracy to have attended the commission of the crime.

In applying Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in Garcia and Pincalin, this Court, gave the same
justification as in Abella: that both cases were covered by the rule that "when for the attainment of a
single purpose, which constitutes an offense various acts are executed, such acts must be considered as
only one offense, a complex one." Correspondingly, "where a conspiracy animates several persons with a
single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the
act of execution, giving rise to a complex offense. Various acts committed under one criminal impulse
may constitute a single complex offense.97

We however found no intention by this Court to establish as doctrine, contrary to Lawas, that Article 48 is
applicable even in cases where several acts were performed by the accused and conspiracy attended the
commission of the crime. In Pincalin, this Court has already clarified that: nonetheless, this Court further
held that "in other cases where several killings on the same occasion were perpetrated, but not involving
prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is to say, the killings would be treated as separate offenses,
as opined by Mr. Justice Makasiar and as held in some decided cases."98

De los Santos, Abella, Garcia and Pincalin, therefore, were exceptions to the general rule stated in Article
48 which exceptions were drawn by the peculiar circumstance of the cases.

It may be mentioned that in People v. Sanidad,99 this Court, once again, applied Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code although the circumstances of the case were not the same as in Lawas, De los Santos, Abella,
Garcia and Pincalin, where this Court departed from the general rule.

In Sanidad, suddenly and without a warning, several accused unleashed a volley of shots at the jeepney
boarded by the victims. Miraculously, all passengers, except Rolando Tugadi (Rolando), survived the
ambush and suffered only minor injuries. Conspiracy attended the commission of the crime. Accused
were convicted for the complex crime of murder and multiple attempted murder. We there held that the
case comes within the purview of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Citing Lawas and Abella, it was
pronounced that although several independent acts were performed by the accused, it was not possible to
determine who among them actually killed Rolando; and that there was no evidence that the accused
intended to fire at each and every one of the victims separately and distinctly from each other. On the
premise that the evidence clearly shows a single criminal impulse to kill Marlon Tugadi’s group as a
whole, we repeated that where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their
individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution,
giving rise to a single complex offense.100

The reliance in Sanidad, on Lawas and Abella is incorrect.

The application of the Abella doctrine, has already been clarified in Pincalin, thus: where several killings
on the same occasion were perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is
to say, the killings would be treated as separate offenses. Since in Sanidad, the killings did not involve
prisoners or it was not a case of prisoners killing fellow prisoners. As such, Abella would not apply.

To repeat, in Lawas, this Court was merely forced to apply Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code because
of the impossibility of ascertaining the number of persons killed by each accused. Since conspiracy was
not proven therein, joint criminal responsibility could not be attributed to the accused. Each accused could
not be held liable for separate crimes because of lack of clear evidence showing the number of persons
actually killed by each of them.

Proven conspiracy could have overcome the difficulty.

Our repeated ruling is that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It is as though each one performed
the act of each one of the conspirators. Each one is criminally responsible for each one of the deaths and
injuries of the several victims. The severalty of the acts prevents the application of Article 48. The
applicability of Article 48 depends upon the singularity of the act, thus the definitional phrase "a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies." This is not an original reading of the law. In
People v. Hon. Pineda,101 the Court already recognized the "deeply rooted x x x doctrine that when
various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes." As we
observed in People v. Tabaco,102 clarifying the applicability of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, this
Court further stated in Hon. Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48, x x x there must be
singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law."103

With all the foregoing, this Court holds appellants liable for the separate crimes of two (2) counts of
murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder.

As to penalty. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposed for the crime of murder
is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the penalty to
be imposed upon appellants is reclusion perpetua for each count, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 63 104 of
the Revised Penal Code.105

Appellants are also guilty of seven (7) counts of attempted murder. The penalty prescribed by law for
murder, i.e., reclusion perpetua to death, should be reduced by two degrees, conformably to Article
51106 of the Revised Penal Code. Under paragraph 2, Article 61,107 in relation to Article 71 of the Revised
Penal Code, such a penalty is prision mayor. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, the same should be imposed in its medium period pursuant to paragraph 1, Article 64 108 of
the Revised Penal Code.109 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in the case of attempted murder, the
maximum shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor, which is 8 years and 1 day to 10
years, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional,
in any of its periods, the range of which is 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. This Court, therefore, imposed
upon the appellants the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count of attempted murder.

As to damages. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages;
(4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.110

Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the
deceased are entitled to be indemnified for the death of the victim without need of any evidence or proof
thereof. Moral damages like civil indemnity, is also mandatory upon the finding of the fact of
murder.111 Therefore, the trial court and the appellate court properly awarded civil indemnity in the
amount of P 50,000.00 and moral damages also in the amount of P 50,000.00 to the heirs of each
deceased victims.

Article 2230 of the Civil Code states that exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. In this case, treachery may no longer be
considered as an aggravating circumstance since it was already taken as a qualifying circumstance in the
murder, and abuse of superior strength which would otherwise warrant the award of exemplary damages
was already absorbed in the treachery.112However, in People v. Combate,113 this Court still awards
exemplary damages despite the lack of any aggravating circumstance to deter similar conduct and to serve
as an example for public good. Thus, to deter future similar transgressions, the Court finds that an award
of P 30,000.00 as exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of each deceased victims is proper. 114 The said
amount is in conformity with this Court’s ruling in People v. Gutierrez.115

Actual damages cannot be awarded for failure to present the receipts covering the expenditures for the
wake, coffin, burial and other expenses for the death of the victims. In lieu thereof, temperate damages
may be recovered where it has been shown that the victim’s family suffered some pecuniary loss but the
amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty as provided for under Article 2224 of the Civil
Code.116 In this case, it cannot be denied that the heirs of the deceased victims suffered pecuniary loss
although the exact amount was not proved with certainty. Thus, this Court similarly awards P 25,000.00
as temperate damages to the heirs of each deceased victims.117

The surviving victims, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito, are also entitled to
moral, temperate and exemplary damages.

Ordinary human experience and common sense dictate that the wounds inflicted upon the aforesaid
victims would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, moral shock, and similar
injuries.118 It is only justifiable to grant them moral damages in the amount of P 40,000.00 each in
conformity with this Court’s ruling in People v. Mokammad.119

The award of P 25,000.00 each as temperate damages to Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni
and Juanito is also in order. It is beyond doubt that these victims were hospitalized and spent money for
their medication. As to Macasuba, although he was not confined in a hospital, it cannot be gainsaid that
he also spent for the treatment of the minor injuries he sustained by reason of the ambush. However, they
all failed to present any receipt therefor. Nevertheless, it could not be denied that they suffered pecuniary
loss; thus, it is only prudent to award temperate damages in the amount of P 25,000.00 to each of
them.1âwphi1

The award of exemplary damages is also in order. Thus, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni
and Juanito are awarded exemplary damages in the amount of P 30,000.00 to conform to current
jurisprudence.120

This Court likewise affirms the award of P 50,000.00 for and as attorney’s fees, as well as costs of the
suit, in favor of Mayor Tawan-tawan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC No. 00246
dated 18 June 2008 is hereby MODIFIED, as follows: (1) appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of murder thereby imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count; (2) appellants are also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7) counts of attempted
murder thereby imposing upon them the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count; (3) other than the
civil indemnity and moral damages already awarded by the trial court and the appellate court, appellants
are further ordered to pay, jointly and severally, exemplary and temperate damages in the amount
of P 30,000.00 and P 25,000.00, respectively, to the heirs of each deceased victims; and (4) appellants are
also directed to pay, jointly and severally, Macasuba, Mosanip, PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni and Juanito the
amount of P 40,000.00 each as moral damages, P 25,000.00 each as temperate damages and P 30,000.00
each as exemplary damages.

Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

3) G.R. No. 199892 December 10, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARTURO PUNZALAN, JR., Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated April 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 02816 denying the appeal of appellant Arturo Punzalan, Jr. of the Decision2 dated March 21, 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of fba, Zambales and affirming his conviction for the complex crime of
double murder with multiple attempted murder, with certain modifications on the civil liability imposed
on appellant.3

In August 2002, Seaman 1st Class (SN1) Arnulfo Andal, SN1 Antonio Duclayna, SN1 Evelio Bacosa,
SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya, and SN1 Erlinger Bundang were among the members of the
Philippine Navy sent for schooling at the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) at San
Miguel, San Antonio, Zambales. On August 10, 2002, at around 5:00 or 6:00 in the afternoon, they went
to the "All-in-One" Canteen to have some drink. Later, at around 10:00 in the evening, they transferred to
a nearby videoke bar, "Aquarius," where they continued their drinking session. Shortly thereafter, a
heated argument between SN1 Bacosa and appellant ensued regarding a flickering light bulb inside
"Aquarius."4 When SN1 Bacosa suggested that the light be turned off ("Patayin ang ilaw"), appellant who
must have misunderstood and misinterpreted SN1 Bacosa’s statement belligerently reacted asking,
"Sinong papatayin?," thinking that SN1 Bacosa’s statement was directed at him.5 SN1 Cuya tried to
pacify SN1 Bacosa and appellant, while SN1 Bundang apologized to appellant in behalf of SN1 Bacosa.
However, appellant was still visibly angry, mumbling unintelligible words and pounding his fist on the
table.6

To avoid further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave "Aquarius" and return to the NETC camp.
They walked in two’s, namely, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo in the first group, followed by the group
of SN1 Bacosa and SN1 Cuya, and SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna in the last group, with each group at
one arm’s length distance from the other.7 Along the way, they passed by the NETC sentry gate which
was being manned by SN1 Noel de Guzman and F1EN Alejandro Dimaala at that time. 8 SN1 Andal and
SN1 Duclayna even stopped by to give the sentries some barbecue before proceeding to follow their
companions.9

Soon after the navy personnel passed by the sentry gate, SN1 De Guzman and F1EN Dimaala flagged
down a rushing and zigzagging maroon Nissan van with plate number DRW 706. The sentries approached
the van and recognized appellant, who was reeking of liquor, as the driver. Appellant angrily uttered,
"kasi chief, gago ang mga ‘yan!," while pointing toward the direction of the navy personnel’s group.
Even before he was given the go signal to proceed, appellant shifted gears and sped away while uttering,
"papatayin ko ang mga ‘yan!"10 While F1EN Dimaala was writing the van’s plate number and details in
the logbook, he suddenly heard a loud thud. Meanwhile, SN1 De Guzman saw how the van sped away
towards the camp and suddenly swerved to the right hitting the group of the walking navy personnel
prompting him to exclaim to F1EN Dimaala, "chief, binangga ang tropa!" SN1 De Guzman then asked
permission to go to the scene of the incident and check on the navy personnel.11

When they were hit by the vehicle from behind, SN1 Cuya and SN1 Bacosa were thrown away towards a
grassy spot on the roadside. They momentarily lost consciousness.12 When they came to, they saw SN1
Duclayna lying motionless on the ground.13 SN1 Cuya tried to resuscitate SN1 Duclayna, while SN1
Bacosa tried to chase the van.14

SN1 Domingo was not hit by the van as he was in the first group and was pushed away from the path of
the speeding van. He was able to see the vehicle’s plate number. He also tried to chase the van with SN1
Bacosa but they turned around when the vehicle made a U-turn as they thought that it would come back
for them. The vehicle, however, sped away again when other people started to arrive at the scene of the
incident.15

SN1 De Guzman found SN1 Cuya administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on SN1 Duclayna.
He also saw the misshapen body of SN1 Andal lying some 50 meters away, apparently dragged there
when the speeding van hit SN1 Andal. SN1 Cuya instructed SN1 De Guzman to get an ambulance but the
car of the officer on duty at that time arrived and they boarded SN1 Duclayna’s body to the vehicle to be
brought to the hospital.16 The other injured navy personnel, namely, SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, and SN1
Bundang, were brought to the infirmary for treatment.17

Members of the local police soon arrived at the scene of the crime. Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Roberto
Llorico, the police investigator, found the bloodied lifeless body of SN1 Andal lying on the side of the
road. SPO1 Llorico was informed that appellant was the suspect. Fortunately, one of the responding
officers was appellant’s neighbor and led SPO1 Llorico to appellant’s place where they found appellant
standing near his gate. Appellant appeared drunk and was reeking of alcohol. They also saw the van
parked inside the premises of appellant’s place. Its front bumper was damaged. When they asked
appellant why he ran over the navy personnel, he simply answered that he was drunk. The police officers
then invited appellant to the police station and brought the van with them.18

A post mortem examination was conducted on the bodies of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna by Dr. Jericho
Cordero of Camp Crame Medical Division. Dr. Cordero’s findings were that the injuries sustained by
SN1 Andal were fatal and caused by a hard blunt object that hit his body. The force of the impact was
such that the internal organs like the kidneys, mesentery and spleen were also fatally injured. SN1 Andal
died of cardiorespiratory arrest as a result of massive blunt traumatic injuries to the head, thorax and
abdomen. On the other hand, SN1 Duclayna sustained fatal injuries to the head and liver. The head and
neck injuries were such that a lot of blood vessels were ruptured and the fractures were embedded in the
brain. The laceration on the liver, also a mortal injury, was a blunt traumatic injury.19
As regards the other navy personnel, SN1 Cuya suffered lacerated wounds on the head and different parts
of the body for which he was confined at the infirmary for about eighteen (18) days; 20 SN1 Bacosa
sustained injuries on his knee and left hand and stayed in the infirmary for a day; 21 and SN1 Bundang
suffered injuries to his right foot.22

