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CATU, Complainant
Atty. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, Respondent
A.C. No. 5738
February 19, 2008


Wilfredo Catu filed a case against Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The reason why the case was filed
was because Atty. Rellosa entered his appearance as counsel in a case of ejection for Elizabeth Catu and
Antonio Pastor despite being an incumbent Barangay Captain and despite the fact that the Respondent
presided over a failed conciliation where Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor was one of the parties
involved. Elizabeth was the one who sought for the legal assistance of the Respondent. Moved by
Elizabeth’s situation and because respondent felt he needed to prevent the commission of patent
injustice, he represented Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor.

The complaint filed by was forwarded to the IBP for investigation. The IBP after examining the
facts and contention of both parties presented before it ruled that the Respondent is guilty under for
violating the following laws:

1. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Ethics1;

2. Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees)2; and
3. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility3.

The IBP recommended that the Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for 1 month with a
stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

The Supreme Court modified the findings and the penalty imposed towards the Respondent.


1. Whether or not the Respondent was liable for violating his oath as a lawyer.


Yes, but in their decision, the Court ruled that Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Ethics is not
applicable because the Respondent was an incumbent Barangay Captain and not one who has already

1 Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in

connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

2SEC. 7.Prohibited Acts and Transactions, b. Outside employment and other activities related thereto, 2. Engage in

the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions


left government service. In addition, it should have been Section 90 of RA 71604 and not Section 7(b)(2)
of RA 6713 that was applied. The Latter is the general law which applies to all public officials and
employees while the former applies to elective local government officials. In RA 7160, the elective local
government officials totally prohibited to practice their profession are governors, city mayors and
municipal mayors, while partial prohibition is given to members of the Provincial Council, City Council
and Municipal Council. There was no prohibition given to Barangay Captains and members of the
Barangay Council therefore it should be understood that they are allowed to practice their profession
without prohibition. However, the Barangay Captain should still procure permission or authorization
from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations5. It is in this requirement that
the Respondent have failed to comply with. This non-compliance has made him liable for breaking his
oath as a lawyer, to obey the laws and exact ethical standards of the legal profession. The importance of
this oath has been enshrined respectively as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility 6
and the seventh canon of upholding the integrity and dignity of the legal profession7. The act of the
respondent meted a guilty verdict from the Supreme Court and was suspended for 6 months and is
sternly warned that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Diana Ramos vs. Atty. Jose R. Imbang

AC No. 6788; August23, 2007

4 RA 7160 (Local Government Code); Section 90 –Practice of Profession –

(a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging
in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunianmembers may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall
1. Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
2. Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or
local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
3. Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and
4. Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on
occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation
5Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules - No officer or employee shall engage directly in any

private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will
be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire
time be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage
in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will
not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent
conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties,
and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors.
6Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.


Ramos v. Imbang

This case is about the disbarment or Suspension against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

1992, Ramos sought the assistance of Atty. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the
spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos. She gave Imbang P8, 500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued
areceipt for P5,000 only. Ramos tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the
Jovellanoses. Imbang never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait
outside. He would the income out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been
cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six times and for each “appearance” in court, respondent
charged her P350.Ramos was shocked to learn that Imbang never filed any case against the
Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO)

Whether or not Atty. Imbang should be disbarred.

YES, as per SC’s decision Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and
integrity. More specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious
of their actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also
public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service.

The SC supported this with three explanations:

1. Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In
addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution
and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official
and employee and are hereby declared unlawful (b) Outside employment and other activities related
thereto, public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not (1) Engage in the private
practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice
will not conflict with their official function. In this instance, Imbang received P5,000 from the
complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship.

2. Revised Administrative Code Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative
Code provides:

The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal
assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial
cases. As a PAO lawyer, Imbang should not have accepted attorney's fees from the
complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission.

3. Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

uphold the law.
This undertaking includes the observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by
Imbang when he accepted the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in
consideration of his legal services. Consequently, Imbang's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of
Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the
private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as Ramos' counsel.

People v. Samson A.C. No. 9608


Complainant Maria Victoria B. Ventura filed on July 29, 2004 a Complaint2 for Disbarment or Suspension
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline against respondent Atty.
Danilo S. Samson for “grossly immoral conduct.”

The herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA executed a Sworn Statement dated 19 April 2002
and a Supplemental Complaint dated 10 May 2002 stating therein that the crime of RAPE was
committed against her person sometime in December, 2001 and on 19 March 2002 when she was
merely thirteen (13) years of age by herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON, then thirty eight (38)
years old, married to Teresita B. Samson

In his Counter-Affidavit, herein Respondent ATTY. DANILO S. SAMSON admitted that sexual intercourse
indeed transpired between the herein Complainant MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA and himself

After the conduct of preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan Del Sur,
Philippines issued a RESOLUTION dated 10 June 2002 dismissing the charge of RAPE and finding the
existence of probable cause for the crime of QUALIFIED SEDUCTION and issued the corresponding

The act/s committed by the herein Respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson against the herein Complainant
MARIA VICTORIA B. VENTURA as hereinbefore stated clearly constitute … “grossly immoral conduct”
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines which provides for a penalty of

Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the allegations in paragraph 8 of the complaint to the effect
that the acts of respondent in having sex with complainant constitute … grossly immoral conduct. The

truth is that [the] act of respondent in having sex with complainant was done [with] mutual agreement
after respondent gave money to complainant. Respondent respectfully submit[s] that his act of having
sex with complainant once does not constitute … gross[ly] immoral conduct. There is no human law that
punishes a person who [has] sex with a woman with mutual agreement and complainant [accepts]
compensation therefore. Having sex with complainant once with just compensation does not amount to
immoral conduct….

The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:


Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. x x x x

Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal


WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral Conduct,
Violation of his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of
the records of respondent in the Office of the. Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let
copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts. This
Decision takes effect immediately.

Guevarra vs. Eala A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007

Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala

A.C. No. 7136

August 1, 2007

Facts: On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Committee on Bar Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala for grossly immoral
conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer’s oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the
respondent in January 2000 when his then fiancée Irene Moje introduced respondent to him as her
friend who was married to Marianne Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant noticed that from January to March 2001,
Irene had been receiving from respondent Cellphone calls, as well as messages some which read “I love
you,” “I miss you,” or “Meet you at Megamall.” He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very
late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work.
When he asked her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parent’s house in Binangonan, Rizal
or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and Respondent together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22,
2001 complainant went uninvited to Irene’s birthday celebration at which he saw her and the
respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he
left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all
her personal belongings. Complainant later found a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2007, the day of
his wedding to Irene, Complainant soon saw respondent’s car and that of Irene constantly parked at No.
71-B11 Street, New Manila where as he was later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already
residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on about January 18, 2002 together
with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
Whether Concubinage or Adulterous relationship, be the reason for the disbarment of Atty. Jose
Emmanuel Eala.

Lawyer’s oath stated that a lawyer should support the Constitution and obey the laws, meaning he shall
not make use of deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or be
convicted in any crime involving moral turpitude. In the case at bar Atty. Eala was accused of
Concubinage, under ART. 334 of the Revised Penal Code, “ Any husband who shall keep a mistress in a
conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who
is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium period. Section 2 of ART. XV states that “Marriage, as an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state. Respondent’s grossly
immoral conduct runs afoul of the constitution and the laws, that he as a lawyer has sworn to uphold.
Hence the court declared Atty. Jose Emmanul M. Eala DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation
of his oath of office, and violation of canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991

Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The
1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed
of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Whether the respondent does not possessed the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all
action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and
a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

Ulep v. The Legal Clinic Inc.

223 SCRA 378 – 42 SCAD 287 – Legal Ethics – Advertisement in the Legal Profession – Practice of Law
In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales was to
move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms. Now,
Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latter’s advertisements
which contain the following:

P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am – 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday
to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal Problems” in Star Week
of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed of specialists that can
take care of a client’s problem no matter how complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are
“specialists” in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a
battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the US which
now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the advertisement is merely
making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.
Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is allowed; whether or
not its advertisement may be allowed.
Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not allowed. The Legal
Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include various legal problems wherein a
client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are
exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the
services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession
condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous
marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best advertising possible
for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be
earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-
product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial
stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-
product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also
enumerated the following as allowed forms of advertisement:

1. Advertisement in a reputable law list

2. Use of ordinary simple professional card
3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization


The primary duty of lawyers is to be well-informed of the existing laws, o keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments, and jurisprudence, and be conversant with basic legal principles.

Susan Soriano Dulalia (Susan), wife of Juan, applied for a permit in the Municipal Government to build a
high rise building in Bulacan. The permit was not released due to the opposition of Atty. Cruzwho sent a
letter to the Municipal Engineers office, claiming that the building impedes the airspace of their
property which is adjacent to the Dulalia’s property. Juan Dulalia (Juan) filed a complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Pablo Cruz (Cruz) for immoral conduct.

