Religious Stratification in America

Religion, Work and Inequality
Religious Stratification in America

James D. Davidson, , Ralph E. Pyle,
Article information:
To cite this document: James D. Davidson, , Ralph E. Pyle, "Religious Stratification
in America" In Religion, Work and Inequality. Published online: 08 Mar 2015; 3-25.
Permanent link to this document:
https://doi.org/10.1108/S0277-2833(2012)0000023004
Downloaded on: 28 July 2017, At: 06:37 (PT)
References: this document contains references to 64 other documents.
Downloaded by Universite Laval At 06:37 28 July 2017 (PT)
To copy this document: permissions@emeraldinsight.com

The fulltext of this document has been downloaded 107 times since 2015*
Users who downloaded this article also downloaded:
(2012),"Religion and The American Occupational Structure", Research
in the Sociology of Work, Vol. 23 pp. 75-102 <a href="https://
doi.org/10.1108/S0277-2833(2012)0000023007">https://doi.org/10.1108/
S0277-2833(2012)0000023007</a>
(2012),"Did the Religious Group Socioeconomic Ranking Change Leading into
the Great Recession?", Research in the Sociology of Work, Vol. 23 pp. 27-47 <a
href="https://doi.org/10.1108/S0277-2833(2012)0000023005">https://doi.org/10.1108/
S0277-2833(2012)0000023005</a>
Access to this document was granted through an Emerald subscription provided by

emerald-srm:331053 []
For Authors
If you would like to write for this, or any other Emerald publication, then please
use our Emerald for Authors service information about how to choose which
publication to write for and submission guidelines are available for all. Please visit
www.emeraldinsight.com/authors for more information.
About Emerald www.emeraldinsight.com
Emerald is a global publisher linking research and practice to the benefit of society.
The company manages a portfolio of more than 290 journals and over 2,350 books
and book series volumes, as well as providing an extensive range of online products
and additional customer resources and services.
Emerald is both COUNTER 4 and TRANSFER compliant. The organization is a partner
of the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) and also works with Portico and the
LOCKSS initiative for digital archive preservation.
*Related content and download information correct at time of download.

RELIGIOUS STRATIFICATION
IN AMERICA
James D. Davidson and Ralph E. Pyle

ABSTRACT
Purpose – This study examines religious stratification in America from
the colonial period until the present.
Design/Methodology/Approach – We use a conflict theoretical approach

to examine trends in religious stratification over time. The rankings of
religious groups are based on tabulations of the religious affiliations of
economic, political, and cultural elites collected at 37 data points from the
colonial era until the present.
Findings – In the colonial period, the Upper stratum religious groups

(Anglicans, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists) accounted for nearly
90 percent of elites in cultural, economic, and political spheres. The
representation of Upper stratum groups among American elites declined
from the 1800s to the early 1900s, rebounded somewhat after the 1930s,
and then declined after the 1960s. The four groups that comprise the
New Upper stratum (Episcopalians, Jews, Presbyterians, and Unitarian-
Universalists) account for nearly half of the nation’s elites while
representing less than 10 percent of the total population.
Religion, Work and Inequality

Research in the Sociology of Work, Volume 23, 3–25
Copyright r 2012 by Emerald Group Publishing Limited
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved
ISSN: 0277-2833/doi:10.1108/S0277-2833(2012)0000023004
3
4 JAMES D. DAVIDSON AND RALPH E. PYLE
Research implications – Our research indicates that religious stratifica-

tion has had largely destabilizing effects on society. In line with other
research on stratification, we find that the harmful effects were somewhat
muted when inequality was most severe, and these negative effects
increased as religious inequality became less pronounced.
Originality/Value – This chapter highlights the importance of religion as

a factor in stratification. The use of a conflict perspective allows us to
bridge the gap between the stratification literature and the religion
literature.
Keywords: Religion; stratification; conflict theory; inequality; power

relations
INTRODUCTION
Religious stratification was a fact of life in America’s 13 original

colonies. Anglicans, Congregationalists, and Presbyterians were the Upper
stratum. Below them was an Upper Middle stratum, which included
Quakers and Unitarians, whose influence far exceeded their numbers in
the total population. The Lower Middle stratum consisted of all other
Protestants, such as Baptists, Dutch and German Reformeds, Lutherans,
and Methodists. Catholics, Jews, and ‘‘Nones’’ were in the Lower stratum.
This fact invites three questions: (1) Why did religious stratification arise
in the colonies, and not religious equality? (2) How has the original pattern
of religious stratification persisted and changed over the course of U.S.
history? and (3) What effect has religious stratification had on American
society?
We explore these questions in our book Ranking Faiths: Religious
Stratification in America (Davidson & Pyle, 2011) using a conflict theoretical
approach similar to the approaches used in studies of racial stratification,
class stratification, and gender stratification along with a combination of
original data and data that we have gleaned from previous research. Of
special importance are 37 data points from the colonial period to the present
indicating the religious affiliations of signers of the Declaration of
Independence, delegates to the Constitutional Convention, U.S. presidents,
Cabinet officers, Supreme Court justices, Ivy League presidents, other
intellectual elites, and business leaders. This chapter summarizes our key
Religious Stratification in America 5
findings and their implications for social theory, future research on religious
stratification, and public policy.
THEORETICAL APPROACH
We looked for a theoretical approach that would allow us to link the

