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G.R. No.

L-68385 May 12, 1989 Meanwhile, on January 18, 1977, the decedent's will had been admitted to
probate in the Circuit Court of Oregon 6Ward Graham, the designated
ILDEFONSO O. ELEGADO, as Ancillary Administrator of the Testate executor, then appointed Ildefonso Elegado, the herein petitioner, as his
Estate of the late WARREN TAYLOR GRAHAM, petitioner attorney-in-fact for the allowance of the will in the Philippines.7
vs.
HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL Pursuant to such authority, the petitioner commenced probate proceedings in
REVENUE respondents. the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 8The will was allowed on December 18,
1978, with the petitioner as ancillary administrator. 9 As such, he filed a second
Agrava, Lucero & Gineta for petitioners. estate tax return with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on June 4, 1980.10

The Office of the Solictor General for public respondents. On the basis of this second return, the Commissioner imposed an assessment
on the estate in the amount of P72,948.87.11 This was protested on behalf of
the estate by the Agrava, Lucero and Gineta Law Office on August 13, 1980. 12

While this protest was pending, the Commissioner filed in the probate
CRUZ, J.: proceedings a motion for the allowance of the basic estate tax of P96,509.35
as assessed on February 9, 1978.13 He said that this liability had not yet been
What the petitioner presents as a rather complicated problem is in reality a paid although the assessment had long become final and executory.
very simple question from the viewpoint of the Solicitor General. We agree with
the latter. There is actually only one issue to be resolved in this action. That The petitioner regarded this motion as an implied denial of the protest filed on
issue is whether or not the respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in August 13, 1980, against the second assessment of P72,948.87. 14 On this
dismissing the petitioner's appeal on grounds of jurisdiction and lack of a cause understanding, he filed on September 15, 1981, a petition for review with the
of action. Court of Tax Appeals challenging the said assessment. 15

Appeal from what? That indeed is the question. The Commissioner did not immediately answer (in fact, as the petitioner
stressed, no answer was filed during a delay of 195 days) and in the end
But first the facts. instead cancelled the protested assessment in a letter to the decedent's estate
dated March 31, 1982.16 This cancellation was notified to the Court of Tax
On March 14, 1976, Warren Taylor Graham, an American national formerly Appeals in a motion to dismiss on the ground that the protest had become
resident in the Philippines, died in Oregon, U.S.A. 1 As he left certain shares of moot and academic.17
stock in the Philippines, his son, Ward Graham, filed an estate tax return on
September 16, 1976, with the Philippine Revenue Representative in San The motion was granted and the petition dismissed on April 25, 1984. 18 The
Francisco, U.S.A. 2 petitioner then came to this Court oncertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
On the basis of this return, the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue
assessed the decedent's estate an estate tax in the amount of P96,509.35 on The petitioner raises three basic questions, to wit, (1) whether the shares of
February 9, 1978.3 This assessment was protested on March 7, 1978, by the stocks left by the decedent should be treated as his exclusive, and not
law firm of Bump, Young and Walker on behalf of the estate . 4 The protest was conjugal, property; (2) whether the said stocks should be assessed as of the
denied by the Commissioner on July 7, 1978.5 No further action was taken by time of the owner's death or six months thereafter; and (3) whether the appeal
the estate in pursuit of that protest. filed with the respondent court should be considered moot and academic.

We deal first with the third issue as it is decisive of this case.


In the letter to the decedent's estate dated March 31, 1982, the Commissioner finding that the said cancellation had rendered the petition moot and academic.
of Internal Revenue wrote as follows: There was really no more assessment to review.

