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​Torralba v. People (supra)

​Sps. Viloria v. Continental Airlines (G.R. No. 188288,
January 16, 2012) arriana

Spouses Fernando And Lourdes Viloria vs Continental

Airlines Inc.
G.R. No. 188288 ​January 16, 2012

Upon returning to the Philippines, Fernando demanded a
refund from CAI alleging that Mager, an agent from Holiday
Travel had deluded them into purchasing an airline tickets on
board CAI. They claimed that the representation of Mager as to
unavailability of seats for train tickets be considered fraudulent
as to vitiate the consent of Spouse Viloria in the purchase of the
subject ticket. In a letter dated March 24, 1998, Continental
Micronesia denied the request and informed him for that the
subject tickets may be used as a form of payment for the
purchase of another Continental ticket, albeit with a re-issuance
fee. He went to CAI for the replacement but was informed that a
round trip ticket to Los Angeles was US$1,867.40 so he would
have to pay what will not be covered by the value of his San
Diego to Newark round trip ticket.

Spouses Viloria then filed a complaint for sum of money

and damages against CAI. Fernando claimed that CAI’s act of
charging him with US$1,867.40 for a round trip ticket to Los
Angeles, which other airlines priced at US$856.00 breached its
undertaking under its March 24, 1998 letter. CAI argued that
Spouses Viloria’s sole basis to claim that the price at which CAI
was willing to issue the new tickets is unconscionable is a piece
of hearsay evidence – an advertisement appearing on a
newspaper stating that airfares from Manila to Los Angeles or
San Francisco cost US$818.00.

RTC ruled in favor of the spouses however it was reversed

by the CA. According to the CA, there is no compulsion for CAI
to charge the lower amount of US$856.00, which Spouses
Viloria claim to be the fee charged by other airlines. The matter
of fixing the prices for its services is CAI’s prerogative, which
Spouses Viloria cannot intervene.
ISSUE: Are newspaper clippings admissible in evidence?

There is also no showing that Spouses Viloria were
discriminated against in bad faith by being charged with a higher
rate. The only evidence the petitioners presented to prove that
the price of a round trip ticket between Manila and Los Angeles
at that time was only $856.00 is a newspaper advertisement for
another airline company, which is inadmissible for being
“hearsay evidence, twice removed.” Newspaper clippings are
hearsay if they were offered for the purpose of proving the truth
of the matter alleged. As ruled in Feria v. Court of Appeals,:

[N]ewspaper articles amount to “hearsay evidence, twice

removed” and are therefore not only inadmissible but without
any probative value at all whether objected to or not, unless
offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter
asserted. In this case, the news article is admissible only as
evidence that such publication does exist with the tenor of the
news therein stated.

​ eople v. Cusi (G.R. No. L-20986, August 14, 1965)



Puesca, Apa, Gustilo, Macalinao, Dairo, and Montano were
charged with robbery in band with homicide, to which they
pleaded not guilty. While Sgt. Bano was testifying as
prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made
to him by Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting his
participation in the commission of the offense charged, revealed
that other persons conspired with him to commit the offense,
mentioning the name of each and everyone of them. The
prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention in court the
names of Puesca's alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for the
accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the
ground that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as
far as his clients were concerned. The respondent judge resolved
the objection directing the witness to answer the question but
without mentioning or giving the names of the accused who had
interposed the objection.

ISSUE/HOLDING: Whether or no Sgt. Bano is allow to

answer the question in full.
Yes. Hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may not be
admitted. But while the testimony of a witness regarding a
statement made by another person, if intended to establish the
truth of facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay
evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement
in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement
was made or the tenor of such statement.

In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer is

nothing more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca
had mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of those who conspired
with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that
Puesca's statement or the answer to be given by Sgt. Bano would
be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons
so named really conspired with Puesca. The question
propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have
been allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding,
however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent
evidence to show that the persons named really and actually
conspired with Puesca and later took part in the commission of
the offense.

​ strada v. Desierto (G.R. Nos. 146710-15 & 146738,

March 2, 2001) elver

Estrada vs Desierto
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President
on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she
is the President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada
was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued
by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. However,
petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared
inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive
Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At
2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for
President where he would not be a candidate.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. On January 22, the
Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately
discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal
problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting
any further proceedings or in any other criminal complaint that
may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as
President is over and only if legally warranted." Thru another
counsel, petitioner, on February 6, for Quo Warranto. He prayed
for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding
the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution.
Among the pieces of evidence offered to prove that Estrada had
indeed resigned from the presidency is the Angara Diary,
chronicling the last moments of Estrada in Malacanang.

Whether the use of the Angara diary to determine the state of
mind of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates the
rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.

The Supreme Court held that the Angara diary is not an out of
court statement but is a part of the pleadings of the case.
Furthermore, the Court noted that the Angara diaries contained
direct statements of Estrada with respect to his proposal for the
holding of a snap election, his intent to leave his post by
Monday and his exasperation over the bureaucracy, controversy
and red tape. An ANALYSIS of the same leads to the conclusion
that the contents of the diary may be more accurately classified
as admissions of a party. Pursuant to the Rules of Evidence, “the
act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may
be given in evidence against him.
The Angara diary contains statements of the petitioner, which
reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his
intent to resign. It also contains statements of Sec. Angara from
which we can reasonably deduce petitioner’s intent to resign.
Moreover, the statements cannot be regarded as hearsay
evidence because the same can be properly categorized as
independently relevant statements. Independently relevant
statements are those which are “independent” from the truth of
the statements. Independently relevant statements may be
classified into statements which consist of the very facts in issue
and those which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue,
such as the statements of a person showing his state of mind or
statements of a person from which an inference may be made as
to the state of mind of another. Pursuant to this, it may well be
said that the entries in the Angara diary may be regarded as
containing statements regarding the state of mind of Estrada,
hence constituting circumstantial evidence of his intent to

​ ornejo v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. L-58831, July 31,

1987) grace

Cornejo v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. L-58831, July 31, 1987


Engineer Alfredo R. Cornejo, Sr. called up Beth Chua, who was

renting the premises owned by Crisanto Bautista as her
residence and a sari-sari store, and introduced himself to be
connected with the City Engineer's Office. Cornejo said
pursuant to the Building Code, the Metro Manila Commission
requires that the floor area of all houses be measured, a service
for which a fee of P3.00 per square meter is charged, but that, if
said service is undertaken by him, the charge would be only
P0.50 per square meter. Chua believed him because he talked
nicely and warned her that unless she complied, she could be
liable. She was also convinced by Cornejo that having her store
measured and a plan thereof made would prevent her eviction
from the subject premises. City Engineer Jesus I. Reyna later
issued a certification, which was presented as Exhibit B, to Chua
stating that Cornejo was not authorized to conduct inspection
and investigation of privately-owned buildings. Cornejo was
then arrested in an entrapment operation.

Whether or not the certification issued by Pasay City Engineer
Jesus Reyna is admissible.


Yes. The law provides that where the statement or writings

attributed to a person who is not on the witness stand are being
offered not to prove the truth of the facts stated therein but only
to prove that such statements were actually made or such
writings were executed, such evidence is not covered by the
hearsay rule. In the case at bar, Exhibit B was not presented as
an independent evidence to prove the want of authority of
petitioner to inspect and investigate privately-owned buildings,
but merely as part of the testimony of-the complainant that such
certification was issued in her presence and the declaration of
Assistant Pasay City Engineer Ceasar Contreras that the
signature appearing thereon was that of Engineer Reyna. Thus,
the certification issued by Pasay City Engineer Jesus Reyna is

​ hilippine Realty v. Firematic (G.R. No. 156251, April 27,

2007) harey

​Philippine Realty and Holdings Corporation (PRHC), entered into a Construction Agreement[3] with Firematic
Philippines, Inc. (Firematic) for which the latter undertook to supply, deliver and install the fire alarm system for Phase I of the Tektite
To facilitate the purchase of the approved model and specifications of... the fire pumps from Technotrade Industrial Sales, Inc., then
the firematic presented to PRHC for approval The... subject materials were delivered and eventually installed by Firematic.

PRHC requested the Connel Bros. Co., Philippines for a quotation of the Peerless UL/FU Fire pump similar to those installed by
Firematic in Tektite Tower I.However, Connel Bros. Philippines, Inc. replied by letter that it would be difficult for them to trace
whether they had records of transactions with Technotrade-USA, because the pump model and serial number that PRHC furnished
were not of Peerless origin.

Firematic billed for the balance of the amount of the automatic sprinkler supplies installed.[24] However, PRHC rejected the claim.
PRHC insisted that Firematic committed fraud in the performance of its obligations under the two contracts in (1) actually delivering

and installing pumps that were not genuine "Peerless" products, non-UL listed and non-FM approved; (2 ​
Firematic filed a Complaint for Collection for Sum of Money plus Damages against PRHC.

Firematic alleged in its complaint that when it followed up its final billings and retention money, the PRHC, under new
management, refused to pay its obligation. It further claimed that the PRHC's reason, that the sprinkler system and fire alarm
system were defective was so... flimsy because the sprinkler and fire alarm systems were certified to be in good condition.
etitioner asserts, because respondent failed to dispute its claim and present proof that the fire pumps delivered were genuine, it had
impliedly admitted that the fire pumps were not original Peerless pumps. Petitioner further contends that the issuance of the
certificate of... completion and the fact that the fire pumps were used did not cure their defects.

Respondent contends that the fire pumps were inspected, examined and tested by petitioner's technical staff, and that the latter
found them to be operational. Thus, it cannot now be permitted to belatedly complain.

A Respondent likewise reiterates that the evidence presented by petitioner to prove that the fire pumps were not genuine is
inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay.


whether or not the fire pumps supplied and delivered by respondent to petitioner conformed to the technical specifications of the

NO. In this case, petitioner relied on the principle of estoppel by silence, as well as on Letter No. L/93-272[63] and Letter
No. L/94-043[64] of Connel Bros. to prove that the fire pumps, which respondent supplied and installed, were not...
genuine.However, petitioner failed to present the signatory of the letters (E.L. Sta. Maria, Jr.) to testify on the veracity of the contents
of the letters; thus, respondent was not given the opportunity to cross-examine him. It also appears that the person who signed the
letters had no... personal knowledge of the facts stated therein, as he claimed that he had been "verbally advised" that the
manufacturer of Peerless pumps never had direct negotiation with Technotrade, and as such, the latter is not a dealer of the pumps.