study of religious stratification to studies of racial stratification, class
stratification, and gender stratification. Macro-level sociological theory
offered us a choice between two general frameworks: functionalism and
conflict theory. These two paradigms have evolved over time and spawned
theoretical variants, such as systems theories and theories of social
reproduction, but the basic assumptions of the conflict and functional
traditions still inform much of contemporary sociological research, even if
the labels ‘‘functionalism’’ and ‘‘conflict theory’’ seem somewhat anachro-
nistic today.
In the first half of the twentieth century, specialists in the study of
stratification and specialists in the study of religion tended to use
functionalist theories (Davis & Moore, 1945; Nottingham, 1954). Since
then, stratification researchers and sociologists of religion have gone in
very different theoretical directions. Specialists in stratification have
largely abandoned functionalism and gravitated toward a variety of
conflict perspectives (e.g., Aguirre & Baker, 2008; Feagin & Feagin, 2008;
Landry, 2007). For instance, those studying racial stratification have
developed critical race theories (Delgado & Stefancic, 2001), racial
formation theories (Omi & Winant, 1994), and theories of whiteness
(Doane & Bonilla-Silva, 2003), all of which draw heavily on a critical-
conflict tradition. Analysts focusing on class-based inequalities have
introduced social reproduction theories to explain the intergenerational
transmission of power and privilege (Bourdieu, 1977; MacLeod, 2009),
world system theory to account for patterns of global economic
domination (Wallerstein, 1979), and a variety of neo-Marxian perspectives
that concentrate on class, culture, and consciousness (Ritzer, 2011).
Researchers investigating sex and gender inequality have developed
standpoint theory (Smith, 1990), socialist feminist theory (Vogel, 1995),
and intersectionality theory to highlight the linkages between inequalities
based on race, class, gender, and sexuality (Collins, 1990; Landry, 2007).
Unfortunately, as they have been used by stratification specialists, these
theories overlook religion, or deliberately omit it for a variety of
debatable reasons, such as the assumption that religion is more voluntary

and less visible than race, class, and gender (Davidson & Pyle, 2011).
On the other hand, sociologists of religion have been less willing to
embrace a conflict approach and more inclined to hold onto function-
alism (Christiano, Swatos, & Kivisto, 2008; Davidson & Pyle, 2005, 2011;
Johnstone, 2007). Their reluctance to use conflict theory is probably linked
to Marxism’s tendency to treat religion merely as an epiphenomenon and/or
as little more than a means by which economic elites oppress women and
minorities. Their continuing use of functionalism is almost certainly tied to
that theory’s view of religion as a social institution that contributes to the
well-being of society.
Therefore, functionalism would not allow us to link studies of religious

stratification to studies of stratification based on race, class, and gender, but
a conflict perspective would. If we used it, specialists in the study of
stratification might gain an appreciation of religious affiliation as a factor
affecting people’s access to power, privilege, and prestige, and sociologists of
religion might gain an appreciation of conflict theory.
Having made that decision, we then had to choose among the many
varieties of conflict theory (Ritzer, 2011; Turner, 2002). We made a basic
distinction between Marxist and Weberian versions. In our view, Marxist
versions have at least two limitations: they only see religion as part of a
larger structure of oppression, and they see society as divided into only two
opposing classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Weberian versions, on
the other hand, have several advantages. They invite considerations of race,
class, gender, and religious affiliation as factors that have independent
effects on people’s access to social resources. They emphasize the
importance of intergroup relations and their effects on the laws, ideologies,
and customs of the society. They examine access to multiple resources,
including power (the ability to get one’s way when opposed by others),
privilege (wealth and income), and prestige (social honor and respect).
Finally, unequal access to these resources is depicted in terms of multiple
strata, not polarized classes.
Using this framework, we define religious stratification as the institutio-
nalized use of religious adherence as a factor in the struggle for access to
social, economic, and political resources. Whenever and wherever the laws,
ideologies, and customs of society encourage, or even require, the use of
religious affiliation as a factor affecting people’s access to social resources,
there is a relatively permanent tendency for the members of some religious
groups to have more control over their own destinies, more access to high-
paying jobs and wealth, and more social honor and respect than other groups
have. These inequalities are best described as vertically and horizontally

differentiated strata, not as dialectically related classes (Davidson & Pyle,
2005, 2011; Pyle, 1996).
ORIGINS
Some people believe that the United States was founded on the principle of
religious equality for all (Dargo, 1974; Nussbaum, 2008). They claim that
America has always been a land of opportunity for people of all religious
affiliations. According to these people, some individuals have encountered a
few speed bumps and potholes en route to prosperity, but our society as a
whole has always been open to newcomers and encouraged upward mobility
without regard to religion. People who embrace this view of American life
tend to overlook the degree to which religious stratification has been a
permanent feature of the American experience.
We, on the other hand, contend that religious stratification has been an
integral part of American life from the very beginning. Religious
stratification emerged in colonial America because the relationship between
religious groups involved three characteristics: ethnocentrism or religious
prejudice, competition, and differential power (Noel, 1968; Pyle &
Davidson, 2003).
In the wake of the Protestant Reformation and the counter-Reforma-
tion, religious prejudice was a prominent feature of the European countries
the colonists came from (Housely, 2003) and an undeniable element in
European colonists’ initial contacts with Native Americans and one
another in the New World. There was a division between people who
claimed a religion and those who did not. There also was an early bias
toward Christians and a discernible element of anti-Semitism. Protestant-
Catholic relations also were quite sour, resulting in a bias toward
Protestants and the undeniable existence of anti-Catholicism. But, there
also were antipathies between ‘‘liberal’’ Protestant reformers and more
radical or ‘‘evangelical’’ reformers (Ahlstrom, 1972). Thus, there was ill will
between ‘‘insiders’’ (adherents, Christians, Protestants, and especially
liberal Protestants) and ‘‘outsiders’’ (nonadherents, evangelical Protestants,
Catholics, and Jews).
These groups openly competed for political and cultural influence, and
the right to live as they wished. Some groups had more resources than
others, such as more advanced educations, more money (both earned and
inherited), and political alliances with the British crown. In this context,
three liberal Protestant groups got the upper hand on all others: Anglicans,
Congregationalists, and Presbyterians. Two of these groups, Anglicans and
Congregationalists, created laws making themselves the ‘‘established’’
churches in nine colonies. Liberal Protestants also developed an ideology
that made their denominations and their beliefs the cultural norm against
which all other groups would be evaluated. That ideology stressed the
superiority of faith that is individualistic, voluntary, rational, tolerant of
differences within one’s religious tradition, and democratic in its decision-
making. The larger the differences between these cultural emphases and
other groups’ approaches to faith, the more deficient the other groups were
thought to be. Culturally inferior groups such as evangelical Protestants,
and to an even greater extent, Catholics, Jews, and ‘‘Nones,’’ were expected
to surrender their traditions and assimilate into the dominant culture.
The dominant groups also developed customs that allowed them to
accumulate resources and pass them on to their children and grandchildren.
These customs skewed the allocation of resources in favor of people
belonging to their own religious groups and away from members of other
religious groups. For example, in the political area, the dominant groups
nominated political candidates who belonged to the same religious groups,
voted for members of their own groups, appointed people of the same faith
to political office, and created their own lobbying groups (Daniels, 1986;
Snell, 1986). In the economic sphere, they established their own businesses,
hired people who shared their religious affiliation, promoted members
of their own religious groups more than workers with other religious
preferences, and left their businesses and wealth to family members and
other members of their own religious groups (Chickering, 1986). In the area
of family life, they encouraged their children to marry members of their
own religious groups (Baltzell, 1964). Within the educational sphere, they
founded church-sponsored colleges and universities, hired teachers and
administrators on the basis of their religion, and gave preference to students
who belonged to the same faith (Coe & Davidson, 2010). And, of course,
they built their own religious organizations, selected people who shared their
beliefs and practices, and interacted with other groups that shared their
values and interests.
Colonists brought different socioeconomic experiences with them from
Europe to the New World, but conditions in the colonies also affected
religious groups’ access to important resources. When we tallied the groups’
access to higher education, economic prosperity, and political clout at
the time of the American Revolution, we found a clear and highly insti-
tutionalized ranking of religious groups: Anglicans, Congregationalists, and
Presbyterians, followed by Quakers and Unitarians. Below them were other

