FACTS ISSUE HELD CONSTI ISSUE

17. The Sangguiniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of
Camarines 1998, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase
Sur v. CA – or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial
222 capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food
SCRA 173 - and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing
Marinelle project for the provincial government employees.
Fernandez
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Governor filed two
separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto and
Efren San Joaquin.
The Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the
Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no
need for approval by the Office of the President of the
exercise of the Sangguiniang Panlalawigan of the right
of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General
expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur
must first secure the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands for
use as a housing project.
The CA allowed the Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of the lands. It also ordered that the trial
court suspend the expropriation proceedings until after
the Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the
requisite approval of DAR to convert the classification of
the property of the San Joaquins from agricultural to
non-agricultural land.
Whether or not the NO. The Court ruled that to sustain the Court of Appeals - Under the new concept, “public use”
Province of Camarines would mean that the local government units can no longer means public advantage, convenience
Sur must comply with expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction or benefit, which tends to contribute to
the provision of Section of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without first the general welfare and prosperity of the
65 of the CARL and applying for conversion of the use of the lands with the whole community.
must first secure the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these
approval of the projects would naturally involve a change in the land use.
Department of Agrarian In effect, it would then be the Department of Agrarian
Reform of the plan to Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a
expropriate the lands of public purpose or public use.
the San Joaquins.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local
government unit that shall determine whether the use of
the property sought to be expropriated shall be public, the
same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts
defer to such legislative determination and will intervene
only when a particular undertaking has no real or
substantial relation to the public use. In this case, the
expropriation of the property authorized by the question
resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a
pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit
and advantage of the people of the province of Camarines
Sur.

22. Municipality of Daet instituted condemnation W/N the determining When plaintiff takes possession before the institution In order for there to be res judicata,
Municipality proceedings against private respondent Li Seng value of the property of the condemnation proceedings, the value should be the following requisites must be
of Daet v. Giap & Co. Inc. for the purpose of acquiring and should be rendered fixed as of the time of the taking of the property, not of present:
CA - 129 subsequently converting their property into a public from the rendition of the filing of the complaint, and the latter should be the 1. former judgement must be
SCRA park. the judgement of the basis for the determination of the value, when the final
665 - Trial Court dismissed the expropriation because trial court or at the date taking of the property involves coincides with or is 2. it must have been rendered
Nathalie Uy there was “no genuine” need to convert the property of filing of the subsequent to the commencement proceedings. by a court having jurisdiction
to a public park and there was no funds to pay the complaint. In the case at bar it is a fact that there has been no of the subject-matter and of
reasonable value of the land. taking of the property prior to the institution of the the parties
CA reversed the Trial Corut’s decision. It declared W/N the CA gravely condemnation proceedings. It cannot even be said 3. it must be a judgement on
that the municipality od Daet had the lawful right to abused its power when that the filing of the complaint coincided with the taking the merits
take the property sought to be condemned for public it gave credence to the of the property by the plaintiff because the latter did not 4. there must be, between the
use. appraiser under the enter into possession of the property since it failed or first and the second actions,
On March 20, 1969, private respondent filed a employ of the did not comply with the order of the Court requiring the identity of parties, of subject
“Motion for Appointment of Commissioners to Fix respondent and municipality to make the necessary deposits of the matter and of cause of
Just Compensation for the Property Sought to be disregarded the provisional value. action.
Taken.” findings of the By not complying with the orders of the trial court, the
Trial court issued twin orders: (1) provisional value of commissioner. petitioners benefitted which should not be allowed. It To constitute res judicata the right to
the land is at Php 120 per square meter and the was prejudicial to the respondent who was denied relief in one suit must be upon the
value of the improvement at Php 30,000.00 totalling beneficial use of the land for 17 years. same question which in essence and
Php 356,040.00 and requiring the municipality to Petitioner upon filing the complaint has the duty to substance was litigated and
deposit a security, and (2) appointing 3 make the deposit in the amount visually ascertained determined in the first suit.
 commissioners.
The commissioners followed the sale approach in
appeasing the land sought to be expropriated. They
declared that the Fair Market Value of the property
was at Php 60.00 her square meter and the structure
remains cost Pho 15,000 in 1962.
Private Respondent submitted additional evidence
which consisted of an expert testimony of Engr.
Aquino, who appraised the land at Php 200.00 per
square meter and the improvement at Php 36,500.00
in 1969.
Trial Court rendered a decision disregarding the
valuation made by the commissioners and used the
appraisal of Engr. Aquino in 1969 as basis for the
determination of the value in 1962. They put the
value at Php 117.00 per square meter and the
improvement at Php 36,500.00 with interests from
the filing of the complaint.
CA sustained the valuation of the property in 1969
and declared that the municipality has the lawful right
to expropriate and modified the judgement of the trial
court with respect to the interest that can be
recovered which should be from the date of actual
taking.
26. Meralco The judge during an expropriation proceedings,
v. Pineda – arrived at the valuation of Php 40.00 per square
206 SCRA meter on a property declared for real estate tax
196 - purposes at Php 2.50 per hectare on the basis of a
Nathalie Uy Joint Venture Agreement submitted before him. It
was without the reception of evidence before a
Board of Commissioners.
and fixed by the court. This deposit serves a double
purpose of prepayment of the property and indemnity
for damages if the proceedings are dismissed.
The SC held that the property should be priced at Php
200.00 per sq. meter for a total of Php 543,300.00 and
the value of the improvement is Php 36,500, both to
bear legal interest from and after the date of actual
taking of possession by the municipality until full
amount is paid.
Section 5 Revised Rules of Court calls for the
appointment of not more than 3 commissioners. The
commissioner’s power is limited to assessing the value
and determining the amount of damages. They are to
discharge the trust reposed in them according to
well-established rules and form their judgement upon
correct legal principles. The reports submitted by the
commissioners of appraisals in condemnation
proceedings are not binding, but merely advisory in
character, as far as the court is concerned.
The CA is did not err in giving credence to the
appraiser employed by the private respondent and in
disregarding the commissioner’s report. Engr. Aquino
is more than qualified to make a competent appraisal
of the fair market value of the land.
P.D. no 42 only states the provisional value of the
property. It does not necessarily represent the true and
correct value of the land. It is clearly stated that just
compensation is based on the current and fair market
value not on the provisional value.
W/N the court can Under sec 5, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court Two stages of expropriation:
dispense with the (RoC), it is provided that upon entry of the order of 1. First is concerned with the
assistance of a Board condemnation, the court shall appoint not more than 3 determination of the authority of
of Commissioners in persons as Commissioners to ascertain and report the the plaintiff to exercise the
an expropriation just compensation for the property sought to be taken. power of eminent domain and
proceeding and But under sec 8 of the RoC, the court may do the the property of its exercise in the
determine for itself just following: context of the facts involved in
compensation. 1. After hearing, accept the report and render the suit.
judgement in accordance with it; 2. Second phase of the eminent
2. For a cause shown, recommit the same to domain action is concerned with
the Commissioners for further report of the the determination by the Court
facts; of just compensation for the
3. Set aside the report and appoint new property sought to be taken,
Commissioners which is done by the Court with
4. Accept the report in part and reject in part. the assistance of not more than
5. make such order or render judgement as 3 Commissioners.
shall secure the property of condemnation
and just compensation
SC further held that trial before the Board of
Commissioners is a mandatory requirement in an

