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T not courts

regulations must be prescribed by agencies and must be legally binding – courts meet
GEPA 10 (“General Education Provisions Act (GEPA): Overview and Issues,” Every CRS Report,

For the purposes of this section, a

regulation is defined as "any generally applicable rule, regulation, guideline, interpretation, or other
requirement" that is prescribed by the Secretary or ED and that is legally binding with respect to an
applicable program. Regulations must contain citations to the particular section of statutory law or
other legal authority upon which relevant provisions are based, and all regulations must be uniformly
applied and enforced in all 50 states. Although the Administrative Procedure Act, which establishes the process that agencies must follow when
enacting regulations, contains an exemption for matters pertaining to public property, loans, grants, and benefits,14 GEPA specifies that this exemption shall apply
only to regulations that govern the first grant competition under a new or substantially revised program or if the Secretary determines that the requirements of this
subsection will cause "extreme hardship" to the program beneficiaries affected by the regulations.

Violation: the aff specifies court action

Prefer it –
1.) Limits – the topic is already massive – allowing courts creates rulings on endless
numbers of cases that are related to education
2.) Bi-directionality – court rulings can be enforced, left alone, or inspire action that
runs counter to the precedent being set – only legislative and agency action
guarantees hard action
The appropriate number of the fifty states will invoke their power under Article V of
the Constitution to call a limited constitutional convention for the purpose of
Establishing that the precedent established in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman I applies to elementary and secondary education spending statutes that
mandate state delivery of particularized in-kind services, and the precedent
established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. applies
to elementary and secondary education statutes that require states to adopt simple
regulatory proscriptions and cross-cutting conditional education spending. The
appropriate number of the fifty states will ratify the amendment.

Amending instead of judicial policy change solves the case without hurting the
Supreme Court's image or risking rollback
Thomas E. Baker, Law Prof @ Texas Tech, 1995, “Exercising the Amendment Power,” 22 Hastings Const. L.Q. 325

Indeed, the
best use of this “republican veto” would be to set aside a Supreme Court decision that itself overrules a
prior decision. This would have the immediate effect of reinstating the preferred earlier interpretation.
For example, Congress and the state legislatures by vetoing either National League of Cities v. Usery86 or Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
could have settled the debate over the Tenth Amendment, at least for this generation. That
would have avoided the constitutional
consternation that resulted from the Court’s yo-yoing of its own precedents.88 This usage to set aside
judicial overrulings has the potential to reclaim valuable constitutional precedent at only an incremental
cost to the Court as an institution.89 The Supreme Court’s recent internal debate over stare decisis for constitutional questions is instructive and provides
Congress with some helpful criteria to consider in deciding whether to veto a Supreme Court decision. Such criteria include the narrowness of the margin of the
decision, the persuasiveness of the dissents, the lack of allegiance by present members of the Court, the difficulty of consistent application by the lower courts and
subsequent Supreme Courts, the extent of reliance on the ruling within the legal community and in society at large, how related doctrines have affected the ruling,
and whether the facts and assumptions relied on in the decision have been overcome by subsequent developments.90 The debate over the particular proposal
ought to take place on this level of pragmatic argumentation, with full consideration afforded to all relevant and prudential factors,91 including the threshold
assumption that there is a higher burden for constitutional change than for legislative matters. Constitutional politics ought to claim the best wisdom of our nation,
expressed through the Congress and the state legislatures. How can the Supreme Court be expected to act in response to the
exercise of the “republican veto” if the practice becomes routine? If an amendment is proposed by Congress and ratified by the states, then the Court is

oath-bound 92 to respect the outcome of the political process.93 In fact, each time Article V has been relied
on to overrule a Supreme Court decision, the Justices have adhered to their oaths.94 The Supreme Court, no less than
the political branches, must adhere to the rule of law; indeed, the Court as an institution has the most to lose under the rule of man.95 The constitutional dialogue
would be enhanced by regular repair to the “republican veto.”96 Under settled understandings of the principle of separation of powers, the decisions when and
what to propose and ratify in a “republican veto” are wholly given over to the Article V procedures. The judicial task of interpreting any amendment, including a
new amendment setting aside a specific Court decision, necessarily resides with the Supreme Court, as does the continuing obligation to interpret the scope of the
underlying provision of the Constitution’ The implied veto of judicial review is subject to the explicit veto of Article V, but the awesome responsibility to interpret
the Constitution will remain with the Supreme Court. Once
ratified, a “republican veto” will become part and parcel of the
same constitutional dynamic.98 Arguably, an amendment that is negative should be preferred over an amendment that attempts
affirmatively to state a new constitutional rule for decision. What is needed is a different interpretation, not different language.99 In our constitutional theater, the
Supreme Court always will perform center stage, but Article V makes Congress the director, and the people in the states the playwrights. A “republican veto” will

oblige the Justices to reinterpret their part as they perform their ongoing role. This is a constitutionally
creative collaboration which is textually preferred over the common law methodology within the
exclusive domain of the Justices.’°°
T edu

Education means the process of learning within schools – it’s distinct from the broader
Cooch, 3 – Judge for the Superior Court of Delaware (Richard, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff-
BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW, Defendants-Below, Appellees. C.A. No. 02A-03-001 RRC SUPERIOR
COURT OF DELAWARE, NEW CASTLE 2003 Del. Super. LEXIS 37, 1/30, lexis)

The Court's view that the placement of the Bank's facilities within the Student Center serves "school
purposes" is further buttressed by the fact that the Agreement between the school and the Bank
frequently notes that its purpose was "to provide [or implement] enhanced levels of banking service to…
[University] students…" 65 When one thinks of a "school" as encompassing the body of students,
faculty, administrators, and employees which constitute the institution's makeup, it is not illogical to
view "enhanced levels of banking service" directed at those persons as serving a "school" purpose; this
is to be contrasted with the term [*31] "education," which, as noted above, is more directed to the
actual process of learning itself. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 65 See Agreement at 1
para. 1 (R. at 13), 2 para. 3 (R. at 14). - - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - By contrast, the
County, although couching its arguments against property tax exemption in terms of "school purposes,"
focuses solely on the connotation of the "educational" purpose portion of section 8105. The County
relies heavily on cases from other jurisdictions decided under differently-worded statutes. It argues that
"school" purpose means "an institution for learning…" 66 and that "providing convenient banking
facilities does not promote instruction or education[][.]" 67 But this analysis fails to take into account
that the term "school" is not necessarily limited to the actual process of learning, in contrast to the term
"education," which tends to be more exactly limited. And when one considers that the predominant use
of the Bank in the Student Center is student convenience, this Court's finding that that the Bank serves
"school [*32] purposes" is warranted; the Burris Court itself noted that student "convenience" is
entitled to consideration when it found that the property at issue was taxable because it was for the
headmaster's convenience and not "a convenient place for holding meetings and social affairs" in
connection with the school. 68 The County's argument that tax exemption of the Bank's facility would
lead to a commercial advantage in its favor, while colorable, is ultimately unpersuasive.

Violation – the plan acts on issues separate from the classroom

Voting issue
--limits – expanding the topic to include the entire school systems makes us debate
anything tangentially related to education – Education as learning is a finite,
predictable literature base

-- legal precision – our interpretation is a court determination that education is more

limited than schooling
The United States federal government should
- Dismiss all legal challenges to Title IX of the Education Amendments and
dismiss any cases that seek to apply the non delegation, clear statement or
major questions doctrine
- not issue any laws that conditionally preempting state government policies
concerning fracking
Court ptx
Wisconsin’s districting map is going to get struck down – maintaining Kennedy is key
Greenblat, Staff Writer, 9/13/2017
Alan, “Will the U.S. Supreme Court Take a Stand Against Partisan Gerrymandering?”

The U.S.
One of the most time-honored and criticized traditions in American politics is for the party in power to draw legislative districts in ways that help keep them in power.

Supreme Court, though, may soon outlaw at least the most blatant partisan gerrymandering. On Oct. 3, the nation's
highest court will hear oral arguments in a case challenging Wisconsin's state legislative districts. Plaintiffs
complain that the map unfairly protects Republican lawmakers from partisan competition. A lower court agreed with that argument last November. "This could be a huge

case if the justices strike down Wisconsin's partisan gerrymander," says Joshua Douglas, a law professor at the University of Kentucky.
"That will show that there are some limits to partisan gerrymandering." The last time the Supreme Court heard a partisan gerrymandering case, in 2004's

Vieth v. Jubelirer, the justices were divided. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that there could be such a thing as an

unconstitutional partisan gerrymander -- but only if the courts had a "workable standard" for
determining when partisans had crossed that line. The Wisconsin case, known as Whitford v. Gill, represents an
attempt to come up with such a standard. To prove their argument that partisan gerrymandering in the state exceeded what's constitutional, the
plaintiffs used a new political science measurement known as the efficiency gap, which looks at how votes
translate into victories. According to this argument, all votes cast for a losing candidate and any votes for the winner beyond what was needed to win are considered
“wasted.” If too many districts have lopsided outcomes (where the party that drew the map “wasted” significantly fewer votes), the argument goes, that shows that the

party that drew the map sought to game the system, creating districts that are totally safe for one party or the other and diluting its strength in
neighboring districts. Plaintiffs in the Wisconsin case used the efficiency gap to show that Wisconsin's Assembly map -- as measured by results in the 2012 elections -- was roughly three times
more inefficient than the average legislature's. Democrats actually won a majority of the overall vote in Wisconsin's legislative contests in 2012 but came away with only 39 of the Assembly's
99 seats. "Basically, it didn't matter what we did in an election," says Sachin Chheda, a Democratic consultant in Milwaukee who directs the Fair Elections Project, which organized and
launched the Whitford lawsuit. "We could get more votes, but there was no path to a majority in the legislature." That's because regardless of how the total vote breaks out, what matters is
winning by district, says Matt Walter, president of the Republican State Leadership Committee, which helps elect GOP state officials nationwide. "The redistricting process in and of itself is
inherently political and was designed as such at the founding," Walter says. "It was designed to have accountable elected officials take the actions of adjusting districts based on population
growth." For their part, Wisconsin Republicans have maintained that they didn't draw the maps to punish Democrats. Rather, they note that most Democrats are clustered in Milwaukee or
Madison, while Republican voters are spread out more evenly around the state. Although the issue is almost always divided along partisan lines (depending on which party is in power),

there's growing bipartisan support for putting a stop to partisan gerrymandering. A handful of
prominent Republicans -- including Ohio Gov. John Kasich, U.S. Sen. John McCain and former California Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger -- urged the Supreme
Court to use the Wisconsin case to establish a standard for measuring partisan gerrymanders. "The Supreme
Court has said before that partisan gerrymandering can be unconstitutional, but basically it doesn't know how to tell when a plan goes too far," says Annabelle Harless, an attorney with the
Campaign Legal Center, which is working with plaintiffs in the Wisconsin case. "They could adopt the test plaintiffs propose, they could in theory come up with their own standard, or they

plaintiffs in Wisconsin didn't rely exclusively on the efficiency gap. They demonstrated
could say it's not justiciable [not an issue for courts to decide]." Harless notes that the

that Wisconsin legislators acted with partisan intent, namely by unearthing emails that showed they were
putting Democrats at a disadvantage. They also argued that the fact that Democrats tend to live in the state's major cities wasn't enough to justify the lopsided
nature of the Assembly map. The makeup of the Supreme Court has changed considerably since 2004 -- the last time it took a partisan

gerrymandering case -- but the ideological breakdown of justices is expected to remain the same, with four

convinced that partisan gerrymanders are out of bounds and four others believing the exact opposite. On
this question, as in many other cases, Justice Kennedy is expected to remain the swing vote. "Justice Kennedy's views," says
Douglas, the law professor, "are really the whole ballgame."

Court ruling on education undermines the political question doctrine and SOP –
collapses legitimacy
F. Clinton Broden, Federal Criminal Defense Attorney, Litigating State Constitutional Rights to an
Adequate Education and the Remedy of State Operated School Districts, 42 Rutgers L. Rev. 779, 809
Some commentators have argued that, by
intruding into an area outside of the judiciary's expertise such as
education, courts will necessarily sacrifice the legitimacy of the judiciary. They contend that when the
judiciary involves itself in political issues, such involvement must be regarded as a presumptively
illegitimate exercise of judicial power.50 This view of judicial illegitimacy is an offshoot of Justice Mountain's
philosophy of avoidance of political questions and the closely related doctrine of separation of powers.
It is important that a court consider the issue of judicial legitimacy as it determines the appropriate
remedy for a violation of the T&E clause. However, this consideration should not lead the court to forsake its duty to provide a remedy
for a constitutional wrong. Several scholars who have written on the subject of judicial decrees and institutional remedies have recognized that,
since protecting rights is a judicial enterprise, the institutional decree that serves that end is legitimate as well.' 5' As one scholar wrote: [T]he
presumption of illegitimacy may be overcome when the political bodies that should ordinarily exercise such discretion are seriously and
chronically in default. In that event, and for as long as those political bodies remain in default, judicial discretion may be a necessary and
therefore legitimate substitute for political discretion.'52 While the
courts' judicial power must necessarily include
adequate remedial power, the potential problem of judicial illegitimacy does place practical
constraints on this power. Therefore, before a court enters an institutional decree it must engage in
some form of interest balancing by examining both the victims' interests and the social interest involved
in the case. 153 The social interests in a T&E case are the societal benefits of local control over education and the right
of communities to be free from protracted legal battles. The victims' interests are clearly the interests of children in
receiving a thorough and efficient education.

That kills democracy, prevents an effective congress, and allows for an unchecked
Klaas, Washington Post, 2017
Brian, “Gerrymandering is the biggest obstacle to genuine democracy in the United States. So why is no
one protesting?”

There is an enormous paradox at the heart of American democracy. Congress is deeply and stubbornly
unpopular. On average, between 10 and 15 percent of Americans approve of Congress – on a par with public support for traffic jams and cockroaches. And yet, in the 2016 election, only eight
incumbents – eight out of a body of 435 representatives – were defeated at the polls. If there is one silver bullet that could fix
American democracy, it’s getting rid of gerrymandering – the now commonplace practice of drawing electoral districts in a distorted way for partisan gain. It’s also
one of a dwindling number of issues that principled citizens – Democrat and Republican – should be able to agree on. Indeed, polls confirm that an overwhelming majority of Americans of all stripes oppose gerrymandering. In the

average electoral margin of victory was 37.1 percent. That’s a figure you’d expect
2016 elections for the House of Representatives, the

from North Korea, Russia or Zimbabwe – not the United States. But the shocking reality is that the typical race ended with a Democrat
or a Republican winning nearly 70 percent of the vote, while their challenger won just 30 percent. Last year, only 17 seats out of 435 races were decided by a margin
of 5 percent or less. Just 33 seats in total were decided by a margin of 10 percent or less. In other words, more than 9 out of 10 House races were landslides where the campaign was a foregone conclusion before ballots were even

not healthy for a system of government that, at its core, is

cast. In 2016, there were no truly competitive Congressional races in 42 of the 50 states. That is

defined by political competition. Gerrymandering, in a word, is why American democracy is broken. The
word “gerrymander” comes from an 1812 political cartoon drawn to parody Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry’s re-drawn senate districts. The cartoon depicts one of the bizarrely shaped districts in the contorted form of a
fork-tongued salamander. Since 1812, gerrymandering has been increasingly used as a tool to divide and distort the electorate. More often than not, state legislatures are tasked with drawing district maps, allowing the electoral
foxes to draw and defend their henhouse districts. While no party is innocent when it comes to gerrymandering, a Washington Post analysis in 2014 found that eight of the ten most gerrymandered districts in the United States
were drawn by Republicans. As a result, districts from the Illinois 4th to the North Carolina 12th often look like spilled inkblots rather than coherent voting blocs. They are anything but accidental. The Illinois 4th, for example, is
nicknamed “the Latin Earmuffs,” because it connects two predominantly Latino areas by a thin line that is effectively just one road. In so doing, it packs Democrats into a contorted district, ensuring that those voters cast ballots in a
safely Democratic preserve. The net result is a weakening of the power of Latino votes and more Republican districts than the electoral math should reasonably yield. Because Democrats are packed together as tightly as possible in

uncompetitive districts have a seriously

one district, Republicans have a chance to win surrounding districts even though they are vastly outnumbered geographically. These

corrosive effect on the integrity of democracy. If you’re elected to represent a district that is 80 percent
Republican or 80 percent Democratic, there is absolutely no incentive to compromise. Ever. In fact, there is a strong
disincentive to collaboration, because working across the aisle almost certainly means the risk of a
primary challenge from the far right or far left of the party. For the overwhelming majority of
Congressional representatives, there is no real risk to losing a general election – but there is a very real
threat of losing a fiercely contested primary election. Over time, this causes sane people to pursue insane
pandering and extreme positions. It is a key, but often overlooked, source of contemporary gridlock and endless
bickering. Moreover, gerrymandering also disempowers and distorts citizen votes – which leads to decreased turnout and a sense of
powerlessness. In 2010, droves of tea party activists eager to have their voices heard quickly realized that their own representative was either a solidly liberal Democrat in an overwhelmingly blue district or a solidly conservative