Appellant was thereafter charged under an Information23 which reads as follows:

That on or about the 10th day of August 2002, at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening, in Brgy. West
Dirita, Municipality of San Antonio, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, while driving and in control of a Nissan Van with
plate no. DRW 706, did there and then wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously, bump, overrun, smash and
hit from behind with the use of the said van, the following persons: Antonio Duclayna, Arnulfo Andal,
Evelio Bacosa, Danilo Cuya, Erlinger Bundang and Cesar Domingo, all members of the Philippine
[N]avy then assigned at the Naval Education and Training Command in San Antonio, Zambales, thereby
inflicting upon them the following physical injuries, to wit:

DANILO CUYA:

"Head Injury, grade 1 (Lacerated wound 5.0 cm, accipitoparietal area, (L) and lacerated wound, Lower
lip) 2 to VA"

EVELIO BACOSA:

"Multiple abrasion, wrist, volar surface (L), 2nd digit, abrasion, dorsun, (L) foot"

ERLINGER BUNDANG:

"Abrasion, medial maleolus, (R)"

ARNULFO ANDAL:

"Head Injury, Grade IV; (Depressed Fracture, Frontal: Lacerated wounds, 8.0 cm 3.0 cm. forehead, and
5.0 cm parietal, (R);

Avulsion, medial aspect, upper arm to elbow, hip and enguinal area, (L);

Multiple abrasion, anterior and posterior chest, knees and (R) footsecondary to VA"

ANTONIO DUCLAYNA:

"Head Injury, Grade IV (Lacerated wound, Contusion, Hematoma (R) Parietal) secondary to VA"

which act of said accused directly caused the death of Arnulfo Andal and Antonio Duclayna, and in so far
as Danilo Cuya, Evelio Bacosa and Erlinger Bundang were concerned, said accused performed all the acts
of execution which would produce the crime of Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not
produce said crime by reason of cause/s independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Danilo Cuya, Evelio Bacosa and Erlinger Bundang, which prevented their
death, and finally as to Cesar Domingo, said accused commenced the commission of the acts constituting
Murder directly by overt acts, but was not able to perform all the acts of execution by reason of some
cause other than accused’s own desistance, that is due to the timely avoidance of the van driven by
accused, and that the commission of the crimes was attended with treachery, evident premeditation,
cruelty and use of a motor vehicle, and by deliberately and inhuman[ely] augmenting the suffering of the
victim Arnulfo Andal, to the damage and prejudice of Danilo Cuya, Evelio Bacosa, Erlinger Bundang and
Cesar Domingo and the family and heirs of the deceased Arnulfo Andang and Antonio Duclayna.

When arraigned, appellant maintained his innocence.24

After pre-trial, trial ensued and the prosecution presented evidence to establish the facts stated above.

In his defense, appellant testified that in the evening of August 10, 2002, he was drinking with Marvin
Acebeda and Romeo Eusantos at the "Aquarius" videoke bar. When he sang, the navy personnel who
were also inside the bar laughed at him as he was out of tune. He then stood up, paid his bills and went
out. After a while, Acebeda followed him and informed him that the navy personnel would like to make
peace with him. He went back inside the bar with Acebedo and approached the navy personnel. When
SN1 Bacosa appeared to reach out for appellant’s hand, appellant offered his hand but SN1 Bacosa
suddenly punched appellant’s right ear. To avoid further altercation, appellant left the bar with Acebeda
in tow. Appellant went home driving his van, with the spouses Romeo and Alicia Eusantos who hitched a
ride as passengers. When they passed by the sentry, somebody threw stones at the van. When he alighted
and inspected the vehicle, he saw that one of the headlights was broken. Thereafter, he saw SN1 Bacosa
and another man approaching him so he went back inside the van but the duo boxed him repeatedly on his
shoulder through the van’s open window. When he saw the four other navy personnel coming towards
him, he accelerated the van. During the whole incident, Romeo was asleep as he was very drunk while
Alicia was seated at the back of the van. Upon reaching appellant’s home, the spouses alighted from the
van and proceeded to their place. After 20 minutes, police officers arrived at appellant’s house and told
him that he bumped some people. Appellant went with the police officers to the police station where he
was investigated and detained.25

Appellant’s only other witness was Alicia Eusantos. She testified that she and her husband hitched a ride
with appellant in the evening of August 10, 2002. She did not notice any unusual incident from the time
they rode the vehicle until they alighted from it. She learned about the incident on the following day only
when her statement was taken by the police.26

After the parties have rested their respective cases, the RTC of Iba, Zambales found appellant guilty and
rendered a Decision dated March 21, 2007 with the following dispositive portion:

IN VIEW THEREOF, accused ARTURO PUNZALAN, JR. is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the complex crime of Double Murder qualified by treachery with Attempted Murder attended by the
aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua.

For the death of SN1 Antonio Duclayna and SN1 Arnulfo Andal, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 each is
awarded to their heirs. This is in addition to the amount of moral damages at P50,000.00 each for the
emotional and mental sufferings, plus P12,095.00 to the heirs of Duclayna representing actual damages.

Accused is likewise ordered to pay SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya and SN1
Erlinger Bundang P30,000.00 each or an aggregate amount of P120,000.00 as indemnity for their
attempted murder.27
Appellant filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In his brief, 28 appellant claimed that the trial court
erred in not finding that he may not be held criminally liable as he merely acted in avoidance of greater
evil or injury, a justifying circumstance under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. His act
of increasing his vehicle’s speed was reasonable and justified as he was being attacked by two men whose
four companions were also approaching. He asserted that the attack against him by the two navy
personnel constituted actual and imminent danger to his life and limb. The sight of the four approaching
companions of his attackers "created in his mind a fear of greater evil," prompting him to speed up his
vehicle to avoid a greater evil or injury to himself. According to appellant, if he accidentally hit the
approaching navy men in the process, he could not be held criminally liable therefor. The instinct of self-
preservation would make one feel that his own safety is of greater importance than that of another.29

Appellant further faulted the trial court in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery. He
asserted that nothing in the records would show that he consciously or deliberately adopted the means of
execution. More importantly, treachery was not properly alleged in the Information.30

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the People of the Philippines, refuted the
arguments of appellant and defended the correctness of the RTC Decision. In its brief, 31 the OSG claimed
that the trial court rightly rejected appellant’s defense of avoidance of greater evil or injury. Appellant’s
version of the events did not conform to the physical evidence and it was not consistent with the
testimony of his own witness.

The OSG also argued that treachery was appropriately appreciated by the trial court. The Information was
written in a way that sufficiently described treachery where "the unsuspecting victims were walking
towards their barracks and totally unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind."32

After considering the respective arguments of the parties, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Decision dated April 29, 2011 with the following decretal portion:

WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is Denied. The assailed Decision, dated March 21, 2007, of the
Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. RTC-3492-I,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that Accused-Appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of
SN1 Antonio Duclayna and SN1 Arnulfo Andal civil indemnity of Php75,000, moral damages of
Php75,000, temperate damages of Php25,000 and exemplary damages of Php30,000. In addition to the
foregoing damages, Accused-Appellant is as well held liable to pay the heirs of SN1 Andal the amount of
Php2,172,270.21 to represent the amount of loss of earning capacity of SN1 Andal.

Accused-Appellant is likewise ordered to pay the surviving victims, SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Cesar
Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya and SN1 Erlinger Bundang, moral and exemplary damages in the amount of
Php40,000 and Php30,000, respectively. Award of temperate damages in the amount of Php25,000 is
proper in favor of SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Cuya and SN1 Bundang for the unsubstantiated amount of pecuniary
losses they suffered on account of the injuries they sustained. SN1 Cesar Domingo, however, is not
entitled to temperate damages.33

Hence, this appeal.

Both appellant and the OSG adopted the respective briefs they filed in the Court of Appeals.34

Is appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with frustrated murder?

After a thorough review of the records of this case and the arguments of the parties, this Court affirms
appellant’s conviction.

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the evidence presented and offered by the prosecution
credible and that the "prosecution witnesses had overwhelmingly proved beyond reasonable doubt the
culpability of the Accused-Appellant."35 The Court of Appeals correctly observed that prosecution
witnesses F1EN Dimaala and SN1 De Guzman "positively identified accused-appellant as the one who hit
and ran over the victims."36 The Court of Appeals further found:

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, taken together, inevitably showed the criminal intent of the
Accused-Appellant to inflict harm on the victims. They testified on the incident in a clear, concise,
corroborative, and straightforward manner. Thus, their testimonies must prevail over the testimony given
by the Accused-Appellant which, on the other hand, was neither substantiated nor supported by any
evidence.

The prosecution witnesses testified that they actually saw how Accused-Appellant ran over the victims
who were walking inside the NETC camp on the night of August 10, 2002. Accused-Appellant, who was
driving his van from behind, suddenly bumped and ran over the victims. The victims were thrown away,
resulting in the instantaneous death of SN1 Duclayna and SN1 Andal and causing injuries to the other
victims.

xxxx

Accused-Appellant’s version of the crime, upon which the justifying circumstance of avoidance of greater
evil or injury is invoked, is baseless. This is because his assertions anent the existence of the evil which
he sought to be avoided [did] not actually exist as [they] neither conformed to the evidence at hand nor
[were] [they] consistent with the testimony of his own witness, Alicia Eusantos x x x.

xxxx

Accused-Appellant’s own witness, Alicia Eusantos, not only failed to corroborate his claim but also
belied Accused-Appellant’s claim that he was attacked by the Philippine Navy personnel. Alicia Eusantos
categorically stated that she did not witness any unusual incident in the evening of August 10, 2002 while
on board the Nissan Urvan Van driven by Accused-Appellant while they were cruising the access road
going to the NETC compound. Accused-Appellant’s claim, therefore, is more imaginary than real. The
justifying circumstance of Avoidance of Greater Evil or Injury cannot be invoked by the Accused-
Appellant as the alleged evil sought to be avoided does not actually exist.37

Moreover, whether or not petitioner acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury is a question of fact. It is
an issue which concerns doubt or difference arising as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.38 In
this connection, this Court declared in Martinez v. Court of Appeals39:

[T]he well-entrenched rule is that findings of fact of the trial court in the ascertainment of the credibility
of witnesses and the probative weight of the evidence on record affirmed, on appeal, by the CA are
accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, by the Court and in the absence of any justifiable reason to
deviate from the said findings.

This Court has combed through the records of this case and found no reason to deviate from the findings
of the trial and appellate courts. There is nothing that would indicate that the RTC and the Court of
Appeals "ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of
substance, which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case."40

Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, to successfully invoke avoidance of greater evil
as a justifying circumstance, 41 the following requisites should be complied with:

(1) the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;

(2) the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; and

(3) there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

The RTC and the Court of Appeals rejected appellant’s self-serving and uncorroborated claim of
avoidance of greater evil. The trial and appellate courts noted that even appellant’s own witness who was
in the van with appellant at the time of the incident contradicted appellant’s claim. Thus, the RTC and the
Court of Appeals concluded that the evil appellant claimed to avoid did not actually exist. This Court
agrees.

Moreover, appellant failed to satisfy the third requisite that there be no other practical and less harmful
means of preventing it. Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, infliction of damage or
injury to another so that a greater evil or injury may not befall one’s self may be justified only if it is
taken as a last resort and with the least possible prejudice to another. If there is another way to avoid the
injury without causing damage or injury to another or, if there is no such other way but the damage to
another may be minimized while avoiding an evil or injury to one’s self, then such course should be
taken.

In this case, the road where the incident happened was wide, some 6 to 7 meters in width,42 and the place
was well-lighted.43 Both sides of the road were unobstructed by trees, plants or structures.44 Appellant was
a driver by occupation.45 However, appellant himself testified that when he shifted to the second gear and
immediately stepped on the accelerator upon seeing the four navy personnel approaching from in front of
him,46 he did not make any attempt to avoid hitting the approaching navy personnel even though he had
enough space to do so. He simply sped away straight ahead, meeting the approaching navy personnel
head on, totally unmindful if he might run them over.47 He therefore miserably failed to resort to other
practical and less harmful available means of preventing the evil or injury he claimed to be avoiding.

The appreciation of treachery as a circumstance that qualified the killing of SN1 Duclayna and SN1
Andal and the attempted killing of the others is also correct. This Court agrees with the following
disquisition of the Court of Appeals:

We find that the RTC correctly appreciated the existence of treachery in the commission of the offense.
Treachery qualifies the killing to murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
especially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended
party might make. The elements of treachery are: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was
deliberate or consciously adopted.

Accused-Appellant’s act of running over the victims with his van from behind while the victims were
walking inside the NETC camp was a clear act of treachery. The victims were not given any warning at
all regarding the assault of the Accused-Appellant. The victims were surprised and were not able to
prepare and repel the treacherous assault of Accused-Appellant. The prosecution witnesses testified that
after they had flagged down Accused-Appellant’s van, the latter accelerated and upon reaching the middle
of the road, it suddenly swerved to the right hitting the victims who were startled by the attack.

xxxx

A close review of the information would disclose that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was stated
in ordinary and concise language and the said act was described in terms sufficient to enable a layman to
know what offense is intended to be charged, and enables the court to pronounce proper judgment.

We quote pertinent portion of the information, which reads:

"x x x the said accused, with intent to kill, while driving and in control of a Nissan Van with plate No.
DRW 706, did then and there willfully and feloniously, bump, overrun, smash and hit from
behind with the use of said van, x x x."