Well-entrenched is the rule that a private certification is hearsay where the person who issued the same was never
presented as a witness. The same is true of letters. While hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of objection
by the adverse party's counsel, it is... nonetheless without probative value.[65] Stated differently, the declarants of written
statements pertaining to disputed facts must be presented at the trial for cross-examination.[66] The lack of objection may
make an incompetent... evidence admissible, but admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.
Indeed, hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative value.[

Petitioner asserts that respondent impliedly admitted that the fire pumps it installed were "not of Peerless origin" because of its
failure to dispute petitioner's accusation and to present proofs that the fire pumps delivered were genuine. Thus, petitioner contends
that... estoppel by silence applies to respondent.

The principle of estoppel in pais applies wherein one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his own silence when he
ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other
rightfully... relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.

We find the principle inapplicable in the present case. Acording to respondent's Managing Director Jojie S. Gador, she did not
completely keep silent on petitioner's accusation. She testified that when petitioner refused to pay respondent, she went to the Fire
Department of the City of Pasig and made an inquiry regarding the fire incident that took place at the Tektite project.[69] In answer to
this inquiry, the Fire Department issued a Certification[70] stating, inter alia, that the office[71] was very much delighted because the
management of Tektite Tower had substantially complied with the safety requirements of Presidential Decree No. 1185.[72] In
making such inquiry, respondent in effect denied petitioner's accusation that the... fire pumps it had installed were defective; as
such, the principle of estoppel by silence does not apply.
Because good faith is presumed, respondent was not obliged to present proofs of the genuineness of the fire pumps it supplied and
installed. The burden of proof to show that the pumps were not genuine fell upon petitioner.

​ NPC v. Diato-Bernal (G.R. No. 180979, December

15, 2010) janine

G.R. No. 180979, December 15, 2010


National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), is a government owned and controlled corporation created for
the purpose of undertaking the development of hydroelectric power throughout the Philippines. To carry out the said
purpose, NAPOCOR is authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain. Thus, in order to complete the
construction of structures and steel posts for NAPOCORs Dasmarinas- Zapote 230 KV Transmission Line Project, it
had to acquire an easement of right of way over respondent’s property.

Thus, NAPOCOR filed an expropriation suit against respondent. NAPOCOR is willing to deposit the
amount of Eight Hundred Fifty- Three Pesos and 72/100 (P853.72), representing the assessed value of the property.
But the parties failed to reach an agreement.

So, the RTC proceeded to determine the amount of just compensation and appointed three (3)
commissioners. The commissioners submitted their report and recommended that the just compensation due from
NAPOCOR be pegged at P10,000.00 per sq. m, based on the property’s fair market value.

NAPOCOR filed an Opposition asserting that it was not substantiated by any official documents or
registered deeds of sale of the subject propertys neighboring lots. However, CA rendered its Decision affirming the
RTCs judgment.

​Hence, this present petition for review on certiorari interposed by NAPOCOR.


Is the valuation report of just compensation made by the court-appointed commissioners admissible?


No. As correctly invoked by NAPOCOR, a commissioner’s report of land prices which is not based on any
documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court.
​Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation and to convey thereby the
idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. Indeed,
the just-ness of the compensation can only be attained by using reliable and actual data as bases in fixing the value
of the condemned property.

​It is evident that the above conclusions are highly speculative and devoid of any actual and reliable basis.
First, the market values of the subject property neighboring lots were mere estimates and unsupported by any
corroborative documents, such as sworn declarations of realtors in the area concerned, tax declarations or zonal
valuation from the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the contiguous residential dwellings and commercial
establishments. The report also failed to elaborate on how and by how much the community centers and
convenience facilities enhanced the value of respondents property. Finally, the market sales data and price listings
alluded to in the report were not even appended thereto.

​Dantis vs. Maghinang (supra)

​People v. Valero (G.R. Nos. L-45283-84, March 19, 1982)

Dying Declaration

​ eople v. Mara-Mara (G.R. No. 110994, October 22,

1999) lourdes

A benefit dance sponsored by the Calpi Elementary School
Parents-Teachers Association of which accused-appellant is the
president, was held in the yard of accused-appellant’s house in
Barangay Calpi, Claveria, Masbate in the evening of November
18, 1991. At about 12 midnight, while Ricardo Donato was
dancing with a certain Rowena del Rosario, one Dante Arce, a
friend of accused-appellant, approached Ricardo Donato and
boxed him on the chest. Frightened, Rowena ran away while
Ricardo Donato scampered toward the fence for safety.
Miguelito Donato was about two (2) meters away from where
Ricardo Donato stayed at the fence. Not for long, accused-
appellant took his handgun tucked in his waist and fired at
victim Miguelito Donato, hitting the latter on the left breast.
Ricardo Donato tried to help his fallen brother Miguelito but
somebody struck Ricardo’s head with an iron bar which knocked
him out for about three (3) minutes. When Ricardo regained
consciousness, he hurried home and informed his parents of
what happened to their son Miguelito.
Regarder Donato, Miguelito’s father, immediately went to the
crime scene and rushed Miguelito to the Pio Duran Hospital
where the latter died early in the morning of the next day
(November 19, 1991). Before Miguelito expired, Regarder
Donato asked who shot him and Miguelito replied that it was
The accused-appellant was charged with murder and was ruled
by the RTC to be guilty thereof. However, the accused-appellant
challenged the findings of the trial court before the SC in the
hope of securing an acquittal or, at the least, being held liable
only for the death of Miguelito in a tumultuous affray.

Whether the dying declaration of Miguelito is admissible.

Yes. Regarder Donato’s testimony regarding Miguelito’s
identification of the accused-appellant as his assailant certainly
qualifies as a dying declaration that is worthy of credence. For a
dying declaration to be admissible in evidence, these requisites
must concur: (1) that death is imminent and the declarant is
conscious of that fact; (2) that the declaration refers to the cause
and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) that the
declaration relates to facts which the victim is competent to
testify to; (4) that the declarant thereafter dies; and (5) that the
declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant’s
death is the subject of inquiry. The degree and seriousness of the
wounds suffered by the victim Miguelito Donato and the fact
that his death supervened shortly thereafter may be considered
as substantial evidence that the declaration was made by him
with the full realization that he was in a dying condition. The
victim Miguelito Donato’s dying declaration having satisfied all
these requisites, it must be considered as an evidence of the
highest order because, at the threshold of death, all thoughts of
fabrication are stilled. A victim’s utterance after sustaining a
mortal wound may be considered pure emanations of the

​ eople v. Molo (G.R. No. L-44680. January 11, 1979)


In the evening of April 9, 1976 at about 8:00 p.m. at
Municipality of Romblon, Venancio Gapisa and Simeona Rapa-
Gapisa, husband and wife, retired to sleep. Venancio Gapisa
immediately fell asleep because he was tired from clearing the
fields, and besides, had drunk tuba on that day. He slept near the
door lying on his right side. Not long after the couple had
retired, Simeona, who had not yet fallen asleep, heard an
indistinct sound of murmur and gnashing of teeth. Although she
was seized by fear, she managed to peep through the dilapidated
buri wall and saw accused Dominador Molo attired only in short
pants. He was alone. Trembling, she immediately lighted a
kerosene lamp and placed it on top of the trunk nearby. She tried
to awaken her husband, but the latter did not respond.

Meanwhile, the accused had already climbed up the house which

was only a flight of two steps. The accused forcibly pushed the
sliding door and barged into the house. He inquired from
Simeona where Venancio was and she replied that he was
asleep. Finding Venancio sleeping near the door, he immediately
grabbed his left wrist and started hacking at the sleeping old
man. Rudely awakened, Venancio quickly stood up and with his
right hand reached for his bolo which was atop the table nearby;
but he was not able to retaliate in as much as Dominador Molo
was quick to hack at him again. Fearing for her own life,
Simeona rushed out of the house through the door of the
unfinished kitchen to summon help from her son, Alejandro
Gapisa, who was at Roman Mangaring's house some 100 meters
away. Trembling, she told him that his father was boloed by
Boslo, the name by which accused-appellant was known in their

Upon being informed, Alejandro and Roman ran towards the

house of Venancio, followed by Simeona. Upon arrival, they
saw Venancio bleeding profusely and in weakened condition. He
was sitting on the floor of the kitchen, defecating in his pants.
When Alejandro took him in his arms, Venancio told him that he
was boloed by Boslo. Roman Mangaring who was present also
inquired from Venancio who his assailant was and elicited the
answer, "Boslo". Venancio was then rushed to the hospital and
arrived there at about 1:50 a.m. He expired a few minutes after.

An autopsy of the victim disclosed that he died of hemorrhage

from multiple incised wounds. The following morning an
investigation of the fatal incident was conducted. Pat. Manuel
Marino in the presence of Patrolmen Montojo and Antonio
Madali took the statement of Simeona Gapisa, who Identified
Dominador Molo as the assailant of her deceased husband.
Thereafter, PC soldiers and policemen were dispatched to the
house of Dominador Molo some one and a half (1-1/2)
kilometers away from the scene of the killing. Dominador Molo
was placed under arrest and brought by the arresting officers to
the poblacion. Investigated at the PC barracks, Molo denied
having committed any wrong and having gone to the place of
Venancio Gapisa.

After trial, the court a quo finds the accused Dominador Molo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Accused-appellant thru Atty.
Pedro Q. Quadra, counsel de oficio now seeks acquittal on the
basis that the so-called dying declarations should not have been
accorded credence, because the victim could not have Identified
his assailant.

Whether or not the statements made by Venacio to Alejandro
and Roman are admissible.

Yes. The statements of Venancio Identifying Dominador Molo
as his assailant to Alejandro, his son, and Roman, his neighbor
are dying declarations.

Considering the nature and extent of the wounds, eight in all,

Venancio must have realized the seriousness of his condition and
it can therefore be inferred that he made the incrimination under
the consciousness of impending death, which, in fact,
supervened barely 4-1/2 hours after he was boloed.

In resume then the credible and unimpeached testimonies of the

victim's widow, Simeona Gapisa, who was an eye-witness to the
fatal incident, and that of Alejandro Gapisa, the victim's son, and
Roman Mangaring, a neighbor, who both testified on the ante-
mortem statements of the victim, establish the guilt of accused-
appellant beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
qualified by treachery, and aggravated by circumstances of
dwelling, recidivism and reiteration, it appearing that accused
has been convicted by final judgment of murder, frustrated
murder, grave slander, less serious physical injuries, qualified
trespass to dwelling and robbery, and, had served sentences for
said crimes.