Those who now oppose President Trump are

Republican in an overwhelmingly red district. Those representatives would not listen because the electoral map meant that they didn’t need to.

quickly learning the same lesson about the electoral calculations made by their representatives as they make calls or write letters to congressional
representatives who seem about as likely to be swayed as granite. This helps to explain why 2014 turnout sagged to just 36.4 percent, the lowest turnout rate since World War II. Why bother showing up when the result already

seems preordained? There are two pieces of good news. First, several court rulings in state and federal courts have dealt a blow to gerrymandered
the most important is a Wisconsin case (Whitford v. Gill) that ruled that districts
districts. Several court rulings objected to districts that clearly were drawn along racial lines. Perhaps

could not be drawn for deliberate partisan gain. The Supreme Court will rule on partisan gerrymandering in 2017, and it’s a case

that could transform – and reinvigorate – American democracy at a time when a positive shock is sorely
needed. (This may hold true even if Neil Gorsuch is confirmed to the Supreme Court, as Justices Kennedy and Roberts could
side with the liberal minority). Second, fixing gerrymandering is getting easier. Given the right parameters, computer models can fairly apportion citizens into districts that are diverse,
competitive and geographically sensible – ensuring that minorities are not used as pawns in a national political game. These efforts can be bolstered by stripping district drawing powers from partisan legislators and putting them
into the hands of citizen-led commissions that are comprised by an equal number of Democrat- and Republican-leaning voters. Partisan politics is to be exercised within the districts, not during their formation. But gerrymandering
intensifies every decade regardless, because it’s not a politically “sexy” issue. When’s the last time you saw a march against skewed districting? Even if the marches do come someday, the last stubborn barrier to getting reform
right is human nature. Many people prefer to be surrounded by like-minded citizens, rather than feeling like a lonely red oasis in a sea of blue or vice versa. Rooting out gerrymandering won’t make San Francisco or rural Texas
districts more competitive no matter the computer model used. And, as the urban/rural divide in American politics intensifies, competitive districts will be harder and harder to draw. The more we cluster, the less we find common

what truly differentiates democracy from despotism is political

ground and compromise. Ultimately, though, we must remember that

competition. The longer we allow our districts to be hijacked by partisans, blue or red, the further we gravitate
away from the founding ideals of our republic and the closer we inch toward the death of American

Democracy checks global conflicts

Kasparov, Chairman of the Human Rights Foundation, 2/16/2017
Garry, “Democracy and Human Rights: The Case for U.S. Leadership”

The Soviet Union was an existential threat, and this focused the attention of the world, and the American people. There existential threat today is not found on a map,
but it is very real. The forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world order.
Terrorist movements in the Middle East, extremist parties across Europe, a paranoid tyrant in North
Korea threatening nuclear blackmail, and, at the center of the web, an aggressive KGB dictator in Russia. They all want to turn the
world back to a dark past because their survival is threatened by the values of the free world,
epitomized by the United States. And they are thriving as the U.S. has retreated. The global freedom index has declined for ten
consecutive years. No one like to talk about the United States as a global policeman, but this is what happens when there is no cop on the beat. American leadership begins at home, right

here. America cannot lead the world on democracy and human rights if there is no unity on the meaning and

importance of these things. Leadership is required to make that case clearly and powerfully. Right now,
Americans are engaged in politics at a level not seen in decades. It is an opportunity for them to rediscover that making
America great begins with believing America can be great. The Cold War was won on American values
that were shared by both parties and nearly every American. Institutions that were created by a
Democrat, Truman, were triumphant forty years later thanks to the courage of a Republican, Reagan. This bipartisan consistency
created the decades of strategic stability that is the great strength of democracies. Strong institutions
that outlast politicians allow for long-range planning. In contrast, dictators can operate only tactically, not
strategically, because they are not constrained by the balance of powers, but cannot afford to think
beyond their own survival. This is why a dictator like Putin has an advantage in chaos, the ability to move quickly. This can only
be met by strategy, by long-term goals that are based on shared values, not on polls and cable news. The fear of making things worse has paralyzed the United States from trying to make things better. There will always be

. The spread of democracy is the only proven remedy for nearly every crisis that
setbacks, but the United States cannot quit

plagues the world today. War, famine, poverty, terrorism–all are generated and exacerbated by
authoritarian regimes. A policy of America First inevitably puts American security last. American leadership is required because there is no
one else, and because it is good for America. There is no weapon or wall that is more powerful for security than America
being envied, imitated, and admired around the world. Admired not for being perfect, but for having
the exceptional courage to always try to be better. Thank you
Tax reform
Tax reform will pass now – massive Republican and lobby support.
Melin 10/10 (Mark Melin, “Tax Reform Tea Leaves Are Lining Up, Trump Might Get Bigly Yuge Win,”
ValueWalk, October 10, 2017,, Accessed
10/14/2017, Kent Denver-jKIM)

a win on tax reform could materialize, says one analyst. The US tax
With a host of early legislative failures pockmarking the record of President Donald Trump,

reform initiative is heading for legislative success, predicts CLSA’s Christopher Wood. the reason
, for instance, But for

may come at the hands of the established order

success rather than through a populist revolt. There have been many cautionary notes about the potential for a Trump victory in Congress. Moody’s, for its
part, warned that age-old concerns about increasing debt levels might bog down Republican efforts. "The extension of debt ceiling and government fu nding debates into fourth-quarter 2017 may limit Congress’ ability to pass tax reform," Moody’s analysts wrote in a September report. But

aKPMG noted that the “first step towards tax reform” has been taken, as House Republicans passed a

budget resolution. It is easy to dismiss the

For CLSA’s Wood this is just one of several signs that, when reading the political tea leaves, helps him draw the conclusion that the “Trumponomics trade” is back on.

Trump administration’s legislative potential But this time it is different. when considering their lack of accomplishment to date. While the nuanced undercurrents of
a President elected under a populist mandate concern the established order, looking at what is happening on US tax reform paints a different picture. The “Big Six” are coming together while a nest of “huge vested interests” swirl. CLSA notes Republican leaders -- Treasury Secretary Steven

Mnuchin Cohn Ryan Brady

, National Economic Council Director Gary McConnell and
, House Speaker Paul , House Ways and Means Chairman Kevin , Senate Majority Leader Mitch Senate Finance Chairman Orrin

Hatch are all rallying around the prospect of tax reform. Not only are the big six coming out in force,

but CLSA detects a high level of professional coordination This paints a very ahead of the release of a nine-page tax reform blueprint.

different picture than what occurred during the Obamacare debate , Wood says. But it’s not just the established political wing that is embracing US tax reform.

Meadows head of a group of Republicans known as the “House Freedom Caucus

Congressman Mark (R-NC), ,” has been a staunch critic of

When US tax reform is on the table, however, all pretense towards defending the
government spending that meaningfully increases the deficit.

budget appears to have vaporized. Meadows is indicating his group will not “dogmatically” insist on the now

tax package being revenue neutral “ A win in

,” a key sign that Wood uses to line up the tea leaves on this issue. Forget those pesky bond vigilantes, there is nothing holding back interest rates for rising.

Congress would likely lift a White House that finds itself under siege, potentially turning momentum. often But

victory in this issue might not happen quickly.

Only thing that can derail passage is controversy over education – Trump has
triangulated agenda and pivoted against congress
Benjamin Domenech is the publisher of The Federalist, host of The Federalist Radio Hour, and writes
The Transom, a daily subscription newsletter for political insiders. He was previously a fellow at The
Manhattan Institute and a senior fellow at The Heartland Institute; editor in chief of The City, an
academic journal on faith and culture; and a speechwriter for HHS Secretary Tommy Thompson and U.S.
Senator John Cornyn of Texas. Politics, 9-6-2017, The Pivot Is Real, And It's Spectacular," Federalist,, Accessed: 9-11-2017, /Kent

So President Trump calls the leadership of the Republicans and Democrats into the Oval Office today for
a meeting about what to do about the debt ceiling and funding the government, and he promptly does
something that Washington should’ve expected, but didn’t because they’re locked in to bad
conventional wisdom: he overruled his aides to side with Chuck Schumer and Nancy Pelosi over Mitch
McConnell and Paul Ryan. The pivot is real, and it’s spectacular. Ryan and McConnell were flabbergasted. “Republicans
left the Oval Office Wednesday stunned. Trump had quickly sided with Democrats on a short-term debt ceiling increase, even overruling his
own Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin to concur with “Chuck and Nancy,” as he later called them on Air Force One. “But Trump defied more
than his top aides. He turned on Republican leaders in Congress when he caved to Democrats’ demands to raise the debt limit and fund the
government for three months, setting up a brutal year-end fiscal cliff. The move shocked everyone, as top White House officials and GOP
leaders had been gearing up to raise the debt ceiling through the 2018 midterm election, looking to pass legislation as soon as Friday. “But even
after Mnuchin, Speaker Paul Ryan and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell pushed back on the Democratic demands in the meeting,
Trump agreed to the three-month deal that will also head off the possibility of a government shutdown until mid-December. “During the
meeting, Ryan sharply criticized the Democratic proposal, a source familiar with the exchange said. But Schumer reminded him that Ryan had
supported short-term increases in the past intended to help create bipartisan deals in 2013. “So after Democrats rejected GOP proposals to
raise the debt ceiling for 18 months, and then six months — Trump endorsed Schumer’s three-month pitch. That means Congress will have to
raise the debt ceiling, negotiate a massive trillion-dollar spending bill, and potentially hash out a deal on immigration all at once. “Democrats
were gleeful.” And well they should be! It may be that this is the first sign Trump is himself waking up to the
inaccuracy of the conventional wisdom about “needing McConnell and Ryan” which has animated so
much of the early failures of the Republican legislative agenda. So he’s being more honest: he doesn’t like McConnell
and Ryan, never did. He likes Chuck Schumer, and knows him, and thinks he can work with him. And he
knows Chuck always makes money for his partners. Back in May, I wrote that Trump would be better off doing exactly this:
“So what would that pivot look like? It begins with doing the same thing that he did all the time during
the presidential campaign: running against Washington and refusing to even pretend to be a traditional
Republican. He can start by calling Capitol Hill Republicans into the Oval Office and demand answers on
health care, on tax reform, on why they have been so incapable of advancing an agenda even with
united government and years of preparation. He can even publicly attack them – why should he care
about crossing Hill Republicans at this point? Hill Republicans had six months to repeal Obamacare and
get moving on tax reform, and they’re not up to the job. (Sad!)” If it was true in May, it’s even more true today: there
is zero downside for Trump taking sides against feckless Republicans who have failed to deliver on their
promises to him or to their voters, who lag him consistently in the polls, and who are clearly being
blamed more than the president for failing to deliver on their agenda. See this recent CNN poll: “Consider this:
In January, 75% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents approved of their party’s
congressional leadership. Now? Just 39% approve, according to a new CNN poll. That bears repeating: Less than four in 10
REPUBLICANS approve of the job REPUBLICAN congressional leaders are doing.” As I wrote in a recent edition of The Transom: The truth is
that Trump doesn’t need McConnell. What would he need him for? Every Republican wants tax reform.
Yesterday some reporters were warning darkly about the debt limit or the budget. Who do you think is more worried about the consequences
of a shutdown, Trump or McConnell? And
if, come December, Congress has failed to send health care, tax reform, the
wall, infrastructure, had a short shutdown, and
Trump and McConnell are blaming each other for the failure, who
does the media think will win that fight with GOP voters? It won’t even be close. Now, personal animosity may
play a key role here. But the importance of this moment is that the Democratic ask was on its face ridiculous. They themselves probably didn’t
even take it seriously – it wasn’t so much a Hail Mary as a pass that you tried to throw out of bounds to stop the clock, but got caught instead.
And the results of this decision by Trump will throw the whole end of year schedule into amazing chaos. What could be included in the
December measure? Cromnibus, debt limit increase, more money for victims of Harvey and Irma, flood insurance, opioid money, transportation
stimulus, and perhaps even a clean DACA Christmas present? Dream big! As preposterous as this is, it’s
also a glimpse of how the
“pivot” to the center would work. Trump siding against GOP leaders and seeing them bend over
illustrates how he could get them to do this on just about everything. The path of least resistance, the
path of popularity for him, is to dismiss the demands of Congressional Republicans on virtually
everything except abortion, judges, education, free speech, and regulations. In almost every other way,
he has the opportunity to govern like Bill Clinton and triangulate a path through this screwed up
political system. He’s that much stronger than congressional Republicans, and he doesn’t even seem to know it.

That’s key to pharma and life-sciences

Michael 17 (Kathleen, PwC, Partner, US Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences Tax Sector Leader, “A
Prescription For Change: Navigating Tax Reform In 2017”, 1-18-2017,
The beginning of a new year is often a time to look ahead with anticipation for what the next twelve months will bring – both opportunities and challenges. During 2017, pharmaceutical and life
sciences (PLS) companies will face a wave of change impacting their businesses including: potential ACA repeal, increases in emerging
technologies and new entrants, and continued pressure on pricing. Adding to this already challenging environment, PLS companies must closely monitor the ongoing tax reform debate. I truly
believe that 2017 will bring significant and fundamental change to the tax world. While the specific details remain to be seen, the election of President-elect Donald Trump along with GOP majorities in both the

House of Representatives and Senate suggest the probability of comprehensive tax reform has never been higher. In June 2016, the House Ways and Means Committee and Speaker Paul Ryan unveiled a
Better Way for Tax Reform in an effort to modernize and simplify the existing tax code. The ‘blueprint’, as it is known, goes well beyond the incremental changes we saw over the last 30 years and harkens back to the sweeping

changes made with the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The proposed changes transcend the tax world and will impact all aspects of businesses
PLS companies may be most impacted
including: supply chain, capital structures, pricing and deal modeling, to name a few. With this in mind, I wanted to share my thoughts on how

and can prepare for the changes to come: Reduction in the corporate income tax rate: A reduction in the corporate tax rate from 35% to 20% likely will benefit many PLS

companies and provide opportunities for tax planning. Pre-enactment planning should be considered, including accelerating deductions, credits and other attributes into periods where the current 35% rate applies
and deferring income to periods where the lower rate will apply. The rate reduction will likely have financial statement impacts to uncertain tax positions, deferred taxes, and effective tax rates, and will also impact forecasts
communicated internally and externally to the extent effective tax rates included reflect current law. All of these impacts will need to be evaluated. Border adjustable consumption-type tax: The proposed ‘border adjustable,
destination-based, business cash-flow’ tax system would likely tax imports of goods and services and exempt exports. This new system would also likely apply to intangibles and related royalty flows. The impact on PLS companies
will depend on their supply chain structures and whether exchange rates or prices adjust in response to this new aspect of the tax code. Affected companies should examine the current state of their supply chain in light of this new
tax system and determine the impact to their after-tax results. Important first steps include mapping out existing physical asset footprints and physical and financial transaction flows and evaluating the tax treatment under both
current and proposed tax law. New business income tax rate for pass-through entities: Collaboration agreements, alliances, joint ventures and formal partnerships are increasingly common in the PLS industry and I expect this trend
to continue in 2017. The House blueprint proposes a 25% rate for pass-throughs. Entity level taxation for pass-through entities is a major change and PLS companies should consider the types of entities they use to structure

alternative deals. Full expensing of tangible and intangible property: PLS companies will likely benefit from full expensing of tangible and intangible property. However,
land would be excluded, and it is uncertain how inventory would be treated. The House Republican tax reform blueprint states that the last-in-first-out inventory method will be retained, but inventory accounting issues require
further consideration. The full expensing of intangible assets could impact the way deals are modeled and structured given the large portion of value typically placed on intangible assets in the industry. No net interest deduction:
The corporate tax deduction for interest expense has been a part of U.S. tax law since 1894 and has been an important factor considered by companies when choosing between debt and equity financing alternatives. PLS
companies often incur debt to make acquisitions and support investment in research and development; they currently deduct the related interest expense. To prepare for the elimination of the deduction for interest expense, PLS
companies should assess the tax impacts of their current capital structure and consider alternative financing options going forward. Loss of most business tax credits and deductions: Although most business tax credits and

The research and development credit will likely be retained – and possibly enhanced – to
deductions are expected to be repealed, they will likely be offset by the reduced corporate income tax rate.

provide a continued benefit for PLS companies. Importantly and at this time, the House blueprint does not explicitly address the Orphan Drug Credit, which provides a significant benefit for companies
in that therapeutic area. Mandatory deemed repatriation of US companies untaxed post-1986 foreign earnings and profit (E&P): The PLS industry reported over $400 billion of unremitted earnings in 2015. Mandatory deemed
repatriation is a critical area of focus, and the impact of the one-time mandatory repatriation tax will depend on the specific company, as well as the repatriation tax rates ultimately enacted. Affected companies should consider
pre-enactment dividend / foreign tax credit planning opportunities, and ‘controlled foreign corporation’ earnings and profit reduction through accounting method changes. Companies also should consider the impact on financial

statements. Repeal of Affordable Care Act (ACA): PLS companies likely would benefit from the repeal of the pharmaceutical tax and medical
device excise tax; however, the timing for a repeal and replace is uncertain and may not be linked to comprehensive tax reform. Post-election transitions present uncertainty, opportunity and implications for
any industry, to which healthcare is no exception. The significance of the United States market and the high volume of trade between its partners make reform of the current tax system a

top issue for PLS organizations—one for which they must prepare.

