CHAPTER 1. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
(Neptali Gonzales,
PHILIPPINES
What is Political Law?
That branch of public law, which deals
with the organization and operations of the
governmental organs of the State and defines the
relations of the State with inhabitants of its
territory (People v. Perfecto)
Scope /Divisions of Political Law
1. Constitutional Law. – The study of the
maintenance of the proper balance
between authority as represented by the
three inherent powers of the State and
liberty as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
(Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., p 1)
2. Administrative Law. That branch of
public law which fixes the organization of
government, determines the competence
of the administrative authorities who
execute the law, and indicates to the
individual remedies for the violation of
his rights.
3. Law on Municipal Corporations
4. Law of Public Officers
5. Election Laws
FROM ALBANO:
Are there any distinctions between a
Constitution and a statute?
Yes. A Constitution is a legislation direct from the
people; a statute is a legislation from the people’s
representatives. A Constitution states general
principles; a statute provides the details of the
subject of which it treats. A Constitution is
intended not merely to meet existing conditions; a
statute is intended primarily to meet existing
conditions only. A Constitution is the
fundamental law of the State to which all other
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laws and statutes must conform.
Political Law, citing Malcolm)
Is the constitution a conferment of powers or a
limitation of the same?
It is both a conferment of powers and a limitation
of the same. The constitution allocates to the three
(3) departments of the government. It also
provides for limitations on the exercise of such
powers, like the provisions of the Bill of Rights.
What is meant by the statement, “the
Constitution is a social contract?”
The Constitution as a social contract means that it
where the people have surrendered their
sovereign powers to the State for the common
good. Hence, as held in Marcos vs. Manglapus
lest the officers of the government exercising the
powers delegated by the people forget and the
servants of the people become rulers, the
Constitution reminds everyone that “sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them” (Sec. 1, Art. II, 1987
Constitution).
History of Constitution- Comm. Sarmiento
1. Malolos Congress
It is known as the La Constitución política de
Malolos and was written in Spanish
Following the declaration of independence from
Spain by the Revolutionary Government, a
congress was held in Malolos, Bulacan in 1899 to
draw up a constitution.
It was the first republican constitution in Asia.
The document declares that the people have
exclusive sovereignty. It states basic civil rights,
the separation of church and state, and calls for
the creation of an Assembly of Representatives
which would act as the legislative body. It also the
president elected for a term of four years by a
majority of theAssembly. The Malolos
Constitution established Spanish as the official
language of the Philippines.
The Preamble reads:
"Nosotros los Representantes del Pueblo Filipino,
convocados legítimamente paraestablecer la
justicia, proveer a la defensa común, promover el
bien general y asegurar los beneficios de la
libertad, implorando el auxilió del Soberano
Legislador del Universo para alcanzar estos
fines, hemos votado, decretado y sancionado la
siguiente"
(We, the Representatives of the Filipino people,
lawfully convened, in order to establish justice,
provide for common defense, promote the general
welfare, and insure the benefits of liberty,
imploring the aid of the Sovereign Legislator of
the Universe for the attainment of these ends,
have voted, decreed, and sanctioned the following)
2. Commonwealth and Third Republic (1935)
The 1935 Constitution of the Philippines was
written in 1934, approved and adopted by the
Commonwealth of the Philippines (1935-1946)
and later used by the Third Republic of the
Philippines (1946-1972). It was written with an
eye to meeting the approval of the United States
Government as well, so as to ensure that the U.S.
would live up to its promise to grant the
Philippines independence and not have a premise
to hold on to its "possession" on the grounds that
it was too politically immature and hence unready
for full, real independence.
The Preamble reads:
“ "The Filipino people, imploring
the aid of Divine Providence, in
order to establish a government
that shall embody their ideals,
conserve and develop the
patrimony of the nation, promote ”
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the general welfare, and secure to
themselves and their posterity the
blessings of independence under
a regime of justice, liberty, and
democracy, do ordain and
promulgate this constitution."
The original 1935 Constitution provides, inter
alia, for a unicameral Legislature and a single six-
year term for the President. It was amended in
1940 to have a bicameral Congress composed of
a Senate and House of Representatives, as well the
creation of an independent Commission on
Elections. The Constitution limited the President
to a four-year term with a maximum of two
consecutive terms in office.
A Constitutional Convention was held in 1971 to
rewrite the 1935 Constitution. The convention
was stained with manifest bribery and corruption.
Possibly the most controversial issue was
removing the presidential term limit so that
Ferdinand E. Marcos could seek election for a
third term, which many felt was the true reason
for which the convention was called. In any case,
the 1935 Constitution was suspended in 1972
with Marcos' proclamation of martial law, the
rampant corruption of the constitutional process
providing him with one of his major premises for
doing so.
3. Second Republic (1943)
The 1943 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines was drafted by a committee
appointed by the Philippine Executive
Commission, the body established by the Japanese
to administer the Philippines in lieu of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines which had
established a government-in-exile. In mid-1942,
Japanese Premier Hideki Tojo had promised the
Filipinos "the honor of independence" which
meant that the commission would be supplanted
by a formal republic.
The Philippine Independence Committee tasked
with drafting a new constitution was composed, in
large part, of members of the pre-war National
Assembly and of individuals with experience as
delegates to the convention that had drafted the
1935 Constitution. Their draft for the republic to
be established under the Japanese Occupation,
however, would be limited in duration, provide for
indirect, instead of direct, legislative elections, and
an even stronger executive branch.
Upon approval of the draft by the Committee, the
new charter was ratified in 1943 by an assembly
of appointed, provincial representatives of the
KALIBAPI, the organization established by the
Japanese to supplant all previous political parties.
Upon ratification by the KALIBAPI assembly, the
Second Republic was formally proclaimed (1943-
1945). José P. Laurel was appointed as President
by the National Assembly and inaugurated into
office in October of 1943. Laurel was highly
regarded by the Japanese for having openly
criticized the U.S. for the way they ran the
Philippines and because he had a degree from
Tokyo International University.
The 1943 Constitution remained in force in
Japanese-controlled areas of the Philippines, but
was never recognized as legitimate or binding by
the governments of the United States or of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines and guerrilla
organizations loyal to them. In late 1944,
President Laurel declared that a state of war
existed with the United States and the British
Empire and proclaimed martial law, essentially
ruling by decree. His government in turn went into
exile in December, 1944, first to Taiwan and then
Japan. After the announcement of Japan's
surrender, Laurel formally proclaimed the Second
Republic as dissolved.
Until the 1960s, the Second Republic, and its
officers, were not viewed as legitimate or as
having any standing, with the exception of the
Supreme Court whose decisions, limited to
reviews of criminal and commercial cases as part
of a policy of discretion by Chief JusticeJose Yulo
continued to be part of the official records (this
was made easier by the Commonwealth never
constituting a Supreme Court, and the formal
vacancy in the chief justice position for the
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Commonwealth with the execution of Jose Abad
Santos by the Japanese). It was only during the
Macapagal administration that a partial, political
rehabilitation of the Japanese-era republic took
place, with the recognition of Laurel as a former
president and the addition of his cabinet and
other officials to the roster of past government
officials. However, the 1943 charter was not
taught in schools and the laws of the 1943-44
National Assembly never recognized as valid or
relevant.
The Preamble reads:
“ "The Filipino people, imploring the
aid of Divine Providence and
desiring to lead a free national
existence, do hereby proclaim
their independence, and in order
to establish a government that
shall promote the general welfare,
conserve and develop the
patrimony of the Nation, and
contribute to the creation of a
world order based on peace,
liberty, and moral justice, do
ordain this Constitution." ”
The 1943 Constitution provided strong executive
powers. The Legislature consisted of a unicameral
National Assembly and only those considered as
anti-US could stand for election, although in
practice most legislators were appointed rather
than elected.
4. Fourth Republic (1973)
The 1973 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, promulgated after Marcos'
declaration of martial law, provides for a
parliamentary form of government. Legislative
power was vested in a National Assembly whose
members were elected for six-year terms. The
President was elected as the symbolic head of
state from the Members of the National Assembly
for a six-year term and could be re-elected to an
unlimited number of terms. Upon election, the
President ceased to be a member of the National the next constitution which became the 1987
Assembly. During his term, the President was not constitution.
allowed to be a member of a political party or hold
any other office. Executive power was exercised 5. The Constitution of the Republic of the
by the Prime Minister who was also elected from Philippines (In Filipino: Ang Konstitusyon ng
the Members of the National Assembly. The Prime Republika ng Pilipinas), ratified on February 2,
Minister was the head of government and 1987, is the fourth fundamental law to govern the
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. This Philippines since it became independent on July 4,
constitution was subsequently amended three 1946. First, the 1935 Constitution, which became
times. fully operational after the Inauguration of the
Third Philippine Republic. Second, the 1973
On 22 September 1976, President Marcos issued Constitution, which was promulgated during
Presidential Decree No. 1033 proposing Martial Law and became fully operational only
amendments to the Constitution, which was later after the lifting of Martial Law in 1981. Third, the
on ratified and included in the 1973 Constitution. 1986 Provisional "Freedom" Constitution, which
The amendments provide, among other things, for was promulgated on March 25 by President
the replacement of the National Assembly by the Corazon C. Aquino after the successful People
Batasang Pambansa. It also states that the Power Revolution in 1986.
incumbent President of the Philippines shall be
the Prime Minister, and shall continue to exercise History of Constitution- Atty. Gabriel
legislative powers until Martial Law has been
lifted. Amendments were done again in 1981 7 constitutions in the Philippines after
which re-established a parliamentary form of Spanish colonization
government with a president elected by direct vote
of the people. In reality, these amendments had a. Biak-na-bato – first
little effect at the time due to the ongoing Marcos revolutionary constitution in
dictatorship; however, Marcos did, at least in Asia (unicameral)
name, dissolve martial law at about this time and
b. Malolos – first democratic
conduct (highly questionable) elections, which he
constitution in Asia (uni/parl)
unsurprisingly "won". Presidential Proclamation
No. 3, popularly known as the 1986 Provisional c. 1935 – Unicameral, Presidental -
Freedom Constitution, was the most far reaching -- May 14, 1935 changed to
set of amendments to the 1973 constitution that it bicameral
was almost a constitution in its own right.
However, it is really a large set of amendments d. 1943 – Japanese constitution
which superseded and abolished certain during belligerent occupation
provisions from the constitution. It granted the (uni/pres)
President certain powers to remove officials from
office, reorganize the government and hold a new e. 1973 – uni/parl
constitutional convention to draft a new
constitution. f. Freedom – bicam
Following the EDSA People Power Revolution that g. 1987 – bicam, revision of 1935
removed President Ferdinand E. Marcos from
office, the new President, Corazon C. Aquino
issued Proclamation No. 3 and the adoption of a
 The 1897 Constitution of Biak-na-Bato, or
provisional constitution that would prepare for
Constituciong Halal sa Biak-na-Bato,

