TEtECOH CONFERENCE

142200 August 1945

Washington:

Guam:

Horstad and Lovett Spaatz and Giles

1. Spaatz to Arnold.

300 SUperfertresses will hit targets in Japan tonight. Latest' time the attack can be canoelled is 2300 Guam time or 0900 your time. Am standing by persona~ly for possible oancellation order.

Norstad to Spaatz.

Go ahead with your sohedule until and unless defin.itely orde.red to cease operations. We will keep telecon open and lrlll advise you the minute we get anything firm.

2. Norstad to Spaatz.

What is target time for these 300 airplanes:

Reply.

90 airplanes on Kumagaya 92 airplanes on Isezaki 140 aIrplanes on .Akita

39 airplanes on Minning.

During dayl ight today 443B-29' shit Hikaki, Osaka, and Marifu. Two wings have landed without loss. One Wing is still landing. All bombing visual and reported as exoellent.

at 0100 Guam time. at 0100 Guam time. at 2400 Guam t i.T!le.

3. Horstad to Spaatz.

What will be the total number of bombers? Fighters? Dispatohed since your order to resume operations.

Reply.

Total number of bombers Total number of fiters

836 - 173

Grand total 1009

4. Norstad to Spaatz.

Mr. Alexander of the D~Olier Committee is in Washington. He haa selected the nucleus of the group for Jap survey and is getting them baok here at once. Know you will appreciate the importanoe of this work am will do everything possible to faoilitate it. We will give you detailed information later but it is essential these people get going fast.

Spaatz to Norstad. Will be on lookout for Alexander and his group.

Suggest War Department send message to MaoArthur re importance of D80lier Committee.

Borstad to Spaatz. D'Oller groups status and direotive will be sent to MaoArthur and N~itz as well as to you. This is advance information to you only.

6. Nor.tad to Giles. Reference surrender formalities, there is nothing I OaD add to the information given you gesterday. Subject is still alive.

U. S.AIDlY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES HEADQUARTERS, Guam

For Release ~Qth last elementrs bombs away signal.

COMMUNIQUE NO. ,I

1·. Approximately 800 Marianas-based B-29 Superfortresses struck in the

early hours today, 2 August (Guam Time), at the Japanese industrial cities of

Hachioji, Toyama, Nagaoka and Mito, and at petroleum installations at Kawasaki.

Approximately 6,000 tons of incendia~y and high explosive bombs were dropped

on the targets.

CARL SPAATZ,

General, U.S. Army, Commanding, United States Army strategic Air Forces.

u, s, ARMY ST:r~TEG I HEADQ,UA.nTERS, Guam

- FO:tl.CES

Immediately

COMMUNI QUE NO.2.

1. In the Superfortress strike against Japan in the early hours of

2 August (Guam Time), 820 Marianas-based B-29s attacked the targets. Of ~.lu. ~~ OA,.t..Ah &.v....

this number 778 bombers struck at the"cities of Hachioji. Toyama, lITagaoka

and Mita and at oil storage and refinery targets in the petroleum complex at

Kawa sakd , The other 42 bombers mined enemy waters eIl!lP'e'lift!: '&ftB gHime&e<86li~.

,_ 8+. Ta its arret Q if .tth'i EI i lei. 8 e 0 P Be 1 sltt!l and La ef!'.Ml: er'!'!='i!hc h0'l' M1e'l1'11110 § b "C eM! 15 ..

of KOTo?

66 ~

A total of 32 tons of bombs and mines- war.s- dropped.

,

:Returning

crews reported good to

excellent bombing results, with general conflagrations

, -

~~

94i!iul. Enemy fighter opposition Q.;,berthA target

"obser-ved in the target

cities ranged from none to slight, and anti-airc;raft fire from none to mode-

rate.

targets,

ged from

b~

our ail 191e:ao-s

fire \\faS

is

2. The p-47 Thunderbolts recently adcled to our fishter strength on

Iwo Jima made their first at t ack on' Japa.n on August 1st (Guam Time) I joining

P-51 Mustfmgs in a small scale mi-ssion against the Nagoya_Kobe area. The

fi€hters strafed and launched rockets <;I.gainst locomotives and cars in the

Fukida railroad yards and but.Ldt ng s and f'ac t or i e s at the. Itami and Nagoya

East airfields.. The operation was carried out under adverse wea t her con-

di tions. No enemy fighter opposi tion was encountered. Four of our ~ "~~!rfailed to return.

CARL SP.AATZ I

General, U. S. Army, Commnding. United States Army StrategiC Air Forces.

o p

HEADQ,UARTERS ,

~ITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES APO 234

2 August 194

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SPAATZ

SUBJECT: Proposed Inspection Schedule

1. I have made tentative arrangements for your inspection as follows':

August 3

9:00 AM 10:00 AM 11:30 AM 4:00 PM

10 :00, AM 11:00 AM 2:00 PM

4:00 PM ,5:00 PM

August 4

August 6

8:00 AM

Headquarters, ,Twentieth Air Force at Guam 3i4th Wing, North Field at Guam

315th Wing, Nortl;_lwest Field at Guam

Depot at Guam

Depart here

Arrive Saipan. Visit 73rd Wing.

Depart Saipan for Tinian. Inspect, 313th Wing Inspect ,8th Wing.

Inspect ,09th Wroup

Return to Guam on afternoon of 4 A~gust

Depart Guam for Iwo for inspection o£ Seventb Fighter Command and otheE Air Units there.

, 2. For your information, the following named comman~ers are in

command of the units to be inspected:

Twentieth Air Force - 314th Wing

315th Wing

Depot at Guam

73rd Wing

313th Wing

,58th Wing

.509th Group

Seventh Fighter Wing

.

Gen. Twining

,Col. Storey ('until necent Ly ,

-General Power) Ge De raL Arms trong

Col. Carlson

Gen. O'Donnell

Gen. Davies

Gen. Ramey

Col. Tibbetts

Gen. ~oore

3. Island Com,manders that you will see on the trip are:

Saipan Tinian Iwo Jima

Admiral Whiting General KimbleGeneral Chaney'

BARNEY M. GILES Lieutenant General, United State A:

3 August 1945

In morning visited 514th Wing, Colonel Storey cOIIlIlAnding, on Guam.

In aternoon, visited 315th Wing, Gen. Armstrong oommanding, on Guam.

Aocompani.ed by Giles, Twining and Linsay.

4 August 19'45

Visited Saipan, 73rd Wing, Brig. Gen. O'1)onnell oommanding.

No reaotion en part of crews to advance notioe of targets to be attacked in Japan. Idea of having oontinuonr effort every day with part of foroe, rather than spasmod ic effort with all of force, bel iaved sound by all group oommanders and O'Donnell.

Saipan is an important island for the future of the Air Forces.

Very apparent from methods Navy is employing that this is realized thruout Mariannas and Paoific. Their intention is to intertwine logistio support so thoroughly as to foroe Strategic Air Forces into Navy's hands. Essential that all islands exoept Guam be placed under administrative oontrol of Army; divoroed from Hawaii and placed under senior oommanders of paramount interest.

Toured island wIth Maj Gen Jarman and he stated. there is no diffioulty in having shipping come direct from U.S. to Mariannas without Navy 'ooordination or convoy. In tour of islands, ~oted i:anumerable oases on cllffs of Navy gunfire, indioating ineffectiveness of that type ot support. This is visual evidence of reason why oasual ties have been

muoh greater when Navy has taken an island than when Mao~thur has

been in command. YaoArthur I s plan, aooording to my conversation with him on 51 August was to saturate the area with aerial bombardment for several weeks and then walk ashore. Navy, as evidenoed on Saipan, has depended on their flat projeotory fire, whioh is ineffeotive and in my opinion is basic reason for excessive oasual ties.

Returned in B-17 to Guam at 1730 hours. Aooompanied by Giles, Twining and Lindsay.

,

5 August 1945

At 1000 hours left in 45' Launeh , Returned 1700 with no fish.

Talked with Idwa1d Eawards who is on way baok to States. Disoussed personnel matters suoh as promotions whioh he wanted to take up with the War Depar'bneat direot to speed up aotion. Told him we would stiokto the Air Foroe ohannels at all times and that personnel problems must be routed through Fred AndersoD even if it delays the aotion.

-

Talked to Col. Whitney regarding his personnel survey of this headquarters. He will stop in Hawaii to speed up the olosing of USASTAF . Admin there. Told him that expeot him to be ready to take over Adjutant:

General's position in USASTAF here about September 1st •

...

Dinner with General Giles.

I~

HIAD u, a. AJIlT BtlU.!JI}IO AI FORCIS ott i •• ot the Co .. nding Oetl8l"al De 1M

8 Augu.t 1945

JaR I ONLY

Qea.-al or the ._,. H. H. At-no14

C nd iDg . General J.nq Air For C.,

lIaelngtoD. D.C.

Dear pa

Cabell il returnirlg tonight to the U.S •• nd I am sending a ahortnote wi h him.

line. :y arrival I have oheoked in with Nimits. oArtbur and had a fin. visit with (enney. Kenney aM I ... eye to eye on t to probl 8 which confront UI. anel I ... Ul Dot lea.,.. & .tone l:.lllturnod to IIlIlin~ain a har . niolllaln affioient letup.

In addition toviliting . qArt.h.ur ana 'E.emuiy in ManUa, have 8tpent praotioall the r • .t of my time with he ftl"iOU8 wi a of th!, 20th Air loroe. !ave b •• u tMr UChly pr •• aed with the init-iative and effioiency of t,h. 20th. They are the most profe •• ional o:~u~rator8 I have .en. •

.. are Toring to effeot the organi,ation with the minim.u number c·£ peJ"lIO-

!mel in our headquarter' and my basic instruction is that nothing hould b. done to di,turb the continuity or Qifioianoy of pre.ent.operations.

Suoh photographl0 COTWaEe •• we bave had of the rnisli-on. inO& uri val

il1d1 .. t. uoell&nt r •• ultill. ~ B have dillilous-aed i#he; desirability of illtainiDe 4tODtinUOua pr.awr. every day 'With a cd.rate e.tfort rather than a 1-

.t.tort .-very third day. A8 long as enemy fighter. are not. a probl bell ..... DOW tha, oontlnUGu, pr.s8UF •• Ulhave • gr •• ter i>Byobolo~ioal oa thee..,.. wUl insur. more "llual bQmbin and .Ul -also p:rovid r.at.J"

• iiiy iD O\U' operatiOl'1'. The total tonn.~" of ombe on Japan er m.onth

will b... ..t. it not greater .•

• 1r1 th \he l08th Group upon return of th. mi •• ion today and t'r ell ao........ the r.8Ult. uoeeded espeotationa. This mission 10110wed a 00-

p1 •• , ~D ..,...10U& targ.t. W ~ l •• t night. the or_ on the .. latt r

attaR. r or1led r.. 1 t. trom ,.0<1 to • .x_llent.

Will wl_ in r. 4 •• 11 100D - R. I ". been to Okinawa and obtain

• 1. or1a1rat1a OD all the probl a here.

ia .an ha •• be. -" lDt e..-i • Hope you mIl f1

• ....7 DMr tuture.

1in4t.r.17

CARL PAA!Z OeDeral. USA.

6 August 1945

Inspeoted 313th Wing, Gen. Davies oommanding; 68th Wing, Gen • . Ramey oommanding, and 509th Group, Col. Tibbetts oommanding, on Tinian.

Group oommanders oonoerned primarily about not getting DFC' s for the.ir creW's upon completion of their missions, and lack of promotions due to failure to get authorization for grades and ratings for inoreased orews and airplanes operating in the squadron.

Awarded Legion of Merit to for having

maintained his airplane for fifty combat missions without an abort.

Gave Distinguished. Service Cross to Tibbetts for sueoessfUlly completing the mission upon whioh the first atomio bomb was dropped.

Disoussed, upon return to Guam, message from Marshall referenoe exohange of liaison missions between Russia and U.S. Deoided that Giles would be Air Forces representative in MaoArthur's liaison group. (Ref

is Viotory 361 and WARX 44735)

Guests for dinner tonight: Charles Murphy of Time, Life and Fortune; Mr. Adler, VP of New York Times; Mr. Knight, Editor Chicago NEWS, Mr. Cowles, owner Des Moines and Minneapol is papers. Diverted latter three from tour planned by Navy for tomorrow to listen to briefing by

Col. Garcia in 20th Air Foroe and watoh take off of mission. All seem

to be for the Department of National 'Defense with Land, Sea and. Air on

a co-equal standing.

FOR NORSTAD.

MORE THAN 200 NAVY I1ACARTHUR AND USASTAF CORRESPO~ DENTS vIlLL'

SHORTLY VI srr, INSPECT AND PHOTOGRAPH TWO ATOM! C BONB TP,RGETS

TO TRY TO KEEP THEM OUT OF A~EAS

{lJOULD DE GREAT i'IISTAKE II~ VIET;] OF DETAILED DESCRIPTIONS 'OF DAI>!AGE BROADCAST BY jAPAI"ESE ALSO GIVEN TO CORRESPONDENTS our

OF INFORMATION BROUGHT TO t1ANI LA BY JAPANESE DELEGA TES. THERE

. ,

IS ABSOU)TELY 110 tvAY IN t~HICH CORRESPOPDENTS CAN BE KEPT FRan

DESCRIBING t'lHAT THEY SEE IN l'JAGASAKI AND HIROSHI~1A 'WITHOUT' A

I

SPECH I C DIRECTIVE FRoN THE IvAR 'DEPARTr1ENT IVHI CH InLL ALSO

COVER CORRESPONDEIHS ACCREDITED TO THE NAVY. STRON'GLY P,DVISE

,

AGAINST SUPRESSIOI BUT REQUEST SPECIFI C POLlCY' GUIDAI CEo I,AR

, .

51902 FRON CO~1GE!!AIR INADEQUATE TO COVER FUTURE STORIES ..

WE ARE GOING TO TRY TO GET FOR RELEASE STORIES OF ATROCITY TREAT·IENT OF DOvlNED B-29 CRE'IS BY JAPS TO OFFSET PROBABLE

:'EA eTI ON TO A TONI C B0118 DAl1AGE STOR IES BUT POSSI BLE liE CA 'i\OT

,

GET AIRTIGHT £VI DENCE SOON E~\OUGI·I. HE HAVE '0 DESIRE TO RELEASE

,

FURT~ER FACTS ASOUT TECHNICAL DETAILS OF l'JANUFACTURE, DESIGN

OR. EI·1PL 0 Y~1EN T OF A TOM I C DOH B.

~JE ONLY REQUEST AUTHORl TY TO

II'

HANDLE BOMB DAMAGE STORIES . liND PHOTOGRAPHS UNDER NORI'lAL PUBLIC RELATIO IS PROCEDURE PLUS ADDITIONAL POLICY GUIDAFCE.

"

20,000 tana

1cbaat.t

\bID 2. jaa

, ~h1ch 1.4 the .1J' arlll.aTl. b

I lut '00$1111"

evtJIl" ueed. in t.he

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BId .. 19.59, • Mid,. it flU t, aco.pt.ed bel..1efof5Oiantlet

that " _ ... laa1l¥·pOA1blo" t.o ftlII_ :t.0iIIWl e •

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..... tMt t&1'4 • 1.'rwnui _aW •

• be ... ww. t.$ PNdd' lO. that tb. Gerarana a-t 1*

... till' b·tmy ~ .}, late

.. JJa lJJd.\1IIt qaant.ltt. and .,.. . .,. sraWul ;t tberd:1d no t1iJI M.s. btJIIb at. .u."

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I

• I

7 AU,gust 1945

Attended meeting at Adm. Nimitz' headquartel'sat 0930.

Held press oonferenoe 1I1 USASTAF headquarters a.t 1100 at which were present Ad.mira1 Parnell, Gen. Farrell, LeMPi,. and other offioers of thi,s headqulirters. 'Disoussion centered around atomio bomb.

Had as guest .f'or lunoh Capt. Bouverie, Nava1British LiaisOD offioer with lilIitz' headquarters.

Disoussion with Llnd,sa,. reference RAY Squadrons. Dispatohed

mea .. sage to waShington after reoeiving message from Kenney oCiDourring

in deoisio:n to plaoe them under him, but re-emphasized to L:Lndsay that any message effecting both USASTAF and FEAF lDUst be sent throu,gh Kenne,._

1700 .. 1900 Open Rouee held at Giles with all Wing Comnanders present as well as all Chiefs of'Sectiens of this and the 20th MF he.adquarters.

u, s. AJ..MY ST~TEGIC HEA:oQ.UAi\.TEAS. Guam.

FORCES,

COMMUNIQ,UE NO. 3i

1. A force of 139 P-51 Mustan,gs from Iwo Jima struck Japan around noon

of 2 August (Guam Time), strafing an.d launching rockets against five ~irfields

and targets of opportunity in the Nagoya-Kobe area. OUr force sighted one

airborne enemy aircraft, which fled., and eight opera.tionalenemy ,aircraft on.

the ground. RetUrning pilots reported that they destroyed one enemy fight,sr

on Kiyosu airfield and seven locomotives in the NagoYtpToyohashi yards, and

damaged two aircraft •. airfield hangars and buildings. four factories. one

refinery, natural gas tanks. power lines, seven locomotives, railroad cars and

stations, and 14 small vessels. Anti-aircraft fire Te.ngi.i:lg from meager to

moderate caused 'minor damage- to 11 of our fighters. All o-f our airplanes

returned.

2. Mission summaries" for the .B-29 Superfortress strike i.n the early hours of 2 August (Guam Time.) show that our ·forces encounser-ed 20· enemy fighter

attacks whic~ resulted in damage to two of our bombers. four bombers were

damaged by anti-a.ir,craft fire... No e.dditiQna.~ reports 01i the resUlts on our bombing are available at this time.

CA.nL A. SPAATZ. General" U. S. 'Army, 'Commanding. Uni ted .States- .Army ·Stra.tegic Air Forces.

I 1_

,.

./ U. S. ARMY STRATEG!C A HEADQUARTERS, Guam.

CES,

For Release: 1330, 6 August 1945.

