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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MOISES CAOILE, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 203041, June 05, 2013


[AAA], the herein victim, was left in the care of her grandmother and auntie in Alipang, Rosario, La Union when her
mother left to work abroad when she was still young. One of their neighbors was the accused whose daughter,
Marivic, was the playmate of [AAA]. One day, the accused invited [AAA] to go to the bamboo trees in their place.
Upon reaching thereat, the accused directed [AAA] to lie down on the ground. [AAA] followed the instruction of the
accused whom she called uncle Moises. Thereafter, the accused removed [AAA]’s short pant[s] and panty and
inserted his penis into her vagina. [AAA] felt pain but she did not do anything. After two minutes or so, the accused
removed his penis inside [AAA]’s vagina. [AAA] stood up and wore again her short pant[s] and panty. Before the
accused allowed [AAA] to go home, the former gave the latter a medicine, which she described as a red capsule with
white casing, with the instruction of taking the same immediately upon reaching home. As instructed by her uncle
Moises, [AAA] took the medicine as soon as she got home. After that, there were several times where the accused
again had carnal knowledge with the victim. After that, she learned that she also has a friend that became the victim
of the accused.

After examining [AAA] on June 21, 2005, Dr. Claire Maramat found out that [AAA]’s genitalia suffered a multiple
hymenal laceration which, at the time of the examination, was already healed, thus, possibly, it was inflicted a week
or months prior to the examination. According to Dr. Maramat, a multiple hymenal laceration may be caused by
several factors, such as trauma to the perineal area or penetration of a penis. Dr. Rosuman testified that after
examining the seminal fluids taken from [AAA], she found the presence of spermatozoa, which means that [AAA]
had sexual intercourse, and the predominance of coccobacilli, meaning that [AAA] could be suffering from infection
caused by hygiene or acquired through sexual intercourse. Several other doctors also testified that the victim is a
mental retardate.

In the defense of the accused, he alleged that he and the victim were sweethearts and that during their relationship,
[AAA] suggested that they [live] together as husband and wife. The accused refused because he cannot leave his
family. The accused did not know that [AAA] was a demented person since she acted like a normal individual. In fact,
she went to a regular school and she finished her elementary education. The accused did not force himself [on]
[AAA]. [AAA] knew that he is a married man, but she, nonetheless, loved him without reservation.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to prove his guilt despite the amended information

HELD: Yes, the erroneous reference to paragraph 1(d) in the Amended Informations, did not cause material and
substantial harm to Caoile. Firstly, he simply ignored the error. Secondly, particular facts stated in the Amended
Informations were averments sufficient to inform Caoile of the nature of the charges against him.

The absence of will determines the existence of the rape. Such lack of will may exist not only when the victim is
unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also when she is suffering some mental deficiency impairing her
reason or free will. In that case, it is not necessary that she should offer real opposition or constant resistance to the
sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge of a woman so weak in intellect as to be incapable of legal consent constitutes
rape. Where the offended woman was feeble-minded, sickly and almost an idiot, sexual intercourse with her is rape.
Her failure to offer resistance to the act did not mean consent for she was incapable of giving any rational consent.

The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental abnormality or deficiency is enough. Cohabitation with a
feebleminded, idiotic woman is rape. Sexual intercourse with an insane woman was considered rape. But a deafmute
is not necessarily deprived of reason. This circumstances must be proven. Intercourse with a deafmute is not rape
of a woman deprived of reason, in the absence of proof that she is an imbecile. Viada says that the rape under par.
2 may be committed when the offended woman is deprived of reason due to any cause such as when she is asleep,
or due to lethargy produced by sickness or narcotics administered to her by the accused. x x x.
G.R. No. 197291 April 3, 2013





