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Name: Frinz Castillo

Case: Sumaway vs Urban Bank


Gr No.: 142534
Date: June 27, 2008
Topic: Rule 41, Commencement of Period to Appeal

Facts:
Petitioners filed an action for Reformation of Contract, Specific Performance,
Damages, Consignation with Injunction, with Restraining Order, with the Regional
Trial Court.
Respondents Urban Bank, Isabela Sugar Co., Inc., and Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña,
filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states
no cause of action; the claim is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds; the
action has prescribed; and the pendency of another action.
The trial court, granted the motion to dismiss.
Petitioners’ counsel received the order on September 19, 1995, and filed a motion
for reconsideration on October 2, 1995. On January 30, 1996, the trial court denied
the motion for reconsideration, which order was received by petitioners’ counsel
on April 25, 1996.
On May 3, 1996, petitioners’ counsel filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due
course by the trial court in its Order dated May 17, 1996. Consequently, the trial
court ordered the transmittal of the records of the case to the CA.
Petitioners submitted their brief on May 2, 1997.
On June 3, 1997, respondent Urban Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the
ground that the appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period.
Respondent contended that petitioners’ notice of appeal was filed five days late,
as it should have been filed on April 28, 1997, and not May 3, 1997.
The CA found merit in respondent’s contention and granted the motion to dismiss
The CA also denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals (CA) erred in dismissing petitioners’ appeal for
having been filed out of time.

Ruling:
Petition is GRANTED
The fresh 15-day period within which to file notice of appeal counted from notice
of the denial of the motion for reconsideration may be applied to petitioners’ case
inasmuch as rules of procedure may be given retroactive effect to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage.19 Thus, in Republic of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals,20 involving A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, which provided
for the rule that the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari shall
be reckoned from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, the
Court stated that rules of procedure "may be given retroactive effect to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is
no vested rights in rules of procedure."
Therefore, the appeal before the CA should be deemed as timely filed and the case
be remanded to the CA for further proceedings as was done in the Neypes case.

Doctrine:
Fresh period rule. The Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
Name: Frinz Castillo
Case: Refuerzo vs Heirs of the Late Francisco Refuerzo
Gr No.: 162442
Date: October 23, 2006
Topic: Rule 41, Perfection of Appeal

Facts:
Involved in that suit is a parcel of land located at San Eugenio Aringay, La Union, in
the name of Francisco Refuerzo, Sr. The respondent heirs claimed ownership of the
same land as the legal heirs of its registered owner, the late Francisco Refuerzo, Sr.
In their complaint, the heirs, as plaintiffs, alleged that petitioner Manuel Refuerzo,
under the pretense of being the son of the late Francisco Refuerzo, Sr., deceitfully
and maliciously executed an Affidavit of Adjudication adjudicating unto himself the
one-half southern portion of the property subject of the suit and thereafter sold
said portion to his co-petitioner Melchor Juloya, even as Juloya knew that the land
was registered in the name of respondent heirs; and that of December 19, 1995,
Manuel again executed a deed of sale, this time disposing of a western portion of
the property in favor of Gina R. Parentila and Edna P. Gatchalian. The plaintiff heirs
alleged that in all these transactions, the respective transferees knew that they (the
heirs) were the registered owners of the property sold, hence all the
aforementioned conveyances were null and void, the buyers being purchasers in
bad faith.
On the other hand, the petitioners, as defendants a quo, countered that Manuel
Refuerzo is the surviving son and legal heir of the late Francisco Refuerzo, Sr. Hence,
upon the demise of Francisco Refuerzo, Sr., Manuel succeeded and became the
owner of the subject property which he thereafter adjudicated unto himself in good
faith; and that as new owner of the property, he sold the same to Melchor Juloya
who subsequently caused the subdivision thereof and transferred the subdivided
portions for value to the other transferees who are buyers in good faith.