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 promulgated by the Philippine Revolutionary
Government on November 1, 1897, is the
provisionary Constitution of the Philippine
Republic during the Revolution against Spain.
It provides that the Supreme Council, vested
with the supreme power of government, shall
conduct foreign relations, war, the interior,
and the treasury.
 The 1899 Political Constitution of the
Republic, known as the Malolos Constitution,
was approved by President Emilio Aguinaldo
on January 21, 1899 and served as the
Constitution of the First Philippine Republic.
It provides for a parliamentary form of
government, but the President, and not a
Prime Minister, acts as the head of
government. Legislative power is exercised by
the Assembly of Representatives of the Nation,
and judicial power is lodge in a Supreme
Court.
 The 1935 Constitution of the Philippines,
ratified on May 17, 1935, establishes the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, defining
its powers, composition and organization as it
function as the Government of the Philippine
Islands. It is based on the principle of
separation of powers among the three
branches of government. Executive power is
vested in the President and shall serve for a
single-six year term. Legislative power is
vested in a unicameral National Assembly,
and judicial power is exercised by the
Supreme Court. It also provides that upon
proclamation of Philippine Independence, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines shall be
known as the Republic of the Philippines.
 The 1939 Amendment — The amendments
liberalized all laws and made few changes on
the economic provisions of the Tydings-
Mcduffie Law.
 The 1940 Amendments — The amendments,
by virtue of Resolution No. 73, provide for the
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establishment of a bicameral Congress,
composed of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, and limits the term of office
of the President to four years, but may
continue to serve for a maximum of eight
years. The amendment also provides for the
creation of a Commission on Elections.
 The 1947 Amendment — known as the Parity
Amendment, gave Americans equal rights with
Filipinos in the exploitation of Philippine
Natural resources.
 The 1943 Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, or the Constitution of the
Second Philippine Republic, was ratified by
the general assembly of the KALIBAPI. It is
based on the system of separation of powers
among the executive, legislative, and the
judiciary. It served as a temporary
constitution, for it stipulated that one year
after the end of the World War II, it shall be
replaced by a new constitution.
 The 1973 Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, or Ang Saligang Batas ng
Pilipinas, ratified by the Citizens Assemblies
on January 17, 1973, provides for a shift
from a presidential form of government to a
parliamentary system. The President serves as
a symbolic head of State, executive power is
exercised by the Prime Minister with the
assistance of the Cabinet, and legislative
power is vested in a unicameral National
Assembly. In 1976, the National Assembly was
replaced by the Batasang Pambansa, by
virtue of PD 1033 issued by President
Ferdinand Marcos.
 The 1973 Constitution as amended
(amended in 1981 and 1984) provides for a
semi-parliamentary form of government,
where the President, no longer acts as a
symbolic head, but acts as the head of state
and the chief executive. The Office of the
President has been restored to its original
 status under the 1935 Constitution.
Legislative power is vested in a unicameral
Batasang Pambansa. The Prime Minister, who
is subordinated to the President, acts as the
Head of the Cabinet.
 The 1986 Provisional Constitution,
popularly known as the Freedom Constitution,
promulgated by President Corazon C. Aquino
on March 25, 1986, was a provisional
constitution after a successful People Power
Revolution. Under the Freedom Constitution,
executive and legislative powers are exercised
by the President, and shall continue to
exercise legislative powers until a legislature
is elected and convened under a new
Constitution. Furthermore, the President is
mandated to convene a Constitutional
Commission tasked to draft a new charter.
What is a Constitution? – Atty. Gabriel, *you
may also answer the definition in Manila
Prince Hotel Case
Cooley- That body of rules and maxims in
accordance with which the powers of sovereignty
are habitually exercised.
Definition of Constitution in Philippine
Context?
Malcolm – That written instrument enacted by
direct action of the people by which the
fundamental powers of the government are
established, limited and defined, and by which
those powers are distributed among the several
departments for their safe and useful exercise for
the benefit of the body politic.
*memorize the two definition by heart he will ask
these
GABBY PRE-WEEK: *useful during exams and
recits
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It is not the beginning of a community. It is not
the origin of private rights. It is not the fountain
of law nor the incipient state of government. It is
not the cause, but the consequence of personal
and political freedom; it confers no rights to the
people; it is the creature of their power, the
instrument of their convenience. (Cooley)
 Can the constitution be wrong?
 No, the constitution can never be
wrong because it is the direct act of the
people according to Justice Malcolm.
*also cite the doctrine in case of Marcos
vs. Manglapus below.
The Constitution is the work or will of
the People themselves, in their original,
sovereign, and unlimited capacity. Law is the
work of the Creator, and the other of the
Creature. The Constitution fixes limits to the
exercise of legislative authority, and
prescribes the orbit within which it must move.
In short, gentlemen, the Constitution is the sun
of the political system, around which all
Legislative, Executive and Judicial bodies must
revolve. Whatever may be the case in other
countries, yet is this there can be no doubt that
every act of the Legislature, repugnant to the
Constitution, as absolutely void. (Justice Malcolm)
 Constitution will always prevail! Why so
special?
 enacted by the people
 surrendered sovereign powers in favor
of governmental organs
 sovereignty = direct act of the people
 The Constitution is the source of all rights.
T or F?
 False. There are rights which do not
need constitutional conferment
  Oposa case: right to balanced and
healthful ecology – emanates from
being a human being.
 NOT origin of private rights.
 Which comes first, Constitution or
Government? (by analogy to chicken and
eggs)
 Constitution because it provides
for organization of the
government.
 But without a government, who will enact a
constitution?
 There must be a government first
for it precedes the promulgation of
the constitution.
 But can we not argue that it’s the
constitution that lays down the powers of
the government?
 The Constitution of a State is stable
and permanent, not to be worked
upon by the temper of the times, nor
to rise and fall with the tide of events:
notwithstanding the competition of
opposing interests, and the violence
of contending parties, it remains firm
and immovable, as a mountain amidst
the strife of storms, or a rock in the
ocean amidst the raging of the waves
(Vanhorne vs. Dorrance)
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws
for the governance and administration of a
nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and
unalterable except by the authority from which
it emanates ( Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS)
 Is the Constitution a social contract?
 Yes, in Marcos vs. Manglapus…
In Marcos vs. Manglapus, the Supreme Court
held that “it must be borne in mind that the
Constitution, aside from being an allocation of
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power is also a social contract whereby the
people have surrendered their sovereign
powers to State for the common good.”
 What is the Doctrine of Constitutional
Supremacy?
That fundamental conception in other words is
that it is a supreme law to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all
private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered. Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract
violates any norm of the constitution that law or
contract whether promulgated by the legislative
or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and
void and without any force and effect. Thus,
since the Constitution is the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is
deemed written in every statute and contract.
(Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS)
 Constitution is immutable, it will
always prevail. Why? Direct act of the
people.
 It reflects the people’s sovereignty (the
power to do anything without any
accountability).
 What are the rights independent of the
Constitution?
 The right to life, liberty and security
are examples of the rights independent
of the Constitution. These are rights
are inherent from the time immemorial
when man exists. (Suggested answer lang
paki rephrase or paki correct n lng)
Purpose of the Constitution- Atty. Gabriel and
Comm. Sarmiento
1. To prescribe the permanent framework
of a system of government;
 2. To assign to the several departments
their respective powers and duties and;
3. To establish certain first principles on
which the government is founded (Manila Prince
Hotel vs. GSIS)
CLASSIFICATION- Atty. Gabriel (memorize by
heart)
1. WRITTEN OR UNWRITTEN
a. Written — one whose precepts
are embodied in one document
or set of documents;
b. Unwritten — consist of rules
which have not been integrated
into a single, concrete form but
are scattered in various sources,
such as statutes of a fundamental
character, judicial decisions,
commentaries of publicists,
customs and tradition, and
certain common law principles.
 Is it correct to say that the classification of
a constitution as written/ unwritten
depends on form?
 No, both are in writing. Distinction
is recognized as to sources in
unwritten constitution have
scattered sources unlike written
constitution.
2. ENACTED (CONVENTIONAL) OR
EVOLVED (CUMULATIVE)
Enacted (Conventional) — a
conventional constitution is
enacted, formally struck off at a
definite time and place following
a conscious or deliberate effort
taken by a constituent body or
ruler;
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Evolved (Cumulative) — it is the
result of political evolution, not
inaugurated at any specific time
but changing by accretion rather
than by any systematic method.
3. RIGID OR FLEXIBLE
a. Rigid- is one that can be
amended only by a formal and
usually difficult process;
b. Flexible- one that can be
changed by ordinary legislation.
 So what then is the Philippine
Constitution?
 The Philippine Constitution is a written,
enacted and rigid type of constitution.
HOW? It is embodied in a single document,
enacted by the Congress acting as Constitutional
Convention or Constitutional Assembly ratified by
the Filipino people in a plebiscite called for such
purpose.
QUALITIES OF A GOOD WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION:
a. BROAD- Not just because it provides
for the organization of the entire
government and covers all persons
and things within the territory of the
State but because it must be
comprehensive enough to provide
for every contingency.
b. BRIEF- It must confine itself to basic
principles to be implemented with
legislative details more adjustable to
change and easier to amend.
c. DEFINITE- To prevent ambiguity in
its provisions which could result in
confusion and divisiveness among
the people.
ESSENTIAL PARTS OF A GOOD WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION:
a. Constitution of Liberty – The series
of prescriptions setting forth the
fundamental civil and political rights
of the citizens and imposing
limitations on the powers of
government as a means of securing
the enjoyment of those rights. E.g. Art.
III
b. Constitution of Government – The
series of provisions outlining the
organization of the government,
enumerating its powers, laying down
certain rules relative to its
administration, and defining the
electorate, E.g. Arts. VI, VII, VIII and IX
c. Constitution of Sovereignty – The
provisions pointing out the mode or
procedure in accordance with which
formal changes in the fundamental
law may be brought, E.g., Art. XVII
-By analogy to essential parts of a
human body: absence of one will not
negate its supremacy, only that it is
lacking an essential part.
-A constitution can include parts not
essential, e.g. Article I – The National
Territory.
Preamble is not part of Constitution
-to walk before, to introduce
-prefatory statement
INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION OF THE
CONSTITUTION
Rules of Construction of the Constitution:
*do not mention directly the tools of
construction cited in Francisco v. House of
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Representatives go first to the case of Manila
Prince Hotel
1. Determine Self-Executing vs. Non Self-
Executing Provisions (Manila Prince
Hotel Case Doctrine)
Admittedly, some constitutions are
merely declarations of policies and
principles. Their provisions command the
legislature to enact laws and carry out the
purposes of the framers who merely establish
an outline of government providing for the
different departments of the governmental
machinery and securing certain fundamental
and inalienable rights of citizens. A provision
which lays down a general principle, such
as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing.
But a provision which is complete in itself
and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by
means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Thus a constitutional provision is self-
executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and liability imposed are
fixed by the constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action.
2. In Case of Doubt, Constitutional
Provisions are Self- Executing (Manila
Prince Hotel Case Doctrine)
Hence, unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary
to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing.
Why?
If the constitutional provisions are
 treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have
the power to ignore and practically nullify
the mandate of the fundamental law. This
can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing
view is, as it has always been, that-X x x x in
case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non
self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is
clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or
whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the
will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
DECISION
(En Banc)
BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS:Pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in
public auction its stake in Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). Only 2 bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of
the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with
ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for
the same number of shares at P44.00 per share,
or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme
Court to compel the GSIS to allow it to match the
bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First
Policy enshrined in §10, paragraph 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “in
the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions
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covering the national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos.”
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision
and does not need implementing legislation to
carry it into effect;
2. Assuming §10, paragraph 2, Article XII is
self-executing, whether the controlling shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our
patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,”
hence, mandated to implement §10, paragraph 2,
Article XII of the Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it
should give preference to the petitioner, a Filipino
corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign
corporation, in the sale of the controlling shares
of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
RULING:
[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]
1. YES, §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision and does not need implementing
legislation to carry it into effect.
Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such
a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-
executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from
enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute
squares with the Constitution. Minor details may
be left to the legislature without impairing the
self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing
nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is
implied from the tenor of the first and third
paragraphs of the same section which
undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument
is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not
self-executing because Congress is still to enact
measures to encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises fully owned by Filipinos,
as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs
legislation to regulate and exercise authority over
foreign investments within its national
jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a
fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph
can only be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony. A
constitutional provision may be self-executing in
one part and non-self-executing in another.
xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it
in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates
that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding
the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency
and puissance, and from which all legislations
must take their bearings. Where there is a right
there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila
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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony
as a nation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the
term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it
refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the term natural resources, but also to
the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
xxx xxx xxx
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has
bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures,
loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its
existence is impressed with public interest; its
own historicity associated with our struggle for
sovereignty, independence and
nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part
of our national economy and patrimony. For
sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within
the purview of the constitutional shelter for it
comprises the majority and controlling stock, so
that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will
have actual control and management of the
hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on
which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we
cannot sustain respondents’ claim that
the Filipino First Policy provision is not
applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of
the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the
Hotel building nor the land upon which the
building stands.
3. YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,”
hence, it is mandated to implement §10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC
could only be carried out with the prior approval
of the State acting through respondent Committee
on Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale
of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a
“state action.” In constitutional jurisprudence, the
acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered “state action” covered by the
Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is
a “public function;” (2) when the government is so
significantly involved with the private actor as to
make the government responsible for his action;
and, (3) when the government has approved or
authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in
respondent MHC comes under the second and
third categories of “state action.” Without doubt
therefore the transaction, although entered into
by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the
State and therefore subject to the constitutional
command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it
refers not only to the people but also to the
government as elements of the State. After all,
government is composed of three (3) divisions of
power - legislative, executive and
judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate
directed to the State is correspondingly directed
to the three (3) branches of government. It is
undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among
others to the Executive Department and
respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality
deriving its authority from the State.
4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the
petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares
of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm
offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that
the highest bidder shall only be declared the
winning bidder after it has negotiated and
executed the necessary contracts, and secured the
requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First
Policy provision of the Constitution bestows
preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending
of the highest bid is not an assurance that the
highest bidder will be declared the winning
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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to
make the award yet, nor are they under obligation
to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in
choosing the awardee respondents are mandated
to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution
the provisions of which are presumed to be
known to all the bidders and other interested
parties.
xxx xxx xxx
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides
that [i]f for any reason the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS
may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that
have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest
bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the
constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not
to award the block of shares immediately to the
foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of
a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we
cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits
the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony,
thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no
question that the Filipino will have to be allowed
to match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the
Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the
award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if
we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino
First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be
expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding
rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be
simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to
sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
3. Specific Tools of Constitutional
Construction (Francisco vs. House of
Representatives Case Doctrines)
 *use of the tools must be one
after the other in short the
three must be used
successively
To determine the merits of the issues
raised in the instant petitions, this Court
must necessarily turn to the Constitution
itself which employs the well-settled
principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis that is, wherever
possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are
employed. It is to be assumed that the
words in which constitutional provisions
are couched expressed the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be
given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed in
which case the significance thus attached
to them prevails. As the Constitution is
not primarily a lawyer’s document, it
being essential for the rule of law to be
obtain that it should ever be present in
the people’s consciousness, its language
as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have in
common use.
WHY is that verbal legis is used as a
tool for construction?-not a lawyer’s
document- people must understand
since it is created by and for the people
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio
legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional
construction is the intention underlying
the provision under consideration. Thus,
it has been held that the Court in
construing a Constitution should bear in
mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the
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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the
Constitution was framed. The object is to
ascertain the reason which induced the
framers of the Constitution to enact the
particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in
order to construe the whole as to make
the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.
Ratio legis est anima
-may courts of justice use
extraneous mats?? NO- only if all 3 tools failed
‘yong history, what’s going on in society at that
time lang?
When ratified, they did not have
deliberations of consti commission
-must inform themselves in 4 corners
of Consti lang
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat.
The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted as a whole. The members of
the Constitutional Convention could not
have dedicated a provision of our
Constitution merely for the benefit of one
person without considering that it could
also affect others. When they adopted
[provisions of the Constitution], they
permitted, if not willed, that said
provision should function to the full
extent of its substance and its terms, not
by itself alone, but in conjunction with all
other provisions of that great document.
(Francisco vs. House of Representatives,
GR No. 160261, Nov. 10, 2003)
4. Extraneous Materials Can ONLY be
used if the Above-Mentioned Rules Fail
 Likewise, still in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court
affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in
constitutional construction that no one
provision of the Constitution is to be
separated from all the others, to be
considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view and
to be so interpreted as to effectuate the
great purposes of the instrument.
Sections bearing on a particular
subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate
the whole purpose of the Constitution
and one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to
stand together.
In other words, the court must
harmonize them, if practicable, and must
lean in favor of a construction which will
render every word operative, rather than
one which may make the words idle and
nugatory. (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning
of the word is not found to be clear,
resort to other aids is available. In still
the same case of Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, this Court
expounded:
While it is permissible in this
jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had
only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the
terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention “are of values
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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reasons
for their votes, but they give us no light
as to the views of the large majority who
did not talk, much less of the mass of our
fellow citizens whose votes at the polls
gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face.” The proper
interpretation therefore depends more
on how it was understood by the
people adopting it than in the framers’
understanding
Francisco vs. House of Representatives
(GR 160261, 10 November 2003)
En Banc, Carpio Morales (J): 1 concurs, 3 wrote
separate concurring opinions to which 4 concur,
2 wrote concurring and dissenting separate
opinions to which 2 concur.
FACTS: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress
of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings, superseding the previous House
Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of
Representatives adopted a Resolution, which
directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner
of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former
President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
complaint (first impeachment complaint) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for
"culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
the public trust and other high crimes." The
complaint was endorsed by House
Representatives, and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution. The House Committee on Justice
ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"
but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four
months and three weeks since the filing of the
first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after
the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss
it, the second impeachment complaint was filed
with the Secretary General of the House by House
Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned
House Resolution. The second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least 1/3
of all the Members of the House of
Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the
Supreme Court against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the
provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings
shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year."
ISSUE: Whether the power of judicial review
extends to those arising from impeachment
proceedings
HELD: The Court's power of judicial review is
conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our
present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating
power" to "determine the proper allocation of
powers" of the different branches of government
and "to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts
as a necessary consequence of the judicial power
itself, which is "the power of the court to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated
in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial
review is indeed an integral component of the
delicate system of checks and balances which,
together with the corollary principle of separation
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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican
form of government and insures that its vast
powers are utilized only for the benefit of the
people for which it serves. The separation of
powers is a fundamental principle in our system
of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that
the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system
of checks and balances to secure coordination in
the workings of the various departments of the
government. And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other departments in the exercise of its
power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of
the Constitution.
The major difference between the judicial power
of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the
U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of
judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S.
Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and
lower courts, as expressly provided for in the
Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty,
and it was given an expanded definition to include
the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion
on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality. There are also glaring
distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the
Philippine Constitution with respect to the power
of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.
Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment
to the House of Representatives without limitation,
our Constitution, though vesting in the House of
Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases, provides for several
limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
thereof. These limitations include the manner of
filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year
bar on the impeachment of one and the same
official. The people expressed their will when they
instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution. This shows that the Constitution did
not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to
the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it
provided for certain well-defined limits, or
"judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such
discretion, through the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this
Court exercised the power of judicial review over
congressional action. Finally, there exists no
constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of checks
and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to
be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures
that no branch of government act beyond the
powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Francisco vs. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261
FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment
proceedings were filed against Supreme Court
Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable
controversy in this case was the constitutionality
of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to
controvert the rules of impeachment provided for
by law.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives is constitutional, and whether the
resolution thereof is a political question — h; as
resulted in a political crisis.
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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules
of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which
were approved by the House of Representatives
are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5,
Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
REASONING: In passing over the complex issues
arising from the controversy, this Court is ever
mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate
doctrine of separation of powers among the
legislative, executive or judicial branches of
government by no means prescribes for absolute
autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of
the governmental power assigned to it by the
sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks
and balances which has been carefully calibrated
by the Constitution to temper the official acts of
each of these three branches must be given effect
without destroying their indispensable co-
equality. There exists no constitutional basis for
the contention that the exercise of judicial review
over impeachment proceedings would upset the
system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and
"one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another." Both are integral components of the
calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it
by the Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution also understood
initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a
proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote
of at least one-third of all the Members of the
House shall be necessary… to initiate
impeachment proceedings," this was met by a
proposal to delete the line on the ground that the
vote of the House does not initiate impeachment
proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint
does.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place
by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of
the impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least
one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the
House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.
The Court in the present petitions subjected to
judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only
the main issue of whether the impeachment
proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-
year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about
assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor
indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of
decidedly political questions. Because it is not at
all the business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great branches of
the government.
When did the 1987 Constitution take effect?
It took effect on February 2, 1987.
De Leon vs. Esguerra Case Doctrine:
The main issue revolved in the judgment
at bar whether the 1987 Constitution took effect
on February 2, 1987, the date the plebiscite for its
ratification was held or whether it took effect on
February 11, 1987, the date its ratification was
proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the
President of the Philippines, Corazon C. Aquino.
The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution
should be deemed to “take effect on the date its
ratification shall have been ascertained and not at
the time the people cast their votes to approve or
reject it.” This view was actually proposed at the
Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was
withdrawn by its proponent in the face of the
“overwhelming” contrary view that the
Constitution “will be effective on the very day of
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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
the plebiscite.” The record of the proceedings and
debates of the Constitutional Commission fully
supports the Court’s judgment. It shows that the
clear, unequivocal and express intent of the
Constitutional Commission in unanimously
approving (by thirty-five (35) votes in favor and
none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of
Transitory Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution was that “the act of ratification is
the act of voting by the people. So that is the
date of the ratification” and that “the canvass
thereafter [of the votes] is merely the
mathematical confirmation of what was done
during the date of the plebiscite and the
proclamation of the President is merely the
official confirmatory declaration of an act
which was actually done by the Filipino people
in adopting the Constitution when they cast
their votes on the date of the plebiscite.” (De
Leon vs. Esguerra)
De Leon vs. Esguerra
153 SCRA 602
G.R. No. L-78059, August 31, 1987
FACTS: On May 17, 1982, Alfredo De Leon won as
Brgy. Captain and other petitioners won as
Councilmen of Brgy. Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. Under
the Barangay Election Act of 1982, their terms of
office shall be six years, which commenced on
June 7, 1982 up to June 7, 1988. On Feb. 8, 1987,
while the petitioners still have one year and four
months, Gov. Benjamin Esguerra of Rizal Province,
issued a memorandum designating Florentino
Magno as the new Brgy. Captain and other
respondents as the new Councilmen of the said
barangay. The respondents relied on the
Provisional Constitution of 1986, which grants
the governor to appoint or designate new
successors within the one year period which
ended on Feb. 25 1987. They also contended that
the terms of office of the petitioners were already
been abolished and that they continued in office
simply because no new successors were
appointed yet; and that the provision in the
Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of
Barangay officials up to six years must have been
deemed repealed for being inconsistent with the
Provisional Constitution. Petitioners instituted an
original action for prohibition to review the order
of the governor.
ISSUE: Whether the designation was valid
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the
memoranda issued by Gov. Esguerra has no legal
effect. Though the designation was within the one
year period which ended on Feb. 25, 1987,
however, it was cut short when the 1987
Constitution took effect on Feb. 2, 1987. When the
1987 Constitution was in effect, the governor no
longer had the authority to designate successors
under the Provisional Constitution which was
deemed to have been superseded. There has been
no proclamation or executive order terminating
the term of elective Barangay officials; and the
Barangay Election Act is not inconsistent with the
Constitution. The writ of prohibition was granted
and the petitioners have acquired the security of
tenure.
Notes:
When did the 1987 Constitution take effect?
The Supreme Court, with only one dissent, ruled
in De leon vs. Esguerra that the 1987
Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987
which is the date of its ratification in the
plebiscite, by virtue of its provision under Article
XVIII, Section 27 that it “shall take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose.”
(This provision was unanimously approved by
thirty-five votes in favor and none against in the
Con Com of 1986)
The effectivity of the Constitution should
commence on the date of the ratification that is
the date the people have cast their votes in favor
of the Constitution. The act of voting by the
people is the act of ratification. It should not be
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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
on the date of the proclamation of the President
since it is the act of the people. In fact, there
should be no need to wait for any proclamation
on the part of the President, if there is, it is merely
the official confirmatory declaration of an act
done by the people. The COMELEC, on the other
hand, should make the official announcement that
the votes show that the Constitution was ratified,
but the canvass is merely a mathematical
confirmation of what was done during the
plebiscite.
DISSENT OF J. SARMIENTO
The Constitution should be deemed to
take effect on the date its ratification shall have
been ascertained. (in this case, Feb. 11, 1987) and
not at the time the people cast the votes to
approve or reject it. This view was actually
proposed at the Constitutional Commission
deliberations but was withdrawn by its proponent
in the face of the overwhelming contrary view that
the Constitution will be effective on the very day
of the plebiscite.
Atty. Gabriel: Is the Decision not violative of
Due Process, in the sense that during the
PLEBISCITE the people still does not know if
the Constitution will be ratified?
No. It is the Constitution itself that
provides for its effectivity. The Constitution,
being the fundamental law of the land, it is to
be upheld, unless later amended or revised.
Moreover, it is the people themselves that
participated in the plebiscite. Hence, unlike in
the case of ordinary legislative enactments, it
cannot be said that they were deprived of due
process, considering that during the plebiscite,
they already know of the contents/ possible
contents of the “would be Constitution.”
 Why is the Constitution likened to a
traveler?
  A good constitution must provide a
mechanism for change.
Permanence of the Constitution
-explain this concept but it cannot “stand still”
The Constitution is permanent in a
sense that unless the people change the
constitution through amendment or revision it
remains to be the constitution. It cannot “stand
still” it must cater the exigencies that may arise
(not sure eh  )
 What are the two changes? Amendment and
Revision
Amendment implies such an addition or change
within the lines of the original instrument as will
effect an improvement, or better carry out the
purpose for which it was framed.
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a
basic principle in the constitution, like altering
the principle of separation of powers or the
system of checks-and- balances. There is also
revision if the change alters the substantial
entirety of the constitution, as when the change
affects substantial provisions of the constitution.
On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to
a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without