NAS 8 (National Academy of Sciences, “The Role of the Life Sciences in Transforming America's Future
Summary of a Workshop,” December 3, 2008, Board on Life Sciences Division on Earth and Life Studies,
National Research Council)
A Critical Time for the Life Sciences Speaker after speaker at the Summit agreed: the life sciences are poised to usher in a period of unprecedented health and prosperity. Basic scientific
research into how living things function is producing new understanding of how living systems work and new ways of using biological processes to meet human needs. If current opportunities

life sciences can help produce enough food for a growing population, cure chronic and acute diseases, meet fImportant segments of the life
are grasped, the

sciences are merging with the physical sciences and engineering to create “transdisciplinary” scientific endeavors focused on pressing global
problems. This blending of d Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) President Susan Hockfield. They improve human health. They foster potential of
vaccines and antibiotics, among many other research results, have improved the lives of people everywhere. The progress made in combating heart disease is a prime
example of the payoffs from investment in the life sciences, said Hockfield. Over the past 30 years, the National Institutes of new knowledge in medicine. Fostering Industries to Counter Global

Problems The life sciences have applications in areas that range far beyond human health. Life-science based approaches could contribute to advances in many
industries, from energy production and pollution remediation, to clean manufacturing and the production of new biologically inspired materials. In fact, biological systems
could provide the basis for new products, services and industries that we cannot yet imagine. Microbes are already producing biofuels and could, through further research, provide a

major component of future energy supplies. Marine and terrestrial organisms extract carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, which suggests that biological systems could be

used to help manage climate change. Study of the complex systems encountered in biology is decade, it is really just the beginning.” Advances in the underlying science of
plant and animal breeding have been just as dramatic as the advances in genetic can put down a band of fertilizer, come back six months later, and plant seeds exactly on that row, reducing

global agricultural system needs to adopt the goal of doubling the current yield of crops
the need for fertilizer, pesticides, and other agricultural inputs. Fraley said that the

while reducing key inputs like pesticides, fertilizers, and water by one third. “It is more important than putting a man on the moon,” he said. Doubling
agricultural yields would “change the world.” Another billion people will join the middle class over the next decade just in India and China as economies continue to
grow. And all people need and deserve secure access to food supplies. Continued progress will require both basic and applied research, The evolution of life “put earth
under new management,” Collins said. Understanding the future state of the planet will require understanding the biological systems that have shaped the planet. Many of these biological
systems are found in the oceans, which cover 70 percent of the earth’s surface and have a crucial impact on weather, climate, and the composition of the atmosphere. In the past decade, new

tools have become available to explore the microbial processes that drive the chemistry of the oceans, observed David Kingsbury, Chief Program Officer for
Science at the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation. These technologies have revealed that a large proportion of the planet’s genetic diversity resides in the oceans. In addition, many

organisms in the oceans readily exchange genes, creating evolutionary forces that can have global effects. The oceans are currently under
great stress, Kingsbury pointed out. Nutrient runoff from agriculture is helping to create huge and expanding “dead zones” where oxygen levels are too low to sustain life. Toxic algal
blooms are occurring with higher frequency in areas where they have not been seen in the past. Exploitation of ocean resources is disrupting ecological balances that

have formed over many millions of years. Human-induced changes in the chemistry of the atmosphere are changing the chemistry of the oceans, with potentially catastrophic
consequences. “If we are not careful, we are not going to have a sustainable planet to live on,” said Kingsbury. Only by
understanding the basic biological processes at work in the oceans can humans live sustainably on earth.
Spending power
Existential risk first
Bostrom 12 (Nick, Professor of Philosophy at Oxford, directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute and
winner of the Gannon Award, Interview with Ross Andersen, correspondent at The Atlantic, 3/6, “We're
Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction”,

Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human extinction risks are poorly
understood and, worse still, severely underestimated by society. Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural
ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number
and potency over the next century.¶ Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is a longtime advocate of
transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we
humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory,
to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential
risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them.¶ Some have argued that we ought to be directing
our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that

existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present
suffering. Can you explain why? ¶ Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being
worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just
as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to

A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future
the moon or to Africa or something.

generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this very stark
implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else
that you could do. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if
humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants
might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people
than exist currently. Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this
enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing
malaria, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

Agency flexibility crashes effective decision-making – flips regulatory ability

Super, Law Prof @ Georgetown, 11
(David, Against Flexibility, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 1375-1467)

Agencies’ shortfalls in decision-making resources inevitably will force them to ration these resources.
Often, the first step in this rationing turns out to be nothing more than a simple queue. When the agency’s backlog reaches
politically unacceptable levels, the agency may be forced to identify lower-priority steps in its adjudicatory process to jettison. The clamor for expeditious relief of
disaster victims make these shortcuts almost impossible to oppose. Once implemented, however, these low-priority features of adjudications identified during
disasters may become candidates for elimination in non-crisis situations if programs seem to operate well without them. This can produce both good and bad
results over time. Research has found that, contrary to some claims,443 people believing in a strong government role in responding to disasters are no less likely to
prepare for a disaster themselves; thus, a robust government policy seems to create little moral hazard.444 Accordingly, disaster relief programs largely abandon
work requirements and other common tests of moral character. The programs rely on the known etiology of recipients’ distress—disaster rather than presumed
sloth—as a surrogate for moral worthiness. This is true even though some disaster victims are thugs and even though many of the people that suffer in the disaster
also had been destitute before the disaster and treated by public benefit programs as unworthy. This inconsistency suggests that the substantial resources public
benefit programs expend adjudicating individuals’ moral worthiness may be a relatively dispensable features of public benefits law. The disaster experience will be
particularly helpful in making this case if, as seems likely, displaced persons receiving aid without the usual tests of moral worth turn out to be independently
motivated to secure steady incomes by finding work. On the other hand, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) granted states waivers to deny
claimants appeal rights in disaster Medicaid programs.445 The constitutionality of these waivers is open to question: the core of those rights originated not in HHS’s
regulations but in Goldberg. 446 It nonetheless suggests that HHS may be contemplating a broader assault on those rights, a broader assertion that the resources
they consume could be better expended elsewhere.447 In either instance, however, serious questions can be raised as to whether these choices ought to be made
primarily through the exercise of abrogational discretion. If the disaster experience has taught us that our normative or structural decisions about these programs
are defective, we should reopen those decisions rather than merely evade them. In today’s contentious legal culture, universally
accepted verities
are in very short supply. One norm that has approached that status has been flexibility. Regarding
decision making as an exercise of power, and hence consumptive, makes legal actors that exercise
discretion promptly seem impetuous and those that postpone action, awaiting more information,
appear judicious and prudent. In fact, decision making is the law’s principal productive activity. Exercises of discretion therefore should be timed in
the same manner that other productive enterprises are: by seeking the time at which the cost of required inputs is lowest relative to the value of the output that it
can produce. Not a little ironically, another principle with broad acceptance among contemporary scholars is that legal analysis should proceed from an ex ante
perspective to the extent possible.448 Implicit in many arguments for ex ante reasoning is the value of early decisions in guiding private parties—and the value lost
when those exercises of discretion are delayed. Unfortunately, contemporary thinking about the timing of legal decisions tends to ignore both this diminished value
of delayed decisions as well as the increased costs of the necessary inputs. Indeed, all too
often it does not conduct even the crudest
cost-benefit analysis of delay but either assumes that retaining discretion is sagacious or confounds
temporal issues with procedural and institutional ones, the latter dominating. The calamity that Hurricane
Katrina wrought provides a vivid reminder of the costs of flexibility. So, too, does the present financial
crisis, in which regulators steadfastly postponed the exercise of discretion until the value of their
potential decisions had declined by hundreds of billions of dollars. In these cases, and countless others, the supposedly
parsimonious retention of unexercised discretion has been exposed as the wasteful procrastination that
it is. The only remaining question is whether we can learn from these mistakes or are bound to repeat

No critical infrastructure collapse and alt causes overwhelm

Amerding 16 (Taylor Amerding - Freelance writer at International Data Group, CSO – “Catastrophic
cyber attack on U.S. grid possible, but not likely” – 4/15/16 -

Warnings about U.S. critical infrastructure’s vulnerabilities to a catastrophic cyber attack – a cyber “Pearl
Harbor” or “9/11” – began more than 25 years ago. But they have become more insistent and frequent over the past
decade.¶ Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta warned in a 2012 speech of both a “cyber Pearl Harbor” and a “pre-9/11 moment.”¶ They
have also expanded from within the security industry to the mass media. It was almost a decade ago, in 2007, that the Idaho National
Laboratory demonstrated that a cyber attack could destroy an enormous diesel power generator – an event featured in a 2009 segment on the
CBS news magazine “60 Minutes.”¶ Late last year, retired “Nightline” anchor Ted Koppel warned in his book "Lights Out" of possible
catastrophe – thousands of deaths – if the U.S. grid is ever taken down by a major cyber attack. ¶ And just this month, the FBI and Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) launched a national campaign to warn U.S. utilities and the public about the danger from cyber attacks like the one
last December that took down part of Ukraine’s power grid.¶ The worst-case scenario, according to some experts and
officials, is that major portions of the grid could go down for months, or even a year.¶ Yet, nothing close
to that has happened yet – the damage over the past decade from natural disasters like hurricanes,
tornadoes and earthquakes has been much more significant than any cyber events.¶ All of which raise
the obvious question: Why? If a hostile nation state like Iran could deal the “Great Satan” a crippling blow,
why wouldn’t it?¶ There are several theories to explain it. One is that even countries like Iran or a rogue state like
North Korea would not want to take down the U.S. economy because it would have a drastic negative
effect on the world economy.¶ “The same interdependencies that exist in the global economy could
have unintended global consequences, were any nation to suffer widespread disruption to foundational
systems,” said Anthony Di Bello, director of strategic partnerships for Guidance Software.¶ If any large country truly becomes a national
security threat to another large country (a cyber attack) may well be far more likely than it would be in today's climate.¶ Another is that
hostile nation states are more interested in espionage than an attack, in the hope that knowledge of
U.S. infrastructure systems will give them some leverage in foreign policy disputes, or prevent a country
like the U.S. from ever attacking them with conventional weapons.¶ Yet another is that if other countries
are inside U.S. systems, the U.S. must be inside of theirs, which creates the equivalent of a cyber
“balance of terror” – the U.S. could do as much or more damage to them in response to an attack.¶ As
Jason Healey, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, put it, “cyber deterrence is working. They (hostile nation states)
haven’t attacked our cyber systems for many of the same reason they haven’t sent nuclear-tipped
missiles: They have no reason to unless the world is in a serious crisis, not least because they know there
would be a dangerous counterattack from the U.S.Ӧ Indeed, there is general agreement that destructive cyber attacks are
unlikely unless hostile nations are heading into war – an armed conflict.¶ “If any large country truly becomes a national security threat to
another large country it may well be far more likely than it would be in today's climate,” Di Bello said. “Barring that, it would be unlikely.”¶ For
that reason, major cyber attacks are much more likely in areas where there is already armed conflict, or the potential for it. Robert M. Lee,
cofounder of Dragos Security and a former U.S Air Force cyber warfare operations officer, noted that the attack on Ukraine’s grid, widely
attributed to Russia, was, “simply an extension of what was going on with the military. ¶ That, he said, would increase the likelihood of attacks
between countries like North and South Korea, or between Iran and Israel – “traditional conflict areas,” as he put it.¶ Of
course that
leaves out terrorist organizations that don’t represent any nation state and which give no indication that
it would trouble them at all to take down the world economy.¶ But Lee and other experts said this week that
smaller organizations – even lethal terrorist groups like ISIS – don't have the same capability as nation
states. They say while the U.S. grid and other industrial control systems (ICS) have significant
weaknesses – and U.S. adversaries are constantly probing those weaknesses – launching an effective,
sustained attack is not as easy as some people, including high government officials, suggest.¶ “It is
significantly more difficult to do a high-confidence attack on ICS than people think,” Lee said “It doesn’t just involve the cyber
component – it’s the engineering piece as well.”¶ Al Berman, president of Disaster Recovery Institute, agreed. He said one
reason is that, over the past decade, there has been “tremendous sharing” about threat information among utility companies. The ICS ISAC
(Information Sharing and Analysis Center) is “enormously strong,” he said.¶ A second is that most ICSs are not completely automated. “The big
ones still require manual intervention,” he said. “There are manual bypasses occurring all the time – people are manning centers around the
clock.”¶ That, he said, makes it more difficult for attackers to get control of a system remotely.¶ Third, he said, is that most
utilities are
privately owned and have different software, applications and system designs. That diversity makes it
much more difficult to launch a coordinated attack on multiple systems.¶ Dr. Paul Stockton, managing director at
Sonecon, made that point in a recent paper titled “Superstorm Sandy: Implications for designing a post-cyber attack power restoration
system.Ӧ He wrote that the
diversity of systems would likely impede recovery efforts after a major attack, but would also have the
benefit of making large-scale attacks much more difficult in the first place.¶ “The enormous diversity of
ICS software and control system components among utilities greatly complicates the task of conducting
a ‘single-stroke’ attack to black out an entire interconnect or the U.S. grid as a whole,” he wrote.¶ And
according to Lee, even with all that diversity, critical infrastructure systems are relatively simple to defend.
“They are among the few networks on the planet that are defensible,” he said.¶ Added to that, said Lila Kee, chief product officer at GlobalSign,
is that utility providers are very much aware of the threats, and highly motivated to defend against them.¶ “Grid providers don’t want to be any
more regulated than they are, and they understand if they don’t address cyber security vulnerabilities, the government will do it for them,” she
said. “It’s also important to note that grid providers have a self interest around protecting generation and
transmission systems.”

China is an alt cause to semiconductors

Jean-Marc F. Blanchard 2-18-17, Distinguished Professor, School of Advanced International and Area
Studies, East China Normal University (China) and Founding Executive Director at the Mr. & Mrs. S.H.
Wong Center for the Study of Multinational Corporations (USA), “Rational Thinking About China's
Semiconductor Push,”

Over the past 12 months or so, there

has been growing angst around the world, especially in the United States, about
China’s designs in the semiconductor sector. These ambitions are not new and constitute an integral part of China’s efforts
since the 1950s to gain national technological independence, enhance its military capabilities and control over information, and move up the
industrial value-added chain. What seems to have triggered the new level of anxiety is the fact that Chinese
firms, many state-owned or with close state ties, now are pursuing billions of dollars of deals in the sector, as
witnessed by Chinese attempts — some successful, some not — over approximately the past year to
acquire Fairchild Semiconductor and Lattice Semiconductor in the U.S. as well as Aixtron in Germany. Moreover, the
Chinese government reportedly has built a $100-$150 billion war chest to fund additional acquisitions in the sector.

In response to Chinese moves, former President Barack Obama, at the end of his second term in office, belatedly launched a review of
U.S. “semiconductor innovation, competitiveness, and security” that, not surprisingly, paid extensive attention to
China. The final report, prepared under the auspices of Obama’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology and into which American
semiconductor industry representatives had substantial input, called for a number of policies to ensure American leadership in this critical
sector. Among other things, it advocated working with allies to strengthen global export controls; bolstering support for the domestic
industry through tax measures, funding for research, and talent development; shedding greater light on Chinese practices and
reviewing Chinese investments in the sector in the context of broader Chinese objectives such as
national security goals; and responding directly to Chinese policies that violate trade rules and distort the global market. Of course,
such recommendations were paired with calls for reciprocity; that is, demands that China open its chip
sector to American investors in return for being granted the opportunity to buy to U.S. chip firms and
chip technologies.