​People v. Bautista (G.R. No. 117685, June 21, 1999) mary


People v. Basay (G.R. No. 86941, March 3, 1993) nina

Teodoro Basay and Jaime Ramirez were charged with Multiple

Murder with Arson in a criminal complaint for having allegedly
killed the spouses Zosimo and Beatrice Toting and their six-year
old daughter, Bombie, and for having burned the said spouses'
house to conceal the crime; as a consequence of such fire, the
spouses' other daughter, Manolita, was burned to death. MCTC
issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused; no bail was
recommended and were detained at the Pamplona municipal jail.
After both accused entered a not guilty plea during their
arraignment trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution upon which the decision is
based is summarized in detail in the trial court's decision and
partly contains as follows:
Upon arriving at Tigbaw, they found a burned house and several
dead bodies. The trial court identified the four (4) fatalities and
their injuries as follows:
(3) Bombie Toting, inflicted hack wound from the anterior
lumbar area transecting mid-abdomen, inguial area left to the
medial thigh left, through and through, with necrotic transected
Bombie Toting related to Sgt. Tabanao that on March 4, 1986 at
7:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant and Teodoro Basay killed
her parents and burned their house.
On the same day the investigating officers went to the
appellant's house. They saw appellant fixing the roof of his
house and when appellant saw them, he went down and tried to
ran. Appellant was turned over to the Pamplona Police Station.
Bombie Toting was brought to the hospital but due to the gravity
of her injuries she died on March 7, 1986 at 1:40 P.M.
On the other hand, the trial court did not admit the statement of
Bombie Toting as a dying declaration but merely as part of the
res gestae because the prosecution failed to prove two (2) of the
requisites for the admissibility of a dying declaration, viz., that
the statement was given under consciousness of an impending
death and that Bombie Toting is a competent witness.
Whether or not Bombie’s testimony is admissible.

We harbor very serious doubts about the alleged statement given

by Bombie Toting to Sgt. Tabanao and Jaime Saguban
identifying the appellant and Teodoro Basay as the perpetrators
of the heinous crime. In the first place, the trial court itself ruled
that Bombie was not a competent witness. We agree with such a
conclusion, not necessarily because she was only six (6) years
old, but because her condition at the time she supposedly gave
her statement made it impossible for her to have communicated
effectively. She suffered the following injuries: "Infected hack
wound from the right anterior lumbar area transecting mid
abdomen, inguinal area left to the medial thigh left through and
through, with necrotic transected muscle." She was taken from
the crime scene only on 6 March 1986, or two (2) days after the
commission of the crime, and died in the hospital on 7 March
1986. The doctor who first attended to her when she arrived at
the Provincial Hospital, a certain Dr. Sy, was not presented as a
witness. On the other hand, the doctor who attended to her
before she died, Dr. Edgar Cantalao, testified that when he last
saw Bombie alive, she could not talk.

Although persons of tender age are prone to tell the truth,

however, the Court must be cautious in appreciating said
testimony where the person had a serious wound and had not
eaten for one day and one night. There is no evidence to show
that Bombie Toting told the doctor as to who were the
perpetrators of the crime; neither did she tell her own brother,
Zosimo Toting, Jr. that it was the accused, Teodoro Basay and
Jaime Ramirez who killed her parents and her brother and sisters
and burned their house. . . . The Court cannot understand why
P.C. Sgt. Tabano did not ask Bombie Toting questions
concerning the commission of the crime by the accused. Neither
did the P.C. or (sic) the police take any statement from her on
her way to the hospital or at the hospital. Surprisingly, Bombie
Toting did not even tell her own brother, Zosimo Toting, Jr. that
it was the accused who committed the crime. Had the statement
of Bombie Toting been made to the doctor or to the barangay
captain or to any reputable member of the community where the
incident happened, the Court will have to put weight and
consider her statement as a dying declaration. Our experience
has shown that persons in authority are prone to fabricate or
misrepresent the facts to serve their own purpose. Innocent
people had been charged in Court simply by the false statements
of peace officers. The Court therefore has to be cautious when
these peace officers testify in Court."

While it may be true that the appellant ran away when he first
saw the armed law officers, he did so merely out of fear of them.
This act should not be considered as the flight which is
indicative of guilt. The appellant had not left his house or
barangay since 4 March 1986, the day the crime was committed.
If he were indeed one of the perpetrators and had the intention to
flee in order to avoid arrest, he should have vanished sooner and
should not have remained in his house. Besides, if indeed his
running away could be construed as flight, it could only be
considered as circumstantial evidence. Such evidence would still
be insufficient for a conviction. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court, in order that circumstantial evidence may
sustain a conviction, there must, inter alia, be more than one (1)
circumstance. No other circumstance was established in this

People vs. Cabtalan (richard)

Dying Declaration

Benry and Adriano, conspiring, confederating together and

mutually helping one another, with deliberate intent, with
treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault, and stab
Jesus with the use of long bolos, with which both accused have
provided themselves for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the
victim multiple stab wounds, which wounds resulted to his
instantaneous death.

Wilfredo went to the store to buy salt. Thereat, Benny and

Adriano asked him to join them in their drinking spree to which
Wilfredo obliged In the course of their drinking spree, Wilfredo
noticed that Benny and Adriano had bolos tucked on their
waists. He also heard the two talking about their plan to assault
someone that same night. Sensing that something wrong would
happen, Wilfredo left them and walked home.

Upon reaching his house, Wilfredo soon noticed Benny and

Adriano circling the house of Jesus’s daughter, Elena, which is
just about two arms length away from his house. Thereafter, the
duo stood on a dark portion of the road. Later on, he saw Jesus
and his 9-year-old daughter, Jonalyn walking towards the house
of Jonalyn’s mother, Elena. Jesus stopped and turned towards a
grassy area to urinate when suddenly, Benny and Adriano
emerged from their hiding place. They held Jesus by his
shoulders and alternately stabbed him. At that moment, Jesus
shouted “I am wounded, please help me because I was stabbed
by Benny and Adriano. Jesus then fell to the ground while
Benny and Adriano immediately fled from the crime scene.

For her part, prosecution witness Jonalyn narrated that on the

night of the incident, she fetched her grandfather Jesus from her
Ate Susan’s house. She and her grandfather walked side by side
in going to their house. However, upon reaching the vicinity of
their house, her grandfather went across the street to urinate. IT
was then that she saw Benny and Adriano on the same street.
She knew the two because Benny and her father are cousins
while Adriano and her mother are also cousins. She saw the two
men take hold of her grandfather’s arms, after which Benny
stabbed her grandfather with a long bolo. She heard her
grandfather say “Donie, help me, I am wounded.” After that,
Jonalyn saw Benny go home.

Elena also tesified that when she heard her father shouting for
help, she immediately went outside the house and saw Benny
releasing her father. As she got nearer to Jesus, Benny and
Adriano ran away. When Elena asked her father as to who
stabbed him, the latter replied that it was Benny and Adriano.

Answers of the respondent:

1. Wilfredo’s testimony that Benny and Adriano took turns in

stabbing Jesus differs from that of Jonalyn who stated that
while the two assailants attacked Jesus in unison, it was
only Benny who inflicted the mortal wounds. Therefore,
Wilfredo’s testimony is not credible.
2. Wilfredo is not a credible witness since he surfaced three
years after the incident to testify for the prosecution.
3. Wilfredo and Jonalyn are related. Therefore, their
testimony are not credible.
4. There are inconsistencies in Elena’s testimony and in her

Issue: Are the testimony of the witnesses credible?

Ruling: Yes.

1. With respect to the Answer in no. 1, the inconsistency

pertains merely to the manner the fatal stab wounds were
inflicted on Jesus. The materiality of the assailants' exact
position during their attack on the victim is a trivial and
insignificant detail which cannot defeat the witnesses'
positive identification of Benny as one of the assailants.
Besides "[i]t is perfectly natural for different witnesses
testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying
details as there may be some details which one witness may
notice while the other may not observe or remember. In
fact, jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dovetailing
of narration by different witnesses as it could mean that
their testimonies were fabricated and rehearsed.
2. Deference or reluctance in reporting a crime does not
destroy the truth of the charge nor is it an indication of
deceit. Delay in reporting a crime or an unusual incident in
a rural area is well-known. It is common for a witness to
prefer momentary silence for fear of reprisal from the
accused. he fact remains that Wilfredo fulfilled his duty as
a good member of society by aiding the family of Jesus
when they were seeking justice. In the absence of other
circumstances that would show that the charge was a mere
concoction and that Wilfredo was impelled by some evil
motives, delay in testifying is insufficient to discredit his
3. While admittedly, Wilfredo is a relative of the husband of
Julita, who is the daughter of Jesus, and Jonalyn is Jesus's
granddaughter, relationship per se does not evince ulterior
motive nor does it ipso facto tarnish the credibility of
witnesses. "Mere relationship to a party cannot militate
against the credibility of witnesses or be taken as
destructive of the witnesses' credibility.” What matters is
that Wilfredo and Jonalyn positively identified Benny and
Adriano as the assailants of Jesus and that they testified in a
straightforward manner. These indicate that the two are
telling the truth.
4. It is settled that "affidavits or statements taken ex parte are
generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by
nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court, and
whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and
the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony
commands greater weight.” The reason for this is that trial
courts have the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
first hand and note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude
under grilling examination."

​ arate v. Gingoog (G.R. No. 152263, July 3,

2009) ​rizyl

Zarate v. RTC

At or around 10 pm of April 1, 1994, while the victim, Ernesto
Guiritan was sitting outside the Sta. Rita Church, the accused-
petitioner approached the victim to ask for a cigarette but when
the former failed to give one, the latter stabbed and ran away.
Due to the help sought by the victim, he was brought to the
hospital where he was treated. The morning after the incident, a
police officer went to the hospital to take ante-mortem statement
of the victim in the presence of the latter's doctor. Guiritan stated
that he felt as if he would die from his wound and that Ating
Arthur Zarate was the one who stabbed him. The victim narrated
the incident and how he happen to know his perpetrator.
Accused-Petitioner put up the defense of alibi, that he only knew
the victim in court and that he was in some other place 200
meters away from the place of the incident. RTC found Zarate
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated
homicide. It further held that the victim's positive identification
of Zarate as the person who stabbed him prevails over the denial
and alibi of Zarate.
Appealed denied by CA, and confirmed RTC's decision. Hence
this petition.

Issue: WON the ante-mortem statement of the victim can be

taken as part of the res gestae since the statement was taken after
the operation of the victim, which operation may have affected
his mental and physical condition.