altering the basic principle involved. Revision
generally affects several provisions of the
constitution, while amendment generally affects
only the specific provision being amended.
 Is it necessary to determine the character
of change?
 Yes, it is necessary to determine the
character of the proposed change
because different procedure applies
and initiative by people can only
propose amendments.
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AMENDMENTS AND REVISION
 Are the procedures for amendment &
revision in 1935 and 1987 identical?
 Yes (except that in 1987 – voting
separately)
 initiative vs. referendum?
 election vs. plebiscite?
Election (1935) Plebiscite (1987)
“simultaneously” with Pertains to process,
general election not the day. It can be
held on a general or a
special election day.
What really happened during the 1973
plebiscite was a showing of hands during
barangay consultative assemblies. The people
were asked: “do you want to bring home one
sack of rice?” then someone took photos. -
Javellana vs. Executive Secretary
-procedure in 1935 constitution was not
followed, but no more obstacle to its force and
effect. (nandyan na yan e!)
Proposal
Gonzales vs. COMELEC case doctrine:
 Atty. Gabriel: Is the power to propose
amendment included in the general
legislative power? No.
The Power to Propose Amendments or Revisions
to the Constitution is not included in the General
Legislative Power
NATURE OF POWER TO AMEND THE
CONSTITUTION. The power to amend the
Constitution or to propose, amendments thereto is
not included in the general grant of legislative
powers to Congress (Sec. 1, Art, VI, Const.) It is
part of the inherent powers of the people - as the
repository of sovereignty in a republican state,
such as ours (Sec. 1, Art. II, Const.) — to make and
hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law.
Congress may propose amendments to the
Constitution merely because the same explicitly
grants such power (Sec. 1, Art. XV, Const.). Hence,
when exercising the same, it is said that Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives act,
not as members of Congress, but as component
elements of a constituent assembly. When acting
as such, the members of Congress derive their
authority from the Constitution, unlike the people,
when performing the same function, for their
authority does not emanate from the Constitution
- they are the very source of all powers of
government, including the Constitution itself.
POWER OF THE COURT TO REVIEW THE
EXERCISE OF THIS POWER BY THE CONGRESS.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of
Congress — acting as a constituent assembly —
violates the Constitution, is essentially justiciable,
not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review,
and, to the extent that this view may be
inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, the latter should be deemed
modified accordingly. The Members of the Court
are unanimous on this point.
 Can the Congress acting as a Constituent
Assembly, may directly propose
amendments or revisions and at the same
time, calls a constitutional convention? Yes
As a Constituent Assembly, Congress May
Directly Propose Amendments or Revisions AND
at the same time, Calls a Constitutional
Convention.
THE CONGRESS, ACTING AS A CONSTITUENT
ASSEMBLY MAY DIRECTLY PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, AND
SIMULTANEOUSLY CALL A CONSITUTIONAL
CONVENTION TO PROPOSE THE NEEDED
AMMENDMENTS. Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus
curiae maintains that Congress may either
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propose amendments to the Constitution or call a
convention for that purpose, but it cannot do
both, at the same time. This theory is based upon
the fact that the two (2) alternatives are connected
in the Constitution by the disjunctive "or." Such
basis is, however, a weak one, in the absence of
other circumstances — and none has been
brought to our attention — supporting the
conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact,
the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean
"and," or vice-versa, when the spirit or context of
the law warrants it.
It is, also, noteworthy that R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3
propose amendments to the constitutional
provisions on Congress, to be submitted to the
people for ratification on November 14, 1967,
whereas R.B.H. No. 2 calls for a convention in
1971, to consider proposals for amendment to the
Constitution, in general. In other words, the
subject- matter of R.B.H. No. 2 is different from
that of R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the
amendments proposed under R.B.H. Nos. 1 and 3,
will be submitted for ratification several years
before those that may be proposed by the
constitutional convention called in R.B.H. No. 2.
Again, although the three (3) resolutions were
passed on the same date, they were taken up and
put to a vote separately, or one after the other. In
other words, they were not passed at the same
time.
In any event, we do not find, either in the
Constitution, or in the history thereof, anything
that would negate the contested of different
Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions,
or of the same Congress to pass the same in
different sessions or different days of the same
congressional session. And, neither has any
plausible reason been advanced to justify the
denial of authority to adopt said resolutions on
the same day.
Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a
constitutional convention to propose
amendments, why not let the whole thing be
submitted to said convention, instead of, likewise,
proposing some specific amendments, to be
submitted for ratification before said convention
is held? The force of this argument must be
conceded, but the same impugns the wisdom of
the action taken by Congress, not its authority to
take it. One seeming purpose thereof is to permit
Members of Congress to run for election as
delegates to the constitutional convention and
participate in the proceedings therein, without
forfeiting their seats in Congress. Whether or
nothing should be done is a political question, not
subject to review by the courts of justice.
 Is it necessary that ratification must be
held at a special election? No.
Ratification of the Constitution may be held
simultaneously in a general election. The
proposed Constitutional Amendments may be
submitted at a plebiscite scheduled on the SAME
DAY as the regular elections.
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION MAY BE
HELD SIMULTANEOUSLY IN A GENERAL
ELECTION. There is in this provision nothing to
indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a
"special," not a general election. The circumstance
that three previous amendments to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for
ratification in special elections merely shows that
Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate
its authority to submit proposed amendments for
ratification in general elections.
It would be better, from the viewpoint of a
thorough discussion of the proposed
amendments, that the same be submitted to the
people's approval independently of the election of
public officials. And there is no denying the fact
that an adequate appraisal of the merits and
demerits of proposed amendments is likely to be
overshadowed by the great attention usually
commanded by the choice of personalities
involved in general elections, particularly when
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provincial and municipal officials are to be
chosen. But, then, these considerations are
addressed to the wisdom of holding a plebiscite
simultaneously with the election of public
officers. They do not deny the authority of
Congress to choose either alternative, as implied
in the term "election" used, without qualification,
in the above-quoted provision of the Constitution.
Such authority becomes even more patent when
we consider: (1) that the term "election," normally
refers to the choice or selection of candidates to
public office by popular vote; and (2) that the
word used in Article V of the Constitution
concerning the grant of suffrage to women is, not
"election," but "plebiscite."
Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as
used in Section 1 of Art. XV of the Constitution,
should be construed as meaning a special
election. Some members of the Court even feel
that said term ("election") refers to a "plebiscite,"
without any "election," general or special, of
public officers. They opine that constitutional
amendments are, in general, if not always, of such
importance, if not transcendental and vital nature
as to demand that the attention of the people be
focused exclusively on the subject-matter thereof,
so that their votes thereon may reflect no more
than their intelligent, impartial and considered
view on the merits of the proposed amendments,
unimpaired, or, at least, undiluted by extraneous,
if not insidious factors, let alone the partisan
political considerations that are likely to affect the
selection of elective officials.
This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is
a goal the attainment of which should be
promoted. The ideal conditions, are, however, one
thing. The question whether the Constitution
forbids the submission of proposals for
amendment to the people except under such
conditions, is another thing. Much as the writer
and those who concur in this opinion admire the
contrary view, they find themselves unable to
subscribe thereto without, in effect, reading into
the Constitution what they believe is not written
thereon and cannot fairly be deduced from the
letter thereof, since the spirit of the law should
not be a matter of sheer speculation.
 Can the congress propose amendment
through ordinary legislation?
 No. The Congress, CANNOT through
ordinary legislative process, have
the power to amend or propose
amendment to the Constitution.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to
propose amendments thereto is not included in
the general grant of legislative powers to
Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of
the people — as the repository of sovereignty
in a republican state, such as ours— to make,
and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental
Law. Congress may propose amendments to
the Constitution merely because the same
explicitly grants such power. Hence, when
exercising the same, it is said that Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives act,
not as members of Congress, but as component
elements of a constituent assembly. When
acting as such, the members of Congress derive
their authority from the Constitution, unlike
the people, when performing the same
function, for their authority does not emanate
from the Constitution — they are the very
source of all powers of government, including
the Constitution itself.
GONZALES VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GR. NO L-28196, NOVEMBER 9, 1967
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
FACTS:
The Congress passed 3 resolutions
simultaneously. The first, proposing amendments
to the Constitution so as to increase the
membership of the House of Representatives from
a maximum of 120, as provided in the present
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Constitution, to a maximum of 180. The second,
calling a convention to propose amendments to
said Constitution, the convention to be composed
of two (2) elective delegates from each
representative district, to be elected in the general
elections. And the third, proposing that the same
Constitution be amended so as to authorize
Senators and members of the House of
Representatives to become delegates to the
aforementioned constitutional convention,
without forfeiting their respective seats in
Congress. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill,
which, upon approval by the President, became
Republic Act No. 4913 providing that the
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned resolutions be submitted, for
approval by the people, at the general elections.
The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the
said law contending that the Congress cannot
simultaneously propose amendments to the
Constitution and call for the holding of a
constitutional convention.
ISSUES:
(1) Is Republic Act No. 4913 constitutional?
(2) WON Congress can simultaneously propose
amendments to the Constitution and call for the
holding of a constitutional convention?
HELD:
YES as to both issues. The constituent power or
the power to amend or revise the Constitution, is
different from the law-making power of Congress.
Congress can directly propose amendments to the
Constitution and at the same time call for a
Constitutional Convention to propose
amendments.
The Congress, CANNOT through ordinary
legislative process, have the power to amend or
propose amendment to the Constitution.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to
propose amendments thereto is not included in
the general grant of legislative powers to
Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of
the people — as the repository of sovereignty
in a republican state, such as ours— to make,
and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental
Law. Congress may propose amendments to
the Constitution merely because the same
explicitly grants such power. Hence, when
exercising the same, it is said that Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives act,
not as members of Congress, but as component
elements of a constituent assembly. When
acting as such, the members of Congress derive
their authority from the Constitution, unlike
the people, when performing the same
function, for their authority does not emanate
from the Constitution — they are the very
source of all powers of government, including
the Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly,
amendments to the Constitution, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the
Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they
do not have the final say on whether or not their
acts are within or beyond constitutional limits.
Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the
same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that
ours is a government of laws, not of men, and to
the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity
is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution
expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, the
power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite
the eminently political character of treaty-making
power.
GONZALES VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GR. NO L-28196, NOVEMBER 9, 1967
FACTS: On March 16, 1967, the Senate and
the House of Representatives passed resolutions
No. 1, 2 and 3 – i.e. to increase the seats of the
Lower House from 120 to 180; to convoke a
Constitutional Convention of 1971; and to amend
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the Constitution (Section 16, Article VI) so they
can become delegates themselves to the
Convention.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon
approval by the President, on June 17, 1967,
became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the
amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be
submitted, for approval by the people, at the
general elections which shall be held on
November 14, 1967.
Two cases were filed against this act of Congress:
One is an original action for prohibition, with
preliminary injunction by Ramon A. Gonzales, in
L-28196, a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter.
He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a
class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens,
taxpayers, and voters similarly situated. Another
one is by PHILCONSA, in L-28224, a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-
partisan organization the objective of which is to
uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to
defend its Constitution against erosions or
onslaughts from whatever source.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not a Resolution of Congress
— acting as a constituent assembly —
violates the Constitution?
2. May Constitutional Amendments Be
Submitted for Ratification in a General
Election?
HELD: The issue whether or not a Resolution of
Congress — acting as a constituent assembly —
violates the Constitution essentially justiciable,
not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review.
In the cases at bar, notwithstanding that the R. B.
H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of
three-fourths of all the members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, said resolutions are null and void
because Members of Congress, which approved
the proposed amendments, as well as the
resolution calling a convention to propose
amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen
(based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution, no apportionment has been made
been made by Congress within three (3) years
since 1960. Thereafter, the Congress of the
Philippines and/or the election of its Members
became illegal; that Congress and its Members,
likewise, became a de facto Congress and/or de
facto congressmen);
However, As a consequence, the title of a de
facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally.
Referring particularly to the contested proposals
for amendment, the sufficiency or insufficiency,
from a constitutional angle, of the submission
thereof for ratification to the people on November
14, 1967, depends — in the view of those who
concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this
phase of the case, constitute the minority — upon
whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913
are such as to fairly apprise the people of the gist,
the main idea or the substance of said proposals,
which is — under R. B. H. No. 1 — the increase of
the maximum number of seats in the House of
Representatives, from 120 to 180, and — under R.
B. H. No. 3 — the authority given to the members
of Congress to run for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto,
to discharge the duties of such delegates, without
forfeiting their seats in Congress. We — who
constitute the minority — believe that Republic
Act No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that
said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.
One of the issues raised in this case was the
validity of the submission of certain proposed
constitutional amendments at a plebiscite
scheduled on the same day as the regular
elections. Petitioners argued that this was
unlawful as there would be no proper submission
of the proposal to the people who would be more
interested in the issues involved in the election.
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HELD: Pursuant to Art 15 of the ’35 Constitution,
SC held that there is nothing in this provision to
indicate that the election therein referred to is a
special, not a general election. The circumstance
that the previous amendment to the Constitution
had been submitted to the people for ratification
in special elections merely shows that Congress
deemed it best to do so under the circumstances
then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to
submit proposed amendments for ratification in
general elections.
DISSENT OF JUSTICE SANCHEZ: The people
must be afforded opportunity to mull over the
original provisions compare them with the
proposed amendments, and try to reach a
conclusion as the dictates of their conscience
suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous
or possibly insidious influences., There must
be a fair submission, intelligent consent or
rejection
**J Reyes dissented. “Plebiscite should be
scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate “Fair
submission, intelligent consent or rejection”. They
should be able to compare the original
proposition with the amended proposition
Atty. Gabriel: In this case, the Congress made
both the PROPOSAL and the CALL FOR A
CONVENTION. Is this Legally Possible? Yes. See
the doctrine above
Suppose there is no Art. XVII. Who may now
propose amendments or revision? The people.
The people’s authority does not come from the
Constitution- they are the very source of all
powers of the government, including the
Constitution itself. The 1987 Constitution,
particularly Art. XVII is but a limitation to the
people’s authority or power.
SANIDAD vs. COMELEC CASE DOCTRINES:
 Is the power to propose amendment or
revision a political question or justiciable
question?
  JUSTICIABLE but once it is ratified
it ceases to be justiciable.
THE POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION IS A PURELY JUSTICEABLE
CONTROVERSY. The Solicitor General would
consider the question at bar as a pure political
one, lying outside the domain of judicial review.
We disagree. The amending process both as to
proposal and ratification, raises a judicial
question. This is especially true in cases where the
power of the Presidency to initiate the amending
process by proposals of amendments, a function
normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously
doubted. Under the terms of the 1973
Constitution, the power to propose amendments
to the Constitution resides in the interim National
Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15,
Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the
regular National Assembly in its active session,
the power to propose amendments becomes ipso
facto the prerogative of the regular National
Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973
Constitution). The normal course has not been
followed. Rather than calling the interim National
Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent
assembly, the incumbent President undertook the
proposal of amendments and submitted the
proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree
1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on
October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity of the
procedure for amendments, written in lambent
words in the very Constitution sought to be
amended, raises a contestable issue. The
implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031,
and 1033, which commonly purport to have the
force and effect of legislation are assailed as
invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said
Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the
competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2
(2) Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All
cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
executive agreement, or law shall be heard and
decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no
treaty, executive agreement, or law may be
declared unconstitutional without the
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concurrence of at least ten Members. . . .." The
Supreme Court has the last word in the
construction not only of treaties and statutes, but
also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like
all other powers organized in the Constitution, is
in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so
that the Supreme Court is vested with that
authority to determine whether that power has
been discharged within its limits.
Political questions are neatly associated with the
wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. Where
the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality
or validity of the contested act, that matter is
definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in
the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act
of the incumbent President in proposing
amendments to the Constitution, but his
constitutional authority to perform such act or to
assume the power of a constituent assembly.
Whether the amending process confers on the
President that power to propose amendments is
therefore a downright justiciable question. Should
the contrary be found, the actuation of the
President would merely he a brutum fulmen. If the
Constitution provides how it may be amended, the
judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution,
can declare whether the procedure followed or the
authority assumed was valid or not.
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor
General, in pursuing his theory of non-
justiciability, that the question of the President's
authority to propose amendments and the
regularity of the procedure adopted for
submission of the proposals to the people
ultimately lie in the judgment of the latter. A clear
Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the
people themselves, by their sovereign act,
provided for the authority and procedure for the
amending process when they ratified the present
Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, that
constitutional provision has been followed or not
is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by
the people themselves — of course — who
exercise no power of judicial review, but by the
Supreme Court in whom the people themselves
vested that power, a power which includes the
competence to determine whether the
constitutional norms for amendments have been
observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a
priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission
to and ratification by the people.
SINCE THE PRESIDENT, UNDER THE 1973
CONSTITUTION, MAY EXERCISE LEGISLATIVE
POWER, HE MAY LIKEWISE THEREFORE,
PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION. As earlier pointed out, the power
to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the
interim National Assembly during the transition
period. However, the initial convening of that
Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the
judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the
exercise of that judgment, the President opted to
defer convening of that body in utter recognition
of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period
of transition, the power to propose amendments
to the Constitution lies in the interim National
Assembly upon special call by the President (Sec.
15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to
the dictates of the sovereign will, the President
decided not to call the interim National Assembly.
Would it then be within the bounds of the
Constitution and of law for the President to
assume that constituent power of the interim
Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's
legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the
President has been legitimately discharging the
legislative functions of the interim Assembly,
there is no reason why he cannot validly
discharge the function of that Assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution, which is
but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross
legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that
the President has converted his office into a
constituent assembly of that nature normally
constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the
interim National Assembly not convened and only
the Presidency and the Supreme Court in
operation, the urges of absolute necessity render
it imperative upon the President to act as agent
for and in behalf of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically,
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by its very constitution, the Supreme Court
possesses no capacity to propose amendments
without constitutional infractions. For the
President to shy away from that actuality and
decline to undertake the amending process would
leave the governmental machinery at a stalemate
or create in the powers of the State a destructive
vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis
government "to end the crisis and restore normal
times." In these parlous times, that Presidential
initiative to reduce into concrete forms the
constant voices of the people reigns supreme.
After all, constituent assemblies or constitutional
conventions, like the President now, are mere
agents of the people.
 Atty. Gabriel: Does proposal to amend
and/or to revise the Constitution need the
Approval of the President? No.
In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the
state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a
Constitution, that body is not in the usual
function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when
engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is
exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by
the fundamental character itself. While, ordinarily
it is the business of the legislating body to
legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional
contentment amending of the Constitution is not
legislative in character. In political science a
distinction is made between constitutional
contents of an organic character and that of a
legislative character. The distinction, however,
is one of policy, not of law. Such being the
case, approval of the President of any
proposed amendment is a misnomer. The
prerogative of the president to approve or
disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases
of legislation. The President has nothing to do
with proposition or adoption of amendments
to the Constitution. (Sanidad vs. COMELEC)
SANIDAD VS. COMELEC
73 SCRA 333 (1976)
President Marcos issued P.D. 991 calling for a
national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the
Citizens Assemblies (“Barangay”) to resolve,
among other things, the issues of martial law, the
interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of
such replacement, the period of its existence, the
length of the period for the exercise by the
President of his present powers.
Thereafter, P.D.1031 was issued, amending P.D.
991 by declaring the provisions of P.D. 229
applicable as to the manner of voting and
canvassing of votes in barangays for the national
referendum- plebiscite of October 16, 1976. P.D.
1033 was also issued, declaring therein that the
question of the continuance of martial law will be
submitted for referendum at the same time as the
submission of his (President) proposed
amendments to the Constitution through a
plebiscite on October 16, 1976.
Petitioner Sanidad filed suit for Prohibition and
Preliminary Injunction, seeking to enjoin the
COMELEC from holding and conducting said
Referendum-Plebiscite on the basis that under the
1935 and 1973 Constitution, there is no grant to
the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the
new Constitution, hence, the Referendum-
Plebiscite on October 16 has no legal basis.
Petitioner Guzman filed another action asserting
that the power to propose amendments to or
revision of the Constitution during the transition
period is expressly conferred to the interim
National Assembly under sec.16, Art. XVII of the
Constitution.
A similar action was instituted by petitioners
Gonzales and Salapantan arguing that:
1. Even granting him legislative powers under
the martial law, the incumbent President
cannot act as a constituent assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution
2. A referendum-plebiscite is untenable under
the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973,
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3. The submission of the proposed
amendments in such a short period of time
for deliberation renders the plebiscite a
nullity,
4. To lift martial law, the President need not
consult the people via referendum, and
5. Allowing 15-year-olds to vote would
amount to an amendment of the
Constitution, which confines the right of
suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines
18 years of age and above.
The Solicitor General, in his comment for
respondent COMELEC, maintains that:
1. Petitioners have no standing to sue
2. The issue raised is political in nature,
beyond judicial cognizance of the court
3. At this state of the transition period, only
the incumbent President has the authority
to exercise constituent power
4. The referendum-plebiscite is a step
towards normalization.
ISSUE/S:
Do the petitioners have the standing to sue?
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of
the Presidential Decrees 991, 1031, and 1033
political or judicial?
2. Does the President possess the power to
propose amendments to the Constitution as well
as set up the required machinery and prescribe
the procedure for the ratification of his proposal,
in the absence of an interim National Assembly?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed
amendments within the time frame allowed
therefore a sufficient and proper submission?
HELD:
1. YES. At the instance of taxpayers, laws
providing for the disbursement of public funds
may be enjoined upon the theory that the
expenditure of public funds by the State for the
purpose of executing an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds.
2. It is a judicial question.
3. YES. If the President has been legitimately
discharging the legislative functions of the
Interim Assembly, there is no reason why he
cannot validly discharge the function of that
assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution, which is but adjunct, although
peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This is not
to say that the President has converted his office
into a constituent assembly of that nature
normally constituted by the legislature. Rather,
with the Interim Assembly not convened and only
the Presidency and Supreme Court in operation,
the urges of absolute necessity render it
imperative upon the President to act as agent for
and in behalf of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically,
by its very constitution, the Supreme Court
possesses no capacity to propose amendments
without constitutional infractions. For the
President to shy away from that actuality and
decline to undertake the amending process would
leave the governmental machinery at a stalemate
or create in the powers of the State a destructive
vacuum. After all, the constituent assemblies or
constitutional conventions, like the President now,
are mere agents of the people.
4. YES. Art. XVI of the Constitution makes
no provision as to the specific date when the
plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that “it
shall be held not later than 3 months after the
approval of such amendment or revision.” The
period from September 21 to October 16, or a
period of three weeks is not too short for free
debates or discussions on the referendum-
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plebiscite issues. The issues are not new. They are
the issues of the day, and the people have been
living with them since the proclamation of martial
law four years ago. The referendums of 1973 and
1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That
notwithstanding, the contested brief period for
discussion is not without counterparts in
previous plebiscites for constitutional
amendments.
Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections
GR. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976
FACTS: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand
E. Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national
referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve the issues of
martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement,
the powers of such replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for the exercise
by the President of his present powers.
On 22 September 1976, the President issued
another PD 1031, amending the previous
Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the
provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing
for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
"barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to
the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October
1976. The President also issued PD 1033, stating
the questions to be submitted to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The
Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the
people's continued opposition to the convening of
the interim National Assembly evinces their desire
to have such body abolished and replaced thru a
constitutional amendment, providing for a new
interim legislative body, which will be submitted
directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite
of October 16. The Commission on Elections was
vested with the exclusive supervision and control
of the October 1976 National Referendum-
Plebiscite.
Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father
and son, commenced for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the
COMELEC from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare
without force and effect PD 991, 1033 and 1031.
They contend that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to
propose amendments to the new Constitution.
On 30 September 1976, another action for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, was
institutedby Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the
1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that
the power topropose amendments to, or revision
of the Constitution during the transition period is
expressly conferred on the interim National
Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the
Constitution. Another petition for Prohibition
with Preliminary Injunction was filed by Raul M.
Gonzales, his son, and Alfredo Salapantan, to
restrain the implementation of Presidential
Decrees.
ISSUE: W/N the power of the incumbent President
(Marcos) to propose amendments to the present
Constitution in the absence of the interim
National Assembly which has not convened, a
valid one?
HELD: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973
Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1)
Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by the National
Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2)
The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-
thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convention or, by a majority vote of all its
Members, submit the question of calling such a
convention to the electorate in an election."
Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment
to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not later than three
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months after the approval of such amendment or
revision."
The power to legislate is constitutionally
consigned to the interim National Assembly
during the transition period. However, the initial
convening of that Assembly is a matter fully
addressed to the judgment of the incumbent
President. And, in the exercise of that judgment,
the President opted to defer convening of that
body in utter recognition of the people's
preference. Likewise, in the period of transition,
the power to propose amendments to the
Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly
upon special call by the President (See. 15 of the
Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the
dictates of the sovereign will, the President
decided not to call the interim National Assembly.
Would it then be within the bounds of the
Constitution and of law for the President to
assume that constituent power of the interim
Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's
legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the
President has been legitimately discharging the
legislative functions of the interim Assembly,
there is no reason why he cannot validly
discharge the function of that Assembly to
propose amendments to the Constitution, which is
but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross
legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that
the President has converted his office into a
constituent assembly of that nature normally
constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the
interim National Assembly not convened and only
the Presidency and the Supreme Court in
operation, the urges of absolute necessity render
it imperative upon the President to act as agent
for and in behalf of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically,
by its very constitution, the Supreme Court
possesses no capacity to propose amendments
without constitutional infractions. For the
President to shy away from that actuality and
decline to undertake the amending process would
leave the governmental machineries at a stalemate
or create in the powers of the State a destructive
vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis
government "to end the crisis and restore normal
times." In these parlous times, that Presidential
initiative to reduce into concrete forms the
constant voices of the people reigns supreme.
After all, constituent assemblies or constitutional
conventions, like the President now, are mere
agents of the people.
The President's action is not a unilateral move. As
early as the referendums of January 1973 and
February 1975, the people had already rejected
the calling of the interim National Assembly. The
Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng
mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng
mga Barangay, and the Pambansang Katipunan
ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000
barangays, about the same number of Kabataang
Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458
municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces,
and 60 cities had informed the President that the
prevailing sentiment of the people is for the
abolition of the interim National Assembly. Other
issues concerned the lifting of martial law and
amendments to the Constitution .27 The national
organizations of Sangguniang Bayan presently
proposed to settle the issues of martial law, the
interim Assembly, its replacement, the period of
its existence, the length of the period for the
exercise by the President of its present powers in
a referendum to be held on October 16. The
Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created
under Presidential Decree 995 of September 10,
1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9
officials with cabinet rank, 91 members of the
Lupong Tagapagpaganap (executive committee)
of the Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayan
voted in session to submit directly to the people in
a plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted
proposed amendments to the Constitution,
including the issue of martial law. Similarly, the
"barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to
the President the submission of the proposed
amendments to the people on October 16. All the
foregoing led the President to initiate the
proposal of amendments to the Constitution and
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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
the subsequent issuance of Presidential Decree
No, 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the
questions (proposed amendments) to the people
in the National Referendum-Plebiscite on October
16.
In general, the governmental powers in crisis
government-the Philippines is a crisis
government today-are more or less concentrated
in the President. According to Rossiter, “(t)he
concentration of government power in a
democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective
to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine
of the separation of powers. There are moments
in the life of any government when all powers
must work together in unanimity of purpose and
action, even if this means the temporary union of
executive, legislative, and judicial power in the
hands of one man. The more complete the
separation of powers in a constitutional system,
the more difficult and yet the more necessary will
be their fusion in times of crisis. The power of the
state in crisis must not only be concentrated and
expanded; it must also be freed from the normal
system of constitutional and legal limitations. The
rationale behind such broad emergency of the
Executive is the release of the government from
the “the paralysis of constitutional restraints” so
that the crisis may be ended and normal times
restored.
This petition is dismissed. The President can
propose amendments to the Constitution and he
was able to present those proposals to the people
in sufficient time.
 Atty. Gabriel: Can you reconcile the Case of
Gonzales and Sanidad?
 In the case of Gonzales constituent
power is not inherent while in the
case of Sanidad constituent power
is an “adjunct” of legislative power.
Sanidad is a pro hac vice, it applies
only to a particular situation and it
is not a stare decisis. Gonzales is
still controlling.