On the surface, these

policy recommendations seem quite reasonable. After all, it is incontestable that the
semiconductor sector writ large is a vital one for national defense and the industrial sector, as chips are used
in missiles, bombers and fighters, and a slew of other military equipment as well as computers, telecommunication equipment, and the
Internet of Things. Beyond this, there is no doubt that China has not done an adequate job protecting the intellectual property (IP) of foreign
chip firms and has been parochial in the way that it has treated foreign semiconductor firms that want to enter the China market or that
already operate on the Chinese mainland. Regarding the latter, Chinese pressure, implicit and explicit, has driven firms like AMD, Intel, and
Qualcomm to construct billion dollar chip plants in China, build advanced R&D facilities there, and partner with Chinese firms and research
institutions. It
remains open to question, though, if a strategy crudely limiting Chinese investment in home
country semiconductor firms, hindering Chinese access to chip technologies, or blocking foreign firm cooperation
with Chinese ones is an ideal one.
Critical questions that any government needs to ask before implementing a one-size-fits-all restrictive policy include: (1) Would limitations such
as export controls on chips and/or chip technologies and demands for reciprocity really work? (2) How might China react
economically and politically to such restrictions, especially given that the overall tenor of the
relationship seems to be growing more tense? (3) Is every chip firm and every chip technology really critical to defense and
industrial security? (4) Are workers and companies in the chip sector really better off without Chinese investment? (5) Would pushing
Chinese efforts “underground” be better than seeing what was transpiring above ground? (6) Are established
review processes like the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS) truly inadequate to deal with putative Chinese threats?

Without thoroughly answering these important questions and researching what strategies might be the optimal ones to deal with any issues raised, it is possible
that governments, like the
new Donald Trump administration, which reports indicate has embraced the recommendations and tenor of the
aforementioned Obama administration report, might enact poor policies. If so, foreign governments might find

themselves no more secure than before, denied the economic benefits of Chinese investment in the
semiconductor sector (increased tax revenues, job creation, and greater access to cheaper capital), and dealing with a more
protectionist, hostile China while third parties (including U.S. allies) profit from greater Chinese investment and
product sale and service opportunities the United States has denied itself.
Trump means states are winning across the board – he’s a functional reset button
AP, writing in the Minneapolis Star Tribune, 17
(Associated Press, “Walker calls for more states' rights under Trump”,

MADISON, Wis. — Gov. Scott Walker says he is optimistic that states will get more power under President
Donald Trump's administration. Walker spoke about transferring more power to the states Thursday at the
Conservative Political Action Conference's annual meeting in suburban Washington. He says other than the military and "maybe
preserving things like Social Security and Medicare, I think just about everything else is better done by the
states." Walker says he "loved" Trump's Cabinet and hoped it, along with Congress, would make
transformational changes to send more power back to the states. He says "this is a unique opportunity in
time to have transformational change."

The Sebelius precedent on the ACA locks in massive state authority and prevents
federal encroachment in unrelated issues
--civil rights, social welfare, environmental policy

--the plan would mess this up by functionally overturning Sebelius, since it would involve compelling
states to do something they otherwise would not

Chinn, thesis submitted for an M.A. from APUS, 15

(Elizabeth, “National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: The Unsung Victory for American
Federalism in a Win-Win Decision”,

The federalism implications of the Court’s ruling are potentially enormous given that a vast amount of the New Deal/Great Society state
is built on conditional spending legislation (Bagenstos 2013, 864). To that end the Court’s decision in NFIB opens the door for substantial

future litigation over the question of whether conditional spending constitutes an inducement for or
coercion against the several states (Huberfeld, Leonard and Outterson 2013, 39). State challenges to laws in the areas of civil
rights, social welfare, and the environment on the basis that they exceed Congress’s spending power
have typically failed throughout the years, but NFIB paves the way for a revival of challenges to a number of
those laws (Bagenstos 2013, 864). At the very least, NFIB provides the states with ample leverage to deal with the
federal government over spending conditions through the mere threat of filing a lawsuit. In the end the
NFIB decision will “likely accelerate the trend toward federalism by waiver” (Bagenstos 2013, 921). In other words, NFIB
can pave the way for state-friendly bargaining between state and federal officials in the administration of
programs that involve cooperative spending, effectively serving American federalism.
The plan spills over to sanctuary cities, which are key to protect immigrants from
aggressive deportation – the constitutionality of Trump’s immigration XO depends on
how healthcare precedent is interpreted by courts – which the plan clearly would
Greabe, Con Law Professor @ U of New Hampshire, 17
(John, “Trump, federalism and the punishment of sanctuary cities”,
Historically, liberals have tended to hold more expansive understandings of the scope of federal power. Conservatives, on the other hand, have tended to embrace stronger theories of

The 10th Amendment

federalism - the term we use to describe the reservation of government power to state and local governments under the Constitution.

captures the essence of our federalism: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." Consider the recent debates over the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act, also

known as Obamacare. Many liberals defended Obamacare as a perfectly appropriate exercise of federal power to solve a

national problem. Many conservatives, in contrast, saw Obamacare as a vast federal overreach. These positions typified the usual positions

of liberals and conservatives on major federal social programs. Now, consider the emerging debate over the vigorous enforcement of

the nation's immigration laws promised by the Trump administration. In this new context, the traditional positions of liberals and conservatives with respect to
federalism have been turned on their heads. On Jan, 25, President Donald Trump issued an executive order directing that federal funds be withheld from so-called "sanctuary cities."

Sanctuary cities, which are typically controlled by relatively liberal political forces, limit their cooperation with the federal government
in enforcing national immigration laws as a matter of local policy. In response to the executive order, a
number of sanctuary cities filed lawsuits challenging its constitutionality, These lawsuits assert a
number of theories, but place two arguments front and center. First, the order coerces the cities to participate in a
federal law program from which they are constitutionally entitled to abstain. Second, the order
impermissibly commandeers local authorities to serve as unwilling agents of the federal government.
The success of these arguments will likely depend on how courts apply two Supreme Court
federalism precedents created in the context of conservative challenges to liberal
federal regulatory programs. The first precedent arose from the fight over Obamacare. Recall that, after
Obamacare was enacted, a number of states sued to halt its implementation. While the Supreme Court upheld the core of
statute against constitutional challenge, the lawsuits succeeded in part. In 2012, in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court held

that Congress could not coerce a state to accept Obamacare's Medicaid expansion provisions by
conditioning all of the state's future Medicaid funding on its acquiescence to the new provisions. Writing for a
7-2 court majority, Chief Justice John Roberts described these provisions as a gun to the head of the states. While

Congress has wide latitude to impose conditions on federal funds made available to state and local governments, Roberts wrote, it cannot use
its spending power to coerce state and local governments to participate in a federal regulatory
program. By threatening to withhold all of a state's Medicaid funding if the state did not accept the
Medicaid expansion, Congress was effectively making the states an offer that they could not refuse.
Federalism does not permit this.

Federal education policy destroys federalism in unrelated areas including

environmental policy.
Kazman et al. 16 — Sam Kazman, the Competitive Enterprise Institute's general counsel, with Ilya
Shapiro, a senior fellow in constitutional studies at the Cato Institute, editor-in-chief of the Cato
Supreme Court Review, former special assistant/adviser to the Multi-National Force in Iraq on rule-of-
law, and Joshua P. Thompson, a senior attorney at the Pacific Legal Foundation, 2016 (Amicus Brief of
Pacific Legal Foundation, Competitive Enterprise Institute, and CATO Institute in support of the
petitioner in the Supreme Court case Christopher J. Christie, Governor of New Jersey, et al., v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association, et al., November, Available Online at,
Accessed 06-30-2017)

For instance, the federal government could compel states to continue implementing education policies well
after they have proven unpopular. Previously, the need to convince states to cooperate has given them significant leverage to influence federal
policy. See Young, supra at 1074-75 (explaining that state resistence to federal education policy forced a federal agency to change its requirements). If, once

adopted, the federal government could compel states to continue to implement particular policies, the political

consequences could be far reaching. The federal government could dictate curricula or testing
requirements in those states that previously embraced the federal policy. But see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) (recognizing education as
an area of traditional state and local control). It could also require states to continue enforcing their current bathroom

policies, whatever those may be. Cf. G.G. ex rel. Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, No. 16-273 (Oct. 28, 2016).
Limiting the anti-commandeering doctrine could also have severe repercussions in environmental policy.

Federal-state cooperation on environmental regulation is particularly useful because states have greater
local knowledge and more available enforcement officers. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J. 1196, 1243-50 (1977). But if the federal government could

indefinitely impose its will on states after they initially agree, that would threaten these cooperative federalism
arrangements, with far reaching affects. Cf. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 Md. L. Rev.
1141, 1174 (1995).

Deportation causes manufacturing decline

Ehrenfreund 11/16/16 My name is Max Ehrenfreund, and I’m a reporter at The Washington Post. I
don’t usually keep this site up to date, but you can find my most recent posts for Wonkblog here.
Previously, I wrote for the Washington Monthly and The Sacramento Bee.

According to a recent estimate from the Pew Research Center, there are about 8 million unauthorized
workers in the United States in total. If all undocumented workers were immediately removed from the
country, Edwards and Ortega forecast a decline of 9 percent in agricultural production and declines of 8
percent in construction and leisure and hospitality over the long term. These are the industries most
dependent on undocumented labor. Relative to the overall economy, however, the most important
effect would be a decline in manufacturing output of $74 billion over the long term, followed by
somewhat more modest declines in wholesale and retail trade and financial activities.

Key to stop all wars

O’Hanlon 12 – scholar at Brookings (Michael, “The Arsenal of Democracy and How to Preserve It: Key
Issues in Defense Industrial Policy”, Brookings, January,
The current wave of defense cuts is also different than past defense budget reductions in their likely
industrial impact, as the U.S. defense industrial base is in a much different place than it was in the past.
Defense industrial issues are too often viewed through the lens of jobs and pet projects to protect in
congressional districts. But the overall health of the firms that supply the technologies our armed forces
utilize does have national security resonance. Qualitative superiority in weaponry and other key
military technology has become an essential element of American military power in the modern era—
not only for winning wars but for deterring them. That requires world-class scientific and
manufacturing capabilities—which in turn can also generate civilian and military export opportunities
for the United States in a globalized marketplace.
Advisors all constrain trump – he doesn’t have power to launch attacks
James Kitfield, 8-4-2017, "Trump’s Generals Are Trying to Save the World. Starting With the White
House.," POLITICO Magazine,
generals-mattis-mcmaster-kelly-flynn-215455//)MBA HBJ

the generals have emerged as a fairly coherent bloc of foreign-policy thinkers

But during the first seven months of his administration,

whose views have put at least the most extreme fears of critics to rest. Through both experience and military education, the
generals are pragmatic realists and internationalists, committed to the United States’ leadership role in
the world. Internally, they’ve been a strong counterweight to the nationalist /populist faction in the White House led by chief
strategist Steve Bannon, which was behind controversial Trump policies like the initial immigration ban, the rejection of the Paris Climate Change Accords, and potential steel tariffs that could yet spark a global trade war. Taken as

a group, Trump’s generals have tended to see their mission as twofold: The first job is to correct what senior military officers see as the
mistakes of the Obama administration, a hesitancy to use force or commit troops that many allies perceived as a retreat from traditional U.S. commitments in the world. The second job—and the far
riskier one—is to mitigate the damage caused by their boss. An undisciplined and shoot-from-the-lip president, Trump has shown a proclivity for rattling allies with unexpected

tweets and bullying phone calls. When he trumpets his “America first” foreign policy, it’s widely interpreted by allies as a fig leaf for isolationism and protectionism. The generals, with Tillerson as something of a

junior partner—nicknamed the “axis of adults” by a number of establishment Republicans and conservative commentators—have become the reassurers-

in-chief to the outside world. They’ve already persuaded Trump to back away from some of his most
controversial foreign policy positions, including labeling NATO “obsolete,” moving the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem,
rescinding the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Iran nuclear deal, and reconsidering the venerable “One China” policy. And they’ve won some internal

fights. McMaster, in particular, appears to be locked in battle with the nationalist faction: He has recently cleared out a number of senior national-security staffers associated with his predecessor Mike Flynn or seen as allied
to Bannon; he’s fired Rich Higgins, the strategic-planning director who wrote a conspiracy-laced memo, as well as Intelligence Directorate head Ezra Cohen-Watnick, a Bannon ally who earlier this year secretly shared intelligence
with Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee Rep. Devin Nunes. For his troubles, McMaster is now under attack by Bannon’s former website, Breitbart, which is covering his “purge” with blazing headlines—though he

to both corral a deeply

appears to be enjoying some protection from the arrival of Kelly. Which suggests that the more interesting internal fight may be the one Kelly is just beginning, trying

disjointed White House staff and temper Trump’s erratic day-to-day impulses. What’s at stake, in the minds of the generals, is something
considerably larger than winning the internal Game of Thrones. In the back of his airplane returning from a recent trip to Asia, General Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told me that that the international order they
were striving to protect was more volatile and unpredictable today than at any moment since World War II. “Today, we’re confronting simultaneous challenges posed by China, North Korea, Russia and Iran, as well as a natural
disaster in Sri Lanka,” he said, referring to flooding that had recently displaced hundreds of thousands of people. “So, as I prepare for posture hearings in Congress, that’s a reminder that this is the world as it is, not the world as we
might want it to be.”
Ending deference empowers Congress to undertake institutional reform and accept
responsibility for policy – boosts their oversight and authority
Rao, Associate Professor of Law @ George Mason, 15

A stronger collective or institutional Congress would be able to exercise not just the niggling powers of
administration, but also the constitutional power to enact legislation and to offer meaningful and
effective oversight of the executive. This Article has detailed incentives that members have for delegation to the executive.231 But such
incentives push members of Congress toward relatively small-scale influence—serving constituents or
special interests in specific ways. Involvement with administration will usually include sporadic actions by

members, rather than sustained shaping of policy. Such actions are inherently limited in their scope. Individual cajoling, persuasion, and
browbeating are unlikely to serve as the foundation for major agency policy. Under delegated authority, the White House and the

political leadership of an agency will direct major regulatory policy. Delegation thus leaves (as it should) the
primary administrative power with the President and executive branch officials. Unsurprisingly, members of Congress
ultimately cannot serve as effective administrators. Thus, members have an interest in redirecting their attention to the legislative process and the institutional
power that they lawfully possess by virtue of their election to Congress. Collective lawmaking is required by the Constitution and serves important constitutional
values of accountability and limited government. Yet the arguments here do not depend on legislators to be “enlightened Statesmen.”232 Rather, they require only
that members of Congress appreciate how exercising collective power—the legislative power—may ultimately provide a firmer foundation for satisfying self-
interest and ambition. The precise content of political reforms is beyond the scope of this Article; yet recognizing
a root cause of collective
weakness should spur reform efforts. Many commentators have assumed and predicted perpetual
congressional dysfunction, but government institutions can recover their authority and power. One analogy
may be the response following the weakness of the presidency in the 1970s. Edwin Meese, as President Reagan’s Attorney General, and various scholars identified
and defended the centrality of a unitary executive to separation of powers.233 These ideas were translated into reforms, including the creation of the Office of
Management and Budget and regulatory review that centralized administrative policy.234 These reforms could have gone further. For instance they did not attempt
to bring independent agencies into their purview—a prudential, not legal, limit that has persisted through to the current administration.235 Nonetheless, these
changes brought about a meaningful shift to more presidential responsibility and control over execution and administration of the laws.236 Similarly, reforms could
focus on asserting the collective power of Congress, encouraging a more robust legislative process. The vast and varied bureaucracy undermines both the unitary
executive and the collective Congress. But it is possible to push back. With respect to Congress, the
time is ripe to reconsider what specific
reforms would bolster its institutional power. Institutional reforms could experiment with structures
designed to reinforce collective lawmaking power. There needs to be a public and persuasive account of how Congress’s institutional
power can benefit individual members. An effective and strong Congress can realign the interests of congressmen with Congress and shift congressional action
toward its collective legislative power. The conventional approach
leaves nondelegation concerns to the political rivalry
between Congress and the executive. Yet the conventional understanding is incomplete. If delegations simply shifted power away from
Congress, then interbranch rivalry might provide a check on excessive delegations, as commentators and courts have maintained. But delegations erode the
institutional operation of Congress in a manner that cannot be checked by ordinary separation of powers incentives. Delegation upsets the major structural
principle of the collective Congress. This means not only that “lawmaking” occurs outside of Congress in administrative agencies, but also that lawmakers become
shadow administrators, threatening the independence of both Congress and the executive. The Constitution bars congressmen from executing the laws or
exercising any powers other than legislative ones. Delegations allow members of Congress to interfere with the executive power, which shifts their energy and focus
away from their collective legislative power. Understanding the failure of structural checks and balances to prevent excessive delegations, courts should
reconsider enforcement of constitutional limits on delegation. At the same time, the political branches should undertake
reforms to realign Congress with its collective power. This Article has focused on delineating a particular problem of delegation and has provided a sketch of some
solutions to direct further inquiry. Congress is the source of delegations that create the pathologies of administrative
discretion and so we need some account of how Congress can reestablish its independence and
effectiveness. Thinking through the requirements of collective lawmaking might be one approach. Our dynamic political system can accommodate new
understandings of legal forms and respond accordingly. The political branches may be far removed from the constitutional

ideal, but they can recalibrate closer to the constitutional limits that define their powers.
The Sebelius decision locks in state-friendly bargaining in other policy domains related
to spending power – environment, education, and civil rights – but limited federal role
is key
Ryan, J.D., Harvard Law School, 14

In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that portions of the
Affordable Care Act exceeded federal authority under the Spending Clause. With that holding, Sebelius
became the first Supreme Court decision since the New Deal to limit an act of Congress on spending-
power grounds, rounding out the “New Federalism” limits on federal power first initiated by the
Rehnquist Court in the 1990s. The new Sebelius doctrine constrains the federal spending power in contexts
involving changes to ongoing intergovernmental partnerships with very large federal grants. However, the decision
gives little direction for evaluating when the amount of change or funding reaches the threshold of spending-power coercion. Sebelius thus leaves open important

unanswered questions about the contours of the new limit and how it will impact intergovernmental

bargaining. This Article assesses the Sebelius doctrine by testing its application in a legal realm in which
spending-power bargaining features prominently: federal environmental law. Methodically applying the new limit to the
major environmental programs of cooperative federalism, the analysis concludes that all should withstand legal challenge—even a potentially vulnerable provision of the Clean Air Act. The

review sheds light not only on environmental law after Sebelius, but also the many other realms of American
governance that engage spending-power bargaining, such as public education, civil rights law, social service
programs, and civic infrastructure. The Article concludes that the impacts of the doctrine will be most
palpable in the dynamics of intergovernmental bargaining. States will have more leverage when
negotiating design and enforcement terms within spending-power partnerships. However, the federal government may
adapt by relying on spending-power bargaining less often and with less at stake, even in contexts where states may prefer spending partnerships to the alternative.