Applying the Supreme Court’s discussion in People vs. Batin, citing the case of Balitaan v. Court of First
Instance of Batangas, to wit:

"The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set forth in an Information is to
enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of
the facts that constitute the offense. x x x.

It is often difficult to say what is a matter of evidence, as distinguished from facts necessary to be stated
in order to render the information sufficiently certain to identify the offense. As a general rule, matters of
evidence, as distinguished from facts essential to the description of the offense, need not be averred. For
instance, it is not necessary to show on the face of an information for forgery in what manner a person is
to be defrauded, as that is a matter of evidence at the trial.

We hold that the allegation of treachery in the Information is sufficient. Jurisprudence is replete
with cases wherein we found the allegation of treachery sufficient without any further explanation
as to the circumstances surrounding it."

Clearly, We find that the information is sufficient as it not merely indicated the term treachery therein but
also described the act itself constituting treachery. Such statement, without a doubt, provided the
supporting facts that constituted the offense, sufficiently alleging the qualifying circumstance of treachery
when it pointed out the statement, "smash and hit from behind."48 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted.)

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on unsuspecting victims,
depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without risk
to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims.49 The six navy personnel
were walking by the roadside, on their way back to their camp. They felt secure as they have just passed a
sentry and were nearing their barracks. They were totally unaware of the threat to their life as their backs
were turned against the direction where appellant’s speeding van came. They were therefore defenseless
and posed no threat to appellant when appellant mowed them down with his van, killing two of them,
injuring three others and one narrowly escaping injury or death. Beyond reasonable doubt, there was
treachery in appellant’s act. This was sufficiently alleged in the Information which not only expressly
mentioned treachery as one of the circumstances attending the crime but also described it in
understandable language:
[T]he said accused, with intent to kill, while driving and in control of a Nissan Van with plate no. DRW
706, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, bump, overrun, smash and hit from
behind with the use of said van, the following persons: Antonio Duclayna, Arnulfo Andal, Evelio
Bacosa, Danilo Cuya, Erlinger Bundang and Cesar Domingo, x x x.50 (Emphasis supplied.)

Use of motor vehicle was also properly considered as an aggravating circumstance. Appellant deliberately
used the van he was driving to pursue the victims. Upon catching up with them, appellant ran over them
and mowed them down with the van, resulting to the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and injuries
to the others.51 Thereafter, he continued to speed away from the scene of the incident. Without doubt,
appellant used the van both as a means to commit a crime and to flee the scene of the crime after he
committed the felonious act.

The felony committed by appellant as correctly found by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, double
murder with multiple attempted murder, is a complex crime contemplated under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a single act of
stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road ramming through the navy personnel,
causing the death of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna and, at the same time, constituting an attempt to kill
SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo.52 The crimes of murder and attempted murder
are both grave felonies53 as the law attaches an afflictive penalty to capital punishment (reclusion
perpetua to death) for murder while attempted murder is punished by prision mayor,54 an afflictive
penalty.55

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Article 6356 of the same Code provides that if the penalty prescribed is composed of two indivisible
penalties, as in the instant case, and there is an aggravating circumstance the higher penalty should be
imposed. Since use of vehicle can be considered as an ordinary aggravating circumstance, treachery, by
itself, being sufficient to qualify the killing, the proper imposable penalty – the higher sanction – is death.
However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346,57 prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty for the killing of each of the two victims is reduced to reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole.58 The penalty of reclusion perpetua thus imposed by the Court of Appeals on
appellant for the complex crime that he committed is correct.

The awards of P75,000.00 civil indemnity and P75,000.00 moral damages to the respective heirs of SN1
Andal and SN1 Duclayna are also proper. These awards, civil indemnity and moral damages, are
mandatory without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the
commission of murder.59

Moreover, in view of the presence of aggravating circumstances, namely the qualifying circumstance of
treachery and the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle, the award of P30,000.00
exemplary damages to the respective heirs of the deceased victims is also correct. 60 In addition, it cannot
be denied that the heirs of the deceased victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was
not proved with certainty.1âwphi1 Thus, the award of P25,000.00 temperate damages to the heirs of each
deceased victim is appropriate.61
As it was proven that, at the time of his death, SN1 Andal had a monthly income of P13,245.55,62 the
grant of P2,172,270.21 for loss of earning capacity is in order.63

As to the surviving victims, SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo, the Court of
Appeals correctly granted each of them P40,000 moral damages for the physical suffering, fright, serious
anxiety, moral shock, and similar injuries caused to them by the incident.64 And as the crime was attended
by aggravating circumstances, each of them was properly given P30,000 exemplary damages.65

Finally, those who suffered injuries, namely, SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa and SN1 Bundang, were correctly
awarded P25,000 temperate damages each for the pecuniary loss they suffered for hospitalization and/or
medication, although no receipts were shown to support said loss.66

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated April 29, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02816 affirming the conviction of appellant Arturo Punzalan, Jr. for
the complex crime of double murder with multiple attempted murder, imposing upon him the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the following:

(a) To the respective heirs of SN1 Arnulfo Andal and SN1 Antonio Duclayna:

(i) P75,000.00 civil indemnity;

(ii) P75,000.00 moral damages;

(iii) P30,000.00 exemplary damages; and

(iv) P25,000.00 temperate damages;

(b) To the heirs of SN1 Andal, P2,172,270.21 for loss of earning capacity;

(c) To each of the surviving victims, SN1 Danilo Cuya, SN1 Evelio Bacosa, SN1 Erlinger
Bundang and SN1 Cesar Domingo:

(i) P40,000.00 moral damages; and

(ii) P30,000.00 exemplary damages; and

(d) To SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa and SN1 Bundang, P25,000.00 temperate damages each
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

4) FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 194629, April 21, 2014

4) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. DANTE DULAY, Accused–Appellant.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

For review is the Decision1 dated May 26, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA–G.R. CR–H.C. No.
03584 which affirmed the Decision2 dated September 30, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cabarroguis, Quirino, Branch 31, finding accused–appellant Dante Dulay (Dulay) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder and Frustrated Murder.

The following are the antecedent facts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[Dulay] entered a plea of “not guilty” to the indictment which reads as follows:

"That on or about 6:30 in the evening of December 30, 2002 in Ligaya, Aglipay, Quirino, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above–named accused by using a grenade and by
means of explosion, did then and there willfully and unlawfully and after removing the safety pin of the
said grenade, throw it at the house of Orlando Legaspi Sr., producing a land explosion and as a
consequence[,] the shrapnels hit ORLANDO LEGASPI SR. to [sic] the different parts of his body that
caused his death.

That on the same occasion, said accused armed with the same grenade and by means of explosion did
then and there willfully and unlawfully threw the grenade after removing its safety pin at the house of
ORLANDO LEGASPI SR. causing loud explosion as the shrapnel of the grenade hit ORLANDO
LEGASPI, JR. Thus accused performed all the acts of execution that would produce the crime of murder
as a consequence but did not produce it because of timely medical assistance rendered unto ORLANDO
LEGASPI JR. which prevented his death.

Acts contrary to law.”

The records reveal that in the evening of 30 December 2002 at around 6:30, Orlando Jr. (or simply
“Junior” ), a child about six years of age, was outside the kitchen of their house located in Ligaya,
Aglipay, Province of Quirino. His father, the late Orlando Sr., was also somewhere in the yard and was
asking Junior to hand him a chair. They had just finished dinner and were intending to watch the
television later.
Wondering why the dog was barking loudly, Mrs. Engracia Legaspi peeped from inside the kitchen and
noticed Dulay’s dog in the vicinity. She surmised that its master, [Dulay], was also present. Junior’s elder
sister, Melanie went out to look for the dog–leash to transfer the mutt to another area.

Using the flashlight he was constantly prohibited from playing with, Junior directed a beam towards the
grassy area where he discovered [Dulay] whom he recognized because of the characteristic “mumps”
below his left ear. Melanie also saw [Dulay] as he was staring at Orlando Sr. Their uncle Dante suddenly
threw something that resembled a ball, towards the cemented part of the yard. It turned out to be a
grenade, and it landed about seven meters from where Junior and his father were. [Dulay] then went away
on his bicycle towards the direction of his house, x x x.

When the grenade exploded, Junior was hurt in his pelvic area, while his father was fatally hit by
shrapnel, causing his death. Melanie rushed to the succor of her bloodied father, barely noticing Junior
who was likewise lying on the ground, but was still conscious and crying. Engracia hollered for help from
the neighborhood. Because of the firecrackers in that New Year’s Eve, people did not readily render
assistance, until they realized the intensity of the explosion that shook the ground.

Police operatives who arrived at the crime scene instructed the assisting neighbors to locate the grenade
fragments. In the early morning of 31 December 2002, three of the male neighbors continued the search
and found a grenade safety lever, along with a torn–out pair of rubber shoes in the road near Dulay’s
house. Examining the rubber shoes which turned out to belong to the latter, the three men further
recovered a grenade ring pin from inside the left shoe.

Orlando Sr. was rushed to the hospital but he expired shortly thereafter. His Certificate of Death states
that he died of cardio–respiratory arrest due to hemorrhagic shock due to “transection of the right kidney,
perforation of the duodenum, pancreas and stomach due to grenade blast injury.”

[Dulay’s] alibi consists of his purported trip from the house of his uncle Onofre Dulay in Gamis to his
friend, Joel Ritualo in another barangay, Dibul. According to his story, he was Onofre’s caretaker while
the latter was in Manila. Since he had no electricity in Gamis, he went on a bike to Ritualo to have his
Motolite battery recharged. While waiting for the recharging to finish, he went on a drinking spree with
Ritualo and another man, Pepito Maluret, until around 7:30 p.m. when he bid the two liquor–companions
goodbye. With the energized battery in tow, he left, but Ritualo insisted on accompanying him to the road
as he was already drunk. Not long afterwards, Ritualo hailed the passenger jeepney that passed them
which was driven by his uncle, witness Robert Daileg.
In convicting Dulay, the trial court noted that Junior had no ill–motive to testify falsely against his uncle.
Against the self–serving alibi of the appellant, the prosecution witnesses positively identified the
perpetrator because they were familiar with him, the court added.3 (Citations omitted)

The RTC found Dulay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Attempted
Murder. The dispositive portion of the RTC ruling is as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Court finds accused Dante Dulay GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt with the complex crime of Murder with Attempted Murder and is hereby
sentenced to Reclusion Perpctua.

He is further ordered to pay the heirs Orlando Legaspi Sr., the sum of [P]50,000[.00] as civil indemnity,
and moral damages in the amount of [P]50,000.00[.]

Also he must pay [P]30,000[.00] pesos as moral damages to Orlando Legaspi, Jr.

[P]115,956[.00] as actual expenses/damage [s] for the hospitalization of the two victims, namely: Orlando
Legaspi, Sr., and Orlando Legaspi, Jr.

SO ORDERED[.]4

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction with modification. The fallo of the judgment
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the challenged Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accordingly, the accused–appellant is convicted of the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder
and is sentenced to suffer:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1) the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;

2) the award of actual damages in the amount of [P] 115,956.00 for the hospital expenses of the two
victims;

3) the award of civil indemnity for the death of Orlando Sr., in the increased amount of [P]75,000.00;
4) the award of moral damages in the respective amounts of |P]75,000.00 and [P]55,000.00 for Orlando
Senior and Junior; [and]

5) the award of exemplary damages in the amount of [P]30,000.00 each for both Orlando Senior and
Junior.

IT IS SO ORDERED.5

The CA held that pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty of death which would have been
imposable is properly reduced to reclusion perpetua but the RTC erred in stating in the body of the
decision that Dulay was guilty as well of “frustrated murder” as charged in the Information with respect
to the bomb–injured Orlando Legaspi, Jr. (Junior), and yet convicted him in the dispositive part only of
“attempted murder.” The prosecution was able to establish that all acts of execution, not merely
preparatory acts, were performed to produce the felony as a consequence, but Junior nevertheless
survived for reasons independent of the will of the perpetrator; that is, the timely medical assistance to
him.6

The records of this case were then elevated to this Court pursuant to CA Resolution7 dated August 5,
2010, which gave due course to Dulay’s notice of appeal.

Our Ruling

"It is settled that this Court will not interfere with the trial court’s assessment of the witnesses' credibility,
absent any indication or showing that the trial court overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its
discretion, especially where, as in this case, such assessment is affirmed by the CA. In the present case,
we see no compelling reason to disturb the factual findings of the courts a quo”

Dulay averred that he was in Dibul, Saguday, Quirino, when the crime occurred. While defense witness
Robert Daileg (Daileg) testified that Dulay rode as a passenger in the former’s jeepney from Dibul to
Gamis one night, Daileg cannot even remember the exact date when this occurred. Consequently, Daileg
cannot adequately support Dulay’s version of facts that the latter was somewhere else that fateful night.

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense
was committed and that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically
present at the place of the crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.9 Since Dulay
was not able to prove that he was in Dibul when the crime was committed, both the CA and the RTC were
correct in disregarding his alibi. Junior and Melanie, Junior’s elder sister, on the other hand, have both
positively identified Dulay as the assailant. On this score, this Court has held in a number of cases that
denial and alibi are weak defenses, which cannot prevail against positive identification.10

As regards the crime committed against Junior, the Court is in accord with the CA’s conclusion that
Dulay is guilty of frustrated murder. The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has
performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony; and (2) that the felony is not
produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s will.”

