Cigre 029 Ultra-High-Voltage PDF

Room 5.
2.9 ULTRA HIGH-VOLTAGE

Wednesday, 14th September
(11.00 - 12.45)
Chm: Aki Ametani
Rpt: Jinliang He
291 Availability of different transmission systems for long distance transmission -
C. Neumann,, B. Rusek,, U. Sundermann,, T. Benz,, N. Christl
292 Experimental study on corona environment effects of 1000-kV ac UHV
transmission lines - J.L. He, J. Tang, B. Zhang, R. Zeng
293 Design study for 1000 kV UVH UVH-AC
AC - Composite insulating string -
J.M. Seifert, D. Stefanini, F. Lehretz
294 Lightning strike characteristics of +/- 800-kV DC UHV transmission lines -
J.L. He, R. Zeng
295 Considerations for the standardization of high-speed earthing switches for
secondary arc extinction on transmission lines - M. Toyoda, Y. Yamagata, L-
R. Jaenicke, H. Heiermeier, A. Lathouwers, K. Edwards, I.M. Kim, B. Han, G.
Marquezin, M. Kosakada
k d
296 Considerations and recommendations for the specification of UHV substation
equipment - H. Ito, A.L.J. Janssen, D. Dufournet, Y. Yamagata, U. Riechert, P.
Fernandez M.
Fernandez, M Kosakada,
Kosakada D. D Peelo
297 The impact of large renewable deployment on electricity high voltage systems -
G. Celli, S. Mocci, F. Pilo, S. Tedde, G. Fulli, A. Purvins, E. Tzimas
Availability of different long distance
transmission systems
C. Neumann, B. Rusek, U. Sundermann, Amprion, Germany
T. Benz, ABB, Germany
N. Christl, Siemens, Germany
Content
1 Introduction
2 Considered long distance transmission systems
3 Definitions
4 Approach to define the availability of components
 Extra high voltage equipment
 Transformers
 LCC & VSC & SLC
 Overhead lines
 Cables
5 Results
6 Conclusions
2 Availability of long distance transmission systems| CIGRE C4

Bologna
Bologna
2011
2011
Introduction
In the next ten years an increase of power generation from renewables
in Germany of 25 % up to 30% to be expected, the largest portion by
offshore wind energy generation.
Transmission of additional wind energy from northern to southern

parts of Germany using existing structures is not possible
Extension of the existing network needed, an overlay grid under
discussion
Various transmission technologies under consideration
One of the main decision factors

 availability of the transmission system
3 Availability of long distance transmission systems| CIGRE Bologna 2011

Considered transmission systems (500km, 3GW)
compensation
OHL +Series
XLPE cables
OHL
OHL
OHL
OHL
OHL
(AC1a) (AC1b) (AC2) (DC1) (DC2a) (DC2b) (DC2c)
Description
AC AC 2x380- HVDC LCC

AC 1x750-kV HVDC VSC 3Bx320-kV HVDC VSC 2x500- HVDC VSC
2x380- kV D with 1Bx500-kV
F* 2T cable kV D* 1x500-kV D*
kV D SC D*
wer
Po
3600 3600 4000 4000 3000 3600 2720

Definitions
Unavailability  derived from forced energy unavailability FEU
If no exact data are available
Thereby :
MDT - mean down time
MTBF – Mean time between failures
λ – failure rate

Availability of EHV equipment
Reliability of the EHV equipment

 the worst failure rate value from the past CIGRE surveys and Amprion
database.
The assessment of outage time due to failure

 according Amprion service experience
The unavailability is strongly affected by minor failures.
13% Circuit-breaker
17% Forced Energy
20% instrumment transformer Unavailability
of a 380-kV-bay
pantograph disconnector
17%
1,4 hour / year
center-break disconnector
33% earthing switch

Availability of transformers
Data source  different CIGRE Surveys and Amprion experience
Reliability  LCC Transformers  MTBF = 50 years per unit

VSC (AC) Transformers  MTBF = 100 years per unit
Mean Down Time  Time to replace a transformer = 48 hours
FEU of transformer
0.48 … 0.96 hour / year

Availability of VSC and LCC poles and SC
Power electronics
MTBF = 5 years / pole FEU of power electronics

1.4 hour / year
MDT = 7 hours
Share in unavailability for typical LCC and VSC 1-pole stations

Interpretation of FNN data
Availability of outages due to galloping conductors
overhead lines probable less probable
Data source  FNN - German Forum (included) (excluded)

for Network technology and Network
operation
90% of single mode failures

 fault clearing with auto reclosing
 similar behaviour of DC systems
10% of common mode failures

 fault end-ups usually with an outage
(except galloping conductors)
MTBF  3.86 years / 100 cct. km Typical towers DC towers

FEU of OHL in FNN
MDT  12h
3.1 hour / year
Availability of DC cables
No data for on-land DC XLPE

 Use of data for AC XLPE (CIGRE, TB 379)
λ adjustments: AC 3 phases  DC 2 poles
Joint every 0.8 km per cable  2.5 joints per cct. km
MTBF = 8.06 year / 100 cct. km FEU of DC cable

MDT = 120 h (4 - 5 days) !! 14.8 hours / year

Forced energy unavailability – comparison of
different long distance transmission systems
1,2
2,5
Forced Energy Unavailability %
Transmission lines (OHL/cables) 2.48

EHV switchyard
1,0
UHV switchyard
Transformer
0,8 Converter stations (VSC,LCC, SLC)
88%
0,6 73%
82% 52% 58%

0,4 41% 42%
9%
8% 11%
0,2 19% 28%
27% 8% 12%
34% 48%
20% 30%
10%
0,0
(AC1a) (AC1b) (AC2) (DC2b) (DC2c) (DC2a) (DC1)

Conclusions
Comparable forced energy unavailability of AC & DC

systems with overhead lines ⇒ 1.7 - 3.3 days/year
Availability of the transmission lines is crucial
Slightly worse availability of VSC systems caused by higher
number of components and some power restrictions
VSC option using cables as transmission system is strongly
affected by the presumed availability of the XLPE cables
Since many new LCC and VSC systems are going to be
installed, the service performance should thoroughly be
observed