“or” -separates 2 modes

 within the authority of Congress not only as a
-The word “ or” may be interpreted as “and”
Gonzales- 3 resolutions

 its comprehensive legislative power so long as it
-discretion of propose
congress call convention
“wisdom” of
congress 
 1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent
IMBONG VS. COMELEC CASE DOCTRINES
In making use of 2 modes constituent


-can congress at the same time provide for
terms/rules & reqs— yes 

-supposing Congress omitted, can Congress
provide for omissions in exercise of
legislative power? Yes
Can the Congress, acting as a Constituent
Assembly, may Propose Amendments or
Revisions, AND as a Legislative Body, Provide
for the Rules and Regulations? Yes, the
Congress acting as a Legislative Body may
provide details by virtue of NECESSARY
IMPLICATION.
THE CONGRESS, ACTING AS A CONSTITUENT
ASSEMBLY, MAY PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION, AND EXERCISING ITS
GENERAL LEGISLATIVE POWER, PROVIDE FOR
THE DETAILS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION.
The constitutionality of the enactment of R.A.
6132 by Congress must be upheld for the
following reasons: 1) Congress, acting as
Constituent Assembly pursuant to Article XV of
the Constitution, has authority to propose
constitutional amendments or call a convention
for the purpose by 3/4 votes of each house in
joint session assembled but voting separately; 2)
Such grant includes all other powers essential to
the effective exercise of the principal power by
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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
necessary implication; 3) Implementing details are
Constituent Assembly but also in the exercise of
does not contravene any provision of the
Constitution; and 4) Congress as a legislative
body may thus enact necessary implementing
legislation to fill in the gaps which Congress as a
Constituent Assembly omitted.
Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution, has full and plenary
authority to propose Constitutional
amendments or to call a convention for
the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of
each House in joint session assembled
but voting separately. Resolutions Nos.
2 and 4 calling for a constitutional
convention were passed by the required
three-fourths vote.
2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent
Assembly of such plenary authority to
call a constitutional convention
includes, by virtue of the doctrine of
necessary implication, all other powers
essential to the effective exercise of the
principal power granted, such as the
power to fix the qualifications, number,
apportionment, and compensation of
the delegates as well as appropriation
of funds to meet the expenses for the
election of delegates and for the
operation of the Constitutional
Convention itself, as well as all other
implementing details indispensable to a
fruitful convention. Resolutions Nos. 2
and 4 already embody the above-
mentioned details, except the
appropriation of funds.
3. While the authority to call a
constitutional convention is vested by
the present Constitution solely and
exclusively in Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly, the power to
enact the implementing details, which
 are now contained in Resolutions Nos.
2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132,
does not exclusively pertain to
Congress acting as a Constituent
Assembly. Such implementing details
are matters within the competence of
Congress in the exercise of its
comprehensive legislative power, which
power encompasses all matters not
expressly or by necessary implication
withdrawn or removed by the
Constitution from the ambit of
legislative action. And as long as such
statutory details do not clash with any
specific provision of the Constitution,
they are valid.
4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as
a Constituent Assembly, omits to
provide for such implementing details
after calling a constitutional
convention, Congress, acting as a
legislative body, can enact the
necessary implementing legislation to
fill in the gaps, which authority is
expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res.
No. 2 as amended by Res. No. 4.
5. The fact that a bill providing for such
implementing details may be vetoed by
the President is no argument against
conceding such power in Congress as a
legislative body nor present any
difficulty; for it is not irremediable as
Congress can override the Presidential
veto or Congress can reconvene as a
Constituent Assembly and adopt a
resolution prescribing the required
implementing details.
IMBONG VS. COMELEC
35 SCRA 28 (1970)
FACTS: Petitioners Manuel Imbong and Raul
Gonzales, both interested in running as
candidates in the 1971 Constitutional
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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
Convention, filed separate petitions for
declaratory relief, impugning the constitutionality
of RA 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights
as candidates.
Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly,
passed Resolution No.2 which called for the
Constitutional Convention to propose
Constitutional amendments. After its adoption,
Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A.
4914 implementing said resolution, restating
entirely the provisions of said resolution.
Thereafter, Congress, acting as a Constituent
Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4 amending the
Resolution No. 2 by providing that “xxx any other
details relating to the specific apportionment of
delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding
of the Constitutional Convention shall be
embodied in an implementing legislation xxx”
Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted R.A.
6132, implementing Resolution Nos. 2 and 4, and
expressly repealing R.A. 4914.
ISSUE: May Congress in acting as a legislative
body enact R.A.6132 to implement the resolution
passed by it in its capacity as a Constituent
Assembly?
HELD: YES. The Court declared that while the
authority to call a Constitutional Convention is
vested by the Constitution solely and exclusively
in Congress acting as a constitutional assembly,
the power to enact the implementing details or
specifics of the general law does not exclusively
pertain to Congress, the Congress in exercising its
comprehensive legislative power (not as a
Constitutional Assembly) may pass the necessary
implementing law providing for the details of the
Constitutional Conventions, such as the number,
qualification, and compensation of its member.
The reasons cited by the Court in upholding the
constitutionality of the enactment of R.A. 6132
are as follows:
 1. Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly
pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution,
has authority to propose constitutional
amendments or call a convention for the
purpose by 3⁄4 votes of each house in joint
session assembled but voting separately.
2. Such grant includes all other powers
essential to the effective exercise of the
principal power by necessary implication.
3. Implementing details are within the
authority of the Congress not only as a
Constituent Assembly but also in the
exercise of its comprehensive legislative
power which encompasses all matters not
expressly or by necessary implication
withdrawn or removed by the Constitution
from the ambit of legislative action so long
as it does not contravene any provision of
the Constitution; and
4. Congress as a legislative body may thus
enact necessary implementing legislation to
fill in the gaps which Congress as a
Constituent Assembly has omitted.
OCCENA VS. COMELEC CASE DOCTRINE
A consti convention is separate and distinct
from congress.


-it’s a collegial body


-Required vote to approve proposal?
Majority: Occena vs Comelec -No legal
basis


What’s a good legal basis?

 constituent body, can propose amendments. In
Sec 1 of Art 2


The Philippines is a democratic republican
institution 

-will of majority (in absence of 
 any request
under Consti= 
majority) 

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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
-is there anything in art 17 that vote must be
majority? none. 

 What is the necessary vote to approve
proposals to amend the constitution?
 TO APPROVE PROPOSALS TO
AMEND THE CONSTITUTION, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
ONLY NEEDS MAJORITY VOTE,
SUBJECT TO THE RATIFICATION BY
THE PEOPLE. –
Ratification


-1M required voters- what is the required
number to ratify? 500,001 1⁄2+1


-Low turnout. Only 50% voted. How many
votes are required to ratify? 50% 
 of
votes cast 

May the ratification be made simultaneously
with general election? 

-“election”-1935


-“plebiscite”- 1987 

Always a special election, but may still be held
simultaneously with general election (on the
day of the general election)
The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a
that capacity, only a majority vote is needed.
REASON: It would be an indefensible proposition
to assert that the three-fourth votes required
when it sits as a legislative body applies as well
when it has been convened as the agency
through which amendments could be proposed.
That is not a requirement as far as constitutional
convention is concerned. It is not a requirement
either when, as in this case, the Interim Batasang
Pambansa exercises its constituent power to
propose amendments.
AMENDMENT INCLUDES REVISION - Petitioners
would urge upon us the proposition that the
amendments proposed are so extensive in
character that they go far beyond the limits of the
authority conferred on the Interim Batasang
Pambansa as successor of the Interim National
Assembly. For them, what was done was to revise
and not to amend. It suffices to quote from the
opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the
Court, in Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections
to dispose of this contention. Thus: "3. And
whether the Constitutional Convention will only
propose amendments to the Constitution or
entirely overhaul the present Constitution and
propose an entirely new Constitution based on an
ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of
no moment; because the same will be submitted to
the people for ratification. Once ratified by the
sovereign people, there can be no debate about
the validity of the new Constitution. 4. The fact
that the present Constitution may be revised and
replaced with a new one . . . is no argument
against the validity of the law because
'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total
overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate,
whether the Constitution is merely amended in
part or revised or totally changed would become
immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the
sovereign people."
There is here the adoption of the principle so
well-known in American decisions as well as legal
texts that a constituent body can propose
anything but conclude nothing.
We are not disposed to deviate from such a
principle not only sound in theory but also
advantageous in practice.
STANDARD REQUIRED FOR A PROPER
SUBMISSION: With respect to the period, the 1973
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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
Constitution provides: “xxx Any amendment to, or
revision of this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not later than three
months after the approval of such amendment or
revision.”
The three resolutions were approved by the
Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981.
In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the
plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within
the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.
Thus any argument to the contrary is unavailing.
As for the people being adequately informed, it
cannot be denied that this time, as in the cited
1980 Occena opinion of Justice Antonio, where
the amendment restored to seventy the retirement
age of members of the judiciary, the proposed
amendments have “been intensively and
extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, so
that it cannot, therefore, be said that our people
are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages
of the proposed amendments.
ARTICLE XVII, SECTION 15, 1973
CONSTITUTION
OCCENA VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. L-56350, APRIL 2, 1981
FERNANDO, C.J.:
FACTS: The challenge in these two prohibition
proceedings is against the validity of three
Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing
constitutional amendments. Petitioners urged that
the amendments proposed are so extensive in
character that they go far beyond the limits of the
authority conferred on the Interim Batasang
Pambansa as successor of the Interim National
Assembly. For them, what was done was to revise
and not to amend.
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A.
Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and
former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention that framed the present Constitution,
are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox
aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the
1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law. The
suits for prohibition were filed respectively on
March 6 and March 12, 1981.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is
already in effect.
2. Whether or not the Interim Batasang
Pambansa has the power topropose
amendments.
3. Whether or not the three resolutions are
valid.
HELD:
1. Yes. It is much too late in the day to deny the
force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution.
In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The
Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for
prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its
ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a
vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being
the vote of the majority, there is no further
judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect."
With such a pronouncement by the Supreme
Court and with the recognition of the cardinal
postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not
only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a
factor for instability was removed. The Supreme
Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring
what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of
coordinate branches but may also sustain their
validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation
that what was done cannot be stigmatized as
constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a
suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning
of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since
then, this Court has invariably applied the present
Constitution. The latest case in point is People v.
Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During
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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
the first year alone of the effectivity of the present
Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.
2. Yes.The existence of the power of the Interim
Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The
applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is
quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus:
"The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the
same powers and its Members shall have the same
functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly
and the regular National Assembly and the
Members thereof." One of such powers is
precisely that of proposing amendments. Article
XVII, Section 15 of the 1973 Constitution in its
Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National
Assembly with the power to propose amendments
upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote
of the majority of its members to be ratified in
accordance with the Article on Amendments.
When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa,
upon the call of the President and Prime Minister
Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it
acted by virtue Of such impotence Its authority to
do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did
propose the amendments embodied in the
resolutions now being assailed.
3. Yes. The question of whether the proposed
resolutions constitute amendments or revision is
of no relevance. It suffices to quote from the
opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the
Court, in Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections
to dispose of this contention. Whether the
Constitutional Convention will only propose
amendments to the Constitution or entirely
overhaul the present Constitution and propose an
entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology
foreign to the democratic system, is of no
moment; because the same will be submitted to
the people for ratification. Once ratified by the
sovereign people, there can be no debate about
the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that
the present Constitution may be revised and
replaced with a new one ... is no argument against
the validity of the law because 'amendment'
includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the
entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the
Constitution is merely amended in part or revised
or totally changed would become immaterial the
moment the same is ratified by the sovereign
people."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack
of merit.
DISSENTING OPINION OF J. TEEHANKEE, JR.
As held in the Sanidad case, the President is not
vested by the Constitution with the power to
propose amendments. Such power must come
from the Interim National Assembly, if a regular
National Assembly not yet exists.
TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC CASE DOCTRINE
Is Piece-Meal Submission of the Proposals for
Ratification allowed? No
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE
PEOPLE FOR RATIFICATION IN ONE ELECTION,
PIECE-MEAL RATIFICATION IS NOT ALLOWED. –
The ultimate question, therefore, boils down to
this: Is there any limitation or condition in
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which
is violated by the act of the Convention of calling
for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained
in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds
that there is, and it is the condition and
limitation that all the amendments to be
proposed by the same Convention must be
submitted to the people in a single "election" or
plebiscite. It being indisputable that the
amendment now proposed to be submitted to a
plebiscite is only the first amendment the
Convention will propose We hold that the
plebiscite being called for the purpose of
submitting the same for ratification of the
people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized
by Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution,
hence all acts of the Convention and the
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respondent COMELEC in that direction are null
and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the
following reasons:
1. The language of the constitutional provision
aforequoted is sufficiently clear. It says distinctly
that either Congress sitting as a constituent
assembly or a convention called for the purpose
"may propose amendments to this Constitution,
"thus placing no limit as to the number of
amendments that Congress or the Convention
may propose. The same provision also as
definitely provides that "such amendments shall
be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes cast at an
election at which the amendments are submitted
to the people for their ratification," thus leaving
no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or
plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment
or amendments proposed by the same constituent
assembly of Congress or convention, and the
provision unequivocably says "an election" which
means only one.
2. Very little reflection is needed for anyone to
realize the wisdom and appropriateness of this
provision. As already stated, amending the
Constitution is as serious and important an
undertaking as constitution making itself. Indeed,
any amendment of the Constitution is as
important as the whole of it, if only because the
Constitution has to be an integrated and
harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as the
framework of the government it establishes, on
the one hand, and adequately formidable and
reliable as the succinct but comprehensive
articulation of the rights, liberties, ideology, social
ideals, and national and nationalistic policies and
aspirations of the people, on the other. It is
inconceivable how a constitution worthy of any
country or people can have any part which is out
of tune with its other parts.
A constitution is the work of the people thru its
drafters assembled by them for the purpose. Once
the original constitution is approved, the part that
the people play in its amendment becomes harder,
for when a whole constitution is submitted to
them, more or less they can assume its harmony
as an integrated whole, and they can either accept
or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they
can examine it before casting their vote and
determine for themselves from a study of the
whole document the merits and demerits of all or
any of its parts and of the document as a whole.
And so also, when an amendment is submitted to
them that is to form part of the existing
constitution, in like fashion they can study with
deliberation the proposed amendment in relation
to the whole existing constitution and or any of its
parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment
as to its acceptability.
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment
in question. Prescinding already from the fact that
under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is
evident that no fixed frame of reference is
provided the voter, as to what finally will be
concomitant qualifications that will be required
by the final draft of the constitution to be
formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able
to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other
considerations which make it impossible to vote
intelligently on the proposed amendment,
although it may already be observed that under
Section 3, if a voter would favor the reduction of
the voting age to eighteen under conditions he
feels are needed under the circumstances, and he
does not see those conditions in the ballot nor is
there any possible indication whether they will
ever be or not, because Congress has reserved
those for future action, what kind of judgment can
he render on the proposal?
But the situation actually before us is even worse.
No one knows what changes in the fundamental
principles of the constitution the Convention will
be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do
not have any means of foreseeing whether the
right to vote would be of any significant value at
all. Who can say whether or not later on the
Convention may decide to provide for varying
types of voters for each level of the political units
it may divide the country into. The root of the
difficulty in other words, lies in that the
Convention is precisely on the verge of
introducing substantial changes, if not radical
ones, in almost every part and aspect of the
existing social and political order enshrined in
the present Constitution. How can a voter in the
proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the
effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the
different institutions which the Convention may
establish and of which presently he is not given
any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that
a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment
to the Constitution may be validly held, it must
provide the voter not only sufficient time but
ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of the
nature of the amendment per se as well as its
relation to the other parts of the Constitution with
which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the
context of the present state of things, where the
Convention has hardly started considering the
merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of proposals
to amend the existing Constitution, to present to
the people any single proposal or a few of them
cannot comply with this requirement. We are of
the opinion that the present Constitution does not
contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite
or "election" wherein the people are in the dark as
to frame of reference they can base their
judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the
present Constitution is a possible frame of
reference, for the simple reason that intervenors
themselves are stating that the sole purpose of the
proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen
year olds to take part in the election for the
ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by
the Convention. In brief, under the proposed
plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice
Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the
Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission".