Juan also claimed that Cruz’s illicit relationship with a woman while still married is in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Cruz invokes good faith, claiming to have had the impression that
the applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil Code, for while Article 256 of the Family
Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive application, there is a qualification.


Whether or not Cruz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility


Cruz’s claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August 3, 1988 as he was
in the United States from 1986 and stayed there until he came back to the Philippines together with his
second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as “ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance

Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as
opposed to grossly immoral conduct, connotes “conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of
society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.” Gross immoral conducton
the other hand must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the
existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such
duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of the
bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

The Court therefore concludes that Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Canon 5 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is suspended from the practice of law for one year.
Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan vs Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa(A.C. No. 7360)


Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in Regional Trial Court,
Branch 10,Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case
for which he previously appeared as prosecutor.

Atty. Silvosa appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00 (Esperon Case), for the
complex crime of double frustrated murder and later on November 23, 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private
lawyer and as counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgement of
the Esperon Case. Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Prosecutor Toribio for 30,000.00php and
failed. Prosecutor Toribio excuted her affidavit on June 14, 1999, a day after the failed bribery attempt,
and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. On May 18,
2006, the Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case. 27776 for direct bribery on an NBI set-
up entrapment operation, wherein, Atty. Silvosa demanded15,000.00php from Lanticse for the dismissal
of the case and for ther elease of Cadinas who was in detention for more than two years.


1. Whether or not respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility.

2. Whether or not a delay of the filing for an administrative complaint exonerate a respondent.

3. Whether or not crime involving moral turpitude can be aground for disbarment.


1. Yes, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines. Atty. Silvosa's attempt to minimize his role in saidcase would be unavailing. The fact is
that he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of the said case. Such would constitute
sufficient intervention in the case. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states "A lawyer
shall not, after leaving government service,accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service." The Court agree with Commissioner Funa's
finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03, when he entered his appearance in the motion to Post Bail
Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interest except by written consent of concern given after a full disclosure of facts."
Atty. Silvosa's representation of conflicting interests merit at least the penalty of suspension.

2. No, delay of filing for an administrative complaint does notexonerate a respondent. There is certain
difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that occurred more than seven years ago. In this instance, the
conflicting allegations are merely based on the word of one person against the word of another. When
the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against
him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times
expected of him. Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect. The Court says, mere delay in filing of an
administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a
respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has elapsed from the
time of the commission of the act complaint of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring
member of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. Atty. Silvosa's failed
attempt at bribing Prosecutor Toribio also merit at least the penalty of suspension.
3. Yes, crime involving moral turpitude can be a ground for disbarment. Moral turpitude is defined as an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals. There is no doubt that the
Sandiganbayans' judgement in Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of public record and is already final.
Rule 138, Section 27 provides, A member of the bar may be disbarred by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. The crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude, as
ruled, in Magno vs COMELEC. The practice of Law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself
unfit to exercise his privilege.Wherefore, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby disbarred and his
name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. So ordered.

FELICITAS S. QUIAMBAO vs. ATTY. NESTOR A. BAMBA Adm. Case No. 6708, August 25, 2005


Quiambao was the president and managing director of Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. (AIB), a family-
owned corporation engaged in providing security and investigation services. She employed the legal serv
ices of Atty. Bamba not only for the corporate affairs of AIB but also for her personal case. In fact, Atty.
Bamba acted as her counsel of record in an ejectment case. Atty. Bamba convinced the complainant to f
orm a new security agency, QRMSI, with the former as a silent partner. She then resigned. However, abo
ut six months thereafter, Atty. Bamba filed on behalf of AIB a complaint for replevin and damages agains
t her for the purpose of recovering from her the car of AIB assigned to her as a service vehicle. At this po
int the ejectment case was still pending and he did not withdraw as counsel.

It was also averred that Atty. Bamba also convinced complainant’s brother to organize another security
agency, SESSI, where the former served as its incorporator, director, and president.


In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that Atty. Bamba;s theory is incorrect that since the ejectmen
t case and the replevin case are unrelated cases with different issues, parties, and subject matters, the p
rohibition is inapplicable. His representation of opposing clients in both cases, though unrelated, obviou
sly constitutes conflict of interest or, at the least, invites suspicion of double-
dealing. While the respondent may assert that the complainant expressly consented to his continued re
presentation in the ejectment case, the respondent failed to show that he fully disclosed the facts to bot
h his clients and he failed to present any written consent of the complainant and AIB as required under
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

It must be noted that Republic Act No. 5487, otherwise known as the Private Security Agency Law, prohi
bits a person from organizing or having an interest in more than one security agency. Thus, in organizing
SESSI, the Atty. Bamba violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which man
dates lawyers to promote respect for the law and refrain from counseling or abetting activities aimed at
defiance of the law. Atty. Bamba is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR


REVILLA, JR., Respondent

A.C. No.7054 November 11, 2014PER CURIAM


Reinstatement to the Practice of Law -- The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice
of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character.x
x x The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again
worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character and
standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was
disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between
the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.


ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR. (REVILLA) was disbarred by the court from the practice of law on the
following grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes; filing of multiple actions and forum-
shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood and deception before the courts;
maligning the name of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court.

Prior to said disbarment , the court had penalized him already in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia
versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of
court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-
lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for
six (6) months.

The court in rendering their decision stated that: He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal
profession serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can
save him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and
the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.


On July 8, 2010, Revilla filed a Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion praying that his license to
practice law be restored based on humanitarian considerations, but the Court En Banc resolved to deny
the petition for lack of merit. Subsequently, Revilla appealed his case and pleaded the court’s mercy, but
his prayers were denied by the court. Albeit, Revilla continued to file appeals before the court and
continued to receive negative response from the court.

On July 18, 2014, the respondent filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency reiterating his apologies
to the Court. He stressed that the penalty of disbarment has already taken its toll on his health; he has
now become most frail and weak; and he had been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at stage five
(5) and undergoing dialysis thrice weekly. He also stressed that in the years that he had been excluded
from the practice of law, he devoted his time to Christian and charity pursuits serving with all humility as
a Lay Minister and a regular lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church, Quezon City.

The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he intends to practice law again, but to be made
whole, to recover from being shattered, and to finally have peace of mind. He expressed his sincere
repentance and deep remorse by taking full responsibility for his misdemeanor. He also prayed that his
disbarment be lifted and that he be reinstated as a member of the Philippine bar. As part of his petition,
he submitted a Medical Abstract evidencing his diagnosis for chronic kidney disease, and a certification
from St. Peter Parish, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he and his family are dedicated


WON Atty Revilla is qualified for reinstatement in the practice of law.


NO, Atty Revilla is no longer qualified.

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and
continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness inintellectual attainment and in moral
character. The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its
inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish their
present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to
the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the
legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are opened,it is done so only
as a matter of justice.

The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatementto the practice of law is whether the lawyer has
sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character. Whether the applicant shall be
reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The
lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy
of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character and standing
prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred,
his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement.

In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage of more than four (4) years is sufficient
to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional transgressions.

We emphasize that this is the second time that the respondent was accused and was found guilty of
gross misconduct.1âwphi1 The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v. Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla,Jr., was likewise found guilty of gross misconduct for committing willful and intentional falsehood
before the court; misusing court procedure and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and
collaborating with non lawyers in the illegal practice of law – mostly the same grounds on which the
Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders, we granted the
respondent’s motion for reconsideration and reduced the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
from two (2) years to six (6) months out of compassion to the respondent.

Considering the respondent’s earlier disbarment case(and subsequent reduction of the penalty imposed
as an act of clemency), and another disbarment case against him still pending review by the Court, we
are not fully and convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already reformed. The period of five (5)
years is likewise not considerably long considering the nature and perversity of the respondent’s
misdeeds. We believe that it is still early for the Court to consider the respondent’s reinstatement.

Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's sincerity in acknowledging his

guilt.1âwphi1 While he expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full responsibility of his
misdemeanor, his previous inclination to pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and
to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion. The respondent also failed to submit
proof satisfactorily showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
he is again worthy of membership in the legal profession. We thus entertain serious doubts that the
respondent had completely reformed.

As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the respondent's unfortunate physical condition, we
stress that in considering his application for reinstatement to the practice of law, the duty of the Court is
to determine whether he has established moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding its feeling
of sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this requirement was not met. Until such time when the
respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to
resume his membership in the Bar, Our decision to disbar him from the practice of law stands.


WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency filed by Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla, Jr. is hereby DENIED.
Carmelita I. Zaguirre vs. Atty. Alfredo Castillo

03 August 2005


Atty. Alfredo Castillo was already married with three children when he had an affair with Carmelita
Zaguirre. This occurred sometime from 1996 to 1997, while Castillo was reviewing for the bar and
before the release of its results. Zaguirre then got pregnant allegedly with Castillo’s daughter. The
latter, who was already a lawyer, notarized an affidavit recognizing the child and promising for her
support which did not materialize after the birth of the child. The Court found him guilty of Gross
Immoral Conduct to which Castillo filed a motion for reconsideration.

