B.M. No.
1678 December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M.
Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He
practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek
medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program.
His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in
May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his
Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as
a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends
to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether
petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the
Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May
2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant
cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the
Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission
to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a member of
the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a
resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him, involving
moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that,
by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006,
petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he
be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his
duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant
with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so
delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a
duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the
legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement and payment of membership fees to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for
membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the
privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these
conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which
the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his
professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person
heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
1 remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the
Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements and
who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of
Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also
produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as
furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other
qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of
court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good
standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means continued
membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership
dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional
tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal
profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary
control.14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino
citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso
jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of
naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of
[RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his
membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law
practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession
in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant
to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise,
before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA
9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this
Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual
membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education; this is specially significant to
refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine
laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only
 and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a
member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is
hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated
above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar
Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the
Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE
BAR,vs. VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a
Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine
citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age
of majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the
present case involving the application for admission to the
Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat
Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino,
was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964.
Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of
Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed
an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a
Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was
allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition
that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine
citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on
18 November 1998, the following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of
Accountancy of the Professional Regulations Commission
showing that Ching is a certified public accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by
Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching
is a registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by
Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations
were released and Ching was one of the successful Bar
examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees
was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the
questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed
to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court,
dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof
of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on
Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the
documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that
Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a
2
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching
the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict
compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625
entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option
to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person
Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that
"(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine
citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching
the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that
"two (2) conditions must concur in order that the election of
Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the
mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of
the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon
reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the
meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been
construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age
of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of
Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p.
51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940).
Said period may be extended under certain circumstances, as
when a (sic) person concerned has always considered
himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955;
3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that
an election done after over seven (7) years was not made
within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally
elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would
already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present
jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances
surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the
relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the
phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to
elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625
prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching
therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and
his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his
Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared
myself as one in my school records and other official
documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant)
reserved for Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was
eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member
of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and
sworn to by me before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the
oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of
the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of
allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing
fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15
July 1999, the question raised is whether he has elected
Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the
affirmative, whether his citizenship by election retroacted to
the time he took the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the
1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of
the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child
elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine
citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it
provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen
hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the
Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973
Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which
states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted,
however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on
the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood
as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935
Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to
challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge
had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new
Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3),
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure
that should be followed in order to make a valid election of
Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate
children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be
signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with
the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the
aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not
prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine
citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides
that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of
majority." The age of majority then commenced upon
reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election
of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing
the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the
proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn,
based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of
the United States Government to the effect that the election
should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the
age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been
interpreted to mean that the election should be made within
three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of
Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible
rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a
reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that
3
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the
reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the
constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may
be extended under certain circumstances, as when the
person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the
option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February
16, 1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His
election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he
was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7)
years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that
said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of
majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April
1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied
with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or
over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of
majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon
reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly
beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period
within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in
this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by
Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the
Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a
registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot
vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays
down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship
by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot
constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal election
of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In
re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic)
legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of
suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that
Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928,
and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old),
Esteban was already participating in the elections and
campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are
sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and
circumstances obtaining therein are very different from those
in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First,
Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the
requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935
Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine
citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling
in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the
OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect
Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he
being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the
Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is
therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be
necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges
attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29
Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12,
1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election
Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could cannot be simply glossed over.
any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non- Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity
filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when
rightfully entitled. 17 convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As
in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
Representatives, 18 where we held: promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result. this
formal and an informal process. golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY
the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine
the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act Bar.
of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact SO ORDERED.
pronouncement of the Court, we held:
A.C. No. 4148 July 30, 1998
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. Atty. LAURO
age constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52:
L. TAPUCAR, respondent.
emphasis supplied)
PER CURIAM:
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant
right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her husband,
Philippines.
Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who
conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under
cannot be excepted to have elected Philippine citizenship as
scandalous circumstances. 1
they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively
xxx xxx xxx
charged four times for conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. In
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a
Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980,
requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For
respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the
those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there
penalty of six months suspension without pay, 2 while in
are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding.
Administrative Matters Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which
Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public
were consolidated, 3 this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the
office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during
separation from the service of respondent. 4
election time, running for public office, and other categorical
Now he faces disbarment.
acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations
The records reveal the following facts:
for these persons.
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the
Bar Discipline, it appears that complainant and respondent
person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because
married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman
he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this
Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their
case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-
residence in Antipolo, Rizal, where eight of their eleven children
one (21).
were born. In 1962 respondent relocated his family to
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the
Dadiangas, Cotabato (now Gen. Santos City), where his last
part of the private respondent would not only have been
three children were born and where he practiced his profession
superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity.
until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January
How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19
30, 1976.
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge,
Ching. However, even if we consider the special
respondent began cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña,
circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the
in Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. On December 28, 1977, Elena gave
Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a
birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Peña.
Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed
disagree with the recommendation of the OSG.
an administrative complaint against respondent for immorality.
Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect
After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a
Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that
period of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon
lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he
respondent. 5
finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with
clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of
Elena, giving rise to another charge of immorality and other
electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching
administrative cases, such as: conduct unbecoming an officer
has offered no reason why he delayed his election of
of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were
Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing
consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
dismissal and separation from the service. 6
painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to
But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and,
his ways. He continued living with Elena, which resulted in the
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's
4
birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
Peña Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned
complainant and his children by her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to
Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along Elena and their two children.
And on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with
Elena in a ceremony solemnized by MTC Judge Isagani A.
Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the
respondent's marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on
record shows the dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States
of America upon her retirement from the government service in
1990. However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept her
posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their
father's acts, including deception and intrigues against them.
Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a similar case which
she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present
petition for disbarment under the compulsion of the maternal
impulse to shield and protect her children from the despotic
and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the
assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-
Baua, to represent her in this case.
Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
the matter was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation. After conducting a thorough
investigation, the Commission through Commissioner Victor C.
Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and his
name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was
premised on the ground that, notwithstanding sanctions
previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court,
respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena. 7
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of
contradicting the charges against him, respondent displayed
arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the Court,
as when he said:
I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two
months without pay in 1980 for having a mistress, the same girl
Ms. Elena (Helen) Peña, now my wife. Being ordered separated
in later administrative case constitute double jeopardy. If now
disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Peña will constitute triple
jeopardy. If that's the law so be it. 8
Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, passed on May 17, 1997, a Resolution
adopting the Commissioner's recommendation, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97
Adm. Case No. 4148
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs.
Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and
that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner
Fernandez, as approved and adopted by the Board of
Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support
the foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the
recommendation to this Court by said Board pursuant to Rule
5
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
139-B, Sec. 12 (b), of the Rules of Court. * We are in agreement
that respondent's actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a
condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it
must also remain intact in order to maintain one's good
standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. 9 There is
perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which
a high-toned morality is more imperative than that of law. 10 The
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession. (Emphasis supplied.)
As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live
up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession,
by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a
high standard of legal proficiency, as well as morality including
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times
subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community
approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct — both
public and private — fails this scrutiny would have to be
disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized
accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once
a member of the judiciary, a fact that aggravates his
professional infractions. For having occupied that place of
honor in the Bench, he knew a judge's actuations ought to be
free from any appearance of impropriety. 11 For a judge is the
visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of
justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength
that fortifies their will to obey the law. 12 Indeed, a judge should
avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his actuations,
lest it be a demoralizing example to others. 13 Surely,
respondent could not have forgotten the Code of Judicial
Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives. 14
Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and
ethical conduct, 15 an attorney-at-law is also invested with
public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of
justice. Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must
ensure the faith and confidence of the public that justice is
administered with dignity and civility. A high degree of moral
integrity is expected of a lawyer in the community where he
resides. He must maintain due regard for public decency in an
orderly society.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients. 16 Exacted from him, as a member of the profession
charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the
defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency,
truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously
described as "moral character." To achieve such end, every
lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the
dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public
regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a
lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court. 17
The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great
caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct which seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of
the Court and member of the bar. 18 For disbarment
proceedings are intended to afford the parties thereto full
opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is
taken, to assure the general public that those who are tasked
with the duty of administering justice are competent, honorable,
trustworthy men and women in whom the Courts and the clients
may repose full confidence.
In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., 19 a complaint for
disbarment was filed against a member of the bar by his wife.
She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and their
son; and that he had adulterous relations with a married but
separated woman. Respondent was not able to overcome the
evidence presented by his wife that he was guilty of grossly
immoral conduct. In another case, 20 a lawyer was disbarred
when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another
woman who had borne him a child. The Court held that
respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality
expected and required of a member of the bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous
sanctions imposed upon him by this Court, respondent
continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than his lawfully-
wedded wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned to
investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent far from
contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even
arrogance, in the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of
Governors, tasked to determine whether he still merited the
privileges extended to a member of the legal profession,
resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of
grossly immoral conduct abounds against him and could not be
explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering into another
marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as abandoning
and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his
disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law
and the lawyer's oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long
period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent's
character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community,
and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could
not but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the
integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need
for strict but appropriate disciplinary action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby
DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his
name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992
EUFROSINA Y. TAN, complainant, vs. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL,
respondent.
SBC No. 609 February 24, 1992
MOISES B. BOQUIA, complainant, vs. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL,
respondent.
SBC No. 616 February 24, 1992
HERVE DAGPIN, complainant, vs. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL,
respondent.
Nelbert T. Paculan for respondent.
Moises B. Boquia for himself and Herve Dagpin.
6 addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 29 December 1986, and that
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On 29 November 1983, * this Court sustained the charge of
unauthorized practice of law filed against respondent Sabandal and
accordingly denied the latter's petition to be allowed to take the oath
as member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
From 1984-1988, Sabandal filed Motions for Reconsideration of the
aforesaid Resolution, all of which were either denied or "Noted
without action." The Court, however, on 10 February 1989, after
considering his plea for mercy and forgiveness, his willingness to
reform and the several testimonials attesting to his good moral
character and civic consciousness, reconsidered its earlier
Resolution and finally allowed him to take the lawyer's oath "with the
Court binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly abide by and
adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath and
the highest standards of the legal profession" (Yap Tan v. Sabandal,
10 February 1989, 170 SCRA 211).
However, before a date could be set for Sabandal's oath-taking,
complainants Tan, Dagpin and Boquia each filed separate motions
for reconsideration of the Resolution of 10 February 1989. These
were acted upon in the Resolution of 4 July 1989 hereunder quoted,
in part, for ready reference:
On 7 April 1989, Complainant Herve Dagpin in SBC No. 616, and
Complainant Moises Boquia in SBC No. 609 also filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of our Resolution allowing respondent to take his
oath. They alleged that respondent had deliberately and maliciously
excluded them in his Petition of 28 June 1988. That, of course, is
without merit considering that in his Petition of 28 June 1988,
respondent had discussed said cases quite lengthily.
On 27 April 1989, Complainant Tan also manifested that
Complainant Benjamin Cabigon in BM No. 59 and Complainant
Cornelio Agnis in SBC No. 624, had passed away so that they are in
no position to submit their respective Comments.
One of the considerations we had taken into account in allowing
respondent to take his oath, was a testimonial from the IBP
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, dated 29 December 1986, certifying
that respondent was "acting with morality and has been careful in his
actuations in the community."
Complainant Tan maintains that said IBP testimonial was signed
only by the then President of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte
Chapter, Atty. Senen O. Angeles, without authorization from the
Board of Officers of said Chapter; and that Atty. Angeles was
respondent's own counsel as well as the lawyer of respondent's
parents-in-law in CAR Case No. 347, Ozamiz City. Attached to
Complainant's Motion for Reconsideration was a Certification, dated
24 February 1989, signed by the IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter
President, Atty. Norberto L. Nuevas, stating that "the present Board
of Officers with the undersigned as President had not issued any
testimonial attesting to the good moral character and civic
consciousness of Mr. Nicolas Sabandal."
In his Comment, received by the Court on 27 March 1989,
respondent states that the IBP testimonial referred to by
Complainant Tan must have been that signed by the former IBP
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter President, Atty. Senen O. Angeles,
he himself had not submitted to the Court any certification from the
IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter Board of Officers of 1988-1989.
Under the circumstances, the Court has deemed it best to require
the present Board of Officers of the IBP, Zamboanga del Norte
Chapter, to MANIFEST whether or not it is willing to give a
testimonial certifying to respondent's good moral character as to
entitle him to take the lawyer's oath, and if not, the reason therefor.
The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del
Norte is likewise required to submit a COMMENT on respondent's
moral fitness to be a member of the Bar.
Compliance herewith is required within ten (10) days from notice.
Pursuant to the aforesaid Resolution, Judge Pelagio R. Lachica,
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del
Norte, filed his Comment, dated 4 August 1989, and received on 25
August 1989, pertinently reading:
The undersigned, who is not well acquainted personally with the
respondent, is not aware of any acts committed by him as would
disqualify him from admission to the Bar. It might be relevant to
mention, however, that there is Civil Case No. 3747 entitled Republic
of the Philippines, Represented by the Director of Lands, Plaintiff,
versus Nicolas Sabandal, Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del
Norte and Rural Bank of Pinan, (Zamboanga del Norte), Inc., for
Cancellation of Title and/or Reversion pending in this Court in which
said respondent, per complaint filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a
certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned
out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a
free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Pinan
(ZN) Inc. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land sold at
public auction and respondent has not redeemed the land until the
present. (Emphasis Supplied)
The IBP Zamboanga del Norte Chapter also submitted a
Certification, dated 2 February 1990, signed by its Secretary Peter
Y. Co and attested to by its President Gil L. Batula, to wit:
This is to certify that based on the certifications issued by the Office
of the Clerk of Court—Municipal Trial Court in the City of Dipolog;
Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte and the Office of the
Provincial and City Prosecutors, Mr. Nicolas E. Sabandal has not
been convicted of any crime, nor is there any pending derogatory
criminal case against him. Based on the above findings, the Board
does not find any acts committed by the petitioner to disqualify him
from admission to the Philippine Bar.