Held: Yes, Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides
for the exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, which includes
statements given as part of the res gestae. The pertinent
provision reads:

SEC. 42. Part of the res gestae. - - Statements made by a person

while a startling occurrence is taking place, or immediately prior
or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof,
may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the
res gestae.

A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is

deemed as part of the res gestae when (1) the principal act, the
res gestae is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made
before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the
statements concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances. In this case, Guiritan lost
consciousness when he was brought to the hospital and regained
consciousness the following morning after the operation. His
statements were still the reflex product of immediate sensual
impressions so that it was the shocking event speaking through
him, and he did not have the opportunity to concoct or contrive
the story. Thus, his statement is admissible as part of the res

It is well settled that positive identification, where categorical

and consistent and not attended by any showing of ill motive on
the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails
over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving weight in law. For this reason, the defense of alibi
and denial cannot prosper in the light of the positive
identification by complainant Guiritan that it was petitioner who
stabbed him.

Declaration Against Interest
​Lichauco v. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co. (supra)
​People v. Toledo (G.R. No. 28655, August 8, 1928)) sandro

​ uentes Jr. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 111692,

February 9, 1996) shanine

1. Petitioner points to an alleged inconsistency between the

testimonies of prosecution witnesses Alberto Toling and
Honorio Osok to the effect that they saw petitioner stab
Malaspina on the right lumbar region, and the testimony of the
attending physician that the victim was stabbed on the left
lumbar region. This discrepancy is inconsequential. What is
material is that Malaspina was stabbed to death and that three
(3) prosecution witnesses positively identified petitioner as the
knife wielder. It must be stressed that these witnesses had known
petitioner for quite some time and never had any personal
misunderstanding nor altercation with the latter as to create any
suspicion that they were impelled by ill motives to falsely
implicate him.

2. One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that

pertaining to declarations made against interest. (Sec. 38 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court) The admissibility in evidence of such
declaration is grounded on necessity and trustworthiness.

3. There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of

a declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be
available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact
cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must
render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.

4. In the instant case, we find that the declaration particularly

against penal interest attributed to Zoilo Fuentes Jr. is not
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. One
striking feature that militates against the acceptance of such a
statement is its patent untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to
accused-appellant had every motive to prevaricate. The same
can be said of accused-appellant and his uncle Felicisimo. But
more importantly, the far weightier reason why the admission
against penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is
that the declarant is not unable to testify. There is no showing
that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically
incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere
absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto
unavailable under this rule. For it is incumbent upon the defense
to produce each and every piece of evidence that can break the
prosecution and assure the acquittal of the accused. Other than
the gratuitous statements of accused-appellant and his uncle to
the effect that Zoilo admitted having killed Malaspina, the
records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to
produce Zoilo as a witness. Thus, for this case at least, exclusion
is the prudent recourse.

People v. Bernal (G.R. No. 113685, June 19, 1997) stephanie

Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other
persons whose identities and whereabouts are still unknown,
were charged with the crime of kidnapping.
It appears that on August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning,
while Roberto Racasa and Openda, Jr. were engaged in a
drinking spree, they invited Bernal, who was passing by, to join
them. After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men,
apparently because he was going to fetch his child. Thereafter,
two men arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if
he was Payat. When he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled
out a handgun while the other handcuffed him and told him not
to run because they were policemen and because he had an
atraso or a score to settle with them. They then hastily took him
away. Racasa immediately went to the house of Openda, Jr. and
informed the latters mother of the abduction. The theory of the
prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a certain Salito
Enriquez, tends to establish that Openda, Jr. had an illicit affair
with Bernals wife Naty and this was the motive behind the
formers kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing. On
the other hand, the defense asserts that Openda, Jr. was a drug-
pusher arrested by the police on August 5, 1991, and hence, was
never kidnapped.
The court a quo rendered judgment finding Bernal guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for the abduction
and disappearance of Bienvenido Openda, Jr. Bernal assails the
lower court for giving weight and credence to the prosecution
witnesses allegedly illusory testimonies and for convicting him
when his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. For the
charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victims
liberty, which is the essential element of the offense, must be
duly proved. In the case at bar, Bernal indisputably acted in
conspiracy with the two other unknown individuals as shown by
their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and
community of purpose. Proof of conspiracy is perhaps most
frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only.
A certain Adonis Sagarino, a childhood friend and neighbor of
the victim, testified that he saw Bernal at the billiard hall at
about 11:00 a.m. with his two companions and overheard him
dispatching one of them to Tarsings Store to check if a certain
person was still there. This person later turned out to be Openda,
Jr. He added that after the latters presence was confirmed, the
three men left the billiard hall. Minutes later, Openda, Jr.,
already handcuffed, passed by the billiard hall with Bernals

Equally important is the testimony of Roberto

Racasa, a resident of Bucana, Davao City who knew both Bernal
and the victim, the former being his neighbor and compadre. He
narrated that he and the victim were drinking at Tarsings Store
on that fateful day when Bernal passed by and had a drink with
them. After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave, after which,
two men came to the store and asked for Payat. When Openda,
Jr. confirmed that he was indeed Payat, he was handcuffed and
taken away by the unidentified men. Likewise, a certain Salito
Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that
sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he
and Bernals wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty
even gave Openda, Jr. money which they used to pay for a motel
room. He advised Naty not to do it again because she (was) a
married woman. Undoubtedly, his wifes infidelity was ample
reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge.

Whether or not the revelation of Openda Jr. to Enriquez is
admissible in evidence.
Yes. Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in
establishing the identity of the perpetrator. Coupled with enough
circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be
reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive
may be sufficient to support a conviction. Openda, Jr.s
revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with
Bernals wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made by
a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the
declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it
was made so far contrary to declarants own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and
against third persons.
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the
following requisites, to wit: (1) that the declarant is dead or
unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of
the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the
declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid
interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and
believed such declaration to be true.
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be
called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a
declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty
Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence because no sane
person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.


NO. 146556, 2006-04-19
A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords
the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.
The theory under which declarations against interest are
received in evidence notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the
necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence
advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration
asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral
On February 27, 1992, Simeon Prudencio filed a complaint for
recovery of possession and damages against Danilo Parel with
the RTC Baguio alleging that: he is the owner of a two-storey
residential house located at No. 61 Forbes Park National
Reservation near Department... of Public Service (DPS)
compound, Baguio City; such property was constructed solely
from his own funds and declared in his name under Tax
Declaration No. 47048; he commenced the construction of said
house in 1972 until its completion three years later; when the
second floor of said house became habitable in 1973, he allowed
Danilo's parents, Florentino (now deceased) and Susan Parel, to
move therein and occupy the second floor while the construction
of the ground floor was on-going to supervise the construction
and to safeguard the materials; when the construction of the
second floor was finished in 1975, Simeon allowed Danilo's
parents and children to transfer and temporarily reside thereat; it
was done out of sheer magnanimity as Danilo's parents have no
house of their own and since Simeon's wife is the older sister of
Florentino, Danilo's father; in November 1985, Simeon wrote
Florentino a notice for them to vacate the said house as the
former was due for retirement and he needed the place to which
Danilo's parents heeded when they migrated to U.S. in 1986;
however, without Simeon's knowledge, Danilo and his family
unlawfully entered and took possession of the ground floor of
Simeon's house; Danilo's refusal to vacate the house despite
repeated demands prompted Simeon to file the instant action for
recovery of... possession. Simeon also asked Danilo for a
monthly rental of P3,000.00 from April 1988 and every month
thereafter until the latter vacates the said premises and surrender
possession thereof; and for moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and cost of suit.
The RTC found the following matters as conclusive: that
Danilo's father was an allocatee of the land on which the subject
house was erected, as one of the lowly-paid government
employees at that time when then Mayor Luis Lardizabal gave
them the chance to construct their own... house on said
reservation; that Simeon failed to show proof of any contract,
written or oral, express or implied, that the late Florentino and
his family stayed on the house not as co-owners but as mere
lessees, nor any other proof that would clearly establish his
sole... ownership of the house; and, that the late Florentino was
the one who gathered the laborers for the construction of the
house and paid their salaries. Thus, the RTC ruled that co-
ownership existed between Simeon and Danilo's father,
The RTC did not give credence to the tax declaration as well as
the several documents showing the City Assessor's assessment
of the property all in Simeon's name since tax declarations are
not conclusive proof of ownership. It rejected the affidavit
executed by Florentino declaring the house as owned by
Simeon saying that the affidavit should be read in its entirety
to determine the purpose of its execution; that it was executed
because of an advisement addressed to the late Florentino by the
City Treasurer concerning the property's tax... assessment and
Florentino, thought then that it should be the Simeon who
should pay the taxes; and that the affidavit cannot be accepted
for being hearsay.
Was the affidavit admissible in evidence against Florentino and,
by extension, Danilo?
Yes. Section 38 of Rule 130 states: The declaration made by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the
declarant, if the fact is asserted in the declaration was at the time
it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against
third persons.
The affidavit
The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was Danilo's father
and had adequate knowledge with respect to the subject covered
by his statement. In said affidavit, Florentino categorically
declared that while he is the occupant of the residential building,
he is not the owner of the same as it is owned by Simeon who is
residing in Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not
have made such declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it
is prejudicial to himself as well as to his children's interests as
his heirs. A declaration against interest is the best evidence
which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.
Notably, during Florentino's lifetime, from 1973, the year he
executed said affidavit until 1989, the year of his death there is
no showing that he had revoked such affidavit even when a
criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had been filed by
Simeon against him (Florentino) and Danilo in 1988 regarding
the subject house which the trial court dismissed due to the
absence of evidence showing that Danilo entered the house
against the latter's will and held that the remedy of Simeon was
to file an action for ejectment; and even when a complaint for
unlawful detainer was filed against Danilo and his wife also in
1988 which was subsequently dismissed on the ground that
Simeon's action should be an accion publiciana which is beyond
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
The theory under which declarations against interest are
received in evidence notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the
necessity of the occasion renders the reception of such evidence
advisable and, further that the reliability of such declaration
asserts facts which are... against his own pecuniary or moral
Tax Declaration
Notably, Simeon has been religiously paying the real estate
property taxes on the house declared under his name since 1974.
In fact, Danilo during his cross-examination admitted that there
was no occasion that they paid the real estate taxes nor declared
any portion of the house in their name.
We agree with the CA that while tax receipts and declarations
are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute
at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. The house which Danilo claims to be co-owned by
his... late father had been consistently declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Simeon, and this fact, taken with the
other circumstances above-mentioned, inexorably lead to the
conclusion that Simeon is the sole owner of the house subject
matter of the litigation.