27. San On September 5, 1938, certain parcels of land were the
Roque v. subject of an expropriation proceeding (to carry out the
Republic – development program of the Philippine Army as
532 SCRA provided in the National Defense Act) initiated by the
493 - then Commonwealth of the Philippines wherein Judge
Marinelle Martinez ordered the initial deposit of P9,500.00.00 as a
Fernandez pre-condition for entry on the lands sought to be
expropriated.
On May 14, 1940, a Decision was rendered
condemning the parcels of land. However, the title of the
subject parcel of land was not transferred to the
government. Eventually, the land was subdivided and
new titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of
Cebu. Two parcels of the same were acquired by San
Roque Realty and then they begun construction of
townhouses in 1995.
On February 22, 1996, the Republic filed a
case alleging that it is the owner of the subject parcels of
land by virtue of 1938 Decision in the expropriation
case, thus the new titles that were issued are null void
and therefore San Roque Realty had no right to possess
the subject properties because it was not its lawful
owner.
In answer, San Roque Realty claimed that it
was a buyer in good faith. It also claimed that there is no
valid expropriation because it was initiated by the
executive branch without legislative approval. It also
expropriation case, such may not be done away with
capriciously or for no reason at all. It is indispensable
to allow the parties to present their evidences
regarding just compensation.
Though the findings of the Commissioners are not
necessarily binding and may be disregarded by the
Court, the latter may only do so for valid reasons:
● When the commissioners have applied illegal
principles to the evidence submitted
● When the Commissioners have disregarded a
clear preponderance of evidence
● When the amount allowed by the
Commissioners is either grossly inadequate or
excessive
SC held that prior to the determination of just
compensation, the property owners may rightfully
demand to withdraw from the deposit made by the
condemner. Upon award of a smaller amount by the
court, the property owners are subject to a judgement
for excess or upon the award of a larger sum, they are
entitled to a judgement for the amount awarded by the
court.
1. Whether or not the 1. YES. The Court ruled that the CA ruling that
CA erred in its disregards established facts and neglects to
ruling. reconcile contradictions does not deserve
concurrence by this Court. The CA failed to
2. Whether or not the resolve the issue of the Republic’s failure to
Republic paid just register the property in its name, it also did not
compensation. give any explanation as to why title and
continuous possession of the property
remained with San Roque Realty and its
predecessors-in-interest for 56 years. The
general rule is that the State cannot be put in
estoppel or laches by the mistakes or errors of
its officials or agents. This rule, however, admits
exceptions. One exception is when the strict
application of the rule will defeat the
effectiveness of a policy adopted to protect the
public such as the Torrens System.
2. The Republic’s bare contention and assumption
cannot defeat San Roque Realty’s apparent
ownership over the subject property. There was
no record of payment of compensation to the
land owners. Eminent domain cases are to be
strictly construed against the expropriator. The
payment of just compensation for private
property taken for public use is an
indispensable requisite for the exercise of the
State’s power of eminent domain. There is no
showing that the Republic complied with the
aforestated registration requirement.
 alleged that the expropriation was never consummated
because the government did not actually enter the land
nor were the owners paid any compensation.
RTC Ruling: dismissed Republic’s complaint and upheld
San Roque Realty’s ownership over the subject
properties. It also found that there was no valid
expropriation since the records are bereft of a showing
that consideration was paid for the subject properties.
CA Ruling: reversed the RTC decision on the finding
that the appeal from the CFI Decision in the
expropriation case was never perfected by the original
owners of the subject properties, and thus the
expropriation became final and binding. The CA further
held that laches and estoppel cannot work against the
Republic.
28 . Land Bank v. Spouses Orilla - Jill Kathryn Lao
30. Two petitions are consolidated, first is the
Manotoc v. constitutionality of PD 1669 – expropriation of
NHA - 150 “Tambunting Estate” and the second is the
SCRA 89 - constitutionality of PD 1670 – expropriation of the
Rudolf de property along the Estero de Sunog-Apo.
Luna
In both cases, the petitioners maintain that the two
decrees are unconstitutional and should be declared
null and void because:
(1) They deprived the petitioners of their properties
without due process of law.
(2) The petitioners were denied to their right to just
compensation
(3) The petitioners' right to equal protection of the law
was violated.
(4) The decrees are vague, defective, and patently
erroneous.
(5) The petitioners' properties are not proper subjects for
expropriation considering their location and other
relevant circumstances.
On June 11, 1977, the President of the Philippines
issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 555 instituting a
nationwide slum improvement and resettlement
program (SIR). On the same date, the President also
issued LOI No. 557, adopting slum improvement as a
national housing policy.
On December 22, 1978, the President issued
Proclamation No. 1810 declaring all sites Identified by
the Metro Manila local governments and approved by
the Ministry of Human Settlements to be included in the
ZIP upon proclamation of the President. The
W/N PD 1669 and PD Yes. The challenged decrees are uniquely unfair in the Republic v. Juan (92 SCRA 26, 40): 'To
1670 are procedures adopted and the powers given to the begin with, it must be emphasized that
unconstitutional and respondent NHA. plaintiff-appellee in this instant case is
should be declared the Republic of the Philippines which is
void? The Tambunting subdivision is summarily proclaimed a exercising its right of eminent domain
blighted area and directly expropriated by decree without inherent in it as a body sovereign. In the
the slightest semblance of a hearing or any proceeding exercise of its sovereign right the State
whatsoever. Not only are the owners given absolutely no is not subject to any limitation other than
opportunity to contest the expropriation, plead their side, those imposed by the Constitution which
or question the amount of payments fixed by decree, but are: first the taking must be for a public
the decisions, rulings, orders, or resolutions of the NHA use; secondly, the payment of just
are expressly declared as beyond the reach of judicial compensation must be made; and
review. An appeal may be made to the Office of the thirdly, due process must be observed in
President but the courts are completely enjoined from any the making, x x x"
inquiry or participation whatsoever in the expropriation of