We required the complainants to comment on the aforesaid IBP
Certification and to reply to Executive Judge Pelagio Lachica's
comment in our Resolution of 15 February 1990.
On 17 April 1990, after taking note of the unrelenting vehement
objections of complainants Tan (in BM 44) and Boquia (in SBC 616)
and the Certification by Executive Judge Lachica, dated 4 August
1989, that there is a pending case before his Court involving
respondent Sabandal, this Court resolved to DEFER the setting of a
date for the oath-taking of respondent Sabandal and required Judge
Lachica to inform this Court of the outcome of the case entitled
Republic v. Sabandal, (Civil Case 3747), pending before his "Sala"
as soon as resolved. 7 provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the Register of
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
In the meantime, on 18 April 1990, the Court received another
Comment, dated 13 March 1990, by complainant Herve Dagpin in
SBC 609, vehemently objecting to the oath-taking of respondent
Sabandal and describing his actuations in Civil Case 3747 as
manipulative and surreptitious. This comment was Noted in the
Resolution of 22 May 1990.
In a letter, addressed to the Chief Justice, dated 15 August 1990,
complainant Tan in Bar Matter 44, informed the Court that her
relationship with Sabandal has "already been restored," as he had
asked forgiveness for what has been done to her and that she finds
no necessity in pursuing her case against him. Complainant Tan
further stated that she sees no further reason to oppose his
admission to the Bar as he had shown sincere repentance and
reformation which she believes make him morally fit to become a
member of the Philippine Bar. "In view of this development," the
letter stated, "we highly recommend him for admission to the legal
profession and request this Honorable Court to schedule his oath-
taking at a time most convenient." This letter was Noted in the
Resolution of 2 October 1990, which also required a comment on
Tan's letter from complainants Boquia and Dagpin.
Moises Boquia, for himself, and complainant Dagpin, in their
comment, dated 5 November 1990, stated thus:
Eufrosina Yap Tan's letter dated 15 August 1990 is a private
personal disposition which raises the question whether personal
forgiveness is enough basis to exculpate and obliterate these cases.
On our part, we believe and maintain the importance and finality of
the Honorable Supreme Court's resolutions in these cases. . . .
It is not within the personal competence, jurisdiction and discretion of
any party to change or amend said final resolutions which are
already res judicata. Viewed in the light of the foregoing final and
executory resolutions, these cases therefore should not in the least
be considered as anything which is subject and subservient to the
changing moods and dispositions of the parties, devoid of any
permanency or finality. Respondent's scheming change in tactics
and strategy could not improve his case.
The above was "Noted" in the Resolution of 29 November 1990.
In compliance with the Resolution of 2 October 1990, Judge Pacifico
M. Garcia, Regional Trial Court Judge of Branch 8, Dipolog City
(who apparently succeeded Judge Pelagio Lachica, the latter having
availed of optional retirement on 30 June 1990) submitted to this
Court, on 17 December 1990, a copy of the "Judgment," dated 12
December 1990, in Civil Case 3747, entitled "Republic of the
Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal et al" for Cancellation of Title and/or
Reversion, which, according to him, was already considered closed
and terminated.
Said judgment reveals that an amicable settlement, dated 24
October 1990, had been reached between the principal parties,
approved by the Trial Court, and conformed to by the counsel for
defendant Rural Bank of Pinan.
Briefly, the said amicable settlement cancelled the Original
Certificate of Title under Free Patent in Sabandal's name and the
latter's mortgage thereof in favor of the Rural Bank of Pinan;
Deeds for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain
the land covered by the aforesaid Certificate of' Title with defendant
Sabandal refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership
over said land; caused the defendant Sabandal to pay defendant
Rural Bank of Pinan the sum of P35,000 for the loan and interest;
and the Rural Bank of Pinan to waive its cross-claims against
defendant Nicolas Sabandal.
Judge Pacifico Garcia's letter and the afore-mentioned Judgment
were NOTED in our Resolution of 29 January 1991. In the same
Resolution, complainants Tan, Boquia and Dagpin were required to
comment on the same.
Upon request of Sabandal, a certification, dated 20 December 1990,
was sent by Executive judge Jesus Angeles of the RTC of
Zamboanga del Norte, certifying that Sabandal has no pending case
with his Court and that he has no cause to object to his admission to
the Philippine Bar. This was "Noted" in the Resolution of 26 February
1991.
Meanwhile, Sabandal reiterated his prayer to be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath in a Motion dated 8 June 1991. In our Resolution of 1
August 1991, we deferred action on the aforesaid Motion pending
compliance by the complainants with the Resolution of 29 January
1991 requiring them to comment on the letter of Judge Pacifico M.
Garcia.
To date, only complainant Tan has complied with the said Resolution
by submitting a Comment, dated 29 August 1991, stating that the
termination of Civil Case No. 3747 is "proof of Sabandal's sincere
reformation, of his repentance with restitution of the rights of
complainants he violated," and that "there is no more reason to
oppose his admission to the Bar." This was "Noted" in the Resolution
of 24 September 1991.
In a Manifestation, dated 6 December 1991, Sabandal reiterates his
plea to be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath.
His plea must be DENIED.
In our Resolution of 10 February 1989, Sabandal was allowed to
take the oath, ten (10) years having elapsed from the time he took
and passed the 1976 Bar examinations, after careful consideration
of his show of contrition and willingness to reform. Also taken
cognizance of were the several testimonials attesting to his good
moral character and civic consciousness. At that time, we had not
received the objections from complainant Tan to Sabandal's taking
the oath nor were we aware of the gravity of the civil case against
him.
It turns out that Civil Case No. 3747 entitled "Republic of the
Philippines v. Nicolas Sabandal" was instituted by the Government in
1985 and was brought about because of respondent's procurement
of a certificate of free patent over a parcel of land belonging to the
public domain and its use as security for a mortgage in order to
obtain a loan. At that time, Sabandal was an employee of the Bureau
of Lands. He did not submit any defense and was declared it default
by order of the RTC dated 26 November 1986. The controversy was
eventually settled by mere compromise with respondent
surrendering the bogus certificate of title to the government and
paying-off the mortgagor, "to buy peace and forestall further
expenses of litigation incurred by defendants" (Rollo, Judgment 8 in
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
Civil Case No. 3747). The Office of the Solicitor General interposed
no objection to the approval of the said amicable settlement and
prayed that judgment be rendered in accordance therewith, "as the
amicable settlement may amount to a confession by the defendant"
(Rollo, supra). It must also be stressed that in 1985, at the time said
case was instituted, Sabandal's petition to take the lawyer's oath had
already been denied on 29 November 1983 and he was then
submitting to this Court motions for reconsideration alleging his good
moral character without, however, mentioning the pendency of that
civil case against him.
In view of the nature of that case and the circumstances attending its
termination, the Court now entertains second thoughts about
respondent's fitness to become a member of the Bar.
It should be recalled that Sabandal worked as Land Investigator at
the Bureau of Lands. Said employment facilitated his procurement of
the free patent title over property which he could not but have known
was public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not
speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross
dishonesty while in the public service, which can not be erased by
the termination of the case filed by the Republic against him where
no determination of his guilt or innocence was made because the
suit had been compromised. Although as the Solicitor General had
pointed out, the amicable settlement was tantamount to a confession
on his part. What is more, he could not but have known of the
intrinsic invalidity of his title and yet he took advantage of it by
securing a bank loan, mortgaging it as collateral, and
notwithstanding the foreclosure of the mortgage and the sale of the
land at public auction, he did not lift a finger to redeem the same
until the civil case filed against him was eventually compromised.
This is a sad reflection on his sense of honor and fair dealing. His
failure to reveal to this Court the pendency of the civil case for
Reversion filed against him during the period that he was submitting
several Motions for Reconsideration before us also reveal his lack of
candor and truthfulness.
There are testimonials attesting to his good moral character, yes.
But these were confined to lack of knowledge of the pendency of any
criminal case against him and were obviously made without
awareness of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case
instituted by the Government against him. Those testimonials can
not, therefore, outweigh nor smother his acts of dishonesty and lack
of good moral character.
That the other complainants, namely, Moises Boquia (in SBC 606)
and Herve Dagpin (in SBC 619) have not submitted any opposition
to his motion to take the oath, is of no moment. They have already
expressed their objections in their earlier comments. That
complainant Tan has withdrawn her objection to his taking the oath
can neither tilt the balance in his favor, the basis of her complaint
treating as it does of another subject matter.
Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a
matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are
not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good
moral character:
The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to
maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in academic
preparation and legal training as well as in honesty and fair dealing.
The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested
in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this
end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those
persons who are known to be honest and to possess good moral
character. . . . (In re Parazo, 82 Phil. 230).
Although the term "good moral character" admits of broad
dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least common
honesty" (Royong v. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7
SCRA 859; In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 [1928]). It has also been
held that no moral qualification for bar membership is more
important than truthfulness or candor (Fellner v. Bar Association of
Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729).
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Sabandal to be unfit to become a
member of the BAR, this Court's Resolution, dated 10 February
1989 is RECALLED and his prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath is hereby denied.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 1512 January 29, 1993
VICTORIA BARRIENTOS, complainant, vs. TRANSFIGURACION
DAAROL, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on August 20, 1975,
complainant Victoria C. Barrientos seeks the disbarment of
respondent Transfiguracion Daarol, ** a member of the Philippine
Bar, on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
After respondent filed his answer (Rollo, p. 12), the Court Resolved
to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation (Rollo, p. 18).
As per recommendation of the Solicitor General and for the
convenience of the parties and their witnesses who were residing in
the province of Zamboanga del Norte, the Provincial Fiscal of said
province was authorized to conduct the investigation and to submit a
report, together with transcripts of stenographic notes and exhibits
submitted by the parties, if any (Rollo, p. 20).
On November 9, 1987, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted
its Report and Recommendation, viz.:
Evidence of the complainant:
. . . complainant Victoria Barrientos was single and a resident of
Bonifacio St., Dipolog City; that when she was still a teenager and
first year in college she came to know respondent Transfiguracion
Daarol in 1969 as he used to go to their house being a friend of her
sister Norma; that they also became friends, and she knew the
respondent as being single and living alone in Galas, Dipolog City;
that he was the General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (ZANECO) and subsequently transferred his
residence to the ZANECO compound at Laguna Blvd. at Del Pilar
St., Dipolog City (pp. 109-111, tsn, September 30, 1976).
That on June 27, 1973, respondent came to their house and asked
her to be one of the usherettes in the Mason's convention in
Sicayab, Dipolog City, from June 28 to 30, 1973 and, she told
respondent to ask the permission of her parents, which respondent
did, and her father consented; that for three whole days she served
as usherette in the convention and respondent picked her up from
her residence every morning and took her home from the convention
site at the end of each day (pp. 112-114, tsn, id.).
That in the afternoon of July 1, 1973, respondent came to
complainant's house and invited her for a joy ride with the
permission of her mother who was a former classmate of
9 and her mother at Singalong, Manila, respondent told them that he
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
respondent; that respondent took her to Sicayab in his jeep and then
they strolled along the beach, and in the course of which respondent
proposed his love to her; that respondent told her that if she would
accept him, he would marry her within six (6) months from her
acceptance; complainant told respondent that she would think it over
first; that from then on respondent used to visit her in their house
almost every night, and he kept on courting her and pressed her to
make her decision on respondent's proposal; that on July 7, 1973,
she finally accepted respondent's offer of love and respondent
continued his usual visitations almost every night thereafter; they
agreed to get married in December 1973 (pp. 115-119, tsn, id.).
That in the morning of August 20, 1973, respondent invited her, with
the consent of her father, to a party at the Lopez Skyroom; that at
7:00 p.m. of that day respondent fetched her from her house and
went to the Lopez Skyroom (pp. 119-121, tsn, id); that at about
10:00 p.m. of that evening they left the party at the Lopez Skyroom,
but before taking her home respondent invited her for a joy ride and
took her to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City; respondent parked
the jeep by the beach where there were no houses around; that in
the course of their conversation inside the jeep, respondent
reiterated his promise to marry her and then started caressing her
downward and his hand kept on moving to her panty and down to
her private parts (pp. 121-122, tsn. id.); that she then said: "What is
this Trans?", but he answered: "Day, do not be afraid of me. I will
marry you" and reminded her also that "anyway, December is very
near, the month we have been waiting for" ([p], 122, tsn, id.), then he
pleaded, "Day, just give this to me, do not be afraid" (ibid), and again
reiterated his promise and assurances, at the same time pulling
down her panty; that she told him that she was afraid because they
were not yet married, but because she loved him she finally agreed
to have sexual intercourse with him at the back seat of the jeep; that
after the intercourse she wept and respondent again reiterated his
promises and assurances not to worry because anyway he would
marry her; and at about 12:00 midnight they went home (pp.
122-124, tsn, id.).
After August 20, 1973, respondent continued to invite her to eat
outside usually at the Honeycomb Restaurant in Dipolog City about
twice or three times a week, after which he would take her to the
airport where they would have sexual intercourse; that they had this
sexual intercourse from August to October 1973 at the frequency of
two or three times a week, and she consented to all these things
because she loved him and believed in all his promises (pp. 125-
127, tsn, id.).
Sometime in the middle part of September, 1973 complainant
noticed that her menstruation which usually occurred during the
second week of each month did not come; she waited until the end
of the month and still there was no menstruation; she submitted to a
pregnancy test and the result was positive; she informed respondent
and respondent suggested to have the fetus aborted but she
objected and respondent did not insist; respondent then told her not
to worry because they would get married within one month and he
would talk to her parents about their marriage (pp. 129-132, tsn, id.).
On October 20, 1973, respondent came to complainant's house and
talked to her parents about their marriage; it was agreed that the
marriage would be celebrated in Manila so as not to create a
scandal as complainant was already pregnant; complainant and her
mother left for Manila by boat on October 22, 1973 while respondent
would follow by plane; and they agreed to meet in Singalong, Manila,
in the house of complainant's sister Delia who is married to Ernesto
Serrano (pp. 132-135, tsn, id.).