DESIGN STUDY FOR 1000/1200 kV
UHV-AC COMPOSITE INSULATOR STRING
Dr. J. M. Seifert; Ing. D. Stefanini
Ing. Fabian Lehretz

„Technology Survey“
100
HVDC
10
UHV
Capacity in GW
765kV 1200kV
1
400/500kV
0.1
Subtransmission
0.01
„Smartgrids“
HVDC - Smart
0.001
1 10 100 1000 10000
Transmission Distance in km
Composite Insulator - 1100kV
Tab. 1: Insulation coordination for 1000/1200 kV
Composite Insulator - 1100kV Field Control
Tab. 2: Maximum electrical design field stresses at the composite insulator
Location Evaluation Criterion (EPRI)

Insulator Path length on which Etg > 4.2
shank kV/cm shorter than 10 mm
Triple point Etg < 3.5 kV/cm
Fig. 3: Tangential Field distribution along the insulator axis and field plot of HV region
HTV - Composite Insulator - Pollution Performance
1
p.u.
0,9
0,8
0,7
Performance
0,6
0,5
0,4
0,3 HTM
0,2 Tracking & Erosion Resistance

0,1
Outdoor performance
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
%
ATH content (by weight)
HTV Composite Insulator - Pollution Performance
140
° RODURFLEX®
120
Generation III/IV HTV-
PDMS² / ATH filled
100
Static Contact Angle
80
RTV-2
60 RTV-1
HTV-Gen III/IV
40 HTV-Gen II
HTV-Gen I
LSR
20
0
0 4 8 12 d 16
Transfer Time
The IST sensitivity analysis in Fig. 3 for the “study” insulator will result in a 2%-
ESDD pollution performance of 0.22 mg/cm² (“heavy pollution”). More performance
can be reached if more underrib sheds will be added (up to CF of 4.0). At same
length 2%-ESDD of 0.6…0.8 mg/cm² can be achieved with silicone rubber
insulators of this design.
Unified Specific Creepage Distance (mm/kVinsulator)

56
11,0
54
10,5 52
10,0 50
9,5 48
46
Insulation Length (m)
9,0
44
8,5 42
8,0 40
7,5 38
36
7,0
34
6,5 32
6,0 30
5,5 28
IEC 60815
26
5,0
Very Light Light Medium Heavy Very Heavy 24
4,5 22
0,001 0,01 0,1 0,22 mg/cm² 1
Pollution Severity: 2% ESDD Level (mg/cm²)
Fig. 6: Insulation Length in m and USCD in mm/kV in dependence on ESDD 2% site pollution.
Test Results – All Tests passed!
600 / 800 kV HVDC
Required Insulation Length:

HEAVY (IEC 60815): ESDD=0.1mg/cm² - NSDD=0.3mg/cm²
533 kV 600 kV 800 kV
Glass / Porcelain 9.8m 12.6m 15.1m
Silicone Rubber 6.4m 7.3m 9.6m

Composite
2011 BOLOGNA SYMPOSIUM
The Electric Power System of the Future‐
y
Integrating Supergrids and Microgrids
13‐15 September 2011, Bologna, Italy
Lightning Strike Characteristics of +/‐
800‐kV DC UHV Transmission lines
Jinliang He and R. Zeng
High Voltage Research Institute
High Voltage Research Institute
Dept. of Electrical Engineering
Tsinghua University, Beijing, China
EMEtech, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

1. Introduction
 More than 70 % failures of transmission lines were caused by lightning strikes
 According to the operation experiences of 1150‐kV ac transmission lines in
Russia, the lightning trip‐out rate was 84.4%, its length is 493.2 km
 For 500‐kV and above transmission line: shielding failure is the main reason
 Li ht i
Lightning striking has following characteristics:
t iki h f ll i h t i ti
 Determinacy: one object must be stroked
 Randomness: Object stroked is random
Randomness: Object stroked is random
 Lightning shielding failure analysis method for transmission lines
EGM (Electrogeometric Model)
g LPM (Leader Propagation Model)
p g
Geometry‐based, not process‐based Process‐based, but along max field
No effect of complex ground Ground configuration too simple to be
configuration realistic
Geometrical parameter‐sensitive Electrical parameter‐sensitive
Suitable for 330 kV and below Suitable for 500 kV and above
Predicted shielding failure number
Predicted shielding failure number Decided by adjusted parameters
Decided by adjusted parameters
much fewer than reality

1. Introduction
 Requirement on the shielding failure analysis method of transmission lines:
 Process‐based, applied to complex ground configuration
 Branched and tortuous characteristics of lightning channel
 Containing some uncertainty and stochasity in the model
 Fractal growth model as a candidate:
 Self‐similarity and multi‐scale property of gas discharges
 Channel developing probabilistically driven by electric field
Channel developing probabilistically driven by electric field
 Only considering ground configurations as boundary condition
 Purpose of this paper:
u pose o is pape
 Application of fractal model on lightning shielding analysis of transmission line
 Modify the Dielectric Breakdown Model (DBM) to make it adaptable to transmission
li
line configuration
fi ti
 The statistic results: considering the randomness of lightning strikes

2. Fractal Model
3 D simulation
3‐D simulation
Fractal dimension
ac a i e sio
( Ei )
Pi 
 ( Ei )
n
[from: J.
[f J Riousset
Ri t and
dVV.
Pasko, EMR3 2006 report ]
Operating voltage of transmission Core Algorithm (DBM): At each time‐step
Solve electric field via Poisson
electric field via Poisson’ss Equation
Equation
li e a be o ide ed
line can be considered
Select direction for the next development

2. Fractal Model
Lightning current magnitude Q=f(Im),
charges are assumed uniformly distributed
in the fractal channels
  43 106 I 2/ 3  16.5106 I 2/3
without with fractal channels
i ou i ac a c a e s
Upward leader inception
 Local field criterion
Ge e al ou ded obje t Ec  500kV/m
General grounded object: 500kV/
Transmission line:
Ec  3000m(1  0.03 / r )
 “Hot‐spot” concept
Hot‐spots distribute every several meters
along the line edges, corners and tips
of the tower
Over one upward leaders can be incepted
Upward leaders incept only at hot‐spots
Upward leaders incept only at hot spots