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, Dulay has performed all acts of execution in throwing the
grenade which could have caused Junior’s death as a consequence, but because of immediate medical
assistance, a cause independent of Dulay’s will, Junior survived.12

The Court thus affirms the CA decision, with modification on the awarded indemnities.

First, the Court retains the award by the CA of P75,000.00 as moral damages, exemplary damages at
P30,000.00 and civil indemnity at P75,000.00 to the heirs of Orlando Legaspi, Sr. (Orlando, Sr.) in
conformity with our ruling in People v. Barde.13 Next, the Court awards moral and exemplary damages
to Junior in the amounts of P50,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively. Furthermore, the Court upholds the
CA’s award of P115,956.00 as actual damages for the hospital expenses of both Orlando Sr. and Junior.
Lastly, the Court imposes an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the award of civil indemnity and
all damages from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence.14

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated May 26, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in
CA–G.R. CR–H.C. No. 03584 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that accused–appellant Dante
Dulay is ordered: (a) to pay the heirs of Orlando Legaspi, Sr. the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; (b) to pay Orlando
Legaspi, Jr., the amount ofP50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (c)
to pay P115,956.00 as actual damages for the hospital expenses of both Orlando Legaspi, Sr. and Orlando
Legaspi, Jr. An interest of six percent (6%) per annum is imposed on the award of civil indemnity and all
damages from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
5) [G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001]

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E.

GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS
PRESIDING JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST DIVISION, respondents.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in ordering
the preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in connection with
pending criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The investigating panel, that took over the case from
Investigator Gualberto dela Llana after having been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
upon petitioners request, came up with a resolution which it referred, for approval, to the Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman. In his Memorandum, dated 26 April 1991, the
Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate informations against petitioner. On 13 May 1991,
OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for clearance; approved, forthwith, three informations
were filed on even date.
In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was indicted thusly:

That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public
officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident
bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization of the stay of the following aliens:
Jhamtani Shalini Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy,
Hong Shao Guan, Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li Xuan, Qui Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Quiu, Wu Hong Guan
Qui @ Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru Qui @ Mary Go Xu Yin Yin Kua, Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao Wei
Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi Tian, Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu Pinting, Wang
Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez,
Yen Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @ Chrismayne Gan, So Chen Yueh-O, Cai
Ya Rong, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive Order no. 324
dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well that
said aliens are disqualified, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the
Philippines was unlawfully legalized by said accused.[1]

Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the
other for libel, were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555
and no. 91-94897.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena
issued an order for the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00)
Pesos.Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for physical appearance as she was then recuperating
from injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until
05 June 1991 or until her physical condition would warrant her physical appearance in court. Upon
manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was able to come unaided to his office on 20
May 1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment on 27 May 1991.
Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that she be allowed
provisional liberty upon a recognizance.
On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition and
Preliminary Injunction before the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 and a motion before the Sandiganbayan
to meanwhile defer her arraignment. The Court taking cognizance of the petition issued a temporary
restraining order.
The Sandiganbayan, thus, informed, issued an order deferring petitioners arraignment and the
consideration of her motion to cancel the cash bond until further advice from the court.
On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary
restraining order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner proved unavailing.
On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports announcing petitioners intention to accept a
fellowship from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the Sandiganbayan
issued an order to enjoin petitioner from leaving the country.
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena from
the case and to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to inhibit. On 09 November 1992, her
motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed anew a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90. At
the same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars with the Sandiganbayan asseverating that
the names of the aliens whose applications she purportedly approved and thereby supposedly extended
undue advantage were conspicuously omitted in the complaint.
The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992, directed the Sandiganbayan to reset petitioners
arraignment not later than five days from receipt of notice thereof.
On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to
admit thirty-two amended informations. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the 32 informations. The
court, in its 11th March 1993 resolution, denied her motion to dismiss the said informations and directed
her to post bail on the criminal cases, docketed Criminal Case No. 18371-18402, filed against her.
Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, docketed G.R.
No. 109266, assailing the 03rd March 1993 resolution of the Sandiganbayan which resolved not to
disqualify its Presiding Justice, as well as its 14th March 1993 resolution admitting the 32 Amended
Informations, and seeking the nullification thereof.
Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing Presiding Justice Garchitorena to
cease and desist from sitting in the case, as well as from enforcing the 11 th March 1993 resolution
ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 amended informations, and from proceeding with her
arraignment on 12 April 1993 until the matter of his disqualification would have been resolved by the
Court.
On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R. 109266, directed the OSP and Ombudsman
to consolidate the 32 amended informations. Conformably therewith, all the 32 informations were
consolidated into one information under Criminal Case No. 16698.
 Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Redetermine probable Cause and to
dismiss or quash said information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July
1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.
On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow the testimony of one Rodolfo Pedellaga
(Pedellaga). The presentation was scheduled on 15 September 1995.
In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition to the 31 st July 1995
motion for the prosecution within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the Sandiganbayan a motion for reconsideration of its
03rd August 1995 order which would allow the testimony of Pedellaga. The incident, later denied by the
Sandiganbayan, was elevated to the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled Miriam
Defensor-Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, docketed G.R. No. 123792.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the prosecution to suspend
her. On 25 January 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved:

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the motion under consideration and hereby
suspends the accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her position as Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines and from any other government position she may be holding at present or hereafter. Her
suspension shall be for ninety (90) days only and shall take effect immediately upon notice.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto Maceda, Senate President, Senate of the
Philippines, Executive House, Taft Ave., Manila, through the Hon. Secretary of the Senate, for the
implementation of the suspension herein ordered. The Secretary of the Senate shall inform this court of
the action taken thereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual date of implementation of the suspension
order as well as the expiry of the ninetieth day thereof so that the same may be lifted at the time.[2]

Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a
ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines, from any government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines
for the implementation of the suspension order.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public
official charged with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and
jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute provides:

SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code
or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as
a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.

In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has
already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government. (As amended by
BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982).
In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan,[3] the Court reiterated:

The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended --- treating of the suspension pendente lite of an
accused public officer --- may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court.

xxx xxx xxx

The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid information under
the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or
pertaining to the career or non-career service.[4]

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be
sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course,
and there seems to be no ifs and buts about it.[5] Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the
Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan[6] observed:

x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted,
the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension.[7]

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an
unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once,
upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted
before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged.Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he
stands accused.[8]
En passan, while the imposition of suspension is not automatic or self-operative as the validity of the
information must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no hard and fast rule as to the
conduct thereof. It has been said that-

x x x No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the
accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the VALIDITY OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary
investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of
Republic Act 3019 or the bribery provisions of the revised Penal Code which would warrant his
mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the
information on any of the grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court x x x.

xxx xxx xxx

Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts
for which he is charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions on bribery of
the Revised Penal Code, and the right to present a motion to quash the information on any other grounds
provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on the ground that the acts for which the
accused is charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019, or of the provisions
on bribery of the revised Penal Code, should be treated only in the same manner as a challenge to the
criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the ground provided in Paragraph (a), section 2 of
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. In other words, a
resolution of the challenge to the validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be limited to
an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements
of an offense punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.[9]

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1)
the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3)
whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the records an other evidence before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive
suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge
the validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to
due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting
his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information
is subject to quashal on any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal procedure.[10]
The instant petition is not the first time that an incident relating to petitioners case before the
Sandiganbayan has been brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the Court has been called upon the
resolve several other matters on the subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs. Vasquez,[11] petitioner sought to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal case No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act
No. 3019; (2) in Santiago vs. Vasquez,[12] petitioner sought the nullification of the hold departure order
issued by the Sandiganbayan via a Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold
Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction, with Motion to set Pending Incident for Hearing; (3) in Santiago vs.
Garchitorena,[13] petitioner sought the nullification of the resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal
Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding Justice Garchitorena
disqualified from acting in said criminal case, and the resolution, dated 14 March 1993, which deemed as
filed the 32 amended informations against her; and (4) in Miriam Defensor Santiago vs.
Sandiganbayan,[14] petitioner assailed the denial by the Sandiganbayan of her motion for her
reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order allowing the testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these
cases,[15] the Court declared:

We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No. 16698
(G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to raise the issue
of the delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the information against her in those
petitions. A piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.

Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not charge any offense punishable under
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were authorized under
Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the
policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor children of qualified
aliens even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31 1983. She concludes that the
Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).

In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information (People
vs. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion that:
 (1) She was a public officer;
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the
Philippines after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official
functions.

The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A.
No. 3019.[16]

The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed against petitioner, behooved
Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress
to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-

x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.[17]

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an
erring member. Thus, in its resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr., vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.,[18] the
Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite his
protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The Court ruled:

x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals with the power
of each House of Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and suspend or expel
a Member by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of
suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct
from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.

The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded
members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes
each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government the Legislative,
the Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of
influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either
branch.
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution,
empowers the Court to act not only in the settlement of actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also in the determination of whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The provision allowing the Court to look into any possible grave
abuse of discretion committed by any government instrumentality has evidently been couched in general
terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu. In its
normal concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains to an affair
internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to the view[19] that unless an
infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not deign
substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches of government. It is an
impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the
steel door for judicial intervention. If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to
contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must promptly react in the manner prescribed by
the Charter itself.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court,
nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue
raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

6) ARNEL COLINARES, G.R. No. 182748

Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
- versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA,
SERENO,
REYES, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:

December 13, 2011

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:
 This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all that it takes; b) what
distinguishes frustrated homicide from attempted homicide; and c) when an accused who appeals may
still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.

The Facts and the Case

The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) with
frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case
T-2213.[1]

Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25, 2000, he
and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a leak by
the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice
on the head with a huge stone, about 15 inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.

Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the
roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the right temple,
knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him.

Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be smoking outside
his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought Rufino to the hospital.

Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate[2] showing that Rufino suffered two lacerated
wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious and
potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.

The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed self-defense. He testified
that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who were all quite
drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather than reply, Rufino
pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried
to stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a stone and, defending himself, struck Rufino on the head
with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was
able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sisters
house. On September 4, 2000, he voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.

Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on the night of the
incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes saw the three engaged in
heated argument with Arnel.
On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Since the
maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for
probation.

Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking
conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty
imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the award for lost income in the
absence of evidence to support it.[3] Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court on petition for review.
 In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel and the Solicitor General to
submit their respective positions on whether or not, assuming Arnel committed only the lesser crime of
attempted homicide with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for
probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.

Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in
case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable. The language and
spirit of the probation law warrants such a stand. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that
under the Probation Law no application for probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected
his appeal from the judgment of conviction.

The Issues Presented

The case essentially presents three issues:

1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head with a stone;

2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of frustrated homicide;
and

3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced
probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial
court.

The Courts Rulings

One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that he merely acted in
self-defense when he hit Rufino back with a stone.

When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that he was legally
justified in killing the victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused must establish the elements of self-
defense by clear and convincing evidence. When successful, the otherwise felonious deed would be
excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused.[4]

In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense requires (1) that the
person whom the offender killed or injured committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the offender
employed means that is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that the
person defending himself did not act with sufficient provocation.[5]

If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has nothing to
prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for being
appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an imminent
danger of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not enough. The victim must attack
the accused with actual physical force or with a weapon.[6]

Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression. He
alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and Ananias tried to stab
him. No one corroborated Arnels testimony that it was Rufino who started it. Arnels only other witness,
Diomedes, merely testified that he saw those involved having a heated argument in the middle of the
street. Arnel did not submit any medical certificate to prove his point that he suffered injuries in the hands
of Rufino and his companions.[7]
 In contrast, the three witnessesJesus, Paciano, and Ananiastestified that Arnel was the
aggressor. Although their versions were mottled with inconsistencies, these do not detract from their core
story. The witnesses were one in what Arnel did and when and how he did it. Compared to Arnels
testimony, the prosecutions version is more believable and consistent with reality, hence deserving
credence.[8]

Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he be liable for
frustrated homicide when the wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and could not have
resulted in death as in fact it did not?

The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accuseds intent to take his victims
life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding
homicidal intent.[9] And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means the
offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim.[10]

Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it
knocked Rufino out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the impact it produced, and the location of
the wounds that Arnel inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced that he intended to kill him.

The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated,
homicide. In Palaganas v. People,[11] we ruled that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as shown
by his use of a deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die because of timely
medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the victims wounds are not
fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.

Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth, and severity of the
victims wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that head injuries are always very serious, [12] he could not
categorically say that Rufinos wounds in this case were fatal. Thus:

Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?

A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.

Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds actually are not
fatal on that very day?
A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from becoming fatal. But on
that case the patient preferred to go home at that time.

Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers to the length of
the wound not the depth of the wound?
A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of scalp.

Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?

A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken up the label of
the frontal lo[b]e, we always call it lacerated wound, but in that kind of
wound, we did not measure the depth.[13]

Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that his skull
incurred fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his head. The wounds were not so
deep, they merely required suturing, and were estimated to heal in seven or eight days. Dr. Belleza further
testified:

Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require surgery?
A: Yes, Madam.

Q: The injuries are slight?

A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give antibiotics and
antit[e]tanus the problem the contusion that occurred in the brain.

xxxx

Q: What medical intervention that you undertake?

A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing the wounds.

Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital?

A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some of them would rather
go home and then come back.

Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?

A: No, Your Honor.

Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?

A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up.[14]

Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the prosecutions
claim that Rufino would have died without timely medical intervention.Thus, the Court finds Arnel liable
only for attempted homicide and entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the
judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.