On October 26, 1973, when respondent came to see complainant
could not marry complainant because he was already married (p.
137, tsn, id.); complainant's mother got mad and said: "Trans, so you
fooled my daughter and why did you let us come here in Manila?" (p.
138, tsn, id.). Later on, however, respondent reassured complainant
not to worry because respondent had been separated from his wife
for 16 years and he would work for the annulment of his marriage
and, subsequently marry complainant (p. 139, tsn, id.); respondent
told complainant to deliver their child in Manila and assured her of a
monthly support of P250.00 (p. 140, tsn, id.); respondent returned to
Dipolog City and actually sent the promised support; he came back
to Manila in January 1974 and went to see complainant; when asked
about the annulment of his previous marriage, he told complainant
that it would soon be approved (pp. 141-142, tsn, id.); he came back
in February and in March 1974 and told complainant the same thing
(p. 142, tsn, id.); complainant wrote her mother to come to Manila
when she delivers the child, but her mother answered her that she
cannot come as nobody would be left in their house in Dipolog and
instead suggested that complainant go to Cebu City which is nearer;
complainant went to Cebu City in April 1974 and, her sister Norma
took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill; she
delivered a baby girl on June 14, 1974 at the Perpetual Succor
Hospital in Cebu City; and the child was registered as "Dureza
Barrientos" (pp. 143-148, tsn, id.).
In the last week of June 1974 complainant came to Dipolog City and
tried to contact respondent by phone and, thru her brother, but to no
avail; as she was ashamed she just stayed in their house; she got
sick and her father sent her to Zamboanga City for medical
treatment; she came back after two weeks but still respondent did
not come to see her (tsn. 48-150, tsn, id.); she consulted a lawyer
and filed an administrative case against respondent with the National
Electrification Administration; the case was referred to the
Zamboanga del Norte Electric Cooperative (ZANECO) and it was
dismissed and thus she filed the present administrative case (pp.
150-151, tsn, id.).
Evidence for the Respondent
The evidence of the respondent consists of his sole testimony and
one exhibit, the birth certificate of the child (Exh. 1). Respondent
declared substantially as follows: that he was born on August 6,
1932 in Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte; that he married Romualda
Sumaylo in Liloy in 1955; that he had a son who is now 20 years old;
that because of incompatibility he had been estranged from his wife
for 16 years; that in 1953 he was baptized as a moslem and thereby
embraced the Islam Religion (pp.
173-180 tsn, Jan. 13, 1977); that he came to know complainant's
father since 1952 because he was his teacher; likewise he knew
complainant's mother because they were former classmates in high
school; that he became acquainted with complainant when he used
to visit her sister, Norma, in their house; they gradually became
friends and often talked with each other, and even talked about their
personal problems; that he mentioned to her his being estranged
from his wife; that with the consent of her parents he invited her to
be one of the usherettes in the Masonic Convention in Sicayab,
Dipolog City held on June 28-30, 1973 (pp. 185-192, tsn, id.); that
the arrangement was for him to fetch her from her residence and
take her home from the convention site; that it was during this
occasion that they became close to each other and after the
convention, he proposed his love to her on July 7, 1973; that (sic) a
week of courtship, she accepted his proposal and since then he
used to invite her (pp. 193-194, tsn, id.).
That in the evening of August 20, 1973, respondent invited
complainant to be his partner during the Chamber of Commerce
affair at the Lopez Skyroom; that at about 10:00 p.m. of that evening
10
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
after the affair, complainant complained to him of a headache, so he
decided to take her home but once inside the jeep, she wanted to
have a joy ride, so he drove around the city and proceeded to the
airport; that when they were at the airport, only two of them, they
started the usual kisses and they were carried by their passion; they
forgot themselves and they made love; that before midnight he took
her home; that thereafter they indulged in sexual intercourse many
times whenever they went on joy riding in the evening and ended up
in the airport which was the only place they could be alone
(p. 195, tsn, id.).
That it was sometime in the later part of October 1973 that
complainant told him of her pregnancy; that they agreed that the
child be delivered in Manila to avoid scandal and respondent would
take care of expenses; that during respondent's talk with the parents
of complainant regarding the latter's pregnancy, he told him he was
married but estranged from his wife; that when complainant was
already in Manila, she asked him if he was willing to marry her, he
answered he could not marry again, otherwise, he would be charged
with bigamy but he promised to file an annulment of his marriage as
he had been separated from his wife for 16 years; that complainant
consented to have sexual intercourse with him because of her love
to him and he did not resort to force, trickery, deceit or cajolery; and
that the present case was filed against him by complainant because
of his failure to give the money to support complainant while in Cebu
waiting for the delivery of the child and, also to meet complainant's
medical expenses when she went to Zamboanga City for medical
check-up (pp. 198-207, tsn, id.).
FINDING OF FACTS
From the evidence adduced by the parties, the following facts are
not disputed:
1. That the complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a college
student, and was about 20 years and 7 months old during the time
(July-October 1975) of her relationship with respondent, having been
born on December 23, 1952; while respondent Transfiguracion
Daarol is married, General Manager of Zamboanga del Norte
Electric Cooperative, and 41 years old at the time of the said
relationship, having been born on August 6, 1932;
2. That respondent is married to Romualda A. Sumaylo with whom
be has a son; that the marriage ceremony was solemnized on
September 24, 1955 at Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte by a catholic
priest, Rev. Fr. Anacleto Pellamo, Parish Priest thereat; and that
said respondent had been separated from his wife for about 16
years at the time of his relationship with complainant;
3. That respondent had been known by the Barrientos family for
quite sometime, having been a former student of complainant's
father in 1952 and, a former classmate of complainant's mother at
the Andres Bonifacio College in Dipolog City; that he became
acquainted with complainant's sister, Norma in 1963 and eventually
with her other sisters, Baby and Delia and, her brother, Boy, as he
used to visit Norma at her residence; that he also befriended
complainant and who became a close friend when he invited her,
with her parents' consent, to be one of the usherettes during the
Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog City from June 28 to 30,
1973, and he used to fetch her at her residence in the morning and
took her home from the convention site after each day's activities;
4. That respondent courted complainant, and after a week of
courtship, complainant accepted respondent's love on July 7, 1973;
that in the evening of August 20, 1973, complainant with her parents'
permission was respondent's partner during the Chamber of
Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in the Dipolog City, and at
about 10:00 o'clock that evening, they left the place but before going
home, they went to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and parked
the jeep at the beach, where there were no houses around; that after
the usual preliminaries, they consummated the sexual act and at
about midnight they went home; that after the first sexual act,
respondent used to have joy ride with complainant which usually
ended at the airport where they used to make love twice or three
times a week; that as a result of her intimate relations, complainant
became pregnant;
5. That after a conference among respondent, complainant and
complainant's parents, it was agreed that complainant would deliver
her child in Manila, where she went with her mother on October 22,
1973 by boat, arriving in Manila on the 25th and, stayed with her
brother-in-law Ernesto Serrano in Singalong, Manila; that respondent
visited her there on the 26th, 27th and 28th of October 1973, and
again in February and March 1974; that later on complainant
decided to deliver the child in Cebu City in order to be nearer to
Dipolog City, and she went there in April 1974 and her sister took
her to the Good Shepherd Convent at Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that
on June 14, 1974, she delivered a baby girl at the Perpetual Succor
Hospital in Cebu City and, named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that
about the last week of June 1974 she went home to Dipolog City;
that during her stay here in Manila and later in Cebu City, the
respondent defrayed some of her expenses; that she filed an
administrative case against respondent with the National
Electrification Administration; which complaint, however, was
dismissed; and then she instituted the present disbarment
proceedings against respondent.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully recommend
that after hearing, respondent Transfiguracion Daarol be disbarred
as a lawyer. (Rollo, pp. 28-51).
After a thorough review of the case, the Court finds itself in full
accord with the findings and recommendation of the Solicitor
General.
From the records, it appears indubitable that complainant was never
informed by respondent attorney of his real status as a married
individual. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by
respondent only after the complainant became pregnant. Even then,
respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for
having been estranged from his wife for 16 years and dangled a
marriage proposal on the assurance that he would work for the
annulment of his first marriage. It was a deception after all as it
turned out that respondent never bothered to annul said marriage.
More importantly, respondent knew all along that the mere fact of
separation alone is not a ground for annulment of marriage and does
not vest him legal capacity to contract another marriage.
Interestingly enough. respondent lived alone in Dipolog City though
his son, who was also studying in Dipolog City, lived separately from
him. He never introduced his son and went around with friends as
though he was never married much less had a child in the same
locality. This circumstance alone belies respondent's claim that
complainant and her family were aware of his previous marriage at
the very start of his courtship. The Court is therefore inclined to
believe that respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his
sexual desires at the expense of the gullible complainant. It is not in
accordance with the nature of the educated, cultured and
respectable, which complainant's family is, her father being the
Assistant Principal of the local public high school, to allow a
daughter to have an affair with a married man.
But what surprises this Court even more is the perverted sense of
respondent's moral values when he said that: "I see nothing wrong
with this relationship despite my being married." (TSN, p. 209,
January 13, 1977; Rollo, p. 47) Worse, he even suggested abortion.
11
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
Truly, respondent's moral sense is so seriously impaired that we
cannot maintain his membership in the Bar. In Pangan v.
Ramos (107 SCRA 1 [1981]), we held that:
(E)ven his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is
still alive and their marriage still valid and existing is contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality. Respondent made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a
Moslem convert and as such, could enter into multiple marriages
and has inquired into the possibility of marrying complainant (Rollo,
p. 15). As records indicate, however, his claim of having embraced
the Islam religion is not supported by any evidence save that of his
self-serving testimony. In this regard, we need only to quote the
finding of the Office of the Solicitor General, to wit:
When respondent was asked to marry complainant he said he could
not because he was already married and would open him to a
charge of bigamy (p. 200, tsn, January 13, 1977). If he were a
moslem convert entitled to four (4) wives, as he is now claiming, why
did he not marry complainant? The answer is supplied by
respondent himself. He said while he was a moslem, but, having
been married in a civil ceremony, he could no longer validly enter
into another civil ceremony without committing bigamy because the
complainant is a christian (p. 242, tsn, January 13, 1977).
Consequently, if respondent knew, that notwithstanding his being a
moslem convert, he cannot marry complainant, then it was grossly
immoral for him to have sexual intercourse with complainant
because he knew the existence of a legal impediment. Respondent
may not, therefore, escape responsibility thru his dubious claim that
he has embraced the Islam religion. (Rollo,
p. 49).
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual
desires, respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated his moral
delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member
of the Bar on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct
(Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court) is in order. Good moral character
is a condition which precedes admission to the Bar (Sec. 2, Rule
138, Rules of Court) and is not dispensed with upon admission
thereto. It is a continuing qualification which all lawyers must
possess (People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 682 [1990]; Delos Reyes v.
Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 [1989]), otherwise, a lawyer may either be
suspended or disbarred.
As we have held in Piatt v. Abordo (58 Phil. 350 [1933], cited in Leda
v. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 [1992]):
It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good character
is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law;
its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January
1990, 181 SCRA 692). As aptly put by Mr. Justice George A.
Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is
bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be
entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the court retains the power
to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).
Only recently, another disbarment proceeding was resolved by this
Court against a lawyer who convinced a woman that her prior
marriage to another man was null and void ab initio and she was still
legally single and free to marry him (the lawyer), married her, was
supported by her in his studies, begot a child with her, abandoned
her and the child, and married another woman (Terre vs. Terre,
Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992).
Here, respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old,
proposed love and marriage to complainant, then still a 20-year-old
minor, knowing that he did not have the required legal capacity.
Respondent then succeeded in having carnal relations with
complainant by deception, made her pregnant, suggested abortion,
breached his promise to marry her, and then deserted her and the
child. Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who
measure up to the exacting standards of mental and moral fitness.
Respondent having exhibited debased morality, the Court is
constrained to impose upon him the most severe disciplinary action
— disbarment.
The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members
the highest standard of morality. The members are, in fact, enjoined
to aid in guarding the Bar against the admission of candidates unfit
or unqualified because deficient either moral character or education
(In re Puno, 19 SCRA 439, [1967]; Pangan vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1
[1981]).
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good
moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character
and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards
of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and an
officer of the Court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also behave
himself in such a manner as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards (Tolosa
vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21, 26 [1989], citing Toledo vs. Toledo, 7
SCRA 757 [1963] and Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859 [1963]).
In brief, We find respondent Daarol morally delinquent and as such,
should not be allowed continued membership in the ancient and
learned profession of law (Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
ACCORDINGLY, We find respondent Transfiguracion Daarol guilty
of grossly immoral conduct unworthy of being a member of the Bar
and is hereby ordered DISBARRED and his name stricken off from
the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all
courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of
the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent
Daarol.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-07-2337 August 3, 2007
[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 04-2060-P]
ROLLY PENTECOSTES, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. HERMENEGILDO MARASIGAN, Clerk of Court VI, Office
of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Kabacan, North
Cotabato, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan (respondent), Clerk of Court VI of the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kabacan, North Cotabato, stands administratively charged with
grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public officer for the
loss of a motorcycle-subject matter of a criminal case which was
placed under his care and custody.
The administrative case against respondent stemmed from a sworn
affidavit-complaint1 filed on November 11, 2004 by Rolly
Pentecostes (Pentecostes), the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle,
which was recovered by members of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) of M’lang, North Cotabato from suspected carnappers against
12
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
whom a criminal case for carnapping, Criminal Case No. 1010, was
lodged at Branch 22, RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato.
On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of M’lang, North
Cotabato turned over the motorcycle to respondent who
acknowledged receipt thereof on August 1, 1995.
After the conduct of hearings to determine the true owner of the
motorcycle, the trial court issued an Order2 of November 15, 2000
for its release to Pentecostes.
Pentecostes immediately asked respondent to release the
motorcycle to him. Respondent, however, told him to wait and come
back repeatedly from 2001 up to the filing of the complaint.