2. Fractal Model
 Fractal dimension
 Calculated by box‐counting method
 As a criterion to testify simulation results
 Photographs are 2‐D projections of actual flashes
 Simulated lightning channels in 3‐D space should be
projected to various vertical planes and then
calculate the fractal dimensions of the projections
 Enough samples and statistics are needed, we find:
 =1.15 to 1.40 is the closest to the observation data,
with fractal dimensions in a range of 1.1 to 1.3
Fractal Dimension of Lightning Discharge
Reference Fractal Dimension Method Data Source

1.05~1.4, Avg:1.213
1 05 1 4 A 1 213 Box counting
B i photographs
h h
[25]
1.1~1.3, Avg:1.137 Polygon photographs
[26] 1.197±0.03 Box counting simulation
1.1~1.4 photographs
[27] Box counting
Box counting
1.1~1.3 simulation

3. Application in 500kV ac Line
 Shielding failure of a 500kV AC line
 Illustration of various lightning strike positions
g g p
•On the horizontal ground, even
if the transmission line satisfies
the perfect shielding condition,
p g ,
shielding failure fault remains
possible
•When the ground obliquity is
g q y
relatively small, the results of
fractal simulation are much higher
than EGM and closer to reality
•Larger obliquity will replace the
randomness of lightning being the
main factor that determines
occurrence of shielding failure
g

4. Application in +/‐800kV DC UHV line
 lightning withstanding levels of (+) and
(‐) pole conductors are 32.9 and 23.3kA
F t l Model
Fractal M d l LPM EGM
500 500 500
400 400
400
eight (m)
300 300
300
He
200 200
200
100 100
0 0 100
-100 -50 0 50 -10 -5 0 5 10 -10 -5 0 5 10

Lateral Distance (m)
The lightning leader of fractal model has a relatively large span, while that of LPM can only propagate
to the small area away from the starting point, and that of EGM propagate to the area right below the
starting point
starting point

 Distribution of the initiating point and falling point
EGM and LPM develop vertically or near vertically, this property leads to the distribution of
the initiating point and falling point of their leaders approaches to a straight line
the initiating point and falling point of their leaders approaches to a straight line.
But the fractal model has scattered distribution of the initiating point and falling point of its
leader. This means downward leader initiating from far place can still have influence on the
transmission line
transmission line

 Influence of sag
 means that the protective angle varies along the line
 If the sag of shielding wire is larger than that of pole conductors, or equivalently
the protective angle in the middle of the interval increases, the lightning
protection may lose some effectiveness
 For example, probability of strikes to middle half of positive conductor increases
from 0.032 (no sag) to 0.049 (with sag)
y g g p
Probability distribution of lightning strike points over the
interval between two towers
Probability (total simulation number：1000)
Strike points
No sag
g Considering sag
g g
the towers 0.300 0.294
middle half of shielding wires 0.292 0.271
other part of shielding wires 0.336 0.335
middle half of positive conductor 0.032 0.049
other part of positive conductor 0.029 0.032
middle half of negative conductor; 0.006 0.011
other part of negative conductor
h f d 0.005 0.008

Shielding failure is most probable to occur in middle part of transmission line
Our statistical results lead to the ratio between numbers of shielding failure faults
g
of (+) and (‐) conductors (~8:1), very close to the operation data (8~10:1) of HVDC
lines of China Southern Power Grid
+/‐800kV DC line

5. Conclusions
 The fractal method tracks the developing process of lightning leader, takes into
account some random factors and therefore leads to results that are more consistent
with operating data while EGM tends to make over optimistic evaluations in the
with operating data, while EGM tends to make over‐optimistic evaluations in the
lightning protection design of EHV and UHV transmission lines.
 The distribution of lightning strike points over a range along the ±800kV HVDC
transmission line from the simulation results of the fractal method indicates
transmission line from the simulation results of the fractal method, indicates
definitely that the positive conductor in the middle of the interval between two
neighboring towers is the weak part of lightning protection, and provide a
p
promising approach for the optimization of the configuration of shielding wires and
g pp p g g
pole conductors. The ratio between the numbers of shielding failure faults of
positive and negative conductors is about 8:1.
 In actual engineering, we can improve the lightning protection property of
g g p g gp p p y
transmission lines by controlling the sags of shielding wires and phase or pole
conductors.

Cigrè International Symposium
13-15 September 2011 – Bologna (Italy)
Considerations for the Standardization of

High-speed earthing switches for secondary
arc extinction
on transmission lines
On behalf of IEC SC17A PT48
M. TOYODA Y. YAMAGATA L-R. JAENICKE H. HEIERMEIER

Toshiba TEPCO Siemens ABB
Japan Japan Germany Switzerland
A. LATHOUWERS K. EDWARDS I. M. KIM B. HAN
KEMA BPA Hyundai H. I. CEPRI
Netherland U.S.A. R. of Korea China
G. MARQUEZIN M. KOSAKADA
Alstom Grid Toshiba
France Japan
P-1
HSESs (HSGSs)
HSES for 550kV system in BPA
P-2
HSESs (HSGSs)
HSES for 800kV system in KEPCO
P-3
SCOPE
• HSES(High Speed Earthing Switch) is used for
secondary arc extinction.
• Technical study on this equipment is required
for IEC standardization. This standardization
activity is conducting by IEC SC17A/PT48 from
2009-1
• Analysis on HSES interruption has conducted
for definition of duties.
• Categorization is done from fault condition.
P-4
Basic Function of HSES

Single phase interruption sequence
CB CB
Transmission fault occurs
0 sec HSES HSES Primary arc
Clear the faulted phase
0.07 sec Secondary arc

HSESs at each end close
to clear the secondary arc
Clear secondary arc
0.27 sec
HSESs at each end open
0.8 sec
Circuit breakers reclose

1 sec
P-5
Direct lightning strokes to phase lines
Direct lightning stroke to the Direct lightning stroke to the

upper phase line middle phase line and flashover
P-6
Location and number of the lightning strokes

Red underline shows the lightning strokes in 1 second.
UHV designed OH-line
11 strokes
9 strokes
200m
Area I Area II
Several lightning strokes can occur in a short time
(less than 1 second) along the transmission lines.
P-7
possibility of the successive fault