the subdivision or its incidents.
The due process clause cannot be rendered nugatory
In J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. Land
every time a specific decree or law orders the Tenure Administration,
expropriation of somebody's property and provides its It is obvious then that a land-owner is
own peculiar manner of taking the same. Neither should covered by the mantle of protection due
the courts adopt a hands-off policy just because the public process affords. It is a mandate of
use has been ordained as existing by the decree or the reason. It frowns on arbitrariness, it is
just compensation has been fixed and determined the antithesis of any governmental act
beforehand by a statute. that smacks of whim or caprice. It
negates state power to act in an
In the instant petitions, there is no showing whatsoever as oppressive manner. It is, as had been
to why the properties involved were singled out for stressed so often, the embodiment of
expropriation through decrees or what necessity impelled the sporting idea of fair play. In that
the particular choices or selections. In expropriations sense, it stands as a guaranty of justice.
through legislation, there are, at least, debates in That is the standard that must be met by
Congress open to the public, scrutiny by individual any governmental agency in the
members of the legislature, and very often, public exercise of whatever competence is
 Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area were
among the sites included.
On December 22, 1978, the President issued
Proclamation No. 1810 declaring all sites Identified by
the Metro Manila local governments and approved by
the Ministry of Human Settlements to be included in the
ZIP upon proclamation of the President. The
Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area were
among the sites included.
The petitioners maintain that the Presidential Decrees
providing for the direct expropriation of the properties in
question violate their constitutional right to due process
and equal protection ofthe law because by the mere
passage of the said decrees their properties were
automatically expropriated and they were immediately
deprived of the ownership and possession thereof
without being given the chance to oppose such
expropriation or to contest the just compensation to
which they are entitled.
The Government as represented by the
Solicitor-General and the NHA, on the other hand,
contends that the power of eminent domain is inherent
in the State and when the legislature itself or the
President through his law-making prerogatives exercise
this power, the public use and public necessity ofthe
expropriation, and the fixing of the just compensation
become political in nature, and the courts must respect
the decision of the law-making body, unless the
legislative decision is clearly and evidently arbitrary,
unreasonable, and devoid of logic and reason; and that
all that is required is that just compensation be
determined with due process of law which does not
necessarily entail judicial process.
32. Home In response to the large number of home foreclosures in
Building 1933, Minnesota passed a law that extended the time
and Loan available for mortgagors to redeem their mortgage from
Assn. v. foreclosures.
Blaisell
- 290 US Respondent applied for an extension of their mortgage
398 - Jenina and the petitioner filed for dismissal of the petition.
Ysabelle M.
Gutierrez
District Court granted the dismissal and Supreme
Court of Minnesota reversed the decision of the District
Court
Petitioner appeals the decision of the Supreme Court of
Minnesota which upheld the constitutionality of Chapter
hearings before the statute is enacted. entrusted to it. As was so emphatically
stressed by the present Chief Justice,
The legislature, according to the Guido case, may not take Acts of Congress, as well as those of the
the property of one citizen and transfer it to another, even Executive, can deny due process only
for a full compensation, when the public interest is not under pain of nullity, x x x.
thereby promoted. The Government still has to prove that
expropriation of commercial properties in order to lease
them out also for commercial purposes would be "public
use" under the Constitution.
The provision of P.D. 1669 which allows NHA, at its sole
option, to put portions of the expropriated area to
commercial use in order to defray the development costs
of its housing projects cannot stand constitutional scrutiny.
P.D. No. 1670 suffers from a similar infirmity. There is no
showing how the President arrived at the conclusion that
the Sunog-Apog area is a blighted community. P.D. Nos.
1669 and 1670 go further. There is no mention of any
market value declared by the owner. Section 6 of the two
decrees peg just compensation at the market value
determined by the City Assessor.
The market value stated by the City Assessor alone
cannot substitute for the court's judgment in expropriation
proceedings. It is violative ofthe due process and the
eminent domain provisions ofthe Constitution to deny to a
property owner that opportunity to prove that the valuation
made by a local assessor is wrong or prejudiced.
SECTION 10
W/N Chapter 339 of the NO. While emergency does not create power, it may Chapter 339 of the Laws of Minnesota of
Laws of Minnesota of furnish the occasion for the exercise of power. The 1933 provides:
1933 was repugnant to constitutional question presented in the light of an ● During the emergency declared
the contract clause emergency is whether the power possessed embraces to exist, relief may be had through
the particular exercise of it in response to particular authorized judicial proceedings
conditions. Though the Constitution upholds the right of with respect to foreclosures of
contracting parties to be free from interference in their mortgages, and execution sales of
contracts, the police power of the state permits real estate
interference under extraordinary conditions (i.e. Great
Depression)
● Sales may be postponed and
periods of redemption may be
· All contracts are subject to the right of eminent domain extended
· Economic interests of the state may justify the exercise of ● Part 1.4: Authorizes the District
339 of the Laws of Minnesota of 1933 its continuing and dominant protective power Court of the county to extend the
notwithstanding interference with contracts. In times of period of redemption from
emergency and extraordinary conditions, the State may foreclosure sales „for such
impose legislation to protect the citizens regardless of the additional time as the court may
private individuals right to contract deem just and equitable. ‟
● The extension is to be
made upon application
to the court, on notice,
for an order determining
the reasonable value of
the income on the
property involved in the
sale, or, if it has no
income, then the
reasonable rental value
of the property, and
directing the mortgagor
'to pay all or a
reasonable part of such
income or rental value, in
or toward the payment of
taxes, insurance,
interest, mortgage ...
indebtedness at such
times and in such
manner' as shall be
determined by the court.