Philippine Free Press v. CA (G.R. No. 132864, October 24,
2005) janet

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the
publication of Philippine Free Press Magazine. Sometime
in 1963, Petitioner purchased a parcel of land situated
Makati. Upon taking possession of the subject land, the
Petitioner constructed their main office thereon.

During the 1965 presidential elections, Petitioner

supported the late President Diosdado Macapagal against
then Senate President Ferdinand Marcos. Upon the
election of the late President Ferdinand Marcos in 1965
and prior to the imposition of Martial law on September 21,
1972, the Petitioner printed numerous articles highly
critical of the Marcos administration, exposing the
corruption and abuses of the regime.

On the evening of September 20, 1972 soldiers

surrounded the Free Press Building and declared that they
were instructed by the President Marcos to take over the
building and to close the printing press. The cessation of
the publication led to financial ruin of the Petitioner.

On separate occasions, Mr. Locsin Sr. the owner of the

Free Press was approached by different persons with an
offer from the President to acquire the Company, but he
refused. Until on 1973 when Brig. Gen. Menzi made the
offer adding that “Marcos cannot be denied” and that “He
had no choice but to sell”. Hence, on October 23, 1973 the
parties executed a Deed of Sale.

On February 26, 1987, Petitioner filed a complaint for

Annulment of Sale on the grounds of vitiating consent and
gross inadequacy of purchase price.
Trial Court ruled in favor of the Respondents.
CA affirmed the TC’s decision with modification on
Attorney’s fee.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in considering
as hearsay the testimonial evidence which clearly
established the threats made upon petitioner and that
respondent Liwayway will be used as the corporate
vehicle for the forced acquisition of petitioner's properties.

Jurisprudence instructs that evidence of statement made
or a testimony is hearsay if offered against a party who
has no opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Hearsay
evidence is excluded precisely because the party against
whom it is presented is deprived of or is bereft of
opportunity to cross-examine the persons to whom the
statements or writings are attributed. And there can be no
quibbling that because death has supervened, the late
Gen Menzi, like the other purported Marcos subalterns,
Messrs. Baizas and De Vega, cannot cross-examine the
Locsins for the threatening statements allegedly made by
them for the late President.

Like the Court of Appeals, we are not unmindful of the

exception to the hearsay rule provided in Section 38, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. - The declaration made

by a person deceased or unable to testify, against the interest of
the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the
time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own interest,
that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and
against third persons.

However, in assessing the probative value of Gen. Menzi's

supposed declaration against interest, i.e., that he was
acting for the late President Marcos when he purportedly
coerced Mr. Locsin, Sr. to sell the Free Press property, we
are loathed to give it the evidentiary weight petitioner
endeavors to impress upon us. For, the Locsins can hardly
be considered as disinterested witnesses. They are likely
to gain the most from the annulment of the subject
contracts. Moreover, allegations of duress or coercion
should, like fraud, be viewed with utmost caution. They
should not be laid lightly at the door of men whose lips had
been sealed by death. Francisco explains why:

[I]t has been said that "of all evidence, the narration of a
witness of his conversation with a dead person is esteemed in
justice the weakest. '" One reason for its unreliability is that the
alleged declarant can not recall to the witness the circumstances
under which his statement were made. The temptation and
opportunity for fraud in such cases also operate against the
testimony. Testimony to statements of a deceased person, at least
where proof of them will prejudice his estate, is regarded as an
unsafe foundation for judicial action except in so far as such
evidence is borne out by what is natural and probable under the
circumstances taken in connection with actual known facts. And
a court should be very slow to act upon the statement of one of
the parties to a supposed agreement after the death of the other
party; such corroborative evidence should be adduced as to
satisfy the court of the truth of the story which is to benefit
materially the person telling it.

Excepting, petitioner insists that the testimonies of its

witnesses - the Locsins - are not hearsay because:

In this regard, hearsay evidence has been defined as "the

evidence not of what the witness knows himself but of
what he has heard from others." xxx Thus, the mere fact
that the other parties to the conversations testified to by
the witness are already deceased does [not] render such
testimony inadmissible for being hearsay.
Again, we disagree.

Even if petitioner succeeds in halving its testimonial

evidence, one-half purporting to quote the words of a live
witness and the other half purporting to quote what the live
witness heard from one already dead, the other pertaining
to the dead shall nevertheless remain hearsay in

The all too familiar rule is that "a witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his own knowledge". There
can be no quibbling that petitioner's witnesses cannot
testify respecting what President Marcos said to Gen.
Menzi about the acquisition of petitioner's newspaper, if
any there be, precisely because none of said witnesses
ever had an opportunity to hear what the two talked about.
Neither may petitioner circumvent the hearsay rule by
invoking the exception under the declaration-against-
interest rule. In context, the only declaration supposedly
made by Gen. Menzi which can conceivably be labeled as
adverse to his interest could be that he was acting in
behalf of Marcos in offering to acquire the physical assets
of petitioner. Far from making a statement contrary to his
own interest, a declaration conveying the notion that the
declarant possessed the authority to speak and to act for
the President of the Republic can hardly be considered as
a declaration against interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

​Dantis vs. Maghinang (supra)


​Mendoza v. CA (201 SCRA 675) thirdy

G.R. No. 86302 September 24, 1991

Facts: The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, in the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City. Teopista Toring
Tufiacao, the herein private respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was
then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos.

The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied her
claim. He denied it to his dying day. Teopista averred that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by
treating her as such and according her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child. The trial court
believed him and dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition.

The appellate court did not and reversed the judgment of the court below. Now the issue is before us on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate child under
Article 283 of the Civil Code.

Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Teopista Toring Tufiacao has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of
Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such. In so holding, we give effect to the policy of the Civil
Code and the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of "the paternity of illegitimate children,
without prejudice to the right of the alleged parent to resist the claimed status with his own defenses, including
evidence now obtainable through the facilities of modern medicine and technology.

Commenting on this provision, Francisco enumerates the following requisites that have to be complied with before
the act or declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.
4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence
other than such declaration.17
All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of
Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of
Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the
very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition. The declarations were made before the complaint
was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between
the declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the
extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.18
The said declarations have not been refuted. Casimiro could have done this by deposition if he was too old and weak
to testify at the trial of the case.

If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath by the private respondent and her witnesses, such as the
financial doles made by Casimiro to Brigida Toring, the hiring of Teopista's husband to drive the passenger truck of
Casimiro, who later sold the vehicle and gave the proceeds of the sale to Teopista and her husband, the permission
he gave Lolito Tufiacao to build a house on his land after he found that the latter was living on a rented lot, and, no
less remarkably, the joint savings account Casimiro opened with Teopista, we can reasonably conclude that Teopista
was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza.

We hold that by virtue of the above-discussed declarations, and in view of the other circumstances of this case,
'reopista Toring Tufiacao has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be
recognized as such. In so holding, we give effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the Family Code to liberalize
the rule on the investigation of "the paternity of illegitimate children, without prejudice to the right of the alleged
parent to resist the claimed status with his own defenses, including evidence now obtainable through the facilities of
modern medicine and technology

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be
the illegitimate child of the late Casimiro Mendoza and entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status. Costs
against the petitioner.

MONINA JISON (G.R. No. 124853 February 24, 1998)

This is a case filed by one Monina Jison for recognition as
an illegitimate child of Francisco Jison who is married to
Lilia Lopez Jison. MONINA alleged that she is the
daughter of FRANCISCO who impregnated her mother
Esperanza F. Amolar, who was then employed as the
nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter. She claims that she
has openly and continuously possessed the status of an
illegitimate child of Francisco and that Francisco had also
openly and continuously recognized her as such.
At trial on the merits, MONINA presented a total of eleven
(11) witnesses, namely: herself, Ruben Castellanes, Sr.,
Adela Casabuena, Arsenio Duatin, Zafiro Ledesma,
Danthea Lopez, Romeo Bilbao, Rudy Tingson, Alfredo
Baylosis, Dominador Zavariz and Lope Amolar.
MONINA during the trial, also presented some documents
she acquired from the relatives of FRANCISCO, in the
following instance;
MONINA then prepared to travel abroad, for which
purpose, she procured letters of introduction (Exhs.
S and T) from a cousin, Mike Alano (son of
FRANCISCOs elder sister Luisa); and an uncle,
Emilio Jison (FRANCISCOs elder brother),
addressed to another cousin, Beth Jison (Emilios
daughter), for Beth to assist MONINA. Exhibit S
contained a statement (Exh. S-1) expressly
recognizing that MONINA was FRANCISCOs
daughter. Ultimately though, MONINA decided not
to go abroad, opting instead to spend the proceeds
of the P15,000.00 check for her CPA review, board
exam and graduate studies. After finishing her
graduate studies, she again planned to travel
abroad, for which reason, she obtained a letter of
introduction from former Vice President Fernando
Lopez addressed to then United States Consul
Vernon McAnnich (Exh. V).

As to other acts tending to show her filiation,

MONINA related that on one occasion, as
FRANCISCOs wife was going to arrive at the latters
Bacolod City residence, FRANCISCO called
Arsenio Duatin and instructed Arsenio to hide
MONINA. Thus, MONINA stayed with Mrs. Luisa
Jison for the duration of the stay of FRANCISCOs
wife. MONINA also claimed that she knew Vice
President Fernando Lopez and his wife, Mariquit,
even before starting to go to school. Thus, MONINA
asked for a recommendation letter (Exh. U) from
Mrs. Mariquit Lopez for possible employment with
Mrs. Rosario Lopez Cooper, another second cousin
of FRANCISCO. In Exhibit U, Mrs. Lopez expressly
recognized MONINA as FRANCISCOs daughter. As
additional proof of her close relationship with the
family of Vice President Lopez, MONINA identified
photographs taken at a birthday celebration on 14
April 1985.
The trial court categorized Monina’s many evidences as
hearsay evidence, incredulous evidence, or self-serving
evidence and ruled against Monina while the Court of
Appeals decided in favour of Monina and declared her to
be the illegitimate daughter of Francisco.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimonies of
Monina’s witnesses were sufficient to establish MONINA's

Whether or not the declarations made by the relatives in
the letters presented by MONINA establishes pedigree?

