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Rule 43 and Rule 45 Case Digests|Block 4401|Batch 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS
(14) ARGOVAN VS. SAN MIGUEL CORP .................................................. 2
(15) JOSE LUIS ANGEL B. OROSA VS. ALBERTO C. ROA ...................... 4
(16) ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME V. NLRC ....................................... 5
(18) ABBOTT LABORATORIES PHILIPPINES, INC. VS. ABBOTT LABORATORIES

APPELLATE EMPLOYEES UNION ......................................................................... 7


(19) CEU FACULTY UNION VS. COURT OF APPEALS.................................... 8
(20) CHED V. MERCADO ................................................................. 9
(21) SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION VS. COURT OF APPEALS ...................... 12

PRACTICE CASE (22) DELOSO VS. MARAPAO, G.R. NO. 144244, NOVEMBER 11, 2005.......... 13
(23) B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC. V. ALZUL ................................................. 15
(24) MANIEBO VS CA..................................................................... 16

DIGESTS
(25)VERGEL DE DIOS VS CA ............................................................ 17
(26) VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD VS. ............................................ 19
RULE 45 .................................................................................. 21
(01) FAT KEE COMPUTER SYSTEMS V. ONLINE NETWORKS

RULE 43-45
INTERNATIONAL ........................................................................ 21
(2) TAY CHUN SUY VS. COURT OF APPEALS ............................................ 22
(3) PRODUCERS BANK V. EXCELSA ...................................................... 23
(4) UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES .................................................. 24
(5) STEELCASE, INC. V. DESIGN INTERNATIONAL SELECTIONS, INC. .............. 26
(6) ESTORES V SUPANGAN .......................................................... 27
(7)DALTON VS. FGR REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION .................... 29

BLOCK4401
(8) PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK V. SPS. ANGELITO PEREZ AND JOCELYN
PEREZ...................................................................................... 29
(9) RGM INDUSTRIES, INC. V. UNITED PACIFIC CAPITAL CORPORATION
.............................................................................................. 31
(10) SARONA V NLRC .................................................................... 32
(11) SPOUSES STA. MARIA VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES FAJARDO...... 33
(12) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DPWH V.
ORTIGAS AND COMPANY ............................................................. 35
(13) ALTRES V. EMPLEO .................................................................. 36
(14) ALONSO VS. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB INC, ......................................... 38
(15) MENDOZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS ................................................ 38

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RULE 43 Facts: Petitioner Spouses Argovan Gaditano (Argovan) and Florida


(14) Argovan vs. San Miguel Corp Gaditano (Florida), who were engaged in the business of buying and
G.R. No. 188767. July 24, 2013 selling beer and softdrink products, purchased beer products from
By: Radovan San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in the amount of P285,504.00. on 7
April 2000. Petitioners paid through a check signed by Florida
Doctrine: The Court of Appeals is clothed with jurisdiction to review and drawn against Argovan’s AsiaTrust Bank Current Account.
the resolution issued by the Secretary of the Department of Justice The check was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient
(DOJ) through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of funds. This prompted SMC to file a criminal case for violation of Batas
Court albeit solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa against petitioners.
committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction. Petitioners claimed that on, the date when they issued the
check to SMC, their joint savings account had a balance of
Summary: Petitioners Sps.Argovan (Argovan and Florida) purchased P330, 353.17. According to Petitioners a certain Fatima borrowed
beer products from SMC in the amount of P285,504.00. Petitioners P30,000 from Florida. As payment for the said loan, Fatima delivered
paid through a check signed by Florida and drawn against Argovan’s a check payable to Florida in the amount of P378,000. Florida pointed
AsiaTrust Bank Current Account. The check was dishonored thus SMC out that the amount of the check was in excess of the loan but she
filed a criminal case for violation of B.P.22 and estafa against was assured by Fatima that the check was in order and the proceeds
petitioners. Petitioners claimed that on, the date when they issued would be used for the payroll of AOWA Electronics. Florida deposited
the check to SMC, their joint savings account had a balance of P330, said check to her joint AsiaTrust Savings Account which she
353.17. However the bank unlawfully garnished and debited their maintained with her husband, Argovan. The check was cleared on
bank accounts when a check in the amount of P378,000.00 which March 6, 2000 and petitioners’ joint savings account was
was cleared by the bank, but after a month such was declared by the subsequently credited with the sum of P378,000.00. Florida initially
bank to not have been cleared due to a material alteration. paid P83,000.00 to Fatima. She then withdrew P295,000.00 from her
Petitioners filed a civil case against the bank and Fatima, the issuer of joint savings account and turned over the amount to Fatima. Fatima
the check. Petitioners argue that the civil case constitute a bar in turn paid her loan to Florida.
to the prosecution of the criminal case for violation of Batas However on April 13,2000, Guevarra, the Bank Manager of
Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa filed by SMC. SMC filed a motion AsiaTrust Bank, advised Florida that the check for P378,000.00,
for reconsideration before the Office of the Prosecutor. Thereafter the same check handed to her by Fatima, was not cleared due to a
SMC filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review material alteration in the name of the payee. Guevarra explained
challenging the Resolutions of the Office of the Prosecutor. Thereafter further that the check was allegedly drawn payable to LG
SMC went up to the Court of Appeals by filling a petition for certiorari. Collins Electronics, and not to her, contrary to Fatima’s
Issue: Whether certiorari is the correct mode of appeal to the Court representation. AsiaTrust Bank then garnished the
of Appeals? Yes, The Court of Appeals is clothed with jurisdiction to P378,000.00 from the joint savings account of petitioners
review the resolution issued by the Secretary of the Department of without any court order. Consequently, the check issued by
Justice (DOJ) through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the petitioners to SMC was dishonored having been drawn against
Rules of Court albeit solely on the ground that the Secretary of insufficient funds. Thereafter, Petitioners filed a civil action
Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess case, for specific performance and damages against AsiaTrust
or lack of jurisdiction. Bank, Guevarra, SMC and Fatima. Petitioners assert that the
issues they have raised in the civil action constitute a bar to
the prosecution of the criminal case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa. The Office of the Prosecutor

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recommended that the criminal proceedings be suspended Court albeit solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice
pending resolution of Civil Case No. Q-00-42386. committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction.
SMC filed a motion for reconsideration before the Office of the
Prosecutor but it was denied for lack of merit. Thereafter SMC filed In Alcaraz v. Gonzalez, we stressed that the Investigating Prosecutor
with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review challenging is subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary who exercises the power
the Resolutions of the Office of the Prosecutor. The DOJ then of control and supervision over said Investigating Prosecutor; and
dismissed the petition. SMC filed a motion for reconsideration, which who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of such
the DOJ Secretary denied. Undaunted, SMC went up to the Court of prosecutor. Thus, while the Court of Appeals may review the
Appeals by filling a petition for certiorari. resolution of the Justice Secretary, it may do so only in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, solely on the ground
CA: Granted SMC’s petition. Drew a distinction between the civil case, that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion
which is an action for specific performance, and damages involving amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction.
petitioners’ joint savings account, and the criminal case which is an Also, in Tan v. Matsuura, we held that while the findings of
action for estafa/violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 involving prosecutors are reviewable by the DOJ, this does not preclude courts
Argovan’s current account. from intervening and exercising our own powers of review with
respect to the DOJ’s findings. In the exceptional case in which grave
Hence this petition for review wherein Petitioners contend abuse of discretion is committed, as when a clear sufficiency or
that SMC’s resort to certiorari under Rule 65 was an improper insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause is
remedy because the DOJ’s act of sustaining the investigating ignored, the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case via a
prosecutor’s resolution to suspend the criminal proceedings petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
due to a valid prejudicial question was an error in judgment
and not of jurisdiction. Petitioners further assert that We agree with the Court of Appeals that the DOJ abused its
nevertheless, an error of judgment is not correctible by discretion when it affirmed the prosecutor’s suspension of the
certiorari when SMC had a plain, speedy and adequate criminal investigation due to the existence of an alleged
remedy, which was to file an appeal to the Office of the prejudicial question.
President.
2. No, the resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not
Issues: determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
investigation against them. In this case The material facts
1. Whether certiorari is the correct mode of appeal to the surrounding the civil case bear no relation to the criminal
Court of Appeals? - YES investigation being conducted by the prosecutor. The prejudicial
question in the civil case involves the dishonor of another check. SMC
2. Whether a prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of is not privy to the nature of the alleged materially altered check
the criminal proceedings? – No. leading to its dishonor and the eventual garnishment of petitioners’
savings account. On the other hand, the issue in the preliminary
Held: investigation is whether petitioners issued a bad check to SMC for the
payment of beer products.
1. YES. The Court of Appeals is clothed with jurisdiction to
review the resolution issued by the Secretary of the DOJ
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of

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(15) JOSE LUIS ANGEL B. OROSA vs. ALBERTO C. ROA


By: Kaye Petitioner seasonably moved for a reconsideration but his motion was
denied. Therefrom, petitioner went to the CA on a petition for
Doctrine: The exclusion of the DOJ from the list under Section 1 of review under Rule 43, but was dismissed on the ground that the
Rule 43 is deliberate, being in consonance with the constitutional Prosecution Office and the DOJ are not among the quasi-judicial
power of control lodged in the President over executive departments, agencies included in Section 1 of Rule 43 whose final orders or
bureaus and offices. Notably, the provision includes the Office of the resolutions are subject to review by the CA.
President in the agencies named therein, thereby accentuating the
fact that appeals from rulings of department heads must first be Issue: Is a petition for review under Rule 43 a proper mode of
taken to and resolved by that office before any appellate recourse appeal from a resolution of the Secretary of Justice directing the
may be resorted to. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of prosecutor to withdraw an information in a criminal case?
administrative remedies is that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is
available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted Held: NO, recourse from the decision of the Secretary of Justice
to before resort can be made to the courts. should be to the President, instead of the CA, under the established
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Facts: Petitioner and respondent are both dentists. Petitioner filed a
complaint-affidavit charging respondent with the crime of libel, which Rule 43 governs all appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and quasi-
stemmed from an article entitled "Truth vs. Rumors: Questions judicial bodies to the CA. As may be noted, the DOJ is not among the
against Dr. Orosa" written by respondent and published in the Dental agencies expressly enumerated under Section 1 of Rule 43. Its
Trading Post. The article delved into the possibility of an examiner in absence from the list of agencies mentioned thereunder does not, by
the licensure examination where his sons were examinees, this fact alone, already imply its exclusion from the coverage of said
manipulating the examinations or the results thereof to enable his Rule. This is because said Section 1 uses the phrase "among these
children to top the same. In his complaint-affidavit, petitioner alleged agencies," thereby implying that the enumeration made is not
that the article in question is defamatory as it besmirched his honor exclusive of the agencies therein listed.
and reputation as a dentist and as the topnotcher in the dental board
examinations in 1994. Respondent denied the accusation, claiming There is compelling reason to believe, however, that the exclusion of
that the article constitutes a "fair and accurate report on a matter of the DOJ from the list is deliberate, being in consonance with the
both public and social concern." constitutional power of control lodged in the President over executive
departments, bureaus and offices. This power of control, which even
Pasig City Prosecutor issued a Resolution, dismissing petitioner's Congress cannot limit, let alone withdraw, means the power of the
complaint on the ground that the publication is a bona fide Chief Executive to review, alter, modify, nullify, or set aside what a
communication on matters of public concern, and made without subordinate, e.g., members of the Cabinet and heads of line
malice. agencies, had done in the performance of their duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. Acting on the appeal, Chief State
Prosecutor set aside the findings of the City Prosecutor and directing The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
the latter to file an Information for libel against respondent. that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the
administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can
Respondent appealed to the Secretary of Justice. The Justice be made to the courts. Notably, Section 1, of Rule 43 includes the
Secretary reversed the Chief State Prosecutor’s Resolution and Office of the President in the agencies named therein, thereby
directed the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information earlier accentuating the fact that appeals from rulings of department heads
filed with the RTC.

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must first be taken to and resolved by that office before any appellate was denied by the NLRC in its resolution for lack of merit, hence the
recourse may be resorted to. present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion.
(16) ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME v. NLRC
G.R. No. 130866. September 16, 1998. Issue: Whether or not appeals from the NLRC should be initially filed
By: Apol Samson in the Supreme Court by petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.