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SECTIONS 1 & 2 ARTICLE 17, 1987
CONSTITUTION
TOLENTINO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GR. NO. L-34150, OCTOBER 16, 1971
BARREDO, J.:
FACTS: A Constitutional Convention was called
upon to propose amendments to the Constitution
of the Philippines, in which, the delegates to the
said Convention were all elected under and by
virtue of resolutions and the implementing
legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The
Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1,
amending section one of article 5 of the
Constitution of the Philippines so as to lower the
voting age to 18. Said resolution also provided in
its Section 3 that the partial amendment, which
refers only to the age qualification for the
exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to
other amendments that will be proposed in the
future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on
other portions of the amended Section or on other
portions of the entire Constitution.
The main thrust of the petition is that Organic
Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing
resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the
Convention have no force and effect as laws in so
far as they are in contravention to Section 1
Article XV of the Constitution. Under the said
provision, the proposed amendment in question
cannot be presented to the people for ratification
separately from each and all of the other
amendments to be drafted and proposed by the
Convention.
ISSUE: Is the Resolution approved by the 1971
Constitutional Convention constitutional?
HELD: NO. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the
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implementing acts and resolutions of the
Convention, insofar as they provide for the
holding of a plebiscite, as well as the resolution of
the respondent COMELEC complying therewith
are null and void.
The Court is of the opinion that in providing for
the questioned plebiscite before it has finished,
and separately from, the whole draft of the
constitution it has been called to formulate, the
Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all
subsequent acts of the Convention implementing
the same violate the condition in Section 1, Article
XV that there should only be one "election" or
plebiscite for the ratification of all the
amendments the Convention may propose. We are
not denying any right of the people to vote on the
proposed amendment; We are only holding that
under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution,
the same should be submitted to them not
separately from but together with all the other
amendments to be proposed by this present
Convention.
Prescinding already from the fact that under
Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is
evident that no fixed frame of reference is
provided the voter, as to what finally will be
concomitant qualifications that will be required
by the final draft of the constitution to be
formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able
to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are other
considerations which make it impossible to vote
intelligently on the proposed amendment. No one
knows what changes in the fundamental
principles of the constitution the Convention will
be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do
not have any means of foreseeing whether the
right to vote would be of any significant value at
all. Who can say whether or not later on the
Convention may decide to provide for varying
types of voters for each level of the political units
it may divide the country into. The root of the
difficulty in other words, lies in that the
Convention is precisely on the verge of
introducing substantial changes, if not radical
ones, in almost every part and aspect of the
existing social and political order enshrined in
the present Constitution. How can a voter in the
proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the
effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the
different institutions which the Convention may
establish and of which presently he is not given
any idea? Clearly, there is improper submission.
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC CASE DOCTRINE:
Is the System of Initiative to Propose
Amendments to the Constitution self-
executing? No
PROVISION ON THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO
DIRECTLY PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, NOT SELF-EXECUTORY.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not
self-executory. In his book, Joaquin Bernas, a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
stated: Without implementing legislation Section 2
cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the Constitution is a mode of
amendment which bypasses congressional
action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on
congressional action. Bluntly stated the right of
the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative
would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the
Constitution has recognized or granted that right,
the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for
whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735 IS INSUFFICIENT, AND
DOES NOT COVER INITIATIVE ON THE
CONSTITUTION. First, Contrary to the assertion of
public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act
does not suggest an initiative on amendments to
the Constitution. The inclusion of the word
"Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought.
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That word is neither germane nor relevant to said
section, which exclusively relates to initiative and
referendum on national laws and local laws,
ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent
as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed
out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is
confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people
are not accorded the power to "directly propose,
enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution" through the system of initiative.
They can only do so with respect to "laws,
ordinances, or resolutions."' . . . Second. It is true
that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act
defines initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and mentions it as one of the three
systems of initiative, and that Section 5
(Requirements) restates the constitutional
requirements as to the percentage of the
registered voters who must submit the proposal.
But unlike in the case of the other systems of
initiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution. Section 5 paragraph (c) requires,
among other things, a statement of the proposed
law sought to be enacted, approve or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does
not include, as among the contents of the petition,
the provisions of the Constitution sought to be
amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution. . . . The use of the clause "proposed
laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed" only strengthens the
conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for
National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle, II)
and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle
III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the
latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act
is initiative and referendum on national and local
laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that
in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the people to sufficient standard is one which defines
directly propose amendments to the Constitution legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
is far more important than the initiative on boundaries and specifies the public agency to
national and local laws. . . . The foregoing brings apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is which the legislative command is to be effected.
incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot
amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its validly promulgate rules and regulations to
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and. implement the exercise of the right of the people
cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC to directly propose amendments to the
"to promulgate such rules and regulations as may Constitution through the system of initiative. It
be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735.
Act." Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section
2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is
misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to
THE CONGRESS CANNOT DELEGATE TO OTHER
therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC
AGENCIES THE POWER TO PROVIDE FOR THE
under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the
EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF INITIATIVE ON THE
Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate
CONSTITUTION. The rule is that what has been
legislation is authorized and which satisfies the
delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in
"completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari
potest. The recognized exceptions to the rule are
as follows: SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC
270 SCRA 106, MARCH 19, 1997
1. Delegation of tariff powers to the President
under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
FACTS: Private respondent Delfin filed with the
Constitution;
COMELEC a “Petition to Amend the Constitution,
2. Delegation of emergency powers to the
to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
President under Section 23(2) of Article
People’s amendments to the Constitution granted
VI of the Constitution;
under Section 2, Art. XVII of the 1987
3. Delegation to the people at large;
Constitution. R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution
4. Delegation to local governments; and
No. 2300. The proposed amendments consist of
5. Delegation to administrative bodies.
the submission of this proposition to the people—
“Do you approve the lifting of the term limits of
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative
all elective officials, amending for the purpose
body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to
section 4 and 7 of Art.VI, Section 4 of Art.VII, and
promulgate rules and regulations is a form of
Section 8 of Art. X of the Philippine
delegation of legislative authority under no. 5
Constitution?” The COMELEC issued an order
above. However, in every case of permissible
directing the publication of the petition and the
delegation, there must be a showing that the
notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for
delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law
hearing. At the hearing, Senator Raul Roco, the
(a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the
IBP, Demokrasya- Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon
policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented
(DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng
by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the
Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN) appeared as
limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
intervenors- oppositors. Senator Roco moved to
determinable — to which the delegate must
dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that it is
conform in the performance of his functions. A
not the initiatory party cognizable by the

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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
COMELEC.
Petitioners filed a special civil action directing
respondents COMELEC and Delfin’s petition to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative under sec.2 of Art.
XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners raise
the following arguments:
1. The constitutional provision on
people’s initiative to amend the Constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed.
2. R.A. 6735 failed to provide subtitle
initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other
modes of initiative. It only provides for the
effectivity of the law after the publication in print
media indicating that the Act covers only laws and
not constitutional amendments because the latter
takes effect only upon ratification and not after
publication.
3. COMELEC Resolution No.2300,
adopted on January 16, 1991 to govern the
“conduct of initiative on the Constitution and
initiative and referendum on national and local
laws”, is ultra vires insofar as initiative or
amendments to the Constitution are concerned,
since the COMELEC has no power to provide
rules and regulation for the exercise of the right
of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only the
Congress is authorized by the Constitution to
pass the implementing law.
4. The people’s initiative is limited to
amendments to the Constitution, to the revision
thereof. Extending or lifting of the term limits
constitutes a revision and is therefore outside the
power of the people’s initiative.
5. Finally, Congress has not yet
appropriated funds for people’s initiative, neither
the COMELEC nor any other department, agency
or office of the government has realigned funds
for the purpose.
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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
The Supreme Court gave due course to this
petition and granted the Motions for Intervention
filed by Petitioners-Intervenors DIK, MABINI, IBP,
LABAN, and Senator Roco.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987
Constitution is a self-executing provision?
2. Whether R.A.6735 is a sufficient statutory
implementation of the said constitutional
provision?
3. Whether the COMELEC resolution is valid?
4. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective
national and local officials as proposed would
constitute a revision, or an amendment to the
Constitution?
HELD:
1. NO. Although the mode of amendment
which bypasses congressional action, in the last
analysis, it is still dependent on congressional
action. While the Constitution has recognized or
granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if
the Congress for whatever reason, does not
provide for its implementation.
2. NO. R.A. 6735 is insufficient and
incomplete to fully comply with the power and
duty of the Congress to enact the statutory
implementation of sec.2, Art.XVII of the
Constitution. Although said Act intended to
include the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution, it is deemed inadequate to cover
that system and accordingly provide for a local
initiative required for proposing Constitutional
changes.
3. NO. The COMELEC Resolution
insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on
the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is void, as expressed in the Latin
maxim “Potestas delegate non delegari potest.” In
every case of permissible delegation, it must be
shown that the delegation itself is valid.
 4. The resolution of this issue is
held to be unnecessary, if not academic, as the
proposal to lift the term limits of elective local and
national officials is an amendment to the
Constitution and not a revision. Thus, the petition
was granted, and the COMELEC is permanently
enjoined from taking cognizance of any petition
for initiative on amendments to the Constitution
until a sufficiently law shall have been validly
enacted to provide for the implementation of the
system.
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC
270 SCRA 106, MARCH 19, 1997
Nature: Petition for prohibition; the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the
constitution through the system of initiative.
Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, Ma.
Isabel Ongpin – petitioners
Jesus Delfin, Alberto & Carmen Pedrosa (PIRMA),
COMELEC – respondents
Raul Roco, DIK, MABINI, IBP, LABAN –
petitioners/intervenors
FACTS: Atty. Delfin filed with the COMELEC a
petition to amend the constitution by People’s
initiative. His proposal is to lift the term limits of
elective officials and thus amending Sections 4
and 7 of Art VI, Section 4 of Art VII and Section 8
of Art X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. In
his petition, Delfin asked the COMELEC to issue
an order (1) fixing the time and dates for
signature gathering all over the country; (2) cause
the publication of such order in newspaper of
general and local circulation; and (3) instructing
municipal election registrars in all regions of the
Philippines to assist him and his volunteers in
establishing signing stations. The COMELEC then
issued an order directing Delfin to cause the
publication of the petition and set the case for
hearing.
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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
At the hearing, Senator Roco filed a motion to
dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is
not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by
the COMELEC. Thereafter, Senator Santiago, et al.,
filed a special civil action for prohibition before
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S:
The issues in the instant petition are the
following:
1. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to
take cognizance of the petition when there is a
pending case before the COMELEC.
2. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act
Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefore,
was intended to include or cover initiative on
amendments to the Constitution; and if so,
whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers
such initiative.
3. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing
the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and
Initiative and Referendum on National and Local
Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
4. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective
national and local officials, as proposed in the
draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or
an amendment to, the Constitution.
5. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of,
or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended
to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for
signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal
election officers to assist Delfin's movement and
volunteers in establishing signature stations; and
(c) directing or causing the publication of, inter
alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative
on the 1987 Constitution.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that:
1. The instant petition is viable despite the
pendency in the COMELEC of the Delfin
Petition. The COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the petition filed by Delfin
and that it becomes imperative to stop the
COMELEC from proceeding any further. The SC
said that despite the pendency of the Delfin
Petition in the COMELEC, the SC had
jurisdiction over the Defensor-Santiago petition
because the petition may be treated as a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, given the Roco motion filed with
the COMELEC seeking dismissal of the Delfin
petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
2. RA 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of
initiative to amend the constitution because
while Sec 3 mentions initiative on the
Constitution and Sec 5 restates the
constitutional requirements as to the
percentage of registered voters needed for a
proposal, the law does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the
Constitution; while there are subtitles for
national and local initiatives, there is no subtitle
for the initiative on the Constitution; thus, the
law is incomplete, and this inadequacy cannot
be cured by empowering the COMELEC to
promulgate implementing rules and regulations.
3. It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot
validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative. It
does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735.
Reliance on the COMELEC's power under
Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution
is misplaced, for the laws and regulations
referred to therein are those promulgated by the
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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of
the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate
legislation is authorized and which satisfies the
"completeness" and the "sufficient standard"
tests.
4. Santiago’s petition contend that the people's
initiative is limited to amendments to the
constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending
or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision
and is, therefore, outside the power of the
people's initiative. Delfin in his memoranda
contend that the lifting of the limitation on the
term of office of elective officials provided
under the 1987 constitution is not a "revision"
of the constitution. It is only an amendment.
"Amendment envisages an alteration of one or a
few specific provisions of the constitution.
Revision contemplates a re-examination of the
entire document to determine how and to what
extent it should be altered. The Office of the
Solicitor General opined that extension of term
of elected officials constitute a mere
amendment to the Constitution, not a revision
thereof. In its amended petition in intervention
DIK and MABINI contend that the Delfin
proposal does not involve a mere amendment to,
but a revision of, the Constitution because, in
the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas it would involve
a change from a political philosophy that rejects
unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited
tenure; and although the change might appear
to be an isolated one, it can affect other
provisions, such as, on synchronization of
elections and on the State policy of
guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for
public service and prohibiting political
dynasties. A revision cannot be done by
initiative which, by express provision of Section
2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to
amendments.
5. COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
Delfin Petition. It was held that COMELEC is
without jurisdiction to entertain the Delfin
 Petition because it did not contain the
signatures of the required number of voters as
required by the Constitution.
The petition therefore is granted; R. A. No. 6735 is
declared inadequate to cover the system of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and
for failure to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation; Those parts of Resolution
No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections
prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct
of initiative or amendments to the Constitution is
declared void; and the Commission on Elections is
ordered to dismiss the DELFIN petition.
Word of the Day:
Initiative is a form of direct legislation by the
people consisting of two parts: petition and
election. It does not become effective until passed
by voters and its availability does not remedy the
denial of the right to referendum.
LAMBINO VS. COMELEC CASE DOCTRINES:
PETITION FOR INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION MUST
CONTAIN THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS.
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended
that the "draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the
people "before" they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that "before they sign there
is already a draft shown to them." The framers
also "envisioned" that the people should sign on
the proposal itself because the proponents must
"prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition" is
that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by
the people. This means two essential elements
must be present. First, the people must author and
thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
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representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as
an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the
full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by
signing such complete proposal in a petition.
Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition" only if
the people sign on a petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be
either written on the face of the petition, or
attached to it. If so attached, the petition must
state the fact of such attachment. This is an
assurance that every one of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full text of
the proposed amendments before signing.
Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the
time constraint, to prove that every one of the
millions of signatories had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing.
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed
at the time of signing of the nature and effect of
that which is proposed" and failure to do so is
"deceptive and misleading" which renders the
initiative void.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not
expressly state that the petition must set forth the
full text of the proposed amendments. However,
the deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution clearly show that the framers
intended to adopt the relevant American
jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular,
the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission explicitly reveal that the framers
intended that the people must first see the full text
of the proposed amendments before they sign,
and that the people must sign on a petition
containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and
Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes
as valid, requires that the people must sign the
"petition . . . as signatories."
An initiative that gathers signatures from the
people without first showing to the people the full
text of the proposed amendments is most likely a
deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on
the people. That is why the Constitution requires
that an initiative must be "directly proposed by
the people . . . in a petition" — meaning that the
people must sign on a petition that contains the
full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital
an issue as amending the nation's fundamental
law, the writing of the text of the proposed
amendments cannot be hidden from the people
under a general or special power of attorney to
unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power
to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the
people even if the members of this Court do not
personally know the people who sign the petition.
However, this trust emanates from a fundamental
assumption: the full text of the proposed
amendment is first shown to the people before
they sign the petition, not after they have signed
the petition.
INTIATIVE CAN ONLY BE EXERCISED TO
PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, AND NOT REVISION.
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend
and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its
solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with
the clear command of the Constitution — that a
people's initiative may only amend, never revise,
the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's
initiative constitute an amendment or revision
of the Constitution? If the Lambino Group's
initiative constitutes a revision, then the present
petition should be dismissed for being outside the
scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the
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Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction
between an amendment and a revision of a
constitution. One of the earliest cases that
recognized the distinction described the
fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an
instrument of a permanent and abiding nature,
and the provisions contained therein for its
revision indicate the will of the people that the
underlying principles upon which it rests, as
well as the substantial entirety of the
instrument, shall be of a like permanent and
abiding nature. On the other hand, the
significance of the term "amendment" implies
such an addition or change within the lines of
the original instrument as will effect an
improvement, or better carry out the purpose
for which it was framed.
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a
basic principle in the constitution, like altering
the principle of separation of powers or the
system of checks-and- balances. There is also
revision if the change alters the substantial
entirety of the constitution, as when the
change affects substantial provisions of the
constitution. On the other hand, amendment
broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces,
or deletes without altering the basic principle
involved. Revision generally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended.
2-part test of California court
Quantitative
Qualitative modify basic
principles
change gov’tal plan
2 changes in Lambino Case:

1) Parliamentary
2) Bicameral- Unicameral
QNT QLT
IOS Separation of powers
check & balances
provs
40 significant
changes
=Revision!!!
 Can the congress amend or revise the
consti? no. PROPOSAL lang
 What are the two test in determining the
change in the Constitution?
In California where the initiative clause allows
amendments but not revisions to the constitution
just like in our Constitution, courts have
developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and
the qualitative test. The (1) quantitative test asks
whether the proposed change is "so extensive in
its provisions as to change directly the
'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the
deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions." The court examines only the number
of provisions affected and does not consider the
degree of the change.
The (2) qualitative test inquires into the
qualitative effects of the proposed change in the
constitution. The main inquiry is whether the
change will "accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental
plan as to amount to a revision." Whether there is
an alteration in the structure of government is a
proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the
nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes
"change in its fundamental framework or the
fundamental powers of its Branches." A change
in the nature of the basic governmental plan also
includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional
form of government and the system of check and
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balances."
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests,
the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and
not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the
Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two
articles — Article VI on the Legislature and Article
VII on the Executive — affecting a total of 105
provisions in the entire Constitution. 40
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter
substantially the basic plan of government, from
presidential to parliamentary, and from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a
revision of the Constitution, as when the three
great co-equal branches of government in the
present Constitution are reduced into two. This
alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system is a revision of the
Constitution. Merging the legislative and
executive branches is a radical change in the
structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President
as the locus of Executive Power alters the
separation of powers and thus constitutes a
revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the
abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters
the system of checks-and-balances within the
legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a
shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the
abolition of the Office of the President and the
abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond
doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the
face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed
changes, it is readily apparent that the changes
will radically alter the framework of government
as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin
Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the
Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a
few specific and separable provisions. The
guiding original intention of an amendment is to
improve specific parts or to add new provisions
deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to
suppress specific portions that may have become
obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In
revision, however, the guiding original intention
and plan contemplates a re-examination of the
entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications for
the entire document, to determine how and to
what extent they should be altered. Thus, for
instance a switch from the presidential system to
a parliamentary system would be a revision
because of its over-all impact on the entire
constitutional structure. So would a switch from a
bicameral system to a unicameral system be
because of its effect on other important
provisions of the Constitution.
 Is the RA No. 6735 a sufficient law to
implement initiative? Yes
Republic Act No. 6735 is a Sufficient Law t
o Implement Initiative on the Constitution
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their
position, as shown by their various opinions a
lready given when the Decision herein was pro
mulgated, that Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient
and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a
people’s initiative.
[Resolution of the Supreme Court in Lambino
vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153,
November 21, 2006]
 What are the essential requirements for a
valid initiative to propose amendment to the
Constitution?
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended
that the “draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the
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people “before” they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that “before they sign there
is already a draft shown to them.” The framers
also “envisioned” that the people should sign on
the proposal itself because the proponents must
“prepare that proposal and pass it around for
signature.”
Reconcile Santiago and Lambino case:
The Supreme Court held that Santiago ruling is
still a good decision, Lambino case did not
overturn the decision in so far as the issue on
non-self executing provision of Sec. 2, Art.
XVII, of the 1987 Constitution. There is a need
of law passed by the Congress regarding
people’s initiative. However on the issue of
sufficiency of RA 6735, Lambino overturn the
ruling in Santiago, the minute resolution
wherein 10 justices vote in favor of its
sufficiency, therefore it is also an en banc
decision.
Lambino on issue on proper submission: IN the
minute resolution SC en banc held that there
was no proper submission.
 Atty. Gabriel: Can the Congress revise or
amend the Constitution?
 No, the Congress can ONLY
PROPOSE revision or
amendments.
 What power does the Congress exercise in
proposing revision or amendment?
 The Congress exercises
CONSTITUENT POWER when
proposing amendments to the
constitution.
LAMBINO VS. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 174153, OCTOBER 25, 2006
FACTS: On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R.
No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups
and individuals, commenced gathering signatures
for an initiative petition to change the 1987
Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino
Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold
a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition
under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had
the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting
at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered
voters, with each legislative district represented
by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered
voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that
COMELEC election registrars had verified the
signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes
the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7
of Article VI (Legislative Department) and Sections
1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by
adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory
Provisions." These proposed changes will shift the
present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
The Lambino Group prayed that after due
publication of their petition, the COMELEC
should submit the following proposition in a
plebiscite for the voters' ratification.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an
Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
ISSUE: Whether the Lambino Group's initiative
petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a people's initiative.
HELD: NO. The court declared that Lambino
Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional
because it dismally fails to comply with the
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution that the initiative must be "directly
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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition" is
that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by
the people. This means two essential elements
must be present. First, the people must author and
thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as
an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the
full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by
signing such complete proposal in a petition.
Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition" only if
the people sign on a petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be
either written on the face of the petition, or
attached to it. If so attached, the petition must
state the fact of such attachment. This is an
assurance that every one of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full text of
the proposed amendments before signing.
Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the
time constraint, to prove that every one of the
millions of signatories had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not
expressly state that the petition must set forth the
full text of the proposed amendments. However,
the deliberations of the framers of our
Constitution clearly show that the framers
intended to adopt the relevant American
jurisprudence on people's initiative. In particular,
the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission explicitly reveal that the framers
intended that the people must first see the full text
of the proposed amendments before they sign,
and that the people must sign on a petition
containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and
Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes
as valid, requires that the people must sign the
"petition x x x as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the
signatures from the people. The proponents
secure the signatures in their private capacity and
not as public officials. The proponents are not
disinterested parties who can impartially explain
the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed
amendments to the people. The proponents
present favorably their proposal to the people and
do not present the arguments against their
proposal. The proponents, or their supporters,
often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents
observed the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the
burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures - that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the
proposed amendments.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million
people who signed the signature sheets did not
see the full text of the proposed changes before
signing. They could not have known the nature
and effect of the proposed changes, among which
are:
1. The term limits on members of the
legislature will be lifted and thus members of
Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;
2. The interim Parliament can continue to
function indefinitely until its members, who areal
most all the present members of Congress,
decide to call for new parliamentary elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will
determine the expiration of their own term of
office;
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3. Within 45 days from the ratification of
the proposed changes, the interim Parliament
shallconvene to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
These three specific amendments are not stated or
even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature
sheets. The people who signed the signature
sheets had no idea that they were proposing these
amendments. These three proposed changes are
highly controversial. The people could not have
inferred or divined these proposed changes
merely from a reading or rereading of the
contents of the signature sheets.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power
to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the
people even if the members of this Court do not
personally know the people who sign the petition.
However, this trust emanates from a fundamental
assumption: the full text of the proposed
amendment is first shown to the people before
they sign the petition, not after they have signed
the petition.
Diff modes of proposing amendments (3
modes) or revisions(2 modes)
Amendment:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its Members; or
(Constituent Assembly)
2. A constitutional convention.
3. People’s Initiative
Revision:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its Members; or
(Constituent Assembly)
2. A constitutional convention.
In proposing amendments, is congress acting
as legislative body?
No. It acts as constituent assembly exercising
constituent powers.
Required vote for congress in proposing: ¾
-manner of voting? Separately- bicameral eh?
Changes in 1987 from 1987
ibig sabihin ba joint? NOOO
separate sabi ni Bernas
construction of consti:
-interpret as a whole, harmoniously
in joint:
-will affect consti principle
Sec 1 of Art 6
BICAMERAL!
Check & balance!!!
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.
What do you mean by ¾ of all its Members? The
HOR and SENATE must vote separately.
*In 1935 Constitution- voting separately
1987 Constitution- no mention of “voting
separately”
Does this mean that voting is joint? No
BASIS: under doctrine of checks and balances
there is a presumption that voting must be
done separately. Further under ut magis valeat
quam pereat construction, the interpretation in
favor of harmonizing the provisions must be
upheld.
 What are the two ways of Calling ConCon?
1. By 2/3 votes of all the members of
Congress
2. By a majority vote of all its Members,
submit to the electorate the question of
calling such a convention.
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 What is the requirement by the ConCon in
approving an amendment?
 Majority Vote. BASIS: The
Philippines is a democratic
state.
 Can the Congress acting as a Legislative
Body provide implementing details?
 Yes, the Congress acting as a
Legislative Body may provide
details by virtue of NECESSARY
IMPLICATION.
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right.
Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-
thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convention, or by a majority vote of all its
Members, submit to the electorate the question of
calling such a convention.
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than
sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be
valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than
sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
certification by the Commission on Elections of
the sufficiency of the petition.
 Does the People’s initiative applies to
revisions?
 No it only applies to
amendments.
 Even without express constitutional grant,
the People can exercise initiative?
 Yes, Art. XVII is just a
limitation.
 What are the Constitutional requirement on
initiative?
1. implementing law
2. 12 % of the total number of registered
voters,
3. of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters
therein.
 2 additional requirements in Lambino
case?
4. the people must author and thus sign
the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf.
5. As an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a
petition.
 Limitations on people’s initiative?
1. exercise 5 years from 1987
2. may be exercise once every five
years
DOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION
Plebiscite may be held on the same day as regular
election provided the people are sufficiently
informed of the amendments to be voted upon, to
conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express
their will in a genuine manner. Submission of
piece-meal amendments is constitutional. All the
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amendments must be submitted for ratification at
one plebiscite only. The people have to be given
a proper frame of reference in arriving at their
decision. They have no idea yet of what the rest
of the amended constitution would be. (Tolentino
v. Comelec)
*DATE OF PLEBISCITE- not earlier than sixty days
nor later than ninety days after the certification
by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency
of the petition. (the constitution provide for the
date itself)
*”election”-singular; plebiscite refers to process
not to character of election
Does the Lambino Group’s initiative constitute
an amendment or revision of the Constitution?
REVISION. By any legal test and under any
jurisdiction, a shift froma Bicameral-Presidential
to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving
the abolition of the Office of the President and the
abolition of one of the chamber of Congress, is
beyond a doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference
between "amendment" and "revision" is only one
of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino
Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts
and proposes changes to the Constitution,
substantive changes are called "revisions"
because members of the deliberative body work
full-time on the changes. However, the same
substantive changes, when proposed through an
initiative, are called "amendments" because the
changes are made by ordinary people who do
not make an "occupation, profession, or
vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following
exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:
With this distinction in mind, we note that the
constitutional provisions expressly provide for
both "amendment" and "revision" when it speaks
of legislators and constitutional delegates, while
the same provisions expressly provide only for
"amendment" when it speaks of the people. It
would seem that the apparent distinction is based
on the actual experience of the people, that on
one hand the common people in general are not
expected to work full-time on the matter of
correcting the constitution because that is not
their occupation, profession or vocation; while on
the other hand, the legislators and constitutional
convention delegates are expected to work full-
time on the same matter because that is their
occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the
difference between the words "revision" and
"amendment" pertain only to the process or
procedure of coming up with the corrections,
for purposes of interpreting the constitutional
provisions.
Stated otherwise, the difference between
"amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably
be in the substance or extent of the correction.
x x x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing
supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if
Congress or a constitutional convention had
drafted the same proposed changes that the
Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the
changes would constitute a revision of the
Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group
concedes that the proposed changes in the
present initiative constitute a revision if
Congress or a constitutional convention had
drafted the changes. However, since the Lambino
Group as private individuals drafted the proposed
changes, the changes are merely amendments to
the Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes
the serious matter of changing the fundamental
law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain
language of the Constitution contradict the
Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the
framers and the language of the Constitution are
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clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate
from such categorical intent and language.45 Any
theory espousing a construction contrary to such
intent and language deserves scant consideration.
More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating
inconsistencies in the form of government
established in the Constitution. Such a theory,
devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and
inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only
exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's
position. Any theory advocating that a proposed
change involving a radical structural change in
government does not constitute a revision justly
deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that
initiative proponents in American jurisdictions
have attempted to advance without any success. In
Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of Oregon
rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not
apply to changes to the constitution proposed by
initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section
2 merely provides a procedure by which the
legislature can propose a revision of the
constitution, but it does not affect proposed
revisions initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure
constitutes a wholesale change to the constitution
that cannot be enacted through the initiative
process. They assert that the distinction between
amendment and revision is determined by
reviewing the scope and subject matter of the
proposed enactment, and that revisions are not
limited to "a formal overhauling of the
constitution." They argue that this ballot measure
proposes far reaching changes outside the lines
of the original instrument, including profound
impacts on existing fundamental rights and
radical restructuring of the government's
relationship with a defined group of citizens.
Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot
measure "will refashion the most basic principles
of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court
correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section
2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the
prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article
XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions
instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x,
the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of
the constitution may not be accomplished by
initiative, because of the provisions of Article
XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII,
section1, relating to proposed amendments, the
court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV,
Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a
means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but
it contains no similar sanction for its use as a
means of revising the constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to
revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the
constitution which provides the means for
constitutional revision and it excludes the idea
that an individual, through the initiative, may
place such a measure before the electorate." x x x
x checks-and-balances among or within the three
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that
Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to
constitutional revisions proposed by initiative.
(Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino
Group's theory which negates the express intent
of the framers and the plain language of the
Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a
spectrum, at one end green for amendments and
at the other end red for revisions. Towards the
middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and
difficulties arise in determining whether there is
an amendment or revision. The present initiative
is indisputably located at the far end of the red
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spectrum where revision begins. The present
initiative seeks a radical overhaul of the existing
separation of powers among the three co-equal
departments of government, requiring far-
reaching amendments in several sections and
articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a
specific provision of the Constitution without
affecting any other section or article, the change
may generally be considered an amendment and
not a revision. For example, a change reducing the
voting age from 18 years to 15 years47 is an
amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change
reducing Filipino ownership of mass media
companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an
amendment and not a revision.48 Also, a change
requiring a college degree as an additional
qualification for election to the Presidency is an
amendment and not a revision.49
The changes in these examples do not entail any
modification of sections or articles of the
Constitution other than the specific provision
being amended. These changes do not also affect
the structure of government or the system of
branches. These three examples are located at the
far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far
red end where the revision sought by the present
petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a
change is an amendment or a revision. A change
in a single word of one sentence of the
Constitution may be a revision and not an
amendment. For example, the substitution of the
word "republican" with "monarchic" or
"theocratic" in Section 1, Article II50 of the
Constitution radically overhauls the entire
structure of government and the fundamental
ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each
specific change will have to be examined case-by-
case, depending on how it affects other
provisions, as well as how it affects the structure
of government, the carefully crafted system of
checks-and-balances, and the underlying
ideological basis of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic
principles, or several provisions of a constitution,
a deliberative body with recorded proceedings
is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision
requires harmonizing not only several provisions,
but also the altered principles with those that
remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally
authorize deliberative bodies like constituent
assemblies or constitutional conventions to
undertake revisions. On the other hand,
constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do
not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies
or recorded proceedings, to undertake only
amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's
proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions
states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the
incumbent President and Vice President, with the
exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall
hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which
shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are
hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as
Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are
inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of
government, in which case, they shall be
amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a
later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a
prior law, the later law prevails. This rule also
applies to construction of constitutions. However,
the Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of the
Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule
of construction by stating that in case of such
irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision
"shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government." The effect is
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to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until
the earlier one "shall be amended," which requires
a future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an
amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily
conceded during the oral arguments that the
requirement of a future amendment is a
"surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to
reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that
the later provision automatically prevails in case
of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not
as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in
the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory
Provisions is not between a provision in Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the
proposed changes. The inconsistency is between a
provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
and the "Parliamentary system of government,"
and the inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of
a "unicameral parliamentary form of
government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of
government" do the Lambino Group's proposed
changes refer to ― the Bangladeshi,
Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models,
which are among the few countries with
unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes
could not possibly refer to the traditional and
well-known parliamentary forms of government
― the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian,
Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which
have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people
who signed the signature sheets realize that they
were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean,
Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of
government?
This drives home the point that the people's
initiative is not meant for revisions of the
Constitution but only for amendments. A shift
from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND
harmonizing several provisions in many articles APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution
through a people's initiative will only result in Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
gross absurdities in the Constitution. Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the
Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not I. — General Provisions
an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void
and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2,
Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as
Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope
"The Initiative and Referendum Act."
of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution."
Section 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of
the people under a system of initiative and
 What is initiative?

 referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or
Sec 2 Art 17- is it a conferment of power to reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
the people? 
 ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
-defining the power

 legislative body upon compliance with the
100 pesos each in pocket- worth of requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
sovereignty

 recognized and guaranteed.
99 pesos worth- power to propose
amendment 
 Section 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes
-reservation of attribute of sovereignty 
 of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
Constitutional requirements for the people
to exercise power of initiative
?-at (a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to
least 12%, 3% from each legislative propose amendments to the Constitution or to
district 
 propose and enact legislations through an
Who submits proposal for ratification? 
 - election called for the purpose.
consti con ≠congress 

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
Accept whole or Partial
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a
reject amendment- no
petition proposing amendments to the
whole? need to accept all/
Constitution;
reject all

Amendment or Revision- accept a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition

proposing to enact a national legislation; and
revision? 
 all/ reject

a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a

petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or
Republic Act No. 6735 August 4, 1989 ordinance.

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF (b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by

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the people through a proposition sent to
Congress or the local legislative body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to
approve or reject a legislation through an election
called for the purpose. It may be of two classes,
namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a
petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part
thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a
petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or
ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and
local legislative bodies.
(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the
voters.
(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which
an initiative on the Constitution is approved or
rejected by the people.
(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing
the proposition and the required number of
signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined
by and submitted to the Commission on Elections,
hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays.
(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, and
Sangguniang Nayon.
(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial
Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and Punong
Barangay, as the case may be.
Section 4. Who may exercise. — The power of
initiative and referendum may be exercised by all
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registered voters of the country, autonomous
regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays.
Section 5. Requirements. — (a) To exercise the
power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per
centum (10%) of the total number of the
registered voters, of which every legislative
district is represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a
petition for the purpose and register the same
with the Commission.
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987
Constitution must have at least twelve per centum
(12%) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on
the Constitution may be exercised only after five
(5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and only once every five (5) years
thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to
be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided
herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered
voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one
hundred (100) words which shall be legibly
written or printed at the top of every page of the
petition.
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law,
resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative
assembly of an autonomous region, province or
city is deemed validly initiated if the petition
thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%)
of the registered voters in the province or city, of
which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
the registered voters therein; Provided, however,
That if the province or city is composed only of
one (1) legislative district, then at least each
municipality in a province or each barangay in a
city should be represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance
passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly
initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at
least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters
in the municipality, of which every barangay is
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
the registered voters therein.
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay
resolution or ordinance is deemed validly
initiated if signed by at least ten per centum (10%)
of the registered voters in said barangay.
Section 6. Special Registration. — The
Commission on Election shall set a special
registration day at least three (3) weeks before a
scheduled initiative or referendum.
Section 7. Verification of Signatures. — The
Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on
the basis of the registry list of voters, voters'
affidavits and voters identification cards used in
the immediately preceding election.
II. — National Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or
Referendum. — The Commission shall call and
supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum.
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Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of
the petition, the Commission shall, upon
determining the sufficiency of the petition,
publish the same in Filipino and English at least
twice in newspapers of general and local
circulation and set the date of the initiative or
referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-
five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days
from the determination by the Commission of the
sufficiency of the petition.
Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or
Referendum Proposition. — (a) The Proposition
of the enactment, approval, amendment or
rejection of a national law shall be submitted to
and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all
the registered voters of the Philippines.
If, as certified to by the Commission, the
proposition is approved by a majority of the votes
cast, the national law proposed for enactment,
approval, or amendment shall become effective
fifteen (15) days following completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, the
proposition to reject a national law is approved by
a majority of the votes cast, the said national law
shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall
become effective fifteen (15) days following the
completion of publication of the proposition and
the certification by the Commission in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines.
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the
national law sought to be rejected or amended
shall remain in full force and effect.
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the
Constitution approved by a majority of the votes
cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to
the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition
approved by majority of the votes cast in an
election called for the purpose shall become
effective fifteen (15) days after certification and
proclamation by the Commission.
Section 10. Prohibited Measures. — The
following cannot be the subject of an initiative or
referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1)
subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the
enactment of which are specifically vested in
Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to
referendum until ninety (90) days after its
effectivity.
Section 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly
accredited people's organization, as defined by
law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with
the House of Representatives, and other legislative
bodies. The petition shall contain a summary of
the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the
organization proposes to be enacted into law by
the legislature.
The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill
shall be the same as the enactment of any
legislative measure before the House of
Representatives except that the said initiative bill
shall have precedence over the pending legislative
measures on the committee.
Section 12. Appeal. — The decision of the
Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or
insufficiency of the petition for initiative or
referendum may be appealed to the Supreme
Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.
III. — Local Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. —
(a) Not less than two thousand (2,000) registered
voters in case of autonomous regions, one
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thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and cities,
one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and
fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a petition
with the Regional Assembly or local legislative
body, respectively, proposing the adoption,
enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law,
ordinance or resolution.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local
legislative body within (30) days from its
presentation, the proponents through their duly
authorized and registered representative may
invoke their power of initiative, giving notice
thereof to the local legislative body concerned.
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially
starting from one (1). The Secretary of Local
Government or his designated representative shall
extend assistance in the formulation of the
proposition.
(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in
an initiative.
(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty
(120) days in case of autonomous regions, ninety
(90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty
(60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30)
days in case of barangays, from notice mentioned
in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required
number of signatures.
(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election
Registrar, or his designated representative, in the
presence of a representative of the proponent,
and a representative of the regional assemblies
and local legislative bodies concerned in a public
place in the autonomous region or local
government unit, as the case may be. Signature
stations may be established in as many places as
may be warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided,
the Commission on Elections, through its office in
the local government unit concerned shall certify
as to whether or not the required number of
signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain
the required number is a defeat of the
proposition.
(h) If the required number of the signatures is
obtained, the Commission shall then set a date for
the initiative at which the proposition shall be
submitted to the registered voters in the local
government unit concerned for their approval
within ninety (90) days from the date of
certification by the Commission, as provided in
subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous
regions, sixty (60) days in case of the provinces
and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of
municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of
barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the
date set, after which the results thereof shall be
certified and proclaimed by the Commission on
Elections.
Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. —
If the proposition is approved by a majority of the
votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days
after certification by the Commission as if
affirmative action thereon had been made by the
local legislative body and local executive
concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of
votes, the proposition is considered defeated.
Section 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. —
(a) The power of local initiative shall not be
exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or
matters which are within the legal powers of the
local legislative bodies to enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the
local legislative body shall adopt in toto the
proposition presented, the initiative shall be
cancelled. However, those against such action
may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the
manner herein provided.
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Section 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative
Bodies. — Any proposition or ordinance or
resolution approved through the system of
initiative and referendum as herein provided shall
not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local
legislative body concerned within six (6) months
from the date therefrom, and may be amended,
modified or repealed by the local legislative body
within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of
three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided,
however, that in case of barangays, the period
shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the
first six (6) months.
Section 17. Local Referendum. —
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4
hereof, any local legislative body may submit to
the registered voters of autonomous region,
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays for
the approval or rejection, any ordinance or
resolution duly enacted or approved.
Said referendum shall be held under the control
and direction of the Commission within sixty (60)
days in case of provinces and cities, forty-five
(45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30)
days in case of barangays.
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the
results of the said referendum.
Section 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in
this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper
courts from declaring null and void any
proposition approved pursuant to this Act for
violation of the Constitution or want of capacity
of the local legislative body to enact the said
measure.
IV. — Final Provisions
SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus
Election Code. — The Omnibus Election Code
and other election laws, not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives
and referenda.
Section 20. Rules and Regulations. — The
Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of this Act.
Section 21. Appropriations. — The amount
necessary to defray the cost of the initial
implementation of this Act shall be charged
against the Contingent Fund in the General
Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter,
such sums as may be necessary for the full
implementation of this Act shall be included in the
annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 22. Separability Clause. — If any part or
provision of this Act is held invalid or
unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions
thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Section 23. Effectivity. — This Act shall take
effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.
SECTION 1. Restatement of policy. — The power
of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or
reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws,
ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body is hereby affirmed, recognized
and guaranteed. C
SECTION 2. Power of initiative. — Subject to the
requirements hereinafter prescribed the people
may propose amendments to the Constitution, or
propose and enact legislations through an
election called for the purpose.
SECTION 3. Power of referendum. — Upon
compliance with the requirements herein setforth
the electorate may approve or reject a legislation
through an election called for the purpose. c
SECTION 4. Who may exercise. — The power of
initiative may be exercised by all registered voters
of the country, autonomous region, provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays, as the case
may be.

Approved: August 4, 1989 SECTION5. Scope of power of initiatives. — The

power of initiative may be exercised to amend the
COMELEC RESOLUTION 2300 Constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a
regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay
law, resolution or ordinance.
IN RE: RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING
THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON THE
SECTION 6. Scope of the power of referendum. —
CONSTITUTION, AND INITIATIVE AND
The power of referendum may be exercised to
REFERENDUM ON NATIONAL AND LOCAL LAWS
approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof,
passed by Congress, or to approve or reject a law,
The Commission on Elections, by virtue of
resolution or ordinance enacted by regional
the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the
assemblies or local legislative bodies.
Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881); Republic
Act No. 6735, and other related election laws,
SECTION7. Definition of terms. — For purposes
hereby resolves to promulgate, as it hereby
hereof the following terms are hereby defined as
promulgates, the following rules and regulations
follows:
to govern the conduct of initiative on the
Constitution, and initiative and referendum on
(a) “Proposition” is the measure proposed by
national and local laws.
the voters:
ARTICLE I General Provisions