● The section also

provides that the time for
redemption from
foreclosure sales
theretofore made, which
otherwise would expire
less than thirty days after
the approval of the act,
shall be extended to a
date thirty days after its
approval, and
application may be made
to the court within that
time for a further
extension as provided in
the section

● By another provision of
the act, no action, prior
to May 1, 1935, may be
maintained for a
deficiency judgment until
the period of redemption
as allowed by existing
law or as extended
under the provisions of
the act has expired. Prior
to the expiration of the

33. Rutter v. (1953 Case - Post World War 2)
Esteban -
93 PHIL. 68 RA 342 provides that debtors of contracts entered into
- Kat Dela prior to World War 2, and suffered from its ravages have
Paz a period of 8 years to settle their debts upon filing a
claim before the Philippine War Damage Commission.
As a result, their debts could not be enforced until after
the lapse of the said period.
The purpose of the law is to afford to pre-war debtors an
opportunity to rehabilitate themselves by giving them a
reasonable time of 8 years within which to pay their
prewar debts so as to prevent them from being
victimized by their creditors.
extended period of
redemption, the court
may revise or alter the
terms of the extension as
changed circumstances
may require.
(1) W/N the reserved (1) YES. The application of the reserved power of the Home Building and Loan Assn v.
power of the state can State to protect the integrity of the government and the Blaisdell
be limited so as to security of the people should be limited to its proper The protective power of the State, the
prevent impairment of bounds and must be addressed to a legitimate purpose. police power, may only be invoked and
the constitutional right justified by an emergency, temporary in
against impairment of If these bounds are transgressed, there is no room for the nature, and can only be exercised upon
contracts exercise of the power, for the constitutional inhibition reasonable conditions in order that it
against the impairment of contracts would assert itself. may not infringe the constitutional
(2) W/N RA 342 is However, the following are instances by which these provision against impairment of
unconstitutional for bounds may be transgressed: contracts. Laws altering existing
contracts will constitute an
impairing the obligation 1. The impairment should only refer to the remedy
of contracts and not to a substantive right impairment of the contract clause of
the Constitution only if they are
2. State may postpone the enforcement of the
obligation but cannot destroy it by making the unreasonable in the light of the
circumstances occasioning their
remedy futile.
3. Another limitation refers to the propriety of the enactment
remedy. (i.e. the alteration or change that the
new legislation desires to write into an existing
contract must not be burdened with restrictions
and conditions that would make the remedy
hardly pursuing.)
2. YES. These obligations had been pending since 1945
as a result of the issuance of EOs 25 and 32. At present
their enforcement is still inhibited because of the
enactment of RA 342 and would continue to be
unenforceable during the eight-year period. This means
that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least
12 years before they could effect a liquidation of their
investment dating as far back as 1941. This period
seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While
the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be
commended, the relief accorded works injustice to
creditors who are practically left at the mercy of the
debtors.
Since liberation, there has been a wave of reconstruction
and rehabilitation sweeping the country thanks to the aid
of America and the innate progressive spirit of our people.
It can now be safely stated that in the main the financial
condition of our country and our people has practically
returned to normal notwithstanding occasional reverses
caused by local dissidence and the sporadic disturbance
of peace and order in our midst.
In the face of the foregoing observations, the continued
operation and enforcement of RA 342 at the present time
is unreasonable, oppressive and should be declared void.
34. Abella v. June 27, 1960 – Rosalina Perez Abella leased a farm
NLRC - 152 land in Negros Occidental, known as Hacienda
SCRA 140 - Danao-Ramona, for a period of 10 years.
Katrine
Alcantara August 13, 1970 – she opted to extend the lease
contract for another 10 years. During the existence of
the lease, she employed Ricardo Dionele and Romeo
Quitco.
October 5, 1981 - Upon the expiration of her lease,
Abella dismissed Dionele and Quitco and turned over
the Hacienda to the owners who continued the
management, cultivation and operation of the farm.
November 20, 1981 – Dionele and Quinto filed a
complaint against Abella at the Ministry of Labor and
Employment for overtime pay, illegal dismissal and
reinstatement with backwages.
July 16, 1982 – the Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissal
is warranted by the cessation of business but granted
the private respondents separation pay. His legal basis
is BP Blg. 130 which amended Section 15 of Article 284
of the Labor Code.
Abella contends that the provision violates the
constitutional guarantee against impairment of
obligations and contracts, because when she leased
Hacienda Danao-Ramona on June 27, 1960, neither
she nor the lessor contemplated the creation of the
obligation to pay separation pay to workers at the end of
the lease.
35. Presley A complaint for specific performance and damages with
v. Bel-Air preliminary injunction was filed by plaintiff-appellee,
Village Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA for short) against
Asso. - 201 Teofilo Almendras and Rollo Almendras (now both
SCRA 13 - deceased and substituted by defendant-appellant
Kats Enedina Presley) for violation of the Deed Restrictions
Gubatan of Bel-Air Subdivision that the subject house and lot
shall be used only for residential and not for commercial
purposes and for non-payment of association dues to
plaintiff BAVA amounting to P3,803.55.
The Almendrases were the registered owners of a
house and lot located at 102 Jupiter Street, Bel-Air
Village, Makati, Metro Manila. They were members of
plaintiff BAVA pursuant to the Deed Restrictions
annotated in their title (TCT No. 73616) over the
property in question and defendant Presley, as lessee of
the property, is the owner and operator of 'Hot Pan de
Sal Store' located in the same address.
At the time the Almendrases bought their property in
question, the Deed Restrictions was already annotated
in their title providing (among others) 'that the lot must
W/N private YES. The purpose of Article 284 as amended is Anucension v. NLU: All contracts made
respondents are entitled obvious-the protection of the workers whose employment with reference to any matter that is
to separation pay? is terminated because of the closure of establishment and subject to regulation under the police
reduction of personnel. Without said law, employees like power must be understood as made in
private respondents in the case at bar will lose the reference to the possible exercise of that
benefits to which they are entitled — for the thirty three power. Otherwise, important and
years of service in the case of Dionele and fourteen years valuable reforms may be precluded by
in the case of Quitco. the simple device of entering into
contracts for the purpose of doing that
In the implementation and interpretation of the provisions which otherwise maybe prohibited.
of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the
workingman's welfare should be the primordial and Legislation impairing the obligation of
paramount consideration. The policy is to extend the contracts can be sustained when it is