The IBP commented that until Castillo admits the paternity of the child and agrees to support her. In his
defense, the latter presented different certificates appreciating his services as a lawyer and proving his
good moral character. His wife even submitted a handwritten letter stating his amicability as a husband
and father despite the affair. More than a year since the original decision rendered by the Court,
Castillo reiterated his willingness to support the child to the Court and attached a photocopy of post-
dated checks addressed to Zaguirre for the months of March to December 2005 in the amount of
Php2,000.00 each.


Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Castillo is guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct and should be punished with
the penalty of Indefinite Suspension.


The Court found that Castillo’s show of repentance and active service to the community is a just and
reasonable ground to convert the original penalty of indefinite suspension to a definite suspension of
two years. Furthermore, the Court noted that Zaguirre’s further claim for the support of her child
should be addressed to the proper court in a proper case.

Eco v Rodriguez


In 1956, Felipe Eco was granted a private woodland registration certification by the Bureau of Forestry
but the same was later cancelled by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (Juan De
Rodriguez) due to numerous oppositions and also by reason of Eco’s refusal to submit to a formal
investigation. Eco questioned the decision before the court but the trial court affirmed the Secretary’s
decision. In 1958, Eco filed a notice of appeal and also posted the required appeal bond. This was
opposed because Eco filed it out of time. Eco argued that the delay is due to excusable negligence. The
alleged negligence consisted of the erroneous computation by Eco’s counsel’s clerk of the period within
which an appeal may be made, said clerk being of the impression that the prescriptive period to appeal
in certiorari cases is also 30 days like in ordinary civil actions instead of 15 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not the delay is excusable.
HELD: No. What was delegated by Eco’s counsel to his clerk was the computation itself of the period
within which the appropriate pleading may be filed. This act is hardly prudent or wise. The duty to
compute the period to appeal is a duty that devolves upon the attorney which he cannot and should not
delegate unto an employee because it concerns a question of study of the law and its application, and
the Supreme Court considers this to be a delicate matter that should not be delegated. The negligence
here cannot, therefore, be considered excusable.

ROBINSON vs VILLAFUERTE (G.R. No. L-5346 January 3, 1911)


April 30, 1908, W. W. Robinson entered suit in CFI Tayabas against Marcelino Villafuerte y Rañola,
alleging: That the plaintiff was engaged, in Manila and at the time specified further on, in the
importation and sale of flour and other products from abroad, with an office in Manila, a business which
he still continued, through the agency of Castle Brothers, Wolf & Sons, established therein; that the
defendant, a resident of Lucena, Tayabas, by an instrument duly executed (October 19, 1906), by his
attorney in fact and legal representative, Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, who was fully empowered and
authorized for the purpose, and ratified on the same date before the notary public of Manila, D.R.
Williams, acknowledged and confessed that he owed the plaintiff the net sum of P3,852.50; that by the
said instrument duly executed the defendant bound and pledged himself to pay to the plaintiff the said
sum in four monthly installments from that date, at the rate of P1,000 for each of the first three
installments and P852.50 for the last one, and likewise the interest thereon at the rate of 8% per
annum, to be adjusted and paid at the time of paying each of the installments fixed; that in the said
instrument the defendant moreover bound himself to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P500 for costs and
expenses, in case the latter should recur to judicial process for the collection of the aforementioned
debt; and that, as security for the payment of the said debt, of the interest thereon and of the amount
for costs and expenses, the defendant voluntarily executed, by means of the said instrument and in
favor of the plaintiff, a special mortgage upon the properties of his absolute ownership and control (11
Rural estates in Lucena). It was stated in the instrument, as an express condition, that default of
payment of any of the installments specified in the fourth preceding paragraph would cause the entire
obligation to mature and would entitle the plaintiff (it says "defendant") to require the payment of the
same in its totality and forthwith to institute foreclosure proceedings against any and all of the
mortgage properties. The complaint further alleged, that, notwithstanding the repeated demands made
upon the defendant, the latter had not paid his debt nor the interest thereon, excepting the sum of
P550. As a second cause of action, the complaint alleged, among other things: That the defendant, by
means of an instrument duly executed on December 21, 1906, by his attorney in fact and legal
representative, Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, who was fully empowered and authorized — an
instrument ratified on the same date before the notary Daniel R. Williams — and in consideration of the
credit which the plaintiff agreed to allow the said defendant up to the sum of P3,560, executed a special
voluntary mortgage of the properties of his absolute ownership and control. The mortgage was
executed as security for the payment to the plaintiff of the sum or sums which the defendant might owe
him by reason of the said credit, which was granted. The defendant, in his answer, alleged: That the
defendant did not execute, consent to, nor authorize the execution of a power of attorney of any kind
whatsoever in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion; that the defendant received no sum whatever from
the plaintiff nor was he in the latter's debt for the amount claimed in the complaint, nor for any other
sum of money; that he did not give his consent to all of to any one of the mortgages alleged in the
complaint, and that all the said mortgages on the properties were founded on a supposed power of
attorney said to have been executed by the defendant in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, which
power of attorney was fictitious, false, fraudulent, null and void, that it was not executed by the
defendant, nor did the latter intervene therein and that the said power of attorney had no true reason
for existence; wherefore the defendant asked that judgment be rendered absolving him from the
complaint with the costs against the plaintiff, by annulling each and all of the mortgages alleged in the
complaint and the inscription of each of them in the office of the register of property of Tayabas, and by
ordering the cancellation of all the inscriptions of the said mortgages and encumbrances of the
aforementioned properties. The purpose of the suit filed by the plaintiff, W. W. Robinson, is the
collection of various sums owed by the defendant, Marcelino Villafuerte y Rañola, the payment of which
is secured by a mortgage on the real properties set out in the two notarial documents evidencing the
debt, exhibited under letter A and B, and inscribed in the property registry of the Province of Tayabas.