Estate of WARREN T. GRAHAM c/o Mr. ILDEFENSO O. ELEGADO Ancillary The petitioner argues that the issuance of the second assessment on July 3,
Administrator Philex Building cor. Brixton & Fairlane Sts. Pasig, Metro Manila 1980, had the effect of canceling the first assessment of February 9, 1978, and
that the subsequent cancellation of the second assessment did not have the
Sir: effect of automatically reviving the first. Moreover, the first assessment is not
binding on him because it was based on a return filed by foreign lawyers who
had no knowledge of our tax laws or access to the Court of Tax Appeals.
This is with regard to the estate of the late WARREN
TAYLOR GRAHAM, who died a resident of Oregon, U.S.A.
on March 14, 1976. It appears that two (2) letters of demand The petitioner is clutching at straws.
were issued by this Bureau. One is for the amount of
P96,509.35 based on the first return filed, and the other in It is noted that in the letter of July 3, 1980, imposing the second assessment of
the amount of P72,948.87, based on the second return filed. P72,948.87, the Commissioner made it clear that "the aforesaid amount is
considered provisional only based on the estate tax return filed subject to
It appears that the first assessment of P96,509.35 was investigation by this Office for final determination of the correct estate tax due
issued on February 9, 1978 on the basis of the estate tax from the estate. Any amount that may be found due after said investigation will
return filed on September 16, 1976. The said assessment be assessed and collected later." 21 It is illogical to suggest that
was, however, protested in a letter dated March 7, 1978 but aprovisional assessment can supersede an earlier assessment which had
was denied on July 7, 1978. Since no appeal was made clearly become final and executory.
within the regulatory period, the same has become final.
The second contention is no less flimsy. The petitioner cannot be serious when
In view thereof, it is requested that you settle the aforesaid he argues that the first assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers
assessment for P96,509.35 within fifteen (15) days upon who filed the return on which it was based were not familiar with our tax laws
receipt hereof to the Receivable Accounts Division, this and procedure. Is the petitioner suggesting that they are excused from
Bureau, BIR National Office Building, Diliman, Quezon City. compliance therewith because of their ignorance?
The assessment for P72,949.57 dated July 3, 1980, referred
to above is hereby cancelled. If our own lawyers and taxpayers cannot claim a similar preference because
they are not allowed to claim a like ignorance, it stands to reason that
Very truly yours, foreigners cannot be any less bound by our own laws in our own country. A
more obvious and shallow discrimination than that suggested by the petitioner
is indeed difficult to find.
(SGD.) RUBEN B. ANCHETA Acting Commissioner 19
But the most compelling consideration in this case is the fact that the first
It is obvious from the express cancellation of the second assessment for assessment is already final and executory and can no longer be questioned at
P72,948.87 that the petitioner had been deprived of a cause of action as it was this late hour. The assessment was made on February 9, 1978. It was
precisely from this assessment that he was appealing. protested on March 7, 1978. The protest was denied on July 7, 1978. As no
further action was taken thereon by the decedent's estate, there is no question
In its decision, the Court of Tax Appeals said that the petition questioning the that the assessment has become final and executory.
assessment of July 3, 1980, was "premature" since the protest to the
assessment had not yet been resolved.20 As a matter of fact it had: the said In fact, the law firm that had lodged the protest appears to have accepted its
assessment had been cancelled by virtue of the above-quoted letter. The denial. In his motion with the probate court, the respondent Commissioner
respondent court was on surer ground, however, when it followed with the
stressed that "in a letter dated January 29, 1980, the Estate of Warren Taylor
Graham thru the aforesaid foreign law firm informed claimant that they have
paid said tax liability thru the Agrava, Velarde, Lucero and Puno, Philippine law
firm of 313 Buendia Avenue Ext., Makati, Metro Manila that initiated the instant
ancillary proceedings" although he added that such payment had not yet been
received.22 This letter was an acknowledgment by the estate of the validity and
finality of the first assessment. Significantly, it has not been denied by the
petitioner.

In view of the finality of the first assessment, the petitioner cannot now raise
the question of its validity before this Court any more than he could have done
so before the Court of Tax Appeals. What the estate of the decedent should
have done earlier, following the denial of its protest on July 7, 1978, was to
appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within the reglementary period of 30 days
after it received notice of said denial. It was in such appeal that the petitioner
could then have raised the first two issues he now raises without basis in the
present petition.

The question of whether or not the shares of stock left by the decedent should
be considered conjugal property or belonging to him alone is immaterial in
these proceedings. So too is the time at which the assessment of these shares
of stock should have been made by the BIR. These questions were not
resolved by the Court of Tax Appeals because it had no jurisdiction to act on
the petitioner's appeal from an assessment that had already been cancelled.
The assessment being no longer controversial or reviewable, there was no
justification for the respondent court to rule on the petition except to dismiss it.

If indeed the Commissioner of Internal Revenue committed an error in the


computation of the estate tax, as the petitioner insists, that error can no longer
be rectified because the original assessment has long become final and
executory. If that assessment was not challenged on time and in accordance
with the prescribed procedure, that error — for error it was — was committed
not by the respondents but by the decedent's estate itself which the petitioner
represents. So how can he now complain.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so


ordered,
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965 Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did
not, however, materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already
vs. waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees. she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised,
because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted
because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant. (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escaño spouses
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees. sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate
what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church,
REYES, J.B.L., J.: due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the
officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid,
First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming
plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship
pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants- between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to
appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2 her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and
Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta
continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following: letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's
welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of aflame.
San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student
of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and
socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not
colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"),
an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the
knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to
the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage
culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then
register. Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition
(Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").
couple were deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their
matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital future On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport,
whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving indicating in her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study,
money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two
engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22
another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein
return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for
elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place. character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was
issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before us.
Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and
1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2). both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest
(army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize
Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten marriages.
children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May only because of the separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613
1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time)
whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining expressly provided that —
her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic
Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the
the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in legal capacity of the contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis
damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid supplied)
marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied
that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal
for moral damages. requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil
effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff provided the following:
from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It
allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage
exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or several of
extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court. the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the
spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following: solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that
the marriage was perfectly legal.
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta
F. Escaño liable for damages and in dismissing the complaint;. The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their
marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note
heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for damages;. here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest
arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father
Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for
damages to the defendant parents on their counterclaims; and. divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and
binding.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the
plaintiff. Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she
was under the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's
defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was
vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute
marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid divorces outside the Philippines.
until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly,
Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should
dismissed for non-prosecution. have appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our
law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.);
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort
Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier,
Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife 95 Phil. 579).
sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District
Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary
entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second
Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to
subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows,
(Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided: likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial
of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the
legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated
Philippines, even though living abroad. charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the
husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse
divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and
further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our
preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the
present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an
to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage invalid divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this
bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1). court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior
to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize
decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the
of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the third present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in
paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following: effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710.
The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-
mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
which have for their object public order, policy and good customs,
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results
that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London
in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her
decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination death is wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very
in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore
be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony
acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the
are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek to
of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected
of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied) her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an
alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should
Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her
the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal
separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives,
undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce;
error. she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled
to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in
a person (whether divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good
question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest himself in the
well known to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to
Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the
are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what will
strict or too liberal. (p. 72) justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections
resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully
entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained. liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from
unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest
Escaño and his wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his
their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for,
supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice
Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a
exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or
was begun (Exh. "2-Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or
these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for
and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take
pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support,
house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not
would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or her
hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of
clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the
parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in case of advice given to a son.
strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or (3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort
social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek entitles the other to recover damages;
annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety,
entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled (4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort
by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give
vent to their prejudices or spleen.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor
Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account, (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal
against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;
(a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized
by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant
lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally
invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto
unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way
character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open of damages and attorneys' fees.
eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the
opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages
and attorney's fees. Neither party to recover costs.