In his Comment3 filed on February 9, 2005, respondent gave the
following explanation:
After the motorcycle was delivered to him by the M’lang chief of
police on August 1, 1995, he requested Alex Pedroso, a utility
worker, to inspect the engine, chassis, and make, after which he
issued an acknowledgement receipt thereof.
He thereafter instructed Pedroso to bring the motorcycle to the
Kabacan police station for which he (respondent) prepared a receipt.
He and Pedroso visited and inspected the motorcycle every time a
hearing on the criminal case was conducted. When the court finally
ordered the release of the motorcycle to Pentecostes on November
15, 2000, the latter refused to receive it, claiming that it was already
"cannibalized" and unserviceable.
From that time on until 2003, Pentecostes harassed him, demanding
that he be responsible for reconditioning the vehicle. During the
latter part of 2004, upon the advice of the executive judge, he
accompanied Pentecostes to the Kabacan police station only to
discover that the motorcycle was missing.
As no explanation could be offered by then Kabacan police chief
Nestor Bastareche for the loss, he prepared a letter-complaint
requesting for assistance in the recovery of the motorcycle and for
the conduct of an investigation. Pentecostes refused to sign the
letter, however.
He later discovered that the turnover receipt attached to the record
of the criminal case and the page of the blotter where the turnover
was recorded were missing. Hence, he submitted the sworn
statements of Pedroso4 and SPO4 Alex Ocampo5 who confirmed the
transfer of the vehicle from his custody to that of the Kabacan chief
of police.
Belying respondent’s averments, Pentecostes, in his
"Rejoinder,"6 contended as follows:
The vehicle was in good running condition when it was delivered to
respondent by police operatives7 of M’lang.
Respondent’s act of passing the blame to the PNP of Kabacan was
a clear case of hand washing as the records showed that
respondent was responsible for the safekeeping of the motorcycle. It
was for this reason that he (Pentecostes) refused to sign the letter to
the chief of police of Kabacan protesting the loss. Moreover, the
police blotter of PNP Kabacan has no entry or record of the alleged
turn over.
By Resolution of October 19, 2005,8 this Court referred the case to
the Executive Judge of RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato, for
investigation, report and recommendation.
Then Executive Judge Francisco G. Rabang, Jr. of the RTC,
Kabacan, North Cotabato submitted on January 16, 2006 his
findings and recommendation for the dismissal of the administrative
complaint against respondent.9
In his report, Judge Rabang noted that Pentecostes denied any
knowledge about the turnover of the motorcycle to the PNP of
Kabacan.
On the evidence for the defense, the investigating judge found that
the motorcycle was delivered by the PNP of M’lang, North Cotabato
to respondent who in turn transferred it to the PNP of Kabacan.
To Judge Rabang, what remained an issue was the actual physical
condition of the motorcycle when it was turned over to the PNP of
Kabacan. The judge noted that there was no proof of Pentecostes’
claim that the vehicle was "cannibalized" from the time it was under
respondent’s custody until its transfer to the PNP of Kabacan.
In light of the peace and order situation in Kabacan in the late 1990s
and in the early part of 2000 and the absence of a suitable
courthouse then, Judge Rabang believed that respondent had made
a wise decision in turning over the custody of the vehicle to the PNP
of Kabacan.
To Judge Rabang’s report and recommendation, Pentecostes filed a
Motion for Reconsideration10 in which he assailed the conclusion
that the motorcycle was no longer roadworthy and was already
"cannibalized" when it was delivered to the office of the clerk of court
from the M’lang police station.
Moreover, Pentecostes maintained that the alleged turnover of the
motorcycle to the police station of Kabacan was irrelevant because
the proper custodian of the vehicle was respondent who should be
held responsible for its eventual loss.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the investigating
judge’s recommendation to be sufficiently supported by the
evidence.11
The OCA thus concurred with Judge Rabang’s recommendation for
the dismissal of the complaint against respondent, subject to certain
qualifications with respect to the physical condition of the vehicle
upon its delivery to respondent and the latter’s lack of authority for
the turn over of the vehicle to the PNP of Kabacan.
While the investigating judge found no evidence to show the actual
condition of the motorcycle at the time it was turned over to
respondent, the OCA observed that the evidence presented during
the investigation supported a finding that the vehicle had missing
parts when it was delivered to respondent.
From the testimony of Pentecostes’ witness SPO2 Servando
Guadalupe, the OCA noted, the motorcycle was loaded into a
service vehicle for delivery to respondent. This fact, according to the
OCA, could only mean that the vehicle could not run by itself.
Although the OCA agreed with the investigating judge that the
evidence sufficiently proved that the vehicle was turned over to the
PNP of Kabacan where it got lost, it noted that respondent failed to
ask prior authority from the trial court to transfer its custody. Only
when respondent was having problems with Pentecostes did he
bring the matter to the attention of the executive judge, the OCA
added.
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent be reminded to
secure prior authority from the court before evidence is turned over
to any authorized government office or agency and that he be
warned to be more careful to prevent any similar incident from
arising in the future.
The finding of the OCA insofar as respondent’s lack of authority to
transfer the motorcycle is well taken, on account of which
respondent is administratively liable for simple misconduct.
It is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all records, papers,
files, exhibits and public property committed to his charge.12 Section
D (4), Chapter VII of the 1991 Manual For Clerks of Court (now
Section E[2], paragraph 2.2.3, Chapter VI of the 2002 Revised
Manual for Clerks of Court) provides:
All exhibits used as evidence and turned over to the court and before
the case/s involving such evidence shall have been terminated shall
be under the custody and safekeeping of the Clerk of Court. 13
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
Similarly, Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, provides:
SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. — The clerk shall safely keep all
record, papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his
charge, including the library of the court, and the seals and furniture
belonging to his office.
From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the
RTC, Kabacan, respondent was charged with the custody and
safekeeping of Pentecostes’ motorcycle, and to keep it until the
termination of the case, barring circumstances that would justify its
safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior authority of the trial court.
No explanation was offered by respondent, however, for turning over
the motorcycle. But whatever the reason was, respondent was
mandated to secure prior consultations with and approval of the trial
court.
Moreover disconcerting is the fact that the acknowledgment receipt
evidencing the turnover of the motorcycle from the trial court to the
Kabacan police station was lost from the records of Criminal Case
No. 1010,13 with nary a lead as to who was responsible for it. This
circumstance is viewed with disfavor as it reflects badly on the
safekeeping of court records, a duty entrusted to respondent as clerk
of court.
With regard to the condition of the vehicle upon its delivery to
respondent, the evidence indicates that it was still serviceable when
it was delivered by the M’lang police to respondent and at the time it
was turned over by respondent to the Kabacan police station. The
Joint Affidavit14 of SPO2 Guadalupe and Police Inspector Romeo
Banaybanay categorically stated that the motorcycle was in "good
running condition" when they delivered it to respondent. Later during
his testimony, Guadalupe narrated that he was the "the driver of the
service jeep while Chief Banaybanay was on board the motorcycle"
when the vehicle was turned over to respondent on August 1,
1995.15
Even respondent’s following testimony that:
"x x x when x x x [he] received the motorcycle for safekeeping, he
immediately delivered together with Alex Pedroso [sic] because it
could be noted that respondent do[es] not know how to drive a
motorcycle, I requested x x x Alex Pedroso to accompany me and
deliver [it] to [the] chief of police of Kabacan"16 (Italics supplied)
suggests that the vehicle was in running condition when respondent
took and subsequently transferred its custody to the Kabacan police.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are
essential and ranking officers of our judicial system who perform
delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of
justice.17 Their duties include the efficient recording, filing and
management of court records and, as previously pointed out, the
safekeeping of exhibits and public property committed to their
charge.
Clearly, they play a key role in the complement of the court and
cannot be permitted to slacken on their jobs under one pretext or
another.18 They cannot err without affecting the integrity of the court
or the efficient administration of justice.19
The same responsibility bears upon all court personnel in view of
their exalted positions as keepers of public faith.20The exacting
standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court employees are
reflective of the premium placed on the image of the court of justice,
and that image is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of court personnel.21 It becomes the imperative and
sacred duty of everyone charged with the dispensation of justice,
from the judge to the lowliest clerk, to maintain the courts’ good
name and standing as true temples of justice.22
By transferring Pentecostes’ motorcycle without authority,
respondent failed to give premium to his avowed duty of keeping it
under his care and possession. He must, therefore, suffer the
consequences of his act or omission, which is akin to misconduct.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of
action; more particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public
officer.23 The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence.
Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple, as in this case.
The Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1999) classifies
simple misconduct as a less grave offense, punishable by
suspension of One Month and One Day to Six Months. Considering
that this is respondent’s first offense and no taint of bad faith has
been shown by his actuations, a 15-day suspension without pay is
deemed appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Clerk of Court Hermenegildo
Marasigan, is found guilty of Simple Misconduct. He
is SUSPENDED for 15 days without pay, with
stern WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 5095 November 28, 2007
FATHER RANHILIO C. AQUINO, LINA M. GARAN, ESTRELLA C.
LOZADA, POLICARPIO L. MABBORANG, DEXTER R. MUNAR,
MONICO U. TENEDRO, ANDY R. QUEBRAL, NESTOR T.
RIVERA, EDUARDO C. RICAMORA, ARTHUR G. IBAÑEZ,
AURELIO C. CALDEZ and DENU A. AGATEP, complainants, vs.
ATTY. EDWIN PASCUA, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3, 1999 of
Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then Academic Head of the Philippine
Judicial Academy, joined by Lina M. Garan and the other above-
named complainants, against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public in
Cagayan.
In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua
falsified two documents committed as follows:
(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint"
of one Joseph B. Acorda entering the same as "Doc. No. 1213, Page
No. 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998".
(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-
Complaint" of one Remigio B. Domingo entering the same as "Doc.
No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10,
1998.
Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999,
Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries appear in the
Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was
Document No. 1200 executed on December 28, 1998; and that,
therefore, he could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and
1214 on December 10, 1998.
In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999,
Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents on
December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in his Notarial
Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C.
Patli, whose affidavit was attached to his comment.
The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized documents were
filed by Atty. Pascua with the Civil Service Commission. Impleaded
as respondents therein were Lina M. Garan and the other above-
named complainants. They filed with this Court a "Motion to Join the
Complaint and Reply to Respondent's Comment." They maintain that
14
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
Atty. Pascua's omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear
case of falsification.1 On November 16, 1999, we granted their
motion.2
Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
for investigation, report and recommendation.
On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its Report
and Recommendation partly reproduced as follows:
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. For this reason, notaries public must observe the utmost care
to comply with the formalities and the basic requirement in the
performance of their duties (Realino v. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318).
Under the notarial law, "the notary public shall enter in such register,
in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed,
sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing,
swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary
shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and
a shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register
on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between
entries" (Sec. 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised
Administrative Code).
Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his
notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required by
law is a ground for revocation of his commission (Sec. 249, Article
VI).
In the instant case, there is no question that the subject documents
allegedly notarized by Atty. Pascua were not recorded in his notarial
register.
Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to
oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot
escape liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the
documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his
part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff.
The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from
true.
The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry which
he notarized on December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200 on Page
240. On the other hand, the two affidavit-complaints allegedly
notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and
1214, respectively, under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio
and the other complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining that
Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned
affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a
Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.
This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of the claim
of inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the affidavit of his own secretary
which is hardly credible since the latter cannot be considered a
disinterested witness or party.
Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of Acorda
(Doc. No. 1213) was submitted only when Domingo's affidavit (Doc.
No. 1214) was withdrawn in the administrative case filed by Atty.
Pascua against Lina Garan, et al. with the CSC. This circumstance
lends credence to the submission of herein complainants that Atty.
Pascua ante-dated another affidavit-complaint making it appear as
notarized on December 10, 1998 and entered as Document No.
1213. It may not be sheer coincidence then that both documents are
dated December 10, 1998 and numbered as 1213 and 1214.
A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act
which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed
by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
profession (Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 409).
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Pascua is
mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to his
office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with
public interest.
A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any
misconduct in his professional or private capacity. The Court
has invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public who were found
guilty of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of their
duties.
In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent lawyer was
suspended from his Commission as Notary Public for a period of one
year for notarizing a document without affiants appearing before him,
and for notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the
signatories. The Court held that respondent lawyer failed to exercise
due diligence in upholding his duties as a notary public.
In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248), respondent lawyer who certified
under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the
vendors were dead was suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months, with a warning that another infraction would
be dealt with more severely. In said case, the Court did not impose
the supreme penalty of disbarment, it being the respondent's first
offense.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA 409), respondent lawyer was
disbarred from the practice of law, after being found guilty of
notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. The Court considered
the seriousness of the offense and his previous misconduct for
which he was suspended for six months from the practice of law.
It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a
suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
may be considered enough penalty for him as a lawyer. Considering
that his offense is also a ground for revocation of notarial
commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended
that the notarial commission of Atty. EDWIN V. PASCUA, if still
existing, be REVOKED and that he be SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months."3
After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt
the findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar
Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct in the
performance of his duties for failing to register in his Notarial
Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio
B. Domingo.
"Misconduct" generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful
conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional
purpose.4 The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption
or criminal intent.5
The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by
a lawyer is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. In Arrieta
v. Llosa,6 wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute
Sale knowing that some of the vendors were already dead, this
Court held that such wrongful act "constitutes misconduct" and thus
imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for six months, this being his first administrative offense. Also,
in Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,7 we revoked the notarial commission
of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law
for six months for violating the Notarial Law in not registering in his
notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized. In Mondejar v.
Rubia,8 however, a lesser penalty of one month suspension from the
practice of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubia for making a
false declaration in the document she notarized.
In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua's first
offense, we believe that the imposition of a three-month suspension
15
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his
offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the same
should also be imposed upon him.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of
misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
(3) months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial
commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED. SO
ORDERED.
JBC No. 013 August 22, 2007
Re: Non-disclosure Before the Judicial and Bar Council of the
Administrative Case Filed Against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, in
His Capacity as the then Asst. Regional Director of the National
Police Commission, Regional Office XI, Davao City.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City on May 17,
2003.1 Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) received confidential information that administrative and
criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as
then Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM), Regional Office 11, Davao City, as a result of which
he was dismissed from the service per Administrative Order (A.O.)