Doctrine: All references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to Held: NO! All such petitions should be initially filed in the Court of
supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts
interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should
henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict Article 302 of the Labor Code (now, Article 223) thereof also granted
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the
appropriate forum for the relief desired. NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently
amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate
Facts: The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint review has since then been provided for. Under the present state of
for illegal dismissal filed by respondent before the NLRC. Respondent the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the
alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner NLRC. The present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of
St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall
contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the
was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory after ten
1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.
misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by
petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the BIR. Petitioner on the The remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for
other hand claims that respondent was not its employee but only the reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent
uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin’s Funeral remedy, and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of
Home. Respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas certiorari under Rule 65, for which said Rule has now fixed the
contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision.
Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, respondent Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of
voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business. the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of
The mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter took over the the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take
management of the business. Amelita then made some changes in cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due
the business operation and respondent and his wife were no longer process considerations if filed within the reglementary period under
allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, Rule 65.
the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally
terminated his employment. Labor arbiter rendered a decision in Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, a
favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-employee relationship review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902
existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the course of
jurisdiction over the case. Respondent appealed to the NLRC. NLRC the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology
rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial
remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the
proceedings. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which

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Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the The instant petition for certiorari is hereby remanded, and all
intended mode of review. pertinent records thereof ordered to be forwarded, to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the
Whatever benefits that can be derived from the expansion of the views and ruling herein set forth.
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas (17) National Federation of Labor v Laguesma
Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its coverage the “decisions G.R. No. 123426. March 10, 1999.*
and interlocutory orders issued under the Labor Code of the Roma
Philippines and by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Among
the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme DOCTRINE: The remedy of an aggrieved party (from the adverse
Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to eliminate decision of the Secretary of Labor) is to timely file a motion for
the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally, extends the reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent
coverage of appellate review of the Court of Appeals in the decisions remedy, and then seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Commission, and the Employees Compensation Commission to
reduce the number of cases elevated to the Supreme Court. FACTS:
A petition for certification election (CE) among the rank and file
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since employees of Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Work, Inc. was filed by
appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the the Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization (ANGLO-
legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari KMU). Forced-intervenor National Federation of Labor (NFL) moved
was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of for the dismissal of the petition on grounds that petitioner has no
the NLRC. The use of the word “appeal” in relation thereto and in the legal personality to file the present petition for certification election
instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because and that it failed to comply with the 25% consent requirement. It
appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both stressed that ANGLO-KMU is not a legitimate labor organization at the
modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The time of the filing of the petition and that it’s submission of the
important distinction between them, however, and with which the mandatory requirements after the freedom period would not cure the
Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action of defect of the petition. The Med-Arbiter ruled in favor of NFL and
certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court dismissed the petition. On appeal, respondent Undersecretary
and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that Laguesma, by authority of the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not set aside the Med-Arbiter’s resolution. NFL thus filed the present
subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court.
in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
ISSUE: WON NFL properly resorted to a remedy of Rule 65 certiorari
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to before the SC
supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are
interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for HELD:
certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should No. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for the case’s
henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict proper disposition.
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired. In San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor, the SC ruled: “It is
generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising

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quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in the (18) Abbott Laboratories Philippines, Inc. vs. Abbott
courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and Laboratories Employees Union
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute. GR 131374 January 26, 2000
Considering the above dictum and as affirmed by decisions of this Digest by Valencia, Emmanuelle Nicole
Court, St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC succinctly pointed out, the
remedy of an aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for Doctrine:
reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent The special civil action for certiorari should be instituted within a
remedy, and then seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari period of sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Considering that the special civil resolution sought to be assailed.
action of certiorari under Rule 65 is within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, all such Facts:
petitions should be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict Abbott Laboratories is a corporation engaged in the
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. While appeal manufacture and distribution of pharmaceutical drugs. On 22
did not lie, the corrective power of this Court by a writ of certiorari February 1996, the Abbott Laboratories Employees Union (ALEU) filed
was available whenever a jurisdictional issue was raised or one of an application for union registration with the Department of Labor
grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess thereof. and Employment. ALEU claimed that it is a labor organization
consisting of 30 rank and file employees in the manufacturing unit of
(Re: appeals to the President) Abbott, and that there was no certified bargaining agent in the unit
P.D. No. 1367 eliminated appeals to the President, but gave the that it sought to represent (manufacturing unit).
President the power to assume jurisdiction over any cases which he On 28 February 1996, ALEU’s application was approved by
considered national interest cases. The subsequent P.D. No. 1391, the Bureau of Labor Relations, and a Certificate of Registration was
further eliminated appeals from the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor issued in its favor, thus making ALEU a legitimate labor organization.
but the President still continued to exercise his power to assume On 2 April 1996, Abbott filed a petition for cancellation of
jurisdiction over any cases which he considered national interest ALEU’s registration. Abbott assailed the certificate since ALEU’s
cases. application was not signed by at least 20% of the total 286 rank and
file employees of the entire employer unit, and because it failed to
(Re: time to file Rule 65 petition) submit copies of its books of account.
Like decisions of the NLRC which under Art. 223 of the Labor Code On 21 June 1996, the Regional Director of the Bureau of
become final after ten (10) days, decisions of the Secretary of Labor Labor Relations cancelled ALEU’s registrations certificate. It had
come to the SC by way of a petition for certiorari even beyond the adopted the 13 June 1996 findings of the Med-Arbiter in its decision,
ten-day period provided in the Labor Code and the implementing stating that ALEU had failed to show that the rank and file employees
rules but within the reglementary period set for Rule 65 petitions of the manufacturing unit were bound by a common interest to justify
under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. the formation of a bargaining unit that was separate and distinct from
those belonging to the sales and office staff units. Therefore, the
bargaining unit should have been comprised of the 286 rank and file
employees of the employer unit.
On 19 August 1996, ALEU appealed the cancellation to the
office of the Secretary of the DOLE. The case was referred to the
director of the BLR. On 31 March 1997, the BLR reversed the
decision of the Regional Director. It cited Art. 234 of the Labor Code,
which does not require proof of the desirability of more than one
bargaining unit within an employer unit; that the issue of

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appropriateness cannot be raised in a cancellation proceeding; and Under Sec. 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court
that the one bargaining unit - one employer policy must not be the special civil action for certiorari should be instituted within a
interpreted in a manner that would trample the employee’s rights to period of sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
self organization and freedom of association. resolution sought to be assailed. Abbott received the decision of the
On 31 March 1997, Abbott filed a Motion for BLR on 14 April 1997 and the order denying its motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied on 9 July 1997. Thereafter, Abbott reconsideration of the said decision on 16 July 1997. The present
appealed to the Secretary of the DOLE. petition was only filed on 28 November 1997, after the laps of more
On 19 September 1997, the Secretary of the DOLE wrote a than four months. Thus, for failure to avail of the correct remedy
letter stating that it refused to act on Abbott’s appeal because it has within the period provided by law, the decision of the BLR has
no jurisdiction to review the decision of the BLR on appeals in become final and executory.
cancellation cases emanating from the Regional Offices. It claimed
that the decision of the BLR is final and executory. The Secretary (19) CEU Faculty Union vs. Court of Appeals
further stated that “since your office has already filed a motion for G.R. No. 165486. May 31, 2006
reconsideration with the BLR, which has been denied … your recourse By: Alba, Ma. Angela
should have been a special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme
Court.” Doctrine: Decisions of the voluntary arbitrator under the Labor Code
are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Does the Secretary of the DOLE have the power to review the The voluntary arbitrator is a government instrumentality within the
decisions of the BLR rendered in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction contemplation of Section 9 of B.P. 129 which provides for the
over decisions of the Regional Director in cases involving cancellation appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The decisions of the
of certificate of registration of a labor union? voluntary arbitrator are akin to those of the Regional Trial Court, and,
therefore, should first be appealed to the Court of Appeals before
Ruling / Ratio: being elevated to the Supreme Court.
NO.
The appellate jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DOLE is Facts: Petitioner filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation
limited only to a review of cancellation proceedings decided by the Board a preventive mediation for the recovery of IP losses due to the
BLR in the exercise of its exclusive and original jurisdiction. The university’s alleged deduction of the cost of CBA-won economic
Secretary has no jurisdiction over decisions of the BLR rendered in benefits from the 70% share of the teachers and employees in the IP.
the exercise of its appellate power to review the decision of the Petitioner asserts that the integrated IP granted in the CBAs should
Regional Director. not be deducted from the personnel’s 70% share in the IP. Petitioner
In the instant case, upon the cancellation of respondent contends that the deduction of the IP integration from the 70% share
union’s registration by the Regional Office, respondent union of tuition fee increase is illegal and contrary to the CBA, as the IP
incorrectly appealed said decision to the Office of the Secretary. integration in the salary is considered a CBA-won increase, hence,
Nevertheless, this situation was immediately rectified when the Office may not be deducted from the 70%. Petitioner hinges its contentions
of the Secretary motu proprio referred the appeal to the BLR. on R.A. 6728, otherwise known as the “Government Assistance To
However, upon reversal by the BLR of the decision of the Regional Students and Teachers in Private Education Act.” R.A. 6728 allows
Office cancelling registration, petitioner should have immediately private schools to increase their tuition fees on the condition that
elevated the BLR decision to the Supreme Court in a special civil 70% of the tuition fee increases shall go to the payment of salaries,
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. wages, allowances an other benefits of teaching and non-teaching
personnel.

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In his decision, Voluntary Arbitrator Mangabat upheld the position of appeal. In addition, an independent action for certiorari may be
respondent university and dismissed the case. Petitioner elevated the availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
case to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari under Rule 65. adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. There was no
The appellate court dismissed the petition on the ground that question of jurisdiction involved in the decision of the voluntary
petitioner used a wrong mode of appeal. It held that petitioner should arbitrator. What was being questioned was merely his findings of
have filed an appeal under Rule 43. The Court of Appeals also denied whether the university’s practice of sourcing the integrated IP in the
the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Hence, this petition. CBA from the 70% share of the personnel in the IP violates the
provisions of the CBA. Such is a proper subject of an appeal.
Issue: Whether the appellate court erred in holding that the proper
remedy is an appeal via Rule 43, considering that this involves a (20) CHED v. Mercado
labor case. G.R. No. 157877, March 10, 2006
By: ARID, Hannah Mhae G.
Held: No, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that petitioner
used a wrong remedy when it filed a special civil action on certiorari
under Rule 65 instead of an appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules Doctrine: Under Rule 43, Section 4, which governs appeals from
of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals did not err in holding that quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals, [t]he appeal shall be
petitioner used a wrong remedy when it filed a special civil action on taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment,
certiorari under Rule 65 instead of an appeal under Rule 43 of the final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in
The Court held in Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. The
Development Bank Employees that decisions of the voluntary use of the disjunctive preposition or in the rule suggests that a
arbitrator under the Labor Code are appealable to the Court of petitioner has the option to file the petition for review after notice of
Appeals. In that case, the Court observed that the Labor Code was the assailed judgment or resolution directly, without need of a prior
silent as regards the appeals from the decisions of the voluntary motion for reconsideration, or after the denial of a motion for new
arbitrator, unlike those of the Labor Arbiter which may be appealed to trial or reconsideration, provided such motion is duly filed in
the National Labor Relations Commission. The Court noted, however, accordance with the rule of procedure of the court or agency below.
that the voluntary arbitrator is a government instrumentality within Thus, for instance, if the rule of procedure of the court or agency a
the contemplation of Section 9 of B.P. 129 which provides for the quo requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The decisions of the judgment or resolution before appeal may be taken, then failure to
voluntary arbitrator are akin to those of the Regional Trial Court, and, comply with the requisite is a ground to dismiss the appeal on the
therefore, should first be appealed to the Court of Appeals before basis of prematurity. In the case at bar, under Section 50,[1][25]
being elevated to this Court. Petitioner’s argument, therefore, that Rule III of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the CSC, a
the ruling in said case is inapplicable in this case is without merit. party may elevate a decision of the Commission before the Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997
Moreover, a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is Revised Rules of Court, without the benefit of a prior motion for
adopted to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court reconsideration.
or quasi-judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion
on the part of such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of Facts: Through a letter-complaint Dimayuga, Dean of the College of
jurisdiction. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or Criminology, Republican College, accused respondent Mercado of
fact which is a mistake of judgment, the proper remedy should be arrogance, abuse of power and authority, ignorance of the
appropriate provisions of the Manual of Regulations for Private

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Schools and incompetence before the CHED. Respondent Mercado is Respondent Mercado failed to appear before the hearing committee
the Senior Education Specialist of the Office of Programs and despite the issuance of at least three (3) subpoenas. At the
Standards of the CHED. hearing,only Dimayuga appeared and testified under oath that she
The complaint stemmed from the Republican Colleges application for never signed any affidavit of desistance and denied that it was her
the recognition of its Master in Criminology Program with the CHED. signature appearing on the affidavit of desistance presented by
As part of the standard procedure, respondent Mercado would respondent Mercado. The hearing committee received the testimonies
evaluate Republican Colleges compliance with the prescribed of the CHED Records Officers, Maximina Sister and Revelyn Brina, to
requirements. Respondent the effect that the Alcala Resolution does not exist in the records.

The CHED en banc issued a resolution denying respondent Mercados


Mercado allegedly acted with arrogance when she manifested that the motion for reconsideration and finding her guilty of the subsequent
fate of Republican Colleges application rested on her to the extent of charges, which include falsification, among others.
maligning the person of Dimayuga during the inspection conducted at Respondent Mercado appealed to the CSC in which CSC denied.
the Republican College. Respondent Mercado moved for its reconsideration. The motion was
granted.
The Office of Programs and Standards Director issued a Memorandum
directing respondent to explain in writing why no administrative The CHED filed a Manifestation with Motion for Clarification dated
charges should be filed against her. Respondent Mercado complied, September 9, 2002 asking, among others, whether CSC Resolution
denying the allegations against her. Dimayuga submitted a reply. No. 02-1106 was final and executory and whether the CHED could
still file a motion for reconsideration in view of the one motion for
CHED sitting en banc: rendered a decision finding respondent guilty reconsideration rule in CSC proceedings. For her part, respondent
of discourtesy in the course of official duties. Respondent Mercado Mercado filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of CSC
was reprimanded and warned that a similar violation in the future will Resolution.
warrant a more severe punishment.
Pending resolution of its Manifestation with Motion for
Respondent moved for the reconsideration of the September 27, Clarification and before the expiration of the period to appeal,
1999 CHED decision. Attached to the motion was a resolution the CHED filed a petition for review, assailing CSC Resolution.
supposedly issued and signed by former CHED Chairman Angel C. Without delving into the merits, the Court of Appeals
Alcala (Alcala Resolution), dismissing the charges against respondent dismissed the petition on the ground of prematurity.
Mercado on the strength of an affidavit of desistance purportedly
executed by Dimayuga. Meanwhile, with the CHEDs petition with the Court of Appeals filed
and even decided already, the CSC acted on the motion and
The CHED, however, deferred the resolution of respondent Mercados manifestation filed by respondent Mercado and the CHED,
motion for reconsideration when it discovered that no record of the respectively, through CSC Resolution No. 030054. In the resolution,
Alcala Resolution was on file and that there was a marked the CSC granted respondent Mercados motion for execution and
discrepancy in the signature appearing in the affidavit of desistance answered, belatedly though, the queries raised in the CHEDs
of Dimayuga and the sample signature she submitted. Manifestation with Motion for Clarification.
CHED en banc passed Resolution placing respondent under preventive The CHED moved for the reconsideration of the Decision of the Court
suspension for a period of sixty (60) days without pay. A hearing and of Appeals but the appellate court denied the motion.
investigation committee was also created for this purpose.