Evaluation from the aspect of lightning
Several direct lightning strokes within 1 second may

result in a multi-phase fault on UHV designed
transmission lines.
The possibility of the successive fault due to a direct

lightning stroke cannot be disregarded.
Therefore, a successive fault as a study condition of
HSES’s specifications should be adopted.
P-8
Successive fault
Definition: additional earth fault that occurs in the adjacent phase circuit
during the time interval of a single-phase earth fault prior to reclosing by
circuit-breakers
tim e (m s) from the
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
First lightning stroke
Fault occurs
CB　1,2 Break: at 70ms CB 1,2 reclose: at 1000ms

Circuit breaker
CB keeps open
HSES Close: at 270ms HSES Open command: at 700ms

HSESarcing
HSES keeps close time may be
HSES HSES Closing Opening time longer in
time some
Arcing time
conditions of
(10～20ms）
successive
HSES Close command: at 170ms fault
HSES Break : around 740ms
Successive faults
on the other phases/
lines
Successive faults donot affect on the HSES interruption
since the successive faults on the other phases/ lines will have been cleared by
CBs
Around 80ms
prior to the HSES opening
Successive fault
may affect on
HSES interruption
since it may not
have been
cleared yet.
P-9
Categories
depending on fault modes & operating sequence
Category Description
This is a basic case. Only one single-line earth fault occurs within the transmission
circuits. For both electromagnetic and electrostatic duties, the currents to be
Category 0
interrupted and recovery voltages are low. The values of category 0 are covered by
those of Category 1.
One single-phase earth fault plus another single-phase earth fault on different circuit
without successive fault. This is the case that up to one single-phase earth fault
Category 1
within each circuit in a double-circuit system. This Category will be covered by
class H1 in [3]
This is the case that a successive single-phase earth fault occurs during HSES opening
operation at the phase where the first single-phase earth fault occurs. Successive
Category 2
fault may occur in the same circuit or in the other circuit located in the vicinity of the
circuit with a faulted line. This Category will be covered by class H2 in [3]
This is the case that a single-phase earth faults with delayed current zero phenomena
occurs in the presence of a successive single-phase earth fault. During the delayed
Category 3
current zero period HSES should be withstood against the stress caused by the arc
generated between the contacts of HSES.
This is the case that multi-phase faults occur within two or more phase circuits which
Category 4 are located in the vicinity each other. At least two different phases should be
remained without fault condition.
P-10
Calculated values and proposed values

One set of duties will be proposed for the standard
Table 4 Calculated and proposed values
Electromagnetic coupling Electrostatic coupling
Comparison
between Rated induced Rated power First TRV peak Time to first Rated induced Rated induced
calculated and current frequency kV peak current voltage
proposed A(rms) recovery ms A(rms) kV(rms)
values voltage
kV(rms)
Category 1(1) 744 76 189 1.92 228 196

(832)(3) (1.0)(4)
Category 2(2) 6832 232 576 0.6 228 235
Duty 6800 240 580 0.6 230 235
Note:
(1) Up to 300km transmission line is considered for calculation in Category 1
(2) Up to 200km transmission line is considered for calculation in category 2.
(3) Calculated value in parentheses is obtained by China tower model.
(4) Calculated value in parentheses is obtained by China tower model and also duty in BPA 500kV HSES specification
P-11
Comparison of earthing switch, fast acting earthing

switch and HSES
Fast acting earthing
Earthing switch switch High speed earthing
Requirement (Class E0 in IEC 62271- (Class E1 (& E2) in IEC switch for secondary
102) for maintenance 62271-102) for fault arc extinction (HSES)
making
Slow motion Fast (High speed) closing Fast (High speed) closing
Closing
e.g. Hand operated operation operation, controlled
Slow motion Slow motion
Opening Fast opening, controlled
e.g. Hand operated May be hand operated
None Must be able to make and Must be able to make and
Making capability Must carry the full short to carry the full short to carry the full short-
circuit current circuit current circuit current
Must be able to interrupt
Clearing
none none induced current and
capability
to withstand a TRV
Operating cycle none close Close- open
Withstand capability 2 (or 5) closings against
2 closings against full
endurance against full short full short circuit
short circuit current
circuit current current P-12
Comparison between four-legged reactor and HSES

four-legged reactor HSES
- Effective for single-phase fault that
Secondary hold the majority of the faults.
arc - Difficult to choose a reactance value - Quick extinction for all fault modes.
extinction of reactors that effectively reduce
the secondary arc current for all
fault modes.
Flexibility to - In case a substation is constructed in - Not affect on the substation

the change the middle of a line, it might be equipment that has already
of network required to substitute a reactor that installed.
has already installed.
- Automatic sequential control such as
Control - Special control is unnecessary for “fault detection  CB open 
/Protection secondary arc extinction. HSES close  HSES open  CB
close” is necessary in each phase,
and it can be easily realized.
- Four-legged shunt reactor is appropriate for transmission lines which require
Economy shunt reactors for voltage control, while HSES would be economical for the
lines without shunt reactors.
- Detailed analysis is necessary so as
not to cause resonance between - Highly reliable control system is
Concern shunt reactor inductance and line required since a mal-function leads
capacitance not only in power to a ground fault.
frequency of 50/60Hz but also in
the high frequency band. P-13
Conclusion
★ PT48 in IEC SC17A works for HSES standardization

from 2009-1
• Effect of system parameters to the interrupting duties is
studied and ５ categories are introduced as interrupting
duties
• Contacting with CIGRE WG A3.22 and A3.28
★ Principal topics discussed in this paper are…;

• coordination with CB re-closing systems
• timing coordination of HSES operation with CBs’
• consideration for successive fault on transmission line
P-14
CIGRE SC A3 Colloquium Vienna, Austria,
September 7th - 8th 2011
Thank you for

your kind
attention !
P-15
Considerations and Recommendations
for the Specification of UHV Substation Equipment
On behalf of CIGRE WG A3.22 / A3.28
Hiroki Ito, Mitsubishi Electric Uwe Riechert, ABB