With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto
Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are
excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said
defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have
seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having
become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has
been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said
defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable
affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.

Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after
the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted
with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree
of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;

(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person
other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation
conformably to Philippine law;
G.R. No. 182894 April 22, 2014 Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty.
Adriano before he was buried and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park
FE FLORO VALINO, Petitioner, was contrary to his wishes, respondents commenced suit against Valino
vs. praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and
ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D. ADRIANO, attorney’s fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and
MARIA TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, and transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in
LEAH ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO, Respondents. Novaliches, Quezon City.

DECISION In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been
separated for more than twenty (20) years before he courted her. Valino
claimed that throughout the time they were together, he had introduced her to
MENDOZA, J.: his friends and associates as his wife. Although they were living together,
Valino admitted that he never forgot his obligation to support the respondents.
Challenged in this petition is the October 2, 2006 Decision 1 and the May 9, She contended that, unlike Rosario, she took good care of Atty. Adriano and
2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61613, paid for all his medical expenses when he got seriously ill. She also claimed
which reversed the October 1, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in a coma and dying, Rosario still
Branch 77, Quezon City (RTC) which ruled that petitioner Fe Floro Valino left for the United States. According to Valino, it was Atty. Adriano’s last wish
(Valino) was entitled to the remains of the decedent. that his remains be interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the Manila
Memorial Park.
The Facts:
Valino further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and brought by respondents. Thus, she prayed that she be awarded moral and
Gregorio Law Office, married respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
November 15, 1955. The couple had two (2) sons, Florante and Ruben
Adriano; three (3) daughters, Rosario, Victoria and Maria Teresa; and one (1) Decision of the RTC
adopted daughter, Leah Antonette.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit as well as
The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they the counterclaim of Valino after it found them to have not been sufficiently
were eventually separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, proven.
one of his clients, until they decided to live together as husband and wife.
Despite such arrangement, he continued to provide financial support to The RTC opined that because Valino lived with Atty. Adriano for a very long
Rosario and their children (respondents). time, she knew very well that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila
Memorial Park. Taking into consideration the fact that Rosario left for the
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in United States at the time that he was fighting his illness, the trial court
the United States spending Christmas with her children. As none of the family concluded that Rosario did not show love and care for him. Considering also
members was around, Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the funeral and that it was Valino who performed all the duties and responsibilities of a wife,
burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably presumed that he wished to be
her husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the buried in the Valino family mausoleum.4
interment for a few days but her request was not heeded. The remains of Atty.
Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the In disposing of the case, the RTC noted that the exhumation and the transfer
Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment. of the body of Atty. Adriano to the Adriano family plot at the Holy Cross
Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City, would not serve any useful
purpose and so he should be spared and respected.5 Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed (2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
Valino to have the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of
respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their expense, to transfer, (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
transport and inter the remains of the decedent in the family plot at the Holy
Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City.
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
In reaching said determination, the CA explained that Rosario, being the legal
wife, was entitled to the custody of the remains of her deceased husband. [Emphasis supplied]
Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family
Code, it was the considered view of the appellate court that the law gave the Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:
surviving spouse not only the duty but also the right to make arrangements for
the funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or
on the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of the exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and
latter’s death, notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact. 305. [Emphases supplied]

Like the RTC, however, the CA did not award damages in favor of respondents In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
due to the good intentions shown by Valino in giving the deceased a decent
burial when the wife and the family were in the United States. All other claims
for damages were similarly dismissed. Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. – The immediate duty of
burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for
the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons herein below specified:
The Sole Issue

(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall
The lone legal issue in this petition is who between Rosario and Valino is devolve upon the surviving spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to
entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano. pay the necessary expenses;

The Court’s Ruling x x x x. [Emphases supplied]

Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 6 of the From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the
Family Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the members of the family to
funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus: the exclusion of one’s common law partner. In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 7 a
petition for habeas corpus was filed by the brothers and sisters of the late
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a Vitaliana Vargas against her lover, Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the latter
relative shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under forcibly took her and confined her in his residence. It appearing that she
Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and already died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy, Tomas Eugenio, Sr.
sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of jurisdiction and claimed the right
have a better right. [Emphases supplied] to bury the deceased, as the common-law husband.

Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the In its decision, the Court resolved that the trial court continued to have
liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided: jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the death of Vitaliana Vargas. As to
the claim of Tomas Eugenio, Sr. that he should be considered a "spouse"
(1) The spouse; having the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for his common-law
wife, the Court ruled:
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an
man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas to
and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so they could attend the
who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to know
be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of December 19, 1992 (December
Philippines. 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately contacted Valino
and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such
relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community of Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless
properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valino’s own testimony that it
to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman was Atty. Adriano’s wish to be buried in their family plot is being relied upon
living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In heavily. It should be noted, however, that other than Valino’s claim that Atty.
any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a Adriano wished to be buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence
legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. was presented to corroborate such claim. Considering that Rosario equally
In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. claims that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried in the Adriano family plot in
188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Novaliches, it becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish of Atty. Adriano
Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted, however, that with was unclear and undefinite. Considering this ambiguity as to the true wishes of
respect to 'spouse,' the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law the deceased, it is the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No
spouses)." presumption can be said to have been created in Valino’s favor, solely on
account of a long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term
"spouse" embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from Moreover, it cannot be surmised that just because Rosario was unavailable to
criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed bury her husband when she died, she had already renounced her right to do
or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no so. Verily, in the same vein that the right and duty to make funeral
distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament arrangements will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, the
or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view right to deprive a legitimate spouse of her legal right to bury the remains of her
cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions deceased husband should not be readily presumed to have been exercised,
of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and
when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner voluntary intent of the deceased to that end. Should there be any doubt as to
vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not the true intent of the deceased, the law favors the legitimate family. Here,
legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.8 [Emphases supplied] Rosario’s keenness to exercise the rights and obligations accorded to the legal
wife was even bolstered by the fact that she was joined by the children in this
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make case.
funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty.
Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be
the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that buried in the Valino family plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result remains
Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right the same. Article 307 of the Civil Code provides:
and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is
baseless. The right and duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the
right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except upon deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation
clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall
to that end.9 While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario be decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the same,
and their children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that after consulting the other members of the family.
human compassion, more often than not, opens the door to mercy and
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe the As for Valino’s contention that there is no point in exhuming and transferring
"form of the funeral rites" that should govern in the burial of the deceased. As the remains of Atty. Adriano, it should be said that the burial of his remains in a
thoroughly explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements place other than the Adriano family plot in Novaliches runs counter to the
reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of the wishes of his family. It does not only violate their right provided by law, but it
Family Code. Even if Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the place of also disrespects the family because the remains of the patriarch are buried in
burial among those on which the wishes of the deceased shall be followed, Dr. the family plot of his live-in partner.
Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino), an eminent authority on civil law,
commented that it is generally recognized that any inferences as to the wishes It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the
of the deceased should be established by some form of testamentary commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a certain right of
disposition.10 As Article 307 itself provides, the wishes of the deceased must possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for
be expressly provided. It cannot be inferred lightly, such as from the the exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate interest
circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent his last remaining days with Valino. It in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law
bears stressing once more that other than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano to bury their dead, also authorizes them to take possession of the dead body
wished to be buried at the Valino family plot, no other evidence was presented for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or to even
to corroborate it. transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may receive the
respect of the living. This is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons
At any rate, it should be remembered that the wishes of the decedent with having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.13
respect to his funeral are not absolute. As Dr. Tolentino further wrote:
All this notwithstanding, the Court finds laudable the acts of Valino in taking
The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in relation to his funeral, must not care of Atty. Adriano during his final moments and giving him a proper burial.
be contrary to law. They must not violate the legal and reglamentary provisions For her sacrifices, it would indeed be unkind to assess actual or moral
concerning funerals and the disposition of the remains, whether as regards the damages against her. As aptly explained by the CA:
time and manner of disposition, or the place of burial, or the ceremony to be
observed.11 [Emphases supplied] The trial court found that there was good faith on the part of defendant-
appellee Fe Floro Valino, who, having lived with Atty. Adriano after he was
In this case, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are limited separated in fact from his wife, lovingly and caringly took care of the well-being
by Article 305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, of Atty. Adriano Adriano while he was alive and even took care of his remains
and subject the same to those charged with the right and duty to make the when he had died.
proper arrangements to bury the remains of their loved-one. As aptly explained
by the appellate court in its disquisition: On the issue of damages, plaintiffs-appellants are not entitled to actual
damages. Defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino had all the good intentions in
The testimony of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino that it was the oral wish giving the remains of Atty. Adriano a decent burial when the wife and family
of Atty. Adriano Adriano that he be interred at the Floro family’s mausoleum at were all in the United States and could not attend to his burial. Actual damages
the Manila Memorial Park, must bend to the provisions of the law. Even are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury
assuming arguendo that it was the express wish of the deceased to be interred sustained. To be recoverable, they must not only be capable of proof but must
at the Manila Memorial Park, still, the law grants the duty and the right to actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. In this case at bench,
decide what to do with the remains to the wife, in this case, plaintiff-appellant there was no iota of evidence presented to justify award of actual damages.
Rosario D. Adriano, as the surviving spouse, and not to defendant-appellee Fe
Floro Valino, who is not even in the list of those legally preferred, despite the Plaintiffs-appellants are not also entitled to moral and exemplary
fact that her intentions may have been very commendable. The law does not damages.1âwphi1 Moral damages may be recovered only if the plaintiff is able
even consider the emotional fact that husband and wife had, in this case at to satisfactorily prove the existence of the factual basis for the damages and its
bench, been separated-in-fact and had been living apart for more than 30 causal connection with the acts complained of because moral damages
years.12 although incapable of pecuniary estimation are designed not to impose a
penalty but to compensate for injury sustained and actual damages suffered.
No injury was caused to plaintiffs-appellants, nor was any intended by anyone
in this case. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may only be awarded if
claimant is able to establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. Unfortunately, neither of the requirements to sustain
an award for either of these damages would appear to have been adequately
established by plaintiffs-appellants.