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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
(b) “Plebiscite” is the electoral process by
which an initiative on the Constitution is
approved or rejected by the people;
(c) “Petition” is the written instrument containing
the proposition and the required number of
signatories in the form to be prescribed by the
Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to
as Commission.
(d) “Local government units” refers to provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays, as the case
may be.
(e) “Local legislative bodies” refers to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan and
Sangguniang Nayon or Barangay, as the case
may be.
(f) “Local executives” refers to Provincial
Governors, City or Municipal Mayors or Punong
Barangay, as the case may be.
SECTION 8. Contents of petition. — A petition for
initiative or referendum shall state the following:
(a) Contents or text of the proposed law sought to
be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;
(b) The proposition;
(c) The reasons therefor;
(d) That it is not one of the exceptions provided
herein;
(e) Signatures of the petitioners or registered
voters;
(f) A formal designation of their duly authorized
representatives;
(g) An abstract or summary proposition in not
more than one hundred (100) words which shall
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be legibly written or printed at the top of every
page of the petition.
ARTICLE II Local Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 9. Petition. — (a) The exercise of the
power of initiative or referendum on local laws
shall be commenced by the filing of a petition
therefor with the Regional Assembly, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod,
Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Barangay,
as the case may be. The petition shall be duly
signed by not less than two thousand (2,000)
registered voters in case of an autonomous
region, one thousand (1,000) registered voters in
case of a province or city, one hundred (100)
registered voters in case of a municipality, and
fifty (50) registered voters in case of a barangay.
SECTION 10. Notice of power of initiative
or referendum. — If no favorable action is taken
thereon by the Regional Assembly or local
legislative body concerned within thirty (30) days
from presentation of the petition, the proponents,
through any or all of their duly authorized and
registered representatives, may invoke their
power of initiative or referendum, giving notice
thereof to the Regional Assembly or local
legislative body concerned, in accordance with the
procedure herein set forth.
SECTION 11. Copies of petition and notice.
— The proponents shall furnish copies of their
petition and notice as follows:
(a) If the subject of the initiative or referendum
is a law, ordinance or resolution within the legal
power of a regional assembly to enact, the
proponents shall furnish the Regional Election
Director sufficient number of copies of the
petition and notice for distribution to the
Provincial Election Supervisors and the Election
Registrars in his region.
(b) If the subject is a law, ordinance or
resolution pertaining to a Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, the proponents shall furnish the
Provincial Election Supervisor sufficient number
of copies of the petition and notice for
distribution to the Election Registrars in the
province.
(c) If the subject is a law, ordinance or
resolution pertaining to a Sangguniang
Panlungsod, the proponents shall furnish the City
Election Registrar sufficient number of copies of
the petition and notice for distribution to the
barangays within the city.
(d) If the subject is a municipal or barangay law,
ordinance or resolution, the election registrar
concerned shall be furnished sufficient number
of copies of the petition and notice for
distribution to the barangays within the
municipality.
(e) The proponents shall likewise furnish the
Commission on Elections in Manila through the
Executive Director and the Election Records and
Statistics Department copies of said petition and
notice.
SECTION 12. Posting. — Upon receipt of the
petition and notice, all election officers concerned
shall cause copies thereof, to be posted
conspicuously in public places in the
autonomous region or local government unit
affected, together with a notice of the dates of
signing in accordance with the following section.
SECTION 13. Schedule of signing of
petition. — Upon receipt of the notice and
petition, the proper election officer in the
autonomous region or local government unit
affected shall schedule the signing of the petition
in his region, province, city, municipality or
barangay, as the case may be, on the first
Saturday and Sunday following receipt thereof,
and every Saturday and Sunday thereafter for a
period of 120 days in case of an autonomous
region, 90 days for a province or city, 60 days for
a municipality, and 30 days for a barangay.
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Signing may also be done on weekdays in the
office of the proper election registrar.
SECTION 14. Signature stations. — Signing
shall be conducted as far as practicable in public
school buildings nearest the residence of the
voters. For this purpose, the Election Registrar
may cluster existing precincts into signature
stations at a ratio of one (1) signature station for
every ten (10) precincts. Each signature station
shall be under the supervision of a public school
teacher designated by the election registrar. The
supervising teacher shall be entitled to a per diem
of two hundred pesos for each day of service.
SECTION 15. Procedure for signing of
petition. — On any of the days scheduled for the
signing of the petition any voter currently
registered in the city, municipality or barangay, as
the case may be, my sign the petition. The petition
shall be signed in the designated signature
stations before the Election Registrar, or his
designated representative, in the presence of the
proponents or their representatives, and a
representative of the regional assembly or local
legislative body concerned.
The signature of the voters shall be affixed on the
form prescribed by the Commission. Each voter
shall affix his signature over his printed name
and address. An illiterate or disabled voter, who is
currently registered as such, shall be assisted by a
person of his confidence. The Election Registrar
shall have custody of all the forms used during
the signing.
SECTION 16. Verification of signature. —
The Election Registrar or his representative shall,
during the period of signing, verify the
genuineness and authenticity of the signatures by
referring to the book of voters, voter’s affidavits
and voter’s identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election. The Election
Registrar shall cancel any signature on the
ground that it is forged or falsified, or that the
signatory is not a registered voter, or that the
signature of the voter appears more than once in
the same or other forms. The determination by the
Election Registrar of the genuineness and
authenticity of the signatures shall be final.
SECTION17. Certification of number of registered
voters. — Upon receipt of its copy of the notice
referred to in Section 11, paragraph (e) hereof, the
Election Records and Statistics Department shall
certify the total number of registered voters in the
constituency to which the initiative or referendum
pertains, and immediately send said certification
to the highest local election officer of the local
government units affected. For initiatives or
referenda on local laws before the 1992 general
elections, the Election Records and Statistics
Department shall, wherever proper, use as basis
the registration records for (a) January 18, 1988
local elections, (b) February 17, 1990 elections in
the Muslim Mindanao Autonomous Region, or (c)
January 30, 1990 Plebiscite for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. Upon receipt of the
certification from the Election Records and
Statistics Department, the Regional Election
Director, Provincial Election Supervisor or
Election Registrar, as the case may be, shall post a
copy of the certification on the bulletin board of
his office.
SECTION18. Number of signatures required. —
(a) In cases affecting an autonomous region,
province or city, the petition shall be signed by at
least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters
in the province or city, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per
centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. If the
province or city is composed of only one
legislative district, each municipality in the
province or each barangay in the city must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
the registered voters therein.
(b) In cases affecting a municipality, the petition
shall be signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of
the registered voters in the municipality, of which
every barangay must be represented by at least
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three per centum (3%) of the registered voters
therein.
(c) In cases affecting a barangay, the petition shall
be signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the
registered in said barangay.
SECTION19. Determination of percentage and
certification. — Upon lapse of the period provided
for in Section 13 hereof, the Regional Election
Director in the case of an autonomous region, the
Provincial Election Registrar in case of a city, or
the Election Registrar in the case of a
municipality or component barangay, shall
determine and certify whether or not the required
number of signatures was obtained. He shall
transmit the certification to the Commission,
through the Executive Director, by the fastest
means of communication, furnishing the
proponents and regional assembly or the local
legislative body concerned copies thereof. If the
required number of signatures is obtained, the
local election officer concerned shall also
recommend to the Commission the date of the
initiative or referendum, taking into consideration
the periods prescribed in Section 21, paragraph
(b) hereof.
SECTION 20. Action by the Commission. —
At the first regular en banc session following
receipt of the certification, the Commission shall
act on the findings of sufficiency or insufficiency
of the petition for initiative or referendum.
SECTION 21. Call for initiative or
referendum by the Commission. —
(a) If the required number of signatures has not
been obtained, the proposition shall be
considered defeated, in which case the initiative
or referendum shall not be held.
(b) If the required number of signatures is
obtained, Commission shall then set a date for the
initiative or referendum at which the proposition
shall be submitted to the registered voters in the
local government unit concerned for their
approval within ninety (90) days from the date of
certification of the local election officer under
Section 19 hereof in case of an autonomous
region, sixty (60) days in case of a municipality,
and thirty (30) days in case of a barangay. The
initiative or referendum shall then be held on the
date set, after which the results thereof shall be
certified and proclaimed by the Commission on
Elections.
SECTION 22. Effectivity of local
propositions. — If the proposition is approved by
a majority of the votes cast, it shall take effect
fifteen (15) days after certification by the
Commission as if affirmative action thereon had
been taken by the local legislative body and local
executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said
number of votes, the proposition is considered
defeated. c
SECTION 23. Referendum initiated by local
legislative body. — Notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 4 hereof, a majority of all
the members of a regional assembly or any local
legislative body may submit to the registered
voters of the autonomous region, province, city,
municipality or barangay for approval or
rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly
enacted or approved by said legislative body.
The legislative body concerned shall submit a
notice to hold the referendum to the Commission
on Elections in Manila through its Executive
Director which shall include a proposed date for
the holding thereof.
Said referendum shall be conducted under the
control and direction of the Commission and shall
be held within sixty (60) days from receipt by the
Commission of said notice in case of an
autonomous region, province or city; forty-five
(45) days in a case of a municipality; and thirty
(30) days in case of a barangay.
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the
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results of said referendum.
SECTION 24. Limitations on local
initiatives. —
(a) The power of local initiative shall not be
exercised more than once a year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or
matters which are within the legal powers of the
local legislative bodies to enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the
local legislative body shall adopt in toto the
proposition presented, the initiative shall be
canceled. However, those against such action,
may, if they so desire, apply for an initiative in the
manner herein provided.
SECTION25. Limitations upon local legislative
bodies. — Any proposition or ordinance or
resolution approved in an initiative or
referendum shall not be repealed, modified or
amended by the regional assembly or local
legislative body concerned within six (6) months
from the date of effectivity. Within three (3) years
thereafter or in the case of barangays, within one
(1) year after the expiration of the first six (6)
months, it may be amended, modified or repealed
by the local legislative body by a vote of three-
fourths (3/4) of al its members. c
ARTICLE III National Initiative and Referendum
SECTION26. Registration of petition. —
Proponents for the adoption, enactment, repeal or
amendment of a national law shall register with
the Commission through the Law Department
their petition containing the signatures of
registered voters duly verified with the Election
Registrar in accordance with Section 30 hereof.
SECTION 27. Required number of
signatures. — A petition for initiative or
referendum on a national law shall be deemed
validly initiated if signed by at least ten per
centum (10%) of the total number of registered
voters nationwide, of which every legislative
district is represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters thereof.
SECTION 28. Certification on the number of
registered voters. — At the instance of the
proponents, the Election Records and Statistics
Department shall issue a certification on the total
number of registered voters in each legislative
district. Before the 1992 general elections, the
Election Records and Statistics Department shall,
wherever proper, use as the basis the registration
records for the (a) January 18, 1988 local
elections, (b) February 17, 1990 elections in the
Muslim Mindanao Autonomous Region, or (c)
January 30, 1990 plebiscite for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.
SECTION 29. Signature stations. —
Signature stations may be established by the
proponents with the assistance of the Election
Registrar in as many places in the municipality as
may be warranted.
SECTION 30. Verification of signatures. —
The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures
on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters’
affidavits and voters’ identification cards used in
the immediately preceding election.
SECTION 31. Determination by the
If it should appear that the required number of
signatures has been obtained, the Commission
shall set the initiative or referendum in
accordance with the succeeding sections.
SECTION 32. Appeal. — The decision of the
Commission on the findings of the sufficiency
and insufficiency of the petition for initiative or
referendum may be appealed to the Supreme
Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.
SECTION 33. Publication of proposition. —
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition
containing the required number of signatures, the
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Commission shall publish the petition in Filipino
and English at least twice in newspapers of
general and local circulation.
SECTION 34. Call and supervision of
initiative or referendum. — The Commission shall
set the date of the initiative or referendum not
earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than
ninety (90) days from the determination of the
sufficiency of the petition, in which the
proposition for the enactment, approval,
amendment or rejection of a national law shall be
submitted to all registered voters for their
consideration. The Commission shall supervise
and control the conduct of the initiative or
referendum called for the purpose.
SECTION 35. Effectivity of initiative and
referendum proposition. —
(a) If, as certified to by the Commission, the
proposition is approved by a majority of the votes
cast, the national law proposed for enactment,
approval, or amendment shall become effective
fifteen (15) days following completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines.
(b) If, as certified by the Commission, the
proposition to reject a national law is approved by
Commission.
a majority
— ofThethe Commission
votes cast, the
shall
saidactnational
on the findings
law of the suffic
shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall
become effective fifteen (15) days following the
completion of publication of the proposition and
the certification by the Commission in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines.
(c) If the majority vote is not obtained, the national
law sought to be rejected or amended shall remain
in full force and effect.
SECTION 36. Prohibited measures. — The
following cannot be the subject of an initiative or
referendum petition:

(a) A measure embracing more than one
subject; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the
enactment of which is specifically vested in
Congress by the Constitution, until ninety (90)
days after their effectivity.
ARTICLE IV Indirect Initiative on Local or
National Law
SECTION 37. Indirect initiative. — The
power of initiative may also be exercised by the
people through a proposition sent to Congress, to
a regional assembly or a local legislative body for
action.
SECTION38. Procedure in indirect initiative. —
Any duly accredited people’s organization as
defined by law, may file a petition for indirect
initiative with the House of Representatives or
other legislative bodies, as the case may be. The
petition shall contain a summary of the chief
purposes and contents of the proposed bill.
The procedure to be followed in the initiative bill
shall be the same as the enactment of any
legislative measure before the House of
Representatives or before the legislative body
concerned.
In every case, the initiative bill shall have
precedence over the other pending legislative
measures in the committee.
ARTICLE V Initiative on the Constitution
SECTION 39. Initiative on the Constitution.
— Initiative to amend the Constitution may be
exercised by the electorate only after five (5) years
from its ratification on February 2, 1987, and
only once every five (5) years thereafter.
SECTION 40. Requirements. — A petition for
an initiative on the Constitution shall have at least
twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
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registered voters as signatories, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters
therein.
SECTION 41. Procedure. — An initiative on
the Constitution shall be conducted under the
control and supervision of the Commission in
accordance with Article III hereof.
SECTION 42. Effectivity of proposition. —
The proposition in an initiative on the
Constitution approved by a majority of the votes
cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of
the day of the plebiscite.
ARTICLE VI Final Provisions
SECTION 43. Special registration. — The
Commission shall set a special registration day at
least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative
or referendum. SECTION44. Applicability of
the Omnibus Election Code and other relevant
election laws. — The Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
Blg. 881), Republic Act No. 6735 and other
relevant election laws shall apply to all initiatives
and referenda.
SECTION 45. Effectivity. — This Resolution
shall take effect on the seventh day following its
publication in the Official Gazette or in two
newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines.
Promulgated this 16th day of January, 1991 in
the City of Manila.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. THE
GOV’T OF THE RP PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL
DOMAIN CASE DOCTRINE:
 Is the President allowed to guarantee a
change to the Constitution? No
The President cannot guarantee a change to the
Constitution.
The President cannot delegate a power that she Malaysia. The subjects of which are
herself does not possess. May the President, in the Security, Rehabilitation, and Ancestral
course of peace negotiations, agree to pursue Domain.
reforms that would require new legislation and - Upon motion by petitioners, a TRO
constitutional amendments, or should the reforms enjoining signing by the GRP of the same
be restricted only to those solutions which the was granted by the Court. Petitioners,
present laws allows? Vice Gov. Of and the Province of North
Cotabato, in this petition through
Being uniquely vested with the power to conduct mandamus and prohibition:
peace negotiations with rebel groups, the o invoke their right to information
President is in a singular position to know the on matters of public concern,
precise nature of their grievances which, if o and supplementarily, the
resolved, may bring an end to hostilities. declaration of the MOA-AD as
unconstitutional.
The President may not, of course, unilaterally o They seek to compel respondents
implement the solutions that she considers viable, to disclose and furnish them
but she may not be prevented from submitting copies of the complete MOA-AD,
them as recommendations to Congress, which o and prohibit the signing thereof
could then, it is minded, act upon them pending the disclosure of its
pursuant to the legal procedures for contents, and the holding of
constitutional amendment and revision. In public consultations thereon.
particular, Congress would have the option, - Zamboanga City, its Mayor and
pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3 of the Representative asked for the same relief
Constitution to propose the recommended and prayed that the City be excluded from
amendments or revision to the people, call a the Bangsamoro Homeland/Juridical
constitutional convention, or submit to the Entity
electorate the question of calling such a - Under the MOA-AD, both parties
convention. recognize
o that the ownership of the
Bangsamoro homeland is vested
While the President does not possess constituent
exclusively to Bangsamoro
powers- as those powers may be exercised only by
people (natives or original
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the
inhabitants of Mindanao and its
people through initiative and referendum- she
adjacent lands before
may submit proposals for constitutional change
colonization, including their
to Congress in a manner that does not involve the
descendants, whether full or half-
arrogation of constituent powers.
blood) by virtue of prior rights
and occupation.
PROVINCE OF COTABATO VS. THE GOV’T. OF o They were recognized as having
THE RP PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN the right to self-governance on
GR NO. 183591, OCT. 14, 2008 the ground of suzerain
authorities of their sultanates.
FACTS: o They were granted with authority
- GRP and the MILF were scheduled to sign and JD over the Ancestral
a MOA-AD aspect of the GRP-MILF Domain and Lands of the
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Bangsamoro

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“Life doesn’t get easier or more forgiving; we get stronger and more resilient”
 o The territory of the Bangsamoro
homeland is described as the
land mass as well as the
maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and
alluvial domains, including the
aerial domain and the
atmospheric space above it,
embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-
Palawan geographic region, over
which the BJE can exercise JD
over natural resources within its
internal waters and territorial
waters described therein.
o The sharing of minerals in
territorial waters between
Central Gov’t and the BJE, but no
similar agreement with respect to
internal waters
o BJE is also free to enter into any
economic cooperation and
trade relations with foreign
countries, and GRP is bound to
ensure BJE’s participation in
international meetings (ASEAN,
UN’s agencies).
o Sharing of total production
pertaining to natural resources is
75:25 in favor of the BJE.
o May cancel or modify licenses
(timber, mining) and concessions,
contracts made or granted by the
PH Central Gov’t or the ARMM.
- Sol-Gen maintains the issue is not ripe
for judicial adjudication because the
MOA-AD remains to be a proposal, and
does not contain legally demandable
rights and obligations until the list of
operative acts are complied with. The
Court cannot pass upon issues based on
hypothetical constitutional problems with
no concrete bases, and petitioners’
perceived injury is merely illusory.
- Respondents also allege mootness of the
case because of the Exec. Sec’s
declaration that the President will not
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sign the MOA-AD and that the GRP panel
is already disbanded
ISSUE/S:
1. Ripeness for judicial determination
2. Mootness
3. Did respondents violate constitutional
and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information
when they negotiated and later initiated
the MOA-AD?
4. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate
the Constitution and the laws?
RULING:
1. Yes, the case is ripe for Court’s
determination. To be ripe for judicial
determination, petitioner must show
that he has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of the act complained
of. Concrete acts are not necessary to
render the controversy ripe for
adjudication. That the law in question is
not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
When an act of a branch of government
is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. The GRP
panel exceeded its authority under EO
No. 3 by:
a. Drafting terms of MOA-AD
without consultationwith LGUs
or communities affected
b. Guaranteeing to MILF the
amendment of the Constitution
when it said that it will effect ‘the
necessary changes to the legal
framework...’
2. The non-signing of the MOA-AD did not
render the issue moot for determination
because the decision in this case will
apply also to on-going and future
negotiations and agreements necessary
for its realization.
- In fact, despite the mootness of a case, the - It is with respect to the mandamus that it
SC can still render its ruling thereon if is moot since copies were already sent to
the following circumstances are present: petitioners and Court
a. There is grave violation of the 3. Yes.
Constitution a. The MOA-AD is a matter of
b. Case is of an exceptional public concern since it involves
character that requires the sovereignty and territory of
resolution for public interest PH which affects the lives of the
i. The case at bar is public at large. The right to
imbued with public information on public concern
interest since it concerns under the Constitution includes
the country’s territory information on negotiations
and political leading to the consummation of
modifications the transaction. Consummated
c. Constitutional issues raised contract is not a requirement for
require formulation of it may be too late to point out its
controlling principles defects when there is already a
i. In the case at bar, the contract. Sec. 28 (Art. 2) stating
Court must formulate the right of public to disclosure
controlling principles of all transactions involving
since the MOA-AD is public interest is complementary
subject to further legal to Sec. 7 of the Bill of Rights. The
enactments including complete and effective exercise
Constitutional of Sec. 7 necessitates that Sec.
amendments to guide 28 shall also be self-executory.
the bench, the bar, the b. EO No. 3 states that PAPP should
public, and the conduct regular dialogues with
government. the National Peace Forum, peace
d. It is capable of repetition yet partners, and concerned sectors
evading decision of the society in the national and
i. In the case at bar, the local levels to render progress
petitioner-cities may reports on the peace process.
possibly be affected if a PAPP committed grave abuse of
decision is not yet discretion by failing to carry
rendered because the act out consultations. Executive
of the government privilege cannot be invoked
complained of is capable because of provisions of EO No.
of repetition 3 on public consultation.
e. When defendant ceased to do the c. LGC states that national agencies
act complained of (voluntary and offices must conduct
cessation), especially when periodic consultations with
petitioner prays for reliefs appropriate local government
- MOA-AD is just part of the Tripoli units, non-governmental and
Agreement in 2001 so mootness will not people's organizations, and other
set in on the latter. concerned sectors of the
community before any project or

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 program is implemented in their as laid down in the Montevideo
respective jurisdictions. The Convention: permanent people,
MOA-AD is one peculiar program defined territory, government,
that unequivocally and and capacity to enter into trade
unilaterally vests ownership of a relations with foreign states. It
vast territory to the Bangsamoro runs contrary to the sovereign
people, which could pervasively and territorial integrity of PH.
and drastically result to the d. It is contrary to the
diaspora or displacement of a Constitutional provision
great number of inhabitants from requiring a plebiscite for the
their total environment. It also creation of the autonomous
failed to observe the provisions region. Previous votes of the
of the IPRA on free and prior LGUs cannot be considered
informed consent of the IPs/ICCs. because they voted to be part of
4. Yes. the ARMM, not the BJE.
a. The MOA-AD contemplates an e. Contrary to Constitutional
‘association’ between the Central provision that only President can
PH Government and the BJE. enter into foreign relations.
Under international law, f. Violative of Sec 22, Art 2 of
‘association’ is a relationship Constitution because promotion
between a principal state and an of ICC’s rights must be in the
associate whereby the latter spirit of national unity and
delegates certain responsibilities placing BJE in a transitional state
to the former while maintaining to independence is not in
its status as a state. Some of the harmony with national unity.
arrangements under the MOA-AD g. Violative of IPRA that lays down
that characterize association are the procedure of delineating
BJE’s capacity to enter into ancestral domains.
foreign trade relations, Central h. Indigenous people have right to
Govt’s responsibility to ensure internal self-determination (to
BJE’s participation in ASEAN and freely determine their political
UN meetings, and more. status and freely pursue their
b. This concept of association is economic, social and cultural
not recognized under our development while respecting
Constitution because association the territorial integrity of existing
implies the recognition of an state), but not external self-
associated entity as a state. It determination (establishment of a
does not provide for transitory sovereign independent state)
status that prepares any part of i. Notwithstanding the suspensive
PH territory for independence. clause, however, respondents, by
Association is often used as a their mere act of incorporating in
transitional device of former the MOA-AD the provisions
colonies on their way to full thereof regarding the associative
independence. relationship between the BJE and
c. BJE is a state in all but its name the Central Government, have
for it meets the criteria of a state already violated the