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Issue: W/N the appeal before the Court of Appeals suffers from There is nothing in the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
prematurity. in the CSC that bars the filing of a motion for clarification.
However, the filing of the Manifestation with Motion for
Held: NO. The Court grants the petition. The Manifestation Clarification did not toll the reglementary period for appeal of
with Motion for Clarification filed by the CHED does not CSC Resolution. The records do not show that the CHED did file
partake of the nature of a motion for reconsideration. A subsequently a motion for reconsideration of the CSC resolution.
reading thereof reveals that the manifestation merely inquired Instead, the CHED elevated said resolution for review by the Court of
into the ramifications of CSC Resolution, that is, whether the Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
resolution was already final and executory and whether the Civil Procedure. The filing of the petition for review prevented the
reinstatement of respondent Mercado was possible resolution from becoming final and executory. As correctly pointed
considering that the position had already been filled up. The out by the Solicitor General, had it failed to file the petition for review
CHEDs Manifestation with Motion for Clarification neither assailed CSC within the reglementary period, the CHED would have lost its right to
Resolution nor sought its reversal. The manifestation merely asked appeal the resolution.
about the propriety of filing another motion for reconsideration in
view of the one motion for reconsideration rule in proceedings before As the CHED did not file a motion for reconsideration of CSC
the CSC. Resolution No. 02-1106, it is relevant to ask: is the filing of a
motion for reconsideration a condition precedent to the filing
of a petition for review? It is not. Under Rule 43, Section 4,
Thus, acting upon the CHEDs Manifestation with Motion for which governs appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the
Clarification, the CSC issued CSC Resolution where it acknowledged Court of Appeals, [t]he appeal shall be taken within fifteen
that available to the CHED as a recourse is the filing of a motion for (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or
reconsideration of CSC Resolution. This indicates that the CSC did not resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if
treat the Manifestation with Motion for Clarification filed by the CHED publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the
as a motion for reconsideration but rather as a simple request for denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration
clarification. duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or
The Manifestation with Motion for Clarification being nothing agency a quo. The use of the disjunctive preposition or in the
more than an unadulterated query, the appeal cannot be rule suggests that a petitioner has the option to file the
barred by litis pendentia. As a ground for dismissal, litis petition for review after notice of the assailed judgment or
pendentia presupposes the filing of two separate actions. resolution directly, without need of a prior motion for
Definitely, that is not the situation in the case at bar. From reconsideration, or after the denial of a motion for new trial or
another standpoint, the CHED can hardly be faulted for filing reconsideration, provided such motion is duly filed in
its petition with the Court of Appeals before the expiration of accordance with the rule of procedure of the court or agency
the period to appeal since the CSC had failed to resolve its below. Thus, for instance, if the rule of procedure of the court
query in time. Indeed, the CHED could have assumed that the or agency a quo requires the filing of a motion for
CSCs inaction was tantamount to a negative response to its reconsideration of the judgment or resolution before appeal
query. may be taken, then failure to comply with the requisite is a
ground to dismiss the appeal on the basis of prematurity. In
The ground of litis pendentia not being in point, it follows that the case at bar, under Section 50 Rule III of the Uniform Rules on
the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the CHEDs petition on Administrative Cases in the CSC, a party may elevate a decision of
the ground of prematurity. the Commission before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for

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review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, without the Undaunted, on 3 April 2000, Rago filed with the petitioner Social
benefit of a prior motion for reconsideration. Security Commission (SSC) a petition for total permanent disability
benefits.

(21) Social Security Commission vs. Court of Appeals In a resolution dated 20 December 2000, the SSC denied Rago’s
G.R. No. 152058. September 27, 2004 petition for lack of merit. The SSC ruled that he was not entitled to
By: Bernardo, Gerard permanent partial disability more than what was already granted,
more so to permanent total disability benefits since he was already
Doctrine: Exceptions to Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: It granted the maximum allowable benefit for his injury.
may be disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) Without filing a motion for reconsideration, Rago appealed to the
when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review.
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the Issue: Whether or not filing of a motion for reconsideration in SSC is
administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable mandatory before appealing to CA.
injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied and assumed Held: Yes, however, this case falls in one of the exceptions. ((3)
approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would lack or excess of jurisdiction)
amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not Section 5, Rule VI of the SSC’s 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure.
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) when there are The party aggrieved by the order, resolution, award or decision of the
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, (12) Commission may file a motion for reconsideration thereof within
when no administrative review is provided by law, (13) where the fifteen (15) days from receipt of the same. Only one motion for
rule of qualified political agency applies, and (14) when the issue of reconsideration shall be allowed any party.
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
Section 1 of Rule VII of the SSC rules provides:
Facts: Private respondent Jose Rago (hereafter Rago) worked as an [Any order, resolution, award or decision of the Commission, in the
electrician for Legend Engineering in Basak, Pardo, Cebu City. While absence of an appeal therefrom as herein provides, shall become final
working on the ceiling of a building, he stepped on a weak ceiling and executory fifteen (15) days after the date of notification to the
joist. The structure gave way and he crashed into the corridor twelve parties, and judicial review thereof shall be permitted only after
feet below. any party claiming to be aggrieved thereby has exhausted his
remedies before the Commission . . . .
Rago filed a claim for permanent partial disability with the Cebu City
office of the Social Security System (SSS). A combined reading of Section 5 of Rule VI, quoted earlier, and
Later on, Rago filed several requests for the adjustment of his partial Section 1 of Rule VII of the SSC’s 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure
disability to total disability. This time, his requests were denied by the reveals that the petitioners are correct in asserting that a motion for
Cebu City office of the SSS. The denial was based on the medical reconsideration is mandatory in the sense that it is a precondition to
findings of the Cebu City office that he was not totally prevented from the institution of an appeal or a petition for review before the Court of
engaging in any gainful occupation. Appeals. Stated differently, while Rago certainly had the option to file
a motion for reconsideration before the SSC, it was nevertheless

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mandatory that he do so if he wanted to subsequently avail of judicial


remedies. It is permanent total.

This rule is explicit in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The SSS had granted Rago sickness benefit for 120 days and,
thereafter, permanent partial disability for 38 months. Such grant is
However, we are not unmindful of the doctrine that the principle of an apparent recognition by the SSS that his injury is permanent and
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule. It may total as we have pronounced in several cases. This is in conformity
be disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when with Section 2 (b), Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees
the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the Compensation which defines a disability to be total and permanent if,
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or as a result of the injury or sickness, the employee is unable to
excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120
administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable days, and Section 1, b (1) of Rule XI of the same Amended Rules
injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose which provides that a temporary total disability lasting continuously
acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied and assumed for more than 120 days, shall be considered permanent.
approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would
amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not (22) Deloso vs. Marapao, G.R. No. 144244, November 11, 2005
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (11) when there are By: Donna Bigornia
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, (12) Doctrine: As can clearly be seen from the foregoing provision,
when no administrative review is provided by law, (13) where the in resolving appeals from quasi-judicial agencies such as the
rule of qualified political agency applies, and (14) when the issue of DARAB, the appellate court has the discretion to give due
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot. course to the petition.

Fortunately for Rago, his case falls within some of these exceptions. Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint with the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) for the province of Agusan del Norte against
Petitioners SSS and SSC have consistently shown their obstinacy in respondents praying that the latter be enjoined from interfering with
their stand to deny Rago’s request to convert his permanent partial her tenurial rights, and that an order be issued fixing the sharing of
disability to permanent total disability. The SSC’s reliance on the the net produce of the landholding between the parties and directing
SSS recommendations, which did not consider other evidence respondents to account for the November 1994 harvest.
of the illness’ progression and its disregard of long-standing
jurisprudence, made for the patent nullity of the SSC decision. The case was referred to the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
The error was made more blatant when, in the SSC’s clarificatory (MARO) of Butuan City for the purpose of determining, among others,
order, it classified the disability based on the amount of contributions whether petitioner is indeed a tenant of the subject landholding. The
Rago had paid. MARO found Alberto Temple to be the tenant of the landholding. The
To give the SSC another chance to rectify its error in accordance with PARAD, however, reversed the finding of the MARO and declared that
the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies would petitioner is a tenant of the landholding. On appeal, the DARAB
inevitably result in the same inflexible stance in defense of its error. affirmed the findings of the PARAD and ruled that the requisites of
agricultural tenancy are present. The decision of DARAB was reversed
Issue outside of procedure: Whether or not Rago’s disability is by the Court of Appeals. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
partial or total. was also denied. Hence, this petition.

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Petitioner contends that the petition filed before the Court of Appeals
was deficient in form and substance as it did not contain a statement Sec. 10. Due course.—If upon the filing of the comment or such other
of facts, issues, and the grounds relied upon for the review. The pleadings or documents as may be required or allowed by the Court
petition also allegedly failed to point out the findings of the DARAB of Appeals or upon the expiration of the period for the filing thereof,
which are not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court and on the basis of the petition or the records the Court of Appeals
allegedly violated Sec. 10, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as it failed to finds prima facie that the court or agency concerned has committed
first give due course to the petition before proceeding to resolve the errors of fact or law that would warrant reversal or modification of
same. In so doing, the Court of Appeals allegedly denied her due the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed,
process. Finally, petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in it may give due course to the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the
reversing the decision of the DARAB which is allegedly supported by same. The findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when
substantial evidence. supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of
Appeals.
Issue:
a. Whether or not the Court of Appeals violated Section 10, As can clearly be seen from the foregoing provision, in resolving
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court for failing to give due course to appeals from quasi-judicial agencies such as the DARAB, the
the petition before proceeding to resolve the same. appellate court has the discretion to give due course to the petition.
b. Whether or not petitioner is a tenant. It is also within the Court of Appeals’ discretion to have the original
records of the proceedings under review transmitted to it.
Ruling: No.
Petitioner’s contention that the appellate court deprived her of the
a. An examination of the petition filed with the Court of Appeals opportunity to elevate the records by deciding the case without first
reveals that while it does not contain a separate section on statement giving the petition due course is, therefore, utterly unmeritorious. The
of facts, the facts of the case are, in fact, integrated in the petition records of the Court of Appeals show that the court decided the case
particularly in the discussion/argument portion. Moreover, the on the basis of the pleadings filed by the parties, such as the petition,
decision of the DARAB which contains the facts of the case was motion to dismiss, comment, reply and rejoinder, including the
attached to the petition and was even quoted by the appellate court. documents attached thereto. The pleadings and annexes, which
The petition also sufficiently discusses the errors committed by the replicate approximately the entire records of the DARAB, undoubtedly
DARAB in its assailed decision. provided adequate basis for the resolution of the case.

There was, therefore, substantial compliance with Sec. 6, Rule 43 of b. In order to establish a tenancy relationship, the following
the Rules of Court. It is settled that liberal construction of the Rules essential requisites must concur: (1) that the parties are the
may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject
formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is
not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose
reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. After all, rules of of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that
procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; they there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
are used only to help secure substantial justice. lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and
the tenant or agricultural lessee.
With regard to the alleged failure of the Court of Appeals to first give
due course to the petition, Sec. 10, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court In this case, three requisites are absent, namely: (1) consent on the
provides: part of respondents for petitioner to become a tenant of the

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landholding; (2) personal cultivation; and (3) sharing in the produce B.E. San Diego assailed the sufficiency of the respondent’s petition to
of the farm. the CA due to lack of essential and relevant pleadings filed with
HLURB and the Office of the President.

(23) B.E. San Diego, Inc. v. Alzul Issue: Whether or not the petition should have been dismissed for
G.R. No. 169501, June 8, 2007 failure to comply with Sec 6. Rule 43 (Failure to attach certified true
By: Joen Corona copy of material portions).
Doctrine:
Ruling: No.
Facts: Respondent bought a 4 subdivision of lots from the Petitioner. SEC. 6. Contents of the petition.—The petition for review shall x x x
It was to be paid in installments. The transaction was executed in a (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified
Contract to Sell. Upon payment of downpayment, Respondent true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed
immediately took possession of the property and constructed fenced from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of
thereon. the record referred to therein and other supporting papers.

Respondent signed a "Conditional Deed of Assignment and Transfer of The above proviso explicitly requires the following to be appended to
Rights" which assigned to a certain Wilson P. Yu her rights under the a petition: 1) clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy
Contract to Sell. Yu, however, failed to pay her obligation under the of the award, judgment, final order, or resolution appealed from; 2)
Conditional Deed. certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to
in the petition; and 3) other supporting papers.
On August 25, 1980, [respondent] commenced an action for
rescission of the conditional deed of assignment against Yu before the Effect of failure to comply with requirements.—The failure of the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. Subsequently, on September petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding
30, 1985, [respondent] caused the annotation of notices of lis the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for
pendens on the titles covering the subject lots. The rescission was costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the
granted. documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof.
Petitioner notified the respondent that the contract to sell was
rescinded due to Yu’s default. Petitioner then sold the land to spouses Material is defined as "important; more or less necessary; having
Ventura who were surprised to see the annotation on the title. influence or effect; going to the merits; having to do with matter, as
Spouses Ventura filed for quieting of title. RTC ruled in favor of the distinguished from form." Thus, material portions of the records are
spouses but the SC reversed and held that the spouses’ title are void. those parts of the records that are relevant and directly bear on the
issues and arguments raised and discussed in the petition.
The Supreme Court gave the Respondent 30 days to pay his
remaining balance. Respondent tendered payment but the petitioner Only plain and clear copies of the material portions of the records are
refused to accept. Petitioner alleged that Yu failed to pay the required under Sec. 3 of Rule 43. This finding is buttressed by our
amortization hence, the contract was long legally rescinded. ruling in Cadayona v. CA, where it was held that only judgments or
final orders of the lower courts are needed to be certified true copies
Respondent filed for an action for consignation and specific or duplicate originals.
performance against petitioner before the HLURB. HLURB dismissed
the petition. CA reversed and ruled in favor of the respondent.