Protestants, such as Baptists, Dutch and German Reformeds, Lutherans,
and Methodists. Catholics, Jews, and ‘‘Nones’’ were in the Lower stratum.
PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE
As we have mentioned, stratification theorists and researchers – who have

documented the persistence of inequalities based on race, class, and gender –
have paid little or no attention to religious stratification (e.g., Aguirre &
Baker, 2008; Hurst, 2007; Kerbo, 2012; Landry, 2007; Marger, 2009;
Rossides, 1997; Rothman, 2005). By leaving religious affiliation out of their
analyses, these scholars suggest that, even if religious stratification existed in
the colonies, it is no longer an important part of American life.
Yet, virtually all textbooks in the sociology of religion show that it is still
possible to rank religious groups according to their members’ access to
resources (e.g., Christiano et al., 2008; Johnstone, 2007; Kosmin & Keysar,
2006). The consensus is that Episcopalians (formerly Anglicans), Presbyter-
ians, and UCCs (formerly Congregationalists) still have more access to
higher education, wealth-producing occupations, and public office than, let
us say, Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Muslims (Burstein, 2007;
Davidson, 2008; Keister, 2000, 2005, 2007, 2008; Kosmin & Keysar, 2006;
Park & Reimer, 2002; Pyle, 2006; Sherkat, 2007; Smith & Faris, 2005).
Thus, we need to explain how religious stratification has persisted and
changed. Contrary to theories that predict evolutionary progress toward
religious equality, our approach calls attention to the power differential
between religious groups and how it affects their access to resources.
Power Differential
The power differential between the groups is measured in terms of member-

ship size, organizational capacity, and resources. As a rule, larger, more
organized groups with more resources have more control over their destinies
than smaller and poorly organized groups with only limited resources. Also,
the more power groups have, the more they can institutionalize laws, customs,
and ideologies that work to their advantage. Thus, it is reasonable to assume
that the religious groups that ranked high in the colonial period would be in a
favorable position to parlay their advantages in such a way that those benefits
would persist over time. Lower ranking groups would be at a disadvantage in

terms of accruing resources, which would contribute to their overrepresenta-
tion in the lower strata. In short, as the literature on social reproduction
demonstrates (Bourdieu, 1977; Oliver & Shapiro, 1995; Persell & Cookson,
1985), stratification would tend to persist.
However, membership size, organizational capacity, and resources are not
constants. Groups that are a large percentage of the population at one point
in time sometimes decline and relatively small ones frequently grow in size.
Highly organized groups can unravel, and loosely structured groups
can become more tightly organized. Groups’ resources also are subject to
change.
These three variables are not always highly correlated. Large groups are
not always highly organized and do not always have lots of resources. Some
small groups are well organized and very prosperous. Moreover, groups that
make sizable gains on one dimension do not always make comparable gains
on others.
In Ranking Faiths, we show that the power differential between the three
groups that comprised the Protestant Establishment in the colonial period
and all of the lower ranking groups declined between 1787 and the 1920s,
widened once again between the 1930s and the 1950s, and has closed again
since the 1960s. These changes have fostered changes in the society’s laws,
ideologies, and customs related to religious stratification.
Laws
The elite religious groups of the colonial period and their largely Protestant
allies have won some legislative victories, such as the Immigration Act of
1924. Such victories have occurred when lay members, acting largely on
their self-interests, have prevailed over clergy and clergy-led organizations,
acting largely on the basis of egalitarian values. But, overall, elite groups
have not been as effective in supporting laws that would perpetuate their
dominance as nonelites have been in opposing them. One reason for this has
been the tendency for liberal clergy and clergy-led organizations to prevail
over adherents’ more conservative values and self-interests. Nonelites also
have been quite successful in forming alliances with those elites who are
willing to side with the ‘‘have-nots’’ instead of the ‘‘haves.’’ As a result,
most of the laws that favored the Protestant Establishment in the colonial
period have been struck down by the courts and replaced by ones
guaranteeing religious groups equal protection. Thus, many legal props
have been knocked out from under religious stratification (Davidson &
Pyle, 2011).
However, that does not mean that religious groups are now on a level
playing field, any more than changes in laws have produced racial equal
ity, economic equality, or gender equality. The enforcement of civil rights
laws is a never-ending problem, as indicated by U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (n.d.) data documenting thousands of claims of
religious discrimination, about one-fifth of which have merit, resulting in
millions of dollars in settlements. And, as recent attempts to restrict
immigration suggest, laws are subject to serious modification or even
reversal. Besides, laws are only one of three factors that need to be
considered.
Ideologies
The second factor is ideologies. In the colonial period, elites promoted