As regards the award of attorney's fees, it is an accepted doctrine that the


award thereof as an item of damages is the exception rather than the rule, and
counsel's fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power
of the court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code
demands factual, legal and equitable justification, without which the award is a
conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and
conjecture. In this case, we have searched but found nothing in plaintiffs-
appellants' suit that justifies the award of attorney's fees. 14

Finally, it should be said that controversies as to who should make


arrangements for the funeral of a deceased have often aggravated the
bereavement of the family and disturbed the proper solemnity which should
prevail at every funeral. It is for the purpose of preventing such controversies
that the Code Commission saw it best to include the provisions on
"Funerals."15

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158907 February 12, 2007 On 24 December 1979, petitioner was arrested by the Marcos military by virtue
of an Arrest, Search and Seizure Order and detained for allegedly committing
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER, Petitioner, arson. During the petitioner’s detention, respondent Locsin ordered fellow
vs. respondent Purugganan to cancel the petitioner’s shares in the books of the
EMILIO PURUGGANAN, JR. AND RAUL LOCSIN, Respondents. corporation and to transfer them to respondent Locsin’s name. 7

DECISION As part of his scheme to defraud the petitioner, respondent Locsin sent
Rebecca Fernando, an employee of Businessday, to Camp Crame where the
petitioner was detained, to pretend to borrow Certificate of Stock No. 100 for
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: the purpose of using it as additional collateral for Businessday’s then
outstanding loan with the National Investment and Development Corporation.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, When Fernando returned the borrowed stock certificate, the word "cancelled"
assailing the Decision,1 dated 30 June 2003, promulgated by the Court of was already written therein. When the petitioner became upset, Fernando
Appeals, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, dated 26 July explained that this was merely a mistake committed by respondent Locsin’s
1995, dismissing the petitioner’s suit. secretary.8

The parties presented conflicting accounts of the facts. During the trial, petitioner also agreed to stipulate that from 1980 to 1982,
Businessday made regular deposits, each amounting to ₱10,000.00, to the
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER’S VERSION Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company accounts of Manuel and Genaro
Pantig, petitioner’s in-laws. The deposits were made on every 15th and 30th of
the month.9 Petitioner alleged that these funds consisted of his monthly salary,
Petitioner Eduardo B. Olaguer alleges that he was the owner of 60,000 shares which Businessday agreed to continue paying after his arrest for the financial
of stock of Businessday Corporation (Businessday) with a total par value of support of his family.10 After receiving a total of ₱600,000.00, the payments
₱600,000.00, with Certificates of Stock No. 005, No. 028, No. 034, No. 070, stopped. Thereafter, respondent Locsin and Fernando went to ask petitioner to
and No. 100.2 At the time he was employed with the corporation as Executive endorse and deliver the rest of his stock certificates to respondent Locsin, but
Vice-President of Businessday, and President of Businessday Information petitioner refused. 11
Systems and Services and of Businessday Marketing Corporation, petitioner,
together with respondent Raul Locsin (Locsin) and Enrique Joaquin (Joaquin),
was active in the political opposition against the Marcos On 16 January 1986, petitioner was finally released from detention. He then
dictatorship.3 Anticipating the possibility that petitioner would be arrested and discovered that he was no longer registered as stockholder of Businessday in
detained by the Marcos military, Locsin, Joaquin, and Hector Holifeña had an its corporate books. He also learned that Purugganan, as the Corporate
unwritten agreement that, in the event that petitioner was arrested, they would Secretary of Businessday, had already recorded the transfer of shares in favor
support the petitioner’s family by the continued payment of his of respondent Locsin, while petitioner was detained. When petitioner
salary.4 Petitioner also executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), on 26 demanded that respondents restore to him full ownership of his shares of
May 1979, appointing as his attorneys-in-fact Locsin, Joaquin and Hofileña for stock, they refused to do so. On 29 July 1986, petitioner filed a Complaint
the purpose of selling or transferring petitioner’s shares of stock with before the trial court against respondents Purugganan and Locsin to declare
Businessday. During the trial, petitioner testified that he agreed to execute the as illegal the sale of the shares of stock, to restore to the petitioner full
SPA in order to cancel his shares of stock, even before they are sold, for the ownership of the shares, and payment of damages. 12
purpose of concealing that he was a stockholder of Businessday, in the event
of a military crackdown against the opposition.5 The parties acknowledged the RESPONDENT RAUL LOCSIN’S VERSION
SPA before respondent Emilio Purugganan, Jr., who was then the Corporate
Secretary of Businessday, and at the same time, a notary public for Quezon In his version of the facts, respondent Locsin contended that petitioner
City.6 approached him and requested him to sell, and, if necessary, buy petitioner’s
shares of stock in Businessday, to assure support for petitioner’s family in the
event that something should happen to him, particularly if he was jailed, exiled respondent Locsin by his receipt of the purchase price, and his failure to raise
or forced to go underground.13 At the time petitioner was employed with any protest over the said sale.22 The Court of Appeals refused to credit the
Businessday, respondent Locsin was unaware that petitioner was part of a petitioner’s allegation that the money his wife received constituted his salary
group, Light-a-Fire Movement, which actively sought the overthrow of the from Businessday since the amount he received as his salary, ₱24,000.00 per
Marcos government through an armed struggle.14 He denied that he made any month, did not correspond to the amount he received during his detention,
arrangements to continue paying the petitioner’s salary in the event of the ₱20,000.00 per month (deposits of ₱10,000.00 on every 15th and 30th of each
latter’s imprisonment.15 month in the accounts of the petitioner’s in-laws). On the other hand, the total
amount received, ₱600,000.00, corresponds to the aggregate par value of
When petitioner was detained, respondent Locsin tried to sell petitioner’s petitioner’s shares in Businessday. Moreover, the financial condition of
shares, but nobody wanted to buy them. Petitioner’s reputation as an Businessday prevented it from granting any form of financial assistance in
oppositionist resulted in the poor financial condition of Businessday and favor of the petitioner, who was placed in an indefinite leave of absence, and,
discouraged any buyers for the shares of stock.16 In view of petitioner’s therefore, not entitled to any salary. 23
previous instructions, respondent Locsin decided to buy the shares
himself.1awphi1.net Although the capital deficiency suffered by Businessday The Court of Appeals also ruled that although the manner of the cancellation of
caused the book value of the shares to plummet below par value, respondent the petitioner’s certificates of stock and the subsequent issuance of the new
Locsin, nevertheless, bought the shares at par value. 17 However, he had to certificate of stock in favor of respondent Locsin was irregular, this irregularity
borrow from Businessday the funds he used in purchasing the shares from will not relieve petitioner of the consequences of a consummated sale. 24
petitioner, and had to pay the petitioner in installments of ₱10,000.00 every
15th and 30th of each month.18 Finally, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the trial court disallowing
respondent Locsin’s claims for moral and exemplary damages due to lack of
The trial court in its Decision, dated 26 July 1995, dismissed the Complaint supporting evidence.25
filed by the petitioner. It ruled that the sale of shares between petitioner and
respondent Locsin was valid. The trial court concluded that petitioner had Hence, the present petition, where the following issues were raised:
intended to sell the shares of stock to anyone, including respondent Locsin, in
order to provide for the needs of his family should he be jailed or forced to go
underground; and that the SPA drafted by the petitioner empowered I.
respondent Locsin, and two other agents, to sell the shares for such price and
under such terms and conditions that the agents may deem proper. It further THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS A
found that petitioner consented to have respondent Locsin buy the shares PERFECTED CONTRACT OF SALE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND MR.
himself. It also ruled that petitioner, through his wife, received from respondent LOCSIN OVER THE SHARES;
Locsin the amount of ₱600,000.00 as payment for the shares of stock.19 The
dispositive part of the trial court’s Decision reads: II.