As to the various notes and letters written by
FRANCISCOs relatives, namely Mike Alano, Emilio Jison,
Mariquit Lopez and Fernando Lopez, respectively,
allegedly attesting to MONINAs filiation, while their due
execution and authenticity are not in issue, as MONINA
witnessed the authors signing the documents,
nevertheless, under Rule 130, Section 39, the contents of
these documents may not be admitted, there being no
showing that the declarants-authors were dead or unable
to testify, neither was the relationship between the
declarants and MONINA shown by evidence other than
the documents in question. As to the admissibility of these
documents under Rule 130, Section 40, however, this
requires further elaboration.
Rule 130, Section 40, provides:
Section 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding
pedigree. -- The reputation or tradition existing in a family
previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of
any one of its members, may be received in evidence if
the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the
family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family
bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings,
family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence
of pedigree.
It is evident that this provision may be divided into two (2)
parts: the portion containing the first underscored clause
which pertains to testimonial evidence, under which the
documents in question may not be admitted as the authors
thereof did not take the witness stand; and the section
containing the second underscored phrase. What must
then be ascertained is whether the said documents, as
private documents, fall within the scope of the clause and
the like as qualified by the preceding phrase entries in
family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings
on rings and family portraits.

We hold that the scope of the enumeration contained in

the second portion of this provision, in light of the rule of
ejusdem generis, is limited to objects which are commonly
known as family possessions, or those articles which
represent, in effect, a familys joint statement of its belief as
to the pedigree of a person. These have been described
as objects openly exhibited and well known to the family,
or those which, if preserved in a family, may be regarded
as giving a family tradition. Other examples of these
objects which are regarded as reflective of a familys
reputation or tradition regarding pedigree are inscriptions
on tombstones, monuments or coffin plates.

Plainly then, Exhibits S to V, as private documents not

constituting "family possessions" as discussed above, may
not be admitted on the basis of Rule 130, Section 40.
Neither may these exhibits be admitted on the basis of
Rule 130, Section 41 regarding common reputation, it
having been observed that:

The weight of authority appears to be in favor of the theory

that it is the general repute, the common reputation in the
family, and not the common reputation in community, that
is a material element of evidence going to establish
pedigree. xxx [Thus] matters of pedigree may be proved
by reputation in the family, and not by reputation in the
neighborhood or vicinity, except where the pedigree in
question is marriage which may be proved by common
reputation in the community.

However, because of the overwhelming evidence that

MONINA presented, she hurdled the high standard of
proof required for the success of an action to establish
ones illegitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions
regarding open and continuous possession or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws;
moreover, MONINA proved her filiation by more than mere
preponderance of evidence.
The totality of the evidence on record established
Monina’s filiation.
Appeal filed by Francisco Jison was dismissed.

​ olinap v. Locsin, Jr. (G.R. No. 146737, December 10,

2001) hana
​Tecson v. Comelec (G.R. No 161434, March 3, 2004)
joseph dave
Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004

COMELEC to disqualify
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the
FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to
be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to
Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley
Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish
national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino
citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to
FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother.

the illegitimate birth of respondent on two

Petitioner based the allegation of
assertions - first, Allan F.Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and,
second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,
married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

WON the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe may
prove paternal relationship of FPJ with father Allan F. Poe

Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in
respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence
where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to
testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person
whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e)
the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.

Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe
submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe,
, i.e, living together with Bessie
recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ
Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house,
and as one family –
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton,
California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do hereby declare that:
1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known
in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.
4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street,
7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at
the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister
that same year.
8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and
Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now
Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between
10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after
Ronald Allan Poe.
18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a
natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.
Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas
Gravador v. Mamigo (G.R. L-24989, July 21, 1967) charmaine
The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta. Catalina,
Negros Oriental when he was advised by the then, Superintendent of Schools, of his separation from the
service on the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65.
Advice contains: based on pre-war records, you were born on November 26, 1897. As of this date,
therefore, you are now 66 years, 8 months, and 22 days old.
The petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced retirement on the ground that
the date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901
Filed suit for quo warranto, mandamus and damages asking the court to adjudge him entitled to the office
of principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School and to order payment to him of not only his back
salaries but also damages.
RTC: Birthday is Dec. 11,1901
- ​The court took into account the verified answer in a cadastral proceeding in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Oriental, dated March 15, 1924, filed by the petitioner's brother, Romulo
Gravador, now deceased. It is therein stated that the petitioner, said to be one of the co-owners of a
piece of land, was at the time 23 years old.
Issue: Date of birth -> which will be used to determine in computing retirement benefits
Ruling: Correct Bday: December 11, 1901
The controversy on the petitioner's date of birth arose as a result of the conflicting records of the Division
of Schools of Negros Oriental. On the one hand the pre-war records show his date of birth to be
November 26, 1897. These records consist of two Insular Teachers Cards and one Employee's Record
Card. It is on the basis of these records that the Superintendent of Schools determined the petitioner's age
to be 66 years, 8 months and 22 days on August 15, 1964.
On the other hand, the post-war records, consisting of an Elementary Teacher's Report Card, an
Employee's Record Card, and an Employee's Record of Qualifications, state that the petitioner was born
on Dec. 11, 1901. These are the records on which the petitioner bases his claim.
The problem is aggravated by two uncontroverted facts, namely, that the records of the church where the
petitioner was baptized were destroyed by fire, and that the municipal civil register contains no record. of
the petitioner's birth.
Ruling related to pedigree: Why birthday should be Dec.11,1901
In the first place, as Moran states, although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his
birth, he may testify as to his age as he had learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in
such case is an assertion of a family tradition. Indeed, even in his application for back pay which he filed
with the Department of Finance, the petitioner stated that the date of his birth is December 11, 1901. He
repeated the same assertion in 1956 and again in 1960 when he asked the Government Service Insurance
System and the Civil Service Commission to correct the date of his birth to December 11, 1901.
In the second place, the import of the declaration of the petitioner's brother, contained in a verified
pleading in a cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old,
cannot be ignored. Made ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration
regarding pedigree within the intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Thus, December 11, 1901 is established as the date of birth of the petitioner not only by evidence of
family tradition but also by the declaration ante litem motam of a deceased relative.
Finally, the patties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother, Constantino, who was born on June 10,
1898 and who retired on June 10, 1963 with full retirement pay. The petitioner then could not have been
born earlier than Constantino, say in 1897 as pre-war records indicate, because Constantino is admittedly
older than he.

​ eople v. Villaneueva (G.R. No. 169643, April 13, 2007)

G.R. No. 169643, April 13, 2007


BBB is the appellant's daughter and was born on January 23, 1983. In the evening of December 23,
1997, BBB, together with her parents and her three brothers, spent the night in her aunt's house. Her
mother left to attend a wake. While inside the room with her brothers (who were then sleeping), BBB
asked for a glass of water from appellant. After drinking, she felt dizzy. When she woke up the following
morning, her breasts and private part were aching, but she did not do anything because she thought that
she had just been bitten by ants.

At around midnight in the first week of February 1998, while BBB and her brothers were inside their room
sleeping, appellant went inside, raised BBB's blouse up to her neck and sucked her breasts. He likewise
pulled down her shorts and panty up to her thighs; kissed her lips; went on top of her; and inserted his
penis into her vagina. After satisfying his lustful desire, appellant told her that he would kill her and her
family if she reported the matter to anyone. BBB did not report the incident. She finally told her mother
when she learned that she was pregnant. Her mother cried and got mad. BBB gave birth in October 1998.
The child was later adopted by her cousin.

Sinumpaang Salaysay that on or about December 23,

BBB executed a

1997, in the x x x Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by
means of force and intimidation, succeed in having sexual
intercourse with his daughter BBB, a minor 15 years old.

Appellant further claimed that

Appellant interposed the defenses of denial and alibi.

he and his wife did not have serious problems with each other
except for petty quarrels over who was going to cook in the
mornings. He did not have any misunderstanding with his
daughter BBB.
RTC, rendered a Decision acquitting the appellant in Criminal Case No. 1288-(98) (1 RAPE), but

convicting him for the crime of rape in Criminal Case 1289-(98)(2 RAPE). ND

The case was initially elevated to the CA on automatic review.

Appellant claimed that the trial court gravely erred in imposing the death penalty despite the prosecutions
failure to prove the qualifying circumstance of minority.While appellant did not
question his conviction, he contested the penalty imposed. He
insisted that the minority of the offended party had not been
sufficiently proven because the prosecution presented a mere
photocopy of the birth certificate which was not certified as a
true copy of the original.
The CA sustained the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty. It held that the

qualifying circumstance of the victims minority had been

specifically alleged in the Information and duly proven during
the trial.
Appellant insists, however, that he was wrongfully sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death,
since the special qualifying circumstance of minority was not substantially proven.


​Whether or not the original document must be produced to prove minority.


There are other exceptions to the best evidence rule as expressly provided under Section 3, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court:
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of the inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in
the following cases:


(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

In People of the Philippines v. Pruna the Court laid down the following guidelines in appreciating the age
of the victim:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate
and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as
the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less
than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's
mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided
that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused

January 23,
Records reveal that the victim testified during the hearing that she was born on

1983, and that appellant did not offer any objection to her
The fact of minority was further established by victim's certificate of live birth, albeit a mere photocopy of
the original. In People of the Philippines v. Mangitngit, People of the Philippines v. Barcena, and People
of the Philippines v. Cayabyab, this Court admitted and gave weight to a photocopied birth certificate to
prove the age of the offended party. Specifically, we ratiocinated in this wise:

We are not unaware of our ruling in People v. Mantis that a mere photocopy of the birth certificate, in the
absence of any showing that the original copy was lost or destroyed, or was unavailable, without the fault
of the prosecution, does not prove the victim’s minority, for said photocopy does not qualify as competent
evidence for that purpose.

However, there are other exceptions to the best evidence rule as expressly provided under Section 3,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of the
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:


(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office.

A certificate of live birth is a public record in the custody of the local civil registrar who is a public officer.
As such, the presentation of the photocopy of the birth certificate of the victim is admissible as secondary
evidence to prove its contents. Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts
discretion, whenever the opponent does not dispute the contents of the document and no other useful
purpose will be served by requiring production.

In the present case, appellant did not dispute the contents of the photocopied birth certificate. Having
failed to raise a valid and timely objection, the document constitutes primary evidence; it is deemed
admitted, and the other party is bound thereby.

Thus, the prosecution sufficiently established that at the time of the commission of the crime of rape in the
first week of February 1998, the victim was only 15 years of age, having been born on January 23, 1983.
​People v. Flores (G.R. No. 177355, December 15, 2010) jr

TOPIC: Common Reputation

CASE:In Re Mallare (59 SCRA 45)--- Arizala

FACTS: The respondent, Florencio Mallare, was admitted to the

practice of law on 5 March 1962. In his verified petition to take
the bar examinations in 1961, he alleged that he is a citizen of
the Philippines and that "his father is Esteban Mallare and his
mother is Te Na, both Filipino citizens".On 16 July 1962, the
then Acting Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano P. Vivo
denounced the respondent to this Court as a Chinaman
masquerading as a Filipino citizen and requested that the matter
be investigated thoroughly and if the respondent fails to show
that he has legally become a Filipino, steps be taken for striking
his name from the roll of persons authorized to practice law.