No. 183 dated April 10, 1995.
In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)2 submitted to the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) on November 26, 2001, Judge Quitain declared that
there were five criminal cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439,
22812, 22813, and 22814) filed against him before the
Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No administrative case
was disclosed by Judge Qutain in his PDS.
To confirm the veracity of the information, then Deputy Court
Administrator (DCA) Christopher O. Lock (now Court Administrator)
requested from the Sandiganbayan certified copies of the Order(s)
dismissing the criminal cases.3On even date, letters4 were sent to
the NAPOLCOM requesting for certified true copies of documents
relative to the administrative complaints filed against Judge Quitain,
particularly A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 dismissing him from
the service. Likewise, DCA Lock required Judge Quitain to explain
the alleged misrepresentation and deception he committed before
the JBC.5
In a letter6 dated November 28, 2003, the NAPOLCOM furnished the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a copy of A.O. No. 183
showing that respondent Judge was indeed dismissed from the
service for Grave Misconduct for falsifying or altering the amounts
reflected in disbursement vouchers in support of his claim for
reimbursement of expenses. A.O. 183 partly reads:
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 183
DISMISSING FROM THE SERVICE ASSISTANT REGIONAL
DIRECTOR JAIME VEGA QUITAIN, NATIONAL POLICE
COMMISSION, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 11
This refers to the administrative complaint against Jaime Vega
Quitain, Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM), Regional Office No. 11, Davao City, for Grave
Misconduct (Violation of Art. 48, in relation to Arts. 171 and 217 of
the Revised Penal Code and Art. IX of the Civil Service Law) filed by
the NAPOLCOM.
xxxx
After circumspect study, I am in complete accord with the above
findings and recommendation of the NAPOLCOM.
It was established that the falsification could not have been
consummated without respondent’s direct participation, as it was
upon his direction and approval that disbursement vouchers were
prepared showing the falsified amount. The subsequent
endorsement and encashment of the check by respondent only
shows his complete disregard for the truth which per se constitutes
misconduct and dishonesty of the highest order. By any standard,
respondent had manifestly shown that he is unfit to discharge the
functions of his office. Needless to stress, a public office is a position
of trust and public service demands of every government official or
employee, no matter how lowly his position may be, the highest
degree of responsibility and integrity and he must remain
accountable to the people. Moreover, his failure to adduce evidence
in support of his defense is a tacit admission of his guilt. Let this be a
final reminder to him that the government is serious enough to [weed
out] misfits in the government service, and it will not be irresolute to
impose the severest sanction regardless of personalities involved.
Accordingly, respondent’s continuance in office becomes untenable.
WHEREFORE, and as recommended by the NAPOLCOM, Assistant
Regional Director Jaime Vega Quitain is hereby DISMISSED from
the service, with forfeiture of pay and benefits, effective upon receipt
of a copy hereof.
Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of April in the year of our
Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-five.
(Sgd. by President Fidel V. Ramos)
By the President:
(Sgd.)
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.
Executive Secretary7
In a letter8 dated October 22, 2003 addressed to DCA Lock, Judge
Quitain denied having committed any misrepresentation before the
JBC. He alleged that during his interview, the members thereof only
inquired about the status of the criminal cases filed by the
NAPOLCOM before the Sandiganbayan, and not about the
administrative case simultaneously filed against him. He also alleged
that he never received from the Office of the President an official
copy of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from the service.
Thereafter, DCA Lock directed Judge Quitain to explain within ten
(10) days from notice why he did not include in his PDS, which was
sworn to before a notary public on November 22, 2001, the
administrative case filed against him, and the fact of his dismissal
from the service.9
In his letters10 dated March 13, 2004 and June 17, 2004, respondent
explained that during the investigation of his administrative case by
the NAPOLCOM Ad Hoc Committee, one of its members suggested
to him that if he resigns from the government service, he will no
longer be prosecuted; that following such suggestion, he tendered
his irrevocable resignation from NAPOLCOM on June 1,
199311 which was immediately accepted by the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Governments; that he did not
disclose the case in his PDS because he was of the "honest belief"
that he had no more pending administrative case by reason of his
resignation; that his resignation "amounted to an automatic
dismissal" of his administrative case considering that "the issues
raised therein became moot and academic"; and that had he known
that he would be dismissed from the service, he should not have
applied for the position of a judge since he knew he would never be
appointed.
Finding reasonable ground to hold him administratively liable, then
Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a member of this
Court) and then DCA Lock submitted a Memorandum12 dated
16
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
September 3, 2004 to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which
states:
In order that this Office may thoroughly and properly evaluate the
matter, we deemed it necessary to go over the records of the subject
administrative case against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, particularly the
matter that pertains to Administrative Order No. 183 dated 10 April
1995. On 15 May 2004, we examined the records of said
administrative case on file with the NAPOLCOM, Legal Affairs
Service, and secured certified [true] copies of pertinent documents.
After careful perusal of the documents and records available,
including the letters-explanations of Judge Jaime V. Quitain, this
Office finds that there are reasonable grounds to hold him
administratively liable.
An examination of the Personal Data Sheet submitted by Judge
Quitain with the Judicial and Bar Council, which was subscribed and
sworn to before Notary Public Bibiano M. Bustamante of Davao City
on 22 November 2001, reveals that he concealed material facts and
even committed perjury in having answered "yes" to Question No.
24, but without disclosing the fact that he was dismissed from the
government service. Question No. 24 and his answer thereto are
hereunder quoted as follows:
24. Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or otherwise
imposed a sanction for the violation of any law, decree, ordinance or
regulation by any court, tribunal or any other government office,
agency or instrumentality in the Philippines or in any foreign country
or found guilty of an administrative offense or imposed any
administrative sanction? [ / ] Yes [ ] No. If your answer is "Yes" to
any of the questions, give particulars.
But all dismissed (acquitted)
Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439
Date of [Dismissal] – August 2, 1995
Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 22812, 22813, 22814
Date of [Dismissal] – July 17, 2000
As borne out by the records, Judge Quitain deliberately did not
disclose the fact that he was dismissed from the government
service. At the time he filled up and submitted his Personal Data
Sheet with the Judicial and Bar Council, he had full knowledge of the
subject administrative case, as well as Administrative Order No. 183
dismissing him from the government service. Based on the certified
documents secured from the Office of the NAPOLCOM, the following
data were gathered:
1. In compliance with the "Summons" dated 19 March 1993, signed
by Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman, Ad Hoc
Committee of the NAPOLCOM, Judge Jaime V. Quitain, through
Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, filed his Answer (dated 29 March 1993) to the
administrative complaint lodged against him by the Napolcom;
2. On 30 March 1993, Judge Quitain received a copy of the "Notice
of Hearing" of even date, signed by Mr. Canonizado, in connection
with the formal hearing of the subject administrative case scheduled
on 30 April 1993;
3. Administrative Order No. 183, dismissing Judge Quitain from the
service, was dated 10 April 1995. On 18 April 1995, newspaper
items relative to the dismissal of Judge Quitain were separately
published in the Mindanao Daily Mirror and in the Mindanao Times,
the contents of which read as follows:
Mindanao Times:
Dismissed NAPOLCOM chief airs appeal
Former National Police Commission (Napolcom) acting regional
director Jaime Quitain yesterday appealed for understanding to
those allegedly behind his ouster from his post two years ago.
Quitain, who was one of the guests in yesterday’s Kapehan sa
Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he read his prepared statement on his
dismissal from government service.
Quitain claimed that after Secretary Luis Santos resigned from the
Department of Interior and Local Governments in 1991, a series of
administrative charges were hurled against him by some regional
employees.
"I was dismissed from the Napolcom Office without due process,"
Quitain said.
He also said he had no idea as to who the people (sic) are behind
the alleged smear campaign leveled against him.
"Whoever is behind all this, I have long forgiven you. My only appeal
to you, give me my day in court, give me the chance to clear my
name, the only legacy that I can leave to my children," Quitain said
in his statement.
"It is my constitutional right to be present in all proceedings of the
administrative case," he also said.
Quitain was appointed Assistant Regional Director of Napolcom in
1991 by then President Corazon Aquino upon the recommendation
of Secretary Santos. He was later designated Napolcom acting
regional director for Region XI.
Mindanao Daily Mirror:
Quitain vows to clear name
Former assistant regional director Jaime Quitain of the National
Police Commission (Napolcom) vowed yesterday to clear his name
in court from charges of tampering with an official receipt.
Quitain[,] who is running for a council seat, expressed confidence
that he would soon be vindicated in court against the group that
plotted his ouster from office: He said his only appeal was for Interior
and Local Government Secretary Rafael Alunan to grant him his day
in court to answer the charges.
"Whoever was behind all of these things, I have long forgiven them,"
Quitain said.
"Just give me the chance to clear my name because this is the only
legacy that I can give my children," Quitain said.
While the records of the subject administrative case on file with the
NAPOLCOM Office does not bear proof of receipt of Administrative
Order No. 183 by Judge Quitain, the same does not necessarily
mean that he is totally unaware of said Administrative Order. As
shown by the above-quoted newspaper clippings, Judge Quitain
even aired his appeal and protest to said Administrative Order.
xxxx
Judge Quitain asseverated that he should not have applied with the
JBC had he known that he was administratively charged and was
consequently dismissed from the service since he will not be
considered. But this may be the reason why he deliberately
concealed said fact. His claim that he did not declare the
administrative case in his Personal Data Sheet because of his
honest belief that there is no administrative or criminal case that
would be filed against him by reason of his resignation and the
assurance made by the NAPOLCOM that no administrative case will
be filed, does not hold water. It is rather absurd for him to state that
his resignation from the NAPOLCOM amounts to an automatic
dismissal of whatever administrative case filed against him because
when he resigned and relinquished his position, the issues raised
therein became moot and academic. He claims that he did not
bother to follow up the formal dismissal of the administrative case
because of said belief. All these are but futile attempts to exonerate
himself from administrative culpability in concealing facts relevant
and material to his application in the Judiciary. As a member of the
Bar, he should know that his resignation from the NAPOLCOM
would not obliterate any administrative liability he may have
incurred[,] much less, would it result to the automatic dismissal 17
of the
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
administrative case filed against him. The acceptance of his
resignation is definitely without prejudice to the continuation of the
administrative case filed against him. If such would be the case,
anyone charged administratively could easily escape from
administrative sanctions by the simple expedient of resigning from
the service. Had it been true that Judge Quitain honestly believes
that his resignation amounts to the automatic dismissal of his
administrative case, the least he could have done was to personally
verify the status thereof. He should not have relied on the alleged
assurance made by the NAPOLCOM.
On the strength of his misrepresentation, Judge Quitain misled the
Judicial and Bar Council by making it appear that he had a clean
record and was qualified to join the Judiciary. His prior dismissal
from the government service is a blot on his record, which has gone
[worse] and has spread even more because of his concealment of it.
Had he not concealed said vital fact, it could have been taken into
consideration when the Council acted on his application. His act of
dishonesty renders him unfit to join the Judiciary, much less remain
sitting as a judge. It even appears that he was dismissed by the
NAPOLCOM for misconduct and dishonesty.
Thus, the OCA recommended that: (1) the instant administrative
case against respondent be docketed as an administrative matter;
and (2) that he be dismissed from the service with prejudice to his
reappointment to any position in the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of
all retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.
Respondent was required to Comment.13
In compliance with the Court’s Resolution respondent filed his
Comment14 contending that before he filed his application for RTC
Judge with the JBC, he had no knowledge that he was
administratively dismissed from the NAPOLCOM service as the case
was "secretly heard and decided." He averred that:
1. Being a religious lay head and eventually the Pastoral Head of the
Redemptorist Eucharistic Lay Ministry in Davao City and the
surrounding provinces, he was recruited as one of the political
followers of then Mayor Luis T. Santos of Davao City, who later
became the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) and was instrumental in his appointment as
Assistant Regional Director of the National Police Commission,
Region XI;
2. After Secretary Luis T. Santos was replaced as DILG Secretary,
the political followers of his successor, who were the same followers
involved in the chain of corruption prevalent in their department,
began quietly pressing for his (Quitain) resignation as Assistant
Regional Director;
3. Finding difficulty in attacking his honesty and personal integrity,
his detractors went to the extent of filing criminal charges against
him;
4. Before these criminal charges were scheduled for trial, he was
being convinced to resign in exchange for the dismissal of said
criminal charges, but when he refused to do so, he was unjustifiably
detailed or "exiled" at the DILG central office in Manila;
5. Upon his "exile" in Manila for several months, he realized that
even his immediate superiors cooperated with his detractors in
instigating for his removal. Hence, upon advice of his relatives,
friends and the heads of their pastoral congregation, he resigned
from his position in NAPOLCOM on condition that all pending cases
filed against him, consisting of criminal cases only, shall be
dismissed, as in fact they were dismissed;
6. From then on he was never formally aware of any administrative
case filed against him. Hence, when he submitted his Personal Data
Sheet before the Judicial and Bar Council in support of his
application as RTC judge, he made the following answer in Question
No. 23:
23. Is there any pending civil, criminal, or administrative (including
disbarment) case or complaint filed against you pending before any
court, prosecution office, any other office, agency or instrumentality
of the government, or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines?
He could only give a negative answer since there was no pending
administrative case filed against him that he knows;
7. Had he known that there was an administrative case filed against
him he would have desisted from applying as a judge and would
have given his full attention to the said administrative case, if only to
avoid ensuing embarrassment; and
8. The filing of the administrative case against him as well as the
proceedings had thereon and the decision rendered therein, without
his knowledge, could have probably occurred during his "exile
period" when he was detailed indefinitely in Manila. The proceedings
had in the said administrative case are null and void since he was
denied due process.