History will never forget the atrocities perpetrated on November 23, 2009, when 57 innocent civilians were
massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the principal suspects was
petitioner, then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao Province. Inquest proceedings were
conducted against petitioner on November 26, 2009 at the General Santos (Tambler) Airport Lounge, before he was
flown to Manila and detained at the main office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) charged other suspects, numbering more than a hundred, for what became aptly
known as the Maguindanao massacre.3 On November 27, 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) resolved to file the
corresponding informations for murder against petitioner, and to issue subpoenae to several persons.4 On
December 1, 2009, 25 informations for murder were also filed against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court, 12th
Judicial Region, in Cotabato City. To prevent miscarrieage of justice (On December 3, 2009, Secretary of Justice
Devanadera transmitted her letter to Chief Justice Puno requesting the transfer of the venue of the trial of the
Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato City to Metro Manila, either in Quezon City or in Manila, to prevent a
miscarriage of justice). The records show that petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 informations for murder
when he was arraigned. It appears that in issuing the joint resolution of February 5, 2010 the Panel of Prosecutors
partly relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag. On August 13, 2010, Dalandag was admitted into the
Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.15 On September 7, 2010, the QC RTC issued its amended pre-trial order,16
wherein Dalandag was listed as one of the Prosecution witnesses. On October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel,
wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to
request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed
his participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations. however, Secretary De Lima denied petitioner’s
request. Petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila (Civil Case No. 10-124777),22 seeking to
compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC

The RTC Manila issued an order dismissing the petition for mandamus.

ISSUE: 1. whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge Dalandag as an accused for
multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his admission to the Witness Protection Program
of the DOJ.


Ruling: No, Respondent cannot be compelled to charge Dalandang as an accused for massacre

1. The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal power and
responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of the power to execute
our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the public prosecutors with a wide
range of discretion – the discretion of what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord
of factors that are best appreciated by the public prosecutors

The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence sufficient to establish
probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not criminal cases should be filed in court ( Crespo v. Mogul, No. L-53373,
June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 462, 410; Paderanga v. Drilon, G.R. No. 96080, April 19, 1991, 196 SCRA 86, 90)

Exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor
committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law."

2. SEC. 2 The complaint or information

his exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Panel of Prosecutors whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that "the complaint or information
shall be xxx against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved," albeit a mandatory provision,
may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state

Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial court of one or more of several accused with
their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is made upon motion by the Prosecution before resting its
case. The trial court shall require the Prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statements of the proposed
witnesses at a hearing in support of the discharge. The trial court must ascertain if the following conditions fixed by
Section 17 of Rule 119 are complied with, namely:

(a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;

(b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of said accused;

(c) the testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

(d) said accused does not appear to be most guilty; and

(e) said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:

Section 10. State Witness. — Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires to be a
witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted
into the Program whenever the following circumstances are present:

a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code or its
equivalent under special laws;

b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;

c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;

d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;

e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and

f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.

Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner, but may not be compelled to act in
a certain way

G.R. No. 164538; 9 August 2010

Del Castillo, J.


Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank) charged respondents Rogelio Reynado and Jose Adrandea with
the crime of estafa under Art. 315 parag. 1(b) of the RPC. It was alleged that the special audit conducted on the cash
and lending operations of its Port Area branch uncovered anomalous/fraudulent transactions perpetrated by
respondents in connivance with client Universal Converter Philippines, Inc. (Universal); that respondents were the
only voting members of the branch’s credit committee authorized to extend credit accommodation to clients up to
P200,000.00; that through the so-called Bills Purchase Transaction, Universal, which has a paid-up capital of only
P125,000.00 and actual maintaining balance of P5,000.00, was able to make withdrawals totaling P81,652,000.00
against uncleared regional checks deposited in its account at petitioner’s Port Area branch; that, consequently,
Universal was able to utilize petitioner’s funds even before the seven-day clearing period for regional checks expired;
that Universal’s withdrawals against uncleared regional check deposits were without prior approval of petitioner’s
head office; that the uncleared checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed";
and, that respondents acted with fraud, deceit, and abuse of confidence.

Respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with Universal and claimed that they only intended
to help the Port Area branch solicit and increase its deposit accounts and daily transactions.

Meanwhile, Metrobank and Universal entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement whereby the latter acknowledged
its indebtedness to the former in the total amount of P50,990,976.27 and undertook to pay the same in bi-monthly
amortizations of P300,000.00 as covered by postdated checks, "plus balloon payment of the remaining principal
balance and interest and other charges, if any.”

After preliminary investigation, prosecutor Edad found petitioner’s evidence insufficient to hold respondents liable
for estafa. According to her, the execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement puts Metrobank in estoppel to argue
that the liability is criminal. Since the agreement was made even before the filing of this case, the relations between
the parties [have] change[d], novation has set in and prevented the incipience of any criminal liability on the part of
respondents. Thus, the dismissal of the case is recommended.

Likewise, the DOJ dismissed the petition averring that no estafa exists in the instant case as it was not clearly shown
how respondents misappropriated the P53,873,500.00. Moreover, fraud is not present considering that the
Executive Committee and the Credit Committee of Metrobank were duly notified of these transactions which they
approved. Also, no damage was caused as Metrobank agreed to settle with Universal.

MR was filed by petitioner which was denied. Aggrieved, it went to the CA to file for certiorari and mandamus. CA
affirmed the twin resolutions of the DOJ Sec, and accordingly, just as Universal cannot be held responsible under the
bills purchase transactions on account of novation, private respondents, who acted in complicity with the former,
cannot be made liable [for] the same transactions. And since the dismissal of the complaint is founded on legal
ground, respondents may not be compelled by mandamus to file an information in court. Although, the OSG, in
sharing the views of petitioner contended that failure to implead other responsible individuals in the complaint does
not warrant its dismissal, suggesting that the proper remedy is to cause their inclusion in the information,
nevertheless, CA disposed of the petition.


Is the non-inclusion of officers of Universal a ground for the dismissal of the complaint?

HELD: No. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court mandates that all criminal actions must be commenced either
by complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons who appear to be
responsible therefor. Thus, the law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against
whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for the offense. The proper remedy under the circumstances
where persons who ought to be charged were not included in the complaint of the private complainant is definitely
not to dismiss the complaint but to include them in the information. As the OSG correctly suggested, the proper
remedy should have been the inclusion of certain employees of Universal who were found to have been in cahoots
with respondents in defrauding petitioner. The DOJ, therefore, cannot seriously argue that because the officers of
Universal were not indicted, respondents themselves should not likewise be charged. Their non-inclusion cannot be
perversely used to justify desistance by the public prosecutor from prosecution of the criminal case just because not
all of those who are probably guilty thereof were charged.

Contrary to the conclusion of public respondent, the Debt Settlement Agreement entered into between petitioner
and Universal Converter Philippines extinguishes merely the civil aspect of the latter’s liability as a corporate entity
but not the criminal liability of the persons who actually committed the crime of estafa against petitioner Metrobank.

The findings of the Secretary of Justice in sustaining the dismissal of the Complaint are matters of defense best left
to the trial court’s deliberation and contemplation after conducting the trial of the criminal case. To emphasize, a
preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is "not a part of the trial.
A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-
grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof." A "finding of
probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged."

Where, as in this case, despite the sufficiency of the evidence before the prosecutor, he refuses to file the
corresponding information against the person responsible, he abuses his discretion. His act is tantamount to a
deliberate refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Secretary of Justice, on the other hand, gravely abused his
discretion when, despite the existence of sufficient evidence for the crime of estafa as acknowledged by the
investigating prosecutor, he completely ignored the latter’s finding and proceeded with the questioned resolution
anchored on purely evidentiary matters in utter disregard of the concept of probable cause. Findings of the Secretary
of Justice are not subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.
Callo-Claridad vs Esteban