ideologies of racism, ethnocentrism, classism, sexism, and ‘‘Anglo-Protes-
tantism.’’ These ideologies distinguished between in-groups and out-groups.
Rich, white, Anglo-Saxon, male Anglicans, Congregationalists, and
Presbyterians were the insiders; the poor, people of color, people of other
ethnicities, women, and people belonging to other religious groups were the
outsiders. These ideologies also asserted that the cultures of the dominant
groups were preferable to the cultures of the subordinate groups. The
religious ideology of the time took the form of a pro-Protestant (especially
liberal Protestant) bias that viewed other religious traditions as undesirable
or even inferior. Although this ideology always contained a discordant
element of egalitarianism, in the main it insisted that the way for outsiders to
overcome this stigma was to shed their own traditions and adopt the
insiders’ way of life (in other words, assimilate).
Most scholars agree that these ideologies extended into the early twentieth
century. However, some writers believe they have lost their potency since
then (Hammond, 1992; Handy, 1984; Putnam & Campbell, 2010). The loss,
they say, is the result of many factors, including the legal changes we just
outlined and the social movements of the last 40–50 years. They argue that
these ideologies have been superseded by a more inclusive and egalitarian
one known as ‘‘cultural pluralism’’ or ‘‘multiculturalism.’’ This ideology
questions the primacy of any one set of religious values, insists that all
groups have a right to their distinctive ways of life, and claims that these
differences should not affect their access to power, privilege, and prestige.
Although pluralism has made some inroads into our culture, racism,
ethnocentrism, classism, sexism, and Anglo-Protestantism persist, albeit in
modified form. Without going into the evidence related to the ideologies
related to race, ethnicity, class, and gender, we can say the following about
Anglo-Protestantism. First, in terms of the ideology’s affiliation com-
ponent, insider status is no longer reserved for members of the two main
establishment denominations (Anglicanism and Congregationalism). The
boundaries have been extended to include Unitarians and Jews. However,
other groups remain outside the boundaries. These include evangelical
Protestants, Mormons, Hindus, Buddhists, Muslims, and ‘‘Nones.’’ These
groups are still different enough that they are not fully welcome in elite
circles.
Second, in terms of the dominant ideology’s belief component, liberal
Protestant values remain the societal norm. The values of individualism,
voluntarism, rationality, tolerance, and democracy are still the cultural
standard against which all other religious traditions are judged. This
standard puts pressure on other groups to adapt, which some groups have
done more than others. Catholics with European roots, Reform Jews, and
Unitarians have embraced enough of the dominant ideology that they are
now seen as acceptable by members of elite Protestant denominations. On
the other hand, evangelical Protestants, Mormons, Latino Catholics,
Orthodox Jews, and the new immigrant religions are still thought to be
undesirable or even inferior. In short, the Anglo-Protestant ideology has
been impacted by multiculturalism, but it has not been supplanted or
replaced by it (Davidson & Pyle, 2011).
Customs
The third factor is customs affecting groups’ access to resources. As we

have noted earlier, colonial elites engaged in a variety of behaviors that
favored insiders over outsiders. A number of these customs (e.g., discrim-
ination against minority groups in areas such as employment, property
ownership, and use of public facilities) are now illegal. The reduction in
such customs certainly has increased nonelites’ access to power, privilege,
and prestige.
However, many other long-standing elite customs persist, and a number
of new ones have been introduced over the years. With regard to power, the
elites of the colonial period do not vote for their own kind quite as
automatically as they used to, but they still vote for themselves more often
than they do for others, and when they have the opportunity to appoint
their own kind to cabinet posts and seats on the Supreme Court, they still
have a tendency to do that (Davidson, Kraus, & Morrissey, 2005). With
regard to privilege, elites who start their own businesses often pass them on
to their sons and daughters. They are more constrained by laws against
religious discrimination in the workplace, but they still tend to recruit
prospective employees at prestigious private institutions where religious
elites are overrepresented in the graduating classes (Pyle, 1996). From the
pool of qualified candidates, they are still more likely to select those who
share their characteristics over those who do not. Avenues for advancement
certainly are more open than they used to be, but elites still promote their
own kind at a higher rate than they promote others, especially in corporate
careers where social acceptability is an important consideration (Pyle, 1996).
Inheritance laws also allow elites to pass their wealth down to their children
and grandchildren (Keister, 2005). With regard to prestige, elite prep
schools, colleges, and universities are not as exclusive as they used to be, but
religious elites are still more likely to be admitted to and graduate from these
schools due to relatively new and widespread customs such as legacy
admissions (Coe & Davidson, 2010; Karabel, 2005). In short, elite religions
created organizations and policies that were more private than public, more
exclusive than inclusive, and more segregated than integrated along the lines
of religious affiliation.
But, nonelites also have customs of their own. Some groups – especially
Catholics and Jews – have been more willing than others – such as
evangelicals or Black Protestants – to assimilate into the dominant culture.
The willingness to assimilate tends to reinforce the hegemony of mainline
Protestant groups, but increases nonelites’ chances for upward mobility
within traditional social structures. One way nonelite religions have tried
to assimilate has been to participate in organizations that have been owned
and operated by elite religions, such as prep schools, colleges, and universities
(Zweigenhaft & Domhoff, 2006). Another way has been to use publicly owned
and operated institutions (such as public high schools and state colleges
and universities). A third way has been to develop organizations owned and
operated by nonelites (such as parochial schools and private colleges and
universities). Minority religions have used all three methods. For example,
Massachusetts Catholics have gone to Harvard, UMass, and Holy Cross;
New York Jews have gone to Columbia, the City University of New York
(CUNY), and Yeshiva. But, groups have done so in varying degrees. For
example, Catholics have developed a vast network of their own schools; Jews
have been less inclined to do so, focusing more on family and community
contacts (Burstein, 2007; Keister, 2003). All three approaches have worked, as
long as the goal has been assimilation. When the goal of retaining minority
distinctiveness has prevailed, all three approaches have led to the perpetuation
of a group’s lower status (Davidson & Pyle, 2011).
In short, just as the power differential between elites and nonelites has
persisted but also changed, so too the laws, ideologies, and customs related
to religious stratification also have persisted and changed. These conditions,
in turn, have produced persistence and change in the ranking of faiths
(Davidson & Pyle, 2011, pp. 134, 136).
Table 1. Religious Stratification circa 1776, 1899, and 2010.
Stratum 1776 1899 2010
Upper Anglicans Congregationalists Episcopalians