Respondent’s Comment was submitted to the OCA for evaluation,
report and recommendation.15
OCA submitted its Memorandum16 dated August 11, 2005 stating
therein that it was adopting its earlier findings contained in its
Memorandum dated September 3, 2004. Based on the documents
presented, it can not be denied that at the time Judge Quitain
applied as an RTC judge, he had full knowledge of A.O. No. 183
dismissing him from government service. Considering that Judge
Quitain’s explanations in his Comment are but mere reiterations of
his allegations in the previous letters to the OCA, the OCA
maintained its recommendation that Judge Quitain be dismissed
from the service with prejudice to his reappointment to any position
in the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits.
The Court fully agrees with the disquisition and the recommendation
of the OCA.
It behooves every prospective appointee to the Judiciary to apprise
the appointing authority of every matter bearing on his fitness for
judicial office, including such circumstances as may reflect on his
integrity and probity. These are qualifications specifically required of
appointees to the Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article VIII of the
Constitution.17
In this case, Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was
administratively charged and dismissed from the service for grave
misconduct per A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 by no less than
the former President of the Philippines. He insists that on November
26, 2001 or before he filed with the JBC his verified PDS in support
of his application for RTC Judge, he had no knowledge of A.O. No.
183; and that he was denied due process. He further argues that
since all the criminal cases filed against him were dismissed on
August 2, 1995 and July 17, 2000, and considering the fact that he
resigned from office, his administrative case had become moot and
academic.
Respondent’s contentions utterly lack merit.
No amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact that
Judge Quitain was dismissed from the service and that he
deliberately withheld this information. His insistence that he had no
knowledge of A.O. No. 183 is belied by the newspaper items
published relative to his dismissal. It bears emphasis that in the
Mindanao Times dated April 18, 1995,18 Judge Quitain stated in one
of his interviews that "I was dismissed from the (Napolcom) office
without due process." It also reads: "Quitain, who was one of the
guests in yesterday’s Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept unabashedly as 18 he
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
read his prepared statement on his dismissal from the government
service." Neither can we give credence to the contention that he was
denied due process. The documents submitted by the NAPOLCOM
to the OCA reveal that Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado,
Chairman Ad Hoc Committee, sent him summons on March 19,
1993 informing him that an administrative complaint had been filed
against him and required him to file an answer.19 Then on March 29,
1993, respondent, through his counsel, Atty. Pedro Castillo, filed an
Answer.20 In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process
is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain
one’s side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. Where opportunity to be heard either through
oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial
of due process.21Furthermore, as we have earlier mentioned and
which Judge Quitain ought to know, cessation from office by his
resignation does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative
complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does
it render said administrative case moot and academic.22 Judge
Quitain was removed from office after investigation and was found
guilty of grave misconduct. His dismissal from the service is a clear
proof of his lack of the required qualifications to be a member of the
Bench.
More importantly, it is clear that Judge Quitain deliberately misled
the JBC in his bid to gain an exalted position in the Judiciary. In
Office of the Court Administrator v. Estacion, Jr.,23 this Court
stressed:
x x x The important consideration is that he had a duty to inform the
appointing authority and this Court of the pending criminal charges
against him to enable them to determine on the basis of his record,
eligibility for the position he was seeking. He did not discharge that
duty. His record did not contain the important information in question
because he deliberately withheld and thus effectively hid it. His lack
of candor is as obvious as his reason for the suppression of such a
vital fact, which he knew would have been taken into account
against him if it had been disclosed."
Thus, we find respondent guilty of dishonesty. "Dishonesty" means
"disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity." 24
Section 8(2), Rule 14025 of the Rules of Court classifies dishonesty
as a serious charge. Section 11, same Rules, provides the following
sanctions:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. – A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious
charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits
as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement
or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of not less than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In Re: Inquiry on the Appointment of Judge Enrique A. Cube,26 we
held:
By his concealment of his previous dismissal from the public service,
which the Judicial and Bar Council would have taken into
consideration in acting on his application, Judge Cube committed an
act of dishonesty that rendered him unfit to be appointed to, and to
remain now in, the Judiciary he has tarnished with his falsehood.
WHEREFORE, Judge Enrique A. Cube of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila is DISMISSED with prejudice to his reappointment to
any position in the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits.
This decision is immediately executory.
We cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the
part of all those who are in the service of the Judiciary.27 We have
often stressed that the conduct required of court personnel, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk of court, must always be beyond
reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility
as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the Judiciary.
We condemn, and will never countenance any conduct, act or
omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of
justice, which would violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the
Judiciary.28lavvphil
Considering the foregoing, Judge Quitain is hereby found guilty of
grave misconduct. He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal.
However, on August 9, 2007, the Court received a letter from Judge
Quitain addressed to the Chief Justice stating that he is tendering his
irrevocable resignation effective immediately as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Davao City. Acting on said
letter, "the Court Resolved to accept the irrevocable resignation of
Judge Jaime V. Quitain effective August 15, 2007, without prejudice
to the decision of the administrative case."29
Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the
Court without prejudice does not render moot and academic the
instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the
time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the
mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation and its
consequent acceptance – without prejudice – by this Court, has
ceased to be in office during the pendency of this case. The Court
retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official innocent or
guilty of the charges against him. A contrary rule would be fraught
with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications.30 Indeed, if innocent, the respondent official merits
vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government
which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to
receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and
imposable under the situation.31
WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V.
QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct which would have warranted
his dismissal from the service had he not resigned during the
pendency of this case, he is hereby meted the penalty of a fine of
₱40,000.00. It appearing that he has yet to apply for his retirement
benefits and other privileges, if any, the Court likewise ORDERS the
FORFEITURE of all benefits, except earned leave credits which
Judge Quitain may be entitled to, and he is PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement and appointment to any branch,
instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-
owned and/or controlled corporations.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Judge Jaime V. Quitain’s
201 File.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1831 February 2, 2007
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, (Formerly OCA
IPI No. 99-796-RTJ) Petitioner,
-versus-
HON. VICENTE A. PACQUING, Presiding Judge, Branch 28 and
MARIO ANACLETO M. BAEZ, JR., Clerk of Court, RTC, San
Fernando City, La Union,Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------
---x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.
19
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
In 1971, Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (Bengson)
borrowed P4,250,000 from petitioner Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), secured by real estate and chattel mortgages. When
Bengson defaulted in the payment of the amortizations, petitioner
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties and sold them at
public auction where it emerged as the highest bidder.
In 1977, Bengson filed an action in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
San Fernando, La Union, Branch 26[1] to annul the extrajudicial
foreclosure. The trial court, through Judge Antonio Fineza, declared
the foreclosure void and directed petitioner to restore to Bengson the
foreclosed properties, pay damages and costs of suit.
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The
CA affirmed with modification the trial courts decision and remanded
the case for reception of evidence on the costs of suit and
determination of the replacement value of the properties should
petitioner fail to return them. The CA decision became final and
executory on February 10, 1988.
When petitioner failed to return the foreclosed properties, the new
presiding judge of Branch 26, respondent Judge Vicente A.
Pacquing, ordered it to pay Bengson the equivalent value of the
foreclosed properties. Thereafter, Bengson moved that it be
permitted to present evidence on the costs of suit. On April 6, 1995,
the trial court directed petitioner to pay Bengson P31 million as costs
of suit. This order became final on April 24, 1995.
Petitioner filed an urgent omnibus motion with the court a quo stating
that its counsel, Atty. Rogelio Terrado, went on AWOL and never
informed it of respondent judges order.[2] This motion, treated as
petition for relief from judgment by respondent judge, was dismissed
on January 16, 1997.[3]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) but respondent
judge denied the same on April 23, 1998.
Petitioner then instituted a special civil action for certiorari in the CA
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47669[4] assailing the court a quos
denial of its petition for relief from judgment. The CA, however,
dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 47669 for having been filed out of time
as three years had elapsed since the order awarding Bengson P31
million as costs of suit became final and executory.[5]
Petitioner filed an MR of the above decision and, while it was
pending resolution at the CA, respondent judge, on December 16,
1998, issued an alias writ of execution ordering petitioner to pay
Bengson the P31 million.[6] Pursuant thereto, respondent Atty. Mario
Anacleto M. Baez, acting as sheriff of Branch 26, executed the writ
and levied on petitioners shares of stock in San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) worth P6.2 million. The garnished shares were later sold at
public auction with Bengson as the only bidder.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved to quash the writ on the ground that its
funds and properties were exempt from garnishment, levy and
execution under Section 39 of RA 8291.[7] Respondent judge denied
the motion stating that only funds and properties that were
necessary to maintain petitioners actuarial solvency, like
contributions of GSIS members, were exempt from garnishment,
levy and execution under RA 8291.[8]
Petitioner filed its MR of the trial courts denial of its motion to quash
the writ but this was rejected as well.
Via a special civil action for certiorari with an urgent motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order
(TRO), petitioner came to us questioning the garnishment and sale
on execution of its SMC shares. The petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 136874.[9]
We referred G.R. No. 136874 to the CA for consideration and
adjudication on the merits. In the CA, it was re-docketed as CA-G.R.
SP. No. 51131 and was consolidated with CA-G.R. SP. No.
47669.[10]
Later, the CA dismissed both petitions.[11]
Petitioner questioned the CAs dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 47669
via a petition for review in this Court docketed as G.R. No.
137448,[12] the ultimate issue of which was the existence of grounds
for relief from the P31 million costs of suit judgment by respondent
judge.
Later, petitioner filed another case, a special civil action for certiorari
in this Court, this time contesting the CAs dismissal of its petition in
CA-G.R. No. 51131. Docketed as G.R. No. 141454,[13] the petition
ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA for
upholding the trial courts issuance of the alias writ of execution and
the subsequent garnishment and sale of its shares in SMC.
Petitioner also filed this administrative complaint [14] against
respondents for ignorance of the law, bias and partiality, and for
violation of RA 8291. In its complaint, petitioner alleged:
In fine, [respondent judge] refused to take cognizance of [Section 39,
RA 8291]. He refused to await an authoritative and definitive
resolution of the issues [on the exemption of GSISs funds and
properties] from execution or the issue of whether GSIS is entitled to
a relief from judgment of his [P]31 million peso cost[s] of suit. [H]e
was in a hurry, as Bengson, to execute the P31 million costs of
suit[O]n the other hand, Sheriff Mario Anacleto M. Baez, seemed to
have the same objective when he refused to take heed of [GSISs
request] to hold in abeyance the execution sale on the basis of
Section 39 (RA 8291).
The foregoing only shows [respondent judges] deliberate disregard
of the express provisions of [RA 8291], specifically Section 39and
his bias, given his exorbitant award for cost[s] of suit, bereft, as it is,
of any legal basis. It evidently reveals a malicious scheme that
seriously undermines the very integrity and impartiality of his court.
The same can be said of the acts of Sheriff Baez in garnishing and
selling [GSISs shares of stock in SMC] to Bengson, characterized by
an unusual swiftness and in clear disregard of the express provision
of Section 39, RA 8291[15]
We referred the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) for investigation, report and recommendation. In its
report[16] to the Court, the OCA found nothing in the records to
support petitioners accusations against both respondents. According
to the OCA, even assuming that respondent judge erred in
interpreting RA 8291, such error did not constitute gross ignorance
of the law. It added that the records also failed to prove malice,
20
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
fraud, dishonesty or bad faith on the part of respondent judge in
issuing the assailed alias writ of execution.
On petitioners allegations against respondent Atty. Baez, the OCA
likewise found no reason to hold him liable for failing to defer the
execution of the writ.
The OCA then recommended the dismissal of petitioners complaint
against respondents.[17]
On petitioners motion, we referred the case to the CA for further
investigation. It was assigned to Associate Justice Roberto A.
Barrios, who acted as investigating officer. Before a hearing on the
case could be conducted, respondent judge died.[18] The hearing
proceeded but we withheld his benefits pending the completion of
the investigation of his case by Justice Barrios.
Subsequently, Justice Barrios submitted his report[19] to us agreeing
with OCAs findings that petitioners complaint against respondents
was unfounded. According to Justice Barrios:
Assuming for the nonce that [respondent judge] erred in issuing the
Order of 16 December 1998 without awaiting the resolution of
[petitioners motion for reconsideration], and in holding that [its]
properties are not exempt from execution, these would not be errors
that are gross and patent, or done maliciously, deliberately or in
evident bad faith. [Petitioner] has not presented proof to the contrary,
which with the factual milieu would call for administrative sanctions
against [respondent judge]. As a matter of public policy, the acts of
the judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action,
even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and absence of
malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient
defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of [the] law can
find refuge.[20]
He added that the filing of the administrative charges against
respondents was premature because this Court at that time had yet
to decide G.R. No. 137448 and G.R. No. 141454. He thus
recommended the dismissal of the administrative charges against
respondents.
On January 31, 2002,[21] we handed down our decision in the above
cases nullifying the CAs resolutions dismissing G.R. Nos.
51131[22] and 47669.[23] In the same decision, we set aside
respondent judges January 16, 1997 order dismissing petitioners
petition for relief from judgment and his April 23, 1998 order denying
the MR.[24]
Notwithstanding the nullification of respondent judges orders, we are
adopting the findings and recommendations of the OCA and Justice
Barrios.
For a judge to be administratively liable for ignorance of the law, the
acts complained of must be gross or patent.[25] To constitute gross
ignorance of the law, such acts must not only be contrary to existing
law and jurisprudence but also motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice
or dishonesty.[26] That certainly does not appear to be the case here
as petitioners complaint was spawned merely by the honest
divergence of opinion between petitioner and respondent judge as to
the legal issues and applicable laws involved.[27] Petitioner also
proffered no evidence that respondent judges acts were imbued with
malice or bad faith.
In the same vein, we hold that respondent judge was neither biased
nor partial against petitioner when he issued the alias writ of
execution. Petitioners assertion that respondent judge precipitately
issued the alias writ is not supported by the records. On the contrary,
the records indicate that the writ was issued more than three years
from the finality of the order directing petitioner to pay Bengson P31
million as costs of suit. Its issuance was not all tainted with undue
haste. In the exercise of his judicial discretion, respondent judge
believed that the issuance of the alias writ had become forthwith a
matter of right following the finality of said order. The rule is that
once a judgment becomes final, the winning party is entitled to a writ
of execution and the issuance thereof becomes a courts ministerial
duty.[28]
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that respondent judge erred in issuing
the alias writ, his act would still not merit administrative sanction
absent malice or bad faith.[29] Bad faith does not simply connote poor
or flawed judgment; it imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity
or conscious doing of a wrong.