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Sec. 7 of Rule 43 does not prescribe outright rejection of the petition unsatisfied with the answer filed by petitioner. In her direct
if it is not accompanied by the required documents but simply gives testimony, the petitioner denied knowledge of the falsified nature of
the discretion to the CA to determine whether such breach constitutes her Career Service (Professional) eligibility rating. She asserted that
a "sufficient ground" for dismissal. Apparently, petitioner was not able the rating had come from the CSC through the mails. She insisted
to convince the CA that the alleged missing attachments deprived that she did not on any occasion approach any personnel of the CSC,
said court of the full opportunity and facility in examining and or anybody else connected with the CSC in order to procure the
resolving the petition. It has not been satisfactorily shown that the passing grade of 74.01%. CSCRO rendered decision finding her
pleadings filed by petitioner with the quasi-judicial agencies have guilty. Petitioner appealed to the CSC, which affirmed the decision.
material bearing or importance to the CA petition. Such pleadings Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied by CSC. Then she
could have been attached to the comment of respondent and hence, appealed with the CA. It dismissed the appeal due to petitioner’s
no prejudice would be suffered. Thus, the CA did not exercise its failure to accompany it with the requisite certified true copies of the
discretion in an arbitrary or oppressive manner by giving due course material portions of the record. (i.e., the preliminary investigation
to the petition. and charge for possession of spurious report of rating, the answer,
the decision dated December 16, 1999 of Civil Service Commission
PANDAGDAG: These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to Regional Office No. IV, Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 02-
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive 0433 dated March 20, 2002, and other supporting papers and the
disposition of every action and proceeding. evidences submitted) Petitioner filed a MR, which her counsel
undertook to submit required certified true copies of the material
portions within 10 days from October 23, 2002. She explained in
her motion that her counsel had failed to submit the required
(24) Maniebo vs CA certified copies, due to her failure to turn over said copies to
By: De Castro her counsel because of the distance between her home in
Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro and the office of her counsel
DOCTRINE: The rule clearly requires the petition for review to be in Fairview, Quezon City. But the CA denied the motion. She even
accompanied by “a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true filed 2nd MR but was likewise denied. Then case was brought before
copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from SC via petition for certiorari.
together with certified true copies of such material portions of the
record refined to therein and other supporting papers.” ISSUE: WON the court of appeals committed reversible error in
dismissing the petitioner's petition for review for failure to attach
FACTS: Mayor of Puerto Galera issued a promotional permanent certified copy of the annexes
appointment to the petitioner as Cashier III in the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer because she appeared to possess the HELD: No, the CA did not commit any error, least of all a reversible
qualifications for the position, including the Career Service one. Its dismissal was founded on the correct application of the
(Professional) Eligibility appearing in line 18 of her Personal Data applicable rule. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
Sheet showing her to have passed with a rating of 74.01% the Career expressly lists down the pleadings and other matters that a petition
Service (Professional) examination. However, upon verification for review should contain.
against the Masterlist of Eligibles, it was discovered that she failed to
obtain a passing rating in the exam. CSC Regional Office held a “Section 6. Contents of the petition.—The petition for
preliminary investigation and find that a prima facie case of review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the
falsification existed against the petitioner. She was charged with case, without impleading the court or agencies either as
possession of spurious report of rating, falsification, grave misconduct petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise
and dishonesty. The case was set for hearing because CSCRO was

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statement of the facts and issues involved and the filed against the resolution dismissing the petition. However, she did
grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied not even substantially comply with the requirement. Also, the
by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true petitioner’s motion for reconsideration did not allege the date
copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution when she had received a copy of the resolution. Her omission to
appealed from, together with certified true copies of allege did not escape the attention of the CA, which cited it in the
such material portions of the record referred to therein resolution dated January 8, 2003 as a ground for denying the motion
and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn for reconsideration. That detail was necessary to determine the
certification against forum shopping as provided in the timeliness of the filing of the motion for reconsideration. The
last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall petitioner next filed a second motion for reconsideration after
state the specific material dates showing that it was the issuance of the resolution dated January 8, 2003. The CA
filed within the period fixed herein.” regarded her doing so as a blatant contravention of the Rules of
Court.
The rule clearly requires the petition for review to be accompanied by
“a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the (25)Vergel De Dios vs CA
award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together GR 127623, June 19, 1997
with certified true copies of such material portions of the record By: Rhio
referred to therein and other supporting papers.” The requirement is
intended to immediately enable the CA to determine whether to give Doctrine: The Court of Appeals acts hastily when it concludes that a
due course to the appeal or not by having all the material necessary party is going to file a petition for certiorari instead of a petition for
to make such determination before it. This is because an appeal review solely on the basis of such party’s allegation that he was going
under Rule 43 is a discretionary mode of appeal, which the CA may to file a petition for certiorari—the appellate court should reserve
either dismiss if it finds the petition to be patently without merit, or judgment on the matter until it shall have actually received the
prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein petition. The very fact that a party seeks an extension of time should
are too unsubstantial to require consideration; or may process by alert the court to the possibility that what said party intends to file is
requiring the respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a a petition for review.
motion to dismiss, within 10 days from notice.
Facts: Petitioner, Vergel de Dios filed ejectment suits against private
The petitioner was not entitled to a liberal construction of the rules of respondents Valentin Sarmiento and Reynaldo (Regino) Venturina.
procedure. Although her petition cited decisions of the Court declaring Originally brought in RTC Malolos, Bulacan, the cases were eventually
that only the copies of the decisions or final orders assailed on appeal referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
needed to be certified, it is acknowledged even in the cited decisions (DARAB) and there docketed as DARAB Case Nos. 248 and 283, on
of the Court that there should at least be a substantial compliance the ground that they involve primarily agrarian disputes.
with the rules. She should not forget that her petition for review in
the CA was essentially assailing not only CSC Resolution 02-1028 In DARAB Case No. 248, petitioner alleged that he was the owner of a
(denying her motion for reconsideration) but also CSC Resolution No. two-hectare farm in Barangay Calawitan, San Ildefonso, Bulacan
02-0433 (the very decision of the CSC finding her guilty of possession under agricultural lease to private respondent Valentino Sarmiento;
of the spurious report of rating, falsification, grave misconduct, and that sometime in 1988, respondent Sarmiento abandoned the
dishonesty, and imposing the penalty of dismissal from the service). landholding by selling his rights thereto to respondent Reynaldo
With respect to the other supporting documents of the petition Venturina; and that Sarmiento did not pay rentals, while Venturina
as set forth in Section 6, Rule 43, their legible copies should have refused to surrender the landholding to petitioner. In DARAB Case
been attached to the petition or to the motion for reconsideration No. 283, petitioner claimed that Venturina had been cultivating an
area of 3.75 hectares without his knowledge and consent and without

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Rule 43 and Rule 45 Case Digests|Block 4401|Batch 2018

paying any rent. The land was formerly under leasehold to one Jose 1993, respectively. The DARAB held that while at the outset,
Salonga who, before his death, had allegedly sold his rights to private petitioner may have been the unwilling lessor, his non-action,
respondent Reynaldo Venturina without petitioners consent. considering his own witnesses declaration that Venturinas cultivation
of the subject landholding was well-known in the community, and his
Provincial Adjudicator: Declared the agricultural leasehold acceptance of the rentals constituted acquiescence on his part.
relationship between petitioner and respondent Sarmiento
extinguished and accordingly ordered respondent Venturina to vacate DARAB: Dismissed the complaints for lack of evidence, ordered the
the landholding in question and to turn over its possession to Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of San Ildefonso, Bulacan to place
petitioner. The Provincial Adjudicator gave credence to petitioners the property under formal leasehold in favor of Valentin Sarmiento’s
claim that Sarmiento had abandoned the landholding by selling his son Pio by reason of Valentin’s advanced age and to prepare and
tenancy rights to Venturina based on petitioners evidence. execute a leasehold contract over the 3.75 hectares between
petitioner and Venturina.
DARAB: On appeal, the DARAB reversed on the ground that
petitioners evidence, on which the Provincial Adjudicator had relied Petitioner moved for a reconsideration, but his motion was denied by
for his decision, was, with respect to petitioners affidavit, self- the board in a resolution received by petitioner on July 31, 1996. On
serving, and, with regard to the affidavits of his witnesses, too good August 9, 1996, petitioner moved for an extension of 15 days, until
to be true. The DARAB also disregarded as hearsay Manuel August 24, 1996, within which to file a petition for certiorari in the
Villanueva’s affidavit, stating among others that the sale of CA. On August 23, 1996, he filed his petition, denominated as one for
Sarmiento’s tenancy rights was known to the residents of the review by way of appeal by certiorari.
barangay. Neither the barangay captain nor the chairperson of the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) was presented to CA: In its resolution, however, the CA denied the motion for
attest to this fact. The DARAB instead gave weight to the declaration extension (1) on the ground that the petition for certiorari which
of Pio Sarmiento that his father Valentin had tilled the land since petitioner intended to file was not the proper remedy and (2) for
1972 but that because of old age had to relinquish its cultivation to violation of Circular No. 28-91, because the certification against
Pio Sarmiento, not to Reynaldo Venturina, and that they had paid all forum shopping was executed not by petitioner himself but by
the yearly rentals except for 1 year when there was a devastating petitioners counsel. In another resolution dated September 18, 1996,
typhoon. the appellate court dismissed petitioner’s petition for having been
filed late. Unknown to the Court of Appeals, petitioner had filed on
With regard to Venturina, the DARAB found him to be the lawful September 13, 1996 a motion for reconsideration of the resolution
tenant of the 3.75 hectare lot formerly cultivated by Jose Salonga on dated August 30, 1996 denying his motion for extension. The motion
the basis of a DAR certification issued on April 27, 1993 which stated was denied on November 15, 1996 along with the motion for
that Venturina had been in actual cultivation of the 3.75 hectare lot reconsideration of the resolution of August 30, 1996. Hence this
owned by petitioner since 1984; the testimony of Josefina Venturina petition for certiorari.
Bravo, administrator of the Victorias Ricemill, that the rentals
consisting of 60 cavans per year had been deposited by Venturina Issue: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
with the ricemill since 1984 and that all the rentals up to 1988 had denying the petitioner’s motion for extension on the grounds that the
been withdrawn by petitioner; the declaration of Melencia Toledo, a petition which petitioner intended to file is not the proper remedy and
palay trader, that from 1989 up to 1992, Venturina had been for violating Circular No. 28-91. He points out that the petition he
depositing lease rentals for petitioner which were all withdrawn by actually filed on August 23, 1996 satisfies the requirements for a
petitioner; and the receipts for 60 cavans of palay each for 1992 and petition for review under Circular No. 1-95, par. 6.
1993 signed by petitioner on December 9, 1993 and December 16,

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Held: Yes. CA was rather hasty in concluding that petitioner was


going to file a petition for certiorari solely on the basis of petitioners
allegation that he was going to file a petition for certiorari. It should (26)
have reserved judgment on the matter until it had actually received Videogram Regulatory Board vs.
G.R. No. 106564. November 28, 1996
the petition especially considering that petitioner’s motion for
BY: Grande, Jonicocel
extension was filed well within the reglementary period for filing a
petition for review. The very fact that petitioner sought an extension
of time should have alerted the CA to the possibility that what Doctrine: There are certain procedural rules that must remain
petitioner really intended to file was a petition for review. As it turned inviolable, like those setting the periods for perfecting an appeal or
out, what petitioner actually filed was a petition for review which filing a petition for review, for it is doctrinally entrenched that the
complies with all the requirements for such a petition under Circular right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that
No. 1-95, par. 6, to wit: a statement of the full names of the parties right must comply with the statute or rules.
to the case, a statement of the material dates to show that it was Facts:
filed on time, a statement of the nature of the action (one for review Upon application made by officers of petitioner Videogram Regulatory
by way of appeal by certiorari), and a summary of the proceedings Board, the MTC, issued Search Warrant against private respondent
before the Provincial Adjudicator and the DARAB. Under the heading Edward L. Unite for violation of Section 6 of P.D., the law creating the
Discussion, the petition contains an analysis of the evidence, while Videogram Regulatory Board and penalizing illegal reproductions of
attached to the petition are certified true copies of the assailed videograms.
decision and resolution of the DARAB and a properly executed Private respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to
certification against forum shopping. Recover Seized Articles.

The DARAB is made a respondent, a feature of a petition for MTC: denied said Motion to Quash.
certiorari, but this fact should have been treated merely as innocuous RTC: declared as null and void the said search warrant issued by the
and should not have been allowed to detract from the true MTC.
consideration of the petition as a petition for review.
Thereafter, petitioner filed with respondent Court of Appeals a Motion
The CA moreover committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the for Extension of Time of Thirty (30) days from May 20, 1992 or until
requirement of Circular No. 28-91 for a certification against forum June 19, 1992 within which to file a petition for review.
shopping to petitioner’s motion for extension. Under this circular, However, in its Resolution dated May 27, 1992, respondent Court
such certification is required in every petition filed with the Supreme granted the petitioner a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days
Court or Court of Appeals. Obviously, a motion for extension is not only, counted from May 20, 1992 or until June 4, 1992, within which
the petition spoken of in this provision. While such certification may to file the petition for review. The OSG allegedly received a copy of
be attached to a motion for extension and, in such a case, may be said Resolution on June 8, 1992, or four days after the lapse of the
considered as compliance with the rules even if none is attached to granted extension.
the petition subsequently filed, the reverse does not follow. The OSG filed a Motion to Admit, alleging that it was physically
Petitioner’s failure to have a properly executed certification against impossible to comply with the deadline of June 4, 1992 since it
forum shopping attached to his motion for extension is not fatal, received a copy of the resolution only on June 8, 1992.
considering that the proper certification was later attached to his CA: RESOLVED to DENY the Motion To Admit.
petition at the time of its filing.
Issue: WON CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
issued the order giving petitioner a fifteen day inextendible

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period to file petition for review was received by petitioner LACK OF NOTICE
when the fifteen day period had already expired. The court have consistently held that allowance or denial of a motion
for extension of time is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, and such discretion vested in the courts must be exercised
HELD: NO. wisely and prudently, and never capriciously, with a view to
substantial justice.
There are certain procedural rules that must remain inviolable, like But, once granted, the extension of time starts from the end of the
those setting the periods for perfecting an appeal or filing a petition original reglementary period. It begins to run whether or not the
for review, for it is doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal is a movant/grantee has knowledge of such action of the granting court.
statutory right and one who seeks to avail of that right must comply Notice in this instance is unimportant as, in the first place, lawyers
with the statute or rules. The rules, particularly the requirements for should never presume that their motions for extension or
perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the postponement would be granted. It behooves them to follow up on
law, must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable their motions, for the mere filing of the same is not enough. They
interdictions against needless delays and for orderly discharge of must check with the division clerks of court for the action on their
judicial business. Furthermore, the perfection of an appeal in the motions, considering that time may run out on them as it did in this
manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory case.
but also jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal renders The OSG persists in pressing that the Court to take judicial notice of
the judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing party its very heavy caseload, which in its estimation constitutes sufficient
has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the justification for the delay. However, it cannot be gainsaid that, with
winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the ordinary diligence and foresight, the Solicitor General and his staff
resolution of his/her case. could have readily found a way to comply with the deadline.
These periods are carefully guarded and lawyers are well-advised to
keep track of their applications. After all, a denial of a petition for Appeal For Liberality
being time-barred is a decision on the merits.
In the case of Lacsamana vs. Second Special Cases Division of the Petitioner insists that the challenged Resolutions must be overturned,
Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court had already put a stop to in light of the fact that petitioner is tasked with regulating the video
and set a policy on overly long extensions of time. The Court said: industry pursuant to P.D. 1987, and that its petition is meritorious,
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this being highly impressed with public interest in view of the unfair
Decision, an extension of only fifteen days for filling a competition against the local movie industry posed by rampant film
petition for review may be granted by the Court of piracy, as well as the erosion of the viewing publics moral fiber due to
Appeals, save in exceptionally meritorious cases. unclassified and unreviewed videotapes of films with pornographic
The motion for extension of time must be filed and the and violent sequences.[21] Petitioner thus prays that we apply a liberal
corresponding docket fee paid within the reglementary interpretation of the rules to its petition.
period of appeal. The court rejects such argument. While the court recognize the
Here, the Solicitor General could not feign ignorance. He knew laudable role and difficult task of petitioner, they do not make the
or ought to have known that, pursuant to the above rule, his case exceptionally meritorious as to warrant the liberal application of
motion for extension of time of thirty (30) days could be the rules. The reasoning employed is untenable. The issue that
granted for only fifteen (15) days. There simply was no basis petitioner tried to bring before respondent Court was the propriety of
for assuming that the requested 30-day extension would be the quashal of the search warrant. It has nothing to do with
granted. petitioners purpose and task because these do not show how the RTC
erred in quashing the aforementioned search warrant.