In a decision dated October 31, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment for the
respondent heirs. Because Manuel is not a legitimate child or primary heir of the
late Francisco Refuerzo, Sr., the trial court ruled that the affidavit of adjudication
executed by Manuel cannot present a valid claim on the land registered in the
names of the respondent heirs, the same affidavit having been executed by Manuel
in bad faith, misrepresentation and fraud of the legal title and absolute ownership
of the respondent heirs. In the same decision, the trial court also annulled all
documents flowing from the nullified affidavit of adjudication and all tax
declarations and certificates of titles issued to the transferees, and ordered the
restoration of OCT No. RO-3184 (8325).
Order dated December 19, 2001, the trial court, on motion of the respondent heirs,
granted execution pending appeal due to petitioners disposal of parts or portions
of the subject property to the prejudice of the general public, especially potential
buyers of portions thereof.

Issue:
Whether the order of execution pending appeal is valid

Ruling:
Petition is DENIED
Discretionary execution may be granted by the court while it has jurisdiction over
the case and is still in possession of the original records thereof. At the time the
RTC issued the questioned orders, that court still had jurisdiction over the main
case since the petitioners, at the time the challenged orders were issued, had not
yet perfected their appeal from the October 31, 2001 decision of the same court.
Petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal only on January 8, 2002, whereas the order
of execution pending appeal was issued way back on December 19, 2001, as
reiterated in the Order of January 23, 2002 denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the first.
Moreover, when those orders were issued, the records of the case were still in the
possession or custody of the trial court. Rule 41, Section 9 of the Rules of Court
states:
Section 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. - A party's appeal by notice of appeal
is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.
A party's appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to
the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due
time.
In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the
perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal
of the other parties.
In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject
matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and
the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
Clearly, prior to the transmittal of the records to the appellate court, the trial court
may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties,
among which is to order execution pending appeal. Hence, the RTC acted within its
discretion in issuing the order of execution pending appeal and in denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof. As stated earlier, the trial court
issued its order of execution pending appeal on December 19, 2001 on motion of
the respondent heirs due to the petitioners disposal of parts or portions of the
property subject of the litigation. In fine, the CA committed no error in affirming
the said errors of the trial court. Indeed, for the petitioners to stay execution
pending appeal, their remedy would have been to post a supersedeas bond under
Section 3, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. This, they failed to do.

Doctrine:
In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal,
the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the
parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal
in accordance with Section 9 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
Name: Frinz Castillo
Case: Plopenio vs Department of Agrarian Reform
Gr No.: 161090
Date: July 4, 2012
Topic: Rule 42, Applicability

Facts:

Petitioner-spouses own 11.8643 hectares of coconut land in Caramoan, Camarines


Sur, while petitioner Eduardo owns 22.8349 hectares of coconut land in the same
locality. In 2000, the land of their brother Gavino Plopenio, likewise located in
Caramoan, Camarines Sur, was valued by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) at ₱51,125.60 per hectare. On this basis, petitioners
offered their entire landholdings to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for
acquisition and distribution pursuant to Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6657, or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. On 26 October 2001, public respondent Land
Bank sent a Notice of Valuation and Adjudication valuing the land of petitioner-
spouses at ₱23,485.00 per hectare and that of petitioner Eduardo at ₱22,856.62
per hectare. Dissatisfied with Land Bank’s offer, petitioners rejected the Notice of
Valuation and Acquisition and referred the matter to the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Camarines Sur for summary administrative
proceedings
The PARAD affirmed the valuation made by Land Bank.
On 11 October 2002, or 14 days thereafter, petitioners filed their Motion for
Reconsideration.
The PARAD denied their Motion.
Petitioners then filed separate Petitions before the SAC-RTC on 6 January 2003, or
16 days after their receipt of the PARAD’s Order. They explained that they were
allowed to file their appeal 15 days from the receipt of the Order of denial of their
Motion for Reconsideration.
Since the 15th day fell on a Sunday, they reasoned that they should be allowed to
file their appeal until 6 January 2003. In its Answer, Land Bank alleged that the
Decision of the PARAD had already attained finality after the lapse of the 15-day
period, counted from petitioners’ receipt of the PARAD’s Decision. Thus, it argued
that the SACRTC should no longer entertain the Petitions.
In its assailed Decisions, the SAC-RTC ruled that the Decision of the PARAD had
already attained finality because petitioners failed to file their Petitions on time.
The lower court thus dismissed the appeal.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the SAC-RTC’s Decision, but their motions
were denied for lack of merit.
From the Decisions and Orders of the SAC-RTC, petitioners then filed the instant
Petitions for Review directly before this Court.
Issue:
Whether filing the instant Rule 45 Petitions directly with this Court is correct.
Ruling:
At the outset, we rule that the consolidated Petitions are immediately dismissible
because petitioners resorted to a wrongful mode of appeal by filing the instant Rule
45 Petitions directly with this Court.
We have repeatedly ruled that the right to appeal is a remedy of statutory origin.
As such, this right must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law authorizing its exercise. The special jurisdiction of the SAC-
RTC is conferred and regulated by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, and
appeals therefrom are governed by Section 60 thereof. That law expressly states
that appeals from SACs must be taken to the Court of Appeals without making a
distinction between appeals raising questions of fact and those dealing purely with
questions of law.
Doctrine:
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we. Consequently, we rule that the only mode of appeal
from decisions of the SAC-RTC is via a Rule 42 petition for review to the Court of
Appeals, without any distinction as to whether the appeal raises questions of fact,
questions of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
Name: Frinz Castillo
Case: Mariners Polytechnic Colleges Foundation, Inc. vs Garchitorena
Gr No.: 162253
Date: August 13, 2008
Topic: Rule 42, Form and Contents

Facts:

Complainant was hired as a college instructor by respondent [herein petitioner]


school way back in June 1986. After two years of full time teaching complainant
went on leave of absence to go abroad in November 1988. When he came back in
June 1992, he applied again in respondent school as a college instructor and was
accepted. Since then he had continuously taught in the school. However, he alleged
that without any cause or reason given to him for the first semester of school year
1997- 1998 he was not given his regular load. When complainant inquired from the
Dean of the College why he was not given his regular teaching load, the Dean
advised complainants to see the Executive Vice-President of the school, Ms.
Melissa Jimenez Ampuan, who according to complainant, just casually told him to
"take a rest" or in Bicol dialect "Magpahingalo ka muna."

Hence, the instant complaint alleging that he was illegally dismissed.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of the complainant.

The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the NLRC. It then appealed
the decision to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari.

The CA dismissed the petition outright for utter failure of the petitioner to comply
with Section 3, Rule 46 of the aforesaid Rules.
Issue:

Whether or not the documents accompanying the petition before the CA


sufficiently supported the allegations therein.

Ruling:

In the case at bar, we find that the documents attached to the petition sufficiently
supported the allegations therein. The attached LA decision made reference to the
position papers of both parties in stating the factual antecedents of the case.
Likewise, it embodied the cause of action of the complainant as well as the
arguments of both parties. Annexed to the Memorandum of Appeal of the
petitioner are the (1) Service Contract signed by the petitioner and the respondent,
and (2) a copy of the workload of the complainant. The LA decision and the
Memorandum of Appeal including its annexes obviated the need for the petitioner
to attach the complaint and the position papers of the parties. Furthermore, the
NLRC decision and the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration discussed the
grounds for appeal and the arguments raised therein.

Doctrine:

The mandatory tenor of Section 2(d), Rule 42 with respect to the requirement of
attaching clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final
orders of both lower courts is discernible and well settled.

The phrase "of the pleadings and other material portions of the record" in Section
2(d), Rule 42 is followed by the phrase "as would support the allegations of the
petition" clearly contemplates the exercise of discretion on the part of the
petitioner in the selection of documents that are deemed to be relevant to the
petition.