COMMUNIQUE NO.4.

1. At least 580 Marianas-based B-29 Superfortresses struck at Japan during

the night of 5-6 August, dropping approximately 3,850 tons of incendia.ry and

"-

high explosive bombs o.n the Ute Goal Liquefaction COffil?any and on the industMAE BASI-II

rial areas of/Nishinomiya,--Mikage, Imabari and Saga" and mining the waters

around Geijitsu,Tsuruga, Hagi-Oura and Rashin. Returning crews reported good

to excellent result s , with large fire s observed in several of the target areas.

Enemy fighter opposition was light and anti-aircraft fire was meager to moder-

ate. One of our bombers failed to return.

2. A small force of B-29s dropped, 45 tons 'of bombs on Moen Airfield No .. 1

at Truk on the afternoon of 5 August. No opposition was encountered.

3. A force of 98 P-51 Mustangs from IwoJima strafed and launched rockets v

against airfields and targets of opportunity in the Tokyo area short;J_y after

\

noon of 5 August. Returning pilots reported that they destroyed two enemy air-

craft and six. locomotives, probably destroyed one aircraft, set two oil tanks

afire, and damaged one aircraft, several factory buildings, four loc,omotives,

railroad stations and cars, seven small boats and various miscellaneous targets.

Our force encountered one enemy interceptor, which fled, and anti-aircraft fire

ranging from meager "to intense. Two of our airplanes were damaged and three

failed to return. One pilot has been rescued.

4. Around noon of 3 August, P-51 Mustangs from lwo Jima struck the TokyO

I

area with the following results: Destroyed, two enemy aircraft in the' air and

eight on the ground, 14 locomotives, several trucks, gun emplacements and a

transformer. Damagetl, seven airoraft, six locomotives, 50 railroad cars,

various hangars, buildings and factories, power lines and 12 to 14 boats. Our

-1-

,~ -

force encountered ten enemy interceptors and anti-aircraK"fire ranging from

. ..

moderate to intense. Of the 97 Mustangs which participated in the mission,

five were damaged and six failed to returp. One pilot is known to have been

rescued.

5.

\

A small force of P-51 Mustangs from Iwo Jima made a neutralization

strike against air installations on Chichi Jima ~he afternoon of 3 August,

strafing the target and dropping four tons of bombs. All of our airplanes

returned.

6.

/

The first photographs available on the results of the B-29 strike in

the early hours of 2 August show thRt the industrial area of Toyama was tota~ly

CARL SP l-Jl T Z I General, 'U.S. Army, Comma nding •

-,

I

- 2 -

u. S. ~~ STRATEGIC AIR FORCES, HEADQUARTFRS, Guam.

For Release: 7 Augrist 1945, 1330.

CARL SPAATZ, General, U.S, Army, Comrranding. .

COMMUNIQUE NO.5.

.-

1. Approximately 125 Marianas-based B-29 Superfortresses struck the

Toyokawa Naval Arsenal with high explosive bombs around noon of 7 August. The

bombers were escorted by fighters from Iwo Jima.

2. P-5l Mustangs from Iwo Jima attacked nine airfields in the Tokyo area

on the morning of 6 August, destroying one enemy aircraft, probably destroying

three and damaging 21. Targets of opportunity damaged on the mission were air-

field installations, hangars, factories, railroad yards and a 200-f~ot vessel

which was set afire. No enemy interceptors were encountered. Anti-aircraft

fire ranged from meager to intense. Of the 97 airplanes which participated in

the mission, six failed to return. Three of the pilots were rescued.

3. Final reports on the B-29 mi.s.sion of the night of 5-6 August show

that 572 bombers struck the pr;imary targets, 28 dropped mines and nine bombed targets of opportunity. The crew of the B ... 29 which failed to return has been

rescued.

I.

(

U R G E N T

.

«PERSQN'AL-EYES. ONLY FOR SPAATZ FROM MARSHALL»

~ E C -fP1f£I~IF1ED

o Itrs.

B .J!f- & 20 JUne41Jt..~ 7JJh<' JI"'I~C;Da~

WAR FOUR FIVE NINE NIWE ONU' A TELETYPE MESSAGE CMA WAR FOUR FIVE FOUJ

. . /

. .

rIVE TWO CMA WAS SENT YOU YESTERAY BY SNRLES REGARDING PUBLIC STATE-

, MENTS RELATIVE TO THE ATOMIC BOMB STGP PAREN .pERSONAL EYES_ONLY FOR SPAAT1·FROM MARSHALL UNPAREN yot:J AND GENERAL LE MAY ARE BEING WIDELY QUOTED IN PAPERS ALL OVER UNITED STATES ON YOUR REMARKS REGARDING RE-

. .

SULTS OF SUCH'A BOMB ON LANDINGS IN NORMANDY COMMA TO THE E'FFECT- THAT.

OUR PRESENT ARMY IS NOT NECESSAFiY FOR THE FURTHER PR0SECUTION OF THE tJAR IN THE PACIFIC AND THAT AN INVASION WILL BE UNNECESSARY COMMA

AND THAT THE'FUTURE 0F ARMIES HAS BEitN DECIDEElLY CURTAILED STOP I WISH

. (

YOU WOULD REFRAIN FROM ANY SUCH COMMENTS AND SEE THAT THOSE ABOUT YOU

~o THE SAME STOP HOWEVER GOOD YOUR INTENTIONS YOU CAN DO INCALCULABLE HARM BACK HERE IN THE EICITED STATE OF AMERICA AND IN VIEW OF THE DIFFICULTIES I AM NOW HAVING IN SUPPORTING THE ARMY -

••• END •••

TeD 0816122 CGF REC RGE '816122 DG

HEADQUARTERS', ARMY AIR WASHINGTON

IN REPLY REFER TO:

3 August 1945

General Carl Spaatz Commanding General, USASTAF A.P.O. 234, c/o Postmaster San francisco, California

Dear Tooey:

,

Supplementing ~ cable of 2 August to General Kenney (information oopy to you) on the subject 0.£ occupation of strategic areas

in Japan, Korea, China and Formosa, there is attached a study prepared here in the office of AC/AS, Plans. This study entitled, "lir Plan

to Aid and to Accelerate Establishment of Occupational Forces in Japan in the Event of a Sudden Surrender or Collapse" indicates, among other things, that by deploying air units available in the Pacific and C-54's from other theaters to forward areas, we can land and maintain on

the Japanese homeland up to three divisions a week. I think this

study errs on the side of conservatism. I am not satisfied that this is the-best we can do. I feel that if we give further consideration

to the problem we will find a way to get B-29's into the Tokyo area· quioker than this study indicates is possible and thereby increase our troop 11ft.

General MacArthur feels strongly that the Army should play the dominant role from the beginning in a~ occupation resulting from surrender. If this is to be accomplished, then serious consideration must be gi van to getting troops into these areas by air lift. Because of the great distances involved and the consequent length of time required to transport troops to any occupational area, it is

not only likely, but essentiai, that the Navy be f;lrst on the scene .. unless we fly troops in. People in this country will not be satisfied with an occupation that first takes place three weeks after surrender. Air lift to these areas appears to be the only solution to the problem of getting into occupation zones approximately at the same time as the Navy. I feel therefore that you should carefully consider what your command ean do to make the necessary lift possible.

I have indi.cated to General Kenney, in conn.ection with priori.tie.s. for occupation zones, that I am of the opinion that Formosa deserves

a much higher priority than it is given in any plan I have yet seen. Bases in this area would not onq oomplete our strategic coverage of

, "

DECLASSIFIED DOD ltrs.

L ~""""~~~~~~.Il"".~.r.r ~~ ~u~:~V- w'zr

Cbina and the Yellow and China Seas, but would also enable us to complete a chain of bases which will make it possible for our shorter

range air units to reach arr:r p.vt of the areas in which we are interested. Also in furtherance of our desires for a chaim"of bases, I visualize that we must eventually have WE bases in Alaska, the Aleutians, Okinawa, the Northern Philippines, Mindanao, Palawan, and the Mar.ianas.

General Kenney and General Stratemeyer are being forwarded a copy of the attachment.

Sincerely yours,

I

Jp1; I.e aotnOlll.qed ot v ur llRt .. ot 3 A~at.. 1$0' CO? of )lWr .-l. _ 1_,. W a August 'x,*, prft'ioo.114.1 oune4 tbe ,.. •• Wl'laI of' 1:W a.at W1'h General UUM-tbur and a1 11 it.

SIl .wat or .. su44_ ~tm1er or 0011 • .,_ of J.p~

I

pl.a w111 lie dftllll1lll11 up on "*'.e ba!:i or the Mlen 1 t'HJ.1blm 1. o-f

the -.18 AS.' • in this crtent .. 1111 the pOMlbU1t 1 .. out-

1 by )'OU will iwn nu.l it ootusldent1o%:1 am ~lo1ta~ on.

CABJ"MTZ QenoNl. SA

a iDe

0/0 Gen. ~IIQ'

0-. L eA7 (with oopyltr trom Arnold aDd enaloaurel)

1

\

r'<

DECLASSIFIED DOD Itr!!.

I

,

U~ S, ARMY STRATEGIC AlI{ FORCES HEADQ.UARTERS. Guam

For Release: 9 August 1945.

COMMUNIQ.UE NO.8.

1. I]he second use of the atomio bomb occurl"ed at noon of 9 August at

Nagasaki. Crew members report"ed good results. No fu:r;ther details will be

available until the mi~sion returns •

t

GAEL SP.A.A.TZ. General, U. S. Army., Commanding.

\

tf

/

9 August 1945

SeooJJjf atomio bomb dropped today. Target: Nagasaki industrial area. Crews reported. geed results. Time: 0045Z.

Lalft"enoe of New York Times guest for lunoh.

Briefing and discussion this af'terno(!)n with LeMay, Power and Allen reference further targets.

Dilm.er with Admiral Nimitz, aooompanied by Gen. Giles.

Giles departed tonight for Manila reference Russian liaison.

See me~sage OD this subjeot attached.

Announoed offioially this morning that Russia has entered the War against Japan. See attaohed message from JCS.

UAIS/j~

SPEC S

"DEvASTA'I'ING' EFFEeT, O;W ATOMIC BOMJj 'AND REWL'll~G' PUBI!IC~'I'Y' IS

., - ., I ~ • r ,.....; ~ ~

ol· ~ .

'. _ " ~_ . ,1'- .. _ ... _' • • . _. _ . • • -

AFFECT!NG'\ CREWS WHp ',DRO? :r~, CONVENTIONAl.. 'TYEE OF, BOlflh,

f ~~: , I. 1. l.~.. • • ,j • ~~. •

'B'SLIErvE' iA; - SH,OR,T, ~$~AGE :FRci~ 'JOll :XO. 'BEi>!W', oro ~,_CREWsj'WO

.. , "'

MlJST :c(nrnNttE'TO '00 mr..PRos4IC TyPE OF OPERATION,. EXPRSSSllfa

. '~- ~. ~ . 'J • . . .~ '4

, It t I ~. ' 1 ., . .",;..., ~_

THE VALUE ¢-ii THEIR ,EFFORTS, WO'UI:iU~:~E'EXTR~mrfY BENEF!C~ AT

. ". . , ,.r - ••

' ...

1

2

TRANS

"

OUNTINT

! PLANS

RAF DOCS

CS

D 6'0 OPS

'A,D.CO OPS

c'- --

a.co ADM

co

D:lR ADM S

, ?!

DECLASSIAEC1

DOD Itrs.

~an.. &ao June Ifl:.../_ 7

8rt~ LC; Dale ~. u:

AAF POA

INCOMING MESSAGE

MESSAGE REFERS TO;

PRECEDENCE TELECON

CLASSIFICATION

or JF IQ§Nj1....."A_' _

11-11

FROM: C n~GENUSAST AF {REAR)

:- COMGENUSAST AF

TO SPAATZ FROU ARNOLD.

UBJECT: eONGRATULATORY LETTER FROU GENERAL GROVES.

WASHINGTON D. C.

1023042 AUGUST

I RECEIVED THE FOlLOWIt'JG LETTER TODAYfROM GENERAL GROVES. ~'ANT YOU TO MAKE TH E CONTENTS KNOWN TO EVER Y OFF I eER A tl) ~:iAN

N YOUR HEADQUARTERS \;"Ji-JO HAS BEEN CONCERNED WI TH T HE ATOMIC SOtIl'B PROJECT. IN ADDITION I WISH TO EXPRESS MY O:lN PERSONAL APPRECIATlON AND THANKS FOR THE t.1ANNER IN V'.H ICH oun PART OF TH I S PROJECT HAS

BEEN CONOUCTE:O. IT IS OeVIOUSlY THE RESULT OF CAREFUL PLAN~'!ING AU)

SUPERB EXECUT I or~ ArlO liAS DONE :vtUCH TO H..tCREAS[ THE PREST I GE OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES.

II I ~~ANT TO TELL YOU AND TO PLACE Of.J T HE RECORD MY SINCERE GRATJTUOE AND DEEP APPRECIATION, BOTH PERS$NAL AND OFFICIAL,

tOP THE :IAGNtF,CENT COOPERAT ION RENDERED TO THE ATm,AlC BOMO PROJECT

B THE ;")FF'ICERS AND fJEN OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES, FROM MY OWN PERSONAL

o SEAVATION AND FROM FREQUENT REPORTS FROM MY OFFICERS, I CAN EMPHASIZE THAT FROM STAAT TO FINISH THRCUGH ALL ECHELONS THE

A FlAY A J R rORCES HAVE SUPPORTED A ND ASS I STED US TOT He L.I MI T • IF'

T ERE HAS aVER BEEN COMPLETE COOPERATION IN AN OPERATION, THIS PROJECT HAS H D t1.

• . DECLASSIt-/~. D

PAGE 2. OF ,o2~o4z AUGU!f Irt~j

, '

"

II lODAY'S REPORTS. FRAGMENTARY THOOGH THEY BE, INDIOATE THA·T

THE PREPARATION AND LEADERSHIP OF' TrE AIR FORCES INVOLV~D IN TH;[S

OPERATION HAVE BEEN OF THE HIGHEST ORDERo THE MAGN9FlCENi P£RFORMANCE

I

OF AIRCRAFT AND CREWS UNDER THE ;.~OST TERR I Fie PRESSURE SPEAKS FOR ITSELF.

.-

n THE SUCCESS OF THE ENTIRE PROJECT HAS BEEN GREATLY ASStSTED

BY V:)UR PERSOf"Al HEARTY SUPPORT AND' THA T OF AL L OF YOUR ST AFT II

WILL YOU COtJVEY :~y FEEL I NGS TOWARD THEM?"

"S I GNED - r..,1AJOR GEN 0 L. R a GROVES."

- ~- ~ - - - - - ~

018T 6 ~OPIES cIs TOR 110039Z

, ,

!'he to110 are

Doo11'\le a.4 Le

ne ala,Spa ta,

. I ~

tbr&e t1 tWQ tI,Ore ppose by

.

,._ CQD8\notloa Wl1t8. , 4 tnatn. Spa 'Z _

un tat DO co: truo~lOl.\ UA1 edlv.rt fro J'u,t·e J' 010 or

ad 118. 6ea ..... '. are bel~ ~ Te4 ~ro the,j,r lIork ,tor' ,F on yo.tan sao. oaug •. 1J1' _OIllUM t~om: ~ Wh to . ,oArt.hu &41t i be1Ag con-

81dered b,. X8DJl.,. to.we .1Sl7 construction anit. Q _ te , Bolo or

udena \0 YUDtan ' ~

}

4. T.

o

a~

a.

-

tb ~oon are not to be taken

/'

AIR OFFENSIVE - 1

The awesome fact about this 8Q-ealled atomic bomb was not just what was done to the Japanese city of Hiroshima 'l;1h086 forlorn fate it was to provide the sits for a.n epochal experiment in annihilation. 'The most antl~ fact Vas what tre

news did to mon's ~inda.

Here in the 'ropical Marianas, from one of ,"vh'ose coral islands w~~ sant thE! first missile, the oxper:ien'ce Was a),most spooky. First there W&B Preside,nt

\

Truman's disclosure v1hieh, at breakfast time, Vlns blCl1"ed from ten ~housand tents

and quonsets by the radio. It Vias ~he first intimation that any but- a handful of

men had that such a bomb was in the Paoi:ic Ocean or e~en in existence. Then three

men, whose faces wero wholly unfamiliar and whose nnmae were unknown, were euddanly

produced in the office of a. distinguished cdr general, nO'lilly ar'rived from Ey,rope,

to Gxplnin to a crowd of perspiring journalists, rushed across the island by buses,

the effects of a neVI explosiv~, prepared oy proc;ess9s too ccmpLex for a layman to

~nderstand and w~ich of courso could no~ be divulged, upon a Japanes~ city of which pr cbab Ly non-e of the mon in the room had ever heard until chance made it a target

for this novel ~xperiment.

'rheae throe men, Boated around General Spaatz, were not mQrely strangers.

In the drama of revele.t ion they were t01.!G':ed I momemtarily I with the sepa.taten0SS of men who had returned from a visit to a new and scary planet. In twenty years

of joyrnaliam I hava never seen news gr:., minds so disconcertingly.

One of ~he strangers was the .pilot who flew the airplAne to Hiroshtma, some 1500 miles from her-e. Another Waif a Capt:::.in in the Navy. ~pt1Va_t!p lt~. The other wqs a genoral in tho Army, in privato life a WHAT. It was tho airman - a

curly-hclirod, earnost youthful colonel 1. .ad Tibbetts - who provided porhaps the

)nly o~tirolY crediblo a@conventionalnoto of tho ontir ,._ ,lfrair, with his un~bt\lhod e.dmissiQP of tho haste with whL:h he whoolod hie- B-29 downwind aftor tho .lomb was raloCl.sed, a.n.d his ombnrrasaod admission that tho airplane WE\S nwnod a.ftar his mothor, Enola. Gay. Bute.ftor tho airman.1 s briof tale Was finished and the ~avnl officer with tho bald head namod Parsonll, and th~ general with the piercing

,

plue _oyos namod. Farrell, had add ed to the narrativ~ one was dra.wn, against the will, into a world such as Edgar AllanPoo might ha.ve Burmised.