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Rule 43 and Rule 45 Case Digests|Block 4401|Batch 2018

And, while the court understands the OSGs predicament, its oft-
repeated excuse of being saddled with a huge caseload, which is Issues:
resorted to almost everytime it applies for extensions of time for
appeal and filing of comments/replies/briefs, has already lost its I. Does the non-attachment of the TSN make the petition fatally
flavor, if not gone stale entirely. Certainly, by this time the OSG must defective?
have already developed a system for keeping track of all its deadlines II. Can an appeal by certiorari raise only factual issues?
and monitoring the progress of work being done on the cases it is
handling. After all, government service really entails hard work and Held:
perennial, unceasing pressure to meet deadlines. Most assuredly, this
is not a ground for the liberal interpretation of the rules. Only in I. No. Non-attachment of the relevant portions of the TSN does not
exceptionally meritorious cases should the rules be relaxed. Such has render the petition of FAT KEE fatally defective.
not been shown to be the situation in this case.
such a requirement was not meant to be an ironclad rule such that
RULE 45 the failure to follow the same would merit the outright dismissal of
the petition. In accordance with Section 7 of Rule 45, "the Supreme
(01) FAT KEE COMPUTER SYSTEMS v. ONLINE NETWORKS Court may require or allow the filing of such pleadings, briefs,
INTERNATIONAL memoranda or documents as it may deem necessary within such
G.R. No. 171238, Feb. 2, 2011
periods and under such conditions as it may consider appropriate."
By: Jovero, John Tristram V.
More importantly, Section 8 of Rule 45 declares that "[i]f the petition
is given due course, the Supreme Court may require the elevation of
Doctrine: Non-attachment of the relevant portions of the TSN does
the complete record of the case or specified parts thereof within
not render the petition for review on certiorari defective.
fifteen (15) days from notice." Given that the TSN of the proceedings
before the RTC forms part of the records of the instant case, the
Facts: ONLINE filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against FAT KEE.
failure of FAT KEE to attach the relevant portions of the TSN was
ONLINE alleged that sometime in November 1997, it sold computer
already cured by the subsequent elevation of the case records to this
printers to FAT KEE. Despite repeated demands, FAT KEE failed to
Court. This pronouncement is likewise in keeping with the doctrine
pay its obligations to ONLINE without any valid reason. As FAT KEE
that procedural rules should be liberally construed in order to
still ignored the demand, ONLINE instituted the instant case.
promote their objective and assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding.
FAT KEE contests the argument of ONLINE that the instant petition is
fatally defective for the failure of the former to attach the transcript
II. As to the substantive issues raised in the instant petition, the
of stenographic notes (TSN) of the RTC proceedings. FAT KEE
Court finds that, indeed, questions of fact are being invoked by FAT
counters that there is no need to annex the said TSN given that
KEE. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law
ONLINE does not dispute the accuracy of the quoted portions of the
is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when
transcripts and the petition does not request for a reevaluation of the
the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a
evidence of the parties. Assuming arguendo that the TSN should have
question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination
been attached to the petition, FAT KEE begs for the relaxation of the
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or
rules so as not to frustrate the ends of substantive justice.
any of them.

FAT KEE also rejects the contention of ONLINE that the petition raises
Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court dictates that a petition for
only factual issues, which are not proper in a petition for review on
review on certiorari "shall raise only questions of law, which must be
certiorari.

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distinctly set forth." This rule is, however, subject to exceptions, one Reyes, Jr., who was to conduct the sale, that MV Sta. Clara I was no
of which is when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and the longer owned by SCLC but by DBP pursuant to a prior extrajudicial
RTC are conflicting. Said exception applies to the instant case. foreclosure sale. Despite such information, Sheriff Reyes, Jr.,
proceeded with the sale and awarded the vessel to petitioner for
(2) Tay Chun Suy vs. Court of Appeals P317,000.00.
G.R. No. 93640 | January 7, 1994. Meanwhile, on 23 July 1986, MV Sta. Clara I was again levied upon
by: Lapuz, Jesus Jr. Ros and attached by Deputy Sheriffs Alfonso M. Zamora by virtue of a
writ of attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court, Br. XI, Cebu
City, in Civil Case No. CEB-5162, “Philippine Trigon Shipyard Shipping
Doctrine: Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not Corp. v. Sta. Clara Housing Industries, Inc., et al.” On 24 July 1986,
adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, the same court issued an order appointing Philippine Trigon Shipyard
and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing Court as they Shipping Corporation as depository of the attached vessel with
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. authority to operate the vessel temporarily. MV Sta. Clara I was then
taken from the port of Davao City to Cebu City.
PETITIONER: Tan Chun Suy
RESPONDENT: Development Bank of the Philippines Upon being informed of the execution sale to petitioner, DBP filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court, Br. XVII, Davao City, for
Facts: On 9 May 1978, Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc. (SCLC), obtained annulment of the execution sale, recovery of possession, damages
a loan of P18,514,357.56 from private respondent Development Bank and attorney’s fees with prayer for restraining order and preliminary
of the Philippines (DBP). As security for the loan, SCLC mortgaged injunction.
some of its properties, among which was a vessel, MV Sta. Clara I.
Upon SCLC’s failure to pay the loan, the mortgage was foreclosed. On Both the RTC and CA issued a decision which, among other matters,
18 August 1982, the Clerk of Court and Provincial Sheriff Ex-Officio of declared that DBP was the lawful owner of MV Sta. Clara I and that
Sultan Kudarat, Aurelio M. Rendon, conducted an auction sale and the public auction sale was null and void. Hence, this petition REVIEW
sold the vessel to DBP for P3,600,000.00. He thereafter issued a ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 by the petitioner.
certificate of sale dated 18 August 1982 in favor of DBP. However,
DBP did not register with the Philippine Coast Guard the mortgage; PERTINENT TO OUR TOPIC: Please take note that the petition with
neither the foreclosure nor the auction sale. the SC of Tan Chun Suy now includes a contention wherein he alleges
that he came to know about the acquisition by DBP only upon its
In December 1983, DBP and Sta. Clara Housing Industries, Inc. filing of the complaint for annulment of the execution sale and that he
(SCHI), entered into a Lease/Purchase Agreement which provided never admitted that he knew of DBP’s prior acquisition at the time of
that DBP should lease some of the former properties of SCLC, execution in his favor. (AN ARGUMENT THAT WAS NOT RAISED WITH
including MV Sta. Clara I, to the latter and transfer actual ownership BOTH RTC and CA)
over these properties upon completion.
Issue: Whether an argument NOT raised with the lower courts may
On 10 July 1986, Petitioner caused the levy and attachment of the still be entertained upon petition with the Supreme Court on
same vessel, MV Sta. Clara I, in order to satisfy a judgment in favor certiorari?
of Petitioner against Sta. Clara Lumber. At the time of the levy, the
coastwise license of the vessel was in the name of Sta. Clara Lumber Held: NO.
Co., Inc. Petitioner never challenged and raised the argument on appeal to the
On the scheduled date of the execution sale, Atty. Necitas Kintanar, Court of Appeals. He is, therefore, estopped from denying knowledge
counsel for SCHI, verbally informed Deputy Sheriff Manases M.

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of the prior claim of DBP to the vessel in the light of his judicial court. The RTC thereafter ordered the consolidation of the two cases.
admission. Hence, he cannot be allowed to ventilate it now in this The RTC rendered a decision upholding the validity of the
proceeding. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not extrajudicial foreclosure and ordering the issuance of a writ of
adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not be, possession in favor of petitioner.
and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing Court as they
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Well-entrenched is the Aggrieved, respondent availed of two modes of appeal. Respondent
rule that factual findings of the trial court, as well as those of the appealed the foreclosure case via ordinary appeal to the CA.
Court of Appeals, are entitled to great weight and respect. This rule Respondent likewise filed a special civil action for certiorari under
finds application in the case at bar. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as to the writ of possession case also
before the CA. In both cases, respondent assailed the Decision of the
The evidence on record fully supports the findings of the lower courts. RTC which is actually a joint decision on the two consolidated cases
PETITION DENIED. subject of the separate actions. CA (First Division) rendered a
decision in the foreclosure case reversing and setting aside the RTC
(3) Producers Bank v. Excelsa decision thereby declaring the foreclosure of mortgage invalid and
G.R. No. 173820, April 16, 2012 annulling the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of petitioner.
By: Mano, Razna I. CA (Tenth Division) also rendered the assailed decision in the writ of
possession case annulling the issuance of the writ of possession in
Doctrine: It is a procedural blunder to file a separate petition for favor of petitioner.
certiorari when two cases were consolidated and a joint decision was
rendered because the cases lost their identities; and a petition for Whether the Petition for Certiorari is the proper remedy to
certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail a decision granting the assail the writ of possession case.
issuance of a writ of possession.
NO. Respondent herein committed a procedural blunder when it filed
Respondent obtained a loan from petitioner secured by a real estate a separate petition for certiorari before the CA, because when the two
mortgage. When respondent presented for negotiation to petitioner cases were consolidated and a joint decision was rendered, the cases
drafts drawn under the letter of credit and the corresponding export lost their identities; and a petition for certiorari is not the proper
documents in consideration for its drawings, petitioner purchased the remedy to assail a decision granting the issuance of a writ of
drafts and export documents by paying respondent the peso possession.
equivalent of the drawings. Petitioner demanded from respondent the
payment of the peso equivalent of said export documents together In this case, there was a joint hearing and the RTC eventually
with its due and unpaid loans. For failure of respondent to heed the rendered a Joint Decision disposing of the cases both as to the
demand, petitioner moved for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real validity of the foreclosure (foreclosure case) and the propriety of
estate mortgage. At the public auction, petitioner emerged as the the issuance of a writ of possession (writ of possession case). This
highest bidder. For failure of respondent to redeem the properties, being so, the two cases ceased to be separate and the parties are left
the titles were consolidated in favor of petitioner and new certificates with a single remedy to elevate the issues to the appellate court. This
of title were issued in its name. is bolstered by the fact that when the appeal in the foreclosure case
was disposed of by the CA (First Division) by reversing the RTC
Respondent instituted an action for the annulment of extrajudicial decision, the appellate court not only declared the foreclosure of
foreclosure with prayer for preliminary injunction and damages mortgage invalid but likewise annulled the issuance of the writ of
(foreclosure case) against petitioner and the Register of Deeds of possession.
Marikina before the RTC. Petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of
a writ of possession (writ of possession case) before the same

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Assuming that respondent could still treat the original cases


separately and could avail of separate remedies, the petition for Doctrine: Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a
certiorari under Rule 65 was incorrectly availed of to assail the criminal case on the ground of improper venue, the allegations in the
issuance of the writ of possession. complaint and information must be examined together with Section
15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
A special civil action for certiorari could be availed of only if a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions Facts: (Rule 45 petition)
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave Tomas was charged in court for perjury under Article 183 of the
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and if Revised Penal Code (RPC) for making a false narration in a Certificate
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy against Forum Shopping.
in the ordinary course of law. It has been repeatedly held in a
number of cases that the remedy of a party from the trial courts The accusation stemmed from petitioner Union Banks two (2)
order granting the issuance of a writ of possession is to file a petition complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against
to set aside the sale and cancel the writ of possession, and the the spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first
aggrieved party may then appeal from the order denying or granting complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0717, was filed before the
said petition. When a writ of possession had already been issued as in RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second
this case, the proper remedy is an appeal and not a petition for complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 342-000, was filed on March
certiorari. To be sure, the trial courts order granting the writ of 15, 2000 and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both
possession is final. The soundness of the order granting the writ of complaints showed that Tomas executed and signed the Certification
possession is a matter of judgment, with respect to which the remedy against Forum Shopping. Accordingly, she was charged of deliberately
of the party aggrieved is ordinary appeal. As respondent availed of violating Article 183 of the RPC by falsely declaring under oath in the
the wrong remedy, the appellate court erred in not dismissing Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she
outright the petition for certiorari. did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same
issue in another tribunal or agency.
When respondent received the unfavorable decision of the RTC, it
appealed the decision to the CA assailing the validity of the Tomas filed a Motion to Quash. The MeTC-Makati City denied the
foreclosure. The CA (First Division) reversed and set aside the RTC Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the
decision, declared the foreclosure invalid, and annulled the issuance Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City. The
of the writ of possession. When it rendered the assailed decision, the MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the Information
CA (Tenth Division) addressed the issues raised by respondent which sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. The MeTC-Makati City
were the very same issues raised by it in its appeal. In short, the subsequently denied Tomas motion for reconsideration.
assailed decision was a mere reiteration of the findings and
conclusions of the CA (First Division). This emphasizes the error Issue: Whether the proper venue of perjury under Article 183
committed by the CA (Tenth Division) in rendering the assailed of the RPC should be Makati City, where the Certificate against
decision. Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the
Certification was presented to the trial court.
The Court settles once and for all the validity of the foreclosure and
the propriety of the issuance of the writ of possession. Held: MeTC-Makati City