Congregationalists Episcopalians Jews
Presbyterians Presbyterians Presbyterians
Unitarian-Universalists
Upper Middle Quakers Quakers Catholics
Unitarians Unitarians Hindus
Methodists
Mormons
Quakers
United Church of Christ
Lower Middle Baptists Dutch/German Buddhists
Dutch/German Reformed Dutch/German Reformed
Reformed German Jews Lutherans
Lutherans Irish Catholics Nones
Methodists Lutherans
Methodists
Nones
Lower Catholics Baptists, Assemblies of God,

Jews Fundamentalists Pentecostals
Nones Black Protestants Baptists,
East European Jews Fundamentalists
Italian Catholics Black Baptists, Black
Mormons Methodists
Muslims
Groups are listed alphabetically within strata.
Today’s Upper stratum includes Episcopalians, Jews, Presbyterians, and

Unitarians (see Table 1). The Upper Middle stratum includes Catholics,
Hindus, Methodists, Mormons, Quakers, and UCCs. The Lower Middle
stratum includes Buddhists, Reformeds, Lutherans, and ‘‘Nones.’’ The Lower
stratum includes the Assemblies of God and a variety of other pentecostal
groups, Southern and independent Baptists and other fundamentalist
groups, black Methodists and black Baptists, and Muslims. This profile is
similar to, but not identical with, other recent rankings.
When we compare the 12 groups that were part of America’s colonial
history and are still part of America’s religious landscape, there is
considerable continuity over time, especially toward the top. Two of the
three groups that were in the Upper stratum during the colonial period are
still members of that stratum (Anglicans/Episcopalians and Presbyterians).
Five of the 12 groups are in the same strata they have always been in:
Anglicans/Episcopalians, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Quakers, and Refor-
meds. Five of the original 12 groups are within one stratum of where they
were in the colonial period: Unitarians, Methodists, and ‘‘Nones’’ have
moved up a notch, and Baptists and UCCs/Congregationalists have gone
down one. Given the fact that we are covering over 250 years of history,
these continuities are striking.
However, there also have been noteworthy changes. Two colonial groups
have moved two or more strata: Jews and Catholics. Jews have made it all
the way from the bottom to the top. With the notable exception that the
United States has never had a Jewish president, Jews are now equal to or
surpass liberal Protestants on most measures of power, privilege, and
prestige. Irish, Italian, and other European Catholics have moved into the
Upper Middle stratum. Mormons also have moved up from the bottom to
the Upper Middle stratum.
When we use the 37 data points to examine the gap between Upper
stratum groups and all other religious groups over the course of U.S.
history, we also find persistence as well as change (see Fig. 1). In the colonial
period, the groups in the Upper stratum accounted for 89 percent of elites in
cultural, economic, and political spheres. Their dominance persisted, yet
declined to 65 percent in the 1800s and 48 percent in the early 1900s. It
rebounded to 56 percent between the 1930s and the 1950s, but has declined
to 37 percent since the 1960s. The four groups that comprise the New Upper
stratum (Episcopalians, Jews, Presbyterians, and Unitarian-Universalists)
account for 46 percent of the nation’s elites, but less than 10 percent of the
total population.
OUS = Episcopalian, UCC/Congregationalist, and Presbyterian
NUS = Episcopalian, Jewish, Presbyterian, and Unitarian-Universalist
Percent
100
90 89
80
70
65
60
56
50 48
46
40
37
30
20
10
Colonial 1789- 1860- 1930- 1960-

Period 1859 1929 1959 2010
Fig. 1. Dominance of Old Upper Stratum (OUS) and New Upper Stratum (NUS)
by Period (Mean Percentages).
CONSEQUENCES
Baltzell (1958, 1964, 1982) believed that the Protestant Establishment was
beneficial for America. A prominent member of that establishment himself,
Baltzell claimed that ‘‘it was a healthy thing for the society as a whole’’
(Baltzell, 1964, p. 48).
In contrast to Baltzell’s functionalist view, we contend that religious
stratification has had largely destabilizing effects on American society. Just
as stratification based on race, class, and gender destabilizes society by
producing a variety of social problems, so does religious stratification
(Davidson & Pyle, 2011, pp. 39–42). It fosters tensions between elites and
nonelites and cultivates a tendency to think in terms of ‘‘in-group virtues and

out-group vices.’’ It is only a short step from there to nativist groups and self-
defensive organizations; hate groups, hate literature, and hate crimes;
marches, protests, and riots; and the wanton destruction of life and property.
Research on other forms of stratification indicates that these harmful
effects are muted when inequality is most severe and most highly
institutionalized. They are most pronounced when inequality is less severe
and less institutionalized (Carter, 2007; Ostby, 2005, 2007). The same is true
for religious stratification. Its destabilizing effects were muted during the
colonial period and early 1800s, when elite groups clearly dominated and
nonelites had no choice but to cope with their lowly status. Since religion-
based inequality has become less institutionalized and the gap between elites
and nonelites has narrowed, religious stratification’s destabilizing effects
have increased. Without denying the importance of earlier incidents and
flashpoints, it is fair to say that problems intensified in the mid-1800s.
Nativist groups such as the Know-Nothings, the American Protective
Association, and the Ku Klux Klan arose in the mid- to late 1800s and the
early 1900s. There was violence against Jews in Georgia and Louisiana in
the 1880s; attacks on Catholics in Montana and Kansas City in 1894; the
lynching of Leo Frank (a Jew) in Georgia in 1915; and Henry Ford’s widely
circulated anti-Semitic publications in the 1920s. These days, nativist groups
have websites, where they preach hate against religious outsiders. Millions
of mean-spirited books, pamphlets, CDs, DVDs, tracts, and cartoons
targeting religious out-groups are produced and sold every year. And,
according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2010), hate crimes related
to religion account for nearly one-fifth of all hate crimes – trailing race, but
ahead of sexual orientation, ethnicity, and disability. We cannot always tell
who the perpetrators are, but, more often than not, these crimes are directed
at Jews, Muslims, Catholics, and other non-Protestants. Since 1995, attacks
on Muslims have increased as a percentage of all religious hate crimes.
It is no wonder that religious outsiders have created self-defense
organizations to monitor and respond to such attacks. Groups such as the
Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, the Catholic League for Religious
and Civil Rights, the American Center for Law and Justice, and the Council
on American-Islamic Relations gather data on violations of religious
liberties, issue news releases, and conduct press conferences calling for an
end to such violations.
The relationship between religious stratification and social instability is
diagrammed in Fig. 2. Scenario 1 indicates high inequality and medium
instability in the colonial period and early 1800s. Scenario 2 depicts medium
Degree of Instability
Amount of Stratification
High Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Medium
Low
Colonies 1787- 1830- 1860- 1900- 1930- 1960-