applicability of the decree to a greater number of enacted for the promotion of the general
employees who can avail of the benefits under the good of the people, and when the
law, which is in consonance with the avowed policy of the means adopted must be legitimate, i.e.
State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. within the scope of the reserved power
of the state construed in harmony with
the constitutional limitation of that
power.
To come under the constitutional
prohibition, the law must effect a change
in the rights of the parties with reference
to each other and not with reference to
non-parties.
1. W/N the Deeds of 1. No. The SC held that the provisions of the Deed of
Restrictions annotated Restrictions are in the nature of contractual obligations
in their titles which freely entered into by the parties. Undoubtedly, they are
provide among others, valid and can be enforced against the petitioner. However,
"that the lot must be these contractual stipulations on the use of the land even
used only for residential if said conditions are annotated on the torrens title can be
purposes." should be impaired if necessary to reconcile with the legitimate
enforced. exercise of police power.
2.W/N petitioners Jupiter Street has been highly commercialized since the
should pay the passage of Ordinance No. 81-01. The records indicate
association dues that commercial buildings, offices, restaurants, and stores
amounting to have already sprouted in this area. We, therefore, see no
P3,803.55. reason why the petitioner should be singled out and
prohibited from putting up her hot pan de sal store. Thus,
in accordance with the ruling in the Sangalang case, the
respondent court's decision has to be reversed.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Sangalang case: the SC absolved the Ayala Corporation
primarily owing to our finding that is not liable for the
opening of Jupiter Street to the general public. Insofar as
these petitions are concerned, we likewise exculpate the
 be used only for residential purpose.
When BAVA came to know of the existence of the 'Pan
de sal' store, it sent a letter to the defendants asking
them to desist from operating the store.
Under the existing Deed Restrictions aforesaid, the
entire Bel-Air Subdivision is classified as a purely
residential area, particularly Jupiter Road which is
owned by and registered in the name of BAVA.
The Almendrases had not paid the BAVA membership
dues and assessments. Teofilo Almendras contended
that there was no written contract between him and
appellee BAVA. Only a consensual contract existed
between the parties whereby Almendras regularly pays
his dues and assessments to BAVA for such services as
security, garbage collection and maintenance and repair
of Jupiter Street. However, when the services were
withdrawn BAVA, there was no more reason for the
latter to demand payment of such dues and
assessments.
RTC ruled in favor of BAVA. CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
36. Miners This case was brought about by the change introduced 1. W/N issuance AO 57
Association by Art XII, sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system and 82 of DENR
v. Factoran of exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of the Secretary, in exercise of
- 240 country’s natural resources. The utilization of inalienable his rule making power,
SCRA 100 - lands of public domains through license, concession or tainted with invalidity.
Robynne lease was no longer allowed.
Lopez 2. W/N the AOs violates
The concept of Jura regalia, recognition of the the non-impairment of
importance of the natural resources fro economic contracts
development, security and national defense, ushered
the adoption of the policy of full control and supervision
by the state in the EDU of the natural resources.
The options open to the state are:
1. Direct undertaking
2. Entering into co-production, joint venture(JV), or
production-sharing agreements, or entering into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations for large
scale EDU.
To implement legislative acts issued by the president,
Sec. Of DENR promulgated AO 57 and 82. Pres.
Aquino, in exercise of her legislative power,
promulgated EO 211 prescribing the procedures in
processing and approval of applications for the EDU of
minerals to insure the continuity of mining operations
and activities.
private respondents, not only because of the fact that
Jupiter Street is not covered by the restrictive easements
based on the 'deed restrictions' but chiefly because the
National Government itself, through the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC), had reclassified Jupiter Street into a
'high density commercial (C-3) zone, pursuant to its
Ordinance No. 81-01 Hence, the petitioners have no
cause of action on the strength alone of the said deed
restrictions.
2. This issue is now moot and academic after petitioner
Presley purchased the property subject of lease from the
Almendrases and settled all association dues.
1. NO, the AOs issued by the Secretary is valid and United States v. Tupasi Molina: the
consistent with EO 211 and 279 regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department
The reliance of the petitioners on PD 463 is erroneous. PD must be in harmony with the provisions
463 pertains to the old system of EDU of natural of the law, and for the sole purpose of
resources through license, concessions or lease has been carrying into effect its general
disallowed by the present constitution. EO 279 repealed provisions.
all mining laws that are inconsistent with it such as PD
463. People v Maceren: An administrative
agency cannot amend an act of
Art XII, sec 2 of the Constitution explicitly ordains that the Congress. The rule or regulation should
exploration, development and utilization of natural be within the scope of the statutory
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of authority granted by the legislature to
the State. the administrative agency. In case of
discrepancy between the basic law and
a rule or regulation issued to implement
There is no clear showing that DERN secretary has said law, the basic prevails because said
transcended the bounds demarcated by EO 279 for the rule or regulations cannot go beyond the
exercise of his rule making power. Said EO expressly terms and provisions of the basic law
authorizes said official to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to effectively implement
its provisions. The subject sought to be governed and Ramas v CAR and Ramos: obligations
regulated by the questioned orders is germane to the of contracts must yield to a proper
objects and purposes of Executive Order No. 279 exercise of the police power when such
specifically issued to carry out the mandate of Article XII, power is exercised to preserve the
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. security of the State and the means
adopted are reasonably adapted to the
accomplishment of that end and are,
2. No, there is no violation of the non-impairment therefore, not arbitrary or oppressive.
clause
 Pres. Aquino promulgated EO 279 authorizing DENR
secretary to negotiate and conclude JV, co-production,
production-sharing agreements for the EDU, and
prescribe guidelines for such agreements.
AO 57, Article 9: all existing mining leases or
agreements which were granted after the effectivity of
the 1987 Constitution, except small scale mining leases
and those of sand and gravel and quarry resources
covering an area of 20 hectares or less, shall be
converted into production-sharing agreement within 1
year of the effectiveness of the guidelines.
AO 82, sec 3: enumerates the persons or entities
required to submit Letter of Intent (LOI) and Mineral
Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) w/in 2 years
from effectivity of AO 57. Failure to do so w/in prescribed
period shall cause the abandonment of the claims.