It w~. a wo,rld (to judgG from tho tir-at accounts) dcoinated by a monstrous Golunmof "moko, wit\l volcD,nic violence, thc.t rOBO beside tho Inland 6ea. On tho p-:round itself theTe WaS a. bright flc.ehJ two distinct shocks which reminded the

- , ,

oilot 0·( .nOok bursts olQ!lO aboard shook tho .Elirplane. Then in the centor of

,

HirQshima, wh.ore 300,000 poople lived, :~ furious boiling of brownish dust was sean,

which quickly covGred the city. From this dirty maelstrom, \1hitosmoko lec.pod

9n a mushroom stam to 20,000 foot whQro it sp.illed into a hugo, billowy aloud •

. ,

hen a st.range thing happenad , The top of this cloud struetur~ broke off the stem

.

'.nd ross several thousand feet; as it dia eo, eJlothor cloud formed on the stem

)xactly'ai the first had done. The thro~ 'ltatchl3!d this phenomenon for two minutes.

he.n t hey raced. for home, across HI' nshue_.nd 1510 tniles of s.ea.

H Q; reondljd tho s to ry tho first ?u edday morning, s uspe nd ad , as- it we r a ,

on that eorio pillar ofamoke .noarly as tall 0.8 Mt. "Evoroet. But a suspenso antored

tho atmosphere. th.l.t btoko the dull_ me- .. n from tho dwnp lotho.rgy cl1ftracteristic of t_ho$o subequator:i!ll latitud()s.

,

A youngof'ticoJ" preparing plans tor a oonventional attack with naarly

5. 000 t ens of convent i onal bombs rO!llarked, w1t h a wry smile I t hat it was hard to cencentr-at o one's mind. on EI. pro ccae Which the atotnicbomb _ if half the claims ma.do for it were true - hadtendorod humdrum and obsoloto. The loudspeakers £illGd tho air with confident commontari0S from Statosido, tho; voioos plying among tho insubstantial ract~ introduced us to tho nr _ prospect., of annihilation. with th@ BaInO tingling ovortonps of ploaeuro; the same blc.nd, unquostion.ing assumption of por ..

--------------------------------~- ._---- _._- -_ •• ,_. -#

',' , tf7\ t . t ·t'h fhvo·lut· 'Il\""r'y d."'_,vol.oprnGnts in

,faction, which the Gar h'k~~'" loma, oaSSOC'l.'l e 1J'l1. ' ,'", ,:.L....... . ...

bre<l.tfo.st foods. But her-e oTO'ryt:bing reduced ,itself to one question. what would

be found' whon tha.t column of smoke lifted?

Latortha.t day tho head intelligence, operational nnd general stuff

offi9EH" were passing around , with undiaguised oxeitomont, photographs taken by, an ~scort airplano. They showed tho smok. ,pillar with two tops exactly as the throo men had described it,a.nd the city hidden in brown smoke~ ,Later that day, a second

photographic airplane lCUlded on a distan-:; island. with the information that four hour" aftar the bomb WaS drOPPlid, Hiroshima. still lay hidden under the pall of emoke

'hat night (k,neral Spa-atz pI c..y ed poker with lis young Wing commanders in his flng

officers quart.era ovorlooking l'1.lmon Bay, but the game broke up oarly; 'there was

morE> talk about the peculiar properties. of thlZl new bomb than tho run ot the cards.

Next morning Generals- Spaatz and LGUc.y finally had on their desks tm

:photographs that answered tho question. Gener{a.l LeMay let rna ase tham. I. have

/?xilllIined many such phot,ographs in the course of wFi.tingabout the nir Wa.r and whilo

noexp art j,n damage all SO e attlen t, I could toll a -; once that here Was a city qu i t.e

~Qmplet e ly destroyod.. It ,JaB a flat gray w~.tQ of aahes , f/i th. I.l profes sional' 8 oyG

,

(feneral L.eMay traced the Fouto of What he called the shack or pressure 'V1aves gono-

i~ated by the blal5t. "!It 'lr'7a1l qui.te a pieoo of vlork," he said, adding that mora

I

than four square miles of tl1e ci tyl a a.light.ly mora thansb: square miles or built

up area had boen destroyed.

I s upp O.S o I half expe ct edt.o he e hown a s C eao of dEl S t ru ct i on Q f P lanot ary proportiona, at least a mighty crater. ,_-,xt tho more I studiod tho photograph tho

,

nora I I"e.a.lizod tha.t it Via! not lIlarkQdly different from th~ vGrtical photographs

if manyothor bombed Japanesr- cities 'Which I havQ seen hore in tho Marianas during

;he last fi vo woeks. I mentioned this to' G' _ I T ~M H

. ..' .... onera ~a.y. e answered thore was one

~rnpo.rtant differoncG botweon tho effoct 1- adueod by the atomic bomb whiohdGst,rcYI y hoat and shock wave , and the straight incondiary M-169 ine:(\lndiary bomb... r,n a.

''I\lcecssful incendiary attaok on a ur,b' an ~·n-.-'_ u_st'rl' al h' h - i t

... .. aroa, W1C . 18 nno y per cant

, • ~ ~ I.·f , I\y scc.ttered firo?# startQ~

made up of wood and pnpd,~~ouBas, notbing,survives. .

...I' t' afj r 1 P.,"'tto··,rn can bo mad G tom,ergo into one huge confl!l.gration, th~

~ccor~~ngo B ca u ~ _ ~

. burn s t·o t.·h,'" .I7P!, reund , ,1' o"'_ving only 0. cold, dead half-tone.,

~ntire target area qUlckly " '" t:;>,.. ,', ~.

h t h But the ,fl.'rat· a·t'om .. Lc bomb , by some quirk in theourvG'" o.f.o:

effect on the p . oograp , • , , .

pres s ures , at loast left some places, th ough net man;w, st and ing •

President Truman WEla quoted in reports pd.c ked up her-e as saying that om ~tomic bomb is equal to 20,000 tons of TNT. As to the accur-aey of that statement, perhaps none of the airmen here is qualified to judge. But property damage compar-;': ~blO in axtent has been done by anj"1Jlhere from ono to two wings. ot E-29's, carrying fro·m 1,000 to 2,000 tons of incendiaricoe • Thi.s obse~vation prompts anothor. It is true that we ha va e ome in.to pcss assi on of a form of power th3. tseems to derive ,as Mr. Truman imagina.tdvalysuggestod, from the very building forces of cr'ea't ion. Bu~.

k d ith' h t whl.·.c·h:t· s the' un ';·v'<>.re e 1· force in the build"!"

of course man h.is long Vlor a w· ..•. eat, ... v ..... . .

An· d ''' ''. I''''_''g'''r·d,e man' 6 p.o""or t'a t urn the creative

i.ng and dissipation of the uni'lforse. . ... <;.;. . . .. .

powers of life to purposes of destruction, we had already travelled .farther down

that path than our people or the rs.st of the world realized. Many have supposed

that because poieon gas VIas not used, this War has boon a. pretty docent war, conduct-

od at least by our side on a high moral and avon humanitarian plane.

It is a fair

iii tat emant, I think, to say most Amoricans believe this 0 And it i sonly natural that

thayshould, for not a singlo bomb evo.r fallon our mightynatio.n. in five years of

f/ar. Nevertheless, it has remadzed foru:e Amorican;, in partnership with the British

.

and out of our unparalleled producti ve- pOViers and r'eaear-ch, to wage war with a. terri-

jIe finality, to return it to the unlimited. status of ('l. War of annihilation against an

ent ira people.

against Garmany tho case for air pOl)'ler, we realizQ now, Was blurred by a

nuber of conditions lifhich WGlrQ not clearly under!tood. The or.iginal forcos were

NGak~ their effoctivoness wns dissipatod by.' random atta'cks an target sye.toms of

d ubd oua v._;.lue~ The =d.rmGl'l. did not ceme into PUBBOB61on of anything like an ad.equate

force until tho mjd dIG of 1944, at which time he Wa.s drawn irrt:.cclosa support. of the -4

the invasion. And the ans too. oven if they missed chanco to exploit air power, at least perceived what it could do to them and rapidly developed counters which kept the air attack from reaching the overwhelming momentum which it wae on

tho verge of attaining when their ground forces disintegrated. Meraver, weather

cons t ant ly stayed hi shand, aJ. though ho Via rkad f' everiehly to a eve! op and perfect

d evi cea that wou.ld permit him to strike cities and plants shelterod by fog and

clouds. Eyen so , during the £ ew monthsin which the airman Vias f'r eu to diirect foree in quantities which he deemed adequate a.gainst targets of his choice,by the admission of the en~myts leaders, he sottled the course of the war and left tho cities or central Europe in permanent ruin.

Here in the Pacific it Was a. different matt~r. The Pacific War has boon fought simultanoously in two centuries. Thera was the Ninetoenth centDry war of tho fleot·s and t he ground .i"orcos. This VIaI' tho Japanese onemy fought very woll • Hi. Navy g~YG ou.r Navy some bad moments before we swarmed over it with air power

and before the saa battle w~rr~re entored the electronic phaso for which he Was on~r 3uperrici~lly ~quipped. And his armies havo held their ground with,a tenacity Which, had they boen of tho western tra.dit ion; would have truly won them imperishable glory.

Then there ~as,the IV/Gntiath Century war of delivering force through the air in which tho airpl:lne happens new to be the most offic·ient carrier. To this wa.r the Jr:.panes6 with his nineteenth contury fleets and armies' brought at the outsat just enough novelty and power to gain momentary ndvantago over our navy and armies of .lpproximatoly the samQ time pattern. But that' advantage '!"(as lost in the Coral Soas at Midway, and in the struggle tor New GuineR. And by tho time we began to move into the Marianas with tho B-29's, his desperate grip on the Twentieth Cent.ry was broken. Tha remnunts of his s~ll tactical air force d Laappear-od in the battlo tor Okinawa, or was broken on tho ground. Ho Was loft with only a ninete~nth century army lockod in caVGS on the watery mGrgins of his islands without tho means to 00.11y forth, doomod to wait for Wl anemy who really need not come t. ClOS8 quartors at all, since ho had already provod he co~~ wipe out JQpaneso citios, ona aftor

, .

.

~othor, from 1500 mile

.. way.

It is ba rd to pu~ into words the extraordinary differenco botween the

. i t J In England, the American nirman

air war in Europe and t he al.r war aga ns . apnn-

found a massive island with rolling coutryside easily adapted to flying fields. Close at hand were all tho conveniences of a modern stuto- ports, railroadS, indust~

"

Here he entered up6'n~ vast ocean waste.

He c~used tho islunds of Tinien, Guam, a~

,

Saipan to be seizod bcce.ue e they fo1l within tho 1500 mile range of the B-29 a i rp Lane .&ll were agrioultural islands. ' .. , Nona had a decent harbor. Eight months ago we wore fighting for Guam, a year age for Saipan. But new these pIe-ces ar-e grossly changed,

we huve knocked tho to~ off obstructing hills xod filled the valleys and levelled

the jungle to make airfields and bomb dumps and gasoline storage basien; we have

literally converted these islands into engines of WE'.r.

I have stood on these fields and watched the bombers loave for Jap~n.

Each wing operates from two runways. Every twenty-five to thirty seconds, first on

ane runway then the other, a bombor with six to s evon tons of high explosives or

incendiaries fla.shes dO"7n the mile and a half wbite c or-e.L runway. Tho same scene

is taking p Lae e v/ith the aame metronomic pr-acd s Lon on the ot.ho r four fields in the

M~ri~n as. Over the sea these airpl~nes, soparatod by this n~rrow interv~l in timGJ

form into

long columns aimod at J:lpan. Fifteen hours or so l?t€lr they are ba.ck,

hr.ving travelled a distt::mce equo.l to 0.. transatLmtic crossing from Nova Scotif\

to Scotland (CHI<:). Three nighte 1a.tor; perho>.ps only two, theY'l,1ill start out again.

General Spa.a.tz, when he finished his first tour of inspoction, das cr-Lbed

the air :1..tt,,-ck here the best organizod air oper-e .. tion ho had ever seen.' In Europe

his stratogic ~ir forcas on ~Qver~l critical occasions lay uselessly on the ground

tor mc.ny dJ.Ys, pinned thoro either by fog over its Lind Lng fields or clouds over

tho- ta.rget which aid not permit it to do the visu?l, precision bombing which wae

then the £und~ental pilla.r at American air doctrine. Th~ force bombs mostly at

night. It possosses preoision instruments which en~ble it to pick up _nd dostroy -6-

'. .

, .

':rith a.lmost certain accur-acy tho ind.ustl'L,11 centors of c I

s hjd don by hundreds

of feet of cloud. Theso instruments aro something less than perfect; it is J~panlf -misfortune to have c r e.i t ed her, cr-amped and teeming citi0S on tho co nst a.L plain,

ez ae t Ly whor-e tho separc t i on between Land and 'ilatGr show up most sharply on these

instreumemts. In Europe our airmen so.id it was folly to bomb cities~ the effects

of bombing would show up too late to aCtect the military decision v/hich our huge

ground farcces were seeking force in battle. In t 10 Puc Lf'Lo , Vie ar-e bomba ng cities

for throe roasons; first, beca.use the stagnant fog~ that h'!ir.g pcrpotually ovor tho

.T2..p1'l.nl3so Le Land s Leave foV{ opportunities for precision strikes at specific p Larrt s

in the w~r production system; socondly, oGcauso J~panose war industry is, to ~

Lar ge extent, performed by thousands of little household plants embedded in the

ur-ban cortex; thirdly, because the .flin:sy and inflammable Ja.panese buildings :trG

almost ideal t~rgets for p~ incondiar.y war wagod from tho air. Th~ very structuro

ot the J upanee e city m:tdr- (,i~o st .. t.e torri bly vulnerc.ble for 3. twont ioth ceni;~ry W'o.r

The stout stono walls and reihforcGd concrete construction of El1rope yielded tha

at r-c nga p he nomenon 0 f the roo fIe ss cit io J and tho bare, wind owl e 5 S 1:7alls. Tho

Br i t Lsh found it har-d to burn Ge rman cities, but Japanese ci tics sink quickly into

ashes.

The five grea.t cities of Tokyo, Nag ey,a , Osakit!, Kobe arrd Yokohama waro ::>.1]

destroy-ad, to the ~irmen' s s at i.sf'ac t Lon , s evor-a Ii mont_ ago. Only Nagoytl pr es sntr

sp:,cLtl difficulty, owing in par-t ,to stubborn and vroll-org3.nized firefighting defense. But after four attacks, t.he airman felt he could cross Nagoya off the targc list.

Since LeMuy revO;:;·l:'sed the Ameri-J .n doctrine and threw tho woight of h.i.s

t cnnage on urban illdustrb.l 8.rei1.S, sixt .. d'ifferent J~lp"l.nOSo citiGe have been at t ac

ode They rango in size from Tokyo with soven million populJ.tion to Tsurg, with

only 32,000. Tan of those citiqs ~~8 c .rriod on the t3rgot lists m~rk - no photogr~phic cover ~inco the att~ck. But forty-eix aro

ViTi th a question off crossed/as dostr;

a.d and s ix as po..rtb.lly : ~ , ' royed . , In the fift-t~vo cities tho total industrial

--------~

b t h d d and seve Y··four aquxr o miles·,

ir ea marked for destructt n was .:\- ou one un ro - ,

.h e :drman, on the strength of tho phct cgr-aph i c evidence, appon r s to ho.ve gotten

151 square miles. He has carried off this job, while t"I,t the SCU"lC time seizing evory opening in the woe-ther for a procision attack, Sl.t a tCltal cost of 0,000 bombers and .,00 men. In the Las t month his losses have been unbelievably low - only seventeen

.

~ombers in 5,600 sorties, or loss than one third of one por ceni. Ja.panese resist-

ance h: s almo s t d i.sapp oared.

I'"hen I wr o t c this only thirty cities remained on the a.irm2.n's ready

list - less t han :l month's work, ::t t ho rc.t o he's going on. \ihen he finishes; with

them, ho may go on to thirty or forty more, sm.i.L), .md middle cities, which will.

pot t ake more t h-in two months more, Simple people find it hard to believe that

wa.rships m'neuvering in tho dead of night on the open sea below the horiz.on can

.

Lo c at e o rch other unerringly and the' first s h i.p to got off a fow salvos can count

o n sending the other to the bottom in a raw mi.nut as , But who <It the start of the we

would have believed bombers streaming tJ~ough cloads would bo eble to destroy citiee

their 'bombardiers cannot see. I have listoned to intelligence officers briefing

oi.Le t s on how to .ippr o .ch J~-:panese cities whose names they could scarcely pronounce.

tn the morning thoso cities had gone.

Thore is a. cert;.in irony in ClmEl juncture in humeri : ... ffairs, for it /

the ~ppe~r~nce of the on the stago

'when the war aga.i ns t

atomic bomb at just this

doeidod. The J~pan se themselvos say that the first of these bombs killod nearly ~l

the poople in Hj r'o shdmc , :--.n almost unim.:'..gin~ble, loss of life. But if; is 0. fair

re sump t i.on th:>..t the Lnc end i ar-y at t acks which went bofore have killed several times

th,~t number. Tho }.irmc.n c , ... lls thorn "burn jobs". The hee.t of tho' fires gener :.to

therm.2l currents violent enough t o hurl i:l B-29 sever-c.l, thousand feet off its fli,gh; p th, to flip it h!lf OVGr on its blck, ~von to bre~k the limbs and gush the skulle

o f tbs crows.

Thore is doubtless 1 profound lesson to be drnwn from this ~tomic force

50 dr '.n).).tic ':.lly r al.e.iaod , :~though it is always dangerous to assume th.3.t on the

I _.:.8~._.