States are ahead in health policy – Sebelius precedent prevents federal coercion
Chinn, thesis submitted for an M.A. from APUS, 15
(Elizabeth, “National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: The Unsung Victory for American
Federalism in a Win-Win Decision”,

opinion of Chief Justice Roberts adopted an

In “The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause after NFIB,” Bagenstos contended that the

“anti-leveraging principle” wherein unconstitutional coercion in federal spending conditions is found

when three conditions occur simultaneously, 1) they are attached to large amounts of federal money, 2) they change the terms
of participation in established programs, and 3) they tie separate programs into a single-package deal. Ultimately, NFIB can
pave the way for state-friendly bargaining between state and federal officials in administering programs
involving cooperative spending, effectively serving American federalism (Bagenstos 2013). In “Safeguarding Federalism by Saving
Health Reform: Implication of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,” Clark examined the rationale of a divided Supreme Court in upholding the ACA, the activity-inactivity
distinction of the Commerce Clause holding, the justification of the taxing-power ruling, the Court’s unprecedented coercion finding regarding the Medicaid expansion and remedy for the

violation, and the implications of the Court’s ruling for future litigation. She contended that in upholding the ACA, the Supreme Court “preserved a
powerful new version of cooperative federalism in healthcare – one that creates a federal platform for state
experimentation, innovation, and regulation to facilitate meaningful choice in the private health
insurance market” (Clark 2013). Clark concluded that a decision by the Court to strike down the ACA would have undermined states’ rights and individual liberty over the long
term rather than give states a choice in whether or not to take advantage of federal funding for public or private expansion (Clark 2013).

That’s key to scale back mass deportation

Somin 11/26/16
cities/?utm_term=.d2d1595c1ecb Ilya Somin is Professor of Law at George Mason University. His
research focuses on constitutional law, property law, and popular political participation. He is the author
of "The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent Domain" and "Democracy
and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government is Smarter."

The looming fight over sanctuary cities is an example of how federalism and constitutional limitations
on federal power can sometimes protect vulnerable minorities – in this case undocumented immigrants.
States and localities have a reputation for being enemies of minority rights, while the federal
government is seen as their protector. That has often been true historically. But sometimes the situation
is reversed – a pattern that has become more common in recent years. Many deportation advocates
claim it is essential to enforce the law against all violators. But the vast majority of Americans have
violated the law at some point in their lives, and few truly believe that all lawbreaking should be
punished, regardless of the nature of the law in question or the reason for the violation. And few have
more defensible reasons for violating law than undocumented migrants whose only other option is a
lifetime of Third World poverty and oppression. In any event, even if there is an obligation to enforce a
particular law, it does not follow that the duty falls on state and local governments. At this point, it is not
yet clear how far Trump intends to push his deportation agenda. Election exit polls suggest that mass
deportation is not a popular policy, with 70% of the public believing that undocumented migrants
working in the US should be offered permanent residency, and only 25% indicating they should be
deported. The spectacle of the federal government trying to deport large numbers of people in the face
of local resistance is unlikely to make good PR for the Trump administration. Perhaps that will lead them
to scale back their ambitions. Should Trump choose to pursue a policy of mass deportation regardless
of the potential downsides, sanctuary cities can refuse to cooperate with it. And they will have the
Constitution on their side.

Fracking doesn’t contaminate groundwater – best studies prove

Tim Lucas, 4-24-2017, "West Virginia Groundwater Not Affected by Fracking, but Surface Water Is,",
water//)MBA HBJ

DURHAM, N.C. – Fracking has not contaminated groundwater in northwestern West Virginia, but accidental spills of fracking wastewater may pose a
threat to surface water in the region, according to a new study led by scientists at Duke University. “Based on consistent evidence from

comprehensive testing, we found no indication of groundwater contamination over the three-year

course of our study,” said Avner Vengosh, professor of geochemistry and water quality at Duke’s Nicholas
School of the Environment. ”However, we did find that spill water associated with fracked wells and their wastewater has an impact on the quality of streams in areas of
intense shale gas development.” “The bottom-line assessment,” he said, “is that groundwater is so far not being impacted, but

surface water is more readily contaminated because of the frequency of spills.” The peer-reviewed study was published this month in the

European journal Geochimica et Cosmochimica Acta.

No correlation to ground water contamination

Samantha Mathewson, 10-14-2015, "Fracking Does Not Contaminate Drinking Water, Yale Study
Confirms," Nature World News,
contaminate-drinking-water-yale-study-confirms.htm//)MBA HBJ

Yale researchers confirmed hydraulic fracturing

have does not contaminate drinking water.
that – also known as "fracking" – The

study confirms
process of extracting natural gas from deep underground wells using water has been given a bad reputation when it comes to the impact it has on water resources but Yale researchers recently disproved this myth in a new that a previous

report by the EPA After analyzing 64 samples of groundwater

Environmental Protection Agency ( ) conducted earlier this year. collected from private residences in northeastern

groundwater contamination was more related to surface toxins

Pennsylvania, researchers determined that than from closely seeping down into the water

fracking operations seeping upwards Their findings were recently published in the journal Proceedings .

of the National Academy of Science.

Court stripping – ruins enforcement and rolls back the aff
Michael Heise, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University, “The Courts, Educational Policy, and
Unintended Consequences”, Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy Volume 11 Issue 3 Summer 2002,

Despite notable successes, those committed to a judicial strategy for educational policy change should recall a history
replete with profound resistance by numerous actors and institutions to judicial intrusions into core
educational policymaking. Just as the education establishment has demonstrated, once again, its instincts for self-
preservation and further entrenchment within an ever-changing policy environment, competing institutions are capable of similar
adaptability. The taxpayer revolt in California, partly prompted by that state supreme court's school finance
decision, illustrates how resistance to court decisions can severely blunt the efficacy of a judicial
strategy.1 66 The California tax revolt reveals problems that arise when property tax-paying citizens -
principally middle- and upper-income families largely satisfied with their educational situations - confront overly ambitious judicial
activity seeking to influence school funding policy. 167 Before the successful school finance lawsuit, per-pupil
spending in California was among the nation's highest. After the Serrano decision, per-pupil spending in
California fell to among the nation's lowest. A judicial strategy that cleverly seeks to leverage
educational standards and assessments to bolster school finance lawsuits presents its own set of risks.
Of course, even when political consensus to help schools further exists, adequate resources must also exist. Now that national defense and
fighting terrorism have displaced (however temporarily) education reform as leading governmental priorities and economic growth has
stagnated, how schools might fare in the annual competition for shrinking state budgets is anyone's guess. 168 By deflecting attention about
student achievement gaps - exposed in part as a result of successful standards and assessments reforms - away from students and toward
school resources, those defending the status quo seek to leverage one reform effort to fuel another. To the extent these battles
find a home in the nation's courts, they promise to be contentious and protracted. Although a healthy portion
of these debates remains in legislative and executive areas, a steady migration to the courts is under way. If history is any guide, once
school finance policy disputes entrench in the courts, they will remain in the judiciary for decades to come. Citizens,
educators, and lawmakers will find it difficult to regain control over school finance issues and their
important policy consequences.
Impact turn
Backsliding causes war and undermines US influence which de-escalates conflicts.
Kendall-Taylor, deputy national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the National Intelligence
Council, 2016

Andrea, “How Democracy’s Decline Would Undermine the International Order” 7/15

there is an emerging consensus in the world of foreign policy: threats to the

It is rare that policymakers, analysts, and academics agree. But

stability of the current international order are rising. The norms institutions that have undergirded , values, laws, and

the international system between nations are being gradually dismantled

and governed relationships . The most discussed sources of this pressure are the
ascent of China and other non-Western countries, Russia’s assertive foreign policy, and the diffusion of power from traditional nation-states to nonstate actors, such as nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, and technology-empowered individuals.

Largely missing is the specter of widespread democratic decline. Rising challenges

from these discussions, however, to democratic governance

are a major strain on the international system,

across the globe but they receive far less attention in discussions of the shifting world order. In the 70 years since the end of World War II, the
United States has fostered a global order dominated by states that are democratic liberal, capitalist, and . The United States has promoted the

However, despite the steady rise of democracy

spread of democracy to strengthen global norms and rules that constitute the foundation of our current international system. since the end of the Cold War,

over the last 10 years we have seen dramatic reversals in respect for democratic principles across the globe. A 2015 Freedom
House report stated that the “acceptance of democracy as the world’s dominant form of government—and of an international system built on democratic ideals—is under greater threat than at any point in the last 25 years.” Although the number of democracies in the world is at a n all-

rollback of democracy in a few influential states or even in a number of

time high, there are a number of key trends that are working to undermine democracy. The

less consequential ones would almost certainly accelerate meaningful changes in today’s global order.
Democratic decline would weaken U.S. partnerships and erode an important foundation for U.S.
cooperation abroad domestic politics are a key determinant of the international behavior of
. Research demonstrates that

states democracies are more likely to form alliances and cooperate more fully with other
. In particular,

democracies than with autocracies authoritarian countries have established mechanisms for . Similarly,

cooperation and sharing of “worst practices.” An increase in authoritarian countries would provide a , then,

broader platform for coordination that could enable these countries to overcome their divergent
histories, values factors that are frequently cited as obstacles to the formation of a cohesive
, and interests—

challenge to the U.S.-led international system Recent examples support the empirical data. . Democratic

backsliding in Hungary and Egypt’s led to enhanced relations between these

the hardening of autocracy under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have

countries and Russia . Likewise, democratic decline in Bangladesh has led Sheikh Hasina Wazed and her ruling Awami League to seek closer relations with China and Russia, in part to mitigate Western pressure and bolster the regime’s domestic

standing. Although none of these burgeoning relationships has developed into a highly unified partnership, democratic backsliding in these countries has provided a basis for cooperation where it did not previously exist. And while the United States certainly finds common cause with

further democratic decline could seriously compromise the

authoritarian partners on specific issues, the depth and reliability of such cooperation is limited. Consequently,

United States’ ability to form the kinds of deep partnerships required to confront today’s that will be

increasingly complex challenges. Global issues such as climate change, migration, and violent extremism
demand the coordination and cooperation that democratic backsliding would put in peril. Put simply, the United States is a less

A slide toward authoritarianism could also challenge the current

effective and influential actor if it loses its ability to rely on its partnerships with other democratic nations.

global order by diluting U.S. influence in critical international institutions , including the United Nations , the World Bank, and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Democratic decline would weaken Western efforts within these institutions to advance issues such as Internet freedom and the responsibility to protect. In the case of Internet governance, for example, Western democracies support an open, largely private, global Internet.
Autocracies, in contrast, promote state control over the Internet, including laws and other mechanisms that facilitate their ability to censor and persecute dissidents. Already many autocracies, including Belarus, China, Iran, and Zimbabwe, have coalesced in the “Likeminded Group of
Developing Countries” within the United Nations to advocate their interests. Within the IMF and World Bank, autocracies—along with other developing nations—seek to water down conditionality or the reforms that lenders require in exchange for financial support. If successful,
diminished conditionality would enfeeble an important incentive for governance reforms. In a more extreme scenario, the rising influence of autocracies could enable these countries t o bypass the IMF and World Bank all together. For example, the Chinese-created Asian Infrastructure
and Investment Bank and the BRICS Bank—which includes Russia, China, and an increasingly authoritarian South Africa—provide countries with the potential to bypass existing global financial institutions when it suits their interests. Authoritarian-led alternatives pose the risk that global

Violence and instability would also likely increase if more democracies give way
economic governance will become fragmented and less effective.

to autocracy International relations literature tells us that democracies are less likely to fight wars

against other democracies suggesting that interstate wars would rise as the number of democracies

declines. within countries that are already autocratic, additional movement away from democracy,

or an “authoritarian hardening,” would increase global instability repressive autocracies are the most . Highly

likely to experience state failure, as was the case in the Central African Republic, Libya, Somalia, Syria,
and Yemen democratic decline would significantly strain the international order because rising
. In this way,

levels of instability would exceed the West’s ability to respond to the tremendous costs of
peacekeeping , humanitarian assistance, and refugee flows. Finally, widespread democratic decline would contribute to rising anti-U.S. sentiment that could fuel a global order that is increasingly antagonistic to the United States and its values. Most autocracies
are highly suspicious of U.S. intentions and view the creation of an external enemy as an effective means for boosting their own public support. Russian president Vladimir Putin, Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, and Bolivian president Evo Morales regularly accuse the United States
of fomenting instability and supporting regime change. This vilification of the United States is a convenient way of distracting their publics from regime shortcomings and fostering public support for strongman tactics. Since 9/11, and particularly in the wake of the Arab Spring, Western

Rising levels of instability, including in Ukraine and the Middle East

enthusiasm for democracy support has waned. , fragile governance in Afghanistan and Iraq, and

sustained threats from terrorist groups such as ISIL have increased Western focus on security and
stability . U.S. preoccupation with intelligence sharing, basing and overflight rights, along with the perception that autocracy equates with stability, are trumping democracy and human rights considerations. While rising levels of global instability explain part of Washington’s
shift from an historical commitment to democracy, the nature of the policy process itself is a less appreciated factor. Policy discussions tend to occur on a country-by-country basis—leading to choices that weigh the costs and benefits of democracy support within the confines of a single
country. From this perspective, the benefits of counterterrorism cooperation or access to natural resources are regularly judged to outweigh the perceived costs of supporting human rights. A serious problem arises, however, when this process is replicated across countries. The bilateral

Many of the threats to the current global order, such

focus rarely incorporates the risks to the U.S.-led global order that arise from widespread democratic decline across multiple countries.

as China’s rise or the diffusion of power, are driven by factors that the United States and West more
generally have little leverage to control Democracy is an area where Western actions can affect
influence or . , however,

outcomes. Factoring in the risks that arise from a global democratic decline into policy discussions is a
vital step to building a comprehensive approach to democracy support . Bringing this perspective to the table may not lead to dramatic shifts in foreign policy,

but it would ensure that we are having the right conversation.