G.R. No. 191567 March 20, 2013

Facts: Around 5:30 p.m. of February 27, 2007, Chase returned home from visiting his girlfriend, Ramonna Liza
“Monnel” Hernandez. Around 7:00 p.m., Chase’s sister Ariane was sitting at the porch of their house when she
noticed a white Honda Civic car parked along the street. Recognizing the driver to be Philip, Ariane waved her hand
at him. Philip appeared nonchalant and did not acknowledge her gesture. Ariane decided to stay behind and leave
with their house helpers, Marivic Guray and Michelle Corpus, only after Chase had left on board the white Honda
Civic car. Marivic Rodriguez, a house helper of Shellane Yukoko, the resident of No. 9 Cedar Place, Ferndale Homes,
was with her co-employee nanny Jennylyn Buri and the latter’s ward, Joei Yukoko, when they heard somebody crying
coming from the crime scene: Help! Help! This was at about 7:30 p.m. Even so, neither of them bothered to check
who had been crying for help. It was noted, however, that No. 10 Cedar Place, which was owned by one Mrs. Howard,
was uninhabited at the time. Based on the initial investigation report of the Megaforce Security and Allied Services,
Inc., the Estebans were illegally parking their cars at Mrs. Howard’s carport. The initial investigation report stated
that the SGs would regularly remind the Estebans to use their own parking garage, which reminders had resulted in
heated discussions and altercations. The SGs kept records of all the illegal parking incidents, and maintained that
only the Estebans used the carport of No. 10 Cedar Place. Around 7:45 p.m., respondent Teodora Alyn Esteban
(Teodora) arrived at Ferndale Homes on board a vehicle bearing plate XPN 733, as recorded in the subdivision SG’s
logbook. At that time, three cars were parked at the carport of No. 10 Cedar place, to wit: a Honda CRV with plate
ZAE 135 parked parallel to the Honda Civic with plate CRD 999, and another Honda Civic with plate JTG 333, the car
frequently used by Philip, then parked diagonally behind the two cars. Some witnesses alleged that prior to the
discovery of the Chase’s body, they had noticed a male and female inside the car bearing plate JTG 333 engaged in
a discussion. At around 7:50 p.m., SG Abelardo Sarmiento Jr., while patrolling around the village, noticed that the
side of the Honda Civic with plate JTG 333 had red streaks, which prompted him to move towards the parked cars.
He inspected the then empty vehicle and noticed that its radio was still turned on. He checked the cars and
discovered that the rear and side of the Honda Civic with plate CRD 999 were smeared with blood. He saw on the
passenger seat a cellular phone covered with blood. It was then that he found the bloodied and lifeless body of
Chase lying between the parallel cars. The body was naked from the waist up, with a crumpled bloodied shirt on the
chest, and with only the socks on. SG Sarmiento called for back-up. SG Rene Fabe immediately barricaded the crime
scene. Around 7:55 p.m., SG Solis received a phone call from an unidentified person who reported that a “kid” had
met an accident at Cedar Place. SG Solis later identified and confirmed the caller to be “Mr. Esteban Larry” when the
latter entered the village gate and inquired whether the “kid” who had met an accident had been attended to.
Moreover, when SG Fabe and SG Sarmiento were securing the scene of the crime, they overheard from the radio
that somebody had reported about a “kid” who had been involved in an accident at Cedar Place. SG Fabe thereafter
searched the village premises but did not find any such accident. When SG Fabe got back, there were already several
onlookers at the crime scene.

Issue: Whether or not the evidence is sufficient to charge the respondents of murder.