" ...... _

strength of two violent 'md ap a c t nc ul.cr' explosions, tho histQric .... l h:'.bits and institutions of ID .. :.nkind h eve boon permcnont Ly unhinged. But here in the P, .... cific,

where ~ force of about 7,000 men entoring the Japanese .... ir at will ten or cleven

timos :. month h.ave domons t r c t ed beyond doubt their ability to wipe out J.J.p.].nes€l

ci tics at the r;J.to of four or fi ve J. night, one hope comes instantly to mind; th"t

thl.·s 1 t t ul r demonstrltion of tho tochnic~.l gulf sopar~ting tho Japaneso

as spec:tc ::.

from us will persuade their lo~ders to ~cknowlodge thoir solf-evident importance an.

thus spar-e our ground forcas the folly of -n invasion whos e underlying ccnc opt i on

runs in tho f'a e o of tho logic of tho .lir and induces us to thro·.f oursolves upon

the onemy ·1..t the only point whore he is strong ~

Now it must take c. fc.nta.stic output of anergy to crea.te just one of thGSQ

a t onn e c ont rxpt i.ons , ThO sparing use suggests th~t the supply on h.ind cannot be

vary Lir'ge , .and th.:t po Li.td ca'l eons fdor-at Lens , as well as tho ncc es sd.t y of pr-act Lc-r,

tests, hc.s t oned its injection in tho battle. Moreover, tho l:-:.borious progresS of

science from one cl~ssie episodo ts nother warns th~t a long timo, perh~ps ye~rs.

will pr-ob.rb.Ly e Lap so boforo _ .. 11 tho thing's baing s.~"id about, the process begin to

come true. But,lro;;>,dy it ha s oxpo aed how abs ur-b arc the Jrtificic..l '·{e.lls sepa.ru-

ting "lir, sec. and ground in the b r oad Pacific; how c onvorrt i.onn I and: .. unimlgino.tive

was tho ground-se ..... b .t t.Lo p Lan to tho very end; how p_;_rochia.l the prop<l.g::a.ndizing

on. the p ir-t of tho p ro fes s i orr-J, scrva ces for. a hugo standing military es tub Li.ah-

mont in the yoar s to como. Tho safety of '~morica lies as alli:/£'l.Ys in the technical

c ompent cnc o of it 5 m".8S industries in "I. ftoe socioty. Tho milit~ry men did not

urad uc e this thing. Evon t ho vi rman , so f-·.rsight od in other t;lctys, in his rob.t ion-'

3 hip tot his d eve lop mont l." s r cscaLod only t t t" t

w. ~S a ranspor ~lon ~gon , with little

knowledge of wh:_t vias in tho pa ckago ,

~ little whib scionco hl,.y not evon nood

him.

-30-

u. S. ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES, EE.ADQ.U.ARTERS, Cu~m

10 August, 1945. FOR RELEASE: 1330

CO~WNIQUE NO.9.

1. Seventy M~ianRs-based ]-29 Superfortresses dropped heavy demolition

bombs on the Tokyo arsen~~ are~ in the late morning of 10 August. The bombers

were escorted by p-47 Thunderbolts gnd P-5l Mustangs from Iwo Jim~.

2. Ninety B-29 Superfortresses dropped heavy demolition bombs pn the

Nippon Oil Refinery CompfI..ny at A.'l1"'.gaseJti in the e::1"r1y hours of 10 August. Enemy

interception was slight and anti-aircraft fire r~~ged from meager to intense.

I

3. Reconnaissance photographs show thRt the Ube Coal Liquefaction Comp~

\,,3.S left completely inoperative -oy the B-29 mission reported in Communique No.

4. All of the refinery units were destroyed or _d",mF.l.ged and a seA_wall -protecting

the plant was broken in seyeral plF.l.ces, flooding the pl~nt site.

CARL SP AATZ • Gener8.1 t U. S. Army, Commanding.

Public Bela.tiona Office I

U. S •. .ARMY STiATEGIC AIE~"]!OilCES

Guam.

For Release:

HJj:A])Q,UARTEB.S, UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES, ~, A~st 10

General Carl Spaatz announced this morning that dama~e assessment photographs

made three and one-half hours after the atomic bombing of Nagasaki showed that

the city was completely covered wi th smoke risi:ag to 20 I 000 feet .•

Scattered fires were visible outside the s~oke area.

No further reports on results of t~:e bombing are available at this time.

ECHa-81045 #1092 .

I

I..

-

1

10 August 1945

Attended oeremonyat mo hours this morning on board HMS DUKE OF 'YORK at which Admiral Nimitz WaS given the GCB, British, by Admiral Fraser.

Doolittle arrived this afternoon. Notes of discussion with him. attached.

Dinner tonight aboard lIMS DUKE OF YORK with Admiral Fraser and. Admiral Nimitz •

.Announcement made over r&d 10 of Japan's aoceptanoe of the Potsdam surrend.er terms. No official confirmation. Te1etwed Worstad and was told to oarry on with scheduled mission tonight until official word. Deoided to canoel mission. because of weather.

u. s. ABMY S~!ATEGIO AI~ JO~CES. HEAD'8JALiTERS t Guam.

For Release: l330 11 August 1945

CO~ruNI~UE NO. 10.

,

1. Reconnaissance photographs made on 10 August after the atomic bombing

reported in Communique No.8 show that at least .98 square mile of Nagasaki's

built-up area of 3.3 square miles was destroyed.

2. A force of 102 P-51 Mustangs from Iwo Jima was over the Tokyo area on the morning of to August as escort for the TI-29 Superfortress mission reported in

Communique No" 9. Our pilots engaged 18 Japanese fighter airplanes in combat,

destroying six. probably destroying one and damaging 11. All of our Mustangs

returned.

3. Mining of enemy waters .by :8-29 Superfortresses continued on 10 A"I.l,{';ust.

CARL SFAATZ, General.U. S. Army, Commanding.

IlfCO)AING MESSAGE No. WAR 41880

1)T'[)' 111535Z

To spaatz trom Arnold

"

Re Marshall',s earl iar me'ssage to. you, all ,strate;gic ~ir operations

ot USASTAF lf111 cease at once and 'any,miles ions which may nOJi be"in: the air

.. . .'

e~out8' to targets will be recall·.d. Tqisre.str icttQD. wil~ 'oontinue un'til

such time as .YOU

upI'ratlons.

J '.

DO BOT RJPKA! NOT P~RMIT- ANY L:sAtAG .!O PRESS,QP MO~iT8 OF

I • _ .t. - '1~ , •

BAltER. TWO N~. IN 'CONNECTION 1/flTIi INSfRUCTlaNS RECBIVED TO:DAY_ OR

T '--

.l1JY CO~DPLATEl), OP~RAT IONS or BAKER TWO NnE~ ~" .

,. -7 1 $- 'It. ,- ~ '.. ~

t.

" •

1 A . CG

!'ROM: 90WEN USASTAF

TO • WAR

REFERRING TO lOUR :lR ,,p.UR Sl!.~~' EIOm TWO FOUR. PRESS HAS 00

\. • f'

,

AUTHORITY TO QUOTE ANY ST.A~'EME!lTS PROM U g .C:-:jI I HAVE ~ DE .L~V",".R.

m otFIGIAL REASON FO CALL lG OFF 'YESTERDAYS OPERATION WAS

.

t '

WEATHER. D WERB 4BOUT TO CAR..W OUT A MlSSIQ" 'TOD Y mI~rr . UR

'0 L,. I j ." •

KlSlIOJT u.s'RICKIVSD. IN VIEW OF "mUR 'mSTRUCTIO~S WILL CAl eEL

n~IOB. aDTCE MY LAS'!' M$SSA,GE TO YOU, REFERENCE PRES~J HAvE, un _' STU.IIITS, AND nT~lD TO lW'JtE NO STATElcJEUTS. AfYTHING

1 , \ .

. .

. " ' ,

PUll.lIB. II I11I&Y, CONJECTURE ON THEIR PART.

1t 18!anmT ION , '

. .

P -w Lk Qb;W: ...... ~~-1I2~~~_.............,.-=--

VA tf~ 8;;. L/-' -p~6,- .1

~ES ONLY MESSAGE FROM GENERAL t1ARSBALL TO GENERAL SF;'AAT2

..

BE DELIVERED IMMEDIATELY ON R~CEIPT:

~OTE-'----

CNERAL MARSHALL TO "GENERAL SPAATZ REFERENCE YOUR TELETYPE FN-l1'

, ,- ~~:

::\~ ~

~ '~DTG 111.12f'Z TO GEN ARNOLD AUGUST 11 COLON YOU ARE QUOTED"

. - .

, .

E!-"PRESS tilTH STATEMENT THAT QUOTE· B-29"S AR.E NOT FLYING TODAY ~ICH HAS BEEN ACCEPTED GENERALLY AS POSITIVE INDICATElflN THAT-~Bj

. . ,

~ JAPAN !fAD BEEN TER~1INATED tALSO THAT 'HALSEY'-S FLEEr HA~ CEESED rTACK. THIS PRESENTS VERY DELECATE AND CRITICAL PR()BLEM TO THE lESIDENT. RESUMPTION OF BOMBING WQULD APPEAR TO INDICATE THAT ~ELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS HAD ~A~LEN TH~OUGH GI~ING ~ISE TO A STO

~

~ PUBLICITY AND CONF~lSING VIEWS. , UNTIL 1. CAN REACH THE PRESIDE

.

. D SECRETARY OF WAR IN ABOUT AN HOUR DO N®r RPT NOT DESPATCH

. \

~ .

~ - I·

(' MORE M~SSlONSBUT CARRY OUT THESE -INSTRUCTIONS IN' SUCH A MAN

r ABSOLUTELY!O AVO~D ANY NEWS ITEM LEAKING OUT FROM GUAM, SAIF

~ OKINAWA. PLEASE MAKE NO RPT NO FURTHER PRESS. COMMENTS OF

~ KIND UNTIL GIVEN RELEASE FROM HERE.

fD

UNQUOTE-----

. -

R THIS ON YOUR MACHINE' PLS

TO I CO GEN AI? NBR,

SPAATZ)

,

I •

1IEATRER COl DITIOtl" DURING' PAST lI,m som

. , .

TO

lfITnaOW ANY 'l- o,l1.i SALE O~RA'J:'10 S U_ 'DER'(O NDITIONS mrca OW / EXIST. NO~ KNOWl'~l(l THE SlTENT TO VHICII ABA HOWE ING l{A Y CO L lCA

, I .

I '" ,.

THE SITUATION, AM. OR Tt PRESENt' LlM'~Tn~(T 'OUR ()~E~TIOtl~ •. 'f,O~ , 'd (A..M.UN ~.' llAi"'AuLc..' b.I..c..(~ 6cm;,J"np t!".,~

AT1'ACKSON }In.ITAlri' T!.RETS VlSU.l\I.L 14 .' ESS I H~" (} IDV

OTHER ISm. ,'i!LL CONT INUE'rII,IS '~OLrC! UN .• IL IT IS DF.T J OR OW JAPAN OFFER 'IS AOCEPTABLE •. IT IS ,81 I n1'lCArI' TF.AT OUR.

,! Il1o. I ~

.. _,

DATRER AIRPLAlm OVE1R TO}{IO 'l'01}Ai!' RECE:rv:&D l~O

, v I

\ ,

.FT FIRB.

mIS

AAF POA OUTGOING MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION

CONCURRE~CE
Ck SECTION Initials
CIS
D/e/opos
Dir Plans
DirComm
Dir Intel
DirWea
D/C/ Ad'n'un
Stn Cont
Lia Off
Engr
DirMSTS
Cb Maint
Ch AF Sup
Ch T/Ser"
QM
Ord
Sig
em)
Fin
Trans
DIAd min
D/Pers
AG
Mor~rv
Spl Serv
Chap)
Postal
Pub Rei
Surg
JA
AI/IG
EvalBd
HqComdl REFERENCE

PRECEDENCE

From:

Serial:

Date Time Group: ,

OUT!

Approved for Transmission

A ~ DISTRIBUTION. -3 B £bJ'

o co

I

Itt by G.-ral &put.

. toll United tiODa1 .0-

eeptanoe or the Japaae.e 8UrJ"eMer.

Por all of' humanity, this is n hour of T~!lk giving. ~"I eac_ 1''''

turns to a world whloh bal not knom eornplew peaoe for a deoad • every

mUlt haTe • len •• of r.lief and humbla gratltud.(!I.

At the .ame ti e .. e of te Air !'orees cannot restrain I. Bonee or gr .. t

pride. For ny long month., before t...'h.e Sup.J!'fcrtr.s •• e appeued in the Pac11"io, this.i.r powv _. r.pr.sen-ced by /.rmy A'4" Foro •• magnificently led by G.neNl Kenney aD:! by air unit. of' the Navy. The work of then Air Forces in 010 ••

• ollabor.tioD with Gl'oUDli Foroes and the 1eeta •• ured to us the b •• e upon

whiC)h to laQ!loh OW' luperfortr.ss attacks d.1reet upon the Empire.. .A.tt.4ir plo-

neer

work fr'om India and Chir.a, our strategic. bomb

prog

ontared its

intenaiv. ph ... reaohed nine nths ato ith lws first oission fro the arianna ••

It did not .. eaoh it. peak of operating ,efficiency until the 0 pture of rwJi.ma.

In • oomparatlnly short time our au erfort. blasted end burned -_Y,must of th. Japan ... Jt!Ip ire , • oapuity "'or· kin ar. ani haft written their pl ee in hi.tory.

'l'ha 1I.U itary for .. that _8 projected against the en

nfl.ota the

total ettort of our iDlunrial mir;ht. the pl ning of' 0 r l •• d rl. ani the

wwk of ..,..,.,. in41v14ual ~1oa11. ~/iotory over Japan s aohi..,.. by all

~ •• rero •• and tho.e ot our 1111e1.

AG

_IAISON

'JA

0','1'

":':" DEClASSIFIEU

DOD ltrs.

, rJ:..,tJ\;; &. 20 June 19J1- 9 C - By, _.LC; Date~'7~ ,

,

PRIORITY - TELBCON

,

13 Augu.t 1946

CARL SPAATZ. GEN USA

eG

FROM: COMGEN U$ASTAP

TO I USASTA! REAR

(PERSON.6L TO ARNOW FROM BP llXZ )

NBR,

,

UVE HJARD OVER RA'.OIO RBPOrRTS OF 'BOMB ING SY, '1'WENTIETH AIR FORO

mDAY. m ORDER to' ,AVO m ANY FaUIB !LITY OF DOUBr IN ANYONB MIND. I JmST INFOmI YOU THAT WE ARB 'STRICTLY C0MPLYtlfG WITH INSTRUCTIONS AND NO BOMBING (1PERATION'S BY THI STRATmIC Am FORC!S !tIRE HAVI' BIlN CARRI1lD' OUT. SINClI RlCBIVlNG mroSE mSTRUC',tIONS. PARA TWO. All VERi' GRA~IPmD TO RECIIVI YOUll dSSAGE.(TILECQN MESSAGB NmmER TWELVE DASH POURTEEN). BEtTlI, .... T1IOII..ACTION I HAVE TArEN IN mIS rs ENTIRELY SOtnfl) AND I RBGRET THA PRISS HAS SUCH A PREBO)(DlANT INFLUENCE IN lln.tuRY STRATIDY.

·DIsnmUTIONI cis Dep CG NO OTHER .

PR

...

-~-

r> TOP SECRET

AAF POA INCOMING MESSAGE

I, .. DEClASSlAEtl

OOD Itrs.

-£igg- & 30 ~~~1\B)-1S"

CLASSIFICATION

.MESSAGE REFERS TO:

PRECEDENCE

URGENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 1417082 AUGUST

- TELECON MSG NR 14-t1

FROMe COMGENUSASTAF (REAR) TO I COMGENUSASTAF

SPAATZ FROM NORSTAD (PERSONAL)

MARARTHUR WILL BE SUPREME COMMANDER WHO WilL ACCEPT FOR THE ALLIES THE FORMAL·SURREND£R OF THE ~APANESE. EACH ALLIED NATtON WILL DESIGNATE 1 OFFICIAL REPRESENTATtVE TO BE PRESENT. NjMITZ HAS BEEN DESIGNATED FOR THE US

.

SURRENDER EXPECTED TO BE ACCEPTED ON A BATTLESHIP, PROBABLV THE MtSSOURI. ONLY 1 REPRESENTATIVE OF EACH NATION IS TO

BE OFFICIALLY PRESENT BUT .T IS EXPECTED HERE THAT MACARTHUR WILL INVITE COMGENUSASTAF IN ADDITION TO ·THOSE SPEC IFf ED. THIS IS FOR YOUR PERSONAL INFORMATION ONLY.

ACTION:

CIS ,,)

'NfO 1 lOG eG DC/G

1

AAF POA INCOMING MESSAGE

MESSAGE REFERS TO:

PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

TELECO~ USG ts-t7 ROM' COMGEN USASTAF REAR

TO " COMGEN USASTAF

UBJECT , STRATEGfC BOMBING GUIDANCE

WASH J t~GTO'J t D.C. 142242Z- AUG:, 945.

EFERENCE TELEOON TN1S DATE SPAATZ-N-DRSTADt FOlLDWffiQ UIDANCE SUGGESTED FOR STRATEGIC BOMBING ROUNDUP. _IN GE"£R L POLICY SET FORtH IN OYERALL GtHDANC£ STATEMERT

OUR WARX 48321 SHOULD BE FOLLOWED. tHE SURRENDER DF JAPAN COMES AFTER THE SEVEREST AND MOST CONOENTRATED BOMBlNGCAUPA1GN IN HISTORV AND WITHOUT ACTUAl INVASION OF THE HOMElAND. THUS IT IS THE 1ST TIME A NAT10N HAS

CAPITULATED W'TH ITS U"tolOR RMfES DESIGNED rOIl DEFENSE DI G

ACTt ON. IRO

INFO.

CIs

L.OQ

OF THE HOMELAND STIll fNTACT.. HOWEVER. IT IS NOT rOR THE

AAF TO SAY THAT A lR POWER HAS WON THE WAR. IE eANNOT OVER- :'0

.

