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Section 8

Cudia vs. PMA Superintendent, G.R. No. 211362, Feb. 24, 2015
Issue: Does the ostracism and segregation of Cadet 1CL Cudia violate his freedom of association?
On ostracism:
While not something new in a military academy, ostracism’s continued existence in the modern times should
no longer be countenanced. There are those who argue that the "silence" is a punishment resulting in the
loss of private interests, primarily that of reputation, and that such penalty may render illusory the possibility
of vindication by the reviewing body once found guilty by the HC. In the court's mind, ostracism practically
denies the accused cadet’s protected rights to present witnesses or evidence in his or her behalf and to be
presumed innocent until finally proven otherwise in a proper proceeding.

On segregation:

The Honor Code and Honor System Handbook provides that, in case a cadet has been found guilty by the
HC of violating the Honor Code and has opted not to resign, he or she may stay and wait for the
disposition of the case. In such event, the cadet is not on full-duty status and shall be billeted at the HTG
Holding Center. In Birdwell v. Schlesinger, the “administrative segregation” was held to be a reasonable
exercise of military discipline and could not be considered an invasion of the rights to freedom of speech
and freedom of association.

DCWD vs. Aranquez, G.R. No. 194192, June 16, 2015

Issue: Was the concerted mass action of the DCWD employees well-within their rights?
YES. It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun run in t-shirts with inscriptions on CNA incentives
was not to effect work stoppage or disrupt the service. As pointed out by the respondents, they followed the
advice of GM Gamboa "to be there" at the fun run. Respondents joined, and did not disrupt the fun run. They
were in sports attire that they were allowed, nay required, to wear. Else, government employees would be
deprived of their constitutional right to freedom of expression.

Quezon City PTCA vs. DepEd, GR. No. 188720, Feb. 23, 2016

Issue: Does the right to organize equate to the state’s obligation to accord official status to every single
association that comes into existence?

NO. The right to organize does not equate to the state’s obligation to accord official status to every single
association that comes into existence. It is one thing for individuals to galvanize themselves as a collective,
but it is another for the group that they formed to not only be formally recognized by the state, but also
bedecked with all the benefits and privileges that are attendant to official status. In pursuit of public
interest, the state can set reasonable regulations—procedural, formal, and substantive—with which
organizations seeking state imprimatur must comply.
Section 9
NPC vs. Manalastas, G.R. No. 196140, Jan. 27, 2016
Issue: Should the inflation factor be included in the computation of just compensation?
NO. Valuation of the land for purposes of determining just compensation should not include the inflation
rate of the Philippine Peso because the delay in payment of the price of expropriated land is sufficiently
recompensed through payment of interest on the market value of the land as of the time of taking from the

Republic vs. Regulto, G.R. No. 202051, April 18, 2016

Issue: Is the Republic liable to pay just compensation to the land of the Regultos which was originally a
public land to be traversed by a public road?
NO. Lands granted by patent shall be subject to a right-of-way not exceeding 60 meters in width for public
highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other similar works of the government or any public enterprise,
free of charge, except only for the value of the improvements existing thereon that may be affected.

Garcia vs. Grecia, G.R. No. 185638, Aug. 10, 2016

In 1989, the subject land was taken by the Sanggunian for road-right-of-way and road widening projects.
Despite the taking of the subject land and the completion of the road widening projects, the Sanggunian
failed to tender just compensation. Petitioners argue that the subject land is a subdivision road which is
beyond the commerce of man.

Issue: Is the City of Cabanatuan liable to pay just compensation to a subdivision lot utilized by the city for
road widening?
YES. The subject land is within the commerce of man and is therefore a proper subject of an expropriation
proceeding. Without a doubt, the respondents are entitled to the payment of just compensation. The right
to recover just compensation is enshrined in the Bill of Rights; Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
states that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

Mosqueda vs. Filipino Banana Exporters, G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016
Issue: Is the imposition by Davao City of a 30 meter buffer zone on the plantations a compensable taking?
NO. The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing the effects of aerial
spraying within and near the plantations. Although the ordinance requires the planting of diversified trees
within the identified buffer zone, the requirement cannot be construed and deemed as confiscatory
requiring payment of just compensation. A landowner may only be entitled to compensation if the taking
amounts to a permanent denial of all economically beneficial or productive uses of the land. The
respondents cannot be said to be permanently and completely deprived of their landholdings because they
can still cultivate or make other productive uses of the areas to be identified as the buffer zones.

SP of Bataan vs. Cong. Garcia, G.R. No. 174964, Oct. 5, 2016

Issue: Whether or not the subject parcels of land are patrimonial properties of the Province of Bataan which
cannot be taken without due process of law and without just compensation?
NO. Under the well-entrenched and time-honored Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain are
under the absolute control and ownership of the State.

The State's ownership of and control over all lands and resources of the public domain are beyond dispute.
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[a]ll lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.

Drugstores Association vs. NCDA, G.R. No. 194561, Sept. 14, 2016
Issue: Failing to provide just compensation to petitioners and other drugstores, is the mandated PWD
discount an invalid exercise of the power of eminent domain?
NO. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled
in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for
an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits.
Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
extending as it does to all the great public needs.

For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow
to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to
general welfare.

Republic vs. PIATCO, G.R. Nos. 181892, Sept. 8, 2015

Issue #1: Whether or not “fair market value” and “replacement cost” are similar eminent domain standards
of property valuation?
Replacement cost is a different standard of valuation from the fair market value. Fair market value is the
price at which a property may be sold by a seller who is not compelled to sell and bought by a buyer who is
not compelled to buy.