Held: No. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be
consistent with one another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion
that a crime has been committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof. The pieces of evidence must
be consistent with the hypothesis that the respondents were probably guilty of the crime and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that they were innocent, and with every rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient, therefore, if: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived have been proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The records show that the circumstantial evidence linking Philip to the killing of Chase derived from the bare
recollections of Ariane (sister of Chase), and of Guray and Corpus (respectively, the househelp and nanny in the
household of a resident of the subdivision) about seeing Chase board the white Honda Civic at around 7:00 p.m. of
February 27, 2007, and about Philip being the driver of the Honda Civic. But there was nothing else after that,
because the circumstances revealed by the other witnesses could not even be regarded as circumstantial evidence
against Philip. To be sure, some of the affidavits were unsworn. The statements subscribed and sworn to before the
officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) having the authority to administer oaths upon matters connected
with the performance of their official duties undeniably lacked the requisite certifications to the effect that such
administering officers had personally examined the affiants, and that such administering officers were satisfied that
the affiants had voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

Thus, it is imperative that the circumstantial evidence that the victim was last seen in the company of respondent
Philip must be established by competent evidence required by the rules in preliminary investigation. Here, it was
allegedly Chase’s sister, Ariane, and their two household helpers, Marivic Guray and Michelle Corpus, who saw
respondent Philip pick up Chase at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening of February 27, 2007. Yet, such fact from which
the inference is derived was not duly proven. The statements of Marivic and Michelle both executed on February
28, 2007 were not sworn to before the proper officer.

Neither was the affidavit dated July 3, 2009 of Ariane Claridad duly notarized nor is there any explanation why the
same was belatedly executed.
Jimenez vs Sorongon


Jimenez(Petitioner) is the president of Unlad Shipping and Management Corporation a local manning agency, while
Antzoulatos, Alamil, Gaza and Avgoustis are the respondents herein and are some of the listed incorporators of
Tsakos Maritime Services Inc, a local manning agency. Aug. 19, 2013, Petitioner files a complaint affidavid with the
office of the prosecutor of Mandaluyong city against the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal
recruitment.Respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint counter-affidavit and denying the complaint.
Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any counter affidavit. An Information for the said crime was filed before the
RTC-Mandaluyong. Dec. 4, 2004 the prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the information and respondents
Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their comment to the opposition however the judge denied the motion as it found
existence of probable cause and issued warrants agains the respondents. Respondent Alamil filed a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause to defer the enforcement of the warrants or arrest. Petitioner filed his
opposition with the motion to expunge, contending that Alamil being a fugitive from justice had no standing to seek
any relief and that the RTC found probable cause. Respondent filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Umali for
being biased or partial. The said judge voluntarily inhibit herself and the case was re-raffled to Judge Sorongon. On
April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable cause to prosecute the
respondents. On April 26, 2006 moved to expunge the motion for being prohibited pleading since the motion did
not have any conformity from the city prosecutor. In its May 10, 2006 order, the RTC denied the petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration, finding that the petitioner merely reiterated arguments in issues that had been finally decided.
On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the petitioner’s notice of appeal since the public prosecutor
did not authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed
his comment to the motion to expunge, claiming that, as the offended party, he has the right to appeal the RTC order
dismissing the case; the respondents’ fraudulent acts in forming TMSI greatly prejudiced him.

Issue: Whether or not the Petitioner has the legal personality to assail the dismissal of the case

Held: No. It is well settled that the real party in interest is the People of the Philippines and is represented by the
prosecutors. All criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of a public prosecutor. In appeals of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals and before this Court,
the Office of the Solicitor General is the appellate counsel of the People; The People is the real party in interest in a
criminal case and only the Office of the Solicitor General can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending
in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court.
People vs. Valdez

G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000


Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The accused was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto and without
authority of law, planted, cultivated and cultured seven (7) fully grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp from
which dangerous drugs maybe manufactured or derived. Appellant was arraigned and with assistance of counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.

The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales,
SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut, all member of the police force, who testified how the information
was received, the commencement of their operation and its details under the specific instruction of Inspector
Parungao. Accordingly, they found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area
where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows,
approximately 25 meters away from his nipa hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and,
according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. They uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took photos
of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants and arrested him. One of the said plants was sent to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory for analysis which produced a positive result. The prosecution also presented a
certification from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources that the land cultivated by appellant where
the growing marijuana plants were found, was part of the public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the
certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his favor.