1829 1859 1899 1929 1959 2010
Fig. 2. Trends in Religious Stratification and Its Consequences.
inequality and high instability since the mid-1800s. There is no empirical

evidence for Scenario 3, in which low inequality is accompanied by low
instability – at least not yet.
IMPLICATIONS
We conclude with some implications related to our approach, our analysis

of origins, our findings related to persistence and change, and our discussion
of consequences.
Our Approach
We prefer a Weberian version of conflict theory over Marxian versions

because, with it, we can treat race, class, gender, and religion as independent
variables, and power, privilege, and prestige as dependent variables. It also
allows us to embrace related analyses (e.g., Noel, 1968), key components of

conflict theory (e.g., power), and a multi-strata view of inequality, rather
than a polarized view. Finally, it accommodates our specific interests in the
origins, persistence and change, and consequences of religious stratification.
We hope our approach encourages other researchers to pay more
attention to religious affiliation as a variable affecting people’s access to
resources. Religion is not simply a means by which elites are able to exploit
and oppress women and minorities. It is much more than that. It also is a
basis for group affiliation and an important component of people’s identities
that needs to be addressed with the same care that is given to race, ethnicity,
class, and gender. For example, just as researchers distinguish between
belonging to a given race and the extent to which members of that race are
involved in race-related activities, they also need to distinguish between
religious affiliation (e.g., being Protestant) and religious involvement (e.g.,
being an active or inactive Protestant). Just as there are subgroups within races
(e.g., African American and West Indian blacks), there also are subgroups
within religions (e.g., Protestants who are Episcopalian and ones who are
Presbyterian). And, just as the differences related to race, class, and gender can
add depth to our understanding of religious stratification, differences related to
religion can add dimension to research on other types of stratification.
We also hope that people in the sociology of religion will pay more
attention to conflict theory. Compared to a functionalist perspective, it
provides more viable explanations of how religious stratification comes into
being, perpetuates itself, changes over time, and impacts society. It also
gives religion scholars an awareness of the ways in which religious groups
and their members pursue their values and worldly self-interests (sometimes
in unison, sometimes in direct conflict with one another). The importance of
intergroup relations and the role of power in these relationships are additional
lessons to be learned. So is the extent to which religion is a source of social
problems. Weberian versions of conflict theory are much broader and more
suited to analyses of religion and stratification than Marxian versions. They
also provide more opportunities to link religious stratification to stratification
based on race, ethnicity, class, and gender. One of the main ways they can do
this is by using similar concepts to investigate similar issues, such as prejudice,
discrimination, dominance, subordination, exploitation, segregation, self-
interest, competition, conflict, power, laws, customs, ideologies, gatekeepers,
exclusion, reproduction, and destabilizing effects.
We have used some of this language to investigate religious stratification
in America. Similar investigations need to be done in other parts of the
world. For example, researchers should look at religious stratification in
other countries that also have high levels of religious diversity, such as
England and Canada. Other studies might be done in countries where one
religion outnumbers all others, but where there also are a number of smaller
groups. Examples would include countries that are heavily Catholic (e.g.,
Poland, Mexico), Lutheran (e.g., Sweden, Denmark), Muslim (e.g.,
Pakistan, Iran), Jewish (i.e., Israel), Buddhist (e.g., Sri Lanka, Thailand),
and Hindu (e.g., India, Nepal).
Origins
We have shown that three conditions led to the rise of religious stratification
in the United States: religious prejudice, competition, and differential
power. Other researchers should replicate our findings to determine if these
conditions have led to the development of stratification in other locations
and at other time periods. Do the variables in our theory behave the same
way in all settings, or do they perform differently in different places? Are all
three necessary? And, of course, alternative theories, hypotheses, and
methodologies might be proposed and tested.
Let us assume for the moment that when religious prejudice, competition,
and differential power prevail in any emerging relationships, religious
stratification is likely to arise. Let us also assume that the absence of any one
of these conditions is enough to produce a more egalitarian outcome. If these
assumptions are correct, then our analysis has important policy implications.
It suggests that interfaith interaction does not automatically result in
religious stratification. If and when there is mutual respect, cooperation, and
a balance of power, religious pluralism is the likely outcome. However, if
and when prejudice prevails over respect, competition over cooperation, and
political inequality over political equality, religious stratification is almost a
sure thing. Not intervening in this situation almost certainly guarantees a
stratified outcome. However, if a more egalitarian outcome is desired, it can
be achieved by replacing religious prejudice with religious respect, religious
competition with religious cooperation, and/or differential power with a
balance of power.
Persistence and Change
Future research on religious stratification should retest the four factors we

hypothesized would affect its persistence and change: power relations, laws,
ideologies, and customs. We need to see if these variables behave the same
way in all settings, or if they perform differently in different places. But, in