Furthermore, for allegations of bias and partiality to stand, petitioner
should have demonstrated that respondent judges decisions and
orders came from extrajudicial sources or from some bases other
than what he had learned from his study of the case.[30] Decisions
formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although they appear
erroneous, are not necessarily partial as long as they are culled from
the arguments and evidence of the parties.[31] The party who alleges
partiality must prove it with clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner
failed in that aspect.
Interestingly, this Court, in our decision in G.R. Nos. 137448 and
141454, nullified the orders of respondent judge only to give
petitioner another chance to seek redress from the gross negligence
and mistake of its then counsel, Atty. Terrado. We did not at all
declare respondent judges orders as erroneous or tainted with
malice or bad faith. In our decision, we said:
It is readily apparent that part of [petitioners] predicament stemmed
from the negligence or mistake, to put it mildly, of its former
counsels.
Indeed, it is undisputed that despite ample opportunity, [petitioners]
counsel, Atty. Rogelio Terrado, did not rebut BENGSONs evidence
on the costs of suit or, at the very least, verify the schedule of costs
and cross-examine BENGSONs witnesses. Much worse, he allowed
the 6 April 1995 Order awarding BENGSON P31 million costs of suit
to attain finality by not filing a motion for reconsideration with the trial
court or a petition with the Court of Appeals. Instead, he went AWOL
without informing petitioner of the said Order. These acts constituted
gross negligence, if not fraud, and resulted in the deprivation of
petitioner of an opportunity to move to reconsider or appeal the
adverse order.
[A]s a general rule, the negligence or mistake of a counsel binds the
client for otherwise there would be never be no end to a suit so long
as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that
the former counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or
learned. But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts
its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance
and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions
thereto and prevent miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court
21
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the
rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.
Moreover, the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper
remedy for correcting the actions of a judge perceived to have gone
beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient remedy
exists.[32] The actions against judges should not be considered as
complementary or suppletory to, or substitute for, the judicial
remedies which can be availed of by a party in a case.[33]
Regarding the accusations against respondent Atty. Baez, the Court
finds no basis to hold him liable for executing the assailed writ at that
time. Undeniably, the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the
execution of judgment.[34] Charged with this task, he must act with
considerable dispatch to administer justice. Otherwise, a judgment, if
not executed at once, would just be an empty victory on the part of
the prevailing party.[35] In executing the writ, Atty. Baez merely
carried out a ministerial duty. He had no discretion to implement the
writ or not.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for ignorance of the law, bias and
partiality, and violation of RA 8291 against the late Judge Vicente A.
Pacquing and Atty. Mario Anacleto M. Baez, is hereby DISMISSED.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Office of the Court
Administrator so that the benefits due the late respondent judge can
be promptly released to his heirs, unless there exists some other
lawful cause to withhold the same.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963
JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARISTON
OBLENA, respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959,
complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J.
Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly
committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon
requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all
the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred.
On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the
case with the recommendation that the respondent "be permanently
removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the
roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia
Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their house and went
down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she"
(complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house
the respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back.
Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with the other
hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced
her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help because he
threatened her and her family with death. He next undressed as she
lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he
removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his
fist to subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned
her not to report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he would kill
her and all the members of her family. She resumed ironing clothes
after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her
foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual
intercourse she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June
2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been
heard by the neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone
because of the threat made by the respondent; that she still
frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes
when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and
received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when
respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his
house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine
(pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the
complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that
after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil
Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the
office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the
administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34,
t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with
the complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their
clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster
parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him,
he limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her
tongue before she completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their
first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached
eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. The last
intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all,
they had sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house
and sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity. He
intended to marry her when she could legally contract marriage
without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit
... because we cannot ask permission to marry, for her foster parents
will object and even my common-law wife, will object.' After the
discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he
confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a
child, something she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25,
t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).
xxx xxx xxx
FINDINGS AND COMMENT
There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of
the complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him
under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the
undersigned are convinced that the sexual intercourse was
performed not once but repeatedly and with her consent. From her
behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have
been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving
her honor ....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned
cannot in conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The
respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not
long after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that
the spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence
shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of adulterous
relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia
Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then
17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a
child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave
abuse of confidence and by means of promises of marriage which
he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who
forsook her husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her.
He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. 22 From
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him
'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of
her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then),
it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him.
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent
filed a sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a
person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the
Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given
on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court
may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he
represented himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has
continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose
husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married woman
and that her marriage still subsists. This fact permanently
disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been
known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been
permitted to take the bar examinations that year or thereafter, or to
take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently
disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his
adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the
same misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent
disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one
for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment
from the office of a lawyer.
xxx xxx xxx
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due
hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from
his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if
respondent did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was
guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another
complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent
of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to
the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living
adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit
relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia,
thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and
unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this
Court render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the
respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his
name from the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the
special defense that "the complaint does not merit action", since the
causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from
the original cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the
necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of
Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for
additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court
Investigators to receive the additional evidence. Accordingly the
case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On
September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a
memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same
was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not
been proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed by the
respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was
committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for admission
to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to be a
member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation
of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his
common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met
respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23).
She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to
Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to
Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from
Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores
registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her
about her status she told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and
her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house,
respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she was
married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26).
She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and
respondent were already living together as 'husband and wife', in
1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when they
were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left
Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with
her because she and respondent 'had already a good
understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and
went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent
was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for
her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her
legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife,
named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to
Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n.
29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35);
in fact, she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report
of Court Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit
at a later date, which request was also granted. The affidavit was
filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others,
the following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the
complainant, because the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and
his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958,
when she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been
living with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20
years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had no intention
to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime
of adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was
shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he
found Briccia alone in his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia,
had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said date
(February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living
together as common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks
thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she
was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living
in Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was
a stranger in the place, nor could he urge her to join her sister
Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia
to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to
see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to
Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with
him again, telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore,
as he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's
husband (Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in fact he
(Arines) was already living with another woman; that he had 23 'no
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
choice but to live with her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his
petition to take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the
slightest intention to hide' from this Court the fact of his 'open
cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not
state said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of
the petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and that
since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good moral
character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he first
learned he was not so; and that he did not commit perjury or
fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar
examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8,
March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding
that: 1) Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take
advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he
did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any
criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality by
continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became
a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the
truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar
examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation
with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The
investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or
alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on
respondent, through his counsel of record, the case was set for
hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave
to file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted
and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had
sexual relations with the complainant several times, and as a
consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he
likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an
adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the
complainant Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation with
Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause
the respondent's disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment
notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his open
cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he
has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is
true that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction,
or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the
disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated
by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer
may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration
is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and
unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary
incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised
without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless
positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in
any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair
opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698,
citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule
that the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making
power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require
disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely
regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such
statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of the court over
attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for
other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States,
where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued
possession of a fair private and professional character or a good
moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in
the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss
requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not
specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for
which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in
either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417).
The tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the
conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the
rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any
misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at
bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His
pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth
birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as
not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared — and that he
limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her
tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his
knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the
complainant was the niece of his common-law wife and that he
enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her
uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of
his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis
(Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle),
undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother.
Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her
inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to
see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission
of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to
be a person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if
the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by
these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity
expected of a member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may
constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we
have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where
this Court quoted with approval the following portion of the decision
of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12
Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between
attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the
statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly
require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that
qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter
upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential
during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way
directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him
unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give
sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be — as the Solicitor
General puts it — recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for
membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from
the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous
relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece 24 did
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of
lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an
essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on
tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character
degeneration of the members of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand
that even if he admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for
disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case,
as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive
action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession
of the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he
continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she
helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of
propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her
after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation,
are hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he
employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the
predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and
maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more
revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The
noblest means he could have employed was to have married the
complainant as he was then free to do so. But to continue
maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and
simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's
niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's
conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges
of the legal profession. As good character is an essential
qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he may be
removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character
(7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General
exceeded his authority in filing the present complaint against him for
seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses
different from those originally charged in the complaint of January
14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule
128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon the evidence
adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient
ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report
to the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion,
whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court
orders differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the
respondent. — If the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to
proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding
complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his
investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be
served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the
complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the
foregoing rules requires the Solicitor General to charge in his
complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed
by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that
should the Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed
against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint,
accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The
Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against the
respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the
investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to
take the bar examinations in 1954 since according to his own
opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of
good moral character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's
own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character.
Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds
to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and
not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice
Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required
to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished
from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of
him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where
he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and
professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to
practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them
to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744
B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52
Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent,
therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he
applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with
Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to
have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good
moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was
discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of
the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of
herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.
ADM. CASE No. 3319 June 8, 2000
LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with
Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at
the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City1and as a result of
their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni,
Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December
1987, however, complainant found out that her husband. Carlos Ui,
was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and
that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street,
Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a
graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines
was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the
respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her office in the
later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of
Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a
child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however; that everything was over
between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the
representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well
from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband
and respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship
between her husband and respondent continued, and that sometime
in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a
second child. Complainant then met again with respondent
sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to
discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The
illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later
25
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
on that respondent had been employed by her husband in his
company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was
then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent
Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the
ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit
relationship with the complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her
Answer,2 respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in
1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the
knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese
woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged.
She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized
his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA
in 19853 . Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with
Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their
Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to
let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second
marriage before they would live together.4
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii
and she would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update
her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to
Manila sometime in June 1988, she was confronted by a woman
who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and
desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui,
respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and
returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20,
1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law firm5 she
was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the
wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if
Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is
not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June
1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil status, she
cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never
lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in
Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L.
Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her
parents' funds.6 By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral
damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00)
against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious
and groundless disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others,
that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to
complainant and had children with her even at the start of her
relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went
abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar,
complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent
with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause
for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal
complaint against respondent reads:
Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the existence of
the "illicit relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered
by the complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however
show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up
to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship"
of respondents started and was discovered by complainant
sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living
at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
Manila and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their
conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when
respondent Carlos left the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic)
the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima
facie established by complainant's evidence, this same evidence had
failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondent's
cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San
Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and
indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense
charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement
only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not
make the complainant's evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S.
vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in
support of their respective positions on the matter support and
bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant
complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable
cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed9 on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that
respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527
San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the
Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent with making false
allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document
which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer
of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred,
among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22,
1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her
averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage 11duly certified by the
State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii
State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date
of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio
was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by
respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for
that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress
upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was
within the wedlock. 12 It is the contention of complainant that such act
constitutes a violation of Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the Revised
Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act
of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and
submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her
moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be
a member of the Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in
Contempt), 15 respondent averred that she did not have the original
copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the
possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because
she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the
marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and
raised the lone issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in
an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the
26
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be
dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the
requirement of good moral character for the practice of the legal
profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent
conducted herself in an immoral manner.
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she
who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did
not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning
of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui.
She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that
the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent
so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship. 18
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged
that it was highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached such
marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was
altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason
for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place
either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent
and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent
and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June
1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified
and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the
date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant
did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this
matter.
Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the
pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with
Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored
car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of
the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing
Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the
garage, 19 does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They
have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken
by a photographer from a private security agency and who was not
presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented
the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-
5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent
for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense
charged 20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of
Justice21 to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any
immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In
fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos
Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful,
flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell
in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that
upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie
Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and
reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate
relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2)
children. Complainant testified that respondent's mother, Mrs. Linda
Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since the
late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs.
Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable
that respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would
not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a
married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent
committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a
photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24 , respondent stated
that complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant
her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of
complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of
the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that
her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that
such information was made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar
Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was
courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single. The
Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in the
light of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he
represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm
commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to
fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic)
true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of
1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the
Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty.
Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each
other because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no
time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any
act on the part of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled
or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure,
she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve
compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad
episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family
life, a dream cherished by every single girl.
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made
part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against
Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is
REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer
a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty.
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the
right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing
the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to
the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the
dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice
of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral
turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to
admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good 27 moral
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
character. More importantly, possession of good moral character
must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the
privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for
the revocation of such privilege. It has been held —
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar,
then the continued possession of good moral character is also a
requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to
have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A
member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as
to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral
delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what
appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not
be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." (7
C.J.S. 959). 26
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that
when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single.
Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result
of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her
knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the
actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will have
a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners
should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a
far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness
notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened
with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle
their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead
us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself
in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and
been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Ui's personal
background prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused
respondent's suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship
with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For
instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had
children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she
never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this
woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987,
Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a
circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering
respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that
respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs.
However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui,
clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes
conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and
the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary
action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as
to be reprehensible to a high degree. 28
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is
not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships . . . but
must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral
standards." 29 Respondent's act of immediately distancing herself
from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that
alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of
flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.
Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit.
After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the
Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her
case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 30 This, herein
complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by
respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the
averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of
the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an
event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would
verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom
how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the
year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human
experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information
contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when she
has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained
therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated
date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot
stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the
highest standards of morality.The legal profession exacts from its
members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand
no less than the highest degree of morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent
Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her
Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or
intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more
severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same
or similar offense in the future.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 11316
PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant vs. RICHARD A. CARONAN
a.k.a. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN," Respondent
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by
complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant), before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan,"
whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for
purportedly assuming complainant's identity and falsely representing
that the former has the required educational qualifications to take the
Bar Examinations and be admitted to the practice of law.
The Facts
Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio2 R.