EMPHASIZE THE 'Ml~ASURABLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF OUR SISTER

FORCES WHICH PRECEDED THE SUSTA I NED ATTACKS BV UND-BASED BOOB£RS. THE LAND BAnLES UP FROM AUSTRAL tA BURMA AND CHINA-- THE ABILITY OF THE NAVY TO BRIDGE UtIPRECEDENTED '/ DISTANCES A,jD JOIN WITH 'TS FAST CARR fER AN» FLEET STRENGTH IN Bmv~ARD.NG JAPANESE OCCUPPIED ISlANDS, PERMITTED AIR POIER TO WIElD ITS MAXIMUM STRENGTH.

,.

... ..

HOWEVER, ONCE THE 8ASES WERE SECURED, OUR STRATEGIC AIR FORCE WAS EN-

~ , .

A LED TO GO INTO AOTION AND nElivER THE 'BLOWS WHICH SPEEDED JAPANESE

C/~P'Tut,TION" THEREFORE Ha ITS OVERALP ... STRA"iEGIC STORY IT MAV BE SAID

iUAT S1R A"'(,£G t G BOMB I NG, ,I NIl'S CUMULATIVE EFr ECT,SUPPl EMENTED B V BLOCKADE SO CRIPPLED JAP~N~S INDUSTRIALo ECONOMIC AND MILITARY RESOURCES "niBT THE ENEMV WA,SFORCED TO SURRENDERo NEVER BEFORE f4AD STRATEGIC

BO~'81 NG BEEN GIVE~l SUOH A RECORDED T£ST BEFORE THE EYES OF THE WORt..Do NEVER BEFORE HAD ITS OPPORTUN'ITV rOR ACCOMPl I SHUENT 50'DI RECTlV AFFEOTED THE WELFA~E OF HUMAN.TY. IT CAN BE SAID THAT A1R POWER EMERGED FRO~

iTS TAIAl, COMPLEtEl.V ViNDICATED AND MATURE UJ STATURE" JAPAN, WITH A

Pit 01 F rc EMPI REFROM WHICH TO DRAW RESOURC ESp t~ A S SO SEV EREl V PUN 1 SHED ON

. ""WAS/ _

HER HOME I SLANDS THAT HER ABlllTV, TOWAGE WAR DESTROYED. IT SHOULD BE

.

C1EliRl r NOTED THAT KNOCt<lNG tJAPAN OUT Of THE WAR ,lITHOUTAN'ACTUAlIN-

VASJON HAS SAVED COUNTLESS LIVES. THIS WAS DONE A' GREAT coST AND NO FEW C,ASUALT IES. BUT THE COST AND CflSUALT I ES WERE FAR LESS ,A~lD FEWER THAN A

D 1i1E'CT LAND ,ASS,AUt T WOULD HAVE ENT,A ILEDe IT I SALSO WELL TO NOTE TH,\,T THEAAf WAS THE tNSTRUMENT TO DELIVER THE ATOMIC DEATH BLOW TO JAPANESE AGGflES S R Of!! • DUE OREn I T MUST GO 'TO THE MUlT 'TUDE OF PEOPLE AND C OUPL EX i TV OF' I NTEFtEST S , SO 'ENT 1ST SAND C I V J l tAN OR OUPSWH I C H MADE THE NEW C AT A C.,. lVSMIO FORCE POSSIBLEo IT WAS THE 8-29 SUP'ERFORTRESS WHICHEFF'ECTIVElV USED TH.IS REVOLUTIONARY WEAPON INA DECISiVE MANNERo NO BETTER INSTBUMEN" THAN THE AtRPLANE HAS BEEN 'OUN~ TO UTILIZE THE MILITARY MrGHT INHERENT H~ THE TlATOMJC BOMBo INDEED. IT IS DIFFICULT TO CONCEIVE OF ANY INSTRU. MENT OTHER TH.AN THE AIRPLAN~ SO REALLY SUITED~TO.THEPURPOSE" IT WOULD B INCO~SI6TENTWITH AAF DIGNITVAND RESTRAI~T TO MAKE THESE STATEMENTS BOtD~V AND BRAZENLY.'N AN OVERALL STRATEGIC STORY THE iMPLICATION CAN B SKILFULLY WOVEN INTO THE PIECE so THAT NO READER CAN FAIL TO DRAW THEUNMtSTAKEABL.E INFERENCE THAT AIR POWER WAS THE OUTSTANDING F'A·CiOR IN ·0··00·.

VICTORY. ~ ~ ~

.. - - .. .. .. - .. - --- - ..

--~-~~~~~,-~,~~"~~~~,-- - --- -- - --- - - _. -- -- ~ ~----

FO czs

He Ani.olcl 11n1" 1r Fol'c'"

Your et~r of 7 A~~ust 194' 'on the reeulta aocom-

plished b7 the t.rat g$.c Air oro,e. in RUrope. and the rt=! u.lts expocted trQlll

our ett '" b I to of the Js:pa,naa8 home 1s1and~; are d.eeply appre-

ciatecl. You are ~dJ' &War. ot '11rI' ,ealing 1d th nsp- not to tile tactical J

.and technical ell e of this 0 d U\ th ' PAcif1c.

tudyint; t implications of your Victo17 )1., of 2{, July 1945 'rca TlJWlNAL. S_e M cU5.ion has b en. had "With Gene.ral IlacArthur's pLanner. on t..h1a .. toter and has daVelopedthat an incroas:ed pace of 1.~J-

JQ. ni will not b eaq. -Two major taoto.... .. ;wvolVi d. - Ql :1s t.be tr. ndous

stN.1n wh10b b. plaCed on enipp1ng .in ace pl,1 . tlJ,e occupa tin '1 of

the Japanee homeland. at tbe earll •• t poefl1b1e dat ) and t.h other is t.he lack: of ad bl.. bABe. on which to plaoe the VH8' $'8.t tee r 'ur-than BOW Bchedaled.., Hqwever I now h a 118.1.0110 fie ~ on d~ty tb <len

cArtbur and another with Gen"iJlru KenneY'.. Thea.off1e ra have, bMA brl. ed

to cH..ecua w1th the . fa of t.ho. t h. quarters, e factors

iDYolvedin tb1. utt,er, as' well- a in. 'iB CKJ ... ~-'3 ' Q - rat.iQn8, d <resolve

tbe d.1.f.t1oulU which eon£root u • expect to te~ t.o th all dat ·t

is developed 1>7 th1. H ~r. which a.aim. 1l d,pelo lin y- plUM- for

<our part.1cipatlon" in "BLAcru,sTn <I

I .. fonaN1As tbrcMAgh lerm.,. to .Tau t.od.&7 a d:Lapatoh ree

t t urg ... tbougbt be &iv.- to the .atabli.hDlent ~t .. clng r "orCD

caan.and1n the PaeUiQ. I believe that ...hould pres.s tor .stablishment

of ~ headq~artera ., it Jiec •• MZ7, Pf'89ent ccmma.nd r illti

ot , and US TAY. 'lhtt 1;aport.an~ thing 1n • Il1rul 1. to retain for tb.1J

.1ngl. hM.clquart,er 1n the Pac1t1c, wh1ch ,ht b. eal.l If A r cU1e" ,

the pNl"OgatiY" at operaUonal CQIlt.rQL d Idl.tcb have been obtained

tor USAS.fAr ADd th. pnria-lon for d1.- t cat.ion th the in

a.neral, < A1r F c .. , on all ... tt. not per\&1A1ng to ot.her The tel"

_~t.a.

U .. an to a.hi.... ~ in tM OVerhead of our au ""1&D1 ... ~1on ben ill \lie .lae1t1e, 'it 1 •••• ent1Al ~hat, we .• ,t." ,. ooneoUda'1on i"b. -..11 .... ,...11a1. "'ft~ alter V-J Dat. I YiInA] i.. the ..,tabl.l. tlt, ot ·AIKU AC- • pombll" 00 o.bu, wJ.t.h two .ubordir..ate n fir air 1"01'0.

eo and .... to hutll. the 'HB's and. tM ot~r t.o handle the: eJ." wdt •

• ooperaUq wl..ua tbe &J'WIId- , .... ' t.b the ao.utlle. '01 connwrl.catJ.OUI

$' " 1. w_, I beU. ••• ncb • It,ruct,\U"4I tJ\ it. t.nC1l1U7' _"ice

e1. __ t.a 801l1d 1\0 .rt1,c1ent.l.y perform \ha a4.1' mI..elon 1ft \118 "Pa,c111c to iDclude the ~ppcrt. ot eeeu t10n fore 8 h.l ,lapan.

Cl'uu. . PAATZ Gen~ral.J u. S. An1:tN' Comntand1ni

\N RIlPL Y RIII'1i:R '1'0:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES WASHINGTON

By Authori tyot 7he CommandIng Army Air 'orcas

~~1 .. £ ~ __ .

Dat. Iuitials

General Carl Spaatz

Commanding General, U S Army Strategic Air Forces AP0234, San Francisco, California

_ 1

Dear Tooey,

I know that you are interested in the reason for the Victory 343 message dabed 26 July 1945 from TERMINAL.

Weare planning to implement fully the 40 group B-29 program even though there may be snearly Japanese capitulation.. In such case, these units will be deployed as rapidly as practicable. If necessary the airplanes and crews may be dispa.tched before they are completely trained or combat equipped. We aTe making plans to deploy B-29 groups to the Aleutians, Philippins.s, Maria.nas and RyUkyus. This will give us complete strategic coverage in the Pacific. Deployment of air forces should be planned in order ·to create an airtight coverage of the entire area and to keep the Japanese under close surveillance.

We are sending offic·ers from this Heaq:quarters to the Alaskan Department and Eleventh Air Foree headquarters to workout plans for the possible deployment of 2 VHB Groups to the Aleutis.n Chain. We will keep you advised as to the results of these conferences ,

During our recent conference in Potsdam, we took t,ime out to observe first hand the utter ruin of some of Germany's largest ci.ties. The results accomplished by the Strategic .Air Forces under your command were astounding and give a vivid example of theef .. rectiveness of air power. I think the world has come to know the striking power of a well trained and equipped air force for the first time.

Arte.r observing Germany and watching the steady growtho.fthe Strategic Air Foree in the PaCific, I feel certain that the results of strategic bombardment of the Japanese home islands will be even more effective in saving the li.ves of our troops than was the case in Europe.

Si.ncerely,

H. H, ARNOLD) Commanding General, Army Air

1 Inc~ Map

DECLASSlFIED DOD ltra,

& 20 June

......

_.,. fl.08 jan. & 20 June 1914~A:lS~ 1 ~

8y!..Mt-: LC; DatJ1u-_ :::..;.:[,.1'.. :._

DECLASSIREIl DOD nrs,

AAF POA

INCOMING MESSAGE

CLASSU"!~N ~RET

. ·'MESSAGE' REFERS TO:

PRECEDENOE URGENT

1 5111 ~Z AUG 11.5

FROM: CINCAFPAC SGO GENERAL MACARTHUR TO : CO All EN USASTAF'

PERSONNAL FOR GENERAL SPAATZ

C 33773

ACTION: cis

MY DEEPEST THANKS FOR YOUR FtNE MESSAGE. YOU AND YOUR MAGNIFI-

CENT C(uv'AND HAVE PLAYED ONE OF THE ~ ... DST PROMINENT ROLES IN THE GREAT DRArJ1A AND I AM PROUD I NDEED TO 8E ASSOCI ATED WITH TtEU IN THE O.FF"'CULT AND COMPLEX PROBLEM THAT LIES AHEAOo

LOG 6

p"

'. DECLASSlAED

DOD Itrs. ./

~. & 2~~;.!!Jt&*'1_S

AAF POA OUTGOI NG MESSAGE

CLASSIFICA1;ION

REFERENCE

PRECEDENCE

From:

Serial:

Date Time Grl?up:

URGENT

Signature &. Title of Writer

Approved for Transmission

K ·f·--··.·:'tI'····MON.AUG.H.1D.llf ... JJR.J..q ... ~~N.i. ll§.A. .... :9..Y.~_~ ..... _ .. . _

.... , -- --.- -- -_-_", .. ;-,_ - ,... __ --_ ~ --- ---- -.

Otfice AWf'gln Date Signature Tti

1504042 AUG 45

FROM: COMGEN Ul:)fdTAf

TO : C! NCAF PA '

. DJST 1 CG

NAR: 2091

,

e G/

1 LO

(PERSONAL SPAATZ TO .AACARTHUR) IN TH I S lOUR OF' OOMPlETE AND Ft NAL V I eTORV PLEASE AeCEPTrl1'V

HEART i .. 81 COr~GRATULATi ON,:) ON YOUR I~PPt) I NTMENT AS SUPREME eOMMANDER

0'«;" T'J... All- i ED PO!!/ERSo YOUR STR ~ K' UG EXAMPLE Of FA I TM AND PERSER- .

v ·~ANeE fN THE DARK DAYS OF 194j Ai\\) 'J9'4~ AND YOUR iNSPIRED I\ND BRIL~J.ANT LF:I\DERSHIP ON THE ROAD BAr.1K ro THE PHH .. IPPINES AND ON TO TOKYO

wru, NEVER BE FCRGQTTEN 8Y A Gr{l\TEFlIL AMER,eA" STRA.TEGIC AIR FOReE.

A~A~T YOUR ORDERS.

5

• I

t 1$, 1945

/_ \.\

u' I told JOU mar teleph<me. e or CJII are .

1_ the 1Ihol.eheartad and e:tt.ct1_ COOiDAI""""

u or \be Irq ili Foroee, in the special leafle"t

.,_" our1ed out " bet Japan'. S ,er~

tI:Il'.I:ilflllHl. Apprec1a tion tor the

l' 111 which 3.. Oen. Lauria j()rt; d

Brl& • E. t:'Ioddp1.'tab«t m and ., a1h1e ~

eD<nlt1GD of tb1s pec1al. project. ptrttcular . '9'OW

of 18 alao au. 1. ~J*& tor

~ .,... ud. elf.a "lOOeS8 in 1th1ob the M:I'-.:LIIdCNt

~ axt.r&0'C'41.n&r7 F03ect ,

."'11~''''oaat HtleotdOll or the ~ 8 t that

Air ~ ~ in pey~Log1.c&l.

ttel'8.

omoe w111 be tetul it this (Jl'Id of aPP"C1at.1on

be \a the t10ers ~ •

For

se: 8 August 1945 1330 .•

11. S, A.l\MY ST1ATEGIC ANUriCES, EEADQU~TEJ\S. Guam.

._,

COMMUNI QUE NO, 6,

1, Reoonnaissance photographs made over Hiroshima on the mornins- of 6 Au.,"'"U.st show that 4.1 square miles or 60% of the city1s built-up area of 6.9

square milas were completely destroyed hy the Atomic bombing missioll~ Five

major industrial targets "'Ji thin this area were destroyed. Additional damage

wa.s shown outside the completely destroyed area,

2. Up .... !ards of 225 Marianas-based :1-29 Superfortresses struck the industr-

ial areas of Yawata with heavy demolition bombs in tho late morning of 8 Aug-

ust, The bombers were escorted by p-47 Thunderbolts from Okinawa.

3. On the ]3..29 mission a~ainst' Toyokawa Naval Arsenal on 7 August, 121

bombers dropped 7J50 tons of high explosives on the target, \lIith results reported

by returning crews to be gonerally excellent. No enemy interception W8.S en-

countered and anti-aircraft fire vias moaaor , One damaztod bomber was abandoned

on the return trip.. The craw '.110,6 rescued •.

4, Du.rin?; the :B-29 mission a~e.inst Toyokawa. 97 P-5l 14:usta.np.;s "vere over

Japan. Half of the force escorted the bombeza ; The other half strafed targets

in the Yokosu.'l:::a area,. eJCploding a 200-foot froighter. sotting two oil banks.

afire and dama.r~ing three locomoti ve s , 25 freight cars. t''10 :railroad stations.

radio stations, power lines and transformers and 19 small vessels, No enemy

interceptors were encountered. Anti-aircraft fire ra.~ed from meager to intense.

One of our airplanes was lost on the way to the target but the pilot vas rescued.

5. Mining missions 'by J:-.29s wer e conducted on the night of 7-S'August

in eneJD.Y waters.

6.. Small forcos of J3-29s dropped 92 tons of h i.rh explosives on Marcus Island and 88 tons on the Dub19n boe.t basin at Truk: on the afternoon of 7 AUGUst. All of our combers rstlll"ned,

""'- __ ._- ---

.CA.rtL . SfAATZ • General. U. S. Army. CornD'll"tnnin!".

./

AAF POA

INCOMING MESSAGE

CLASSIFlcAn6N'; MESSAGE REFERS TO; PRECEDENCE
l 8EOfl!;~ .-I TELECOM - ROUTINE
TELECON MSG NR 9-1

\ : .. ,

VIASH I NGrCt~,. D. C 0 NFT.

FROMI CG USASTAF (REAR) TO : eG USASTAF

PERSONAL TO SPAA TZ FROM NORSTAD

IT IS UNDE:RSTOOD THAT THE SECRETARY OF WAR IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE TOMORROW WtlL RELEASE A MAP OR PHOTOSTAT OF HIROSHIMA SHOWING THE AIMING POINT AND THE GENERAL AREA OF GREATEST DAMAGE, ALL SASED UPON INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM YOU LAST NIGHT. IT'S BELIEVED HERE THAT

THE ACCURACY WITH t'lH I CH TH I S BOMB WAS PLACED MAY COUNTER A THOUGHT I

THAT T CENTERBOARD ROJECT INVOLVES WANTON, INDISCRtMINATE

....___------

BOMBING. THIS MAY BE A USEFUL IDEA FOR THE PSYCHOLOGfCAL WARFARE

PROPAGANDA NOW EMANATING FROM GUAM.

- - ~ - - ~ ~ - - - -

DI5T- CIS i COPIES TOR - 082328Z

U. S. ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES EEADQUARTERS. Guam

For Release: 9 August 1945 1330.

COMMUNIQUE NO.7.

1. In the first hour of 9 August, 92 Maril3,na.s-based B-29 Superfortresses

dropped upwards of 500 tons of incendi<'lry bombs in the industr~al areas of

Fukuyama. Returning crews reported excellent results, with generA.l confIRgrA.(

tiona observed. No enemy interception was encountered and anti-aircrA.ft fire

\

was meager. All of our bombers returned.