addition to retesting our hypotheses, scholars also should extend and revise
our approach to include other variables and explore other hypotheses. And,
once again, alternative theories, hypotheses, and methodologies might be
proposed and tested.
In the meantime, our findings call attention to the remarkable continuities
we have found over the course of U.S. history. In a religiously diverse
society, such as the United States, in which there is so much emphasis on the
future and willingness to change, we are impressed by two facts: (a) that
many of the religious groups that date back to the colonial period are still in
the same stratum or have moved up or down no more than one stratum in
over 250 years and (b) that two of the groups that comprised the Protestant
Establishment in the colonial period (Episcopalians and Presbyterians) are
still in the Upper stratum, and the third (UCCs/Congregationalists) is still
overrepresented among leaders in many spheres of American life.
But, we also are impressed with the changes that have taken place in the
rankings and the fact that religious inequalities are not as severe as they
were in colonial times. Jews, Catholics, and Mormons have made great
progress in gaining access to resources, and the gap between elite and
nonelite groups has narrowed. The religious composition of today’s
Supreme Court may be the most dramatic sign of these changes. For the
first time in history, there are no Protestant justices on the Court. Instead of
being dominated by Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists, it
is now made up entirely of Catholics and Jews.
As far as we are concerned, these are striking findings that need to be
explained. We have taken a step in that direction and hope others also will
pursue this line of inquiry. Our explanation hinges on the power relation-
ships between religious groups, and the effects these relationships have on
laws, ideologies, and customs over time. The Protestant Establishment of
the colonial period has retained a great deal of its power, but the erosion of
that power was underway by the mid-1800s, proceeded quite rapidly
through the early 1900s, was reversed between the 1930s and 1959, and has
proceeded again since 1960. The United States has not yet achieved religious
equality, and it is not likely to at any point in the near future, as the groups
in the New Upper stratum compete with other groups for access to power,
privilege, and prestige.
This analysis suggests several ways to alter this course and foster religious
pluralism, instead of stratification. Although it is not possible (or, in our
view, desirable) to equalize the memberships, organizational capacities, and
resources of religious groups, it is possible (and, in our view, desirable) to
strike all laws making religious affiliation a criterion for access to resources,
replace ethnocentric religious ideologies with more egalitarian beliefs, and
remove societal customs that favor any one group over others.
Consequences
Our analysis challenges Baltzell’s view that the Protestant Establishment has
been functional for American society. Instead of calling attention to
stratification’s contributions to the well-being of our society, it raises
awareness of religious stratification’s destabilizing effects. These effects are
muted when religious inequalities are most extreme and so highly

institutionalized that elite religious groups see no need to confront nonelite
groups publicly, and nonelite groups see no hope for change. They are more
disruptive when religious differences are less extreme, when elite religious
groups feel threatened and attack nonelite groups publicly, and when
nonelite groups believe they can improve their lot in life.
The implication of our analysis is that the best way to reduce religious
stratification’s negative consequences is to reduce religious stratification
itself. But, how? The same way we reduce other forms of stratification and
their harmful effects: by forming social movement organizations aimed at
creating a society in which religious stratification and its destabilizing effects
are virtually nonexistent. These organizations should expose and oppose
violations of laws that make it illegal to discriminate against others on the
basis of religious affiliation, customs such as legacy admissions that are
rooted in religious discrimination and continue to favor historical elites, and
ideological biases that have the same effect (such as the tendency to use
liberal Protestant norms and language to describe the experiences of other
groups). Whatever groups do to challenge such violations, customs, and
cultural biases would be important steps toward reducing religious
stratification and its destabilizing consequences. Americans wanting a more
just and stable society should add religious stratification to their list of
conditions that need to be overcome.
REFERENCES
Aguirre, A., Jr., & Baker, D. V. (Eds.). (2008). Structured inequality in the United States (2nd
ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice-Hall.
Ahlstrom, S. E. (1972). A religious history of the American people. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Baltzell, E. D. (1958). Philadelphia gentlemen. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.