But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the
maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With
this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the
case to the RTC.

Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by the state
only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: That no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
judgment of conviction.[15] Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be
deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation.

But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the
right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The
Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to
apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not
to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case.

Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals from the judgment of conviction
is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of
conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial
court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard position, it will apply the probation law
on Arnel based on the trial courts annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation
because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Courts judgment of
conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial courts
judgmenteven if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial
courts erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang
nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?

The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation
would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals[16]that the probation law requires
that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there
is a huge difference between Francisco and this case.

In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused guilty of grave
oral defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one day to one year and eight months
of prision correccional, a clearly probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still, he chose to
appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for probation. When the acquittal did
not come, he wanted probation. The Court would not of course let him. It served him right that he wanted
to save his cake and eat it too. He certainly could not have both appeal and probation.

The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed
his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accusedto wager on the result of his appealthat when his conviction is
finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence
inevitable, he now applies for probation as an escape hatch thus rendering nugatory the appellate courts
affirmance of his conviction.[17]

Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say, By
taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation. The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on
him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this
Courts greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who
will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their
right to apply for that privilege.

Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on
him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not frustrated,
homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from the
beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for probation.

In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of
attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense
and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have afforded
Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of
his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is
not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. [18] As Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to
be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to
disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not
because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.[19]

One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for probation
after he appealed from the trial courts judgment of conviction would not be consistent with the provision
of Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to provide an opportunity for the reformation of
a penitent offender. An accused like Arnel who appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is claimed,
shows no penitence.

This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction. Here,
however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6
years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now finds, he did
not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.

Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty, it
would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead undergo
reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the
correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for
probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC
done right by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was
not probationable.

The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for
probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed by
the trial court, subject to probation?

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the Decision
dated July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel
Colinares GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty from four months of arrestomayor, as minimum, to two years and four months
of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena the amount of P20,000.00 as moral
damages, without prejudice to petitioner applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the record
of the case has been remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in
Criminal Case T-2213.

SO ORDERED.
7) G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014

ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 154954

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO
LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON,
ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA
FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE
GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL
D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR.,
ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 155101

FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO
CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa due to
fraternity hazing. While there is nothing new in the arguments raised by the parties in their respective
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, we find a few remaining matters needing to be clarified and
resobed. Sorne oJ' these matters include the effect of our Decision on the finality of the Court of Appeals
judgments insofar as respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda (Almeda), June] Anthony D. Arna (Arna),
Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are concerned; the question of who are eligible
to seek probation; and the issue of the validity of the probation proceedings and the concomitant orders of
a court that allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.
Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed by petitioners
People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa
(Villa); and by respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.) concerning
the Decision of this Court dated 1 February 2012.1 The Court modified the assailed judgments2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520 and found respondents Fidelito Dizon (Dizon),
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering the criminal liability of Dizon from the
crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al. from slight physical injuries. The
CA Decision itself had modified the Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch
121 finding all of the accused therein guilty of the crime of homicide.3

Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but related case docketed as CA-G.R. S.P. Nos.
89060 & 90153 and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the
criminal case against Manuel Escalona II (Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr.
(Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) on the ground that their right to speedy trial was violated.
Reproduced below is the dispositive portion of our Decision:5

WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of
homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954
– finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty
of the crime of slight physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito
Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized
under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are
ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount
of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of 1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at
the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision until satisfaction. Costs de oficio.

The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby AFFIRMED. The
appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised
Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio
Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact
of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.

SO ORDERED.

To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present case:6

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar
"Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto Francis "Bert"
Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila Fraternity
(Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s Restaurant to have
dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the
neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be
physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for
three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the
commencement of their initiation.

Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults from the
Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota court of the
Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then
subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which
required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to
the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs
against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the
"Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans
charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were
being hit with fist blows on their arms or withknee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the
"Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on
the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They
survived their first day of initiation.

On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to present comic plays
and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s
principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the
afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and
psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the
first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio
Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino
(Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the
initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
"paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which
was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain
and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He
had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended,
and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and incoherent
mumblings.1avvphi1 Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he was just
overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started
helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When
his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:

In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)

1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)

2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)

3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)

4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)

5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)

6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)

7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)

8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)

9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)

10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)

11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)

12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)

13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)

14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)

15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)

16. Antonio General (General)

17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)

18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)

19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)

20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)

21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)

22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)

23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)

24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)

25. Adel Abas (Abas)

 26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)

2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)

3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)

4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)

5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)

6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)

7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)

8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)

9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried. On the other
hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance
due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.

On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the
26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or
on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced
anew.

On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court
in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the accused according to
individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied
only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants– Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De

Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima,
Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were acquitted,as their individual guilt was not
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the crime of slight physical
injuriesand sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs
of the victim the sum of P30,000 as indemnity.

3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizonand Artemio Villareal– were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
 Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They were
also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of P50,000
and to pay the additional amount of P1,000,000 by way of moral damages.

On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against accused
Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on different dates between
the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona,
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed
the trial court’s Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on
the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually brought before
this Court. (Citations omitted)

Motion for Partial Reconsideration

filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa

Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration7 in connection with G.R. Nos.
178057 & 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,Saruca, and Adriano (collectively, Escalona et al.) in
its assailed Decision and Resolution.8 Villa reiterates her previous arguments that the right to speedy trial
of the accused was not violated, since they had failed to assert that right within a reasonable period of
time. She stresses that, unlike their co-accused Reynaldo Concepcion, respondents Escalona et al.did not
timely invoke their right to speedy trial during the time that the original records and pieces of evidence
were unavailable. She again emphasizes that the prosecution cannot be faulted entirely for the lapse of 12
years from the arraignment until the initial trial, as there were a number of incidents attributable to the
accused themselves that caused the delay of the proceedings. She then insists that we apply the balancing
test in determining whether the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated.

Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG

The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People
v. Court of Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had
neither the felonious intent to kill (animus interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure (animus
iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it concedes that the mode in which the accused committed the crime was
through fault (culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed should have been equivalent to that
for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. It argues that the nature
and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the accused was so gross that it shattered the
fine distinction between dolo and culpaby considering the act as one committed with malicious intent. It
maintains that the accused conducted the initiation rites in such a malevolent and merciless manner that it
clearly endangered the lives of the initiates and was thus equivalent to malice aforethought.

With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their acquittal may also be
reversed despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No. 15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al. should have been
similarly convicted like their other co-accused Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the
former also participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions contributed to his death.

Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.

Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court
of Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the effect of our Decision insofar as their criminal
liability and service of sentence are concerned. According to respondents, they immediately applied for
probation after the CA rendered its Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal liability from
the crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical injuries, which
carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend that, as a result, they have already been discharged
from their criminal liability and the cases against them closed and terminated. This outcome was
supposedly by virtue of their Applications for Probation on various dates in January 2002 11 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as the Probation Law. They argue that Branch
130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already granted their respective Applications for
Probation on 11 October 200212 and, upon their completion of the terms and conditions thereof,
discharged them from probation and declared the criminal case against them terminated on various dates
in April 2003.13

To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true copies of their respective Applications for
Probation and the RTC Orders granting these applications, discharging them from probation, and
declaring the criminal case against them terminated. Thus, they maintain that the Decision in CA-G.R.
No. 15520 had already lapsed into finality, insofar as they were concerned, whenthey waived their right to
appeal and applied for probation.

ISSUES

I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of their right to speedy trial

II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to that for intentional
felonies

III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation
discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against them
DISCUSSION

Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of

Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa

As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal assertions raised by
petitioner Villa in her Motion for Partial Reconsideration concerning G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 have
already been thoroughly considered and passed uponin our deliberations, which led to our Decision dated
1 February 2012. We emphasize that in light of the finding of violation of the right of Escalona et al. to
speedy trial, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to an acquittal,15 and that any
appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a violation of their right against double
jeopardy.16 Though we have recognized that the acquittal of the accused may be challenged where there
has been a grave abuse of discretion,17 certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that the CA’s
Decision dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed judgment constitutes "a patent and gross abuse
of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed
by law or toact in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to
deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice." 18 Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be
attributed to a court simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.19

We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioner’s arguments and found
no basis to rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in concluding that the right to speedy trial of the
accused was violated. Its findings were sufficiently supported by the records of the case and grounded in
law. Thus, we deny the motion of petitioner Villa with finality.

Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG

We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with respect to G.R.
Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). Many of the arguments raised
therein are essentially a mere rehash of the earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition for Certiorari.

Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s theory that even if the act complained of was born of
imprudence or negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on account of the gravity of the
actions of the accused. We emphasize that the finding of a felony committed by means of culpa is legally
inconsistent with that committed by means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs done as a
result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. The Revised Penal Code expresses thusly:

ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit
any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayorin its maximum period toprisión correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a
less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its medium and maximum periods; if
it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall
be imposed.

xxxx

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing
or failing to perform suchact, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage
impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. (Emphases supplied)

On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate malicious intent to do
an unlawful act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion on the matter: 20 Our Revised Penal Code
belongs tothe classical school of thought. x x x The identity of mens rea– defined as a guilty mind, a
guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent – is the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to
do what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be
committed by means of doloor "malice."

The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence, and intent.
x x x x The element of intent – on which this Court shall focus – is described as the state of mind
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with
which a person proceeds.It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while
intentconcerns the result of the act. While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action for a
definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result. On the other hand,
the term "felonious"means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or
purpose.With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to
malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated
otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus– that the act or omission be done
"willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice aforethought." The maxim is
actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea– a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the
act complained of is innocent. As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious
intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

xxxx

The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in establishing the
commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the
existence of malice or dolo immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to
kill – or animus interficendi– cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable
doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been the product of accident, natural
cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent – but with lack
of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or
imprudence resulting in homicide.

xxxx

In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the Revised Penal
Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se,
the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be
found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, incase of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code,
there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical
integrity or wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions.
Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting
physical injuries per semerely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional felony.
The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his intentions are.

Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries, absentmalicious
intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony.x x x.

xxxx

The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused fraternity
members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that
are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful
act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from which an
immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and
consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done
without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight
or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.

The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows: Would a
prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer
the duty to take precaution against the mischievous resultsof the act. Failure to do so constitutes
negligence.

As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the degree of
precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved. If, on account of a certain
line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to
follow that particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, inorder to prevent or avoid damage or
injury. In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus possible that there are
countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, "from a transitory
glance of care to the most vigilant effort." The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of care
will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)

We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent
or dolus malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for committing an intentional felony.

Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we cannot agree with the
argument of the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for intentional felony can also be applied to
the present case on the ground that the nature of the imprudence or negligence of the accused was so
gross that the felony already amounted to malice. The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the
imposable penalties as regards felonies committed by means of culpaon the one hand and felonies
committed by means of doloon the other in the context of the distinctions it has drawn between them. The
penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are mandatorily applied if the death of a
person occurs as a result of the imprudence or negligence of another. Alternatively, the penalties outlined
in Articles 246 to 261 (Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the death was a result of the
commission of a forbidden act accompanied by a malicious intent. These imposable penalties are
statutory, mandatory, and not subjectto the discretion of the court. We have already resolved – and the
OSG agrees – that the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi nor animus
iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the imposable penalty is what is
applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration

filed by Tecson et al.

We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents Tecson et al. vis-à-
vis G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).

The finality of a CA decision will not

bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.
In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA finding them guilty of
slight physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result of their respective availments of the
probation program and their ultimate discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can no longer be
convicted of the heavier offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. 22 Respondents allude to
our Decision in Tan v. People23 to support their contention that the CA judgment can no longer be
reversed or annulled even by this Court.

The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the former had timely filed
with this Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65 petition is analogous to an appeal, or a
motion for new trial or reconsideration, in that a petition for certiorarialso prevents the case from
becoming final and executory until after the matter is ultimately resolved.

Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once the accused
applies for probation, viz:

SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of convictionmay, upon motion of the accused,

be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death
penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes finalafter the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or
whenthe sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accusedhas waived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)

Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of Rule 122,26 it can be culled from the foregoing
provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the relief
being sought is the correction or review of the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order to give
life to the constitutional edict27against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. It is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy if the state appeals
the criminal judgment in order to reverse an acquittal or even to increase criminal liability. Thus, the
accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as when applying for probation – makes the criminal judgment
immediately final and executory. Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth reiterating:28

Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the government
has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s culpability; after
failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the
constitutional ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the
defendant’s already established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction,
but also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who
has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State.

Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be allowed another
opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that
had attended the first trial, all in a process where the government’s power and resources are once again
employed against the defendant’s individual means. That the second opportunity comesvia an appeal does
not make the effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience. (Emphases
supplied, citations omitted)

It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not
confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in our Decision that the
rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails
the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal judgment. 29 The reasoning behind the exception
is articulated in Nazareno, from which we quote:30
In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in an appeal,
actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per sevoid on jurisdictional
grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has
appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of whether there has been a validly rendered
decision, not on the question of the decision’s error or correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule
65 petition, the burden — a very heavy one — is on the shoulders of the party asking for the review to
show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or
of a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
While this Court’s Decision in Tan may have created an impression of the unassailability of a criminal
judgment as soon as the accused applies for probation, we point out that what the state filed therein was a
mere motion for the modification of the penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition. A petition for certiorari is a
special civil action that is distinct and separate from the main case. While in the main case, the core issue
is whether the accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged, the crux of a Rule 65 petition is whether
the court acted (a) without or in excess of its jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly speaking, there is nomodification of judgment in a
petition for certiorari, whose resolution does not call for a re-evaluation of the merits of the case in order
to determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the accused. In a Rule 65 petition, any resulting
annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence of the finding of lack of jurisdiction.