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 Memorandum of Instructions
From The President dated March
1, 2001, which states that the
negotiations shall be conducted
in accordance with the principles
of the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.
j. Despite the President’s power to
recommend to Congress or to the
people constitutional
amendments or revisions, she
cannot guarantee to a third party
that the required amendments
will be put in place.
ADDITIONAL FROM BERNAS PRIMER:
 What is the significance of the presence of
a special article on amendment and
revision in the Constitution?
1. It indicates that the Philippines has
adopted a rigid type of Constitution,
i.e, one that cannot be changed by
ordinary legislation but only by a
more cumbersome process of change.
2. It identifies legal sovereignty as
residing in the people, since only a
direct act of the people can finally
effect a change in the Constitution.
 Distinguish “constituent power” from
“legislative power”
CONSTITUENT POWER:
1. is the power to formulate a Constitution or to
propose amendments to or revision of the
Constitution and to ratify such proposal.
2. Is exercised by Congress (by special
constitutional conferment), by a Constitutional
Convention or Commission, by the people
through initiative and referendum, and ultimately
by the sovereign electorate.
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3. It does not need the approval of the Chief
Executive. (Jurisprudence under martial law,
however, sanctioned the proposition that on the
basis of absolute necessity, where no body existed
which could proposal amendments, both the
constituent and legislative powers of the
legislature may be exercised by the Chief
Executive. Sanidad vs. Comelec)
LEGISLATIVE POWER:
1. Is the power to pass, repeal or amend ordinary
laws or statutes.
2. Is an ordinary power of Congress and of the
people, also through initiative and referendum.
3. Ordinarily needs the approval of the Chief
Executive, except when done by the people
through initiative and referendum.
 May a constitution be changed without
following the process prescribed by
existing constitution?
Generally, no, because by adopting the article on
amendments and revision the people themselves
have imposed on themselves a constitutional
limitation on their capacity to dispose of the
Constitution. However, since the people are the
ultimate legal sovereign, they may in
extraordinary circumstance decide to disregard
the constitution. When they do so, they change the
effect is neither amendment nor revision in the
constitutional sense but “revolution”. The
ratification of the 1973 Constitution was done in
an extra-constitutional way. Ratification cases,
Similarly, the Freedom Constitution was
promulgated by Pres. Aquino under her
revolutionary authority conferred by the people
through the EDSA event.
 If the constitutional change is to be
effected by amendment or revision, what
are the required steps?
In general. (1) there must be proposal of
amendments or revision, that is, the formulation
of the changes contemplated, (2) submission of
the proposed amendments or revision to the
people; and (3) ratification.
 Who may propose amendments to or
revision of the Constitution?
The 1935 and 1973 Constitutions provided for
two constituent assemblies, that is, bodies
empowered to propose amendments. They were
the Congress or National Assembly and the
Constitutional Convention. The 1987 Constitution
has provided for a third: the electorate, through
popular initiative.
 How does Congress propose amendments
to the Constitution?
Under the 1987 Constitution, however, the
provision simply reads thus:
“Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-
fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.”
Since nothing is said about a joint session, it is
submitted that each House may separately
formulate amendments by a vote of three-fourths
of all its member, and then pass it on to the other
house for a similar process. Disagreements can be
settled through a conference committee.
But if the two houses decide to come together in
joint session, they still must vote separately
because Congress is bicameral.
 Who submits the proposed changes for
ratification by the people?
Either Congress as a constituent assembly or the
Constitutional Convention may submit the
changes to the people. However, if neither
Congress as a constituent assembly nor the
constitutional convention submits the changes,
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that is, designates the time and circumstances for
the plebiscite, Congress as an ordinary legislative
body may do so.
 How does a constitutional convention come
into existence?
“The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all
its Members, call a constitutional convention, or
by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the
electorate the question of calling such a
convention.”
 Must Congress be in joint session for
purposes of calling a constitutional
convention?
Since the Constitution is silent, it is submitted that
the presumption is that the two houses may vote
separately as they are where they are. But they
may also come together in joint session.
 Who decides whether amendments or
revision should be proposed by Congress
or by a constitutional convention?
The choice of which constituent assembly should
initiate amendments or revision is a matter of
wisdom left to the discretion of Congress.
Gonzales vs. COMELEC
 Does this mean therefore that a decision of
Congress to call a constitutional
convention is not subject to judicial
review?
Whether or not to call a convention is a matter
completely within the discretion of Congress; but
the manner of calling a convention is subject to
judicial review, because, among others, of the
constitutional requirement of a qualified majority
vote.
 If in calling a constitutional convention
Congress, acting as a constituent assembly,
does not supply the details for the calling
 of a convention (such as qualification,
compensation, distribution of delegates),
who may supply such details? (Gabriel
Question)
Congress, acting as an ordinary legislative body,
may supply such details, Imbong v. COMELEC, in
supplying such details, however, the Congress,
acting as an ordinary legislative body may not
transgress the resolution passed by the Congress
acting as a constituent assembly.
 May the constitutional convention
appropriate money for its expenses?
No money may be spent out of the public treasury
except pursuant to an appropriation made by law,
Article VI, Section 29 (1). Hence, the constitutional
convention may not appropriate money out of the
public treasury. However, the constitutional
convention is free to dispose of the funds
appropriated by Congress for the Convention’s
operation.
 What amendments or revision may be
proposed by a constituent assembly?
Since the effectivity of a proposal made by a
constituent assembly depends upon the approval
by the sovereign people, a constituent assembly
may propose any change in the constitution. The
only possible exception is that a constituent
assembly may not propose anything that is
“inconsistent with what is known, particularly in
international law, as Jus Cogens.” Planas v.
COMELEC
Jus Cogens, or peremptory norm of international
law, means “a norm accepted and recognized by
the international community of States as a whole
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same
character.” Article 53, Vienna Convention on
Treaties.
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 Does this mean therefore that proposals
made by a constituent assembly are not
subject to judicial review? (Gabriel
Question)
The substance of the proposals are not subject to
judicial review since what to propose, subject to
the above limitation, is left to the wisdom of the
constituent assembly. However, the manner of
making the proposal is subject to judicial review.
This is because a constituent assembly owes its
existence and derives all its authority and power
from the Constitution. Hence, whether or not it
has acted according to the constitution must
always be matter for judicial cognizance.
Give examples of matters which may be reviewed
by the Court.
1. Whether or not a proposal was
approved by the required number of
votes of Congress.
2. Whether or not the approved
proposals were properly submitted to
the people for ratification. Tolentino
v. COMELEC
The Batasang Pambansa proposed amendment to
the Constitution providing, among others, for the
inclusion of “grant” as a mode of alienation of
public land and also mandating “urban land
reform.” Petitioners sought to enjoin the
plebiscite as scheduled on the ground that the
public had not had adequate time to study the two
above matters. DECIDE.
The 1973 Constitution prescribed that the
plebiscite should be held not later than three
months after the approval of the proposal; but the
actual time to be given within the three month
maximum was left to the discretion of the Batasan
taking into consideration the complexity of the
matter proposed. Almario v. Alba
 How is proposal of amendments by
“initiative and referendum” done?

Through the “initiative” phase, the people propose
the amendments. There is a valid proposal when a
proposition has received the approval of at least
3% of the registered voters of each district and
12% of the total number of registered voters
nationwide. This is followed by the “referendum”
phase where the people vote to reject or ratify the
proposal.
 May a revision of the Constitution be
effected through initiative and
referendum? (Gabriel Question)
No. The change authorized by Sec. 2 through
initiative and referendum can only be amendment.
REASON: The formulation of provisions revising
the Constitution requires both cooperation and
debate which can only be done through a collegial
body.
 Does the President have power to propose
amendments to the Constitution? (Gabriel
Question: RECONCILIATION of SANIDAD
and GONZALES)
Under martial law and in the absence of a
legislative assembly, the Supreme Court upheld
the power of President Marcos to propose
amendments.
In Sanidad v. COMELEC, a divided Supreme
Court upheld such power of the President
although there was no unanimity in approach
even among those who upheld the power, Briefly,
the chief positions for upholding the power may
be summarized thus:
1. Under the extraordinary conditions
on martial law and the Transitory
Provisions, the incumbent President
possessed legislative power.
Legislative power does not normally
include constituent power. However,
the normal repositories
constituent power to initiate
amendments, the National Assembly
and the interim National Assembly,
were not operative. Moreover, the
people had voted in referenda
against the convening of the interim
National Assembly which was
empowered to propose amendments
under the Transitory Provisions.
Hence, a stalemate one must
remember that a Constitution cannot
be understood as having set up a
government that is powerless to act
in the face of crisis. Hence, the power
to propose amendments was
recognized most logically as residing
in the incumbent President, the
present possessor of legislative
power, since the distinction “between
constitutional content of an organic
character… is one policy, not of law”
and since “the function of the
Assembly to propose amendments to
the Constitution… is but adjunct,
although peculiar, to its gross
legislative power.”
2. Even assuming that the President was
without power, on his own, to
propose amendments, what in reality
happened was that the sovereign
people, in the various referenda,
proposed the amendment, and the
President, acting as agent of the
sovereign people, merely collated
what the people had already
proposed. (In other words, the
President merely re-proposed to the
people what they had already decided
by themselves. No explanation is
given why the people should still
ratify their own will.)
Ultimately, what all these boil down to
is this: the supreme law is not the
Constitution but the law of necessity
of as seen by the President and
legitimized by the Supreme Court.

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 The law of necessity can dictate that
governmental powers in certain
situations be concentrated in the
Executive.
 Does publication of proposed amendments
in the Official Gazette, at the polling places,
and in newspapers of general circulation
satisfy the constitutional requirements of
proper submission to the people?
The determination of the conditions under which
proposed amendments shall be submitted to the
people is a matter which generally falls within the
legislative sphere. That the legislature could have
done better in enlightening the people about such
proposed amendments does not make the means
taken by legislature unconstitutional. Gonzales v.
COMELEC
 When does an amendment or revision take
effect?
“Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite which hall be held not earlier than sixty
days nor later than ninety days after the approval
of such amendment or revision.”
“Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be
valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than
sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
certification by the Commission on Elections of
the sufficiency of the petition.”
 Is presidential proclamation required for
the effectivity of amendments to the
Constitution?
No, unless the proposed amendment says so and
is so ratified.
 What are the essential requisites of a valid
ratification?
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The practice under the 1935 Constitution was
that ratification of amendments must be held in
an election conducted under the election law,
supervised by the independent Commission on
Election, and where only franchised voters take
part. A majority of the Justices in Javellana v.
Executive Secretary, held that these three
elements are of the essence of a valid ratification
of amendments or revision. It is submitted that,
although the 1973 Constitution no longer uses
the word “election” but rather “plebiscite”, the
same requirements still hold because a plebiscite
is just a specie of the generic word election.
 If the above are the requirements of a valid
ratification, how do you explain the
ratification of the 1973 Constitution
where the above requisites, according to a
majority of the Justices, were not followed?
The above requirements apply to amendments and
revision under the Constitution. When, however,
the people in the exercise of their sovereignty
decide that they no longer wish to be bound by
the amendatory process of the Constitution, there
is legally nothing to prevent them from adopting a
new Constitution in a novel extra-constitutional
manner.
In other words, a new constitution can come into
being extra-constitutionally, i.e., by revolution.
The 1973 Constitution was the product of a
“bloodless revolution” The Freedom Constitution
of 1986 was also a product of revolution.
FROM ALBANO REVIEWER:
 After the Constitutional Convention has
finally drafted the amendments to the
Constitution or any process of amending
the same, should they be submitted to the
people for ratification? Why?
Yes, because the Constitution provides that “any
amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution,
shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite called for that purpose.”
(Sec. 4, Art. XVII)
 When should the plebiscite be called if the
amendments are proposed by a Constitutional
constitutional convention or Congress
sitting as a constituent assembly? Why?
The plebiscite shall be held not earlier than 60
days nor later than 90 days after the approval of
such amendments or revision (Sec. 4[1], Art. XVII,
1987 Constitution), so that the people may have
sufficient time to discuss the issues.
 When shall the plebiscite be held if the
amendments are proposed through
people’s initiative?
It shall be held not earlier than 60 days not later
than 90 days after the certification by the
Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the
petition. (Sec. 4[2], Art. XVII, 1987 Constitution).
This has to be so because the people should be
given sufficient time to discuss the merits and
demerits of the proposed amendments. (Tolentino
vs. COMELEC)
 What is meant by revision?
Revision is the revamp or rewriting of the entire
Constitution.
 What is meant by amendment?
Amendment is the isolated or piecemeal change in
the Constitution.
 Give the concepts on the position of a
constitutional convention in relation to the
power of amending the constitution
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The concepts on the position of a constitutional
convention are:
1. The theory of conventional
sovereignty. Under this concept, the
Convention is
supreme over the other departments
of the government. (Loomis vs.
Jackson). There is no need to submit
the proposed amendments of the
Constitution for ratification by the
people;
2. The second theory is that the
constitutional convention is
inferior to the other departments
of the government as it is a mere
creation of the Congress; and
3. The third theory is that it is
independent of and co-equal with
the other departments of the
government. (Frantz vs. Autry)
 In relation to a constitutional convention,
what theory is adopted by the Philippines?
Why?
The Philippines, through the Constitution,
adheres to the third theory. (Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito, 78 Phil. 1).
This is so because the Constitution requires that
for the validity of the amendments to or revision
of the Constitution, the same must be ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for
that purpose. It is in this provision that the
Constitution rejected the theory of Conventional
Sovereignty.
 What is the operative act that gives validity
to the proposed amendments to the
Constitution?
It is the ratification by the people in a plebiscite
called for that purpose that gives operative act to
the proposed amendments to the Constitution.

 What is the doctrine of fair and proper
submission of the proposed amendments
to the Constitution?
It means that the Constitution should be
submitted to the people as a whole, not piecemeal.
The people must be informed of the issues and
they must be given sufficient time to discuss the
merits and demerits of the proposed amendments.
It may also mean that the plebiscite may be held
on the same day at a regular election (Gonzales vs.
COMELEC)
 What are the two (2) component standards
of the doctrine of fair and proper
submission?
They are:
1. the period or time of the submission;
and
2. the opportunity of the people to be
informed of the proposed changes or
occasion for their study, deliberation
and debate on the issues.
 Is the ratification of the proposed
amendments to the Constitution a political
or justiciable question? Why?
It is a justiciable question which is subject to
judicial review. (Javellana vs. Executive
Secretary)
 What is initiative?
Initiative is the power of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution or to propose
and enact legislation through an election called
for the purpose. (Sec. 2[a], RA. No. 6735).
 What are the three (3) systems of initiative?
The three (3) systems of initiative are:
1. Initiative on the Constitution which
refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution;
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2. Initiative on statutes which refers to
the petition proposing to enact a
national legislation; and
3. Initiative on local legislation which
refers to a petition proposing to
enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance. (Sec. 2 [a],
RA. No. 6735).
 What is meant by indirect initiative?
Indirect initiative is the exercise of initiative by
the people through a proposition sent to
Congress or the local legislative body for action.
(Sec. 2[b], RA No. 6735).
 Is there any difference between an
initiative and referendum?
Yes, there are statutory and conceptual
demarcations between referendum and initiative.
Under the Initiative and Referendum Act (RA No.
6735, Sec. 3);
“Initiative” is the power of the people to
propose amendments to the Constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an
election called for the purpose.
“Referendum” is the power of the
electorate to approve or reject a legislation
through an election called for the purpose. It may
be of two classes, namely:
c.1 Referendum on statutes which refers
to a petition to approve or reject an act or law or
part thereof, passed by Congress; and
c. 2 Referendum on local law which
refers to a petition to approve or reject a law,
resolution or ordinance enacted by regional
assemblies and local legislative bodies.
Hence, initiative is the power of the people to
propose bills or laws, and to enact or reject them
at the polls independently of the legislative
assembly.
Referendum is the right reserved to the people to
adopt or reject any act or measure which has been
passed by a legislative body which in most cases
would, without action on the part of the electors,
become a law.
 On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus Delfin
filed with the COMELEC, a Petition to
Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits
of Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative.
Admittedly, he has not yet gathered
signatures pursuant to the Constitution. Is
the petition proper? Why?
No, because a petition for initiative on the
Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the
total number of registered voters of which every
legislative district is represented by at least 3% of
the registered voters therein. Since he has not yet
gathered the required signatures, the petition
cannot be validly initiated. (Santiago vs.
COMELEC)
 RA No. 6735 provided for the system of
initiative on national and local legislations,
but it did not provide a system/procedure
on the Constitution. Can the COMELEC
promulgate rules and regulations for a
people’s initiative on the Constitution
based on such law? Why?
No, otherwise there would be violation of the
principle of delegation of powers. RA No. 6735 is
incomplete, inadequate, and wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
This substantive matter is fatal and cannot be
cured by empowering the COMELEC to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative
body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to
promulgate rules and regulations is a form of
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delegation of the legislative authority. In every
case of permissible delegation, there must be a
showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is
valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself,
setting forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and
(b) fixes a standard, the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate and determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. (Santiago vs.
COMELEC)
 The Constitution provides for a people’s
initiative on the Constitution. It likewise
provides that Congress shall provide for
the implementation of the exercise of this
right. Can the right be exercised without
proper legislation? Why?
No, because the constitutional provision is not
self-executing as can be seen from the
Constitution itself providing that the Congress
shall provide for the implementation of the right
of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution through people’s initiative. The right
of the people to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution through the system of initiative
would remain entombed in the cold niche of the
Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. (Santiago vs. COMELEC)
 May the right of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution through
people’s initiative include the right to
revise the Constitution?
No, it is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand to a revision
which contemplates a total overhaul of the
Constitution. (Santiago vs. COMELEC)
 Is there a form required of the proposal?
Explain.
None. These essential elements are present only if
the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by
signing such complete proposal in a petition.
Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition” only if
the people sign on a petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be
either written on the face of the petition, or
attached to it. If so attached, the petition must
state the fact of such attachment. This is an
assurance that every one of the several millions of
signatories to the petition had seen the full text of
the proposed amendments before signing.
Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the
time constraint, to prove that every one of the
millions of signatories had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing. (Lambino
vs. COMELEC)
 What is the rationale for the requirement
that in initiative petitions, the people must
first see the full text of the proposed
amendments? Explain.
The unbending requirements is that the people
must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign to signify their
assent, and that the people must sign on an
initiative petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments. (State ex. Rel. Patton vs.
Myers)
The rationale for this requirement is that, a
signature requirement would be meaningless if
the person supplying the signature has not first
seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further,
and more importantly, loose interpretation of the
subscription requirement can pose a significant
potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe
orally the contents of an initiative petition to a
potential singer, without having actually examined
the petition, could easily mislead the singer by, for
example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly
misrepresenting, portions of the petition that
might not be to the singer’s liking. This danger
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seems particularly acute when, in this case, the
person giving the description is the drafter of the
petition, who obviously has a vested interest in
seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to
qualify for the ballot. (Capezzito vs. State Ballot
Commission)
Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed
at the time of signing of the nature and effect of
that which is proposed” and failure to do so is
“deceptive and misleading” which renders the
initiative void. (Stumpf vs. law, Lambino vs.
COMELEC)
 Atty. Lamino admitted that the signature
sheets did not contain the full text of the
proposed changes in the Constitution.
State the effect of such failure. Explain.
The omission is fatal. The failure to so include the
text of the proposed changes in the signature
sheets renders the initiative void for non-
compliance with the constitutional requirement
that the amendment must be “directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition.” The
signature sheet is not the “petition” envisioned in
the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million
people who signed the signature sheets did not
see the full text of the proposed changes before
signing. They could not have known the nature
and effect of the proposed changes. (Lambino vs.
COMELEC)
 During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino
stated that this provision is a “surplusage”
and the Court and the people should simply
ignore it. Is the contention proper? Why?
No. Far from being surplusage, it invalidated the
initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to
the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicamera-Parliamentary system. American
jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this
logrolling – when the initiative petition
incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the
same petition. This puts the people in a dilemma
since they can answer only either yes or no to the
entire proposition, forcing them to sign a petition
that effectively contains two propositions, one of
which they may find unacceptable.
for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010.
However, there is no counterpart provision for the
present members of the House of Representatives
even if their term of office will all end on 30 June
2007, three years earlier than that of half of the
present Senators. Thus, all the present members
of the House will remain members of the interim
Parliament after 30 June 2010.

Under American jurisprudence, the effect of
logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and
not only the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in
Fine v. Firestone, the Supreme Court of Florida
declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one
proposal constitutes “logrolling” which, if our
judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we
cannot permit. The very broadness of the
proposed amendments amounts to logrolling
because the electorate cannot know what it is
voting on- the amendment’s proponents’
simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the
iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the electorate
fair notice of the proposed amendment being
voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant
case fails to do that. The very broadness of the
proposal makes it impossible to state what it will
affect and effect and violates the requirement that
proposed amendments embrace only one subject.
(Lambino vs. COMELEC)
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30
June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister
exercises all the powers of the President. If the
interim Parliament does not schedule elections
for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the
Prime Minister will come only from the present
members of the House of Representatives to the
exclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this
discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3
million people who signed the signature sheets
could not have known that their signatures would
be used to discriminate against the Senators. They
could not have known that their signatures would
be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim
Parliament’s choice of Prime Minister only to
members of the existing House of Representatives.

*There is another intriguing provision inserted in

the Lambino Group’s amended petition of 30
August 2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the
Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of
office ends in 2010 shall be members of
Parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June
2010.

 State the effect of such provision. Explain

After 30 June 2010, not one of the present

Senators will remain as member of Parliament if
the interim Parliament dos not schedule elections

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