Whether a Law Clerk, Jose Moreno Lacalle, should be permitted to examine witnesses during the
hearing of the case


With regard to the first two alleged errors, relative to Jose Moreno Lacalle being permitted to address
questions to some of the witnesses during the hearing of the case, notwithstanding the presence of
Attorney Agustin Alvarez, who represented the plaintiff, it is unquestionable that the intervention of the
said law clerk and employee of Messrs. Haussermann, Cohn & Williams, the plaintiff's attorneys in this
suit, was improperly admitted; it was not authorized by any law, for the reason that the said Lacalle did
not have the capacity and qualifications of a lawyer admitted under oath to practice his profession
before the courts of these Islands, and therefore, on objection being made to his present at the hearing
of the case, the judge should have sustained such objection and should have excluded Lacalle and not
permitted him to address questions to the plaintiff's witnesses, notwithstanding the fact that Attorney
Agustin Alvares, designated in substitution of the said Haussermann, Cohn & Williams as the plaintiff's
representative in CFI Tayabas, was present. Notwithstanding this, the acts performed in the course of
some of the proceedings under the direction of Jose Moreno Lacalle are not subject to annulment, as no
positive detriment was caused to the defendant, although such intervention is in no manner permitted
by the law of procedure. However, even though the questions addressed by Lacalle to the plaintiff's
witnesses and the presentation of documents of various kinds exhibited at the trial be stricken out for
the reason that they were made by a person who was neither a party to the suit nor counsel for the
plaintiff, yet we do not find any reason, based upon any positive prohibition of the law, to authorize the
striking out to the answers given by the witnesses interrogated by Lacalle, even though the said answers
may have been evoked by questions addressed by a person not authorized by law, and there is much
less reason for rejecting the cross-questions addressed to the same witnesses by the defendant's
attorney, and the answers thereto. Although the presentation of the documents which support the
claims of the plaintiff party be deemed to be improper, on account of their having been made by a
person who had not the qualifications of a practicing attorney it is nevertheless true that their
presentation was authorized by the attorney Alvarez and the documents exhibited continued to be
united to the record and were not stricken out therefrom on motion by the other side, but, on the
contrary, the attorney for the defendant or his counsel discussed the authenticity and validity of the said
documents, made allegations against the same and concluded by asking that these documents, and also
the inscription of those designated under letters A and B, be declared null and void. From the preceding
statements it is concluded that the intervention of Jose Moreno Lacalle in the present suit has in no
manner prejudiced the rights and interests of the defendant and that, if judgment was rendered against
him and in favor of the plaintiff, it was in consequence of the merits of the evidence adduced by the
plaintiff and of the inefficacy and worthlessness of the testimony given by the defendant. If the
defendant Marcelino Villafuerte had presented substantial, strong and convincing evidence of the falsity
of the two powers of attorney executed in favor of Vicente Marcelo Concepcion, the plaintiff's
documentary evidence would have been totally invalidated and annulled, and this suit would have had a
different ending.