Anton Janssen, Liander Paulo Fernandez, Eletrobras
Denis Dufournet, Alstom Grid Masayuki Kosakada, Toshiba
Yoshibumi Yamagata, TEPCO David Peelo, Consultant
Scope: Review the state-of-the-art of project specific and national technical

specifications for all substation equipment within the scope of CIGRE Study Committee
A3 at voltages exceeding 800 kV.
Recommend future specifications and standardizations of 1100 kV and 1200 kV
equipment and provide technical backgrounds on the collected information to IEC TC17.
CIGRE Symposium in Bologna, 13-14 September 2011 1

Highest voltage of AC power transmission
Highest voltage of AC power transmission （kV）
1200kV 1200kV
1200 (1985-91,USSR) 1100kV field tests (2012-,India)
1100 (1996-,Japan) 1100kV
787kV
(2008-,China)
735/765kV (1967-,USSR) 800kV
800
420kV (1965-,Canada) (USA, South Africa, Brazil, Korea, China)
(1957-,USSR) 25.7
550
420 380kV 20.1
300 (1952-,Sweden)
12.1 14.0
4.8 7.6 World electricity consumption (1000TWh)
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
year
Russian 1200kV GCB TEPCO UHV testing station China 1100kV substation 2
Insulation level: LIWV / LIPL and SIWV / SIPL
LIPL (value in kV)
2500 LIWV for transformers
LIWV for other equipment
2000
1500
1000
500
0
800 kV 1050 kV 1200 kV 1100 kV
SIPL (value in kV)
2500 SIWV for transformers
SIWV for other equipment
2000
1500
1000
500
0
800 kV 1050 kV 1200 kV 1100 kV
3
Maximum SFO for different opening practices
2.0
Fault locations in the middle of the lines
1.9 1.83 p.u.
1.83 Without resistor
Maximum overvoltage (p.u.)
1.8 With 500 ohm resistor
Voltage (kV)
1.7
1.65
1.6
1.52
1.5
1.42 Time (ms)
1.4 1.37 (a) Without Resistor
1.36
1.3
(SA protection level: V20kA=1,620kV)
1.2
Voltage (kV)
1.1
1.0
Fault condition 3LG 1LG 1LG
CB operation 3-phase open 3-phase open 1-phase open
1.42 p.u. Time (ms)
1LG: Single-phase line fault to ground (b) With Resistor (500 ohm)
3LG: Three-phase line faults to ground
Slow-Front Overvoltage (SFO) level depends on the fault-type and tends to be larger in an
order of 1LG < 2LG < 3LG. Even though the probability of 2LG & 3LG faults is
comparatively small, in the event of a successive fault occurring in a healthy line followed
by a fault clearing in another line there could be serious consequence for the system. 4
DC time constants in fault currents
Calculations predict a large DC time constants in fault current in UHV transmission systems due
to usage of multi sub-conductor bundles and the existence of large capacity power transformers.
Conductors DC time Tower and conductor designs
Highest voltage
Size constants
(kV) (mm2 ) Bundle ( ms )
1100kV transmission lines 800kV transmission lines
810mm sq. -8 conductors 1360mm sq. -4 conductors
800
Canada 686 4 75 19m
20.12m
800 572 6 89
22.6 (42.1) m
35 (54.5) m
USA
800 15.5m
South Africa 428 6 67
12m 12m
800
Brazil 603 4 88 16m
800 800kV transmission lines
China 400 6 75 1360mm sq. -4 conductors
1200
Russia 400 8 91 16.5m
42.7m
1050
520 8 100
107.5m
72.5m
120m
Italy
90m
1100
40.3m
Japan 810 8 150 15.24m
27.4m
1100
China 500 8 120
1200
India 774 8 100
Influences of the high DC component on test-duty T100a does not show any significant
difference when the constant exceeds around 120ms. Therefore, it was recommended to
use a time constant of 120 ms for rated voltages higher than 800 kV. 5
UHV TRV requirements
Voltage T100, kpp=1.2, kaf=1.5, t2=3xt1
2000
T60, kpp=1.2, kaf=1.5, t2=4.5xt1
TRV peak Uc / t2 1800
Uc T60, kpp=1.2, kaf=1.5, t2=3xt1
1600
1400
1200
U1 / t1 Uc: TRV peak = Kpp x Kaf x Ur 2/3
U1 T60, kpp=1.3, kaf=1.5, t2=6xt1
U (kV)
U1: First reference voltage = 0.75 x Kpp x Ur 2/3 1000
T60, kpp=1.2, kaf=1.5, t2=6xt1
RRRV U1/ t1: Rate of rise of TRV 800
T100, kpp=1.3, kaf=1.4, t2=4xt1
t2 : time to TRV peak 600
t2 = 4 x t1 for T100, t2 = 6 x t1 for T60 400
Ui 200 TRV for T100 and T60 with Ur=1100 kV

ITRV
0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
0 ti t1 t2 Time Time (μs)
UHV First-pole-to-
clear factor
Amplitude
factor 1100 kV 1200 kV Rate of Rise of
TRV
Time to TRV peak Time to TRV peak
DUTY Kpp Kaf TRV peak (kV) TRV peak (kV) RRRV (kV/µs) t2 t3
T100 1.2 (1.3) 1.5 (1.4) 1617 1764 2 3.0*t1 (4*t1)
T60 1.2 (1.3) 1.5 1617 1764 3 4.5*t1 (6*t1)
T30 1.2 (1.3) 1.54 1660 1811 5 t3 (t3)
T10 1.2 (1.3) 1.76 1897 2076 7 t3 (t3)
TLF 1.2 (1.5) 0.9*1.7 1649 1799 (*) (*)
Out-of-phase 2.0 1.25 2245 2450 1.38*t1 (2*t1)
Values ( ) are standards for 800 kV and below. t1 and t3 are based on Kpp=1.2
(*) : RRRV= Uc / t3 with t3 =6 * Ur / I 0.21 shown in the ANSI C37.06.1-2000 for transformers up to 550 kV
For UHV transformers, RRRV and t3 are determined by the transformer impedance and its equivalent surge
capacitance (specified as 9 nF) 6
Effect of MOSA on TRV waveforms
2000 T60, Breaking current : 26.2kA 2000 T100, Breaking current : 33.8kA
TRV for T60 with twice TRV peak value of existing 550kV standard
TRV for T100 with twice TRV peak value of existing 550kV standards
TRVpeak=1586kV Uc=1751kV (Kpp=1.3, Kaf=1.5)
Uc=1635kV (Kpp=1.3, Kaf=1.4) TRVpeak=1502kV Uc=1635kV (Kpp=1.3, Kaf=1.4)
1500 1500
TRVpeak=1411kV
TRVpeak=1380kV
Voltage (kV)
Voltage (kV)
1000 1000
500 500
Without MOSA Without MOSA
With MOSA (A type characteristic) With MOSA (A type characteristic)
With MOSA (B type characteristic) With MOSA (B type characteristic)
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
Time (ms) Time (ms)
The clipping or suppression level of 1400 kV would lead to a specified TRV level of
1617 kV considering a certain margin between the circuit-breaker performances and the
MOSA protection levels. This recommendation corresponds to the inherent peak value
for T100 and close to the inherent peak value for T60. 7
HSGS/HSES requirements
GCB GCB
Transmission fault occurs
(0 sec) HSGS primary arc HSGS
open open
Clear the faulted phase
(0.07 sec) secondary arc
HSGS at each end close to