Caronan, Jr. and Norma A. Caronan. Respondent is the older of the
two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while complainant was
born on August 5, 1976.3 Both of them completed their secondary
education at the Makati High School where complainant graduated
28
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
in 19934 and respondent in 1991.5 Upon his graduation, complainant
enrolled at the University of Makati where he obtained a degree in
Business Administration in 1997.6 He started working thereafter as a
Sales Associate for Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the
operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores.7 In 2001, he married Myrna G.
Tagpis with whom he has two (2) daughters.8 Through the years,
complainant rose from the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as
a Store Manager of the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa.9
Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled
at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed
for one (1) year before transferring to the Philippine Military
Academy (PMA) in 1992.10 In 1993, he was discharged from the
PMA and focused on helping their father in the family's car rental
business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife,
Rosana, and their three (3) children.11 Since then, respondent never
went back to school to earn a college degree.12
In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told
complainant that the former had enrolled in a law school in Nueva
Vizcaya.13
Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that
respondent passed the Bar Examinations and that he used
complainant's name and college records from the University of
Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's College of Law in
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the Bar
Examinations.14 Complainant brushed these aside as he did not
anticipate any adverse consequences to him.15
In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his
name and identity when he saw the name "Patrick A. Caronan" on
the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's office
in Taguig City.16 Nevertheless, complainant did not confront
respondent about it since he was pre-occupied with his job and had
a family to support.17
Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store
Manager, complainant was ordered to report to the head office of
PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was requesting his
presence at its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an
investigation involving respondent who, at that point, was using the
name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."18 Accordingly, on May 18, 2009,
complainant appeared before the Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes
Division of the NBI where he was interviewed and asked to identify
documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school records;
(2) his transcript of records from the University of Makati; (3) Land
Transportation Office's records showing his and respondent's
driver's licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's University showing that
complainant's transcript of records from the University of Makati and
his Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's College
of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's University showing
respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A.
Caronan."19 Complainant later learned that the reason why he was
invited by the NBI was because of respondent's involvement in a
case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap
(Agtarap), who was one of the principal sponsors at respondent's
wedding.20
Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate
crimes and commit unlawful activities, complainant took it upon
himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan"
and that respondent's real name is Richard A. Caronan.21 However,
problems relating to respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan" continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC received a
letter from Quasha Ancheta Peña & Nolasco Law Offices requesting
that they be furnished with complainant's contact details or, in the
alternative, schedule a meeting with him to discuss certain matters
concerning respondent.22 On the other hand, a fellow church-
member had also told him that respondent who, using the name
"Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," almost victimized his (church-member's)
relatives.23 Complainant also received a phone call from a certain
Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how respondent tricked
her into believing that he was authorized to sell a parcel of land in
Taguig City when in fact, he was not.24 Further, he learned that
respondent was arrested for gun-running activities, illegal
possession of explosives, and violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang (BP) 22.25
Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name
"Patrick A. Caronan," complainant developed a fear for his own
safety and security.26 He also became the subject of conversations
among his colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign from his
job at PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-
Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name and
identity, and illegal practice of law.28
In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him
and invoked res judicata as a defense. He maintained that his
identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been
resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of
Governors dismissed30 the administrative case31 filed by Agtarap
against him, and which case had already been declared closed and
terminated by this Court in A.C. No. 10074.32 Moreover, according to
him, complainant is being used by Reyes and her spouse, Brigadier
General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit,
and harass him because he filed several administrative and criminal
complaints against them before the Ombudsman.33
On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled
mandatory conference where both parties failed to appear.34 Instead,
respondent moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015. 35 On such
date, however, both paiiies again failed to appear, thereby prompting
the IBP-CBD to issue an Order36 directing them to file their
respective position papers. However, neither of the parties submitted
any.37
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva
Cabrera (Investigating Commissioner) issued his Report and
Recommendation,38 finding respondent guilty of illegally and falsely
assuming complainant's name, identity, and academic records.39 He
observed that respondent failed to controvert all the allegations
against him and did not present any proof to prove his identity.40 On
the other hand, complainant presented clear and overwhelming
evidence that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan."41
Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant
are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012
that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo;
and (b) he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.42 However, based
on the Marriage Certificate issued by the National Statistics Office
(NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G.
Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-Caronan.43
The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that
the photograph taken of respondent when he was arrested as
"Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person
as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."44 These, according to the Investigating Commissioner,
show that respondent indeed assumed complainant's identity to
study law and take the Bar Examinations.45 Since respondent falsely
assumed the name, identity, and academic records of complainant
and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor of
laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating 29
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
Commissioner recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan"
with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll
of Attorneys.46He also recommended that respondent and the name
"Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a member of
the Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution,
the IBP was directed to institute appropriate actions against
respondent.47
On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution
No. XXI-2015-607,48 adopting the Investigating Commissioner's
recommendation.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering
that: (a) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from
being admitted to the Bar.
The Court's Ruling
After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by
clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A.
Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name, identity, and academic
records to enroll at the St. Mary's University's College of Law, obtain
a law degree, and take the Bar Examinations.
As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and
complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on
August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and
Norma Atillo.49 Respondent himself also stated that he is married to
Rosana Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges from the official NSO records
showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not
to Rosana Halili-Caronan.51 Moreover, the photograph taken of
respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on
August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the
photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."52 Meanwhile, complainant submitted numerous
documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan," among
which are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of Makati
bearing his photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high school yearbook with
his photograph and the name "Patrick A. Caronan" under it;54 and (c)
NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.55
To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that
respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity, and school
records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real
"Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP
correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real
name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from admission to the Bar.
Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for
admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had
pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, VIZ.:
Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar
examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that
he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began
the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in
an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for
admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school
course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's
degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subject as
major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english,
spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)
In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree.
While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year later and
entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without
graduating.56 Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite
pre-law degree.
The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later
on complete his college education and earn a law degree under his
real name.1âwphi1 However, his false assumption of his brother's
name, identity, and educational records renders him unfit for
admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural,
absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it.57 Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good
moral character.58 In In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar
Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for
Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari 'a Bar, Atty.
Froilan R. Melendrez,59the Court explained the essence of good
moral character:
Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished
from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of
him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where
he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and
professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.60 (Emphasis
supplied)
Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar when he assumed the name,
identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter
into controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his safety
and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good
moral character is essential in those who would be lawyers.61 This is
imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation
which exists between him and his client, as well as between him and
the court.62
Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by
pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He
also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous
activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases
against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place
in the legal profession where one of the primary duties of its
members is to uphold its integrity and dignity.63
WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick
A. Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the
name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A.
Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar
Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of
appropriate civil and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves
that:
(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069
is ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;
(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law
or making any representations as a lawyer;
(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the
Philippine Bar in the future;
(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to respondent under the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan"
and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in
such name are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and
(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered
to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin boards of all courts
of the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, 30 "
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he is not a member of the
Philippine Bar and a statement of his false assumption of the name
and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the
Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR
EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER
OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs,
one of which is ripe while the other has been rendered moot by a
supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed
with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition[1] to disqualify
Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations
and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a
member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his
Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3)
pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and
15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case
No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred
on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words
against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and
other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of
Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title
Attorney in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of
Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that
Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been
received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts Resolution[2] dated December 3, 2002,
Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer,[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal
cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge
Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the
case would be settled because the said Judge has moral
ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in
the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually
arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as
closed and terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and
adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of
his communications really contained the word Attorney as they were,
according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated December 8, 2003, the
OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this
wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed
against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are
ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent
jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law
professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were
already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the
Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar
Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly
by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this
case. What matters is his act of concealing them which constitutes
dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is,
as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in
the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective
term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of
personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct
as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal
law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him
makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a
material fact in connection with his application for admission to the
bar.[5]
As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters,
the explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a
member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as
attorney whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice
of law, the fact is, he is signing his communications as Atty. Haron S.
Meling knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto.As held by the
Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation
attorney may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.[6]
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to
take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event
that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that
Melings membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until further
orders from the Court.[7]
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the
OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar
Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to
prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to
impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a member of the
Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not
a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals
who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character.[8] The requirement of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.[9]
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take
the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or
she has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by
law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative
31
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal
of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any
pending case or charge against him/her. Despite the declaration
required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending
criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done
under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine
whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the
applicant.[10] The nature of whatever cases are pending against the
applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed
with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the
existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness
even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or
insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the
applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending
criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite good
moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed
upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that
he is not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v.
Alauya,[11] the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of
the use of the title Attorney by members of the Sharia Bar who are
not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein,
an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District
in Marawi City, used the title Attorney in several correspondence in
connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his
private capacity. The Court declared that:
persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of
the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Sharia
courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one
who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered counselors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice
in a professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title
attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is
they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. [12]
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as
Meling in this case. The solemn task of administering justice
demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein,
from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be
competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of
honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish
the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the
constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his
marriage in his application to take the Bar examinations and made
conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the
respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of
law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the
imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a
member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.Accordingly, the membership of
Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED
until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect
immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S.
Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is
DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF
TELESFORO A. DIAO, vs. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in
1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having
falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that
he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due
course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be
investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that
Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary
to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he
(Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the
required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private
Education, specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his
A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had
submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his
allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal
education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao,
practically admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had
left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S.
Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which
(according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon
his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his
army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with
respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the
equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is
unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly
meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College;
and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A.
graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had
obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he
says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of
Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation
of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case
not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or
"confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application
disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would
also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that
he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months
before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not
have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules
provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under
oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and
satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as
prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on
"previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar
examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed
to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar.
32
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must
be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed
courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys,
the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his
lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.
B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING
EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y.
Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought
exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00
as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged
that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became
part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then
migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his
retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be
assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the
Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the
practice of ones profession while in government service, and neither
can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for
comment.[2]
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment[3] stating inter
alia: that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice
of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys
as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the
obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as
determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the
Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of
the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP
members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an
Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of
Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an
implementation of the Courts directives for all members of the IBP to
help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that
there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as
requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary
termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what
petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of
his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could
have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have
been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in
the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive
status for its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors
and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment
of the annual dues.
In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what
he is questioning is the IBP Board of Governors Policy of Non-
Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers
regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive
practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the
payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional
infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process
clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual
membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him
considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without
income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from
nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute
deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he
claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status
is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in
inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-
members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to
exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was
inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil
Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-
2003?
We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer
must belong, as distinguished from bar association organized by
individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every
member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of
the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all
lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to
all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the
requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon
proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member.[5]
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of
the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial
support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.[6]
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated
Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the States
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program the lawyers.[7]
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration
of the Philippine Bar[8] - which power required members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to
which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed,
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the
Integration of the Philippine Bar,[9] thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not
mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for
regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary
has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident
to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. 33 It
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without
means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of
law is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional
burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far
outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his
required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership
in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the
compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones
membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of,
or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from
payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the
IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of
his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his
membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his
obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP
Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of
members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues
during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to
comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of
removal would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial
Edillon,[10] in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its
being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a
profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear
that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondents right to practice law before the courts of this country
should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if
the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d],
then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may
be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a
property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the
lawyers public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar
is a privilege burdened with conditions,[11] one of which is the
payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them
entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such
drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption from payment of
IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount
assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005,
within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this
decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension
from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO
R. LLAMAS, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar
membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997,
complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar,
alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and
appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas
who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper
PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in
his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but
he has been using this for at least three years already, as shown
by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in
1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section
1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar
"who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law".
There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that
"default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall
warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and
appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially
its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a
member. Jksm
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060"
sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of
professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28,
suspension of an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme
Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court
(thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R.
Llamas, as shown by:
1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court
Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28,
1981 ( in SCRA )
2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994
in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached
copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion
for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on
appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December
1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by
complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be
respondents signature above his name, address and the receipt
number "IBP Rizal 259060."[1] Also attached was a copy of the
order,[2] dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U.
Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying
respondents motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal
Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification[3] dated March 18,
1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last payment of his
34
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any
amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the
complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after which the case
was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his comment-memorandum,[4] dated June 3,
1998, respondent alleged:[5]
3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for
using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the
Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in
good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an
admitted member of the bar who is in good standing is entitled to
practice law.
The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no
longer in good standing, were as above cited, the October 28,
Annex A.......- "Ex-Parte Manifestation and
Submission" dated December 1,
1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253,
RTC, Br. 224, QC
Annex B.......- "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation
Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in
Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259
(not 257), Paraaque, MM
Annex C.......- "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for
extension of Time to File Required
Comment and Opposition" dated
January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP
(not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th
Div.
1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14,
1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of
encumbrances. Chief
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal
decision was set aside and reversed and respondent was even
promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court
Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim.
Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is
still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the
decision of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and
reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light
felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned
himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had
been delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his
Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited
practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal
occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard
and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a
Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of
Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of
taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he
honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice
of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by
 him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such
exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP
member to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by
the exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner
wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such
dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even
with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is
ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly
saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated
for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act
of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues
despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the
contrary. Esmsc
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a
resolution[6] adopting and approving the report and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty,
and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three
months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a
reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a
resolution,[7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B,
12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the
decision of the IBP ordering respondents suspension for three
months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-
indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings
(Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly
his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from
IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that
respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted
by respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen
since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No.
7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income
taxes as an example."
....
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present
case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of
law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly
made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the present time that
he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents
Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Esmmis
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled
the court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R.
number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for
his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this
issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in
law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits
that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this
Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in
court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus
misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and
receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He
claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and
that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of
taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior
citizen since 1992. 35
LEGAL ETHICS WEEK 2
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar
shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall
determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter
shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the
Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for
the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the
practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that
his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants
senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income
taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed
the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does
not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and
thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid
his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE
INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD
FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation
in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe
penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law,[8] we believe the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP
dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he
has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision
be attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.