(4) Union Bank of the Philippines Unlike in civil cases, a finding of improper venue in criminal
GR No. 192565, February 28, 2012 cases carries jurisdictional consequences. In determining the
By: Mariz

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venue where the criminal action is to be instituted and the court declarations which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing
which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 simultaneous remedies in different fora.
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted In this case, Tomas is charged with the crime of perjury under Article
and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense 183 of the RPC for making a false Certificate against Forum Shopping.
was committed or where any of its essential ingredients The elements of perjury under Article 183 are:
occurred. [emphasis ours]
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed
The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of an affidavit upon a material matter.
the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which states:
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a
Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.
sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the offense
was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some (c) That in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful
place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the particular place and deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the
offense charged or is necessary for its identification. (d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is
required by law or made for a legal purpose. (emphasis ours)
Information Charging Perjury

Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, Where the jurisdiction of the court is being assailed in a criminal case
contains the requirement for a Certificate against Forum Shopping. on the ground of improper venue, the allegations in the complaint
The Certificate against Forum Shopping can be made either by a and information must be examined together with Section 15(a), Rule
statement under oath in the complaint or initiatory pleading asserting 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this basis,
a claim or relief; it may also be in a sworn certification annexed to we find that the allegations in the Information sufficiently support a
the complaint or initiatory pleading. In both instances, the affiant is finding that the crime of perjury was committed by Tomas within the
required to execute a statement under oath before a duly territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC-Makati City.
commissioned notary public or any competent person authorized to
administer oath that: (a) he or she has not theretofore commenced The first element of the crime of perjury, the execution of the subject
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, Certificate against Forum Shopping was alleged in the Information to
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his or her have been committed in Makati City. Likewise, the second and fourth
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if elements, requiring the Certificate against Forum Shopping to be
there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of under oath before a notary public, were also sufficiently alleged in the
the present status thereof; and (c) if he or she should thereafter Information to have been made in Makati City.
learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he or she shall report that fact within five days therefrom to We also find that the third element of willful and deliberate falsehood
the court wherein his or her aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading was also sufficiently alleged to have been committed in Makati City,
has been filed. In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter not Pasay City, as indicated in the last portion of the Information:
in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of the required

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[S]aid accused stated in the Verification/Certification/Affidavit of enjoin Steelcase from selling its products in PH except through DISI;
merit of a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of 2) dismissal of complaint; and 3) payment of actual, moral and
replevin docketed as [Civil] Case No. 342-00 of the Metropolitan Trial exemplary damages. DISI highlighted that Steelcase does not have
Court[,] Pasay City, that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not legal capacity to sue in the PH due to its lack of license to do so,
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues hence, complaint should be dismissed.
in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said
material statement was false thereby making a willful and deliberate On March 3, 1999, Steelcase filed its Motion to Admit Amended
assertion of falsehood. (underscoring ours) Complaint which was granted, however, it still filed another Motion to
Admit Second Amended Complaint on March 13. On November 15,
Tomas’ deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly RTC granted the TRO prayed by DISI and set aside order admitting
shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate against the Amended Complaint. RTC ruled that in requiring DISI to meet
Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her Dealer Performance Expectation and in terminating the dealership
knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and sworn to agreement with DISI, Steelcase revealed that it participated in the
were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC- operations of DISI. Hence, Steelcase was considered “doing business”
Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, in PH as contemplated by RA 7042 or the Foreign Investments Act of
pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of 1991, and since it did not have the license to do business in the
Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the country, it was barred from seeking redress from PH courts.
crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
Makati City, not Pasay City. Steelcase moved for MR but RTC denied. It elevated to the CA by way
of appeal but CA affirmed RTC. Steelcase filed MR but CA denied.
(5) Steelcase, Inc. V. Design International Selections, Inc.
G.R. No. 171995. April 18, 2012 ISSUE:
By: Maria Francesca Montes 1. Whether Steelcase is doing business in PH without a license.
2. Whether DISI is estopped from challenging Steelcase’s legal
DOCTRINE: Foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines capacity to sue.
without a license may still sue before the Philippine courts a Filipino
or a Philippine entity that had derived benefit from their contractual HELD:
arrangement because the latter is considered to be estopped from Court ruled in favor of Steelcase, admitted the Second Amended
challenging the personality of a corporation after it had acknowledged Complaint and remanded case to RTC for appropriate action.
the said corporation by entering into a contract with it. 1. No. IRR of RA 7042 qualified “doing business” under Rule I,
Section 1(f)(3) where it states that “the following acts shall
not be deemed “doing business” in the Philippines: xxx (3)
FACTS: appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the
Steelcase is a foreign corporation registered in Michigan, USA which Philippines which transacts business in the representative’s
is engaged in office furniture manufacturing. DISI is a domestic or distributor’s own name and account. xxx” DISI was
corporation engaged in furniture distribution. In 1986 or 1987, both independent contractor, distributing various products of
orally entered in dealership agreement. Steelcase granted DISI the Steelcase and of other companies, acting in its own name
right to market, sell, distribute, install and service its products to and for its own account.
end-user customers within the PH. In 1999, Steelcase filed a 2. Yes. DISI is estopped from questioning Steelcase’s existence
complaint for sum of money against DISI allegedly for unpaid account and capacity to sue as it acknowledged its entity when it
of USD 600,000. DISI alleged that complaint failed to state cause of
action and sought for 1) TRO and writ of preliminary injunction to

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entered into Dealership Agreement with it and even


benefiting from it. Despite several postponements, petitioner and Arias failed to appear
hence they were deemed to have waived the presentation of their
evidence. Consequently, the case was deemed submitted for decision.
(6) ESTORES v SUPANGAN
G.R. No. 175139, April 16, 2012 RTC rendered its Decision finding respondent-spouses entitled to
By: MORALES, EDILYN T. interest but only at the rate of 6% per annum and not 12% as prayed
by them. It also found respondent-spouses entitled to attorneys fees
Doctrine as they were compelled to litigate to protect their interest.

Interest may be imposed even in the absence of stipulation in the Aggrieved, petitioner and Arias filed their notice of appeal. The CA
contract. Article 2210 of the Civil Code expressly provides that noted that the only issue submitted for its resolution is whether it is
“[i]nterest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon proper to impose interest for an obligation that does not involve a
damages awarded for breach of contract.” In this case, there is no loan or forbearance of money in the absence of stipulation of the
question that petitioner is legally obligated to return the P3.5 million parties.
because of her failure to fulfill the obligation under the Conditional
Deed of Sale, despite demand. Petitioner enjoyed the use of the On May 12, 2006, the CA rendered the assailed Decision affirming the
money from the time it was given to her until now. Thus, she is ruling of the RTC finding the imposition of 6% interest proper.
already in default of her obligation from the date of demand. However, the same shall start to run only from September 27, 2000
when respondent-spouses formally demanded the return of their
Facts money and not from October 1993 when the contract was executed
as held by the RTC. The CA also modified the RTC’s ruling as regards
Petitioner Hermojina Estores and respondent-spouses Arturo and the liability of Arias. It held that Arias could not be held solidarily
Laura Supangan entered into a Conditional Deed of Sale whereby liable with petitioner because he merely acted as agent of the latter.
petitioner offered to sell, and respondent-spouses offered to buy, a Moreover, there was no showing that he expressly bound himself to
parcel of land at Naic, Cavite for the sum of P4.7 million. be personally liable or that he exceeded the limits of his authority.
More importantly, there was even no showing that Arias was
After almost seven years from the time of the execution of the authorized to act as agent of petitioner. Anent the award of attorneys
contract and notwithstanding payment of P3.5 million on the part of fees, the CA found the award by the trial court (P50,000.00 plus 20%
respondent-spouses, petitioner still failed to comply with her of the recoverable amount) excessive and thus reduced the same to
obligation as expressly provided in the contract. Hence, in a letter, P100,000.00.
respondent-spouses demanded the return of the amount of P3.5
million within 15 days from receipt of the letter. In reply, petitioner Petitioner moved for reconsideration which was denied in the August
acknowledged receipt of the P3.5 million and promised to return the 31, 2006 Resolution of the CA.
same within 120 days. Respondent-spouses were amenable to the
proposal provided an interest of 12% compounded annually shall be Petitioner’s arguments- Petitioner insists that she is not bound to
imposed on the P3.5 million. pay interest on the P3.5 million because the Conditional Deed of Sale
only provided for the return of the downpayment in case of failure to
When petitioner still failed to return the amount despite demand, comply with her obligations. Petitioner also argues that the award of
respondent-spouses were constrained to file a Complaint for sum of attorney’s fees in favor of the respondent-spouses is unwarranted
money before the RTC of Malabon against herein petitioner as well as because it cannot be said that the latter won over the former since
Roberto U. Arias (Arias) who allegedly acted as petitioner’s agent.

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the CA even sustained her contention that the imposition of 12% forbearance of money, goods or credits. In other cases, it shall be six
interest compounded annually is totally uncalled for. percent (6%). In this case, the parties did not stipulate as to the
applicable rate of interest. The only question remaining therefore is
Respondent-spouses’ arguments- Respondent-spouses aver that whether the 6% as provided under Article 2209 of the Civil Code, or
it is only fair that interest be imposed on the amount they paid 12% under Central Bank Circular No. 416, is due.
considering that petitioner failed to return the amount upon demand
and had been using the P3.5 million for her benefit. Moreover, it is The contract involved in this case is admittedly not a loan but a
undisputed that petitioner failed to perform her obligations to relocate Conditional Deed of Sale. However, the contract provides that the
the house outside the perimeter of the subject property and to seller (petitioner) must return the payment made by the buyer
complete the necessary documents. As regards the attorney’s fees, (respondent-spouses) if the conditions are not fulfilled. There is no
they claim that they are entitled to the same because they were question that they have in fact, not been fulfilled as the seller
forced to litigate when petitioner unjustly withheld the amount. (petitioner) has admitted this. Notwithstanding demand by the buyer
Besides, the amount awarded by the CA is even smaller compared to (respondent-spouses), the seller (petitioner) has failed to return the
the filing fees they paid. money and should be considered in default from the time that
demand was made on September 27, 2000.

Issue Petitioners unwarranted withholding of the money which rightfully


pertains to respondent-spouses amounts to forbearance of money
Whether the imposition of interest and attorney’s fees is proper which can be considered as an involuntary loan. Thus, the applicable
rate of interest is 12% per annum.
Held
Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the Court finds
YES. respondent-spouses entitled to recover attorney’s fees. There is no
doubt that they were forced to litigate to protect their interest, i.e., to
The Court sustains the ruling of both the RTC and the CA that it is recover their money. However, we find the amount of P50,000.00
proper to impose interest notwithstanding the absence of stipulation more appropriate in line with the policy enunciated in Article 2208 of
in the contract. Article 2210 of the Civil Code expressly provides that the Civil Code that the award of attorneys fees must always be
[i]nterest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon reasonable.
damages awarded for breach of contract. In this case, there is no
question that petitioner is legally obligated to return the P3.5 million
because of her failure to fulfill the obligation under the Conditional
Deed of Sale, despite demand. She has in fact admitted that the
conditions were not fulfilled and that she was willing to return the full
amount of P3.5 million but has not actually done so. Petitioner
enjoyed the use of the money from the time it was given to her until
now. Thus, she is already in default of her obligation from the date of
demand, i.e., on September 27, 2000.
Anent the interest rate, the general rule is that the applicable rate of
interest shall be computed in accordance with the stipulation of the
parties. Absent any stipulation, the applicable rate of interest shall be
12% per annum when the obligation arises out of a loan or a

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(7)Dalton vs. FGR Realty and Development Corporation CA: Affirmed RTC Decision.
G.R. No. 172577. January 19, 2011.
By: Radovan Hence, this petition. Dalton claims that the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that she failed to pay rent.
Dalton vs. FGR Realty and Development Corporation
G.R. No. 172577. January 19, 2011 Issue: Whether the claim of Dalton is reviewable?

Doctrine: Factual findings of the lower courts are binding on the Held: NO. Whether Dalton failed to pay rent is a question of fact. It
Court. Exceptions.—The factual findings of the lower courts are is not reviewable.
binding on the Court. The exceptions to this rule are (1) when there The factual findings of the lower courts are binding on the Court. The
is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on exceptions to this rule are:
speculation; (3) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) (1) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a (2) When the findings are grounded on speculation;
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual findings are (3) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken;
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of (4) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a
the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the misapprehension of facts; (5) When the factual findings are
parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts conflicting;
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) (6) When the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case
when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties;
respondent; and (9) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are (7) When the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
evidence on record. Dalton did not show that any of these (8) When the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the
circumstances is present. respondent; and
(9) When the findings of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
Facts: Flora R. Dayrit (Dayrit) owned a 1,811-square meter parcel of absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
land in Cebu City. Petitioner Soledad Dalton (Dalton) and Sasam, et
al. leased portions of the property. In June 1985, Dayrit sold the Dalton did not show that any of these circumstances is
property to respondent FGR Realty and Development Corporation present.
(FGR). In August 1985, Dayrit and FGR stopped accepting rental
payments because they wanted to terminate the lease agreements (8) PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. SPS. ANGELITO PEREZ
with Dalton and Sasam, et al. In a complaint, Dalton and Sasam, et and JOCELYN PEREZ
al. consigned the rental payments with the RTC. They failed to notify By: Kaye
Dayrit and FGR about the consignation. Dayrit and FGR withdrew the
rental payments. In their motions, Dayrit and FGR reserved the right Doctrine: Nevertheless, even with the existence of the remedy of
to question the validity of the consignation. Dayrit, FGR and Sasam, appeal, this Court has, in certain cases, allowed a writ of certiorari
et al. entered into compromise agreements. In the compromise where the order complained of is a patent nullity.
agreements, they agreed to abandon all claims against each other.
Dalton did not enter into a compromise agreement with Dayrit and Facts: Spouses Perez obtained a revolving credit line from PNB’s
FGR. branch in Cauayan City, Isabela. The credit line was secured by
several chattel and real estate. Spouses Perez defaulted on their
RTC: Dismissed the complaint and ordered Dalton to vacate the financial obligations, prompting PNB to institute extra-judicial
property. foreclosure proceedings over the aforementioned securities. The

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sheriff instituted a Notice of Extra-Judicial Sale for the mortgaged PNB filed a Petition for Certiorari (with Prayer for the Issuance of an
properties by public auction. Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction)
before the CA, which granted the prayer for a TRO. Despite the
Spouses Perez filed a Complaint with a Prayer for the Issuance of a issuance of the TRO, Spouses Perez were able to garnish Php
Preliminary Mandatory Injunctive Writ and a Temporary Restraining 2,676,140.70 from PNB’s account with Equitable PCI Bank on the
Order. Spouses Perez and their counsel failed to appear at the same date the TRO was issued.
hearing of the application so the prayer for injunctive relief was
denied. They likewise failed to appear at the pre-trial conference. In view of this development, PNB filed a Supplemental Petition for
Hence, the trial court dismissed the case. Spouses Perez then filed a Certiorari seeking additional reliefs for the return or reinstatement of
Motion for Reconsideration which was subsequently denied. After this, the garnished amount and/or the appointment of a receiver over the
Spouses Perez filed a Notice of Appeal which was denied at first, but said funds to administer and preserve the same pending the final
was subsequently granted. disposition of the case.

Accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial court. The trial CA: Granted the petition of PNB. It ruled that the sending of a notice
court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on March 8, of pre-trial is mandatory and that the Order dated March 8, 2006
2006. PNB, however, failed to receive a copy of the issued by the trial court cannot be considered as such. Therefore, the
aforementioned order and was, thus, unable to attend the CA held that all orders issued subsequent to the said order are,
hearing on March 8, 2006. Questionably, on said date, the trial likewise, null and void. The Decision of the CA, however, failed to
court issued an Order allowing Spouses Perez to adduce address PNB’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandatory
evidence and considered the hearing as a pre-trial conference. injunction and the return/reinstatement of the Php 2,676,140.70.
PNB filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order. The trial Hence, PNB and Spouses Perez filed their separate petitions with this
court decided in favor of Spouses Perez. Court assailing both the decision and the resolution of the CA.

PNB again filed a Motion for Reconsideration but due to certain In their petition, Spouses Perez argue that the filing of a petition for
reasons, the counsel for PNB failed to send a copy of the said motion certiorari by PNB before the CA was improper for two reasons: (a) a
to the trial court. As a result, the trial court denied the Motion for petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal; and (b)
Reconsideration for having been filed outside the reglementary period there were other pending petitions for relief from judgment and a
and concluded that the Decision already became final and executory motion for reconsideration with the lower court.
by operation of law.
Issue: Whether a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy in
PNB filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment/Order of Execution with this case.
a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, alleging
that the failure to file the Motion for Reconsideration was due to Held: YES.
mistake and/or excusable negligence. Afterwards, the trial court
issued an Order denying the prayer for preliminary injunction. Also, The essential requisites for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are:
the trial court issued an Order annulling the certificates of title issued (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer
to PNB covering the properties subject of the case and directed the exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal,
Register of Deeds of Isabela to issue new certificates of title in the board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
names of Spouses Perez. grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.

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notice of pre-trial rendered all subsequent proceedings null and void.


In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. v. The Hence, the CA was correct in not dismissing the petition for certiorari.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the Court discussed the differences
between "excess of jurisdiction", "without jurisdiction" and "grave Moreover, it is a basic tenet that a petition for certiorari under Rule
abuse of discretion", to wit: 65 is an original and independent action. It is not a part or a
continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the
Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of judgment complained of. Neither does it "interrupt the course of the
jurisdiction means that an act, though within the general principal action nor the running of the reglementary periods involved
power of a tribunal, board or officer, is not authorized and in the proceedings, unless an application for a restraining order or a
invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because writ of preliminary injunction to the appellate court is granted."
the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the Evidently, the argument that the petition for certiorari is precluded by
general power in respect of it are wanting. the motion for reconsideration and the petition for relief from
judgment filed before the trial court is untenable.
Without jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power,
right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes,
considered either in general or with reference to a (9) RGM INDUSTRIES, INC. v. UNITED PACIFIC CAPITAL
CORPORATION
particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise
G.R. No. 194781. June 27, 2012.
authority.
By: Apol Samson

Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and


whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
Doctrine: Oft-repeated is the rule that petitions for review under
jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court may be brought only on questions of
in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
law, not on questions of fact.
personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
Facts: At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
the Rules of Court. The respondent is a domestic corporation engaged
contemplation of law.
in the business of lending and financing, it granted a thirty million
peso short-term credit facility in favor of the petitioner. The loan
In Agulto v. Tecson, the SC ruled that an order by the trial court
amount was sourced from individual funders on the basis of a direct-
allowing a party to present his evidence ex-parte without due notice
match facility for which a series of promissory notes were issued by
of pre-trial to the other party constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
the petitioner for the payment of the loan. The petitioner failed to
Here, the trial court failed to issue a proper notice of pre-trial to PNB.
satisfy the said promissory notes as they fell due and the loan had to
Thus, it committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the Order
be assumed in full by the respondent which thereby stepped into the
dated March 8, 2006 allowing Spouses Perez to present their
shoes of the individual funders. Consequently, the petitioner issued in
evidence ex-parte. Considering that the trial court’s action in issuing
favor of the respondent a consolidated promissory note in the
such order constituted grave abuse of its discretion, PNB availed of
principal amount of P27,852,075.98 for a term of fourteen (14) days
the proper remedy when it filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
and maturing on April 28, 1998. The stipulated interest on the
consolidated promissory note was 32% per annum. In case of
Nevertheless, even with the existence of the remedy of appeal, this
default, a penalty charge was imposed in an amount equivalent to
Court has, in certain cases, allowed a writ of certiorari where the
8% per month of the outstanding amount due and unpaid computed
order complained of is a patent nullity. In the instant case, the lack of
from the date of default. The petitioner failed to satisfy the

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consolidated promissory note, the principal balance of which as of must consider the circumstances of each case. What may be
April 28, 1998 was P27,668,167.87. Respondent thus sent demand iniquitous and unconscionable in one case, may be just in another.
letters to the petitioner but the latter failed to pay and instead asked
for restructuring of the loan. The respondent declined the request and We cannot uphold the petitioner's invocation of our ruling in DBP v.
filed the herein complaint for collection of sum of money against the Court of Appeals, wherein the interest rate imposed was reduced to
petitioner. The petitioner asserted that the respondent unilaterally 10% per annum. The overriding circumstance prompting such
imposed the increased interest rates in violation of the principle of pronouncement was the regular payments made by the borrower.
mutuality of contracts. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. On Evidently, such fact is wanting in the case at bar, hence, the
appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment but modified the interest petitioner cannot demand for a similar interest rate. The
rates and penalty charges imposed. The CA held that the interest circumstances attendant herein are similar to those in Trade &
rates levied by the respondent were excessive and unconscionable Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Roblett
hence, must be reduced to 12% per annum. The CA likewise lowered Industrial Construction Corporation wherein we levied the legal
the penalty charges to 2% per month. Its motion for reconsideration interest rate of 12% per annum. However, pursuant to Bank of the
of the foregoing issuance having been denied, the petitioner Philippine Islands, Inc. v. Yu, we deem it proper to further reduce the
interposed the present petition arguing that the modified interest penalty charge decreed by the CA from 2% per month to 1% per
rates and penalty charges decreed by the CA are still exorbitant and month or 12% per annum in view of the following factors: (1)
that the CA failed to appreciate the partial payments already made respondent has already received P7,504,522.27 in penalty charges,
when it upheld the amount of P27,668,167.87 as petitioner's and (2) the loan extended to respondent was a short-term credit
outstanding balance. facility. The penalty charge is reduced to 1% per month or 12% per
annum; and the attorney's fees is reduced to 1% of the total unpaid
Issue: Whether or not petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules obligation.
of Court may be brought only on questions of law, not on questions of
fact.
(10) Sarona v NLRC
Held: YES! The issue on partial payments and their application to the G.R. No. 185280. January 18, 2012.
outstanding balance involves a calibration of the evidence presented, Roma
hence, factual in nature and not reviewable in the petition at bar. Oft-
repeated is the rule that petitions for review under Rule 45 of the DOCTRINE: A Rule 45 Petition should be confined to questions of
Rules of Court may be brought only on questions of law, not on law. Nevertheless, this Court has the power to resolve a question of
questions of fact. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the courts a fact, such as whether a corporation is a mere alter ego of another
quo, in concluding the outstanding balance of the petitioner, have entity or whether the corporate fiction was invoked for fraudulent or
both carefully considered and appreciated the evidence of partial malevolent ends, if the findings in assailed decision is not supported
payments adduced. As found by the CA, the payments made by the by the evidence on record or based on a misapprehension of facts.
petitioner before the complaint was filed were duly deducted from the
outstanding balance; while the payments made during the pendency FACTS:
of the case were applied to the due and outstanding penalty charges. Sarona was a security guard of Spectre. He was later made to sign a
resignation letter to terminate his services therein and to sign an
We affirm the interest rate decreed by the CA, stipulated interest application for employment for respondent Royale Security Agency.
rates are illegal if they are unconscionable and courts are allowed to He was made to work for some of its clients but later was told by the
temper interest rates when necessary. In exercising this vested GM of Spectre that he will not anymore be given assignments. He
power to determine what is iniquitous and unconscionable, the Court filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and LA Gutierrez ruled ruled that
he was illegally dismissed. However, the LA refused to apply the

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doctrine of piercing the corporate veil as alleged by Sarona. The LA down the findings of the CA and those of the labor tribunals if there is
reasoned that the mere fact that Spectre and Royale has the same a showing that they are unsupported by the evidence on record or
officers and use the same office cannot justify the doctrine’s there was a patent misappreciation of facts.
application, since Spectre is a sole proprietorship. The LA said that
the claim of Sarona should be against the estate of its sole owner, Evidence abound showing that Royale is a mere continuation or
since he already died. successor of Sceptre and fraudulent objectives are behind Royale’s
incorporation and the petitioner’s subsequent employment therein.
The respondents appealed LA Gutierrez’s decision to the NLRC, The management and operation of Spectre and Royale was under the
claiming that the finding of illegal dismissal was attended with grave control of one person: Aida. She took over as soon as the license to
abuse of discretion. This appeal was, however, operate was transferred to Royale. The manner by which the
dismissed by the NLRC. The petitioner, on the other hand, did not petitioner was made to resign from Sceptre and how he became an
appeal LA Gutierrez’s decision but opted to raise the validity of LA employee of Royale suggest the perverted use of the legal fiction of
Gutierrez’s adverse findings with respect to piercing Royale’s the separate corporate personality. It is undisputed that the
corporate personality and computation of his separation pay in his petitioner tendered his resignation and that he applied at Royale at
Reply to the respondents’ Memorandum of Appeal. (Sarona wants the the instance of Spectre and on the impression it created that these
doctrine to apply so the separation pay will be computed to include were necessary for his continued employment. That the petitioner
his services in Spectre). However, as the filing of an appeal is the was made to resign from Sceptre and apply with Royale only to be
prescribed remedy and no aspect of the decision can be overturned unceremoniously terminated shortly thereafter leads to the
by a mere reply, the NLRC dismissed the petitioner’s efforts to ineluctable conclusion that there was intent to violate the petitioner’s
reverse LA Gutierrez’s disposition of these issues. Effectively, the rights as an employee, particularly his right to security of tenure. For
petitioner had already waived his right to question LA Gutierrez’s the piercing doctrine to apply, it is of no consequence if Sceptre is a
Decision when he failed to file an appeal within the reglementary sole proprietorship because it is the act of hiding behind the separate
period. and distinct personalities of juridical entities to perpetuate fraud,
commit illegal acts, evade one’s obligations that the equitable
Sarona then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to the CA, piercing doctrine was formulated to address and prevent.
which recognized the petition. The CA said that errors not assigned
on appeal may be reviewed as technicalities should not serve as bar (11) Spouses Sta. Maria vs. Court of Appeals and Spouses
to the full adjudication of cases. However, the CA refused as well to Fajardo
apply the doctrine of corporate veil. Sarona filed this instant Petition GR 127549, January 28, 1998
for Review under Rule 45. Digest by Valencia, Emmanuelle Nicole

ISSUE: WON the SC may review questions of fact in a Rule 45 Doctrine:


petition for review Rule is settled that the jurisdiction of the Court in cases
brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules
HELD: The question of whether one corporation is merely an alter of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law.
ego of another is purely one of fact. So is the question of whether a Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive,
corporation is a paper company, a sham or subterfuge. As a general except in certain instances (see “Notes” at the end of the digest for
rule, this Court is not a trier of facts and a petition for review on the enumeration).
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must exclusively raise
questions of law. Nevertheless, this Court will not hesitate to deviate Facts:
from what are clearly procedural guidelines and disturb and strike Spouses Fajardo are the registered owners of a parcel of
land in Paco, Obando, Bulacan, Lot No. 124. They acquired the lot