Backsliding guarantees great power war

Azar Gat 11, the Ezer Weizman Professor of National Security at Tel Aviv University, 2011, “The
Changing Character of War,” in The Changing Character of War, ed. Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers,
p. 30-32

Since 1945, the decline of major great power war has deepened further. Nuclear weapons have concentrated the minds of all concerned
wonderfully, but no less important have been the institutionalization of free trade and the closely related process of rapid and sustained economic growth throughout the capitalist
world. The communist bloc did not participate in the system of free trade, but at least initially it too experienced substantial growth, and, unlike Germany and Japan, it was always
sufficiently large and rich in natural resources to maintain an autarky of sorts. With the Soviet collapse and with the integration of the former communist powers into the global capitalist
economy, the prospect of a major war within the developed world seems to have become very remote indeed. This is one of the main sources for the feeling that war has been

War now seems

transformed: its geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted radically. The modernized, economically developed parts of the world constitute a ‘zone of peace’.

to be confined to the less-developed parts of the globe, the world’s ‘zone of war’, where countries
that have so far failed to embrace modernization and its pacifying spin-off effects continue to be
engaged in wars among themselves, as well as with developed countries.¶ While the trend is very real, one wonders if the near disappearance
of armed conflict within the developed world is likely to remain as stark as it has been since the
collapse of communism. The post-Cold War moment may turn out to be a fleeting one. The probability of major
wars within the developed world remains low—because of the factors already mentioned: increasing wealth, economic openness and
interdependence, and nuclear deterrence. But the deep sense of change prevailing since 1989 has been based on the far more

radical notion that the triumph of capitalism also spelled the irresistible ultimate victory of democracy;
and that in an affluent and democratic world, major conflict no longer needs to be feared or seriously prepared for. This notion, however, is fast eroding with

the return of capitalist non-democratic great powers that have been absent from the international
system since 1945. Above all, there is the formerly communist and fast industrializing authoritarian-capitalist China, whose massive growth represents
the greatest change in the global balance of power. Russia, too, is retreating from its postcommunist
liberalism and assuming an increasingly authoritarian character.¶ Authoritarian capitalism may be
more viable than people tend to assume. 8 The communist great powers failed even though they were potentially larger than the democracies,
because their economic systems failed them. By contrast, the capitalist authoritarian/totalitarian powers during the first half of

the twentieth century, Germany and Japan, particularly the former, were as efficient economically as, and if anything
more successful militarily than, their democratic counterparts. They were defeated in war mainly because they were too small and
ultimately succumbed to the exceptional continental size of the United States (in alliance with the communist Soviet Union during the Second World War). However, the new

non-democratic powers are both large and capitalist. China in particular is the largest player in the
international system in terms of population and is showing spectacular economic growth that within a
the return of capitalist non-democratic great powers
generation or two is likely to make it a true non-democratic superpower.¶ Although

does not necessarily imply open conflict or war, it might indicate that the democratic hegemony since the Soviet Union’s

collapse could be short-lived and that a universal ‘democratic peace’ may still be far off. The new capitalist
authoritarian powers are deeply integrated into the world economy. They partake of the development-open-trade-capitalist cause of peace, but not of the liberal democratic cause. Thus,
it is crucially important that any protectionist turn in the system is avoided so as to prevent a grab for markets and raw materials such as that which followed the disastrous slide into
imperial protectionism and conflict during the first part of the twentieth century. Of course, the openness of the world economy does not depend exclusively on the democracies. In
time, China itself might become more protectionist, as it grows wealthier, its labour costs rise, and its current competitive edge diminishes.¶ With the possible exception of the sore
Taiwan problem, China is likely to be less restless and revisionist than the territorially confined Germany and Japan were. Russia, which is still reeling from having lost an empire, may be

more problematic. However, as China grows in power, it is likely to become more assertive, flex its muscles, and
behave like a superpower, even if it does not become particularly aggressive. The democratic and non-democratic powers may
coexist more or less peacefully, albeit warily, side by side, armed because of mutual fear and suspicion, as a result of the so-called ‘security dilemma’, and
against worst-case scenarios. But there is also the prospect of more antagonistic relations, accentuated ideological

rivalry, potential and actual conflict, intensified arms races, and even new cold wars, with spheres of influence and opposing coalitions.
Although great power relations will probably vary from those that prevailed during any of the great twentieth-century conflicts, as conditions are never quite the same, they may vary
less than seemed likely only a short while ago.

Democracy is key to prevent and contain disease spread – crossapply their impact
Ruger, leading scholar of global and domestic health policy and public health, 5
(Jennifer, PhD, Prof of Medical Ethics and Health Policy @ U Penn, “Democracy and health,”, ava)
One theory that relates political institutions to human development focuses primarily on democratic principles, such as regular elections, universal suffrage, representation, one person–one
vote, multiparty competition, and civil liberties.16 In this realm of thinking, representative democracy is generally understood to produce competition for popular support among elites who

are trying to maintain or win elected office,17 although some argue that politicians’ responsiveness to citizens’ needs and concerns has waned in some settings.12

institutions might therefore relate to health through, for example, alleviation of social disparities and income inequalities that
results from greater political voice and participation.18–20 Improving the health of the worst-off can in turn
improve a country's aggregate performance in health. Political institutions might also affect health through their general impact on universal health
policy issues, such as universal access to high-quality services. In such cases, political institutions might help create universal health

insurance and access programs such as the British National Health Service or the Canadian Health Insurance System.21–23 By contrast, the absence of representative
democracy provides few incentives for political elites to compete for votes,24 resulting in less political responsiveness and fewer incentives to spread benefits universally or to the poor.

Authoritarian regimes suppress political competition and tend to have an interest in preventing human
development, because improved health, education, and economic security mobilizes citizens to advocate for greater participation and more
resources. While much can be said about the link between politics and health, this paper examines one aspect of this relationship—the impact of key democratic principles on health. After
presenting a philosophical framework that links democracy and health, it analyses three major public health events in China: the 1958–1961 famine, the SARS epidemic, and the emerging
threat of HIV/AIDS. These three case studies explore the idea that a lack of democratic institutions, especially a free press and multiparty elections, can have deleterious effects on health. The
link between democracy and health can be viewed through a philosophical framework, which sees societal development as expanding individual freedoms, and focuses on two basic aspects of
freedom: opportunity and process.5 The opportunity aspect judges public policy by its impact on individuals’ substantive freedoms or capabilities: for example, its impact on individuals’
capability to avoid premature mortality, preventable morbidity, or involuntary starvation.5,7,25–27 The process aspect stipulates that public participation in political decisions and social choice
is a constitutive part of public policy. This philosophical framework focuses on enhancing individuals’ agency or ability to understand and ‘shape their own destiny and help each other.’5 In this
paradigm, citizens make their own decisions as active agents of change, and state actions must be evaluated in terms of their effectiveness in expanding individual freedom. As Amartya Sen
has demonstrated,5 such freedom can be realized, in part, through a multiparty democracy, with elections and free media, open public debate and discussion, and guaranteed individual civil
and political rights. In such a framework, health is an intrinsically valued end of development and public policy and is also a means to other valuable ends.6–8,25 The same can be said of
political freedoms. Applying this framework to developing countries reveals widely different political, economic, and social contexts. Analysing public health episodes in China in historical
perspective within this framework reveals a political and cultural history of authoritarianism, and a lack of civil liberties, political rights, and freedom of the press that have dramatically
impacted the population's health. Between 1958 and 1961, one of the largest famines in recorded history killed nearly 30 million people in China.28–31 This tragedy followed the famous Great
Leap Forward, which was initiated, in part, to improve the health of the Chinese people. Many have sought to explain this paradox and the resulting health disaster. The country's authoritarian
and undemocratic political system is considered a leading reason why the government failed to respond quickly and effectively to public need.28,,29 The Chinese government received little
pressure to report the famine, because the absence of an opposition group and the lack of open journalism created an uninformed public.29 Furthermore, the government did not admit the
failure of the Great Leap Forward for several years. This motivated government leaders to exaggerate crop yields, to give the impression that agricultural and rural economic policies were
successful. During the height of the famine, Chinese authorities noted they had 100 million more metric tons of grain than they actually had.29 This misconception kept Chinese imports of
food grains down while food grain exports peaked. In 1959, China imported about 2000 tons of food grains, compared with 223 000 tons in 1958.29 During the same period, exports of food
grains peaked in 1959 at 4.2 million tons, up from 1.9 million tons in 1957 and 2.7 million tons in 1958.29 China's famine was also associated with a decline in food production. The average
national grain output per capita in 1956–1957 was 308 kg, which fell by 17% in 1959 and reached its lowest level—a decline of approximately 30%—in 1960.29 However, the rural population
suffered much more than the urban population, because the government moved food from rural to urban areas. In one province, grain availability was 288 kg per head in an urban area but
only 122 kg per head in rural areas.29 Additionally, food procurement from rural areas rose from 17% in 1957 to 21% in 1958 and 28% in 1959.29 Thus, people in rural areas had to part with a
larger proportion of their output. The culprit in this case was the political system, as the famine was not made public for three years, and there were no official policies for responding. The
primary feature of the Chinese government, an ‘absence of adversarial politics and open journalism,‘29 contributed to the largest famine in history. Sen has argued that political freedoms can
help prevent major social disasters such as widespread famine because the existence of free, uncensored media draws attention to social needs and allows government policies to be
evaluated openly. Similarly, democratic elections (with a choice of parties) forces the party in power to justify its policies or reform them in accordance with people's needs. Sen argues that
China's inability to prevent the famine of 1958–1961 resulted in part from its lack of a free, uncensored press and the absence of opposition parties that would have poked holes in the
government's propaganda, false reports, and failed reform policies. Instead, the government continued to pursue a set of harmful policies. A key aspect of this argument is that the lack of a
free press actually ‘misled the government itself‘5 because state policy was dictated by the government's own dogma and by inaccurate reports from local Communist Party officials who were
competing for ‘credit in Beijing.‘5 Sen notes that this campaign of distortion and misinformation led the government to vastly overestimate the country's food supply.5,28,29,,31 More

recently,China's lack of democratic freedoms made it unable to respond promptly to a new health crisis: Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). The government's immediate response to SARS was reminiscent of its reactions to the famine 40 years before. Its first inclination was to cover up,

rather than reveal, both the scope and severity of the disease, thwarting control efforts. For example, the government's censorship of news about the spread of SARS in Guangdong

Province in 2003, which accelerated the spread of the disease,32,,33 was possible because the Communist Party

directly controlled the media. Had citizens been made aware of SARS earlier through accurate reporting of its prevalence and geographic spread and evidence-based
prevention and treatment recommendations, they would have known how to take precautions and obtain needed care. The government was exceptionally vigilant at first however, about
hiding evidence of SARS through heavy-handed propaganda and control of information. It also threatened citizens with execution and lengthy imprisonment should they become infected with
or knowingly spread SARS.34 And there was forceful suppression of opposition or anti-government sentiment as well as infringements of civil liberties. The Chinese government's pledges of
honest reporting of infections and firing of public officials (e.g. firing both the mayor of Beijing and China's health minister) at first brought hope for real political reform,35 but subsequent
efforts fell short of that goal. Far from acting as an independent and free agent, the Communist Party's newspaper, People's Daily, instead served as a Party instrument by publicly praising
government leadership and strategies and misreporting public opinion. For example, it noted that ‘the people have become more trusting and supportive of the party and government.‘34 An

that China made a successful transition to a more open, internationally connected, market-oriented
ironic twist to the SARS story is

economy but failed to capitalize on the simultaneous global movement for democratization. This change exacted
a high price from China and the global community because, unlike the 1958–1961 famine, China's SARS epidemic fatally impacted the rest of the

world. Consequently, China's failure to contain and effectively address SARS exposed it to international criticism and provided a strong rationale for sovereign nations and global
institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO) to become more actively involved in its political economy. Indeed, the ripple effect of the SARS crisis penetrated the international
development community itself, forcing WHO to consider reforms that would allow it to ‘fight future international threats’ more powerfully.36 Thus, while China's handling of SARS has many

China's mismanagement
similarities to the famine of the mid-twentieth century, those similarities remain primarily domestic. In today's more integrated global economy,

of the outbreak impacted the rest of the world as its catastrophic neglect of economic freedom 40 years
ago affected its own people. This time around, however, the international community pressured China to respond, demonstrating that the effects of global integration
can be two-directional. China's handling of the 1958–1961 famine and the SARS epidemic points to a few key lessons that may help China, and the global community, address future public
health threats, particularly the emergence of HIV/AIDS in China. In 2003, an estimated 840 000 individuals in China were living with HIV/AIDS, 80 000 of whom had AIDS.37 First, while the SARS
epidemic exemplified the most authoritarian aspects of the Chinese political system (initial cover-up of the epidemic and massive firing and jailing of health officials), the experience has led to
higher standards of public accountability. For example, the Chinese Ministry of Health has drafted regulations to hold accountable government officials who cover-up HIV/AIDS.38 To the
extent that China can codify (in law), enforce, and apply these regulations to those who have or will cover up the AIDS epidemic, it will have learned its lessons from SARS and the past famine.
Second, China's handling of SARS emphasized that its public-health practices and policies affect the entire world and therefore provide the rest of the world with a vested interest in
cooperating internationally to ensure global health.39 A recent report on HIV/AIDS, for example, argued that the US should significantly increase its bilateral and multilateral ‘engagement’
with China to pre-empt a generalized epidemic that would have catastrophic global consequences.40 Indeed, the SARS episode in particular demonstrated weaknesses in ‘China's system for

monitoring and responding to infectious disease.‘41 This has raised global concerns about the ability of the Chinese public health system to monitor emerging diseases.40,,41

this lesson to the case of HIV/AIDS means that China's public health practices are more vulnerable to
public criticism. In order to obtain funding from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,
for example, the Chinese government was forced to publicize the spread of HIV through unsafe blood collection centres in a
number of provinces.42 This public exposure could ultimately lead to impartial investigation of local and state authorities’ involvement in the collection and transmission of HIV-contaminated
blood by, for example, the United Nations (UNAIDS or WHO). The Global Fund application also shed light on how the stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS in China has significantly hampered the

This could lead to more rapid progress in protecting the rights of, and
country's social and political response to the epidemic.42

eliminating prejudice and discrimination practices against,43 people affected by HIV/AIDS. Third, the SARS
and famine case studies demonstrate the importance of sharing and accessing information, which can
be essential for preventing and treating disease. Both tragedies tested the Chinese governments’ lack of toleration of public discussion and debate on
public health subjects, and the mistake of hiding public health failures. In light of these events, the government has learned to treat HIV/AIDS as a major and genuine public health concern that
requires a serious, coordinated response. A recent report on HIV/AIDS in China recommended media and educational campaigns, especially aimed at youth and China's migrant population,40
and a focus on informed, comprehensive approaches to prevention and treatment.40 A fourth lesson lies in the deleterious social impact of violations in individual rights to freedom of
assembly, association, and expression. The ability to exercise these rights enables citizens to organize interest groups to advocate for rights, respect, and resources. These rights, coupled with

Experience with the HIV/AIDS

the ability to have free and full access to (and to share) information creates conditions under which effective advocacy can take place.

epidemic in the US demonstrates, for example, the power of advocacy groups (people living with HIV/AIDS in particular) in
obtaining rights, resources, and greater dignity. Grassroots organizing by members of civil society (grassroots NGOs, for example)
can have a positive effect on individuals’ health by improving access to, and the quality of, health care and residential services
for people living with HIV/AIDS. Such assistance is critically needed in the fight against HIV/AIDS in China, especially in the delivery of public health services to poor, rural populations involving
both Chinese and foreign NGOs.40 A final key lesson from SARS and the 1958–1961 famine rests in the absolutely essential role of free, uncensored information, including the ability to voice
complaints and opposition to government practices and policies and to shed light on corruption. The SARS-famine case studies highlight the Chinese government's history of censorship and
restrictions on freedom of the press. To combat HIV/AIDS and prevent it from becoming a full-scale epidemic, the Chinese government must permit both domestic and foreign journalists to

Democratic institutions and

report on the disease without any restrictions. Early indications suggest that the government is taking steps to address these restrictions better.

practices can affect human development in multiple ways, including population health and well-being. The absence of democracy, in particular,

can have deleterious affects on health, as the 1958–1961 Chinese famine and the 2003 SARS outbreak demonstrate. These case studies highlight factors that
are essential for preventing a full-scale HIV/AIDS epidemic in China: new and better standards of public accountability; an international imperative to cooperate globally to ensure health; freely

available information, especially about disease prevention, control, and treatment; protection of individual rights and freedom of
assembly, association and expression; and the ability to voice complaints and opposition. By instituting these rights in a timely fashion, China may be able to contain the HIV/AIDS epidemic
before it loses millions of its citizens to yet another public health tragedy.