clear the secondary arc
close Clear secondary arc close
(0.27 sec)
HSGS at each end open

(0.8 sec) open open
close close
Circuit breakers reclose
(1.0 sec)
Recommendations for HSGS requirements by IEC SC17A PT-48 (See paper A3-103)
8
Summary and Considerations
Insulation levels
Suppressing switching overvoltage as much as possible is a predominant factor to
reduce the height of transmission towers and the dimension of open-air parts in
substations. Such technologies as MOSA with higher performance, CB with
opening/closing resistors, DS with switching resistor can effectively suppress the
switching surges less than 1.6pu for substation equipment and 1.7pu for OH-lines.
Secondary arc
4-legged shunt reactor can reduce the secondary arc current by a half.
Secondary arc can be extinguished less than 1 sec. if the current does not exceed 60 A.
First-pole-to-clear factor (FPCF)
Use of a large capacity power transformer reduces FPCF (1.1 for Japan, 1.2 for India)
DC time constant / Line surge impedance
Multi sub-conductors bundles with large diameter can increase the time constants (150
ms for Japan, 120 ms for China) and reduce the line surge impedance around 350 ohm.
TRV
MOSAs reduce the TRV peak for some terminal faults below the SIPL for in UHV systems.
TRVs for TLF give severe rate-of-rise of TRV (RRRV) only in special cases.
CIGRE Symposium in Bologna, 13-14 September 2011 9
Publications of CIGRE WG A3.22
2007
Technical paper presented at IEC-CIGRE UHV symposium in Beijing
2-4-1 “Technical requirements for UHV substation equipments”
2008
First Technical Brochure published in December
TB 362 “Technical requirements for substation equipments exceeding 800 kV”
CIGRE Session paper presented at 2008 CIGRE session in Paris
A3-211 “Technical requirements for UHV substation equipments”
2009
Technical paper presented at IEC-CIGRE UHV symposium in New Delhi
3-1 “System impacts on UHV substation equipment”
4-1 “CIGRE state of the art & prospects for equipment”
2011
Second Technical Brochure published in April
TB456 “Background of technical specifications of substation equipment exceeding 800 kV”
Technical paper presented at 2011 SC A3 colloquium in Vienna
A3-101 Background information & study results for specifications of UHV substation equipment
> WG A3.28 will continue the studies on UHV / EHV switching equipment
10
Cigrè International Symposium Bologna 13-15 Sept. 2011
The Impact of Large Renewable Deployment

on Electricity High Voltage Systems
G. CELLI, S. MOCCI, F. PILO, S. TEDDE

Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University of Cagliari – ITALY
G. FULLI, A. PURVINS, E. TZIMAS

European Commission, DG JRC, Institute for Energy – Petten, The Netherlands
1
Bologna 14 Sept. 2011 - Session 2.9 Ultra High Voltage
Presentation Outline
• Introduction
• The Sardinian Power System
• Power Generation and Load Demand in Sardinia
• Renewable Energy Sources integration in Sardinia
• Scenarios in 2020 and 2030
• Results
• Remarks
2
The Sardinian AC Grid

380 kV AC Transmission Lines [km]
Total 304,9
380 kV EHV transmission network

from North to South of Sardinia
connects the two areas with the
biggest power plants.
A shorter 380 kV EHV line connects
the two HVDC stations.
220 kV AC Transmission [km]
Lines
Total 1335,1
150 kV AC Transmission [km]

±500 kV HVDC 220 kV AC
Total 2064,6 200 kV HVDC 380 kV AC
3
Sardinian DC Grid
200 kV, 300 MW HVDC (SACOI)
Currently the SA.CO.I. is under scheduling a
revamp to increase reliability and power
capacity
500 kV, 1000 MW HVDC (SAPEI)
• Connection from Sardinia to the mainland.
• Two HVDC converter stations (Fiume
Santo, Latina).
• The HVDC system is a bipole of 1.000 MW.
• Each pole has a capacity of 500MW at ±500
kV with 1.000 A as nominal current.
• The DC cable is laid beneath the Tyrrhenian
Sea at depths of up to 1,600 meters.
4
2008 vs 2010 Power Generation Capacity

The energy production in Sardinia on 2008 was dominated by thermal plants
which covers 72% of the total Sardinian electricity generation
12.11% 0.42%
12.46% 13.99 1.63% 10.21
% %
0.41%
Hydro 2.23%
Thermoelectric
Photovoltaic
74.59% 71.94
Wind
%
Biomass
The expansion of RES power plants installed in Sardinia, especially wind

and PV power, has reduced the share of traditional power plants
5
Renewable Power Generation in Sardinia

A fast growth of the PV Distribution of wind capacity
integration in the power
systems with reference to the
number of power plants and
power capacity
In the last 5 years there has

been a great increase of wind
power production that will be
doubled in the next ten
years (1750 MW on 2020).
The orography and

hydrography of the Sardinian
territory do not allow large
hydro generation capacity.
6
2008 Load Demand and Location