The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified he was weeding his vegetable farm when he was
called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go with the latter to see something. This
unknown person then brought appellant to the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100
meters away from his nipa hut. Five armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp
plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge
thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants. Appellant was so nervous
and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana. The police team then brought him to the police station at
Villaverde. At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized
by the police. Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had
more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot
does not remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The right
against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one’s person, which includes his residence, his papers,
and other possessions.


(1) Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is lawful and the seized
evidence admissible.

(2) Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against the accused.

(3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

(4) Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal injection is correct.

In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence of
probable cause given the fact that police had ample time to obtain said warrant. The protection against illegal search
and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants.
The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of
high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.

With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure.
As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, the
said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are
fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have
admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.

In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of a crime, the
prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is
the author thereof. The evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason, it
must likewise be credible and competent. Competent evidence is “generally admissible” evidence. Admissible
evidence, in turn, is evidence “of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be
introduced at trial. And as earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court’s part to have admitted evidences against
the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him for said evidence is doubly tainted.

In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved.” To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that
quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must
stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused. Absent
the required degree of proof of an accused’s guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.
Lilia Organo vs Sandiganbayan

320 SCRA 684 – Criminal Law – Crimes Committed by Public Officers – Plunder; Jurisdiction

Remedial Law – Jurisdiction of Courts – Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan


In 1996, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan against Lilia Organo for the crime of plunder as it was
alleged that she and some other government officials stole P193 million from the government. Organo filed a motion
to quash alleging that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Republic Act No. 8249 which
provides that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over government employees who do not belong to Salary Grade
27. Organo was able to prove that her position in the Bureau of Internal Revenue does not belong to Salary Grade
27. The Sandiganbayan denied her motion. It insisted that under the Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080, as
amended), the Sandiganbayan was vested with the jurisdiction over plunder cases and since RA 8249 is a general
law and that RA 7080 is a special law, RA 7080 should prevail.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan can try plunder cases where the accused is below Salary Grade 27.

HELD: No. The Plunder Law itself provides: Until otherwise provided by law, all pro-sections under this Act shall be
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan only had provisional jurisdiction over all plunder cases. In 1997, when RA 8249 was passed which
further defined the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, there is already no question as to which plunder cases are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The said law finally prescribed that the Sandiganbayan has
no jurisdiction over government employees which are below Salary Grade 27. RA 8249 is a special law the intention
of which was to declog the dockets of the Sandiganbayan. As such, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
Organo. The case should be filed in the appropriate court.
[G.R. Nos. 147706-07. February 16, 2005.]





Pursuant to a resolution dated September 30, 1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman, two separate informations 1
for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, were filed with
the Sandiganbayan on November 17, 1999 against Efren L. Alas. The charges emanated from the alleged anomalous
advertising contracts entered into by Alas, in his capacity as President and Chief Operating Officer of the Philippine
Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with Bagong Buhay Publishing Company which purportedly caused damage and
prejudice to the government.

On October 30, 2002, Alas filed a motion to quash the informations for lack of jurisdiction, which motion was
vehemently opposed by the prosecution. After considering the arguments of both parties, the respondent court
ruled that PPSB was a private corporation and that its officers, particularly herein respondent Alas, did not fall under
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.

The respondent court ruled that the records disclosed that while Philippine Postal Savings Bank is a subsidiary of the
Philippine Postal Corporation which is a government owned corporation, the same is not created by a special law. It
was organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 68. It was registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission under SEC No. AS094-005593 on June 22, 1994 with a lifetime of fifty (50)
years. Under its Articles of Incorporation the purpose for which said entity is formed was primarily for business, . . .

the People, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed this petition 3 arguing, in essence, that the PPSB
was a government-owned or controlled corporation as the term was defined under Section 2(13) of the
Administrative Code of 1987. 4 Likewise, in further defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, RA 8249 did not
make a distinction as to the manner of creation of the government-owned or controlled corporations for their
officers to fall under its jurisdiction. Hence, being President and Chief Operating Officer of the PPSB at the time of
commission of the crimes charged, respondent Alas came under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for
purposes of the provisions of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

HELD: Yes,

RA 8249 9 which preserved the subject provision:

Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense,

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director, and higher, otherwise classified as
grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758)
specifically including:

xxx xxx xxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities
or educational institutions or foundations.