In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must be that it is
inapplicable and irrelevant where the court’s jurisdiction is being assailed through a Rule 65 petition.
Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of a criminal judgment only if the appeal brought before the
court is in the nature of a regular appeal under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, and if
that appeal would put the accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no irregularity in the partial
annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its finality, as the judgment therein was
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The orders of Caloocan City RTC

Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.

First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part and parcel of our
criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate and decide the case before
it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity of the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a particular case or
matter before it.31 That power and capacity includes the competence to pronounce a judgment, impose a
punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33 the execution of a sentencein accordance with law.

The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of Tecson et al. before
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not have competence to take cognizance of
the applications, considering that it was not the court of origin of the criminal case. The OSG points out
that the trial court that originally rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) was Branch
121 of the Caloocan City RTC.

The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)

It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for probation be filed
withthe trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court of origin. Here, the trial
court that originally convicted and sentenced Tecson et al.of the crime of homicide was Branch 121 – not
Branch 130 – of the Caloocan City RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson et
al.in their pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any special authority that would clarify
why the Applications for Probation had not been filed with or taken cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC
Branch 121. While we take note that in a previous case, the CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition
of Branch 121 Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C-38340(91),
the ruling was made specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners therein, i.e. accused Concepcion,
Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez.36

Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications with Caloocan City
RTC Branch 130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that applicants are not at liberty to choose the
forum in which they may seek probation, as the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation law is
substantive and not merely procedural. Considering, therefore, that the probation proceedings were
premised on an unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 never
acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 granted the
probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in which the criminal action has
been properly instituted.37 If a party appeals the trial court’s judgment or final order,38 jurisdiction is
transferred to the appellate court. The execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing
party is concerned.39 The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the entire case the moment the other
party’s time to appeal has expired.40 Any residual jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease – including
the authority to order execution pending appeal – the moment the complete records of the case are
transmitted to the appellate court.41 Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have the authority to
wield the power to hear, try, and decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and
resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and authority shall remain with the appellate court until it
finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any subsequent event, even if the nature of
the incident would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.

According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a
final judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the accused of the offense charged
becomes final under any of the following conditions among others:42 after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal; when the accused waives the right to appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal ofan
appeal; when the sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or served; or when the accused
applies for probation. When the decision attains finality, the judgment or final order is entered in the book
of entries of judgments.43 If the case was previously appealed to the CA, a certified true copy of the
judgment or final order must be attached to the original record, which shall then be remanded to the clerk
of the court from which the appeal was taken.44 The court of origin then reacquires jurisdiction over the
case for appropriate action. It is during this time that the court of origin may settle the matter of the
execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution thereof,45 including the convicts’ applications for
probation.46
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction over the case
when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al.
It shows that the accused filed their respective applications47 while a motion for reconsideration was still
pending before the CA48 and the records were still with that court.49 The CA settled the motion only upon
issuing the Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven months after Tecson et al. had
filed their applications with the trial court.50 In September 2002, or almost a month before the
promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October 2002 granting the probation applications, 51 the OSG
had filed Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with the CA52 and this Court.53 Ultimately,
the OSG assailed the CA judgments by filing before this Court a Petition for Certiorari on 25 November
2002.54 We noted the petition and then required respondents to file a comment thereon.55 After their
submission of further pleadings and motions, we eventually required all parties to file their consolidated
memoranda.56 The records of the case remained with the CA until they were elevated to this Court in
2008.57

For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the probation
applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to suspend their sentence, place
them on probation, order their final discharge, and eventually declare the case against them terminated.
This glaring jurisdictional faux pasis a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law oran
underhanded one-upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or both – to which this
Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.

In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for it. Probation 58 is a
special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who immediately admit their liability
and thus renounce their right to appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate and willingness to be
reformed, the state affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of an incarceration recordby making them
undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major purposes of the law are to help offenders to
eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and self respecting individuals, as well as to assist them
in their reintegration with the community.

It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an act of grace
orclemency conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,59 this Court explained thus:

It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by all.
Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be exercised
primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The
Probation Law should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter’s
prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and
no person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them. (Emphases supplied)

The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et al. 60 It points out
that when they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the RTC, they thereby made themselves
ineligible to seek probation pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the Probation Law).

We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as follows:

SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction.

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied)

Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have appealed the
conviction.61 In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,62 this Court was faced with the issue of
whether a convict may still apply for probation even after the trial court has imposed a non probationable
verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers the original penalty to a sentence within the probationable
limit. In that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to a maximum term of eight years of prisión
mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only became eligible for probation
after the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of
prisión correccional.

In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the accused was
ineligiblefor probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In Francisco, we emphasized that
Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no ambiguity and does not provide for any distinction,
qualification, or exception. What is clearis that all offenders who previously appealed their cases,
regardless of their reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation. Accordingly,
this Court enunciated in Lagrosathat the accused are disallowed from availing themselves of the benefits
of probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation only on appeal as a result of the
downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable to probationable.

While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 issued its various
Orders discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in Lagrosa, however, was a mere reiteration of
the reasoning of this Court since the 1989 case Llamado v. Court of Appeals 63 and Francisco. The
Applications for Probation of Tecson et al., therefore, should not have been granted by RTC Branch 130,
as they had appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents were originally found guilty
of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded their conviction to slight physical injuries and sentenced
them to 20 days of arresto menor, which made the sentence fall within probationable limits for the first
time, the RTC should have nonetheless found them ineligible for probation at the time.

The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use of authority, so gross
that it divested the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a consequence, the RTC Orders granting
the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. and thereafter discharging them from their criminal
liability must be deemed to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, we declare all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in
relation to the probation applications of Tecson et al. null and void for having been issued without
jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in Galman v. Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz:
A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights
can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds
nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis supplied)

The ultimate discharge of Tecson et

al. from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.

Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been extinguished as a
result of their discharge from probation and the eventual termination of the criminal case against them by
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. To support his argument, he cites the following provision of the Revised
Penal Code:

ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.

2. By service of the sentence.

3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.

4. By absolute pardon.

5. By prescription of the crime.

6. By prescription of the penalty.

7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code. (Emphasis
supplied)

As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is as if
no judgment had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment of the Orders of Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 in relation to the probation proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits that technically do
not exist.

In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we find it inapplicable
to this case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to "suspend the execution of the
sentence,"66 and not to replace the original sentence with another, as we pointed out in our discussion in
Baclayon v. Mutia:67

An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a suspension of the
imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an "interlocutory judgment"in the nature of
a conditional order placing the convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation,
to be followed by a final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or
by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied)
Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.
In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.

Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited our ruling in Franciscoand modified our
pronouncements insofar as the eligibility for probation of those who appeal their conviction is concerned.
Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En Bancin effect abandoned Lagrosaand settled the following
once and for all:69

Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the judgment of
conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two
judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the
regional trial court,now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.

If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the probation law on
Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation
because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment
of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’s
judgment — even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the
trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang
nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?

The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would
dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat the probation law requires that an
accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a
huge difference between Franciscoand this case.

xxxx

Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. Hewas not in a position to say, "By
taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on
him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this
Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who
will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their
right to apply for that privilege.

xxxx

In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted
homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the
RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on
him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right
to apply for probation.

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The
underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not
served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to
the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the
teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is
a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.

xxxx

At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct
penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would havehad the right to apply for probation. No
one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the RTC doneright by
him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not
probationable.

The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness.1âwphi1 Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply
for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously imposed
by the trial court, subject to probation? (Emphases supplied)

In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et al.ultimately liable for
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code, the offense is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period (from 4 months and 1 day to 6
months) to prisión correccional in its medium period (from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months). Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more favorable to Tecson et al., we rule that they
are now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was convicted of the same crime,
we hereby clarify that Dizon is also eligible for probation.

While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which granted the Applications
for Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have fulfilled the terms and conditions of
their previous probation program and have eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus, should they
reapply for probation, the trial court may, at its discretion, consider their antecedent probation service in
resolving whether to place them under probation at this time and in determining the terms, conditions, and
period thereof.

Final clarificatory matters

We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the minimum term of the
penalty imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While this issue was not raised by any of the
parties before us, this Court deems it proper to discuss the matter ex proprio motuin the interest of justice.
In the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012, the fourth sentence
reads as follows:

They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum.

As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the "penalty next lower" than that
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, in
accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL),70 the phrase "and one (1) day," which had been
inadvertently added, must be removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of the dispositive portion, the
fourth sentence should now read as follows:

They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as maximum. In this instance, we
further find it important to clarify the accessory penalties inherent to the principal penalty imposed on
Dizon and Tecson et al.

By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding accessory penalty
automatically attaches every time a court lays down a principal penalty outlined in Articles 25 and 27
thereof.71 The applicable accessory penalty is determined by using as reference the principal
penaltyimposed by the court before the prison sentence is computed in accordance with the ISL. 72 This
determination is made in spite of the two classes ofpenalties mentioned in an indeterminate sentence. It
must be emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory penalties specifically allude to the
actual "penalty"73 imposed, not to the "prison sentence"74 set by a court. We believe that the ISL did not
intend to have the effect of imposing on the convict two distinct sets of accessory penalties for the same
offense.75 The two penalties are only relevant insofar as setting the minimum imprisonment period is
concerned, after which the convict may apply for parole and eventually seek the shortening of the prison
term.76

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccionalin its medium period.
As this provision grants courts the discretion tolay down a penalty without regard to the presence of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the imposable penaltymust also be within the aforementioned
range.77 Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al. the actual
(straight) penalty78 of four years and two months of prisión correccional.79 Pursuant to Article 43 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión correccional automatically carries with it 80 the following
accessory penalties: ARTICLE 43. Prisión Correccional— Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of
prisión correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right tofollow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the
duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the disqualification
provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon.

The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty sans the ISL; that is,
for four years and two months81 or until they have served their sentence in accordance with law. Their
suspension takes effect immediately, once the judgment of conviction becomes final.82

We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they shall furthermore
suffer a perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. Under Article 32 of the RevisedPenal
Code, if this accessory penalty attaches, it shall forever deprive them of the exercise of their right (a) to
vote in any popular election for any public office; (b) to be elected to that office; and (c) to hold any
public office.83 Any public office that they may be holding becomes vacant upon finality of the
judgment.84 The aforementioned accessory penalties can only be wiped out if expressly remitted in a
pardon.85

Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of probation, shouldthe
trial court find them eligible therefor. As we explained in Baclayon,86 the grant of probation suspends the
execution of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory penalties. We have
reiterated this point in Moreno v. Commission on Elections:87

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence
but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to
petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory
penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting
probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching
profession.

Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from
the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.

It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running
for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the
duration of the probation. x x x x. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the
penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions
prescribed in the probation order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner Gerarda H.
Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby DENIED. The Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 is
also DENIED.

The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony
D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise DENIED. In light of the finding that
Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130 acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the aforementioned Applications for Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire probation
proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments issued in connection thereto. We,
however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent
Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to apply or reapply for probation in view of our recent ruling in
Colinares v. People of the Philippines,88 without prejudice to their remaining civil liability, if any.

Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012
and hereby delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the fourth sentence of the first paragraph
thereof. The sentence shall now read as follows: "They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of
prisi6n correccional, as maximum."

SO ORDERED.

8) G.R. No. 189644 July 2, 2014

NEIL E. SUYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE CHIEF PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFICER,
DAGUPAN CITY, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 27 March 2009,
which affirmed the Orders dated 31 March 20062 and 26 June 20063 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City. The RTC found that Neil E. Suyan (petitioner) had violated the conditions of his probation
and thus, ordered that his probation be revoked. The instant petition likewise assails the Resolution dated
9 September 20094, which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision
dated 27 March 2009. The facts as found by the CA are summarized as follows:

On 27 October 1995, an Information was filed against petlt10ner, charging him with violation of Section
16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425.5 During arraignment, he pleadedguilty to the charge. The
RTC thereafter proceeded with trial.

On 22 November 1995, petitioner was convicted of the crime, for which he was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional and to pay the costs. On even date, he filed his application
for probation.

On 16 February 1996, the RTC issued a Probation Order covering a period of six (6) years. 6 While on
probation, petitioner was arrested on two occasions, more specifically on 2 September and 20 October
19997 for violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425. Two separateInformations were filed against
him, both of which were filed with the RTC of Dagupan City. One of these cases was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 99-03073-D before Branch 43 (Branch 43 case), and the other case as Criminal Case
No. 99-03129-D before Branch 41.