Agricolture Industry Tertiary Residential Total
Zone GWh GWh GWh GWh GWh

SS 38,6 683 449 458 1.629
Ca 37,4 2.593 927 775,6 4.333
CI 11,7 3.187,9 135,2 172 3.506
OT 11,4 128,9 351,1 289,4 780,7
NU 24,6 289,1 183,9 190,2 687,7
OR 61,7 103,4 178,7 194,4 538,2
VS 18,8 71,6 100,5 111,1 302
OG 7,2 29,6 60,9 60,5 158,2
Tot 211,2 7.086,2 2.386,4 2.251,4 11.935
• One third of demand is concentrated in

the south •Strong increasing of load in
•Load is widespread with very low density summer
7
Seasonal Daily Load Profile

The 2008 peak demand in Sardinia was 1825 MW registered in August
due to the high use of air conditioners
16/04/2008 30/07/2008 15/10/2008 02/12/2008
2000
1600
Daily load [MW]
1200
800
400
0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
Hour
• Maximum peak load appears around 8-9 p.m. during summer

• Minimum valley load around 3-4 a.m. during winter
• Average summer peak and winter valley load data were chosen to create
worst conditions for grid operation with high RES shares. 8
Grid Expansion in 2020

SAPEI HVDC
1. New 380 kV connection between
Fiumesanto/Selargius EHV line and
Codrongianos power station (new
power station in Ittiri);
380 kV AC
2. Building and revamping of the

transmission grid in the North-West 150 kV AC
part of Sardinia (Gallura region);
3. Building of new 150 kV lines in the 150 kV AC

Cagliari area.
9
Grid Expansion in 2030

1) HVDC monopolar connection to the
mainland (SA.CO.I) is put back into
service with the same capacity of the
existing one (300 MW);
2) Upgrades of the existing 150 kV low

capacity lines in the North-West of
Sardinia;
3) Refurbishment of the old 70 kV lines in

the middle of the island with 150 kV new
lines;
4) A possible new monopolar 500 MW/500

kV HVDC link between Algeria and
Sardinia to import “green” energy from
North Africa
10
Load Forecast
2008-2020 + 1,5%
- PEAK LOAD
2020-2030 + 1%
2008-2020 + 0,9%
- VALLEY LOAD
2020-2030 + 1%
The PV generators reduce the energy demand from power supply, the
overall yearly power supply and the number of possible congestions
caused by excessive demand
11
Generation Expansion
2020 1% 0% 2%
2030
Hydro
9% 1% 2% 8%
4% 4%
Thermal 7%
Wind
19%
Photovoltaic
25%
CHP 53%
65%
Solar thermodynamic
Biomass + Urban
Residual
 Investments on Thermal Generation infrastructures aim at improving the

efficiency of the existing generation plants.
 Solar Thermodynamic (CSP) and micro CHP

 in 2020 connection of one 20 MW CSP and 70 MW CHP;
 in 2030 integration of larger CSP plants and 200 MW CHP.
12
Methodology
 The AC power flow studies have been performed using a Newton-
Raphson iterative method to characterize the steady state operation.
 RES production has been dispatched with the highest priority
 The dispatching of the thermal generation units has been scaled

down in accordance with their technical constraints (e.g. minimum
power production).
 For the inflow of energy from Algeria two alternative assumptions:
 The CSP power has always higher dispatch priority versus Sardinian
wind production: the export capacity of the Sardinian grid is practically
halved
 The Sardinian wind production has higher dispatch priority versus the
Algerian power import. In this case, it has been assumed that the
import from the Algerian CSP power plants could be curtailed in order
to allow full wind production.
13
Results (scenario 2020)

CASE STUDIES
 Scenario with the greatest
1 Peak Load-Wind 50%- SAR.CO. 50%-NO PV losses:
2 Peak Load-Wind 90%- SAR.CO. 50%-NO PV  SAR.CO. exploited up to 100%
3 Peak Load-Wind 90%- SAR.CO. 100%-NO PV
4 Peak Load-Wind 90%- SAR.CO. 100%-PV
 90% wind generation
5 Peak Load-Wind 90%- SAR.CO. 100%-PV & CHP  No reduction given by the PV
6 Valley Load-Wind 50%- SAR.CO.100%-NO PV generation
7 Valley Load-Wind 90%- SAR.CO.100%-NO PV
8 Valley Load-Wind 89%- SAR.CO.100%-NO PV & CHP  Scenario with the smallest
losses
16
Number of branches within each congestion level
 valley load scenarios in the
≥ 70% ≥ 80% ≥ 90% ≥ 100%
14 same conditions.
 The
12
increased power
10
8
production causes a greater
6
exploitation of the 380 kV network
4 and HVDC connections.
2
0
 The 150 and 220 kV network is
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 less used with a reduction of
SCENARIOS
power flows on those lines 14
Remarks (Scenario 2020)

 The SA.PE.I HVDC link to mainland raises the export capacity of the
Sardinian system and permits increasing significantly the generation level of
the conventional thermoelectric technology.
 The wind production takes advantage from the SAPEI and no curtailment is
required (in steady state conditions). Some limitations may occur with high
wind production due to local network congestions
The PV generation does not reduce the evening peak load of the Sardinian
system, but it is able to partially reduce the active losses and the exploitation
of some 150 kV lines, especially during the midday peak load.
 From the point of view of the Italian electricity market, the almost complete
elimination of the congestions on the Sardinia – mainland connection allows
reducing the zonal prices of Sardinia as well as the unique national energy
price.
15
Results (Scenario 2030)

CASE STUDIES  The SA.PE.I. HVDC link
Peak Load-Wind 90% - SAR.CO.0% - NO PV-Algeria capacity available to export the
1
100% Sardinian RES power generation
2 Peak Load-Wind 90% - SAR.CO.0% - PV - Algeria 47%
Peak Load-Wind 90% - SAR.CO.0% - PV - CHP -
has been reduced, causing the
3 RES generation curtailment.
Algeria 6.5%
4 Peak Load-Wind 90% - SAR.CO.100% - Algeria 60%
Peak Load-Wind 90% - SAR.CO.100% - CHP-Algeria  The SA.CO.I. revamping
5
40% increases the export capacity to
Number of branches within each congestion level the mainland.
10
9
≥ 70% ≥ 80% ≥ 90% ≥ 100%  The scenario with the largest
8
7
losses:
6  maximum wind generation
 utmost import from Algeria
5
4
3
2  The balance between the
1
0
power locally produced and the
1 2 3 4 5
local consumption allows not
SCENARIOS
exceeding the rated capacity of
the lines 16
Remarks (scenario 2030)