WHEREFORE, for failure of the [herein petitioner] to prove by preponderance THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER
of evidence, his causes of action and of the facts alleged in his complaint, the CONSENTED TO THE ALLEGED SALE OF THE SHARES TO MR. LOCSIN;
instant suit is hereby ordered DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

III.
[Herein respondents’] counterclaims, however, are hereby DISMISSED,
likewise, for dearth of substantial evidentiary support. 20
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE AMOUNTS
RECEIVED BY PETITIONER’S IN LAWS WERE NOT PETITIONER’S
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the trial court that SALARY FROM THE CORPORATION BUT INSTALLMENT PAYMENTS FOR
there was a perfected contract of sale.21It further ruled that granting that there THE SHARES;
was no perfected contract of sale, petitioner, nevertheless, ratified the sale to
IV. ART. 38 Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute,
prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT MR. LOCSIN WAS THE not exempt the incapacitated person, from certain obligations, as when the
PARTY TO THE ALLEGED SALE OF THE SHARES AND NOT THE latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.
CORPORATION; AND
Petitioner, thus, claims that his arrest and subsequent detention are not among
V. the instances covered by the terms "absence or incapacity," as provided under
the SPA he executed in favor of respondent Locsin.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ALLEGED SALE
OF THE SHARES WAS VALID ALTHOUGH THE CANCELLATION OF THE Petitioner’s arguments are unpersuasive. It is a general rule that a power of
SHARES WAS IRREGULAR.26 attorney must be strictly construed; the instrument will be held to grant only
those powers that are specified, and the agent may neither go beyond nor
deviate from the power of attorney. However, the rule is not absolute and
The petition is without merit. should not be applied to the extent of destroying the very purpose of the
power. If the language will permit, the construction that should be adopted is
The first issue that the petitioner raised is that there was no valid sale since that which will carry out instead of defeat the purpose of the appointment.
respondent Locsin exceeded his authority under the SPA 27 issued in his, Clauses in a power of attorney that are repugnant to each other should be
Joaquin and Holifena’s favor. He alleged that the authority of the afore-named reconciled so as to give effect to the instrument in accordance with its general
agents to sell the shares of stock was limited to the following conditions: (1) in intent or predominant purpose. Furthermore, the instrument should always be
the event of the petitioner’s absence and incapacity; and (2) for the limited deemed to give such powers as essential or usual in effectuating the express
purpose of applying the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of petitioner’s powers.31
subsisting obligations with the companies adverted to in the SPA.28
In the present case, limiting the definitions of "absence" to that provided under
Petitioner sought to impose a strict construction of the SPA by limiting the Article 381 of the Civil Code and of "incapacity" under Article 38 of the same
definition of the word "absence" to a condition wherein "a person disappears Code negates the effect of the power of attorney by creating absurd, if not
from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, without leaving an agent to impossible, legal situations. Article 381 provides the necessarily stringent
administer his property,"29 citing Article 381 of the Civil Code, the entire standards that would justify the appointment of a representative by a judge.
provision hereunder quoted: Among the standards the said article enumerates is that no agent has been
appointed to administer the property. In the present case, petitioner himself
ART 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being had already authorized agents to do specific acts of administration and thus,
unknown, and without leaving an agent to administer his property, the judge, at no longer necessitated the appointment of one by the court. Likewise, limiting
the instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person the construction of "incapacity" to "minority, insanity, imbecility, the state of
to represent him in all that may be necessary. being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction," as provided under Article
38, would render the SPA ineffective. Article 1919(3) of the Civil Code provides
that the death, civil interdiction, insanity or insolvency of the principal or of the
This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the power agent extinguishes the agency. It would be equally incongruous, if not outright
conferred by the absentee has expired. impossible, for the petitioner to require himself to qualify as a minor, an
imbecile, a deaf-mute, or a prodigal before the SPA becomes operative. In
Petitioner also puts forward that the word "incapacity" would be limited to mean such cases, not only would he be prevented from appointing an agent, he
"minority, insanity, imbecility, the state of being deaf-mute, prodigality and civil himself would be unable to administer his property.
interdiction."30 He cites Article 38 of the Civil Code, in support of this definition,
which is hereunder quoted: On the other hand, defining the terms "absence" and "incapacity" by their
everyday usage makes for a reasonable construction, that is, "the state of not
being present" and the "inability to act," given the context that the SPA In addition, petitioner made two inconsistent statements when he alleged that
authorizes the agents to attend stockholders’ meetings and vote in behalf of (1) respondent Locsin had not asked the petitioner to endorse and deliver the
petitioner, to sell the shares of stock, and other related acts. This construction shares of stock, and (2) when Rebecca Fernando asked the petitioner to
covers the situation wherein petitioner was arrested and detained. This much endorse and deliver the certificates of stock, but petitioner refused and even
is admitted by petitioner in his testimony.32 became upset.33 In either case, both statements only prove that petitioner
refused to honor his part as seller of the shares, even after receiving payments
Petitioner’s contention that the shares may only be sold for the sole purpose of from the buyer. Had the petitioner not known of or given his consent to the
applying the proceeds of the sale to the satisfaction of petitioner’s subsisting sale, he would have given back the payments as soon as Fernando asked him
obligations to the company is far-fetched. The construction, which will carry out to endorse and deliver the certificates of stock, an incident which unequivocally
the purpose, is that which should be applied. Petitioner had not submitted confirmed that the funds he received, through his wife and his in-laws, were
evidence that he was in debt with Businessday at the time he had executed the intended as payment for his shares of stocks. Instead, petitioner held on to the
SPA. Nor could he have considered incurring any debts since he admitted that, proceeds of the sale after it had been made clear to him that respondent
at the time of its execution, he was concerned about his possible arrest, death Locsin had considered the ₱600,000.00 as payment for the shares, and asked