2. A force of 67 ~.1arianas-b(\sed Superfortresses struck at industrial tar-

gets in the Tokyo arer:l. in the late afternoon of g August, dropping 400 tons of

demolition bombs on the Nakajima aircr~ft p Lant and the Tokyo arsenal area.

Good to excellent results were reported. No enemy R.ircrai't were encountered

but one of our bombers was lost to intense anti-aircraft fire.

3. In the Yawata mission reported in Communique No.6, 233 Superfortresses

dropped 1,400 tons of demolition bombs. Returning crews reported excellent re-

suIts, with several large fires observed. Enemy interception was slight ~d

anti-aircr~t fire moderate. Two of our bombers fRiled to return.

4. A force of 78 P-5l Mustangs a::-.i p-47 Thunderbolts from Iwo Jima struck

four airfields and targets of opportunity in the Osaka ~rect on the morning of 8

August. Pilots reported that they destroyed a highway bridge, a locomotive and

ten smal I boats, set a fact0t:y afire, and damaged Various shops, hangars, bar-

r'aeks , .trains, rA,ilro::td s t at i ona and small shipping. No ellemy ~irpl~nes were

seen in the air. Anti-aircraft fire ranged from me::tger to Intense. Six of our

airplanes failed to return but three of the pilots were rescued.

CARL SPAATZ Gener.ql. U. S. Army t CommAnding.

11 August 1945

Before news came last night of possible Japan surrender had

intended writing to Lovett repeating my views toward invasion. When

the atomio bomb was :first discussed with me in Washington I was not in favor of it just as I have never :favored the destruction of cities as

suoh with all i.nhabltants being killed. It was pointed out to me however that the use of the atomio bomb would oertainly mean that an invasion would be unneoessary and that thousands of Amerioan lives would be saved. The invasion is still planned in spite of this - and only the surrendering of the Japanese after attacks on their homeland by Air only will oancel the invasion.

Signifioant in the surrendering is the fact that though it was brought about by Ai.r Power. an airman is not to be represented at the peace conference - the sea and the grCiluM will be represented.

!!~

FROIl: !,WAy to NORSl'AD

, AWY NEWS SERVICE SAN FRANCISCO BROAOOAST INDICATES JAPANESE ARE AGREEABLE

TO StnmENDER TEIMs OF POTSDAll ULTIM.\TUM PROVIDED EZdPEROR AND ffiESENT FORM OF GOVERNMmT ARE REl'AINED - IN VIEW CF THIS FACT CAN YOU INDICATE POLlCY (R

I

INSTRUCTIONS OF COWENAlR\ ( GENERAL ARNOlD ) WITH RESPEJT TO MISSION NON

\

SCHEOOLED TO TAKE' OFF IN ~YO HClJRS AND A HALF PD. 00 YElU WANr US TO CANCEL IT? WE ARE PREPARED TO T4KE OFF VlrTH CREWS ,ALERTED TO BE PREPARED K>R INSTRUCTICWS IN THE AIR TO JEl'TISONRPT JEl'TISON OVER WATmAND B'lUHN-TAIDEr TIME WILL BE Aa)UT NINE PLUS RPl' PWS HOOHS FIOM NQV

TO OUR KNOWLEOOE an,y INFORMATION Q1 THIS &JBJ.HnT IS NEJlS .AND INl'.ERCEFT.

NO OFFICIAL ACTION HAS BEEN -T.AICEN BY OUR GO VERmENT UP TO rsrs TIME. UNnL YOU

'ARE ADVISED TO '!HE CrnTRARY YOU WILL OONTINUE Wlm -PLANNED ACTI(}I. ON RECEIPr OF

I

ADVICE THA. T HOsrILITIES HAVE CEASED YOU WILL STOP ALL OOiBAT OPERATIONS AT meE.

,

THIS ILL INCL~DE OESSATIqN OF AIL FLYING avER JAPAN, INCLUDING RECONNAIS3ANCE,

, '

EXCl!:PT sum AS MAY BE REQUESTED BY MCARlHUR.

ruE!{ &J BJE:::T:

YOU mOULD ADVISE MCARTHUR If:r ONCE THAT ANY OR ALL OF YOUR RESOURCES WILL BE AVAILABLE TO ASSIST HIM IN CARRYING UJT HIS RESPONSIBILITIES m OONNECTICN WITH A POSSIBLE CAPITUIA TICH •

mv SUBJECT:

mE JOINT (}fIEFS OF srAFF HAVE APPROVED CQ.fPn.""TING THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF ~ 4D RPr WJ B-2J GROUPS AND YOO WILL ProCEED ON THIS BASIS m THE :.EVmT OF CESSATI(N

,

OF HOOTD..rrIBS.

. ,

NFl, SUID~T:

IF .MISSICN IS DISPATCHED BEFOlB WORD FlIlM HERE RETAIN CONI' err UTH 1T BY m

AS UIlG AS POSSIBLE 00 THAT Rlm.'U1il C4N BE ORDERED IF NECESSARY.

PAGE TVA)

NEW SUBJECT:

IN CASE '!HIS REPORrED PEACE OVERTURE IS ACCEPrED,DEl'AIIED INSTRUCTIONS V

,

-BE FURNISHED YOU. IN ORDER TO nOID ANY IELAY, HAVE IOORm.EO<ll srAND BY UNTI

RELEASED.

TO 010 mE FroM Ole IDR

IN VIEW CF PRESENl'_ EUEBGliNCY WE WILL KEEP THIS craeurr OPEN. \m STILL HAVE MORE MATERIAL rn TH IS RPT THIS CONFERENCE.

IF THE AOOVE HAS ANSWERED YOOR ~TE QUESl'ION, I ViILL LEAVE NClY UNLESS YOU HAVE SOME'llIING MORE. I Jdl INVOLVED A lLn'Z CONFERENCE BIT CAN BE ~(}IID AND WILL REMAIN IN <lLo9E TOUQi nTH DEV:ELOPMENTS. '!HAT IS J[,L

KKKK Pro

SPECIAL RADIO. TELETYPE CONFERENCE

14 August 1946 ,

Guam - Gen. Spaatz" Giles and LeMa,y Washington - Gen. Arnold and Noratad

1. From Arnold. It is desired that youste.rt operations with. your B-291 a "a.gainst Japan s,t once. What is the me.,:ximum that you can, . send out? 10.60. looks like avery good min1mum to me. Can you reach it? What can you do abo~t this at once?

Reply from Spaatz. We will dispatche.t least 90.0. airplanes.

Orde,rs for attaok issued at 12.0.1 Aug 13 Guam time. Foroe willetr,ike durin,g daylight August 14 Guam time.

Correction on above. We made error. Our attack ord,er 'W8.B issued s,t 00.0.1 August 14 GUQ,m time.

2. From Arnold. What are the weather prospects!

Reply. Th,e weather prospects are okay.

3. From Arnold. Can Doolittle send any out from Okinawa? How ,many?

i1hen?

Reply. Doolittle cannot send planes from. Okinawa,. Airdromes there have been cleared for Kenny's antioipated troop oarrier operiations. However ~ those pla.nesof 8th Air Force in Marianas ready to go will be sent.

4. From Arnold. Now 8.S toth.e distribution. The maxlinUIll number possible must be sent over Tokyo so as to1mpr,ess the Japanese offio.ials that we mean business and are serious in getting; them to accept our peace proposals n.thout delay. Wb,a.t nUlllber can be used effectively over Tokyo?

5. ft"om Arnold. How man.ywUl you ha.ve left for other c.ities .. m.ere they will do the most good? What citi.es?

Reply to 4. & 5. Tokyo La not, a good target excep b for the

atomic bomb. All of our un.i.t.s have been brie.fed in anticipa.tionof a. quick calIon. the follow.ing plan:

A •• otaka r/r yards.

B. Naval arsenal otaka.

C. Otaka heavy mdu stry.

D. Atina oil refinery north Honshu.

E. Kunakaya. C 1 ty.

F. Iseze.ki city.

(Last two are on Tokyo plain)

To insure strike with maximum effort today above plan must be oarried out .• ReoODmlelld utmost urgency be given to placing 3rd Iltomio bomb here to be dropp ed on Tokyo.

Page 2

6. From. .Arnold. There must be no publicity about this whatever.

We must not have anymore misinterpreted release either official or unofficial relative to our operations. The news release should come from the Japanese not from us.

Reply. Referenoe publicity, does this prevent the issne of the normal oommuniques? We are having a lot of trouble with the press since the atomic bomb episode and I reoonmend the normal offioial oommuniques

be issued. This is vital.

7. These operations have been coordinated with all my superiors all the way to the top. (From Arnold)

Reply. Thank God.

8. F}-om Norstad. That completes Arnold's message. I have a question. when were propaganda leaflets sent out and where? This refers to the texts of the peace proposals.

Reply. Some leaflets were dropped this afternoon and others

will be delivered tonight and in the morning. Towns are Kobe, Osaka, Nagoya, Tokyo J Kyoto and Yokahama.

Norstad. Okay on pamphlets. Thanks.

9. )rom Horstad. On future Centerboard, we will keep you advised on t:ime and target. We have nothing new in that subjeot at this time. Your target reoommendation is being oonsidered.

From Giles to Norstad: What has been done on sending General Spaatz from USASTAF headquarters to aocept the Jap surrender along with Nbnitz and MacArthur?

.From Norstad: Do you have anything else? If not, goodnight and gOM luck.

u. S. ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES, ~DQUARTERS, Guam.

For Release: Immediately

15 August 1945

COMMUNIQUE NO. 11.

1. Over a thousand aircraft of the United States Army Strategic Air

Forces operated against Japan in the last 24 hours. More than 800 Marianas-based B-29 Superfortresses dropped approximately 6,000 tons of demoli tion and. incendiary bombs on Japa.l'l during dayligpt on 14 August and

in the early hours of 15 August. Targets hit were the Hikari Naval Arsenal,

Osaka Army Arsenal f Marifu railroad. yards, the 1Tippon Oil Refi4l.ery at

Akita and the industrial areas of Kumagaya and Isezaki. Nearly 200 fighter

airplanes from Iwo Jima escorted the bombers over Osaka and struck airfields

in the Nagoya area on the afternoon of 14 August.

CARL SP.AATZ, General, U. S. Army, Commanding"

TOPS~T AAF POA' INCOMING MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION

TELECON

MESSAGE REFERS TP:

PRECEDENCE

T~

~~~ TELECON MSG NR: 11-14

"~'. .... .. 0>-

FROM: COMGENUSASTAF (REAR) TO z COMGENUSASTAF SUBJECT: FUTURE TARGETS AND "METHOD OF EMPLOVMENt OF CENTERBOAAD

TO SPAATZ FROM NORSTAD

PENDING THE FINAL DECiSION ON THE FUTURE TARGETS AND M£THOn OF EMPLOYMENT OF CENTERBOARD GROVES AND I HAVE DISCUSSrn THIS MATTER. YOUR RECOMMENDATIONs ON TARGETS ARE BEING CONSIDER£%) ON Ii HIGH LEVEL. AS FOR THE CONDIT.IONS UNDER WHICH THE WEAPON WILL BE USED V~E HAV£ AGREED THAT FOR THE T I ME EtE I NG AT lEAS. M I 55 tONS WILL NOT BE DISPATCHED UNLESS VISUAL CONDIT'O.JS ARE EXPECTtD'~.

AT THE TARGET. RADAR DROPS WILL BE USED ONLY IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED AS AN INTERJM GUIDE TO YOU

AND THE FINAL DECISIONS WI·LL BE TRANSMITTED WITHIN THE NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS. PLEASE PASS THIS INfORMATION TO FARR~Ll.

- - - - ~ - - - - - - - -

D I 5T. . 6 COP I E5 cIs ONL Y TOR: 110117Z

/'

rr

NlWS!EmL SC~IPT FO~ GEN. SPAATZ

Japan was whipped by the mightiest te8JD of a-rmed forces ever raised e.g ,inst

The .Army, the Navy. th~ M.arines and the Far East Air Forces

,

combined to drive the Jap back to his homeland, and to give the E-29s b ses from which we could strike at the heart, the spine, the. vi tals' of Japan. Thank God

we could hit the Jap hard enough to s are Americans the bJssiy cost of another

'I

invasion.

I would like to pa tribute to the ground crews and the air crews W 0

-

brought a mighty new air w.ea,pon, the B-29 t from bas~s in India to China

and finally to the Pacific.. It "\riIS,S always their sweat and courage and

often their blood that· ene,bled the, ::8-29 to d.eliver the knockout punch to

Japan.

nwS1tDL SCUlT FO:! GEN. DOOLITTLE

The Sth Air Force was just about ready to hit Japan twice as hard as we

had to punch to beat the Hun to his knees •. :But they -didn't need us to finish the job. I had alwQ's looked forward to go.ing back to Tokyo for a visit in

St jeep -- but 11m afraid the B-29s of the 20th A.ir Force haven't left much to

look at.

~T ,AAF POA

',' '.,

I ,

DEcLASSIFI££1 DOD Itrs

D...ll' J8~~~, " ao J •

""l"~ lIne/97

I.e; Dale~ 1>-

INCOMING MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION

MESSAGE REFERS TO: \-

\

PRECEDENCE

GUAM·

FROM: CINCPAC

1·602242 AUC .. 9 '45.

TO ~ CO,,,JOEN SASTAF

hWC, 8 G t NCAF"PI C, \;JAR , CO:JU NOH

. N MY CAPAC t YY AS TH~ UN ,'TED STATES R~PRESE~TAT tVE' AT THE

. ACTION:

SiJRHENDEB soc ~ TO 'TAt(E PLACE I i NV I'T~ YOU TO e-:- PRESENT @ NITU ME TO WITNESS THE SURRENDER 1q ~·.H'CH ~~OllR ~ORCE ,HAS CON~

TR ~ BI;''fED SO (J(lC~I.

I WILt sr; HAPPY TO HAVE YOO AND AN AIDE! AS MY

I ,

INFO cIs LOG :.o/eG

• •

G1JEoTS ,N Mf FLAG3H I P ::OR THAT PURPOSE.'

~ .~ ~ .' - - - . - -

. . ,

-

.. • t '

I

AA.FPOA

INCOMING MESSAGE

..

MESSAGE BEFERS TO:

PRECEDE.NCE

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

RGE V \V RM NR 179.

~ OM : COMGENAfR~

".{)

! COMGENUSASTAfo

!\fA G 1465.

THE f.;jGHTV ORG"'HZATtON Of USASTAF WH.9CH YOU WERE eUeLD~NG WITH SUCH s~tlL AND SPEED TO CRUSH JAPAN PAS NOW HAPPilY SERVED iTS PURPOSE EVEN BEFORE iTS

Ull WEiGHT WAS BROUGHT TO BEAR. HISTORY WilL RECORD

HE ACHIEVEMENT. ALL PERSONNEL OF THE ARMY AIR :-:fl1f:ES JOIN ME 'N HEARTY CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU AND TO EVER' L'£U8ER or YOUR corMAND ON THE OCCAS ION' OF' THIS, THE C.EAlEST Of VtC10RtES~

TOR ~ 2133Z.

PPRIORITV

WASHINGTON, D. c., 152108Z, AU.G.. '45.

ACTION c/s

INFO lOG

~

7.

AAF POA

INCOMING MESSAGE

MESSAGE REFERS TO:

PRECEDENOE

I

CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY

t:JASH t HenON I o.c 0 152108z AUG •• 145.

fa f CO~3EN USASTAF t\F;~CG 1451

I\L THE AAnJY A fA f" CReES 0 I N ME iN CONGRATULAT I NO YOOO C' I Rt: COM~ .. tANO. THE 0 _ VI\STAT ING EFFECT OF THE 20TH A I R FO CE S T R , VoE S HAS B FEN T HE t~AJOR FACTOR IN T H£ CRUSH I NG DEFEAT OF JAPAN~ YOU HAVE BROUGHT AlA POWER TO ITS

HI GHTES OPERAT J ONA L FORM'.

ACT tO~J: ~/s

INro

• •

~ ~ ~ - - - ~ - - - - - -

LOG

TO d 160015Z

a

u. s. ARMY STAATEGIC .H.3ADQ.UArtTERS I Guam.

r Release: 2100, 17 August 19450

'.

S,

CO~nJNlQUE NO. 12.

1. From the operations against Japan on 14 August and in the early hours of 15 August all of our bombers returned.. Four fighters are missing. Strike

photographs ind.icate excellent results.

2. Summarizing strategic operations against Japan: E-29s from India

and Marianas bases have f'Lown over 100,000 ,000 miles and have dropped 169,421 tons of bombs. An aggregate of 32,612 flights by individual aircraft (Sorties)

have been executed against objectives which were ordinarily 1.500 m.iles or more

from the point of take-off.

Losses incident tG combat operations were 437 B-29 aircraft. A total of

297 E-29 crews were lost. A total of over 600 combat crew personnel \1a8 rescued

by naval rescue agencie~.

Final and accurate evaluation of results of B-29 operations must await

\

comp'Le t.t on of pho tographi c reconnaissance and. ground survey. Avad Lab l.e intel-

ligence confirms the following damage!

The major portion of the industrial productive capacity of 59 Japanese

cities has been destroyed. Of six additional cities, the innustrial product-

ive capacity has been partially destroyed. Damage to t,.lTO urban industrial

areas has not been assessed. A total of 581 important factories engaged in

production of war materials has been ei theT totally destroyed or severely

damaged. Includ.ed in this number are 23 majo r factories of Japan's aircraft industry, destruction of which has been resulted in an e~timated 60% reduction

in her combat aircraft productive capacity. Also included are six of Japan1s

major ~.rsenals. Also included are two plants producing tetra ethyl lead. In addi tion to the a.bove damage. two .Jnajor steel plants were damaged to an extent regulting in e. 155C reduction in 3D,panl s capacity to produce steel. In addi t i.on ,

1

••

a tota.l of eight principal oil storage and refinery installations was destroyed

or severely damaged, resu,lting in the destruction of Japan1s major oil refining capacity. Included in the above figures are the two urban industrial a)."eas of

Hiroshima and. Nagasaki. which war'e destroyed or severely damaged by one atomic

bomb dropped by a B-29 on each of these targ.-ets .•

Since 28 March 1945, 1,435 ],;29 flights have laid 12,049 mines in enemy

waters.

In their operations against Japan, JJ-29s have destroyed or damaged 1,935

enemy aircraft in the air and over 350 on the ground._

During the period 17 A:p.ril to 11 May ;1.945., a total of 7,850 tons of bombs

was cerried by B-29s f\gainst airfieULs and airfield illsta.ll,a.t.i.(H1S in Kyus'hu for

the purpose of neutrp,lizing these fields in coordinatL,n'l>!ith t4~ t nvas ton of

Okinawa.

Longremge strategiC escort fighters based at Iwo J:tma have made $,012 flights to Japan .• totaling over )8,000 hours. In ad.di tiOl\ to providing escort

protection to ]....29uni.ts operating over Japan, fighters OO·1e ca.rried out attacks

against enemy airfields and lines of communication. As the result of Iwo-hased

fighter operations, 1,047 enemy airere.ft have been destroyed or damaged. at a cost of 106 of our fighters.

CA:i:~J.. SF AATZ I Gentlral, IT. S. Army, 00 mn,&.ndi ng.

- 2 ..... '

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES WASHINGTON

IN REPLY REFER TO:

17 August 1945

EYES ONLY

General Carl Spaatz

Conmanding General, U. $. Army strategic Air Forces APO 234, c/o Postmaster

:San Francisco, California

Dear Tooey:

I wish to congratulate you and your staff on your superior handling of the final stages of the strategic war against Japan. I wish to congratulate you upon proving to the world that a nation can be defeated by air power alone.

Regardless of our demonstrated powers, it is now evident that domination of the War Department over the Air Forces is increasing; since V-J Day the vise of control has been closing. If we do not obtain a IDepartment of Armed Forces, with equal representation by the .Air Forces, or a separate Air Force, in the next six months, we will never have it.

The report by the Richardson board, of which Hal George

and Trubee Davison were members, has not been made public. The first thing that must be done to launch an effective program to obtain a Department of Armed Forces is the release of this board's report. Correspondents throughout the world knew that this board was in existence, and they are familiar with the fact that it has made a report. Since then, the passage of time has dulled their interest in the matter, and there bas been no pressure from the outside to have the report of the board made public. It seems to me that now is the time to contact the k8Y' correspondents, in whan we have confidence, and have them demand that the report of the board be made public, in the interests of. the United states and national seouri ty. Just the fact that the report is being held up will indica.te to them that there ;i.s great reluctance in military and naval circles to having the report published.

I have discussed this matter with Qeneral George and he approves of

this method of approach. I have also sent a letter in this tone to General Cannon, and we are attacking the problem in this w~ at this end.

I also feel it essential that if at all possible you return to t~ United States to help us fight this battle. Ninety per cent

DECLASSIFIED DOD ltrs.

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of the work of Headquarters, Army Air Forces, in the ?fey of planning and implementation of post""'W'ar air forces comes to naught in the War Department.

Most 91 cerely,

DECLASSTFIED

s. A.

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I am sending to MacArthur, to you and to Kenney an outline of what our ideas are with reference to post-war organization and post-war requirements for our Air Arm. This information is in general terms and does not go into much detail. I think it is better that way. We hope to get this out within the next few days.

I am hoping that you will see your way clear to cut down the size and number of your headquarters for the post-hostility period. With the return to civil life of many of our e:apable reserve officers, we must utilize our regular officers to the best advantage.

While thinking along -that line I wish you would let me know what Jimmie Doolittle expects to do - when he wants to get out and what his ideas are as to his future. This, because there are many people asking about him and so far I have received no definite information that I can use.

By this time you have undoubtedly heard from the newspapers of my announced policy of leaving the service soon. That should not be taken by anyone to mean that I am leaving tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. I do hope, however, to get out sometime along about November or December. I would get out sooner only I am interested in the future of the Air Forces, and accordingly want to have a talk with the "powers that be" concerning who my successor shoul.d be, and when he is selected I want to have an overlap of time wi th him in this office sufficient to give him the benefit of my experience here in WaShington, if he should like to receive it.

I think it yery important that you get back to Washington as soon as you can. However, your trip to Washington should not interfere in any way with your appearance in Tokyo or in Manila or at any other place during the arrangements for consummating the cessation of hostilities wi.th the Japanese. With this in mind, I wish you would let me know when you think you can come back to Washington. There are many things I want to talk over with you.

As stated in my wire to you, I am. very appreciative of your wonderful cooperation and the loyal support that I have received from your entire command. I Wl:lnt to say again that you have all done a magni:ficent job - a job that the whole Army Air Forces is proud of.

..

Sincerely,

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES WASHINGTON

19 August 1945

General Carl Spaatz Commanding General, USASTAF APO 234, c/o Postmaster San FranCisco, California

My dear Tooey: 1

While I am naturally feeling very good about peace being effected with Japan, as far as the .Army Air Forces are concernedi t is, shall I say, unfortunate that we were never able to launch the full power of our bombing attack with the B-29s. The power of those attacks would certainly have ~onvinced any doubting Thomases as to the capabilities of a modern Air Force. I am afraid that from now on there will be certain people who will forget the part we have

played. As a matter of fact, I see evidence of it right now in the writings _)

of the columnists - probably inspired by interested people.

We bad quite a time here in Washington when we were getting out the instructions to MacArthur and Nimitz relative to how and where and by whom the _/ peace negotiations should be conducted. There was quite a noticeable attitude

to ignore the Air Arm and forget its existence insofar as representation was concerned. I felt fairly sure that you would be able to carry the ball in the

Far Pacific in such a way that we would get representation, but I had hoped to

make it official by dispatches from Washington. As it turned out, Sutherland

left here with the understandi.ng that MacArthur would invite you to be present.

I am sure, however, that you had fixed it up with MacArthur before that. _l

By this time you must have received cablegrams asking for your recommendations as to the Air Force dispositions in the Far Pacific during the posthostilities period. The same request bas been sent to Kenney and to Stratem.eyer. strange as it may seem, we have never received MacArthur's recommendations for post-hostility dispositions of Air. In view of his intense interest in all phases of air operations, I was a little surprised that we should bave no recommendations from him. I don't know where you are at the moment, but I think it would be a good idea for you to get together and talk this over so that when we get our recommendations from Kenney and from you they will be along the same lines and

in accord with a definite policy.

I received this date a cablegram which indicated that MacArthur wants to

know what our plans are for future organization and command set-up for the

strategic Air Force. My thoughts on the subject are that we turn the B-29s

over to him for operational control. It looks to me as if we would be smart to

do this because he will have them anyhow and there is nothing much that we can

do about it. I do think that in the final organization the strategic bombers

must and should be controlled from Washington; that the Washington Command should farm them out to local commanders when it becomes necessary to take care of con- .J d1tions in various parts of the world. I would like to have your ideas on that subject however. Certainly I do not think that the strategic bombers should be placed under a local Ground Commander as a normal organ~~.

~CLA

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J ~C; DateJ.. VI

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HEADQUA~,1SlS

UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIH FO:aCES

APO 234 .

IS August 1945

su:BJECT: Temporary Censorship Regulations for Operating inside Japan.

TO All Correspondents Accredited to USASTAF.

1. U:lt:i.J such t;tme ac central press cenaor shdp, as prescribed by the 00mmanding l+(;i.\.""T.a.ls of USAFPAC and USAs:nAF and by CINGP,,:;.0- ,;INC?OA, is establi shed , ceusor.ship of ~ l.l press Illater-:'a.J.. will be the responsicili ty of the USASTAF i"ress 1.<31'180r attached to the part Yo He ,·Iill be responsible for censorship of press

1",,"3. ~erial to Ln sure the ~_j.~;'[ of mili tary informat~g.!! and to prevent the di s ... se:rdna.tion of matter which m:ght c..::. S?d,rC;',ge the relations of the Uni ted States or her allies, or the rele.tions of the several br-anche s of the armed forces, as

well El,S for the following specific points:

a. No general officer, either from Headquarter£ USAFPAC or Headquarters USASTJ..F. will be quoted. in any dispatch wri tten from. inside Japan--ei ther directly or by implication--"l,dthout prior epprovaI of the Chief Press Oensor, USAF.PAC.

b. Dispatches that might tend to excite controversy by making claus that any particular branch of the armed. forces' alone won the war g unless such statements are written clearly enough to inctice.te posi tive personal opinion and do not, in any way. involve ana/or quote any person of any branch of the armed forces, will not be cleared.

2. Press material will not be censored for accuracy t but t when practicab'l e , attention of the correspondent will be invited to obvious inaccuracies in his copy.

3. In the event any dispa,tches ar e submi tted for censorship that can not be cleared to satisfaction of the officer-in-charge of the USASTAF party and

to the USASTAF press censor assigned to the missiQf,1. such dispatches "rill be forwardqd.. at request of the writer. to HeadqUArters, USASTAF. by officer courier under confidential clEl,ssifice.tion for review and disposition by h~gh&r authority ..

__,,_.

/..... .,__ .. i;_.,&. /f.. t,

j I_. . ( '. ;'

CARL SFAAtZ,

General, V. S. Army, Commanding.

HEI1.DCiUARTE.fiS

UNITED S'I'iITES AAMl STk'i'EGIC AUt FOH.CES

. b.P.D. ~)4

S'I'nFF idEI!ItING - 19 Augu.st 1945

PRESENT:

llooeral SpaOl.tz / Lt. Gener1:.l Giles

Lt. General Doolittle Major C:enf;rc..l LeMay Brig. Gener",l Kissner Brig. General POl1ers Bri~. General Harbold Brig. General r.1:.:i>fi.!.1.:;hton

Brig. Venere~ A.'1kenb:-6.n.dt Brig. General A:rIn.stron6 Brig. General weir Colonel Goer-s

Colonel Zimme:cm;"n

Col'onel LeffillgHell Colonel Taylor

Colonel ,J enson

1. G aner-e.L DOOLITTLE. asked what he could expect for bhe Eighth hil~ Force - how large forces - hO'lf man .. v fields would be oper~~ted- ·,,,.ru,.;,t nu.mber of per-sonnel, hOl-'; many-wings - Colonel t.:ll\Uil!1:IM..i>N gave tcntativ'.-. i'iguro6, of J ylinp with 3 fields on Oki.ila.Wa.-4 groups in each Id.l.1?; and :36 in each group.

2. General 0001IT'I'I.E stat0d th:"i:. ~"";ASTAF shou.Id b~ rlli:!,Qe up of 3 components 1. Very he~-,vy bombers. ~. ExtremeLy 10116: ra.'i,g2 fignt",rs. 3. Long r'ange transports.

3. General DOOLITTLE suggest-ad the lllal~r.fing of fighter groups to VH8· groups for G.. unit which would be easily mob He and convertible.

4. Eighth Air Forcesl biggest prob:::"e_l11 is key personnel for Hec..dquarter·s and l'riI' corribat crews - they should hold ffrst priority on <.>.irplant: movement s from U. S. to the~tI'c. Geno:rw. LEl>i.AY is h<-.i.Ving 2. stu~ made on th0 USE: of t.ho E,,!29 to JnOve crdt.LcaL personnel and freight to the thc~""tre.

5. PERSONNEL - iiETZEL to be U5 ed witn Gener-al, i\iCNAUGH'l'ON for pcr-sonnul, work wIth this He""dqucll·t0r:;;. Gfq:S~~OLD is to t.ako cOlrJil.,.ond of 301st Fighter ~ling. HURNS is to be retc:.inedo.s .A-.3. .i:3f.J\IFIL is to be relehssri and replc>.ctld by competent A-2 Inc.l1~ possib1:, SGfULLING. GeneN~ iilli'.ENtlrU·J.WT to hell, General MCNAUGHTON find Signal Officei' - Gft,.,LL to be r-cLeascd. Promotions for MOORE c:.:::: Deputy ::;'COIGlMl1der of ucpot d.o.'ic:. future COllllU&1lder of 8th Air Service COIllCbXld to reptaee BEhl'iUNDIS and ror ~'.ARLY for A-4. Genero-l SP:;u;T1 asked Genori:l:l .:4CNAUGHTON to t ... k"" action on sendi~ me ssego urging promotion.

6. General DOOLl"TTLE brought up the quost.i.on of th0 TIGERlorcc - and

occupation of fields by BATe - Genu'c-,lSPp.ATz. said no act ion would be tb.kan -

..l11 decisions on the Bl:'itish prOj~lct would bo made by JCS

'1. G eneruL DOOLIT'l'LE asked tlk. t Opct';;.tiom,1 cont 1;'01 of' tho Okina,/,la I! epot,

be transfcrrud from FEJJ.F to Eighth Air Force us of Scptuinber 1 - 00 thc:.t Eighth Air Force C~ ... ssuae ownership for IUc;ccrial th<..t is in hero Repair Unit Floating JJopots. Co.Loncl, Lofi"ing,veil st;.;,,;_t,I,::d thu:L Gonlr~l 1.INDSAY had pr opar-cd a massage to CINCAFP/.'C roque sting th; (, .. "mt.col be t'iv..,n to. CGUSASTAF'.

8. First }lriority for bui..lding should be trc..nsfc·rr..:-d. to. L.tiqqUtlt.c living qUc.rtcrs - to keep th(: men mor0 cont.cnt , 2nd priority - uirfblds.

9. Gcncr>;l.l SPJUlTZ sti:l.t(;d that thcJ;'c should be! a slow up in sending peoplo

OV()!" until mor~-: living livingf~cilitics wore provi.dod. .

10. Goncr<il SPAATZ pr-oscnt cd the .ucgion of cMcrit to Lt. Colonel Bilrtlott

tiEETIH3 ADJOURNED.

ce. 1'0 thoao pr oscrrt .

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~RECEnENCE

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,,~eRET

Rill

.RGE V ·IUA NR 9

FROM: COMF'EAF' SGO KENNEY

NR : A-83107

TO : CO USASTAF (PERSONAL TO SPAATZ .FROM KENNEY)

PH I 'L I PP I 'NES

202115-1 AlnUST

A I ROORNE OPERA T .1 ONS P~S TPONED TO· 28TH AUGUS T • SUGGEST YOU MEET .flilEOKI NAWA 26 AUGUST. Arv1 I NCLUDrNG YOUR 0-17 FOR TOKYO LANDING

ACTION: cis

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INFO: eG' LOG Dice

(8:

TOR: 201· 230Z

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&' 8 JIIJl, lie 20 June lfl.~ '1<,,1.)

8t;ld& 1&i J:)at~ UNI.'E'LD

HK .. .lX iUJ-tHl'E}'tS

STATES llHMY ST&~'rbGIC J.1.Il~ FORCES

A.P.O. 231+

;,;;.,: August 1945

PftESENT:

Brig. Gen. Weir

Brig. Gen. Ankenbr.tu1dt Col. Zimmerman

Col. Goerz.

(::01. Robbins

Col. Jensen

Col. Muehleise..'1 1iajorViright.

,Lt. General Gil(;!s Major Gener'al LeMay Brig. Ge,n. Kissner Brig. Gen. MacNaughton Brig. Gan. Grow

Brig. Gen. 'Wetzel Brig. Gen. Rutledge

1. . Gen. GIillS ate;,tBU that, i.t was recommended to Gene re.L SPA1.;,TZ t hat, USA8TAF' be mar ad to Hi.ckam l"ielci. Pres::mtr;otion of this plan 'It'd,ll be made to Gen.A.RNOLD and the '~AA DEPAHTl'.lJI:]S\T'f. Col SVvEE1JEY of A-5 is tile officer in charge of planning for this project" ar~Y' suggestions or ·reeomr!l.endaVions f'or or aguans t this p.lun should be made t.hru Col. SlN£IiJ,i£,X.

2. Gener<.l.l GILES wi.Ll, dSlJc.I't for Ivk,l1ila tonight for t he purpose of discussing the est.abkt.ehment. of U2A~'I'JlF l-~DV!'"NCED, He wi Ll. 61.150 sec General KENNEY and discuss other plans.

3. General LeMAY is wor-king on the Manning Tables. Will 0.11 sections please expedite t.hc submission of their T/O's.

4. Genera.l ANKTh']3Ri ND'I' announc.ed the opening of the J ackson E..xchange to take place at 1800 22 August.

5. Gelwral ViETZEL WG.S c..,."r;,~,:['ded the Legi.on of Merit.

8:::E eRE T

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URGENT

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PRECEDENCE

<TOP SEQREl'

RGE V ZVA NR 4 FROM: COrviGENFEAF

TO : USASTAF (PERSONAL FOR SPAATZ FROM GILES)

. PH ILl PP I N£S

,

23f1 COZ AUGUST

SUPPLEMENTING PREVIOUS MESSAGE NR 84268.

HAD CONFERENCE WITH GENERAL MACARTHUR AND FOLLOnlNG .SUBJECTS

WERE OJ SCUSSEO (A) SHOW OF FORCE OF B-29 '5 OVER TOl<YO AREA INFO:

HAS BEEN CURTA I LED. I PO I NTED OUT TO GENERAL r",lACARTHUR mE ~

ADVANTAGE OF A SHO\'/ OF A IR POWER OVER TH TOKYO AREA FOR TIiE o/c

ACTION: cis

PURPOS~ OF LETTI NO NOT ONLY THE JAPANESE. BUT OUR OWN NAVY, THE (6)

RUSSIANS. CHINESE AND OTHERS OBSERVE A GREAT CO CENTRATIQN OF

AIR POWER.

RECOMMEND ~~ SEND 600 0-291S OVER ON D-DAYQ GENERAL

MACARTHUR HAS AGREED TO THIS IDEA AND HAS G~VEN INSTRUCTION

CCORDINGLY. (8) HAD GENERAL DILLER AND COLONEL MCCRARY IN CONFERENCE WITH GENERAL MACARTHUR TO STRAIGHTEN OUT USASTAF PRESS PROBLEM. AS A RESULT OF THIS CONFERENCE GENERAL MACARTHUR HAS DIRECTED THAT OUR 2 PRESS AIRCRAFT PLUS OUR PRESS CORRESPONDENTS ~ LL OE SENT IN ALONG ~ITH HIS PRESS PE~PLE. FURTHER THAT ALL PRESS COMfi.1UNICATIONS OUT OF JAPAN WOULD I3E ON THE BASIS OF SHARE AND SFARE ALIKE l3ET\1EEN USASTAF AND CHJCAFPAC CORRESPONDENTS.

(0) DISCUSSED SETTING UP OF USASTAF HEADQUARTERS ADVAfJCE IN TO YO ~

---------- ~~ , __ .I!! .. _.L_~,~~~,..!! __ .. _ ... ~~ J_~ ........ ~_ ... ._ ..

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AREA WITH GE'NERAL MACARTHUR, STARTING OFF' INITiALLY WITH SMALL HEADQUARTERS TO FOLLOVJ EVENTUALI.,.Y WITH MOVEMENT OF A COMPLETE

0-29 WING. GENERALS MACARTHUR, KENNEY AND SUTHERLAND HAVE ALL

AGREED 10 THIS PROPOSAL. (0) REFERENCE LETTER TO GENERAL ARNOLDp

IN D'SCUSSION GENERAL MACARTHUR STATED THAT HE PREFERRED THAT

GENERAL SPAATZ HANDLE THIS MATTER DIRECTLY WITH WASHINGTON. \'JILL

DISCUSS nilS MATTER FURTHER WITH YOU UPON MY RETURN., OUR ETA 24/0600 GUAM TIME

KENNEY

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TOR: 2321201

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T~~ URGENT
23 615 .... 1 AUGUST

RGE V ZUA NR 2

FROM:COMFEAF SGD: KENNEY

-0 ~ CG USASTAF (SPAATZ FROM GILE~)

['.JR : w- 842 68

ACTION· c/s !NFO DGG

~

6

HAD VERY SUCCESSFUL~NFERENCE WITH KENNEY WHO IS TEMPORARILV LAID

,

UP WITH FLU IN HOSPITAL. HAVE DATE TO SEE GENERAL ~AACAR HUR AT

1730 TODAY. KENNEY AND I AGREED ON T HE FOLLOWING: (AJ FULL AGREE"JIENT

ON YOUR LETTER TO GENERAL ARNOLD W,TH NO CHANGESo (S) FULL AGREEMENT m~ THE ESTAOL I SHMENT OF USAS1AF HEADQUARTERS ADVANCE I N TOKYO AREA ON o PLUS 1 OR 2 DAYS TO BE FOLLOWED UP AS SOONAS PRACTICABLE WIT

THE SECOND SECT ION OF THE HEADQUARTERS IN ABOUT11) DAYS .. KENNEY

DIRECTED THAT SMilE SPACE REQU'REMENTS AND FACILITiES 8E SET" ASIDE

FOR USASTAF ADVANCE AS FEAF HEADQUARTERS. YOUR A DVANCE HEADQUARTERS AND FEAF WILL BE LOCATED IN SAfOlI: AREA. (C) KENNEY IN FULL ACCORD l:JITH THE PLAN TO SEND INTO JAPAN AT AN EARLY DATE.1 B29 WING CO;J1PU:JTE",

(0) KENNEY FULLY EXPRESSED HIMSELF AS BEING IN FAVOR OF A SINGl.E OEPART~'ENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE. WILL DISCUSS THIS MATTE:R \~JITH YOU

UP·) ~ ~1Y RETURN. (E) EXPLA I NED TO KENNEY THE Fur CT IONS OF USASTAF DEer I\.~f' ~IED

o

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ACVANCE HEADQW\RTERS)N TOKYO AREA REFERRliJG TO A COpy or tJ1EMO

GA E TO YOU ON TH ISS UBJECT.. KENNEY CONCUqRED IN THE fUNCT IONS AS LAID DOWN WITH NO CHANGE. (F) JUST LEARNED THAT THE MISStON

. .

'SHOW OF FORCEIi FOR THE 829' S HAD BEEN C ~LLED OFF. WILL 0 iSCUSS TH IS SUBJECT WITH GENERAL MACARTHUR L.~TER ON TODAY, BEL I EVE THAT WE

DEFINITELY SHOULD HAVE THESE S291GEMONST8ATfONS OVER OUR OWN FORCES

IN THAT A REA AS WELL AS THE JAPS. KENNEY AGREES. (G) HAD QUITE LENGTHY CONVERSATION ~IT~ MCCRARY_,ON PUBLIC RELATIONS. HOPE TO CLEAR UP SOME POINTS WITH-GENERAL MACARTHUR LATER TODAY UPON THIS SUBJECT. MCCRA~Y WILL RETURN ~JTH ME TONIGHT FOR A CONFERENCE WiTH YOU .. (H) THE SUB .. '8C~ OF MOVING THE USASTAF HEADQUAR,TERS T 0 HICKAM FIELD v1AS DISCUSSED WtTi-

.

ENNEY. HE STATED HE PREFERRED TO THINK IT OVER AND DISCUSS THIS MA- TE

WITH YOU UPON YOUR ARRIVAL AT OKINAWAD () I REAFFIRMED YOUR DESIRE

TO GIVE FULLOUT 'SUPPORT TO C INCAFPAC AND TO FEAF SUR ING FOPfTHCGrll1 .~G

OPERATIONS. (J) WILL SEND YOU A RADIO LATER ON TODAY GIVING RESULT':

OF CONFERENCE ~ITH GENERAL MACARTHUR.

DECLASSIFIED DOD ltrs.

2. POSTVJAR ARMY AIR FORCE PLANS AND POLICIES INCLUDE THE FOUDWING FOUR FUNDAMENTAL POINTS, WHICH AhE BEING ADVOCAED AS STRONGLY AS POSSIBLE:

a. FOR MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY OF OPEhATION IN TUlE OF WAR AND PEACE, A SINGLE DEPARTMENT OF ARMED FORCES SHOULD SUPPLANT THE PRES~NT V'aR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS. UNDER THIS DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE A COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES ViHO WIll.. COMMAND THE ARMY J THENl>D:WY, AND AIR FORCES, 1 ND NY COMBINED TASK FORCE n~ EXIS-

TENCE, THIS IS THE PROPOSJ~ OUTLINED AND SUPPORTED BY THE SECRETARY OF V.JAR

AND THE WAR DEPT AT EARLIER HEARINGS ON THIS SUBJECT.

b. IN WORLD WAR II, .;IR POWER W S THE lflEAPON WHICH OUR ENEMIES USED,

WITHOUT WARNING, TO STRIKE THE FIRST BLOWS AGAINST OUR DEFENSIVE STRUCTURE.

ANY FUTURE AGGRESSION MUST cors FROM THE AIR. WE ~ruST REGOGNIZE TIIf~T THE ONLY

CERTAIN PROTECTION AGAINST SUCH AGGRESSION IS THE ABILITY TO iliIEET JUlj]) OVER-

COME IT BEFORE THE AQl'RESSOR CAN STRIKE THE FIRST BLOW. THE DEFENSE LIES IN

ADEQUl! TE AIR POWER.

c. THE ARMY AIR FORCES ADVOCATES UNIVERSAL ~ ILITliliY TRAINING AS THE M)ST

FEASIBLE METHOD OF PROVIDING A TRi INED RESERVE FOR REENEORCElJ;lliNT OF THE PEACE TIME PROFESSIONAL MILIT fJiY ESTABLISHMENT.

d. STRATE(lUC i.IR BASES SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED AND,.!AINTAIl\)ED AT ALL LOCATIONS WITHDJ AND BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF THE UNITED STATES WHEREVER NECESSARY: :

,

1. TO INSURE THETERRITORIAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STM:ES AND ITS POSSES-

SIONS.

2. TO MAKE POSSIBLE THE EFFECTIVE PARTIBIPATION OF TIlE UNITED ST ':FliSDJ THE MAINTENANCE OF THE PEACE AND SECHRITY OF T HE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

3. TO ASSIST IN THE FULFILLMENT OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STAtES TO AS[IST IN TH£ FULFILLMENT OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES is A MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

mIESE B1 SES MAY NOT NECESSARILY BE COMPLETELY EQUIPPED OR COMPLETELY GARInSONED, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT TH"T MILITARY RIGHTS THERETO BE OBTAINm WHICH WTI.T.

W LLL .l:SE o~.N'l' IUU At) !(At'lULI A.b .tU!iV li:iJ.VilJb A..tU!i .JU' ~.ltUV ~ •

FOR DEPlOYMENT F VHB GRQUPS, SEE WARX. 51732 DATED 18 AUGUST 19~·5D A.l~F COMMAND

STRUCTURE WILL BE ADJUSTED GRADUALLY AND ~UIT~·.BLY TO CONFORJ:11! TO OCCUPATION

AIR FORCES REQUIREMENTS.

4. WHAT THE .FUTURE Hems FOR :::!ACH INDIVIDUIJ. NOW PRESSNT IN YOUR CCML\UJW

N;~TURALLY VARIZS AS VfillELY AS THE INDIVIDUAl.$ THEMSELVES. THIS QUESTION·WILL

BE AmlERED BY OUR REPLY NOW BEING PREPARED TO roUR TELECON MZSSli.GE 2441 DATED 20 AUGUST 194.5 (POST VJkR AIR FORCE)

5. BRIG lEJ VI. E. TODD NOWENROUTE TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS ~!I:::"i. AMPLIFY THE

INFOW4JlTION CONTAltl;tED IN TH"G PH.ECEDING PARAGRAPHS.

6. THIS INFORMATION IS CONFIDENTIAL AND IS NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE OR COMMmiT AT~.,']HIS TIME EXCEPT AS MAY- BE COVERED BY BREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED POLICIES.

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DODltrs . -

~&2:;~t~~~

AAF POA

INCOMING MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY

PRECEDENCE

MESSAGE REFERS TO:

RGE V ZUA NR 9 F ou: C If~CAFPAC

TO : CG 6TH AfUvlY (KI1UEGR) PASSED

COM7TH FLEeT (K I rJCA I D) PASSED

COt.:1GEN USASTAF (SPAATZ)

COr.~CEN AFr:;JI DPAC (H I CHARDSOfJ) PASS ED

PHILIPPINES 240743 AUGUST

ACTION:

I j'JFO:

~.

RE-ERENCE CX3~904 OF 16 AUGUST, CEREMONY TAKES PLACE ON

cis O/CG LOG

rJu SSOUR tiN TOKYO ON ,1 AUGUST.

{7

TOR: 241919/1

I

\

\

J--SECRET

DECLASSIAEfr DOD !Irs.

wJlfl/tm. 8< 20 June IW "\.r; 1/

. :.«.._,,( Lei Dale'1:d.2.;. .)

HEADQUARTERS

UNITED STATES .ARMY ST.RATEnIC AIR FORCES !PO 234.

!am

20 August 1945

M]]dORANIml FOR GENmAL SPAATZ:

Subject: Mission of USASTAF Advanced Headquarters in Tokyo Area.

Here is my idea of the functions which a USASTAF Advanced Headquarters in the Tokyo Area should perform.

1. LIAISON. Establish liaison with General MacArthur 1 s Headquarters to ,insure complete coordination of USASTAF activities with those of the other Forces of the Allied Supreme Commander.

2. PUBLIC RELATIONS.

a. Maintain supervision over the war correspondents accredited to USASTAF. Insure that appropriate relationships are maintained between these correspondents and CINCAFPAC 1 S Headquarters on any stories that are datelined as being from Japan.

b. Clear stories that a.re strictzy USASTAF responsibility that carry a Guam dateline, but which originate in Jap!.n •

.

c. Assure proper handling of stories dealing Ylith

atomic bombs.

3. OOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT.

a. To assist atomic bomb persorm.el in the performance of their mission.

4. AIR OPERATIONS. Supervise USASTAF air operations in and over Japan atter .the .coordination indicated :in subparagraph 1. above has been effected.

-1-

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r DECLASS'FiEO

5. AIRFmJ) SELECTION. Supervise and coordinate the selection and establishment of ,airfields for B-29 use.

6. ~WUARl'ERS FUNCTIONS.

a. Provide a Headquarters to whicm the key personnel of USASTAF, Eighth and Twentieth Air Forces may report upon their arrival in the Tokyo Area.

s. Amy

b. Coordinate the activities of the above personnel.

,

c. Assure appropriate messing and billeting of the above personnel.

Insofar as possible, USASrAF Advanced Headquarters w1l1 be self-supporting. It is planned to make as few' requests as possible upon General MacArthur's Headquarters for support. It is expected that a USASTAF courier service will be established between the Tokyo Area and the Marianas.

"

TtP SECRET

-2-

r

tIE.U4JARriBB

UNInD STATES ARMY STRATIDIC Am FORCliB !PO ~4

Zl Atlgust 1945

MmlORANDUM FOR G!NERAL SPAATZ:

Subject: ~ Air Cemmand in the Pacific.

1. In diseussing this question with General Kenney and General lIacArthur, I beli89'e it might be fruitful t. be prepare<1 to propose a draft reply t. General Arnold's lette.r to General llacArthur.

2. I appreciate that the draft attached hereto may require some modification to serve the purpose It!eual.ized or IlI&1' be wbelly wertbless. It is presented, however, as a basis for discussion 88d for ~ehuse as maY' be made of it.