The position of the respondent-lawyer is that he is a Filipino

citizen based on the supposed citizenship of his father, Esteban
Mallare, alleged to be a Filipino citizen by choice, because he
was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipina
mother, Ana Mallare and that the respondent's mother, Te Na, a
Chinese, followed the citizenship of her husband upon their

The respondent's second theory is that, having been declared a

Filipino citizen in a final judgment in 1960 by the Court of First
Instance of Quezon province, in its Civil Case No. 329-G
(entitled, Vitaliano Itable vs. Artemio, Florencio, Paciencia,
Esperanza and Raymundo Mallare) and his birth record, wherein
he was originally registered as a Chinese, has likewise been
ordered corrected to Filipino, by final judgment in Special
Proceeding No. 3925 of the same court, his Filipino citizenship

is conclusive, res judicata and binding to the government and to

the world.
Complainant Vivo disputed, on the facts, the respondent's first
theory, and, on the second theory, claimed that the aforestated
Civil Case No. 329-G (Itable vs. Mallare) was a simulated action
calculated to obtain a judicial declaration of Philippine
citizenship and, after having obtained the said declaration, the
respondent, together with his brothers and sisters, utilized the
declaration to change their birth and alien registration the better
to hide their true nationality, which is Chinese.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mallare is a filipino citizen and be

allowed to be admitted in the bar?

HELD: YES. The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had

personal knowledge of the person, birth and residency of both
Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in their declaration
that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in
the place, and that Esteban, her son, was reputedly born out of
wedlock. Such declarations constitute admissible evidence of the
birth and illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare. Reputation has been
held admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, or race-
ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born
alive. Unlike that of matters of pedigree, general reputation
of marriage may proceed from persons who are not
members of the family — the reason for the distinction is the
public interest that is taken in the question of the existence
of marital relations.
The principle could not have been more true than in a Philippine
rural community where relationships not in conformity with
established contentions become the subject of criticisms and
public cynosure. Thus, the public reputation in Macalelon that
Esteban was Ana's natural child, testified to by the witness,
would constitute proof of the illegitimacy of the former. Besides,
if Estaban were really born out of legal union, it is highly
improbable that he would be keeping the surname "Mallare"
after his mother, instead of adopting that of his father. And it
would be straining the imagination to perceive that this situation
was purposedly sought by Esteban's parents to suit some ulterior
motives. In 1903, we can not concede that alien inhabitants of
his country were that sophisticated or legally-oriented.

The assertion of the witnesses, which have not been

controverted, that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog (and, therefore, a
Filipino citizen), cannot be assailed as being mere conclusions
devoid of evidentiary value. The declarations were not only
based on the reputation in the community regarding her
race or race-ancestry, which is admissible in evidence, but
they must have certain factual basis. For it must be realized
that in this Philippine society, every region possesses certain
characteristics all its own. Thus, a Tagalog would normally
detect if a person hails from the same region even from the way
the latter speaks. Considering that the witnesses testified having
known, and lived with, Ana Mallare in Macalelon, their
declaration that she is a Tagalog should receive a high degree of
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is
therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be
necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached
to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332;
Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil.
543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan
vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-
5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act taken on the
erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the
citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled

Res Gestae

​Air France v. Carrascoso (supra)

​People v. Reyes (supra)

Case: People v. Dela Cruz (G.R. No. 13910, July 20, 2001)
Topic: Res Gestae

On or about the 16th of June, 1993 in Quezon City, Philippines,
the said accused (SPo4 Pablo Dela Cruz) conspiring and
confederating with one whose true name, identity and
whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping each other,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with
intent to kill and with treachery, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of one Lt. Col. GARABATO by then
and there shooting the latter with a gun and stabbing him with a
bladed weapon, hitting him on different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon said victim serious and mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death

At his arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty.

The deceased is a military chaplain, assigned at HQS-AFP,

Camp Aguinaldo Quezon City where accused was also assigned.

Accordingly, the two workers were unloading construction

materials consisting of wood and sand from a Ford Fiera owned
and driven by Fr. Garabato. At that moment, Fr. Garabato was
seated at the drivers seat.
The Ford Fiera specifically was parked in front of the house of
the petitioner, SPO4 Pablo De La Cruz (a Philippine National
Police personnel assigned at RHGS, HQS, CAPCOM, Camp
Karingal, Quezon City) where another vehicle was also parked
behind it.

Petitioner drove his jeep out from the garage of his house with
his two kids on board at the backseat. Petitioner accosted Fr.
Garabato to move his Ford Fiera since petitioners jeep could not
pass through abreast together with the Ford Fiera (the road is
more or less five (5) meters wide).

Fr. Garabato drove the Ford Fiera forward and parked further at
the side of the road. By that time, petitioners jeep could already
pass through the road.

At that moment, the two workers were standing behind the Ford
Fiera, and they heard successive shots of gunfire. They
instinctively turned their sights towards the origin of the
gunshots; such that they saw smoke coming from the side of
petitioners jeep and saw petitioner seated in the drivers seat still
holding his gun pointing towards the Ford Fiera.

Petitioner alighted from his jeep, walked towards Fr. Garabatos

position, re-loaded his gun with another magazine and shot Fr.
Garabato anew. Petitioner immediately left the scene on board
his jeep.


Fr. Garabatos body was rushed to Quezon City General Hospital
by the responding police officers where he was pronounced dead
on arrival.

Medico-legal Officer, Police Senior Inspector Vladimir

Villasenor (a physician) conducted a post mortem examination
on Fr. Garabatos body. He concluded that Fr. Garabato died of
(h)emorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds of the
body. The victim sustained six (6) gunshot wounds spread over
his head and body. Four (4) of these wounds were diagnosed to
be fatal, as the bullets pierced vital organs of the victims body.

Manhunt operations were conducted against the accused. He

was surrendered to Sangandaan Police Station were he was also
presented to the media and positively identified by the two
construction workers.
Denial and Alibi

He claims that at the time and date Fr. Garabato was shot, he
was in Gagalangin Health Center in Tondo, Manila; that he and
his two children, Carmela and Pamela, went to fetch his wife,
Cornelia, who was employed therein as a midwife. From there,
they would proceed to Baclaran Church to hear mass. This point
was corroborated by defense witnesses, Cornelia de la Cruz
(Pablos wife) and Romeo Mabahagi (a janitor/utility man at
Gagalangin Health Center).


After due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment finding
petitioner guilty of homicide, not murder as was charged in the
Amended Information. The trial court ruled that the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia was not sufficiently established by the
prosecution. Upon the other hand, the trial court appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

The CA affirmed the conviction of petitioner for homicide. The
appellate court, however, modified the penalty as it held that the
trial court erred in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. According to the CA, voluntary surrender,
to be appreciated, must be spontaneous and unconditional. These
conditions were found to be absent in petitioners case.

The penalty be increased from an indeterminate penalty of

IMPRISONMENT for six years and one day of prison mayor as
minimum to (14) years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal as medium.

Whether or not the basis of guilt by the petitioner-accused is a
fabricated and unreliable evidence.

No, the evidence is sufficient to convict him.

RES GESTAE refers to those exclamations and statements

made by either the participants, the victim(s) or spectators
to a crime immediately before, during or immediately after
the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are
such that the statements were made as a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by excitement of the occasion
and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
and to fabricate a false statement (People vs. Sanchez, 213
SCRA 70).

In the case, although the people who gave this information were
not presented on the witness stand, this Court still resolved to
admit and consider this spontaneous exclamation from the
spectators competent as PART OF RES GESTAE.

Records of this case reveal that the incident was reported to

SPO3 Patriarca at around 2:45 in the afternoon of June 16, 1993,
while the latter was on duty, and immediately, they rushed to the
scene of the crime to investigate. It was at that instance that he
gathered the aforesaid information.

Furthermore, as borne by evidence on record, all the

elements of res gestae are sufficiently established, insofar as
the aforequoted spontaneous utterance is concerned:

a) the principal act (res gestae) the killing of Fr. Garabato in

broad daylight is a startling occurrence;

b) the statements were made before the declarants had time

to contrive or devise that is, within several minutes after the
victim was shot; and

c) that the statements must concern the occurrence in

question and its immediately attending circumstances the
identity of the assailant is a material and vital information
that concerns the aforementioned startling occurrence.




AVA and LEEZEL were initially charged with serious physical injuries under Section 10, Article VI of R.A. No.
7610. However, on 31 May 1996 the victim, Mariel Cariquez y Cruz (hereafter ETHEL) died. On 30 August 1996
the information was amended to charge AVA and LEEZEL with the crime of parricide.

The trial court found AVA and LEEZEL guilty of parricide and homicide, respectively on the basis of circumstantial
evidence. In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General enumerates seven (7) circumstantial evidence
which the trial court took in to account and relied upon as bases for its finding that AVA and LEEZEL, were
criminally responsible for the death of ETHEL.

The Trial Court was fully convinced from the evidence on record of the culpability of AVA and LEEZEL for
ETHELs maltreatment. The testimony of Lilia Gojul, Michelle Torrente and Theresa Castillo ineluctably show that
AVA and LEEZEL tormented ETHEL.

The declarations of Lilia, Michelle and Theresa as to what they observed on ETHEL were not hearsay. They saw her
and personally noticed the injuries and telltale marks of torture. While the answer of ETHEL as to who inflicted the
injuries may have been, indeed, hearsay because ETHEL could not be confronted on that, yet it was part of the res
The case was brought to the Supreme Court taking into consideration the penalty imposed by the Trial Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the statement uttered by the victim was part of the res gestae.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the Regional Trial Court.

An exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SEC. 42. Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately

prior or subsequently thereto with respect to the ​

circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of
the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

There are three requisites to the admission of evidence as constituting part of the res gestae. (1) that the principal
act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending

In this case the startling occurrences were the tortures inflicted on ETHEL, who when asked who caused them
spontaneously pointed to AVA and LEEZEL. That some time may have lapsed between the infliction of the injuries
and the disclosure, it must however, be pointed out that there has been no uniformity as to the interval of time that
should separate the occurrence of the startling event from the making of the declarations. What is necessary is that
the injuries sustained by ETHEL prior to the incident on 27 May 1996 were inflicted by AVA and LEEZEL. These
acts are covered by and punished under R.A. No. 7610, under which they were originally prosecuted. However, the
then Information was amended to charge them with parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. The
evidence on the prior incidents cannot legally justify a conviction for the physical injuries inflicted before 27 May

People v. Tampus (G.R. No. L-44690, March 28, 1980) cabrido


Evidence show that around 10 am of January 14, 1976, Celso

Saminado, a prisoner in Muntinlupa and a patient in the
emergency ward of the prison hospital went to the toilet. He was
followed by the accused, Tampus and Avila and was assaulted
and stabbed therein. Saminado died upon the arrival in the
prison hospital. After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and
Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives. The
motive of the killing was revenge.

The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his
report he stated that Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was
in the toilet. Two days after the killing, another prison guard
investigated the incident and have obtained the extrajudicial
confessions of Avila and Tampus. They both pleaded guilty to
the charge of murder. However, the counsel de officio of the
accused points out that before the extrajudicial confession was
taken the accused was not informed of his rights to have a
counsel and to remain silent.


Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of the accused may

be considered admissible in court.



Article IV Sec. 20 of the constitution provides that, No person

shall be compelled to be a witness at himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain anent and to court and to be informed of such
right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.

There is no doubt that the confession was voluntarily made. The

investigator in taking it endeavored, according to his
understanding, to comply with section 20.

The truth is that, even before Lahoz investigated the killing,

Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when, after coming
out of the toilet, the scene of the crime, they surrendered to
Reynaldo S. Eustaquio, the first guard whom thuy encountered,
and they revealed to him that they had committed an act of
revenge. That spontaneous statement, elicited without any
interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same time
was a voluntary confession of guilt.

Not only that. The two accused, by means of that statement

given freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or
suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to have the
right to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their
extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court.
They did not appeal from the judgment of conviction.

CASE:People v. Sace (G.R. No. 178063, April 5, 2010) causin

On September 9, 1999, at around seven (7) o’clock in the
evening, AAA was inside their house with her 10-year-old
brother BBB and a nephew, who was still a toddler, when
appellant suddenly showed up. As admitted by appellant, he
came from a drinking spree that began at about eleven (11)
o’clock in the morning. AAA told appellant to leave and go
home, but he did not heed her. Appellant then made sexual
advances on AAA. AAA was able to evade appellant when he
tried to embrace her, but appellant pulled a bladed weapon from
his pocket. Sensing danger, AAA ran upstairs to the second level
of their house. Appellant followed AAA, leaving BBB and the
toddler in the first floor of the house. BBB heard appellant
ordering AAA to remove her clothes, otherwise, he will stab her.
Scared with the turn of events, the two (2) children hid at the
lower portion of the house for around twenty (20) minutes, and
came out only when CCC, the mother of AAA and BBB,
arrived. CCC, together with her elder daughter DDD and a
certain Abelardo Motol (Abelardo), was on her way home when
she and her companions heard AAA scream. They hurried
towards the house and searched it but found it to be empty.
As they searched further, appellant came out from somewhere in
the kitchen area of the house. They noticed that he was bloodied
and he told them that he was chasing someone. Appellant then
joined in the search for AAA. Before long, Abelardo found the
lifeless body of AAA lying on the ground nearby. AAA was
half-naked and she appeared to have been ravished when they
found her. Immediately, Abelardo called the barangay officials
and the police.
Barangay Kagawad Carmelita Mawac (Carmelita) and other
barangay officials and tanods, including Rafael Motol and
Bonifacio Vitto, arrived. Upon arrival, they noticed the
bloodstains on appellants clothing. Carmelita asked appellant
what he did, but appellant denied any knowledge of what
happened. Carmelita then went to the half-naked body of AAA
and again asked appellant why he did such a thing to his cousin.
At that point, appellant admitted to the barangay officials and
tanods that he was the one (1) who committed the crime. He
admitted that he raped and killed AAA. Barangay Tanod Rafael
Motol also obtained the same confession from appellant when
he interviewed him in front of other people, namely, Abelardo,
Carmelita, and Bonifacio Vitto, as well as Arnaldo Mawac,
Conchita and Iboy Serdea, and Salvador and Julieta Motol.
Appellant was then photographed by the police and Maribeth,
who at that time had a camera on hand.
Whether or not the confession of appellant is admissible as
The trial court took into consideration the confession of
appellant that he was the one (1) who raped and killed AAA.
The trial court noted that the confession was made voluntarily
and spontaneously in public, and witnessed by prosecutions
witnesses, who were not shown to have any ill motive against
appellant. Thus, appellants declaration was admissible as part of
res gestae, his statement concerning the crime having been made
immediately subsequent to the rape-slaying before he had time
to contrive and devise.
Also, the facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted
the commission of the crime to the prosecutions witnesses.
According to their testimonies, appellant admitted having raped
and killed AAA. Their testimonies were not rebutted by the
defense. Appellants statements infront of the prosecution
witnesses are admissible for being part of the res gestae.
Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, a declaration is deemed
part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception
to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (1) the
principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive
or devise; and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances. All these
requisites are present in this case. Appellant had just been
through a startling and gruesome occurrence, AAAs death. His
admission was made while he was still under the influence of
said startling occurrence and before he had an opportunity to
concoct or contrive a story. In addition, he was still under the
influence of alcohol at that time, having engaged in a drinking
spree from 1:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. that day. His confession
concerned the rape and killing of AAA. Appellants spontaneous
statements made to private persons, not agents of the State or
law enforcers, are not covered by the constitutional safeguards
on custodial investigation and, as res gestae, admissible in
evidence against him.
The rule is settled that where the culpability or innocence of the
accused hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and the
veracity of their testimonies, the findings of trial courts are
given the highest degree of respect. Hence, their findings on
such matters are binding and conclusive on appellate courts,
unless some fact or circumstance of weight and substance has
been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted.

​P v. Lauga (G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010) joy

​People v. Tulagan (G.R. No. L-68620, July 22, 1986)
​DBP Pool v. Radio Mindanao Network Inc. (supra)
​Borromeo v. CA (G.R. No. L-31342, April 7, 1976)
​mie ​


FACTS: Juan Borromeo (petitioner) is an administrator of the

estate of the deceased Simeon Rallos ( Rallos). The main
controversy here centers on the true nature of the three
documents which are on their faces are deeds of absolute sale of
real properties executed by Rallos on various dates in favour of
Emmanuel Aznar. It was alleged by petitioner that said sale were
in fact equitable mortgages to secure loans granted to Rallos by
Matias Aznar, deceased father of Emmanueal and Alma Aznar
and prayed for their reformation.

On the part of the petitioner,it presented Crispina Rallos

Alcantara (Crispina), who claimed to have been present when
the transactions took place, her deceased father merely borrowed
money from the late Matias Aznar in the sums of P6,000.00 and
P35,000.00 and to secure the repayment thereof mortgaged to
the latter the properties and that while thus listening to their
conversations she took down notes of the various amounts
mentioned by them and the respective purposes thereof such as
interest, attorney's fees, other obligations to be paid out of the
money being borrowed by her father, etc., which notes were
Identified at the trial as Exhibits.
ON appeal to CA, it held that there was indeed an absolute sale
by reasoning that the terms of the contract are clear and
equivocal that the parties intended therein to be a sale and not an
equitable mortgage. But somehow, upon the filing of the motion
of reconsideration by the petitioner on the decision of the CA, it
overturn its previous decision by stating that the notations or
memoranda of Crispina were held to be part of res gestae thus
admissible and which statements were supported by the unusual
inadequacy of the prices of the sale of the properties involved.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct in declaring that the

notes and memoranda of Crispina as part of res gestae?

HELD: No. The CA is not correct and the admission of the notes
and memoranda suffers from a fatal defect.
The court did not consider the notes and memoranda as part of
the res gestae for the reasons that:
Cristina was not a party to the transaction in question and that
only Rallos and Matias or Emmanuel or Alma as the documents
It did not also reveal why Crispina was there at the time of the
transaction,hence there can be no basis for holding that she
actually took part in the transaction.
That she made the notes only as witness and not as party and
there was no showing that her taking down notes were made
because of the request or was directed to by the parties. And if
the taking down notes were made under the direction of the
parties, such notes will only be circumstantial.
No witness other than Crispina has testifies as to the veracity of
her testimony relative to her alleged notes and memoranda,not
even her husband who was alleged to be present on one of the
occasions issue.
Thus the court did not give any weight to her testimony when
she herself created them and they were not considered as part of
res gestae.

​ ​
​People v. Espinoza (supra)
​People v. Gatarin (G.R. No. 198022, April 7, 2014)

Entries in the Course of Business

​Canque v. CA (G.R. No. 96202, April 12, 1999)

​Aznar v. Citibank (G.R. No. 164273, March 28, 2007)
​Jose v. Michaelmar Phils. (G.R. No. 169606, November 27,

Entries in Official Records

​Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc (supra)

​Rudy Lao v. Standard Insurance Co., Inc. (G.R. No.
140023, August 14, 2003)
​Wallem Maritime Services v. NLRC (G.R. No. 108433,
October 15, 1996)
​Manalo v. Robles (G.R. L-8171, August 16, 1956)
​Herce, Jr. v. Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna (G.R. No.
166645, November
​ ​11, 2005)
​City of Manila v. Cabangis (supra)
​Fernandez v. CA (G.R. No. 108366, December 16, 1994)
​In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Juan Locsin, Sr.
(G.R. No. 146737, ​ ​ ​ ​December 10, 2001)
​Africa v. Caltex (G.R. No. 12986, March 3, 1966)
​Barcelon v. CIR [G.R. No. 157064, August 7, 2006)
​Salmon, Dexter v. Wijangco (G.R. No. L-21649, October 9,
​Tarapen v. People (G.R. No. 173824, August 8, 2008)
​DOJ v. Pennisi (G.R. No. 169958, March 5, 2010)
​Seguritan v. People (G.R. No. 172896, April 19, 2010)
​Dimaguila v. Monteiro (supra)

Commercial Lists

​PNOC Shipping v. CA (G.R. No. 107518, October 8, 1998)

Learned Treatise

​Seguritan v. People (supra)

Opinion Rule

​ hina Banking Corporation v. CA (G.R. No. 155299, July

24, 2007)
​Marquez v. Sandiganbayan (G.R No. 187912-14, January
31, 2011)
​Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes (G.R. No. 185286, Aug. 18,
​Roxas v. Arroyo (G.R. No. 189155, September 7, 2010)
​Marcos v. Heirs of Navarro (supra)