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under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 6 February 1992, executed by Fajardo would cause them great damage and inconvenience, and that
the vendors, Pedro Sanchez, et. al. there is another access route from Lot 124 to the main road, through
Lot No. 124 is surrounded by: the property of Florentino Cruz, which also abutted the main road,
Northeast portion - Lot 1 (a fishpond); and was being offered for sale.
Southeast portion - Lot 126 (owned by Florentino The trial court ordered an ocular inspection, and found that
Cruz); there was no other way through which the Spouses Fajardo could
Southwest portion - Lots 6-a and 6-b (owned by establish a right of way in order to reach the provincial road, other
Spouses Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria, respectively); and than directly traversing the land of the Sta. Marias. It also found that
Northwest portion - Lot 122 (owned by Jacinto there were no significant structures that would be affected, there was
family). sufficient vacant space between the houses, and that the property
On 17 February 1992, Spouses Fajardo filed a complaint would provide the shortest route from Lot 124 to the provincial road.
against Spouses Sta. Maria or Florcerfida Sta. Maria for the Consequently, on 30 June 1994, the prayer for easement was
establishment of an easement of right of way. Spouses Fajardo granted.
claimed that their lot, Lot 124, is surrounded by properties belonging The Sta. Marias appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
to other persons, including those of the Sta. Marias; since Spouses agreed with the trial court. On 18 December 1996, the Court of
Fajardo have no adequate outlet to the provincial road, an easement Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
of right of way passing through either of the alternative parties’
properties, which are directly abutting the provincial road, would be Issues:
Spouses Fajardo’s only convenient, direct and shortest access to and (1) Can the Supreme Court resolve questions of fact in a case
from the said road. It was also claimed that the predecessors in brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules
interest of the Spouses Fajardo had been passing through these of Court?
properties in their ingress and egress from Lot 124, and that the
mother of the Sta. Marias had promised Spouses Fajardo’s (2) Was the decision in granting the easement of right of way
predecessors in interest to grant an easement of right of way, since correct?
there was no access to the road from Lot 124. Spouses Fajardo
claimed that the Sta. Marias did not grant them an easement, despite Ruling / Ratio:
request and referral of the dispute to barangay officials. (1) NO.
The Sta. Marias filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive,
the lower court lacked jurisdiction, since the Fajardos had failed to except in certain instances. (Please see “notes” section below for the
refer the matter to the barangay lupon. enumeration).
On 18 May 1992, the lower court denied the motion on the A perusal of the pleadings of the assailed decision yields no
premise of substantial compliance. On 25 May 1992, the Sta. Marias ground for the application of any of the exceptions.
filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. On 24 June 1992, the lower court denied the notice of (2) YES.
appeal for lack of merit. The Sta. Marias filed a petition for review on The findings of fact of both courts satisfied the requirements
certiorari of the 18 May order. for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way:
On 8 July 1992, the third division of the Supreme Court 1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other
denied the petition for failure to comply with the requirements. On 20 immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art.
July 1992, the motion for reconsideration was denied with finality. 649, par. 1);
The Sta. Marias then filed their answer in the lower court, 2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649,
where they alleged that granting an easement in favour of Spouses par. 1);

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3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor both questions of fact and questions of law; while an appeal from the
of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and decision of the Regional Trial Court, raising purely questions of law
4. the right of way claimed is at the point least must, in all cases, be taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for
prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest (Art. 650). F: Respondent, Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, is the
Among the three (3) possible servient estates, it is clear that owner of a parcel of land known as Lot 5-B-2 with an area of 70,278
the Sta. Marias’ property would afford the shortest distance from square meters in Pasig City. Upon the request of the DPWH,
Spouses Fajardo’s property to the provincial road. Moreover, it is the respondent Ortigas caused the segregation of its property into five
least prejudicial since as found by the lower court. lots and reserved one portion for road widening for the C-5 flyover
project. It designated Lot 5-B-2-A, a 1,445-square-meter portion of
Notes: its property, for the road widening of Ortigas Avenue.
Findings of fact in cases brought before the Supreme Court from the
Court of Appeals via R45 are conclusive, except: The C-5-Ortigas Avenue flyover was completed in 1999, utilizing only
1. when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, 396 square meters of the 1,445-square-meter allotment for the
surmises, or conjectures; project. Consequently, respondent Ortigas further subdivided Lot 5-B-
2. when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or 2-A into two lots: Lot 5-B-2-A-1, which was the portion actually used
impossible; for road widening and Lot 5-B-2-A-2, which was the unutilized portion
3. when there is grave abuse of discretion; of Lot 5-B-2-A.
4. when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. when the findings of fact are conflicting; On 14 February 2001, respondent Ortigas filed with the RTC of Pasig
6. when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went a petition for authority to sell to the government Lot 5-B-2-A-1.
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to Respondent Ortigas alleged that the DPWH requested the conveyance
the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; of the property for road widening purposes. On 11 June 2001, the
7. when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; RTC issued an order authorizing the sale of Lot 5-B-2-A-1 to
8. when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific petitioner Republic of the Philippines. A motion for reconsideration
evidence on which they are based; was filed, but the same was denied.
9. when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a notice of appeal, but the
respondent; and Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground that an order or
10. when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed judgment denying a motion for reconsideration is not appealable. A
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on motion for reconsideration was filed, but the same was denied on the
record. ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals noted that even if
the order denying the motion for reconsideration was appealable, the
appeal was still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction, because petitioner
(12) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Republic of the Philippines raised only a question of law.
DPWH v. ORTIGAS AND COMPANY
By: Valencia, Mary Clydeen L. I: Did the Office of the Solicitor General commit a fatal mistake when
it brought by way of appeal the denial of its motion for
DOCTRINE: An appeal by notice of appeal from the decision of the reconsideration before the Court of Appeals?
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction to the
Court of Appeals is proper if the appellant raises questions of fact or

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H: YES. Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that matter," leaving the court with nothing else to do but to execute the
appeals taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals decision. Thus, an appeal from an order denying a motion for
raising only pure questions of law are not reviewable by the Court of reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is effectively
Appeals. In which case, the appeal shall not be transferred to the an appeal of the order of dismissal itself." It is an appeal from a final
appropriate court. It shall be dismissed outright. Thus, an appeal by decision or order.
notice of appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals is proper if The RTC order denying petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ motion
the appellant raises questions of fact or both questions of fact and for reconsideration of the decision granting respondent Ortigas the
questions of law; while an appeal from the decision of the Regional authority to sell its property to the government was not an
Trial Court, raising purely questions of law must, in all cases, be interlocutory order, because it completely disposed of a particular
taken to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari in matter. An appeal from it would not cause delay in the administration
accordance with Rule 45. of justice. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ appeal to the Court of
Appeals, however, was properly dismissed because the former used
There is a question of law when the appellant raises an issue as to the wrong mode of appeal.
what law shall be applied on a given set of facts. Questions of law do
"not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence In any event, the Supreme Court resolved the substantive issue on
presented." Its resolution rests solely on the application of a law whether respondent Ortigas may not sell and may only donate its
given the circumstances. There is a question of fact when the court is property to the government in accordance with Section 50 of PD
required to examine the truth or falsity of the facts presented. A 1529.
question of fact "invites a review of the evidence."
Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 does not apply in a case
The sole issue raised by petitioner Republic of the Philippines to the that is the proper subject of an expropriation proceeding. Thus,
Court of Appeals is whether respondent Ortigas’ property should be respondent Ortigas may sell its property to the government. It must
conveyed to it only by donation, in accordance with Section 50 of PD be compensated, because its property was taken and utilized for
1529. This question involves the interpretation and application of the public road purposes.
provision. It does not require the Court of Appeals to examine the
truth or falsity of the facts presented. Neither does it invite a review
of the evidence. The issue raised before the Court of Appeals was, (13) Altres v. Empleo
therefore, a question purely of law. The proper mode of appeal is G.R. No. 180986. December 10, 2008
through a petition for review under Rule 45. Hence, the Court of By: Alba, Ma. Angela
Appeals did not err in dismissing the appeal on this ground.
Doctrine: When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of
Nevertheless, Rule 41, Section 1(a) of the Rules of Court, which whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of
provides that "[n]o appeal may be taken from [a]n order denying a x law.
x x motion for reconsideration," is based on the implied premise in
the same section that the judgment or order does not completely Facts: Sometime in July 2003, the city government of Iligan City
dispose of the case. publicly announced the existence of the vacant career positions in the
city government. Mayor Quijano issued appointments to petitioners.
Orders denying motions for reconsideration are not always Petitioners and other applicants submitted their applications for the
interlocutory orders. A motion for reconsideration may be considered different positions. Toward the end of his term or on May 27, June 1,
a final decision, subject to an appeal, if "it puts an end to a particular and June 24, 2004, Mayor Quijano issued appointments to
petitioners.

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reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition for review on


The Sangguniang Panglungsod then issued two resolutions. The first certiorari.
was addressed to the CSC suspension of action on the processing of
appointments to all vacant positions in the plantilla of the city Respondents argue that petitioners raise questions of fact which are
government until the enactment of a new budget while the second not proper in a petition for review on certiorari as the same must
was directed the officers of the City Human Resource Management raise only questions of law. They entertain doubt on whether
Office to hold in abeyance the transmission of all appointments petitioners seek the payment of their salaries, and assert that the
signed or to be signed by the incumbent mayor in order to ascertain question of whether the city accountant can be compelled to issue a
whether these had been hurriedly prepared or carefully considered certification of availability of funds under the circumstances herein
and whether the matters of promotion and/or qualifications had been obtaining is a factual issue.
properly addressed in view of the Sanggunian’s stated policy against
“midnight appointments.” (Just in case itanong din ni sir…

Respondent city accountant Empleo did not thus issue a certification The lone issue in the present petition is whether it is Sec. 474(b) (4)
as to availability of funds for the payment of salaries and wages of or Sec. 344 of the Local Government Code which applies to the
petitioners, as required by a CSC Memorandum Circular, and the requirement of certification of availability of funds. Respondents
other respondents did not sign petitioners’ position description forms assail as defective the verification and certification against forum
pursuant to the two resolutions. shopping attached to the petition as it bears the signature of only 11
out of the 59 petitioners, and no competent evidence of identity was
The CSC Field Office disapproved the appointments issued to presented by the signing petitioners. In the present case, the signing
petitioners invariably due to lack of certification of availability of of the verification by only 11 out of the 59 petitioners already
funds. On appeal, the CSC Regional Office dismissed the appeal, sufficiently assures the Court that the allegations in the pleading are
explaining that its function in approving appointments is only true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
ministerial, hence, if an appointment lacks a requirement prescribed speculation; that the pleading is filed in good faith; and that the
by the civil service law, rules and regulations, it would disapprove it signatories are unquestionably real parties-in-interest who
without delving into the reasons why the requirement was not undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the
complied with. truth of the allegations in the petition.

Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC against With respect to petitioners’ certification against forum shopping, the
respondent Empleo or his successor in office for him to issue a failure of the other petitioners to sign as they could no longer be
certification of availability of funds for the payment of the salaries contacted or are no longer interested in pursuing the case need not
and wages of petitioners, and for his co-respondents or their merit the outright dismissal of the petition without defeating the
successors in office to sign the position description forms. The RTC administration of justice. The non-signing petitioners are, however,
denied petitioners’ petition for mandamus, holding that, while it is the dropped as parties to the case.)
ministerial duty of the city accountant to certify as to the availability
of budgetary allotment to which expenses and obligations may
properly be charged under Sec. 474(b)(4) the Local Government Issue: Whether the issue raised by petitioners involves a question of
Code, the city accountant cannot be compelled to issue a certification fact, which is not proper in a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari.
as to availability of funds for the payment of salaries and wages of
petitioners as this ministerial function pertains to the city treasurer Held: No. The issue raised by petitioner involves a pure question of
pursuant to Sec. 344 of the same Code.Petitioners’ motion for law and thus, Rule 45 is the proper remedy.

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(15) Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals


A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the G.R. No. 116216. June 20, 1997
correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or By: Bernardo, Gerard
when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being Doctrine: That an entry of judgment was effected by the Court of
admitted. A question of fact, on the other hand, exists when the Appeals indicates that there was no valid service upon the public
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or respondent of the motion for extension of time to file a petition for
when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering review. This is consistent with the presumption of regularity in the
mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevance of performance of duties by public officers and offices.
specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each
other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation. When Facts: Natalia Mendoza and her husband signed a promissory note
there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether the conclusion dated July 10, 1978, for US$35,000.00 in favor of Thomas and Nena
drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law. Asuncion. The promissory note contains that the Mendozas will pay
the Asuncions the amount of $456.00 each month starting on April,
In the case at bar, the issue posed for resolution does not call for the 1978 and 120 consecutive months, thereafter. On April 1988, the
reevaluation of the probative value of the evidence presented, but entire balance of principal and accrued interest then remaining unpaid
rather the determination of which of the provisions of the Local shall be due and payable. Should default be made in the payment of
Government Code applies to the Civil Service Memorandum Circular the interest and principal when due, the entire balance of principal
requiring a certificate of availability of funds relative to the approval and interest then remaining unpaid shall become immediately due at
of petitioners’ appointments. the option of the holder of this note.

(14) Alonso vs. Cebu Country Club Inc, In 1982, the Mendozas defaulted.
By: Arid
The Asuncions filed a case for collection. After due trial, the trial court
rendered its decision dated November 12, 1985, dismissing the case
for lack of cause of action.

The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC, holding that the acceleration
clause gave private respondents the right to collect the full amount of
the promissory note.

The Mendozas filed a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of


the Court of Appeals. One of the contention of the The Asuncions is
that the petition cannot be given due course at all considering
that the decision sought to be reviewed is already final,
Respondent Court of Appeals having made an ‘Entry of
Judgment’ in C.A. G.R. No. CV-18016.

Issue: Whether or not the Mendozas may file for a petition for review
on certiorari.

Held: No.

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Not disputed or denied by petitioner is the fact that there was no


valid service upon Respondent Court of Appeals of the motion for
extension of time to file the present petition. Although the motion
for extension carried a registry receipt purportedly sent to
Respondent Court of Appeals, the affidavit of service attached
thereto did not state whether the service was effected by
personal delivery, ordinary or registered mail. That an entry of
judgment was effected by the Court of Appeals, on the other
hand, indicates that there was no valid service upon the public
respondent of the motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review and that, consequently, the CA Decision
has become final.

This is consistent with the presumption of regularity in the


performance of duties by public officers and offices. For this reason
alone, the dismissal of this petition is already in order.

Issue outside of procedure: Whether or not the Asuncions may


invoke the acceleration clause.

Yes. Petitioner contends that upon default of the payment, she can
invoke the second statement in the promissory note which makes the
obligation’s maturity date on April 1988.

The second statement provides for the discretionary exercise of


leniency by private respondents. However, a definite deadline is
fixed—April 1988—when all obligations then unpaid shall become due
and payable. The third statement is solely for the benefit of the
private respondents if ever they choose to accelerate the total
amount of the obligations upon default in the payment of any of the
installments. In short, the creditors are given by the promissory note
two options in case of default by the debtor: one, to wait for April
1988 before collecting the unpaid installments; and two, to invoke
the acceleration clause and collect the entire balance immediately
without waiting for April 1988.

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