Due to the AOs, Miner’s Association of the Philippines
Inc (MAPI) filed the petition assailing their validity and
constitutionality. MAPI contends DENR secretary
exceeded rule-making power in issuing AOs. If the AOs
dont conform with the EOs, it violates the
non-impairment of contracts because it unduly
pre-terminate existing mining leases and other
agreements, automatically converting it to
production-sharing.
The court issued TRO enjoining implementation of
AOs..
37. Ortigas Plaintiffs ("Ortigas, Madrigal y Cia") engaged in real
v. Feati estate business, developing and selling lots to the
Bank – 94 public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along
SCRA 533 - Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong, Rizal. On
Rudolf de March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla
Luna y Angeles and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered
into separate agreements of sale on installments over
two parcels of land, known as Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block
31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision. The said Vendees
transferred their rights to Emma Chavez.
It is of no moment that the AOs unduly pre-terminate
existing mining leases in general. Article XII, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution does not apply retroactively to
"license, concession or lease" granted by the government
under the 1973 Constitution or before the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution.
AO 57, art 9 applies only to all existing mining leases or
agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution pursuant to EO 211. In text of EO 211.
211, there is a reservation clause which provides that the
privileges as well as the terms and conditions of all
existing mining leases or agreements granted after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to EO 211,
shall be subject to any and all modifications or alterations
which Congress may adopt pursuant to Article XII, Section
2 of the 1987 Constitution
The non-impairment of contract to not apply to the mining
leases granted after effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
Regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or
agreements granted by the State, are subject to
alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police
power of the State
EDU of the natural resources are matters of vital to public
interest and general welfare of the people. The State, in
the exercise of its police power, may not be precluded by
the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract
from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases
or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No.
463.
Nowhere in AO 57 is any provision which lead us to
conclude that the order authorizes the automatic
conversion of mining leases and agreements granted
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. The provision
in AO 57, art. 9 could not possibility contemplate a
unilateral declaration on the part of the Government that
all existing mining leases and agreements are
automatically converted into production-sharing
agreements.
1. W/N 1. Yes. the validity of the said resolution was never "1. The parcel of land subject of this
Resolution No. 27 questioned before it. The rule is that the question of law or deed of sale shall be used by the Buyer
s-1960 is a valid of fact which may be included in the appellant's exclusively for residential purposes, and
exercise of police assignment must be those which have been raised in the she shall not be entitled to take or
power? court below, and are within the issues framed by the remove soil, stones or gravel from it or
parties. In this particular case, the validity of the resolution any other lots belonging to the Seller.
2. W/N the said was admitted, at least impliedly, in the stipulation of facts
Resolution can nullify below, when plaintiff appellant did not dispute the same. 2. All buildings and other improvements
or supersede the (except the fence) which may be con
contractual 2. With regard to the contention that said resolution structed at any time in said lot must be,
obligations assumed cannot nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the (a) of strong materials and properly
 Upon completion of payment of the purchase price, the
plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in
favor of Emma Chavez. Stipulation on the last column.
Eventually, Emma Chavez sold the lots to Feati Bank.
On or about May 5,1963, defendant-appellee began
laying the foundation and commenced the construction
of a building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to
banking purposes, but which defendant-appellee claims
could also be devoted to, and used exclusively for,
residential purposes. The following day
plaintiff-appellant demanded in writing that
defendant-appellee stop the construction of the
commercial building on the said lots. The latter refused
to comply with the demand; contending that the building
was being constructed in accordance with the zoning
regulations, defendant-appellee having filed building
and planning permit applications with the Municipality of
Mandaluyong.
The trial court upheld the defendant appellee and
dismissed the complaint, holding that the subject
restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution
No. 2. It predicated its conclusion on the exercise of
police power of the said municipality, and stressed that
private interest should "bow down to general interest
and welfare.
38. Juarez BP 887 was enacted to regulate rental rates,
v. CA – 214 especially in urban areas. It prevents the lessor from
SCRA 475 - arbitrarily increasing the rentals and, at the same
Nathalie Uy time, prevents the lessee from insisting on paying
inordinately low rentals. The law covered all
residential units with a monthly rental less than Php
480 and applied retroactively.
39. Post Martial Law, petitioner TADECO was ordered to
Hacienda setup a stock distribution plan for farmers of hacienda l.
Luisita v. HLI converted sections of the hacienda for different
by defendant-appellee referring to the restrictions painted, (b) provided with modern
defendant-appellee? incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the sanitary installations connected either to
corresponding TCT issued to defendant appellee it should the public sewer or to an approved
be stressed, that while non impairment of contracts is septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, distance of less than two (2) meters from
since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate its boundary lines."
exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people."
W/N the retroactive The contract clause was particularly useful before in
application of the law protecting the integrity of private agreements from
would violate the government meddling, but hat was when the said
impairment clause. agreements did not affect the community in general.
However, as of the moment more and more interest of
the public have become involved in what are supposed
to be still private agreements, which as a result, have
been removed from the protection of the contract
clause. Instead, the agreements have come within the
embrace of police power. As long as the contract
affects the public welfare in one way or another so as
to require the interference of the State, then police
power must be asserted and the same will prevail over
the contract clause, in the absence of arbitrariness.
In this case, the SC pointed out that “housing” is one of
the most serious social problems of the country and
the lease of residential units affects the public welfare,
which calls for the exercise of police power.
(For Section 10) Main held (short version; incase ma’m asks; Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services,
concerns mostly sec. 9) Inc.