On 1 December 1999, Atty. SimplicioA. Navarro, Jr. (Atty. Navarro), then the Chief Probation and Parole
Officer of Dagupan City, filed a Motion to Revoke Probation (Motion to Revoke).8 Atty. Navarro alleged
that petitioner has been apprehended twice for drug possession while on probation. The former further
alleged that petitioner was considered a recidivist, whose commission of other offenses while on
probation was a serious violation of the terms thereof.Atty. Navarro also pointed out that petitioner was
no longer in a position to comply with the conditions of the latter’s probation, in view of his
incarceration.9

On 15 December 1999, the RTC issued an order revoking the probation of petitioner and directing him to
serve the sentence imposed upon him.10 It denied11 his Motion for Reconsideration.12

Aggrieved, on 6 April 2000 petitioner filed a Rule 65 Petition13 with the CA (first CA case),14 wherein he
assailed the revocation of his probation. He argued that he was denied due process as he was not
furnished with a copy of the Motion to Revoke; and whenthe motion was heard, he was not represented
by his counsel of record.15

On 2 January 2006, the CA in its Decision,16 granted the Rule 65 Petition by annulling and set aside
RTC’s revocation of petitioner’s probation. The CA ruled that the trial court had not complied with the
Probation Law and the procedural requisites for the revocation of probation under the Revised Rules on
Probation Methods and Procedures, enumerated as follows:17

1. No fact-finding investigation of the alleged violations was conducted by the Probation Officer.
2. The Probation Office should havereported to respondent court the result of said investigation, if
any, upon its completion.

3. There was no Violation Report under P.A. Form No. 8, the contents of which are enumerated
under Section 38 of the Revised Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures.
 4. No warrant of arrest was issued by respondent court after considering the nature and
seriousness of the alleged violations based on the report, if any.

5. The petitioner should have been brought to respondent court for a hearing of the violations
charged, during which petitioner – with the right to counsel – should have been informed of the
violations charged and allowed to adduce evidence in his favor.

The CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings, for the purpose of affording
petitioner his right to due process pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 968, and the Revised Rules on
Probation Methods and Procedures.

In compliance with the CA Decision, the RTC conducted a hearing on the Motion to Revoke.18 On 17
February 2006, a Violation Report dated 13 February 200619 was filed by the Dagupan CityParole and
Probation Office recommending the revocation of probation.20 The Violation Report provides in part:

D. CASE SUMMARY

At the outset of his probation period, probationer showed manifested negative attitude by incurring
absences and not attending rehabilitation activities despite constant follow-up by his supervising officers.
He continued with his illegal drug activities despite counselling and warning from this Office.

Obviously, probationer has failed to recognize the value of freedom and second chance accorded him by
the Honorable Court, his conduct and attitude bespeaks of his deviant character, hence he is unworthy to
continuously enjoy the privilege of probation.

On 22 March 2006, the prosecution submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence. A Certification dated
23January 2006 (Certification),21 issued by Manuel Z. de Guzman, was offered as evidence to prove that
petitioner had been convicted in the Branch 43 case (one of the two cases subsequently filed against him,
as stated earlier); and that he had served his sentence from 30 September 2000 until his release, by reason
of the expiration of his maximum sentence on 8 September 2003.Thereafter, petitioner filed his Comment
on the Formal Offer without disputing the Certification.22

On 31 March 2006, the RTC issued an Order23 revoking the probation. It ruled that it had granted
petitioner due process by affording him the full opportunity to contest the Motion to Revoke; but that
instead of rebutting the Violation Report, he merely questioned the absence of a violation report when his
probation was first revoked.24 The RTC further held that there was positive testimony and documentary
evidence showing that petitioner had indeed violated the conditions of his probation. He never rebutted
the fact of his commission of another offense and conviction therefor while on probation. 25 He filed a
Motion for Reconsideration,26 but it was denied.27

Aggrieved, petitioner again filed an appeal with the CA.28 This time, he alleged that he had been deprived
of his constitutional right to due process when his probation was ordered revoked.29 He further alleged
that he had not been given ample opportunity to refute the alleged violations committed by him while on
probation. The probation officer did not conduct a fact-finding investigation of the alleged violations, and,
consequently, petitioner was not furnished any results. After considering the nature and seriousness of the
alleged violations, the RTC did not issue any warrant for his arrest, as he had not been affordedan
opportunity to adduce evidence in his favor with the assistance of his counsel.30
With regard to the specific groundsfor revocation, petitioner claimed that the evidence adduced against
him did not refer to the grounds cited in the Motion to Revoke, but instead, the evidence referred to
alleged violations of Condition Nos. 3, 9 and 10 of the Probation Order.

The CA denied his appeal. With regard to the procedural issues discussed in the assailed Decision, it ruled
that petitioner was afforded due process. A full-blown trial was conducted precisely to allow him to refute
the allegations made in the Motion to Revoke. It held further that petitioner wasted this opportunity when,
instead of rebutting the allegations mentioned in the Violation Report, he merely questioned the absence
of such a report when his probation was first revoked. It added that the procedural infirmities in the
Motion to Revoke were cured when the RTC conducted a hearing in accordance with the directive
laiddown in the First CA Case.

With regard to the substantive issue of revocation, the CA ruled that, for having been apprehended twice
for the commission of two offenses similar in nature, petitioner violated oneof the conditions prescribed
in the Probation Order. He even admitted tohaving served out his sentence for those offenses.

Aggrieved yet again, petitioner filed an appeal with this Court. On procedural grounds, he alleges that
there was no fact-finding investigation of the alleged violations conducted by the probation officer, and
thus no results were furnished him. Likewise, no warrantof arrest was issued by the RTC. Neither was he
affordedany opportunity to adduce evidence in his favor with the assistance of counsel.

On substantive grounds, petitioner alleges that he already showed repentance after his conviction. In his
first case, he readily admitted his accountability by pleading guilty to the charge. Thus, he was convicted
and he subsequently applied for probation. He further alleges that, of the two cases filed against him, one
was ordered dismissed; he has already served his sentence for the other. Since then, no derogatory
information has been received either by the probation office orthe trial court. Petitioner points out that he
has already reformed his ways and is thus entitled to the grace of law. He contends that the CA should
have ordered him to resume his probation pursuant to the positivist theory adopted in our criminal justice
system.

ISSUE

The sole issue to be resolved inthe instant case is whether the probation was validly revoked. THE
COURT’S RULING

We rule that the probation ofpetitioner was validly revoked.

On the procedural grounds, we do notsubscribe to his contention that his right to due process was
violatedafter the RTC had already conducted a full-blown trial on the Motion to Revoke, in compliance
with the directive of the CA. Based on record, he had ample opportunity to refute the allegations
contained in the Violation Report.

The essence of due process is thata party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard in support of his
case; what the law abhors and prohibits is the absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard. 31 When the
party seeking due process was in fact given several opportunities to be heard and to air his side, but it was
by his own fault or choice that he squandered these chances, then his cry for due process must fail.32

We adopt the ruling of the CA inthat petitioner squandered his own opportunity when, instead of
rebutting the allegations mentioned in the Violation Report, he merely questioned the absence of any such
report when his probation was first revoked.
On substantive grounds, we believe that there was sufficient justification for the revocation of his
probation.

Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has served out his sentence for
another offense while on probation.1âwphi1 Consequently, his commission of another offense is a direct
violation of Condition No. 9 of his Probation Order,33 and the effects are clearly outlined in Section 11 of
the Probation Law.

Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall render the
probation order ineffective. Section 11 states:

Sec. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. - A probation order shall take effect upon its issuance, at which
time the court shall inform the offender of the consequences thereof and explain that upon his failure to
comply with any of the conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another offense, he
shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on probation. (Emphasis
supplied)

Based on the foregoing, the CA was correct in revoking the probation of petitioner and ordering him to
serve the penalty for the offense for which he was placed on probation.

As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to observe full obedience to the terms
and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of revocation of this
privilege.34 Regrettably, petitioner wasted the opportunity granted him by the RTC to remain outside
prison bars, and must now suffer the consequences of his violation.35 The Court's discretion to grant
probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the
benefit of the accused.36 Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has the
power to order its revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.37

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 27
March 2009 and Resolution dated 9 September 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 95426 are both AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

9) G.R. No. 188191 March 12, 2014

ENRIQUE ALMERO y ALCANTARA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MIRASOL BARTOLOME, CLARITA P. MATIAS,
ROSENDO P. MATIAS, and ANTONIO P. MATIAS, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, CJ:

We resolve the petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by Enrique Almero y
Alcantara from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 26 September 2008 and Resolution dated
29 May 2009 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 103030.1

THE MTC RULING IN CRIMINAL CASE No. 96-6531

Petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-6531 for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
multiple physical injuries. After private respondents reserved the right to institute a separate action for
damages, trial ensued. On 8 January 2007, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Labo, Camarines Norte
found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.

Petitioner filed an Application for Probation on 7 September 2007, reasoning that he was informed of his
conviction only upon being served the warrant for his arrest.2 Prosecutor Analie Velarde opposed his
application on the ground that he was known to be uncooperative, habitually absent, and had even
neglected to inform the court of his change of address. On 22 February 2007, the MTC denied his
application, prompting petitioner to file a special civil action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). While
his first Petition raised the sole issue of the denial of his application for probation, he filed a Supplemental
Petition,3 which a) assailed the validity of the promulgation of the 8 January 2007 judgment; and b)
impleaded private complainants Mirasol Bartolome, Clarita P. Matias, Rosendo P. Matias and Antonio P.
Matias.

THE RTC RULING IN SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION NO. 07-0012

In his supplemental Petition, petitioner stated that upon close scrutiny, he discovered that the judgment
itself was premature and flawed, because the MTC never ruled upon his Formal Offer of Exhibits. 4 The
RTC found that the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering judgment without first ruling
on his Formal Offer of Exhibits since, technically, petitioner had not yet rested his case. It also ruled that
the promulgation of judgment was similarly tainted with grave abuse of discretion, because petitioner was
not present at the time, in violation of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Without addressing the
issue of probation, the dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
judgment promulgated on 22 February, 2007 is hereby SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED and the case is
remanded to the Municipal Trial Court of Labo, Camarines Norte for further proceedings.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City or any person acting in his behalf to release
immediately petitioner ENRIQUE ALMERO Y ALCANTARA from detention by virtue of the property
bond posted by him for his provisional liberty in Criminal Case No. 96-6531, unless he is being detained
for some other lawful cause or causes.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.5

THE CA RULING

The CA ruled that the RTC should have confined itself to determining whether or not the MTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for probation. Since no appeal or
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available against the denial of
probation, a Rule 65 petition is clearly the appropriate remedy. However, the trial court erred in taking
cognizance of supplemental grounds assailing the judgment of conviction, because an application for
probation is a waiver of the right to appeal from the judgment of conviction and effectively renders the
same final. The CA ruled that even assuming petitioner failed to be present at the promulgation of
judgment, he had no one but himself to blame for failing to inform the MTC of his change of address.6
On the argument that private respondents possessed no legal personality to represent the State in a
criminal case, the CA held that petitioner himself impleaded them in the certiorari petition before the
RTC. The CA also found that petitioner filed his application for probation only on 7 September 2007, or
more than one month after he received notice of the judgment of conviction. Inasmuch as the grant of
probation rests solely on the discretion of the court, the denial thereof cannot be considered grave abuse,
viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the trial court’s appealed January 28, 2008 Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered ordering the DISMISSAL of appellee’s petition for
certiorari.7

Petitioner comes before this Court, assigning the following errors:

I. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ruling that private complainants have
personality to appeal the 28 January 2008 Decision of the RTC.

II. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ruling that the RTC reversibly erred in
nullifying petitioner’s judgment of conviction.

III. The Court of Appeals committed an error of law in ruling that petitioner is not entitled to
probation.8

OUR RULING

The Petition lacks merit.

Anent the first issue, petitioner argues that in criminal cases, the offended party is the State, and that
private complainants’ interest is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. Petitioner's application for
probation purportedly did not involve the civil aspect of the case. Heirs of the Late Francisco Abueg v.
Court of Appeals cited by the CA allegedly cannot apply, since it does not even discuss the right of
private complainants to interpose an appeal.

In the Comment9 it filed, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) reiterated that what petitioner filed
with the RTC was a petition for certiorari, which is a special civil action. It cannot be considered an
appeal in a criminal case over which only the State has an interest, but an appeal in a civil action from
which private persons can appeal in the event of an adverse outcome. Private respondents, in their
Comment,10 argued that the CA correctly applied Abueg, which is on all fours with the present case. In
Abueg, the accused was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property
for crashing against and killing Francisco Abueg. Instead of filing an appeal, the accused applied for
probation. After the CA affirmed the grant of probation, the Supreme Court entertained and acted upon
the petition for certiorari filed by the victims’ heirs.11

We agree with the submission of the respondents. While the present petition originated from a criminal
proceeding, what petitioner filed with the RTC was a special civil action, in which he himself impleaded
private respondents. He cannot now belatedly change his stance to the prejudice of private respondents,
who would otherwise be deprived of recourse in a civil action they did not initiate. In any case, this Court
has consistently ruled that private parties may be clothed with sufficient personality if the facts show that
the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and if the issues in the action could be determined
in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner.
In Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz,12 citing People v. Calo, Jr.,13 the Supreme Court ruled:

While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions
on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the State in criminal proceeding
pending in this Court and the Court of Appeals, the ends of substantial justice would be better served, and
the issues in this action could be determined in a more just, speedy and inexpensive manner, by
entertaining the petition at bar. As an offended party in a criminal case, private petitioner has sufficient
personality and a valid grievance against Judge Adao’s order granting bail to the alleged murderers of his
(private petitioner’s) father.14 (Citations omitted.)