~~~.

Brigadier General U.S. A •. Ass I t Chief ot Staff, Plans

Inel.

S~ e R :&-T

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, DOD Itrs. .r"

~& 20.June 1~~-1.! .a:1~ LC; OCltJ:L.J..._'!::;_~

DRAFT

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IlEssAGE FOR GENERAL ARNOLD FROM GmERAL :MACARTHUR

Have discussed organization of ArlIijr Air in Pacitic Theater with General Spa.atz and in the light of your letter brought today by Todd.

libile I fully subscribe to the ultimate establishment ef an Arm:r Air Command structure in the Pacific of the nature Spaatz prtDposes, my immediate requirements for the use of the air elements of KeMey's and Spaatzl commanu at the present time .. ul fer some few months to acme in discharging my- mission in the occupation Qf Japan, prevent me from agreeing at the present time to the full implementation af such an air establishment. If it is determined, howsver, that an A.rsq Air CGQ!JD8.I1d for the Pacific Theater is ultimately to

be established, and I urge that such a decision be made, ce.rtain steps could be taken now toward the early accGl'Dplisbment of that. end. The foll(nd.ng is

suggested:

a. Redesignate Headqu.arters USASTAF a .. Headquarters A.rtq Air Pacific.

b. Assign for a.dministrative eontrol all ~AirF.rce elEments now present in the Paeific to Headquarters A:rm:3' Air Pacific.

c. Provide that the CQIDIlIanding General, .A.rJQ" Air Pacific" shall

enjoy the same preregati ves and assume the same responsibilities of command

as now pertain to the Ccmnanding General, USASTAF, except as provided in para. d bel •••

d. SimultaneouslY' with the establishment of the Headquarters Arm;:r Air Pacit'ic, pr.vide that the .supreme Allied CCHDlD8J:lder shall have operatiDnal contrel of all ArIq Air elements in the Pacific Theater required to accomplish hi. pd.8sion; namely; the occupation ef Japan and the en£orcomont of t be terms

.1 surrender.

SECRET

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DECLASS1FIEC

DOD Itrs. 4 ,/

IJ pp. 6< 20 J~l\e l,!<i/ ~ ~

By: I..C, Dal ~

OeD.ral ot the Ant Doug].a. ob'tbur

U.S. Anq lorees, Pac1.fio iPO '00, % Po.t.-ter Baa 'ranel.co, Calltomia .•

Dear DouR'

(

. .

lour radio ot 15 Auguat (,ct 33888) 1nd1oated that you de.ired .1"17 iDtosutlG1l OIl the fUture "tatu.e and :relationship or USA F to your Headq~rs.

When the IlUrrender ot Japan bea .. -1: inent, I issued 1nJtructiona to paat. that hi. tfret priorit1 misslon was tot your requlruen\. tor ail" lorce. 1D coDnt!totion .1 th the surrender and oQOupation aDd turtber d~ all hie Qpe~t1oD8 would be coordtnated with 1Ou. I hope "bat thi. ba. prawd atlataoto,,- to yon.

OIl "'Treoent. vie!t to ,our Headquarters we. dilcualHJ(i the question or • UD1tled All' Foraetm the Pacifio. There ".l"8 praotioal d1tticul:tie8 which preftllted the .aeotIPllahllent of thl. at the t_, but I hOW tee1 that thie aot1oD 1, iJlperati1'8. I DOW pl'Opoee that durin. th1a paat ho.tUltl •• period USASrAF and AF 'be aJJal. :ted IUId p1a.ced under eM co_m. SOOQ after the tolWtl aurredar or the Japmeee 18 negotiated

I would 111ce to have SPIB'. retut'D to the states. I think, tb ref ON, that 1 t 1. quite 01_,. that Kenne7 18 the logloal u.n to bead thlJsAnv All' Paoitia orllDi .. tlon.

SiDell tbl •• ubJ.~ 1. one o~ prS-l"1iaportanae to )"OU 1:11 your aapaolty •• Sap,... C~nder or the Allied dWera I would ppree1ate wry .. - tank exp~ •• 1oa ot fOur vi ... prior tQ ., taking a~ action.

At Potec1u. it _ PJIOpoeect to the re.1d.nt that in the a.Dt I_po oapitulaW, the planned. d.plo)'II8Dt of the torllll-29 group. ahould be.-p1.eted. IlI7 -- .. fI'Oa Potadua Oft 28 Ju17, to platz, called for a .tud7 ot h dep1~nt uncleI' thee. eond1~lon.. 18 Au t, I outllMd to ,.a, !put., and Rloh.ardllOll, our propoMd ~juetmeDt of 8-29 ~.. I hope that this OI.ft, 1D general, be _.

--, the Chuter of the United. t10u pl'Odd II tor

1 ,. ,UId Luac1 For of.... n or the United tionl

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