Land transferred to government to SCTEX is excluded The prohibition against impairment of
PARC – 653 purposes. Petitioner filed to revoke the stock distribution
SCRA option agreement, and DAR recommended that SDO be
154 - Bryce cancelled and lands be placed under compulsory
King coverage of CARP.
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted
unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed
by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the
resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock
Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in
Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of
the government.
The Court however did not order outright land
distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are
operative facts that occurred in the interim and which
the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court
declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by
application of the operative fact principle, give way to
the right of the original 6,296 qualified
farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether
they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose
actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule
meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them
the effects, consequences and legal or practical
implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be
asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the
ballot, signing their signatures or placing their
thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed
names.”
40. Goldenway Merchandising Corp v. Equitable PC
W/N it violates section from compulsory agrarian reform coverage as this was the obligation of contracts is aligned with
10 exercised through government power of eminent domain. the general principle that laws newly
HLI is entitled to just compensation that will be transferred
enacted have only a prospective
to DAR to distribution to farmers. Date of taking is when operation, and cannot affect acts or
PARC approved the stock distribution plan. contracts already perfected; however,
as to laws already in existence, their
Section 10 provisions are read into contracts and
No, The broad sweep of HLI’s argument ignores certain deemed a part thereof. Thus, the
established legal precepts and must, therefore, be non-impairment clause under Section
rejected. 10, Article III is limited in application to
laws about to be enacted that would in
any way derogate from existing acts or
A law authorizing interference, when appropriate, in the contracts by enlarging, abridging or in
contractual relations between or among parties is deemed any manner changing the intention of
read into the contract and its implementation cannot the parties thereto.
successfully be resisted by force of the non-impairment
guarantee. There is, in that instance, no impingement of
the impairment clause, the non-impairment protection
being applicable only to laws that derogate prior acts or Brion Separate Concurring
contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner The SDOA/SDP is neither a statute nor
changing the intention of the parties. Impairment, in fine, an executive issuance but, as
obtains if a subsequent law changes the terms of a mentioned, is a contract between the
contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, FWBs and the landowners. A contract
dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws existing stands on a different plane than a statute
remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties. or an executive issuance. When a
Necessarily, the constitutional proscription would not contract is contrary to law, it is
apply to laws already in effect at the time of contract deemed void ab initio. It produces no
execution, as in the case of RA 6657, in relation to DAO legal effects whatsoever. Contracts do
10, vis-à-vis HLI’s SDOA. not carry any presumption of
constitutionality or legality. For this
Further, although the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01 reason, the operative fact doctrine
states that it revokes or recalls the SDP, what it actually applies only to a declaration of
revoked or recalled was the PARC’s approval of the SDP unconstitutionality of a statute or an
embodied in Resolution No. 89-12-2. Consequently, what executive rulemaking issuance,
was actually declared null and void was an executive act, conferring legitimacy upon past acts or
PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2,and not a contract (SDOA). omissions done in reliance thereof prior
It is, therefore, wrong to say that it was the SDOA which to the declaration of its invalidity; the
was annulled in the instant case. Evidently, the operative statute or the executive issuance, before
fact doctrine is applicable. its invalidity, was an operative fact to
which legal consequences attached.
To extend this same principle to an
unconstitutional or illegal contract would
be to invite chaos into our legal system.
It will make the parties a law unto
themselves, allowing them to enter into
contracts whose effects will anyway be
recognized as legal even if the contracts
are subsequently voided by the courts.
From this perspective, the operative fact
doctrine that applies to unconstitutional
statutes is clearly not relevant to the
present case.
Jill Kathryn Lao
41. Pryce FOR CLARITY, I added this - Corporate W/N Respondent NO. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment
Corp v. rehabilitation is intended to enable a distressed China Banking of obligations is limited by the exercise of the police
China corporation to gain a new lease on life, and to Corporation is correct power of the State for the common good of the
Banking
continue its business as a going concern. when it contended general public.
Corp, GR
172302, Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of that the rehabilitation
Feb 18, corporate life and activities in an effort to restore plan’s approval Successful rehabilitation of a distressed
2014 - and reinstate the corporation to its former position impaired the corporation will benefit its debtors, creditors,
Jenina of successful operation and solvency.” obligations of employees, and the economy in general. The court
Ysabelle M. contracts. may approve a rehabilitation plan even over the
Gutierrez The present case originated from a petition for opposition of creditors holding a majority of the total
corporate rehabilitation filed by petitioner Pryce liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the
Corporation on July 9, 2004 with the RTC Makati, rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible and the
Branch 138. On September 13, 2004, the opposition of the creditors is manifestly
rehabilitation court gave due course to the petition unreasonable. The rehabilitation plan, once
and directed the rehabilitation receiver to evaluate approved, is binding upon the debtor and all
and give recommendations on petitioner Pryce persons who may be affected by it, including the
Corporation’s proposed rehabilitation plan creditors, whether or not such persons have
attached to its petition. participated in the proceedings or have opposed
the plan or whether or not their claims have been
The rehabilitation receiver did not approve scheduled.
this plan and submitted instead an amended
rehabilitation plan, which the rehabilitation Rather than let struggling corporations slip and
court approved by order dated January 17, vanish, the better option is to allow commercial
2005. In its disposition, the court found petitioner courts to come in and apply the process for
Pryce Corporation "eligible to be placed in a state corporate rehabilitation.
of corporate rehabilitation." The disposition
likewise identified the assets to be held and
disposed of by petitioner Pryce Corporation and
the manner by which its liabilities shall be paid
and liquidated.