The legislature, in mandating the inclusion of "presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations" within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, has consistently refrained from making any
distinction with respect to the manner of their creation.

The deliberate omission clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to include the presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of both types of corporations within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whenever they are
involved in graft and corruption. Had it been otherwise, it could have simply made the necessary distinction. But it
did not.

It is a basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Ubi
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Corollarily, Article XI Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, on the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman (the government's prosecutory arm against persons charged with graft and
corruption), includes officers and employees of government-owned or controlled corporations, likewise without any

In Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, 10 this Court, already mindful of the pertinent provisions of the 1987 Constitution, ruled
that the concerned officers of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether created by special law or
formed under the Corporation Code, come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for purposes of the
provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Otherwise, as we emphasized therein, a major policy of
Government, which is to eradicate, or at the very least minimize, the graft and corruption that has permeated the
fabric of the public service like a malignant social cancer, would be seriously undermined. In fact, Section 1 of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act embodies this policy of the government, that is, to repress certain acts not only
of public officers but also of private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.
People vs Yparaguirre


On March 24, 1994, at about 11:00 o' clock in the evening, while Charmelita D. Ruina, an invalid and mentally
retarded, was alone and lying in bed, Elmer Yparraguire entered her room. Elmer then undressed himself,
approached Charmelita and caressed and sucked her breasts. When she shouted for help, Elmer told her to keep
quiet. He boxed Charmelita when she put up some resistance. Elmer then sexually abused her. The following
morning, Elmer asked forgiveness from Charmelita's mother and promised that the same will never be repeated.

Accused-appellant Elmer Yparraguire was charged, tried and convicted of the crime of rape by the Regional Trial
Court of Tandag, Surigao del Sur. He was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay damages to the private
complainant. Hence, this appeal.

In his appeal, accused-appellant assailed the jurisdiction of the court contending that the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over the case because the complaint was signed and filed by the chief of police and not by the

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction

HELD: Yes,

Accused-appellant's contention has no merit.

Pursuant to Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the offended party can initiate a prosecution for
rape even if she is a minor, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority.
Although the victim in this case is no longer a minor, it is undisputed that she is a mental retardate and suffering
from physical deformity. No woman would come out in the open, inform the authorities of the injustice done to her,
make a statement of what had happened unless her purpose is to redress the wrong done against her honor. Once
the violation of the law becomes known through a direct original participation initiated by the victim, the
requirements of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), to the effect that the offense of rape "shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents," are satisfied. Moreover, the said
provision is not determinative of the jurisdiction of courts over the private offenses because the same is governed
by the Judiciary Law, not the Revised Penal Code which deals with the definition of felonies and their punishment.

The gravamen of the crime of rape is the sexual congress of a woman by force and without consent. These elements
have been proven beyond reasonable doubt to concur in this case. Furthermore, a plea for forgiveness may be
considered analogous to an attempt to compromise, which offer of compromise by the appellant may be received
in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court with
modification as to indemnity.

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ


G.R. No. 80116

June 30, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were
married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in
Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. More than five months after
the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging
in one that, while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil “had an affair with a certain William Chia.” The Assistant Fiscal,
after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2
complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled “PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia” was assigned to
the court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera. A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was
denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO,
seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. As cogently argued by Pilapil,
Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution
of the criminal action for adultery.

ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering that it was
done after obtaining a divorce decree?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one entered
DISMISSING the complaint … for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case … is hereby made permanent.

NO, under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint
filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with
this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or
legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the
raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the
spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. Stated differently, the inquiry would be
whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the
complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former
against the latter. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status
of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.