Furthermore, in Paredes v. Gopengco, it was held that parties in criminal cases have sufficient personality
as "person(s) aggrieved" to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2
of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the rules, to wit:

Furthermore, as offended parties in the pending criminal case before petitioner judge, it cannot be
gainsaid that respondents have sufficient interest and personality as ‘person(s) aggrieved’ by petitioner
judge’s ruling on his non-disqualification to file the special civil action under sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65.
Recently in line with the underlying spirit of a liberal construction of the Rules of Court in order to
promote their object, as against the literal application of Rule 110, section 2, we held, overruling the
implication of an earlier case, that a widow possesses the right as an offended party to file a criminal
complaint for the murder of her deceased husband.15

Petitioner’s second and third arguments are brought by an erroneous understanding of the nature of
probation and shall be discussed jointly.

Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred by the State, and may
be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the
discretion of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only
incidentally for the benefit of the accused.16

In Francisco v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:

Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects
appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the state
of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an accused must not
have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on
the part of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that when his conviction is finally
affirmed on appeal… he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus rendering nugatory the
appellate court's affirmance of his conviction.17

Aside from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused, the rationale for the treatment
of appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies is that they rest on diametrically opposed legal
positions. An accused applying for probation is deemed to have accepted the judgment. The application
for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led to the judgment of
conviction.18 This was the reason why the Probation Law was amended: precisely to put a stop to the
practice of appealing from judgments of conviction – even if the sentence is probationable – for the
purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for the probation only if the accused fails in his bid.19

Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the judgment, or
apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal.20 While he did not file an
appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition
supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as
amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies.

The assignment of errors in the Petition before us reflects the diametrically opposed positions taken by
accused petitioner. On the one hand, he bewails the defects committed by the trial court during the
promulgation of the judgment, thus casting doubt on the judgment itself. Yet in the same breath, he
persists in his application for probation, despite the waiver and admission of guilt implicit in any
procedure for probation – precisely the unhealthy wager the law seeks to prevent.

Petitioner applied for probation beyond the reglementary period, yet the trial court still allowed the filing
before ultimately denying it for lack of merit. Regarding this delay and the other defects imputed by
petitioner to the RTC, we concur with the findings of the CA:

(W)e find that public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying appellee’s
application for probation. Granted that appellee had not received the notice of the January 8, 2007
decision rendered in Criminal Case No. 06-6531, it appears from the record that appellee had no one but
himself to blame for the procedural quagmire he subsequently found himself in. In denying appellee’s
motion for reconsideration of the September 18, 2007 denial of the application for probation, public
respondent distinctly ruled as follows:

x x x. (T)he application has been filed out of time as accused himself admitted in the motion.1âwphi1 He
blames Atty. Evan D. Dizon, his former counsel, for not notifying the court of his change of address but
Atty. Dizon himself had been trying to contact accused since 2001 even before he filed his formal offer of
evidence since all notices sent to the accused’s given address have been returned to this court since 2001.
If it is true that he moved to Cavite only in 2003, why were said notices returned with notations
‘unknown,’ ‘unclaimed,’ or ‘moved’?21

This Court will not countenance pleas for liberality in adverse outcomes caused by the negligence and
evasiveness of the parties themselves.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 103030 dated 26 September 2008 and 29 May 2009
are hereby AFFIRMED, respectively.

SO ORDERED.

10) URBANO M. MORENO, G.R. No. 168550

Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TINGA,
and NORMA L. MEJES, CHICO-NAZARIO,
Respondents. GARCIA, and
VELASCO, J., JJ.

Promulgated:

August 10, 2006

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

In this Petition[1] dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails the Resolution[2] of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc dated June 1, 2005, affirming the Resolution[3] of
the Comelec First Division dated November 15, 2002 which, in turn, disqualified him from running for
the elective office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

The following are the undisputed facts:

Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running

for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to
Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on
August 27, 1998.

Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already
granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia,[4]the imposition of the sentence of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under
Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall operate
to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his
liability for any fine imposed. The order of the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly terminated
his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his conviction, including the right
to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 elections.

The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for
preliminary hearing. After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer recommended that Moreno be
disqualified from running for Punong Barangay.
 The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for reconsideration filed
with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First Division was affirmed. According to
the Comelec en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides that those sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective
local position.[5]Since Moreno was released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall
commence on this date and end two (2) years thence. The grant of probation to Morenomerely suspended
the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local
office.

Further, the Comelec en banc held that the provisions of the Local Government Code take
precedence over the case of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by Moreno and the Probation Law because it is a
much later enactment and a special law setting forth the qualifications and disqualifications of elective
local officials.

In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code applies
only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the
adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local Government
Code because it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further, even assuming that he is
disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his
previous misconduct.

In its Comment[6] dated November 18, 2005 on behalf of the Comelec, the Office of the Solicitor
General argues that this Court in Dela Torre v. Comelec[7] definitively settled a similar controversy by
ruling that conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude stands even if the candidate was granted
probation. The disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code subsists and remains
totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.

Moreno filed a Reply to Comment[8] dated March 27, 2006, reiterating his arguments and
pointing out material differences between his case and Dela Torre v. Comelecwhich allegedly warrant a
conclusion favorable to him. According to Moreno, Dela Torre v. Comelec involves a conviction for
violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense involving moral turpitude covered by the first part of Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code. Dela Torre, the petitioner in that case, applied for probation nearly
four (4) years after his conviction and only after appealing his conviction, such that he could not have
been eligible for probation under the law.

In contrast, Moreno alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within the period
specified therefor. He never served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the disqualification under
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to him.

The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase within two (2)
years after serving sentence found in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, which reads:
 Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude
or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2)
years after serving sentence; [Emphasis supplied.]
....

We should mention at this juncture that there is no need to rule on whether Arbitrary Detention,
the crime of which Moreno was convicted by final judgment, involves moral turpitude falling under the
first part of the above-quoted provision. The question of whether Arbitrary Detention is a crime involving
moral turpitude was never raised in the petition for disqualification because the ground relied upon
by Mejes, and which the Comelec used in its assailed resolutions, is his alleged disqualification from
running for a local elective office within two (2) years from his discharge from probation after having
been convicted by final judgment for an offense punishable by Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Two
(2) Years and Four (4) Months. Besides, a determination that the crime of Arbitrary Detention involves
moral turpitude is not decisive of this case, the crucial issue being whether Morenos sentence was in fact
served.

In this sense, Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely applicable. Our pronouncement therein that
the grant of probation does not affect the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
was based primarily on the finding that the crime of fencing of which petitioner was convicted involves
moral turpitude, a circumstance which does not obtain in this case. At any rate, the phrase within two (2)
years after serving sentence should have been interpreted and understood to apply both to those who have
been sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude and to those who have been
sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. The
placing of the comma (,) in the provision means that the phrase modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the
Local Government Code.

The Courts declaration on the effect of probation on Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code,
we should add, ought to be considered an obiter in view of the fact that Dela Torre was not even entitled
to probation because he appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court which, however, affirmed his
conviction. It has been held that the perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment of the alternative remedy
of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is to prevent speculation or opportunism on the
part of an accused who, although already eligible, did not at once apply for probation, but did so only
after failing in his appeal.[9]

Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at first glance. The phrase
service of sentence, understood in its general and common sense, means the confinement of a convicted

person in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court.[10] This seemingly clear and unambiguous
provision, however, has spawned a controversy worthy of this Courts attention because the Comelec, in
the assailed resolutions, is alleged to have broadened the coverage of the law to include even those who
did not serve a day of their sentence because they were granted probation.

Moreno argues, quite persuasively, that he should not have been disqualified because he did not
serve the adjudged sentence having been granted probation and finally discharged by the trial court.

In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a
sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence.We held that the grant of
probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the
accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling,
and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order
granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching
profession.

Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public
office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from
the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period[11] imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon
the grant of probation.

It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from
running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold
for the duration of the probation.

Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the
sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends
the execution of the sentence. During the period of probation,[12] the probationer does not serve the
penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions
prescribed in the probation order.[13]

It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG have misapprehended the real issue in this
case. They focused on the fact that Morenos judgment of conviction attained finality upon his application
for probation instead of the question of whether his sentence had been served.

The Comelec could have correctly resolved this case by simply applying the law to the letter. Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code unequivocally disqualifies only those who have been sentenced by
final judgment for an offense punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more, within two (2) years
after serving sentence.

This is as good a time as any to clarify that those who have not served their sentence by reason of
the grant of probation which, we reiterate, should not be equated with service of sentence, should not
likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office because the two (2)-year period of
ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not even begin to run.
 The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging Moreno fortifies his
position. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that [t]he final discharge of the probationer shall operate
to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his
liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted. Thus, when Moreno was
finally discharged upon the courts finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation,
his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were
restored to him, including the right to run for public office.

Even assuming that there is an ambiguity in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code which
gives room for judicial interpretation,[14] our conclusion will remain the same.

It is unfortunate that the deliberations on the Local Government Code afford us no clue as to the
intended meaning of the phrase service of sentence, i.e., whether the legislature also meant to disqualify
those who have been granted probation. The Courts function, in the face of this seeming dissonance, is to
interpret and harmonize the Probation Law and the Local Government
Code. Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est optimus interpretandi.

Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or
immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving defendant who thereby escapes the
extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was convicted.[15] Thus, the
Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards regarding who are qualified for probation. For instance,
it provides that the benefits of probation shall not be extended to those sentenced to serve a maximum
term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years; convicted of any offense against the security of the
State; those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by
imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and one (1) day and/or a fine of not less than P200.00; those
who have been once on probation; and those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive
provisions of the Probation Law became applicable.[16]

It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also
covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify probationers
from running for a local elective office. This omission is significant because it offers a glimpse into the
legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered by the disqualification.

Further, it should be mentioned that the present Local Government Code was enacted in 1991,
some seven (7) years after Baclayon v. Mutia was decided. When the legislature approved the enumerated
disqualifications under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, it is presumed to have knowledge of
our ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia on the effect of probation on the disqualification from holding public
office. That it chose not to include probationers within the purview of the provision is a clear expression
of the legislative will not to disqualify probationers.

On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an exception
to the Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation
which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its
terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of
such earlier statute.[17]

In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that broadens the scope of the
disqualification to include Moreno, the Comelec committed an egregious error which we here correct. We
rule that Moreno was not disqualified to run
for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002
Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

Finally, we note that Moreno was the incumbent Punong Barangay at the time of his conviction
of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. He claims to have obtained a fresh mandate from the people
of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 elections. This situation calls to mind the
poignant words of Mr. Justice now Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Frivaldo v. Comelec[18] where he
said that it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Commission on Elections en

banc dated June 1, 2005 and the Resolution of its First Division dated November 15, 2002, as well as all
other actions and orders issued pursuant thereto, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Commission on
Elections is directed to proceed in accordance with this Decision. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

11) MEL DIMAT, G.R. No. 181184

Petitioner,
Present:
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
- versus - PERALTA,
ABAD,
PEREZ,* and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
January 25, 2012
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:
This case is about the need to prove in the crime of fencing that the accused knew or ought to have known
that the thing he bought or sold was the fruit of theft or robbery.

The Facts and the Case

The government charged the accused Mel Dimat with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law[1] before
the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 03, in Criminal Case 02-202338.

Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben
Familara, testified in substance that in December 2000 Delgados wife, Sonia, bought from accused Dimat
a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate number WAH-569 for P850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the vehicles
engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553.

On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG)
spotted the Nissan Safari on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate number. After
stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was actually TD42-119136
and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111.They also found the particular Nissan Safari on their list of
stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that it had been
stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla.

Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate number JHM-818, which he
mortgaged to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. The vehicle was carnapped on May 25, 1998 at
Robinsons Gallerias parking area. He reported the carnapping to the TMG.

For his part, Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari
in good faith and for value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine
number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold the vehicle to
Delgado. He also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari he sold to Delgado and the one which the
police officers took into custody had the same plate number, they were not actually the same vehicle.

On July 20, 2005 the RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law and sentenced him to
an imprisonment of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion
temporal. The court also ordered him to pay P850,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages, as well as the costs of suit.

On October 26, 2007 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in CA-G.R. CR 29794[2] the RTC decision but
modified the penalty to imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, as
minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum,
thus, the present appeal.

The Issue Presented

 The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that accused Dimat
knowingly sold to Sonia Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped from Mantequilla.

The Ruling of the Court

The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who took
no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or
buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that robbery or theft; (3) the
accused knows or should have known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the
deal he makes to gain for himself or for another.[3]

Here, someone carnapped Mantequillas Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998. Two years later in December
2000, Dimat sold it to Delgado for P850,000.00. Dimats defense is that the Nissan Safari he bought from
Tolentino and later sold to Delgado had engine number TD42-126134 and chassis number CRGY60-
YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale covering those transactions. The Nissan Safari stolen from
Mantequilla, on the other hand, had engine number TD42-119136 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3111.

But Dimats defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped
on the road and inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan
Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct numbers of
the vehicles engine and chassis.

Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is
a special law and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal
intent.[4] Of course, the prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have known that the
Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he
intended to obtain some gain out of his acts.

Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the Nissan
Safari to him as collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old certificate of registration
and official receipt of the vehicle and even promised to give him a new certificate of registration and
official receipt already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on this promise. Dimat insists that Tolentinos
failure to deliver the documents should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado himself could not produce
any certificate of registration or official receipt.

Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly
documented. He said that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But
this certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents
to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly
confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia
Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase. That she might herself
be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand accused in the case.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 26, 2007 in
CA-G.R. CR 29794.

SO ORDERED.