and disappearance. The language of the SPA clearly enumerates, as among petitioner, through Fernando, to endorse and deliver the stock certificates for
those acts that the agents were authorized to do, the act of applying the cancellation.
proceeds of the sale of the shares to any obligations petitioner might have
against the Businessday group of companies. This interpretation is supported As regards the third issue, petitioner’s allegation that the installment payments
by the use of the word "and" in enumerating the authorized acts, instead of he was adjudged to have received for the shares were actually salaries which
phrases such as "only for," "for the purpose of," "in order to" or any similar Businessday promised to pay him during his detention is unsupported and
terms to indicate that the petitioner intended that the SPA be used only for a implausible. Petitioner received ₱20,000.00 per month through his in-laws; this
limited purpose, that of paying any liabilities with the Businessday group of amount does not correspond to his monthly salary at ₱24,000.00. 34 Nor does
companies. the amount received correspond to the amount which Businessday was
supposed to be obliged to pay petitioner, which was only ₱45,000.00 to
Secondly, petitioner argued that the records failed to show that he gave his ₱60,000.00 per annum.35 Secondly, the petitioner’s wife did not receive funds
consent to the sale of the shares to respondent Locsin for the price of from respondent Locsin or Businessday for the entire duration of petitioner’s
₱600,000.00. This argument is unsustainable. Petitioner received from detention. Instead, when the total amount received by the petitioner reached
respondent Locsin, through his wife and in-laws, the installment payments for a the aggregate amount of his shares at par value -- ₱600,000.00 -- the
total of ₱600,000.00 from 1980 to 1982, without any protest or complaint. It payments stopped. Petitioner even testified that when respondent Locsin
was only four years after 1982 when petitioner demanded the return of the denied knowing the petitioner soon after his arrest, he believed respondent
shares. The petitioner’s claim that he did not instruct respondent Locsin to Locsin’s commitment to pay his salaries during his detention to be nothing
deposit the money to the bank accounts of his in-laws fails to prove that more than lip-service.36
petitioner did not give his consent to the sale since respondent Locsin was
authorized, under the SPA, to negotiate the terms and conditions of the sale Granting that petitioner was able to prove his allegations, such an act of
including the manner of payment. Moreover, had respondent Locsin given the gratuity, on the part of Businessday in favor of petitioner, would be void. An
proceeds directly to the petitioner, as the latter suggested in this petition, the arrangement whereby petitioner will receive "salaries" for work he will not
proceeds were likely to have been included among petitioner’s properties perform, which is not a demandable debt since petitioner was on an extended
which were confiscated by the military. Instead, respondent Locsin deposited leave of absence, constitutes a donation under Article 726 37 of the Civil Code.
the money in the bank accounts of petitioner’s in-laws, and consequently, Under Article 748 of the Civil Code, if the value of the personal property
assured that the petitioner’s wife received these amounts. Article 1882 of the donated exceeds ₱5,000.00, the donation and the acceptance shall have to be
Civil Code provides that the limits of an agent’s authority shall not be made in writing. Otherwise, the donation will be void. In the present case,
considered exceeded should it have been performed in a manner more petitioner admitted in his testimony38 that such arrangement was not made in
advantageous to the principal than that specified by him. writing and, hence, is void.
The fact that some of the deposit slips and communications made to agent which might affect the transaction.40 The prohibition against agents
petitioner’s wife contain the phrase "household expenses" does not disprove purchasing property in their hands for sale or management is, however,
the sale of the shares. The money was being deposited to the bank accounts clearly, not absolute. It does not apply where the principal consents to the sale
of the petitioner’s in-laws, and not to the account of the petitioner or his wife, of the property in the hands of the agent or administrator.>41
precisely because some of his property had already been confiscated by the
military. Had they used the phrase "sale of shares," it would have defeated the In the present case, the parties have conflicting allegations. While respondent
purpose of not using their own bank accounts, which was to conceal from the Locsin averred that petitioner had permitted him to purchase petitioner’s
military any transaction involving the petitioner’s property. shares, petitioner vehemently denies having known of the transaction.
However, records show that petitioner’s position is less credible than that taken
Petitioner raised as his fourth issue that granting that there was a sale, by respondent Locsin given petitioner’s contemporaneous and subsequent
Businessday, and not respondent Locsin, was the party to the transaction. The acts.42 In 1980, when Fernando returned a stock certificate she borrowed from
curious facts that the payments were received on the 15th and 30th of each the petitioner, it was marked "cancelled." Although the petitioner alleged that
month and that the payor named in the checks was Businessday, were he was furious when he saw the word cancelled, he had not demanded the
adequately explained by respondent Locsin. Respondent Locsin had obtained issuance of a new certificate in his name. Instead of having been put on his
cash advances from the company, paid to him on the 15th and 30th of the guard, petitioner remained silent over this obvious red flag and continued
month, so that he can pay petitioner for the shares. To support his claim, he receiving, through his wife, payments which totalled to the aggregate amount
presented Businessday’s financial records and the testimony of Leo Atienza, of the shares of stock valued at par. When the payments stopped, no demand
the Company’s Accounting Manager. When asked why the term "shares of was made by either petitioner or his wife for further payments.
stock" was used for the entries, instead of "cash advances," Atienza explained
that the term "shares of stock" was more specific rather than the broader From the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner knew of the transaction, agreed to
phrase "cash advances."39 More to the point, had the entries been for "shares the purchase price of ₱600,000.00 for the shares of stock, and had in fact
of stock," the issuance of shares should have been reflected in the stock and facilitated the implementation of the terms of the payment by providing
transfer books of Businessday, which the petitioner presented as evidence. respondent Locsin, through petitioner’s wife, with the information on the bank
Instead the stock and transfer books reveal that the increase in respondent accounts of his in-laws. Petitioner’s wife and his son even provided receipts for
Locsin’s shares was a result of the cancellation and transfer of petitioner’s the payments that were made to them by respondent Locsin,43 a practice that
shares in favor of respondent Locsin. bespeaks of an onerous transaction and not an act of gratuity.