Replacement cost is "the amount necessary to replace the improvements/structures, based on the current
market prices for materials, equipment, labor, contractor's profit and overhead, and all other attendant costs
associated with the acquisition and installation in place of the affected improvements/structures."

We use the replacement cost method to determine just compensation if the expropriated property has no
market based evidence of its value.

Issue #2: Whether or not the “depreciated replacement cost approach” or the “new replacement cost
approach” shall be used in the appraisal of the NAIA III?
The depreciated replacement cost method, rather than the new replacement cost method, is the more
appropriate method to use in appraising NAIA-IPT III. PIATCO would be compensated for its actual loss if
we adopt the depreciated replacement cost approach. It is defined as a “method of valuation which provides
the current cost of replacing an asset with its modern equivalent asset less deductions for all physical
deterioration and all relevant forms of obsolescence and optima[z]ation.

Republic vs. PIATCO, G.R. Nos. 181892, Apr. 19, 2016

Issue: Is the application of the depreciated replacement cost method allowed under RA 8974?

YES, application of the depreciated cost method is allowed under Section 10 RA 8974 IRR and the principle
that the property owner of the expropriated property shall be compensated for his actual loss.

NTC vs. Oroville Dev. Corp., G.R. No. 223366, Aug. 1, 2017
Issue #1: Are the rulings in Macabangkit Sangkay and Saludares the prevailing doctrine and controlling
ruling on the reckoning period of just compensation?
NO. These rulings are exceptions to the general rule that just compensation must be reckoned from the time
of taking or filing of the complaint, whichever came first. The special circumstances of these cases called for
the valuation of just compensation at the time the landowners initiated inverse condemnation proceedings
notwithstanding that taking of the properties occurred first.

Issue #2: Whether or not the computation of just compensation for the expropriated property should be
based on its value at the time of the taking of the property?
The case of DPWH v Tecson provides a discussion of cases wherein the Court held that payment of just
compensation should be reckoned from the date of taking when such preceded the filing of the complaint
for expropriation. Indeed, the State is only obliged to make good the loss sustained by the landowner, with
due consideration of the circumstances availing at the time the property was taken. The concept of just
compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner alone. Compensation must also be just to the
public, which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.

Issue #3: Whether or not the imposition of a legal interest of 12% is unjustified?

The imposition of a legal interest of 12% is justified. Transco made a provisional deposit of P7,647,200 on
Jan. 21, 2011. Consequently, from 1983 to Jan. 21, 2011, Oroville is entitled to 12% interest per annum which is
the prevailing rate during such period pursuant to Central Bank Circular No. 905, effective from Dec. 22,
1982 to June 30, 2013.

Section 10
Goldenway vs. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 195540, March 13, 2013
Issue: Does Section 47 of R.A. 8791 violate the constitutional proscription against impairment of the
obligation of contract?
No. Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only
modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act
No. 3135. The new redemption period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon
registration of the certificate of sale or three months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise
no retroactive application of the new redemption period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those
properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act
No. 3135.

Yinlu Bicol Mining Corp. vs. Trans-Asia Oil & EDC, G.R. No. 207942, Jan. 12, 2015

This case involves 13 mining claims over the area located in Camarines Norte, a portion of which was owned
and mined by Philippine Iron Mines, Inc. (PIMI). PIMI's portion was sold to the Manila Banking Corporation
(MBC) and BDO. Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corporation (Trans-Asia) then explored the area
from 1986 onwards. On August 31, 2007, Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation (Yinlu) informed the DENR by letter
that it had acquired the mining patents of PIMI from MBC/BDO by way of a deed of absolute sale.

Issue: Are rights pertaining to mining patents issued pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and existing
prior to November 15, 1935, vested rights that cannot be impaired?
Yes. The lands and minerals covered by Yinlu’s mining patents are private properties. The Government,
whether through the DENR or the MGB, could not alienate or dispose of the lands or mineral through the
MPSA granted to Trans-Asia or any other person or entity. Yinlu had the exclusive right to explore, develop
and utilize the minerals therein, and it could legally transfer or assign such exclusive right. Mining rights
acquired under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution were vested
rights that could not be impaired even by the Government. Indeed, the mining patents of Yinlu were issued
pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and were subsisting prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution.
Consequently, Yinlu and its predecessors-in-interest had acquired vested rights in the disputed mineral
lands that could not and should not be impaired even in light of their past failure to comply with the
requirement of registration and annual work obligations.

SWS vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 208062, Apr. 7, 2015

Issue: Does Comelec Res. No. 9674 impair the obligation of contract by forcing petitioners to disclose the
names of “subscribers” of election surveys?
NO. It is settled that "the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare." "It is a basic rule in
contracts that the law is deemed written into the contract between the parties." The incorporation of
regulations into contracts is "a postulate of the police power of the State."

NEECO I vs. ERC, G .R. No. 180642, Feb. 3, 2016

Issue: Whether or not the cap on the recoverable rate of system loss prescribed in Section 10 of R.A. No.
7832 is arbitrary and violative of the non-impairment clause?

NO. The regulation of rates imposed by public utilities such as electricity distributors is an exercise of the
State's police power. As the State agency mandated to regulate and to approve rates imposed by electric
cooperatives, the ERC merely exercised its task of protecting the public interest imbued in the rates imposed
by NEECO I when it directed the latter to refund its over-recoveries to its consumers. All private contracts
must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare. The police
power legislation adopted by the State in R.A. No. 7832 to promote the general welfare of the people must
imperatively prevail.