Specifically middle east

Hamid, deputy director of the Brookings Doha Center, 10
(Shadi, is and a fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Steven
Brooke is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Government at the University of Texas. He was formerly
a research associate at the Nixon Center. “Promoting Democracy to Stop Terror, Revisited,” Hoover
Institute, February 1, 2010
revisited, ava)

U.s. democracy promotion in the Middle East has suffered a series of crippling defeats. Despite occasionally paying lip service to the idea, few politicians on either the left or right appear
committed to supporting democratic reform as a central component of American policy in the region. Who can really blame them, given that democracy promotion has become toxic to a
public with little patience left for various “missions” abroad? But as the Obama administration struggles to renew ties with the Muslim world, particularly in light of the June 2009 Cairo speech,

Promoting democratic
it should resist the urge to abandon its predecessor’s focus on promoting democracy in what remains the most undemocratic region in the world.

reform, this time not just with rhetoric but with action, should be given higher priority in the current administration, even though early
indications suggest the opposite may be happening. Despite all its bad press, democracy promotion remains, in the long run, the most effective

way to undermine terrorism and political violence in the Middle East. This is not a very popular argument. Indeed, a key feature of
the post-Bush debate over democratization is an insistence on separating support for democracy from any explicit national security rationale. This, however, would be a mistake with troubling
consequences for American foreign policy. A post-Bush reassessment The twilight of the Bush presidency and the start of Obama’s ushered in an expansive discussion over the place of human
rights and democracy in American foreign policy. An emerging consensus suggests that the U.S. approach must be fundamentally reassessed and “repositioned.” This means, in part, a scaling
down of scope and ambition and of avoiding the sweeping Wilsonian tones of recent years. That certainly sounds good. Anything, after all, would be better than the Bush administration’s
disconcerting mix of revolutionary pro-democracy rhetoric with time-honored realist policies of privileging “stable” pro-American dictators. This only managed to wring the worst out of both
approaches. For its part, the Obama administration has made a strategic decision to shift the focus to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which it sees, correctly, as a major source of Arab
grievance. This, in turn, has led the administration to strengthen ties with autocratic regimes, such as Egypt and Jordan, which it sees as critical to the peace process. Some might see such

, by downgrading support of Middle East democracy to one among many policy priorities,
developments as a welcome re-prioritization. However

we risk returning to a pre-9/11 status quo, where the promotion of democracy would neither be worn on our sleeve nor trump short-term hard interests.
The “transformative” nature of any democracy promotion project would be replaced by a more sober, targeted focus on providing technical assistance to legislative and judicial branches and
strengthening civil society organizations in the region. In many ways, this would be a welcome change from the ideological overload of the post-9/11 environment. But in other ways, it would
not. Those who wish to avoid a piecemeal approach to reform and revive U.S. efforts to support democracy often come back to invocations of American exceptionalism and the argument that
the United States, as the world’s most powerful nation, has a responsibility to advance the very ideals which animated its founding. These arguments are attractive and admirable, but how
durable can they be when translated into concrete policy initiatives? In the wake of a war ostensibly waged in the name of democracy, can a strategy resting on gauzy moral imperatives garner
bipartisan support and therefore long-term policy stability? In an ideal world, there would not be a need to justify or rationalize supporting democracy abroad; the moral imperative would be
enough. But in the world of politics and decision-making, it rarely is. Democracy and terrorism after 9/11 After the attacks of September 11th, a basic, intuitive proposition surfaced — that
without basic democratic freedoms, citizens lack peaceful, constructive means to express their grievances and are thus more likely to resort to violence. Accordingly, 9/11 did not happen
because the terrorists hated our freedom, but, rather, because the Middle East’s stifling political environment had bred frustration, anger, and, ultimately, violence. Many in the region saw us
as complicit, in large part because we were actively supporting — to the tune of billions of dollars in economic and military aid — the region’s most repressive regimes. The realization that our
longstanding support of dictatorships had backfired, producing a Middle East rife with instability and political violence, was a sobering one, and grounded the policy debate in a way that has
since been lost. The unfolding debate was interesting to watch, if only because it contradicted the popular perception that Republicans were uninterested in the “root causes” of terrorism. In
fact, they were. And their somewhat novel ideas on how to address them would begin to figure prominently in the rhetoric and policies of the Bush administration. In a landmark speech at the
National Endowment for Democracy in November 2003, President Bush argued that “as long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of
stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export.” This theme would become the centerpiece of his inaugural and State of the Union addresses in early 2005. In the latter, the president
declared that “the best antidote to radicalism and terror is the tolerance and hope kindled in free societies.” In the summer of 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told a Cairo audience
that “things have changed. We had a very rude awakening on September 11th, when I think we realized that our policies to try and promote what we thought was stability in the Middle East
had actually allowed, underneath, a very malignant, meaning cancerous, form of extremism to grow up underneath because people didn’t have outlets for their political views.” The aggressive
rhetoric was initially supported by the creation of aid programs with strong democracy components such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative (mepi). But with a deteriorating Iraq, an
expansionist Iran, and the electoral success of Islamist parties throughout the region, American enthusiasm for promoting democracy began to wane. One Egyptian human rights activist
despondently told us in the summer of 2006 that Washington’s rhetoric “convinced thousands that the U.S. was serious about democracy and reform. We also believed this, but we were being
deceived.” Perhaps the most disheartening sign of how far the democratic wave receded in the Middle East came during the 2007 State of the Union address. President Bush singled out
“places like Cuba, Belarus, and Burma,” for democracy promotion, all safely away from his chaotic, failing experiment in the Arab World. It is safe to say that the Bush administration’s project
to promote Middle East democracy failed. It failed because it was never really tried. It is safe to say that the Bush administration’s project to promote Middle East democracy failed. It failed
because it was never really tried. With the exception of a brief period in 2004 and 2005 when significant pressure was put on Arab regimes, democracy promotion was little more than a
rhetorical device. But lost in the shuffle is the fact that one of the strongest rationales for the “freedom agenda” — that the way to defeat terrorism in the long run is by supporting the growth
of democratic institutions — hasn’t necessarily been proven wrong, nor should it be so readily discarded due to its unfortunate association with the wrong methods and messengers. But this is
precisely what seems to have happened. In the Fall 2007 Washington Quarterly, Francis Fukuyama and Michael McFaul argued that “the loudly proclaimed instrumentalization of democracy
promotion in pursuit of U.S. national interests, such as the war on terrorism, taints democracy promotion and makes the United States seem hypocritical when security, economic, or other
concerns trump its interests in democracy, as they inevitably will.” Around the same time, Thomas Carothers, writing in the Washington Post, was more explicit in wishing to disassociate
supporting democracy from the fight against terror: “Democracy promotion will need to be repositioned in the war on terrorism, away from the role of rhetorical centerpiece. It’s an appealing
notion that democratization will undercut the roots of violent Islamic radicalism. Yet democracy is not an antiterrorist elixir. At times democratization empowers political moderates over
radicals, but it can also have the opposite effect.” Carothers and others are correct that democracy is not, nor has it ever been, some kind of panacea. To embrace such lofty expectations will
only hasten disappointment. Promoting democracy is a difficult business with risks and consequences, among them the chance that emerging or immature democracies might, in the short-
term, experience increased political violence and instability. And lack of democracy cannot take the blame for those, like the July 7th London bomber Mohammed Siddique Khan, whose paths
to terrorism began in the freest nations in the world. As the histories of some of these jihadists illustrate, powerful cultural and religious forces cannot be ignored. That said,

decoupling support for democracy from the broader effort to combat terrorism and religious extremism
in the Middle East would be a costly strategic misstep. If there is indeed a link between lack of democracy and terrorism — and we will argue that
there is — then the matter of Middle East democracy is more urgent than it would otherwise be. The question of urgency is
not an inconsequential one. Most policymakers and analysts would agree that the region’s democratization should, in theory at least, be a long-term goal. But, if it is only considered as such,

the continued
then it will not figure high on the agenda of an administration with a whole host of other problems, both foreign and domestic, to worry about. However, if

dominance of autocratic regimes in the region translates into a greater likelihood of political violence and
terrorism, then it becomes an immediate threat to regional stability that the U.S. will need to address sooner rather than later. It is worth
emphasizing that democracy promotion does not involve only our relationships with authoritarian allies. It is worth emphasizing that democracy promotion does not involve only our
relationships with authoritarian allies like Egypt, Jordan, or Saudi Arabia. Our ability and willingness to understand the relationship between autocracy and terror is also intimately tied to
future success in Iraq. Drawing on captured documents previously unavailable to the public, a 2008 study by West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center found that “low levels of civil liberties
are a powerful predictor of the national origin of foreign fighters in Iraq.” Of nearly 600 al Qaeda in Iraq fighters listed in the declassified documents, 41 percent were from Saudi Arabia while
19 percent were of Libyan origin. The study also notes that “Saudi Arabian jihadis contribute far more money to [al Qaeda in Iraq] than fighters from other countries.” According to the
Freedom House index, the Saudi regime is one of the 17 most repressive governments in the world. Because the kingdom brooks no dissent at home, it has, since the early 1980s, sought to
bolster its legitimacy by encouraging militants to fight abroad in support of various pan-Islamist causes. Since the late 1990s, those militants have tended to target the United States. In other

words, Saudi Arabia’s internal politics can have devastating external consequences. Democratic reform also holds out hope for confronting
other Middle Eastern flashpoints. In recent years, the notion of incorporating violent political actors in nonviolent, democratic processes has gained some currency,
particularly in light of the successful integration of insurgents in Iraq. Meanwhile, in the Palestinian territories, whatever else one wishes to say about Hamas, the group’s electoral participation

Recognizing the relevance of democracy to

since 2006 has coincided with a precipitous drop in the suicide bombings that had long been their hallmark.

some of the thorniest Middle Eastern conflicts — whose effects reverberate to our shores — makes democracy promotion much
harder to dismiss as a luxury of idealism and a purely moral, long-term concern. In short, understanding the interplay between tyranny and terror can allow us to better judge — and, if
necessary, elevate — the place of democracy promotion in the hierarchy of national priorities. When we say we want democracy but do very little about it, our credibility suffers and we are

De-emphasizing support for democracy, on the other hand, will have significant consequences
left open to charges of hypocrisy.

at a time when Arabs and Muslims are looking to us for moral leadership and holding out great
expectations for an American president who many continue to see as sympathetic to their concerns.
Obama’s Cairo speech, hailed throughout the Middle East, was a step in the right direction, but disappointment has since grown as the administration has failed to follow up with tangible

Dropping democracy down on the agenda would ignore the fact that our ideals coincide
policy changes on the ground.

with those of the majority of Middle Easterners who are angry at us not for promoting democracy, but
because we do not. When we say we want democracy but do very little about it, our credibility suffers and we are left open to charges of hypocrisy. This credibility gap should not be

the fight against terror is not simply about “connecting the dots,” improving interagency
dismissed. Ultimately,

coordination, and killing terrorists; it is just as important to have a broader vision that addresses the
sources of political violence. Any long-term strategy must take into account an emerging body of evidence which shows that lack of
democracy can be a key predictor of terrorism, and correlates with it more strongly than other
commonly cited factors like poverty and unemployment. If understood and utilized correctly, democracy promotion can
become a key component of a revitalized counterterrorism strategy that tackles the core problem of
reducing the appeal of violent extremism in Muslim societies. It has the potential to succeed where the more traditional, hard power
components of counterterrorism strategy have failed. The link between lack of democracy and terrorism also has consequences for American domestic politics. It provides a unifying theme for
Democrats and Republicans alike, one that honors our ideals while helping keep us safe and secure. To the extent that politicians have had difficulty selling democracy promotion to the
American people, the “tyranny-terror link” provides a promising narrative for U.S. policy in managing the immense challenges of today’s Middle East. Is there a “tyranny-terror link”? The post-
9/11 emphasis on democracy promotion as an essential component of counterterrorism did not go unchallenged. A group of dissenters offered a number of provocative articles arguing the
contrary. And as the “freedom agenda” began to stumble, their voices grew more influential. The most noteworthy of these efforts was F. Gregory Gause’s 2005Foreign Affairs article “Can
Democracy Stop Terrorism?” Gause offers what, at first blush, appears a systematic dismantling of a convenient myth: The numbers published by the U.S. government do not bear out claims
of a close link between terrorism and authoritarianism either. Between 2000 and 2003, according to the State Department’s annual “Patterns of Global Terrorism” report, 269 major terrorist
incidents around the world occurred in countries classified as “free” by Freedom House, 119 occurred in “partly free” countries, and 138 occurred in “not free” countries . . . This is not to argue
that free countries are more likely to produce terrorists than other countries. Rather, these numbers simply indicate that there is no relationship between the incidence of terrorism in a given
country and the degree of freedom enjoyed by its citizens. They certainly do not indicate that democracies are substantially less susceptible to terrorism than are other forms of government.
Yes, Gause is correct: There is no relationship between, as he puts it, “the incidence of terrorism in a given country and the degree of freedom enjoyed by its citizens.” But this is the right
answer to the wrong question. It is certainly true that democracies, such as the United States and Britain, are often targets of terrorism. But Gause’s argument tells us nothing about how, why,
and when terrorists resort to violence. The tyranny-terror hypothesis is concerned with which kinds of countries — specifically what regime types — are more likely to produce terrorists. This
requires us to examine individual terrorists’ country of origin, rather than their targets. Other scholars have essentially replicated Gause’s findings. In a 2006 article in the journal Terrorism and
Political Violence, James A. Piazza argues that higher levels of democracy are actually associated with increased incidence of international terrorism. He comes to this conclusion because, like
Gause, he is interested in which states are terrorist targets, not which states produce the terrorists in the first place. In a later 2008 International Politics article that expands and modifies his
arguments, Piazza continues to record terrorist attacks “based on the country of occurrence, not the nationality or national legal status of the perpetrator.” While this approach may tell us
whether democracies are more likely to experience terrorism, it does not answer the question the tyranny-terror hypothesis seeks to explore. A second concern is that Piazza, like Gause, uses
data from the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism serial publication. There are deficiencies with this data set. Primarily, it tracks only “global terrorism” and therefore tells us
nothing about domestic terrorism (e.g., an Egyptian citizen attacking the Egyptian government). This is not just a casual oversight. Before the rise of al Qaeda, radical Islamist groups were
doctrinally committed to attacking only their own governments. The original objective of most jihadist groups, such as Egypt’s al-Jihad, the Armed Islamic Group (gia) in Algeria, and Juhayman
al-Otaibi’s ragtag group of fighters who took over the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979, was to overthrow ruling elites. Before there was the “far enemy” of the United States, there was the
“near enemy,” those regimes seen as traitors to Islam. Before the rise of al Qaeda, radical Islamist groups were doctrinally committed to attacking only their own governments. In another
effort worth noting, published as a 2006 Harvard University working paper, Erica Chenoweth attempts to tackle the terrorism issue. She states in her introduction that one of her goals “is to
contribute to the growing policy literature endorsing democracy as a way to eradicate terrorism. This project is a critique of the latter perspective, offering some considerations for scholars
and policymakers who advocate democratization without taking into account all of its potential ramifications.” But, again, the fact that she is interested primarily in where terrorists operate,
rather than how and why countries produce terrorists in the first place, makes her study, while commendable for other reasons, less relevant for our purposes. Meanwhile, Michael Freeman,
in a thought-provoking 2008 study that appeared in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, attempts to disaggregate the effects of democracy on the underlying factors he contends motivate al
Qaeda and affiliated networks, one of them being frustration over illegitimate authoritarian regimes. The article is a step forward in attempting a more focused analysis of the relationship
between democracy and global jihadism, but it contains a significant flaw in its rejection of the tyranny-terror link. Freeman argues that for jihadists, “their own governments are illegitimate
because they are insufficiently religious; secular democratic governments would be even worse.” First of all, with mainstream Islamist parties likely to do well in free elections, democratically
elected governments in the Middle East would almost certainly be more religiously-inclined rather than less. In any case, proponents of a link between autocracy and terror have never argued
that progress on political reform will completely eradicate terrorism. Democracy, whether in its liberal or Islamist manifestations, will not convince al Qaeda to give up arms or channel its

efforts into the political process. Those in the jihadist hardcore can only be defeated through military and law enforcement means. For them, it is too late. What democracy
can do, though, is prevent those most susceptible to extremist recruitment — tens of millions of frustrated Arabs and Muslims
throughout the Middle East — from turning to political violence, by giving them alternative outlets for peaceful political

expression. This recognition is crucial to moving our counterterrorism strategy beyond crisis management and towards prevention. Polls have consistently shown widespread support
for democratic ideals among Muslims worldwide. By choosing to focus specifically on the motivations of al Qaeda jihadists, Freeman neglects the Muslim population at large. It is true that
among most doctrinaire Salafists, democracy is seen as an intrusion by man into God’s sacred domain. But neither these Salafists, nor al Qaeda, are representative of Islamists, let alone the
broader Muslim community. Polls have consistently shown widespread support for democratic ideals among Muslims worldwide, while popular Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood
have, in recent years, publicly committed to many of the foundational components of democratic life. The 2006 Pew global attitudes survey notes that: There is enduring belief in democracy
among Muslim publics, which contrasts sharply with the skepticism many Westerners express about whether democracy can take root in the Muslim world. Pluralities or majorities in every
Muslim country surveyed say that democracy is not just for the West and can work in their countries. This is America’s audience, not the jihadists who refuse to accept the legitimacy of
anything other than the most restrictive interpretations of Sharia law. In short, although the articles by Gause, Piazza, Chenoweth, and Freeman purport to cast doubt on tyranny-terror
linkages, a close reading reveals flawed methodologies that lead them to fall short in addressing the relationship between autocracy and terrorism. A 2006 paper in the Economics of National
Security by Harvard’s Alberto Abadie attempts to address some of these limitations. He correctly notes that international terrorism represents only a small fraction of the total amount of
terrorist activity. According to the mipt Terrorism Knowledge Base, from 1998 to 2008, only 9.2 percent of recorded terrorist events were international in nature. Limiting the field to the
Middle East reveals a similar percentage of international attacks: 10.1 percent. To help account for this deficiency, Abadie uses a data set from an international risk agency — the World Market
Research Center’s Global Terrorism Index — that has, as Abadie explains, “the advantage of reflecting the total amount of terrorist risk for every country in the world” by considering a number
of factors, including presence, motivation, efficacy, scale, and prevention of terrorism. While risk ratings do not say much about the perpetrators’ country of origin, the fact that they take into
account not only international but also domestic terrorist attacks means they provide a more balanced sample. For example, if autocracies are more likely to produce terrorists, then we can
expect the risk ratings of repressive dictatorships, like those in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to be relatively high. Abadie’s findings seem to support the existence of a link between authoritarianism
and terrorist activity. He observes that “over most of the range of the political rights index, lower levels of political rights are associated with higher levels of terrorism.” No compelling