Petitioner alleges that the purported sale between himself and respondent Lastly, petitioner claims that the cancellation of the shares and the subsequent transfer thereof were fraudulent, and,
Locsin of the disputed shares of stock is void since it contravenes Article 1491 therefore, illegal. In the present case, the shares were transferred in the name of the buyer, respondent Locsin, without
of the Civil Code, which provides that: the petitioner delivering to the buyer his certificates of stock. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that:

ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a Sec.63. Certificate of stock and transfer of shares.— xxx Shares of stock so issued are personal property and may be
public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another: transferred by delivery of the certificate or certificates indorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or other person
legally authorized to make the transfer. No transfer, however, shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the

xxxx transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation showing the names of the parties to the transaction, the date of the
transfer, the number of the certificate or certificates and the number of shares transferred. (Emphasis provided.)

(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been
entrusted to them, unless the consent of the principal has been given; x x x. The aforequoted provision furnishes the procedure for the transfer of shares – the delivery of the endorsed certificates,
in order to prevent the fraudulent transfer of shares of stock. However, this rule cannot be applied in the present case
without causing the injustice sought to be avoided. As had been amply demonstrated, there was a valid sale of stocks.
It is, indeed, a familiar and universally recognized doctrine that a person who Petitioner’s failure to deliver the shares to their rightful buyer is a breach of his duty as a seller, which he cannot use to
undertakes to act as agent for another cannot be permitted to deal in the unjustly profit himself by denying the validity of such sale. Thus, while the manner of the cancellation of petitioner’s
agency matter on his own account and for his own benefit without the consent certificates of stock and the issuance of the new certificates in favor of respondent Locsin was highly irregular, we
of his principal, freely given, with full knowledge of every detail known to the
must, nonetheless, declare the validity of the sale between the parties. Neither does this irregularity prove that the
transfer was fraudulent. In his testimony, petitioner admitted that they had intended to conceal his being a stockholder
of Businessday.44 The cancellation of his name from the stock and transfer book, even before the shares were
actually sold, had been done with his consent. As earlier explained, even the subsequent sale of the shares in favor of
Locsin had been done with his consent.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals, promulgated on 30 June 2003, affirming the validity of the sale of the shares of stock in favor of
respondent Locsin. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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