On February 23, 2005, respondent China Banking

Corporation elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals. Its petition questioned the January 17,
2005 order that included the following terms:

1. The indebtedness to China Banking

Corporation and Bank of the Philippine Islands as
well as the long term commercial papers will be
paid through a dacion en pago of developed real
estate assets of the petitioner.
xxxx
4. All accrued penalties are waived.
5. Interests shall accrue only up to July 13, 2004,
the date of issuance of the stay order.
6. No interest will accrue during the pendency of
petitioner’s corporate rehabilitation.
7. Dollar-denominated loans will be converted to
Philippine Pesos on the date of the issuance of
this Order using the reference rate of the
Philippine Dealing System as of this date.

Respondent China Banking Corporation

contended that the rehabilitation plan’s approval
impaired the obligations of contracts. It argued
that neither the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 902-A nor the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation
(Interim Rules) empowered commercial
courts "to render without force and effect
valid contractual stipulations." Moreover, the
plan’s approval authorizing dacion en pago of
petitioner Pryce Corporation’s properties
without respondent China Banking
Corporation’s consent not only violated
"mutuality of contract and due process, but
[was] also antithetical to the avowed policies
of the state to maintain a competitive financial
system."

The Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), another

creditor of petitioner Pryce Corporation, filed a
separate petition with the Court of Appeals
assailing the same order by the rehabilitation
court.

On July 28, 2005, the Court of Appeals Seventh

(7th) Division granted respondent China Banking
Corporation's petition, and reversed and set aside
the rehabilitation court’s

With respect to BPI’s separate appeal, the Court

of Appeals First (1st) Division granted its petition
initially and set aside the January 17, 2005 order
of the rehabilitation court in its decision dated May
3, 2006

Petitioner Pryce filed motion for reconsideration.