A 2005 Freedom House study went further

evidence debunks the tyrannyterror link and, instead, the evidence seems to point in the opposite direction.

and found a strong correlation between autocracy and terrorism, noting that “between 1999 and 2003, 70 percent of all deaths from
terrorism were caused by terrorists and terrorist groups originating in Not Free societies, while only 8 percent of all fatalities were generated by terrorists and terror movements with origins in
Free societies.” In addition to this quantitative difference, the study noted that terrorists from “not free” societies were even more brutal and their attacks over twice as lethal as those of their
counterparts from “free” societies. In our view, of the recent studies on autocracy-terror linkages, a relatively early 2003 article by Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova stands apart (Krueger
builds on the article in his excellent 2007 book What Makes a Terrorist?). The authors employ innovative methods to get around the data limitations highlighted earlier. Using the descriptions
of terrorist attacks in the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terror, they try to determine the perpetrator’s national origin. For instance, instead of recording the September 11th attacks as
occurring in the U.S., they look instead at the nationalities of the 19 hijackers, which for their purposes, and ours, is the more relevant measure. Like many other scholars, Krueger and
Maleckova do not examine domestic terrorism, which is obviously a matter of concern. However, their study, which explores the effects of several different factors on terrorism including
education and poverty, is nearly alone in addressing the implied causal hypothesis of the tyranny-terror link as it relates to recent developments in the Middle East — that one’s political
environment has a bearing on whether he or she will resort to political violence. Drawing on their results, Krueger and Maleckova conclude that “the only variable that was consistently
associated with the number of terrorists was the Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties.” In What Makes a Terrorist? Krueger notes the same finding, that “terrorists are
more likely to come from countries that suppress political and civil rights.” Krueger and David Laitin build on this argument in their chapter in Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political
Openness(2008), again observing that “countries that afford a low level of political rights are more likely to be the springboards of terrorism.” These findings suggest that democracy
promotion and the fight against terror should not be treated as discrete policy concerns. There is still much work to be done. The very nature of autocratic regimes makes gathering data on
domestic terrorist events difficult, because governments have strong inducements to either suppress or exaggerate the incidence of violent opposition in the service of their political goals.

no compelling evidence debunks the tyranny-terror link and, instead, the evidence seems to point in

the opposite direction. A new strategy A multitude of factors — economic, political, cultural, and religious — contribute to Islamic radicalism and terror. However, one
important factor, and one that appears to have a strong empirical basis, is the Middle East’s democracy deficit. Any long-term strategy to combat terrorism should therefore include a vigorous,
sustained effort to support democracy and democrats in a region long debilitated by autocracy. Obviously, this is an enormous challenge and should not be taken lightly. However,

abandoning such a critical task would mean more of the same — a Middle East that continues to fester as a
source of political instability and religious extremism. And, in today’s world, such instability, and the violence that so often results, cannot be
contained; it will spill over and harm America and its allies. A new democracy promotion strategy in the Middle East should include a variety of measures, including
making aid to autocratic regimes conditional on political and human rights reforms; elevating democracy as a crucial part of all high-level bilateral discussions with Arab leaders; coming to
terms with the inclusion of nonviolent Islamist parties in the political process; using membership in international organizations as leverage; increasing the budget for programs like the Middle
East Partnership Initiative and the Millennium Challenge Account; deepening cooperation with the European Union to spread responsibility; and sponsoring initiatives that bring together
Islamist and secular groups to forge inclusive pro-democracy platforms. The pace of democratization should take into account local contexts yet must maintain a consistent focus on expanding
the rights of citizens, supporting the development of viable opposition parties, and moving toward free and fair elections. Before moving in such a direction, the idea of Middle East democracy
must be rehabilitated in the eyes of policymakers and the public alike. But before moving in such a direction, the idea of Middle East democracy must be rehabilitated in the eyes of
policymakers and the public alike. Absent a bipartisan political commitment, any new effort will falter. We realize that elevating democracy promotion will mean breaking with the last several
decades of U.S. policy, which has relied upon close relationships with Arab regimes at the expense of Arab publics. But our long-term national security, as well as our broader interests in the
region, demand such a reorientation. The first step, however, is to reestablish a consensus here at home on both the utility and value of democracy promotion. Once that happens, the
discussion of how to actually do it can be conducted with greater clarity. If, on the other hand, we choose to continue along the current path — paying lip service to the importance of
democracy abroad but doing increasingly less to actually support it — a great opportunity will be lost. Turning away from the Arabs and Muslims who overwhelmingly support greater freedom
and democracy will rob us of perhaps our strongest weapon in the broader struggle of ideas. For decades, the people of the region have been denied the ability to chart their own course, ask
their own questions, and form their own governments. Lack of democratic outlets has pushed people towards extreme methods of opposition and made the resort to terrorist acts more likely.

a sustained effort to promote Middle East democracy and represents our best chance at a
Recognizing this is a crucial step toward

durable and effective counterterrorism policy that protects our vital interests while remaining true to our ideals.

Middle East Instability goes nuclear

Louis René Beres, 2-10-2017, (Emeritus Professor of International Law at Purdue. He lectures and
publishes widely on matters of Israeli security and nuclear strategy. "The Fast Track to Armageddon," US
News & World Report,
10/donald-trump-iran-and-the-fast-track-to-nuclear-war-in-the-middle-east//)MBA HBJ
Even if it is being played only by rational adversaries, the advancing strategic "game" would demand
that each contestant relentlessly strive for "escalation dominance." Ominously, it is in the thoroughly
unpracticed internal dynamics of any such rivalry that the serious prospect of a genuinely "Armageddon"
scenario could sometime be realized. This intolerable outcome could be produced either in unexpected
increments of escalation by any or all of the three dominant national players, or instead, by any sudden
quantum leap in destructiveness undertaken by Iran, Israel and/or the United States. The only thing that is wholly predictable in
usefully deciphering such complex dynamics is that they are all unpredictable. For example, even under the best or optimum
assumptions of enemy rationality, all pertinent decision-makers would have to concern themselves with miscalculations,
errors in information, unauthorized uses of strategic weapons, mechanical or computer malfunctions, poorly recognized instances of cyberdefense, cyber-war and even adversarial coups d'etats. In the final analysis, informed
citizens and participants in these hideously complicated games of strategy will need to recall that it is mathematically meaningless to assign any comforting probabilities to unique events. Because an authentic nuclear war would
represent precisely such an event, one with utterly unforeseen intersections, interactions and "synergies," we can never predict with any reassuring degree of precision whether such a conflict would actually be more or less
probable. Indeed, should Trump ever proceed to strike Iran on the erroneously nonspecific assumption that his generals have already "got everything covered," he ought then to be reminded of the classic military warning of Carl

military planners could even envision a nuclear war, the great Prussian general had cautioned about "friction," or "the
von Clausewitz: Long before any

difference between war on paper, and war as it actually is." Where it would be minimized or disregarded altogether by Trump, this
difference could propel the unsteady Middle East toward an irreversible Armageddon.

Multiple warrants solves war

Toms and Weeks 13 – (Michael Tomz is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. Jessica L. Weeks is an
Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at Cornell University, February 2013, JK

The leaders who make the ultimate decisions about war and peace in democracies have powerful
incentives to respect the opinions of citizens. Public opinion matters for several reasons. First, leaders
who disappoint or anger their constituents risk being removed from office. While early research claimed that public
opinion on foreign policy was incoherent (Almond 1960) and that politics “stopped at the water’s edge” (Wildavsky 1966), this view has been supplanted by
numerous studies showing that mass opinion is coherent and influential. Leaders know that citizens care about foreign policy, that foreign policy often plays a role
in electoral campaigns, and that foreign policy mistakes can hurt leaders at the ballot box (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989, Gronke, Koch, and Wilson 2003,
Gelpi, Reifler, and Feaver 2007). Second, democratic leaders face institutional constraints on their powers to use
force (Morgan and Campbell 1991), and public opinion affects how tightly those constraints bind. In many
democracies, leaders need legislative authorization for war, but legislative approval is less likely to
materialize in the face of public opposition (Lindsay 1994, Hildebrandt et al. 2013). Moreover, leaders must raise revenues

to pay for military operations, but legislative bodies are unlikely to levy new taxes, incur new debt, or cut government
programs to finance wars that their constituents oppose (Hartley and Russett 1992, Narizny 2003). Third, leaders understand that, by

remaining popular, they can accomplish more during their time in office. In the U.S., for example, popular presidents have
more influence over Congress (Krosnick and Kinder 1990, Edwards 1997, Howell and Pevehouse 2007). They also wield more international influence, since leaders
who enjoy the backing of the public find it easier to persuade other countries that their promises and threats are credible. Consistent with these arguments,
countless studies have concluded that, in decisions about using force, democratic leaders pay close attention to public opinion
(Rosenau 1961, Mueller 1973, Russett 1990, Foyle 1999, Sobel 2001, Reiter and Stam 2002, Baum 2004, Holsti 2004, Canes-Wrone 2006, Baum and Potter 2008,
Berinsky 2009). Studying the public can, therefore, tell us much about leaders’ political incentives. How might public opinion contribute to the democratic peace?
The well-known Kantian argument says that voters,
who ultimately bear the human and financial costs of war, are more
war-averse than leaders, who do not pay the direct costs of fighting (Rummel 1979). As Kant (1795/1991) wrote in Perpetual
Peace, “If the consent of the citizens is required to decide whether or not war is to be declared, it is very natural that they will have great hesitation in embarking on
so dangerous an enterprise. For this would mean calling down on themselves all the miseries of war…. But under a constitution where the subject is not a citizen,
and which is therefore not republican, it is the simplest thing in the world to go to war.” As others have pointed out, this
argument implies a
monadic democratic peace, in which democracies are more restrained from using force overall (Rosato 2003).
History shows, however, that democracies are only more peaceful in their relations with other democracies. In the
remainder of this article, we investigate whether democratic publics distinguish between autocratic and democratic opponents and are primarily averse to war
against democracies, thus contributing to the dyadic democratic peace. Shared Democracy And Public Support for War: Causal Mechanisms Most theories of war
presume that, before engaging in violence, leaders and their constituents weigh the pros and cons. Perceptions about the advantages and disadvantages of military
action are crucial in classic texts about war (Thucydides, Morgenthau 1948, Jervis 1976), modern game-theoretic models (Fearon 1995, Bueno de Mesquita et al.
1999, Kydd 2005), psychological theories of conflict (Herrmann et al. 1997, Hermann and Kegley 1995), and even constructivist theories, which argue that beliefs
about the need for war are socially constructed (Wendt 1999, Finnemore 2003). From this body of theory, we highlight four inputs into citizens’ calculations about
the merits of going to war. First, individuals form perceptions of how threatening other countries are. Individuals who feel threatened may support an attack in the
interest of self-preservation (Jervis 1978, Kydd 2005). Next, voters could be deterred by the costs of war and the likelihood
of success. All else equal, voters view the use of force as more attractive when they think the economic, diplomatic, and human costs of war will be low and
when they expect military operations to succeed (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2006). Finally, moral considerations could influence decisions

about whether to fight (Welch 1993, Price 1998, Herrmann and Shannon 2001). Existing theories of the democratic peace, we show below, can be
categorized according to the claims they make about how the regime type of the adversary affects these four inputs into the war calculus. Viewing the leading
theories of the democratic peace this way, it becomes clear that they have important but largely untested implications for the preferences and beliefs of individuals.
By highlighting the micro-level implications of different theories, we lay the foundation for our experimental analysis of individual attitudes toward the use of force.
3.1 Threat Perception. The first input into the war calculus is threat perception. Many theories of the democratic
peace suggest that democracies view other democracies as less threatening than autocracies, i.e., less
likely to have malicious intent and to take military action. Perceptions of threat play a crucial role in “normative” theories of the democratic peace.
These theories begin with the premise that citizens in democracies are normatively opposed to violence . People in democracies solve

domestic disagreements peacefully and apply the same nonviolent norms internationally, at least in relations
with democratic states. Democracies expect other democracies to externalize peaceful norms in the same way, and therefore trust that they will not be attacked by
other democracies (Doyle 1986, Maoz and Russett 1993, Russett 1993,) Perceptions of threat also play a crucial role in “institutional” theories. Some
that democratic institutions reduce fear by constraining the executive, thereby slowing the process of
mobilization and lowering the likelihood of surprise attack (Russett 1993). Others claim that democratic institutions contribute to
peace by conveying information about intentions (Fearon 1994, Schultz 2001), thereby increasing the likelihood that inter-democratic disputes will

be resolved through peaceful bargains, rather than unnecessary military conflicts. Finally, democracy could
reduce fear by creating expectations of shared interests. Oneal and Russett (1999), for example, argue that democratic institutions
increase “affinity,” measured by similarity of voting patterns in the U.N. If democracies believe they have common interests, they

may not feel threatened by each other. In sum, a number of prominent theories of the democratic peace suggest that citizens in democracies
may view other democracies as less threatening than autocracies. Testing whether this is true is crucial to establishing why democracy might lead to peace. It is also
important to see how much of the effect of shared democracy is driven by threat perception, as opposed to other mechanisms. 3.2 Deterrence (The Costs of
Fighting and Likelihood of Success). While some theories of the democratic peace generate predictions about threat perception, others
imply that
democracy affects two other inputs into the war calculus: the costs of fighting and/or the likelihood of
success. For example, Lake (1992), Reiter and Stam (2002), and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) argue that wars against democracies are
especially costly, because democratic leaders are better able to mobilize resources for war and have
strong incentives to win the wars they start. Autocrats, by contrast, are said to be less forbidding opponents, either because they have difficulty
mobilizing resources, or because they think they can lose wars without suffering much domestic punishment and therefore choose to spend fewer resources on the
war effort. Following this logic,
citizens may be deterred from using force against democracies because they
anticipate high costs of war and a low probability of victory. If we found little evidence that democracy affected perceptions of
cost and success, this would contradict the idea that democracies are deterred from attacking other democracies because they view them as particularly formidable
adversaries. 3.3 Morality. Finally, shared democracy could produce peace by raising moral concerns about using
military force: perhaps democracies avoid attacking other democracies because they believe it would be morally wrong. In his influential interpretation of
Kant’s Perpetual Peace, Michael Doyle writes: “domestically just republics, which rest on consent, presume foreign republics to be also consensual, just, and
therefore deserving of accommodation” (Doyle 1983, p. 230). We advance a similar hypothesis. The foreign and domestic policies of democracies reflect the will of
the people. Knowing this, people in democracies will feel morally reluctant to overturn policies that the citizens of
other democracies have chosen freely. Coercively interfering with another democracy would, by this argument, count as an illegitimate assault on the freedom and
self-determination of individuals. In contrast, democratic publics might have fewer moral qualms about using force to reverse the will of a dictator who has imposed
foreign and domestic policies without popular consent. If morality is an independent driver of the democratic peace, we would expect to find a moral aversion to
attacking fellow democracies, separate from perceptions of threat, cost, and success. In sum, different theories have distinct implications for how and why shared
democracy could affect public beliefs and preferences. These theories not only suggest that public opinion should be less inclined to use force against a democracy
than against an autocracy, but also propose different reasons why actors would hold these preferences. Through experiments, we not only test whether democratic
publics are reluctant to attack fellow democracies, but also adjudicate among various causal mechanisms