 The HVDC connection with Algeria will significantly impact the
Sardinian power system with possible curtailment of the power
generation:
 The generation of the conventional thermoelectric power plants
should be reduced to preserve the wind production at the evening
peak load.
 Storage devices and electric vehicles are necessary to preserve
adequate reserve margin and comply with technical constraints of
thermal generation when PV generation is maxima.
 At off-peak hours, the wind production has to be limited (80%) if
Algerian power gets dispatch priority. On the contrary, if the
Sardinian RES generation gets highest dispatch priority, the HVDC
connection with Algeria will be used at 60% of its capacity.
 The 150 kV network is the most critical asset of the Sardinia
transmission grid.
17
Question I
According the analysis of the paper, in order not to curtail the

wind production during the evening peak load, it is necessary to
limit the maximum generation level of the conventional
thermoelectric power plants (around 50% of the nominal
installed capacity). What’s the suitable ratio between RES and
thermoelectric power?
18
Answer I
- The suitable ratio between RES and thermoelectric power is the one
expected for 2020:
1000 / 3358 ≈ 30%
because a greater increase of wind generation, such as those planned for

2030, requires generation curtailment.
- The dramatic increasing of PV (250 MW already installed, 400 MW

expected by 2013) will probably cause wind and thermal generation
curtailment in summer windy days
19
Question II
The author has been demonstrated with the study that the 150
kV network is the most critical asset of the Sardinia
transmission grid where the majority of wind farms are
connected particularly in the north-east part of the island.
Connecting the wind farms to higher voltage systems such as
220 kV or 380 kV networks can alleviate network congestions,
but at very high costs for power producers and system
stakeholders. What’s the best high voltage grade for the
network with RES？
20
Answer II
Number of branches within each congestion level
8
By moving wind farms to 220 kV
7
6 level:
5
4 - A drastic reduction of congestions;
3
2 - An improvement of active power
1
0
losses (37,13 MW versus 34 MW)
≥ 70% ≥ 80% ≥ 90% ≥ 100%
150 kV Voltage Level 220 kV voltage Level
The best high voltage grade for the network with RES is 220 kV level, because:
- The 380 kV network is poorly developed and the connection costs are too
high;
- the 220 kV level is the best compromise between cost and reliability of the
connection
21
Question III
Large RES generation facilities are far from the main urban
consumption areas, long distance power transmission
infrastructures are required, an increase in active losses takes
place and some additional difficulties in local voltage control
may also arise. How do the renewable energy sources affect
the structure of power transmission network? And How does the
power transmission network affect the application of RES?
22
Answer III
The structure of the transmission network of the future is affected by a high

penetration level of RES and it will be necessary a re-sizing of some
connections in order to export the RES energy to the north and then to the
mainland.
The power system affects the application of RES introducing some limits to
the distributed generation connection to the grid mainly due to the fact that
the grid has not been constituted to receive high level of RES
23
THANK YOU FOR YOUR KIND ATTENTION
24

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Room 5.

2.9 ULTRA HIGH-VOLTAGE

2 Availability of long distance transmission systems| CIGRE C4

Transmission of additional wind energy from northern to southern

Various transmission technologies under consideration

One of the main decision factors

3 Availability of long distance transmission systems| CIGRE Bologna 2011

AC AC 2x380- HVDC LCC

3600 3600 4000 4000 3000 3600 2720

4 Availability of long distance transmission systems| CIGRE Bologna 2011

Unavailability  derived from forced energy unavailability FEU

If no exact data are available

MTBF – Mean time between failures

5 Availability of long distance transmission systems| CIGRE Bologna 2011

Reliability of the EHV equipment

The assessment of outage time due to failure

The unavailability is strongly affected by minor failures.

6 Availability of long distance transmission systems| CIGRE Bologna 2011

Data source  different CIGRE Surveys and Amprion experience

Reliability  LCC Transformers  MTBF = 50 years per unit

Mean Down Time  Time to replace a transformer = 48 hours

7 Availability of long distance transmission systems| CIGRE Bologna 2011

MTBF = 5 years / pole FEU of power electronics

Share in unavailability for typical LCC and VSC 1-pole stations

8 Availability of long distance transmission systems| CIGRE Bologna 2011

Data source  FNN - German Forum (included) (excluded)

90% of single mode failures

10% of common mode failures

MTBF  3.86 years / 100 cct. km Typical towers DC towers

No data for on-land DC XLPE

λ adjustments: AC 3 phases  DC 2 poles

Joint every 0.8 km per cable  2.5 joints per cct. km

MTBF = 8.06 year / 100 cct. km FEU of DC cable

10 Availability of long distance transmission systems| CIGRE Bologna 2011

Transmission lines (OHL/cables) 2.48

82% 52% 58%

11 Availability of long distance transmission systems| CIGRE Bologna 2011

Comparable forced energy unavailability of AC & DC

12 Availability of long distance transmission systems| CIGRE Bologna 2011

Ing. Fabian Lehretz

Tab. 2: Maximum electrical design field stresses at the composite insulator

Location Evaluation Criterion (EPRI)

0,2 Tracking & Erosion Resistance

Unified Specific Creepage Distance (mm/kVinsulator)

Required Insulation Length:

533 kV 600 kV 800 kV

Glass / Porcelain 9.8m 12.6m 15.1m

Silicone Rubber 6.4m 7.3m 9.6m

EMEtech, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

EMEtech, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

EMEtech, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

EMEtech, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

EMEtech, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

Reference Fractal Dimension Method Data Source

EMEtech, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

EMEtech, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

-100 -50 0 50 -10 -5 0 5 10 -10 -5 0 5 10

EMEtech, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

EMEtech, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

EMEtech, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

EMEtech, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

EMEtech, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China

Considerations for the Standardization of

CB　1,2 Break: at 70ms CB 1,2 reclose: at 1000ms