Baltzell, E. D. (1964). The Protestant establishment. New York, NY: Random House.
Baltzell, E. D. (1982). Puritan Boston and Quaker Philadelphia. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice. London, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Burstein, P. (2007). Jewish educational and economic success in the United States: A search for
explanations. Social Perspectives, 50, 209–228.
Carter, G. L. (2007). The 1960s black riots revisited: City level explanation of the severity.
Sociological Inquiry, 6, 210–218.
Chickering, G. L. (1986). Founders of an oligarchy: The Virginia Council, 1692–1722. In
B. C. Daniels (Ed.), Power and status (pp. 255–274). Middletown, CT: Wesleyan
University Press.
Christiano, K. J., Swatos Jr., W. H., & Kivisto, P. (2008). Sociology of religion. Walnut Creek,
CA: AltaMira Press.
Coe, D. A., & Davidson, J. D. (2010). The religious affiliations of Ivy League presidents. Paper
presented at annual meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion,
Baltimore, MD.
Collins, P. H. (1990). Black feminist thought. Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman.
Daniels, B. C. (Ed.). (1986). Power and status: Office holding in colonial America. Middletown,
CT: Wesleyan University Press.
Dargo, G. (1974). Roots of the republic. New York, NY: Praeger.
Davidson, J. D. (2008). Religious stratification: Its origins, persistence, and consequences.
Sociology of Religion, 69, 371–395.
Davidson, J. D., Kraus, R., & Morrissey, S. (2005). Presidential appointments and religious
stratification in the United States, 1789–2003. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion,
44, 485–495.
Davidson, J. D., & Pyle, R. E. (2005). Social class. In H. R. Ebaugh (Ed.), Handbook on religion
and social institutions (pp. 185–205). New York, NY: Springer.
Davidson, J. D., & Pyle, R. E. (2011). Ranking faiths: Religious stratification in America.
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
Davis, K., & Moore, W. E. (1945). Some principles of stratification. American Sociological
Review, 10, 242–249.
Delgado, R., & Stefancic, J. (2001). Critical race theory: An introduction. New York, NY: New
York University Press.
Doane, A. W., & Bonilla-Silva, E. (Eds.). (2003). White out. New York, NY: Routledge.
Feagin, J. R., & Feagin, C. B. (2008). Racial and ethnic relations (8th ed.). Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2010, November 22). Latest hate crime statistics.
Retrieved from http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2010/november/hate_112210/. Accessed
on October 22, 2011.
Hammond, P. (1992). The Protestant presence in America. Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press.
Handy, R. T. (1984). A Christian America. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Housely, N. (2003). Religious warfare in Europe 1400–1538. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press.
Hurst, C. E. (2007). Social inequality (6th ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
Johnstone, R. L. (2007). Religion in society. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice-Hall.
Karabel, J. (2005). The chosen: The hidden history of admission and exclusion at Harvard, Yale,
and Princeton. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin.
Keister, L. A. (2000). Wealth in America: Trends in wealth inequality. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
Keister, L. A. (2003). Religion and wealth: The role of religious affiliation and participation in
early adult asset accumulation. Social Forces, 82, 173–205.
Keister, L. A. (2005). Getting rich: America’s new rich and how they got that way. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press.
Keister, L. A. (2007). Upward wealth mobility: Exploring the Roman Catholic advantage.
Social Forces, 85, 1195–1226.
Keister, L. A. (2008). Conservative Protestants and wealth: How religion perpetuates asset
poverty. American Journal of Sociology, 113, 1237–1271.
Kerbo, H. R. (2012). Social stratification and inequality (8th ed.). New York, NY:
McGraw-Hill.
Kosmin, B. A., & Keysar, A. (2006). Religion in a free market. Ithaca, NY: Paramount Market
Publishing.
Landry, B. (Ed.). (2007). Race, gender, and class: Theory and methods of analysis. Upper Saddle
River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice-Hall.
MacLeod, J. (2009). Ain’t no makin’ it: Leveled aspirations in a low-income neighborhood (3rd
ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview.
Marger, M. (2009). Racial and ethnic relations (8th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Noel, D. L. (1968). A theory of the origin of ethnic stratification. Social Problems, 16, 157–172.
Nottingham, E. K. (1954). Religion and society. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company.
Nussbaum, M. C. (2008). Liberty of conscience. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Oliver, M., & Shapiro, T. (1995). Black wealth and white wealth: A new perspective on racial
inequality. New York, NY: Routledge.
Omi, M., & Winant, H. (1994). Racial formation in the United States (2nd ed.). New York, NY:
Routledge.
Ostby, G. (2005). Inequality, institutions, and instability: Horizontal inequalities, political
institutions and civil conflict in developing countries, 1986–2003. Paper presented at the
Political Institutions, Development, and a Domestic Civil Peace Workshop, Oxford.
Ostby, G. (2007). Horizontal inequalities, political environment, and civil conflict: Evidence from
55 developing countries, 1986–2003. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper.
Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼979665. Accessed
Park, J. Z., & Reimer, S. H. (2002). Revisiting the social sources of American Christianity,
1972–1988. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 41, 733–746.
Persell, C. H., & Cookson, P. W. (1985). Chartering and bartering: Elite education and social
reproduction. Social Problems, 33, 114–129.
Putnam, R. D., & Campbell, D. E. (2010). American grace. New York, NY: Simon and
Schuster.
Pyle, R. E. (1996). Persistence and change in the Protestant establishment. Westport, CT:
Praeger.
Pyle, R. E. (2006). Trends in religious stratification: Have religious group socioeconomic
distinctions declined in recent decades? Sociology of Religion, 67, 61–79.
Pyle, R. E., & Davidson, J. D. (2003). The origins of religious stratification in colonial America.
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 42, 57–75.
Ritzer, G. (2011). Sociological theory (8th ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Rossides, D. W. (1997). Social stratification (2nd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Rothman, R. A. (2005). Inequality and stratification (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
Sherkat, D. E. (2007). Religion and higher education: The good, the bad, and the ugly. Retrieved
from http://religion.ssrc.org/reforum/Sherkat.pdf. Accessed on September 3, 2011.
Smith, C., & Faris, R. (2005). Socioeconomic inequality in the American religious system: An
update and assessment. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 44, 95–104.
Smith, D. (1990). The conceptual practices of power: A feminist sociology of knowledge. Boston,
MA: Northeastern University Press.
Snell, R. K. (1986). ‘‘Ambitious of honor and places’’: The magistracy of Hampshire County,
Massachusetts, 1692–1760. In B. C. Daniels (Ed.), Power and status (pp. 17–34).
Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
Turner, J. H. (2002). The structure of sociological theory (7th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. (n.d.). Religion based charges FY 1997–2010.
Retrieved from http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/religion.cfm. Accessed
Vogel, L. (1995). Women questions. New York, NY: Routledge.
Wallerstein, I. (1979). The capitalist world-economy. New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press.
Zweigenhaft, R. L., & Domhoff, G. W. (2006). Diversity in the power elite. Lanham, MD:
Rowman and Littlefield.

Religious Stratification in America

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Religious Stratification in America

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Religion, Work and Inequality

Religious Stratification in America

To copy this document: permissions@emeraldinsight.com

Access to this document was granted through an Emerald subscription provided by

*Related content and download information correct at time of download.

James D. Davidson and Ralph E. Pyle

Design/Methodology/Approach – We use a conﬂict theoretical approach

Findings – In the colonial period, the Upper stratum religious groups

Religion, Work and Inequality

Research implications – Our research indicates that religious stratiﬁca-

Originality/Value – This chapter highlights the importance of religion as

Keywords: Religion; stratiﬁcation; conﬂict theory; inequality; power

Religious stratiﬁcation was a fact of life in America’s 13 original

We looked for a theoretical approach that would allow us to link the

debatable reasons, such as the assumption that religion is more voluntary

Therefore, functionalism would not allow us to link studies of religious

have. These inequalities are best described as vertically and horizontally

Presbyterians, followed by Quakers and Unitarians. Below them were other

PERSISTENCE AND CHANGE

As we have mentioned, stratiﬁcation theorists and researchers – who have

The power differential between the groups is measured in terms of member-

would persist over time. Lower ranking groups would be at a disadvantage in

The second factor is ideologies. In the colonial period, elites promoted

The third factor is customs affecting groups’ access to resources. As we

Table 1. Religious Stratiﬁcation circa 1776, 1899, and 2010.

Stratum 1776 1899 2010

Upper Anglicans Congregationalists Episcopalians

Lower Catholics Baptists, Assemblies of God,

Today’s Upper stratum includes Episcopalians, Jews, Presbyterians, and

OUS = Episcopalian, UCC/Congregationalist, and Presbyterian

NUS = Episcopalian, Jewish, Presbyterian, and Unitarian-Universalist

Colonial 1789- 1860- 1930- 1960-

nonelites and cultivates a tendency to think in terms of ‘‘in-group virtues and

High Scenario 1 Scenario 2

Colonies 1787- 1830- 1860- 1900- 1930- 1960-

inequality and high instability since the mid-1800s. There is no empirical

We conclude with some implications related to our approach, our analysis

We prefer a Weberian version of conﬂict theory over Marxian versions

allows us to embrace related analyses (e.g., Noel, 1968), key components of

Persistence and Change

Future research on religious stratiﬁcation should retest the four factors we

way in all settings, or if they perform differently in different places. But, in

muted when religious inequalities are most extreme and so highly

Baltzell, E. D. (1958). Philadelphia gentlemen. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.

You might also like